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max { r t , 0 }d t
(2)
This can be still seen as a risk free margin and can be used to determine the economic value of
deposits. In the experiments section we will see that due to these very narrow margins, the
economic value of deposits is negative using a standard margin and in case we adopt the floor at
zero for market rates, we get a positive value but still approximately close to zero considering the
D0
initial value of deposit
.
While to recover the risk-free economic value we correctly assume that a bank invests its liabilities
from deposits into a risk-free rate with a very short term for liquidity needs so to face clients
withdrawals and interest payments, it is clear that such negative interest rates will lead the bank to
take over more risky behaviours in creating its replicating investment strategy. In the real world in
fact, a financial institution usually invests part of its funds into products bearing longer term rates.
Now, in order to model more realistic (but not risk-free) margins, we can build diverse stochastic
OIS 1M
1.5
1
%Rate
0.5
0
-0.5
Overnight indexed swap time series. The interest rate started falling below zero from 2014.
processes
(r i ( t ) , d ( t ) )
which represent in fact the net interest rate margin and depend on one or
more market rate and on the deposit rate. Bear in mind that the solutions proposed in the following
paragraph are not risk-free and hence not deemed to represent the economic value of deposits but
rather represent a more realistic projection of future cash flows.
2.1.2 Investment strategies against negative margins
As it has been already said, the bank normally looks for investment opportunities on a longer time
horizon which bears a higher interest rate, along with the short rate investment for liquidity
management. Hence, for each time step, our (simplified) asset portfolio will consist in a mix
r
between the short rate t and the longer term instrument yielding R(t , ) :
(3)
=a r t +(1a) Rt d t
Where a
represents the portion invested in the short term that will be rolled over in each period
(1a)
(t , )
disposal; in case of shortage of liquidity we will have to close some of the positions in the longer
maturity investment, selling the instruments before maturity at a discount.
term rate, we can instead ask to a third party for a tailored product which allows us to have at worst
a zero return. In particular, we want to be insured against periods where the short term rate is
smaller than our deposit rate, which consists in flooring our NIM at zero. This way, the hedged
margin will be:
=max {{r t d t ; 0 }
(4)
Again, as we postulated at the beginning, in case the bank can keep its money cash instead of
r
investing in a negative t , the final margin will be:
(5)
max { r t , 0 }d t + max {d t r t ; 0 }
Notice that this approach ensures to have a non negative return also for positive interest rate
scenarios, as long as the interest margin is negative.
A theoretical insurer would pay the bank the spread only in case the deposit rate is higher than the
short term market interest. In order to have an exact hedge against negative income, the notional of
Dt
such product should be the deposit volume for that period
, so that the bank can exactly
replicate the floored margin. Then, the fair value or price for this theoretical insurance product with
maturity T, should be:
This can be seen as the value of and exotic swap contract receiving
dt
and paying
rt
only if
the deposit rate is higher than the market rate. Notice also that the margin paid by the insurer is in
fact the difference between the insured and non insured margins (which is, (5) minus (2)) and in
turn the value of the insurance product, assuming we can perfectly hedge with a stochastic notional
Dt
, can be seen as the difference between the insured value and the economic value of deposits.
If we are not able to request a stochastic swap notional it will be necessary to derive concrete
estimates of future values of deposits: this establishes another reason to build a thorough model for
deposit dynamics (which will be discussed later in chapter 3).
Another approach for hedging against adverse interest rate scenarios consists in changing the
deposit rate policy so to obtain non-negative spreads. This way we would not need to buy any
insurance product; however, lowering deposit rates will have a negative impact on our deposit
dynamics, as investors will have less incentives to keep their money in the deposit account.
Assuming we have full flexibility in changing the deposit rate and assuming that our target solely
consists in generating no negative margin (which is, we do not care if the deposit volume is
negatively affected by our new policies), we can think of exactly replicating the operator in (4)
without any need of buying an insurance product. The importance of discretionary deposit rate
policy function is further discussed in 3.1 and in the empirical section. As a final remark, we remind
that all of the alternatives proposed for the modelling of the interest rate spread can accommodate
limitation on deposit rates: in fact, in case the legal framework does not allow to set negative
interests for retail deposits (this is the case for example of Italy), we would simply use a max
dt
operator on
so to floor it at zero. However, in such a situation, it would be more appropriate to
model the floor at zero directly inside the deposit rate policy function (see paragraph 3.1) so that
negative values are not generated at all, neither in the margin nor inside the relationship built for
deposit volume dynamics.
In this scenario of very tight margins, it is clear that it is not possible anymore for banks to profit
from market segmentation (invoked by [Jarrow]) and set deposit rates below the market interest so
to make risk-free profits. Instead, it is more likely that these financial institution will exploit the
maturity transformation (in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig model (1983)) as modelled for
example in equation (3), such that very short term liabilities (i.e. demand deposits) will be invested
into longer term assets which bear a positive rate of return. Now, if we take a look at the OIS (riskfree) term structure, we can see that the interest on overnight indexed swap is negative up to 7
years, meaning that a bank will have to invest in very long term maturities to get a positive return,
increasing however its liquidity exposure and in turn potentially enhancing the fears of a bank run.
The alternative would be to look for higher return assets (possibly short term, matching liquidity
needs) which instead bear a higher credit risk. Clearly, the overall result is that the bank has more
incentives to take more risky behaviours both in terms of credit and liquidity risk which translate in
disincentives for clients to keep their money invested in deposits as they would not perceive them as
safe as before. We will see in the next chapter that this argument leads us to take into account the
default risk (by means of credit default swaps quotes) of the depositary institution inside the model
for the behaviour of customers.
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
d r t=k (t) [ ( t )r t ] dt + ( t ) dW ( t )
When , ,
are constant, the model reduces to Vasicek. When only is function of time we
and
are functions of
we usually refer to
Extended Vasicek. This class allows for negative rates and usually grants a good fit of observed
term structure. In case of a margin including more than one interest rate (like eq. (3)), we need a
curve for each of them: this can be done by building explicitly different correlated stochastic
processes or by modelling the basis between the two rates we are considering. Multiple curves and
OIS-Libor modelling examples can be found in ([Castagna Cova],[mercurio], [Moreni Pallavicini]).
In paragraph 3.3, we will see that choosing the right model for interest rate behaviour is not trivial
and more complex methodologies can be implemented especially to overcome the issue of historical
and risk-neutral calibration.