The original aim of this dissertation was to take the critical method

of the historian learnt for the MA in Historical Research and see if there
was any comparison with - if it existed - the critical attitude of the political
and military consumers of air intelligence on the Luftwaffe. In other
words, it was to investigate how they interpreted these reports in terms of
intelligence matters, i.e., what these reports meant; what problems they
believed they faced when reading them; how they accounted for these
problems, and how they attempted to overcome them. When consulting the
relevant documentation in the Public Record Office (PRO) the thesis had
to change its emphasis to a strategy of indirect analysis. Why?

The Archival Nature of Intelligence Files in the PRO

(a) Closed Files and Papers
Many records of the intelligence services (the secret and, to a lesser
extent, the military) from the pre-war era are - in 1993 - still not released
for consultation by the public. It is difficult to assess with any degree of
accuracy how many papers from files, and how many files themselves,
have been withheld. In some files there are weeders cards to indicate
that papers have been retained by departments for up to 75 years,1 but
many papers have disappeared (i.e. have been wilfully destroyed) from
the files before they were released into the hands of the weeders. This
can be adduced by comparing the remarks on papers in the minute sheets
with the actual contents of the files themselves.2 Many became part of
department archives under special arrangements. The Green List, an index
containing details of papers that were held by the Foreign Office, offers a
1 D. Dilks, Flashes of Intelligence: The Foreign Office, the SIS and Security

before the Second World War, in The Missing Dimension: Governments and
Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century by C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds.),
(Basingstoke, 1984), p.102; See Appendix A for a copy of a weeders card from
CAB 56/3 (the Joint Intelligence sub-Committee).
2 See the various files of AIR 40 the Air Intelligence Directorate; Dilks,
Flashes of Intelligence, p.104

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guide as to the extent of papers retained, though the exact proportion of

released files and papers to those kept behind has to be one of guess-work.
In many of the PRO indexes, e.g. WO 190, there are sheets telling the
researcher that files xxx to xxxx are closed for 75 years so that he or she
may know that a certain number of files are retained. Unfortunately they
do not indicate, above and beyond the class description of the index, the
general contents of these files, nor the amount of papers in them. But, as
David Dilks points out, many of the files believed to be withheld probably
do not exist, not because they have been destroyed, but because much
discussion of intelligence matters was probably conducted during private
conversations.3 However, those that are open present problems all of
their own for the researcher wishing to assess the critical attitude of British
intelligence.

(b) Open Files and Papers

The main problem that hampers the historian is the lack of access to
the original reports obtained and submitted by field agents, military and air
attaches. In many cases the dispatches of the military and air attaches are
open to historians, but they have no way of knowing whether the
dispatches were summaries made from mental notes of observations and
conversations, or whether they were summarised with the raw material
close at hand. Therefore, we cannot be sure how much of the report was a
faithful summary of the original information, and how much was filtered
through the subjective interpretations of the assessor. We also do not
know how much was tidied up by removing elements of the reports
which did not fit into place.
The historian is also not told by the documentation about the
specific intelligence gathering operations of the SIS, the GC&CS, the

3 Dilks, Flashes of Intelligence, p.102

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names of individual SIS officers or agents, nor the names of foreign

individuals recruited since Care was taken not to give away tricks on
file.4 As the historian does not know what these tricks were - except in
the most general sense (see below p.6) - it is difficult to determine how
efficient these tricks were. Therefore, any analysis of British
Intelligences critical attitude in this area of intelligence has to be another
guess.
The task of the historian is further constrained by the fact that
he/she does not know whether those who were entitled to receive
intelligence (on an intra- and inter-departmental basis) had access to the
originals or to the summaries. He/she also does not know the frequency
with which they received them. Historians can only make informed
guesses through comments on what minute sheets exist. Many WO 190
files consulted for this dissertation had no minute sheets attached, which
hampered any investigation into attitudes to intelligence by an analysis of
the distribution of who could see them. Historians also have to make
guesses about the possible incorporation of intelligence into papers
produced by individuals, departments, and committees that were
(nominally) entitled to have such source material, though many papers
produced contain references only to the previous paper issued on the
subject discussed. Historians are hampered in some respects by the fact
that there was no central machinery for the collection, collation and
analysis of intelligence in this period despite the attempts to set-up such an
organisation in the inter-war period.5 The minutes of committee meetings,
such as the CID, which utilised reports based upon intelligence, offer
some, if meagre, palliative relief.

4 Ibid.
5 F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its

Influence on Strategy and Operations: Volume I (London, 1979), pp.5, 35-43

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However, this situation is not as difficult as its first seems. As stated

before, after weeding there are few intelligence reports left for the
historian to use. When one considers how understaffed and underfunded
British secret and military intelligence really was in the 1930s,6 the level of
activity was probably not as great as the researcher with no experience of
intelligence papers believes before embarking on research. Therefore, the
gaps in papers and files are not the yawning chasm that they sometimes
appear, especially when one remembers that German secrecy on
rearmament made the acquisition of intelligence even more difficult.

A Methodological Solution
(a) In Theory
Therefore, as most files that are locked away were written under the
auspices of the SIS, the historian, in his attempt to assess the quality and
examination of British military intelligence on the Luftwaffe, has little
choice but to resort to the strategy of indirect analysis. This comprises two
approaches.
Firstly, the historian can use the various Air Ministry files on the
Luftwaffe.7 These were released in 1972, with the other service
intelligence records, under the Thirty Year Rule and were done so
because they were almost wholly compiled by non-secret (SIS) means, and
are far less weeded. Christopher Andrew has pointed out that there
remains doubt as to the interpretation of the Thirty Year Rule. Some
files have been weeded - in particular those of the AID,8 and many are
still retained, especially those of the Admiralty. However, there should be

6 W.K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy, pp.11, 21; W. Laqueur, World of Secrets,

p.205
7 AIR 2/1353 - AIR 2/1356; AIR 40/2101- AIR40/2102
8 C. Andrew, Whitehall, Washington and the Intelligence Services,

International Affairs (iii), Volume 53, 1977, note 20, p.399

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enough for a dissertation on intelligence, both on the reports themselves

and on the attitude towards method.9
Secondly, the historian can resort to an analysis of reports, papers,
meetings, and minutes of those committees that had access to intelligence
reports, or to papers based on such sources.10 These include the CID,
DRC, JIC, the Cabinet, and its various committees. The papers of, and
those presented to, these committees should, not only offer evidence of a
wide circulation of intelligence outside the military services, but also
opinions towards intelligence which are in themselves useful, for not only
assessing attitudes per se, but for any comparison between those of the
military leadership and those of the civilian decision-makers.

A Methodological Solution
(b) In Practice
Using the aforementioned solution, it was relatively easy to find
documentation on the Luftwaffe. However, the documentation was not
adequate enough for the original aims of the dissertation. To put it simply,
there was a very noticeable lack of almost any consideration of intelligence
at both civilian and military level. The AID-IIC papers presented to the
CID are a case in point. The assessments by the IIC ... were almost
always approved by the CID without discussion of matters of
substance.11 When discussion did occur it was concerned with
information received since the paper's compilation on the increasing
expansion of the German aircraft industry.

9 For reports, vide supra, note 6; for method, AID and Treasury

correspondence, AIR 2/1688, and AID comments AIR 40 ibid.

10 See CID minutes and memoranda, CAB 2/6 -CAB 2/8 and CAB 4/22 -CAB
4/26 respectively; Cabinet minutes and memoranda, CAB 23 and CAB 24 respectively;
DRC, CAB 16/109 -CAB 16/111
11 Hinsley, British Intelligence, p.33

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Even those full minutes of the Cabinet and its committees are only
compressed, and sometimes decorous, records of long conversations. They
leave the impression of coherence, clear decision, and intellectual discipline.12

It cannot be divined with any certainty that any statement in these

minutes were of short, or long duration, or how long the discussion of
matters lasted.13 Needless to say, intelligence matters received scant
consideration. This is also the case with Air Ministry papers, particularly
those on the strategic orientation of the Luftwaffe. Even the FO, which was
the sharpest critic of the Air Ministry, never criticised it on the basis of
intelligence sources. Criticism concerned itself only with the estimated
level of the Luftwaffes front-line strength. The JIC appears to have been
the only body which was fully aware of intelligence. There is some
evidence of a critical attitude and method. Unfortunately, it only occurs
three times: in the Air Ministrys interrogation of X (a covert informant)
during early 1936; in Air Ministry-Treasury correspondence in 1937; and
in an IIC letter in 1938. However, despite these episodes, the overall
documentary picture is one of a non-critical approach. It could be argued,
as the Official History of British Intelligence does, that this non-critical
frame of mind arose because it was the application of overt information
and common sense to strategic and political assessments14 that identified
Germany as the threat to British security. Intelligence was mobilised after
this assumption was made, prompting the conclusion that its aim was to
collect information which confirmed this picture.
In the light of all the problems discussed in this chapter, it has been
possible to reconstruct a picture of Britains intelligence on the Luftwaffe.
It was possible, to a very limited degree, to directly investigate attitudes

12 D. Dilks, The Unnecessary War? Military Advice and Foreign Policy in

Great Britain, 1931-1939, in A. Preston (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy before
the Second World War (London, 1978); See Appendix D
13 Appendix C
14 Hinsley, British Intelligence, p.49

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towards intelligence. This, however, did not constitute enough to satisfy

the requirements of the dissertation, nor its aims. The main bulk of
research and writing had to be done on the basis of an indirect analysis. It
was indirect in the sense that it examined negative evidence, i.e. what
did not exist. This meant drawing conclusions from: the overall lack of
discussion; the failure to increase intelligence funding; the failure to use
certain specialist forms of intelligence gathering; the failure to challenge
assumptions and calculations on the effects of strategic bombing, and
Germanys capability to launch such an offensive; and, the failure to be
(generally) more open minded about the Luftwaffe despite admissions that
the quality and quantity was not as good as desired.
How these problems, and the attempted solutions, were resolved
is detailed below.

The Structure of the Research Chapters

The research chapters on the expansion of the Luftwaffe consist
almost solely of primary sources. The main core are the various papers
and memos which provided information on the expansion of the Luftwaffe.
When it was possible, information and opinion from different institutions
and groups has been incorporated. It has to be mentioned that not every
paper circulated provoked opinion, comments, or controversy, given the
prevailing assumptions on the nature of the Luftwaffe. Attempts have been
made, when and where it was possible, to show Air Ministry responses to
criticism. However, the Air Ministry did not always do so. This lack of
response to papers and to criticism is the reason why, in certain parts, the
research chapters appear to jump from one paper to another for no
apparent reason.
The research chapter on the strategic orientation of the Luftwaffe is
different. It does not only consist of primary sources. COS, Air Ministry,
and Cabinet Committee papers, were used to show the fear of a

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knock-out blow, but this consensus was so strongly held that there are no
papers produced at that level which expressed a difference of opinion.
However, there were intelligence reports which contradicted this picture,
but they were not acknowledged by the Air Ministry. They have been
included. The chapter also includes sections on other sources of
intelligence that the Air Ministry could have accessed for its appreciations.
These sections are based on official histories, as they had unlimited
access to all intelligence documentation, and on secondary studies, by
professional historians, who have painstakingly reconstructed histories of
covert intelligence sources from fragmentary scraps of information in
various archives around the country.
The memoirs of intelligence officers have been avoided.
Theoretically they could have helped, but as the contents of intelligence
memoirs are restricted by the Official Secrets Act, it is difficult to cross
check the almost too good to be true reminiscences with documentation
in the PRO, if it has not been released. The most interesting memoirs, by
the SISs liaison officer with the AID,15 contains tantalising hints of a
difference of opinion, but supporting evidence is not in the PRO as he was
an employee of the SIS.16

The Structure of Other Chapters

The Introduction is mainly concerned with historical background, a
definition of strategic bombing, a definition of intelligence, and a brief
description of the various British Intelligence bodies relevant to this
dissertation.
The chapter on the Luftwaffe written from secondary historical
studies follows the research chapters. It was originally intended to be
placed before them but this was decided against. Stylistically it seems
15 F.W. Winterbotham, The Nazi Connection (London, 1978)
16 Ibid., pp.3, 94-96, 98-99

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better placed after the research chapters. This chapter is not meant to be
original, it is merely guide/yardstick to help conclusions. It is weighted
more towards strategy than expansion as the former has stimulated more
historical interest.
The Conclusion makes use of the literature on intelligence and
British Intelligence listed in the bibliography, and some primary
intelligence papers. Needless to say, the conclusion is the result of
research done in the PRO, not from books read in Lancaster University
Library. It was the job of the secondary sources to support conclusions
drawn.
The secondary sources in the bibliography do not just consist of
works specifically used. Many read were useful in adding to the
knowledge of the aims, methods, and workings of intelligence per se, and
on Britain in this period. Although they are not included in the footnotes,
they are in the bibliography as they were of use.

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