France and the Rise of Fascism in Italy, 1919-23

Author(s): William I. Shorrock

Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 591-610
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260103
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France and the Rise of
Fascismin Italy, 1919-23

William I. Shorrock

Most discussions of French foreign policy in the early post-war era

concentrate quite rightly on the 'Germanproblem'and the consequent
confrontation between Englandand Franceon how best to deal with it.
Undoubtedly,securite - especiallyalong the Germanfrontier- formed
the most conspicuous leitmotif runningthroughoutFrenchdiplomacy.
France'spolitical leaders,and not only those of the right-of-centreBloc
national, were extremely reluctantto co-operatewith Britishappealsto
appease the WeimarRepublic. This field has been well ploughed but
that of Franco-Italianrelations is relativelyvirginterritory. It must be
consideredfor the light it sheds on the main thrust of Frenchpolicy in
the twenties.
France's initial diplomatic reaction to the rise of fascism in Italy is
important for several reasons. Firstly, the evidence will suggest that,
whereas French leaders rejected the appeasementof WeimarGermany,
they were anxious to take a tolerant and indulgentview of the Italian
fascists, who might well be enrolled in a common front against the
Germans and thus act as a convenient counterweight to the British
determinationto appease. But, it should also be stressedthat France's
strategy for dealing with Italy came to be predicated,in part, on the
state of Anglo-Frenchrelations. In reviewingthe brilliant twenty-six
year career of Camille Barrere, France's influential ambassadorto
Rome, Albert Pinguad,a permanentofficial at the Quai d'Orsay,made
the following observationon 1 January1925:
He [Mussolini] had never exhibited more hostility to France than when the
latter was at odds with Great Britain and more complaisance than when the
entente between London and Paris seemed complete. In this sense, the state of
Franco-Italian relations, according to M. Barrere, was and must remain con-
ditioned by that of Franco-English relations.1
591
592 WilliamI. Shorrock

These views prevailedin the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only in the

mid-1930s and help to explain the Frenchthrust in those years to erect
a common Anglo-Franco-Italianfront againstGermantreaty violations.
But the foundation for these views was laid in the immediatepost-first
world war era, when the ThirdRepublicwas forced to deal diplomatic-
ally with the new political phenomenonof fascism.
Although France and Italy had fought side-by-sideto defeat the
Central Powers and did share a common interest in preservingthe
independence and integrity of Austria, there were, nevertheless, a
number of issues that hindered cordial relations between them. The
Italians were disgruntledat receivingno mandatesover formerGerman
colonies in Africa and dissatisfiedat the minor colonial compensations
offered them by Britain and France as requiredby Article 13 of the
Treaty of London. Many Italians also believed that their country was
entitled to the Adriatic port city of Fiume and to further territorial
gains along the Dalmatiancoast. They held France largely responsible
for their frustration,leading Frenchmen to fear that Italy would be-
come a jealous rival of France in the Mediterranean,an adversary
determinedto stir up trouble among friends of Francein south-central
Europe, notably the Yugoslavs.2Perhapsthe most seriousissue dividing
the two countries, so far as the Italianswere concerned, involved the
rights of Italian immigrantsto the French colony of Tunisia, where
their nationality and rightshad been protected by a convention of 1896
that ironically had marked one of the first steps towardFranco-Italian
rapprochementbefore the first world war. In 1918, Francedenounced
the convention as a first step towardthe naturalizationof all foreigners
living in Tunisia.3 The Italians, sufferingfrom limited resourcesand a
rapidly expanding population, had long regarded their countrymen
living in Tunisia as a major national resource. Their resentment at
French action was considerable.4
But, in spite of these diplomatic tensions and the obvious anti-
French bias of the Italian government,Barreresuccinctly underscored
the importance of Italy to France in a long dispatch to the Foreign
Minister, Alexandre Millerand,on 3 May 1920. He pointed out how
good relations with Italy had served France well in the period from
1902 to 1918, but since the armistice,French policy 'has committed
the greatest conceivable error - that of seemingto be more anti-Italian
than it is in reality.' Barrereobservedthat France'smain task, for the
foreseeable future, would be to build and consolidate the new Euro-
pean order. Italy could perform useful servicesin this enterprise,but,
above all, she could hinder the French effort if she were to remainin
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 593

opposition: 'It is thus beyond doubt,' he argued,'that our best interests

lie in not alienatingher, in not abandoningher to the manoeuvresof
our rivals, nor even sometimes to her own inclinations.' Barrerecon-
cluded his dispatch by outlining a reasonablestrategy for dealingwith
the Italians, advocating a close Anglo-Frenchentente, to which Italy
could then be attached, as the best means of 'discipliningItaly' and
resolving the thorny problems surroundingGermany,the Adriatic and
the Middle East. If such a policy were followed with regardto Italy,
Barrerepredicted that it would 'ameliorateour present relationswith
this country and renderit relativelyamenableto our designs,duringthe
period when the allies are unhappily becoming less united than one
would like to admit.'5 Barrere'sdispatch not only places the problem
of Franco-Italianrelations in the context of Europeanpolitics, it also
demonstrates that some influential voices were anxious to bury the
bitterness of the peace conferences and initiate a rapprochement.One
of the most serious obstacles to such a development,however,was the
virtually anarchicalsocial and political climate in Italy in the immediate
post-warperiod, when the fear of growingbolshevikinfluence there was
a source of concern to French statesmen, as well as the governmental
instabilitywhich was severeeven by Frenchstandards.
Barrereviewed the new Italian governmentwith serious misgivings.
The wartime Orlando ministry was replaced in June 1919 by one
headed by Francesco Nitti and Tommaso Tittoni, both of whom had
been neutralist during the war, but whose sympathies lay with
Germany.Barrerenotified the Quai d'Orsayon 23 June 1919 that the
Nitti Cabinet symbolized the state of mind in Italy in recent months -
'resentment against the Allies, explosion of germanophilesentiments
conceived by pique as well as by inclination, awakening all of the
neutralistand anti-warelements whose tendenciesare favourableto the
Germans.'6The Frenchambassadoralso blamedNitti for encouraginga
bitter anti-Frenchpress campaignin Italy. The Frenchambassadorwas
particularly suspicious of the apparently close working relationship
established between the Italian premier and David Lloyd George, the
Englishprime minister - a cordiality that Barrerefearedwould isolate
Franceon the Germanquestion.7
The anti-Frenchtone of the Italianpressprovideda constant source
of annoyance to Barrere,who was inordinantlysensitive to newspaper
criticism. He and other French officials were also concernedabout the
efforts of German propagandato capitalize on the tone of Italian
newspapersin order to divide the wartime allies. The French Embassy,
located in the historic Palais Farese, noted on several occasions the
594 WilliamI Shorrock

irony of Germany'shaving so little money to pay her reparationsyet

sufficient quantities to bankroll opposition to France in Italy.8 On 9
August 1921, the French charged'affaires in Rome wrote privately to
Barrere, who was vacationing in Paris, that: 'The Germansand Ger-
manophiles are gaining here every day. Little by little, finance, in-
dustry, press, everything. . . is falling into their hands.' He suggested
that Barrere contact Philippe Berthelot, the secretary general of the
Quai d'Orsay,to urge that France counter the pro-Germanpropaganda
by subsidizingfavourablecommentaryin the Italian press or by exer-
cising some economic pressureon Italy.9 The ForeignMinistryrejected
both suggestions. The extreme anti-Frenchattitude abated somewhat
with the fall of the Nitti governmentin June 1920, which was replaced
by that of Giovanni Giolitti, the grand old man of Italian politics.
France'sconcern about the returnto power of this old pro-Germanand
neutralist premier was somewhat appeased by the appointment of
Count Carlo Sforza to the Consulta. The latter's pro-Frenchattitude
was well-known;he told the French charged'affaireson 12 September
1920 that his sole 'raisond'etre in the [Giolitti] Cabinet is for having
been an interventionist and for being a partisan of the alliance with
France and England.'"?
This more favourablepolitical climate, however,must be considered
againstthe backdropof an alarmingexpansionof social unrestthrough-
out the Italian peninsula in the years from 1918 to 1922. Strikes
paralysedthe principalpublic servicesand severelyaffected industryas
well as commerce. These activities were accompaniedby the growth of
the Italian socialist and communist parties. French officials watched
these developments with considerable apprehension;they tended to
place the blame for the social crisison the activitiesof the 'maximalists'
and 'anarchists'.The Italian Communist Party, founded in January
1921, was to be directly financed by Moscow, and Frenchintelligence
reports indicated that Russian money was financingstrikes and distur-
bances in the large cities and industrialcentres of Italy. 1 The resur-
gence of socialist strengthand activity dismayedFrenchmenworkingto
ameliorate Franco-Italianrelations. The socialists, the French charge
informed Foreign Minister Leyges on 12 October 1920, had formally
disavowedthe Treaty of Versaillesand identified Paris as the centre of
reaction par excellence. They are 'the declared and implacable ad-
versaries of French policy . . .Their arrival in power, which they are
working toward, is thus not desirablefor us; and their influence on the
present Government, which is looking at them more favourably...
would not be favourablefor us .. .12
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 595

The factor that compounded the socialist dangerwas the apparent

inability of the Italian governmentto cope successfully with the social
crisis. Barreredenouncedthe Nitti regimeas weak and virtuallyhelpless
in combatingthe constant strikes. He refusedto take a strongstand, as
the press and the majority of the country demanded, and instead
preferred to grant 'concessions and accommodations while events
demonstrate daily the uselessness of his efforts.13 By October 1920,
the economic outlook had darkened considerably:industry was para-
lysed; agriculturewas plaguedby peasantland occupations;exports had
dropped. The Italian government,under both Nitti and Giolitti, argued
that political and social discontent was the result of this prolonged
economic crisis, a view rejected by the French. In a lengthy review of
the Italian internal situation on 9 October 1920, the French charge in
Rome, Francois Charles-Roux,informed the Foreign Minister,Leyges,
that the agitationof socialistsand anarchistswas renderingthe develop-
ment of normal economic life virtuallyimpossible.Charles-Rouxout-
lined the prioritiesvery clearly: 'Since it is socialist agitation,or better,
revolutionarycommunist and anarchistagitation, which has causedthe
aggravationof the economic situation, this agitation must be attacked
first.'l 4 But, if the Italiangovernmentwas either unwillingor unableto
combat the spreadingleftist agitation,what alternativesremained? The
evidence indicates that Frenchdiplomacywas likely to look favourably
upon any force or movement capableof re-establishingorderin Italy by
challenging the left, as it could be expected to harbour a more op-
timistic view of France than that held by the Italian government in
power.
The record demonstrateswith strikingclarity that Frenchdiplomats
in Italy, and particularlyBarrereand Charles-Roux,viewed the nascent
fascist movement with almost unalloyed favour and enthusiasm. The
tone was set in a dispatch from Charles-Rouxto Leyges on 19 October
1920, which contained the first referenceto the fascist phenomenonin
the diplomatic correspondence.He first described the growing social
agitation in the peninsula,a condition borderingon anarchyand after
ritually placing the finger of guilt on the combination of socialist
extremism and governmentalinaction, he notes that the socialistshave
begun to meet systematicopposition from a new political force:
These exploits are. . . the work of nationalist counter-demonstrators organ-
ized for this purpose into 'fasci di combattimento' (faisceau de combat). The
peaceful population can look favourably upon them; but since they are
peaceful, they do not participate. Because of this, it matters relatively little
that the 'fascists,' on occasion, use truncheons, revolvers and hand grenades.' '
596 WilliamI. Shorrock

Similarly sanguine analyses of the squadristiarrivedin Rome from

French consulates in variousparts of Italy. But, throughoutthe remain-
der of 1920 and on into 1921, the most fulsome and uncritical
appraisalsof fascist activity arrivedat the Quai d'Orsayfrom the pen of
Camille Barrere,who informed Leyges on 10 November 1920 that
recent administrativeelections had not resulted in the large gains
anticipated by the socialists, largely because of the fascists, who have
'drawn [the Italian voters] out of their torpor' as a result of their
'protests by word and deed against the incessant provocationsof the
anarchists and bolsheviks'. Thus, he concluded, although the fascists
occasionally employed the same tactics as their adversaries,they never-
theless 'have rendered the service of jolting those who intended to
remain cautious out of their apathy.'16 Again on 1 February 1921,
referringto the fascist tactics of violent confrontation,Barrereadvised
the new foreign minister, Aristide Briand, that the vacillation of the
Nitti and Giolitti regimesin the face of revolution from the left 'fully
justifies the energetic and resolute attitude of the fascists .. .'1 7
Barrere'sattitude revealed itself further in many other dispatches
and telegrams to Briand. He referred to the fascists at one point as
representing'the parties of order.'18 Three weeks later, he urged the
foreign minister to plant a story in Le Temps lauding the 'courageous
struggle'of the fascists againstthe elements of disorderand dissolution
and depicting them as 'representingorder, patriotism and security' -
such a favourable analysis might encourage francophile Italians to
supportfascist candidatesat the next election.' 9 A few monthslater,in
a long assessmentof the socialist and fascist movements since the end
of the war, Barrerearguedthat fascismhad been causedby the excesses
of the socialists and the deficiency of the Italian government. After
October 1920, when the fascists began openly to challenge the
socialists, they became so effective that the latter requested state
protection, to no avail; 'the fascists are continuing their work of
purificationand the governmentis letting these improviseddefendersof
the public orderact.'20
It is clear, then, that Barrere'sinitial admiration for the fascist
movement was based largely upon its anti-socialistactivitiesand that it
appeared to represent a force of order and stability, which was a
prerequisite to establishing closer relations with Italy. In addition,
fascist leadershipappeareddiplomaticallyacceptableto France.Benito
Mussolini was not an unknown quantity to the Palais Famese. During
the first world war, he had been regardedas an importantforce leading
Italy away from her neutralist position and into direct alliance with
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 597

France and England,and evidence demonstratesthat he receivedfinan-

cial support from the French Embassy duringthe interventionistcam-
paign of 1914-15.2 Barrereclearly viewed the fascist leaderas a force
potentially favourableto French foreign policy goals in Germany,an
attitude which emerged in his analysis of Mussolini'smaidenspeech to
the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The Duce became a deputy from
Milan in the election of 15 May 1921. His first speech was strongly
critical of the mild reaction of the Giolitti government to German
propagandaactivities in the Alto Adige and along the Brennerfrontier.
Thus Barrereremarkedon 22 June 1921 in a telegramto Briandthat:

the general anti-German tenor of his speech . . .cannot be displeasing in

France, any more than the fact that one cannot find here (this time at least)
any word of criticism against our policy.2 2

The French Embassy'sratherpositive view of Mussolinias a skilful

and controlled leader of a powerful but disorganizedpolitical force
received reinforcementin later months. The disparatecharacterof the
early fascist movement occasionallyled to outbreaksof violence which
even Barrerehad to admit exceeded the limits of good sense, although
Mussolini himself was increasinglydepicted as the leader who might
curb the violent elements within the movement and direct it into a
creative political force. Barrere noted on 18 November 1921 in a
dispatch to Briandthat the Duce's efforts to transformfascism into a
unified political party demonstratedhis concern about injectingserious
political content into its programmeand eliminatingthe excessive and
violent elements of disorder from the movement.23 Six months later
Charles-Rouxsent a telegramto RaymondPoincare,Briand'ssuccessor
as president of the Council of Ministersand Ministerof ForeignAffairs,
which described in admiring terms Mussolini'sskill at manoeuvering
within the Italian parliamentarystructure.24 These documents form
early indications of the future tendency on the part of French policy-
makersto view Mussolinias the most moderateman of his party, whose
leadershipwas essential to discipliningthe movement and directingit
into creativeand peaceful channels.
The Italian political crisisdeepened throughoutthe last half of 1921
and the first half of 1922 - electoral gains were registeredby the
socialists and the rural-basedCatholic Popular Party, both of which
were strongly anti-fascist and inclined toward a pro-Germanand anti-
French stance in foreign policy. In July 1922, Giolitti declined an
invitation to form another ministry on the groundsthat the composi-
tion of the Assembly made any stable government impossible. His
598 WilliamI. Shorrock

public letter to II Mondo indicated that any governmentwhich con-

tinued to oppose the fascists would encourage civil war. Barrerere-
peated these views to Poincareon 28 July 1922, and indicated that it
was likely that the fascists would have to be brought into the govern-
ment.25 He expressedno alarmat this prospect;in fact, he indicatedto
Poincarethe following day that the Frenchpress ought to be instructed
to abstainfrom any criticalanalysisof the activity of the fascistsduring
the Italian ministerialcrisis,since they, after all, were the ones blocking
the anti-FrenchNitti from returningto power, and 'we are going to
have to adjust to them in the near future.' Besides, Barrereadded,
fascist organshad abstainedfrom attackingFrancefor overthreemonths
and had supported French policy in Germanyand London.26 Barrere
was by no means the only one to take such a benignantview of fascist
foreign policy. The French consul-general in Milan wrote, on 12
September 1922, that, although the fascists were divided between
nationalist extremists and 'pure fascists' whose programmewas aimed
at the reconstitution of national life in Italy, the latter were by no
means unfavourableto France.This group, into which he placed Musso-
lini, might well be a useful element 'towardconsolidatinggood relations
between the two countries.'27
Barrere'sfavourabledisposition toward the fascists continued right
up to the eve of the 'march on Rome' in spite of the increasingly
belligerent domestic stance adopted by the movement. On 7 October
1922, he informed Poincare about an article from La Patria, a fascist
sheet strongly critical of German policy in Italy, which condemned
Germany'ssupportfor II Paese, a stronglypro-German,anti-Frenchand
anti-fascist newspaper. The latter's editorial policy was ill-advised,the
fascist organ emphasized, because the fascists would shortly be in
power - Barrerecommented simply:
We thus can only be pleased that a fascist organ is levelling such a frank attack
on a newspaper like Paese and, behind it, those who are paying it with money
from across the Rhine and who up to the present have not yet been un-
masked.2 8

The French ambassadoreven deplored the appearanceof an article

critical of the fascists which was published in Le Temps, maintaining
that the effect of such articles was unfortunate, since for several
months 'not only have we not had to complain about the fascists,but
we have noticed that in matters of foreign policy they have declared
themselves for us.' Given the fact that the fascists were by that time
one of the most important elements in Italianpolitics and were getting
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 599

stronger every day, it was foolhardy to publish articles which could

only prejudiceMussolini'sparty againstFrance.29
Apart from Le Temps and the socialist press, however, the Italian
fascist movement received reasonably favourable treatment from
French newspaperson the eve of its takeover.EvenLe Tempsmodified
its views, admitting that if the fascists could form a coalition govern-
ment with Giolitti, it could be a guarantee of social order and 'its
programmewill work quite naturallytowardthe rapprochementof our
countries.'30 Le Petit Parisien, politically moderate, with the largest
circulation in France, applaudedthe fact that Italy's next government
was likely to be composed of those elements which had been in the
forefront of the fight againstsocialism.3 Predictablythe centre-right
and rightistpress in France was more demonstrablyenthusiasticabout
the possibility of a fascist governmentin Italy: Le Matin published a
very favourable review of the movement, depicting it as 'the new
national forces thrown into the struggle against socialism and against
the old political caste which abandoned the State to the mercy of
socialism,'32andLe Gauloisrhapsodizedabout the accomplishmentsof
the squadristi,spurredon by the 'magnificentinspiration'of d'Annun-
zio and the 'eloquent advocacy' of Mussolini;'.... the cause they are
defending is just and the spirit which it provokes is irresistible.'33It
should come as no surprisethat neither the Quai d'Orsaynor many of
the organsof French public opinion were greatlyalarmedwhen, on 28
October 1922, the Italian king offered the office of prime minister to
Mussolini.In fact Mussolini'saccessionto power was not badly received
in France, providing an occasion for the resurrectionof old cliches
about the two 'Latin sisters,' and there was a great deal of optimism
about the Duce as a declaredfrancophileand re-establisherof orderin
the peninsula.34 In addition, the Palais Famese stressed in several
telegramsto Poincar6the potential diplomaticbenefits to Franceof the
change in regime. Charles-Rouxinformed the president of the Council
and the foreign minister that the directors of the fascist party were
favourableto France;the fascist presshad recently supportedFrancein
Middle Eastern affairs and on the question of reparationsand inter-
allied debts. A functionary at the Consulta3 told the French charge
d'affaires that Mussolini was inclined to be moderate in his foreign
policy initiatives, even in regardto Yugoslavia,which was a particularly
sensitive point, since the Quai d'Orsayregardedthe Kingdomof Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes as a protege, while substantialterritorialdisputes
remained between it and Italy. Charles-Rouxstressed the anti-German
focus of the fascist mentality in his telegramto Paris,pointing out that
600 WilliamL Shorrock

the blackshirtshad invaded the offices of severalanti-French'germano-

phile' and 'Nittian'newspapersin Rome and burnedrecent issues.36
The main concern of French diplomats in Italy was how the French
press would react to the commencement of the fascist regime in Italy.
But, just as in the United States,37 the majormass circulationorgansof
the centre and right in France either endorsed the new regimewithout
qualification or took a reasonablyfavourable'wait and see' attitude.38
Their editorials of the period from 29 October to 5 November uni-
formly emphasized the return of domestic tranquillity, the marked
decline of socialist activity and the potentially favourabledirection of
fascist foreign policy. So far as France was concerned, the single most
jarringevent of the opening of the fascist era was the sudden resigna-
tion of Count Sforza, the Italian ambassadorto Paris, on 31 October,
because he was bitterly opposed to what he presumed would be the
major thrust of Mussolini'sforeignpolicy; the Duce's maidenspeech to
the Chamber in June 1921 had been scathingly critical of Sforza's
tenure as foreign minister, especially his policy of reconciliationwith
Yugoslavia.39Sforza had long been regardedas a strongpartisanof the
alliance with France, and his departureseemed to many to remove a
moderating force in Italian policy,40 although evidence suggeststhat
the ambassador'sdeparturewas not as serious as originallyspeculated.
Mussolini made an attempt to keep Sforza at his post as a symbol of
good Franco-Italianrelations, but the latter rejected the Duce's over-
tures perhaps more because of personal antipathy than for any other
reason. Besides, it was stressed that the unfortunateeffects of Sforza's
precipitate action would be muted in the long run by Mussolini's
decision to retain Salvatore Contarinias permanentundersecretaryof
the Italian ForeignMinistry;his long experienceand favourabledisposi-
tion to Francewere well-knownat the Quaid'Orsay.41
The French diplomatic community, nevertheless,continued to har-
bour some apprehensionsabout the basic direction of the fascist re-
gime. These were momentarily exacerbated when the Duce presented
his ministerial declarationto the Italian Chamberof Deputies on 17
November 1922, a speech with marked dictatorial overtones which
defined the wartime entente as nothing more than a 'diplomatic ex-
pression' and decried the 'inferior way' that Italy had often been
treated in the past. Mussolini enunciated his famous doctrine of
'nothing for nothing' and indicated that unless the entente became 'an
egalitarian equilibrium of forces,' Italy would seek her freedom of
action.42 There are some indications that, if alarming,such rodomon-
tade was not taken too seriously in high diplomatic councils. Musso-
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 601

lini's first meeting with western statesmenwas scheduledfor 20 Novem-

ber 1922 at the opening of the LausanneConference on the Middle
East. The Duce, however, took the initiative of invitinghis French and
English counterparts,Poincareand Lord Curzon,to meet privatelywith
him in advance of the regularconference at the small Swiss town of
Territet: taken by surprise,they agreedto go. The result was a rather
innocuous communique alluding to the principle of equality among
powers. Jules Laroche, a permanentofficial at the Quaid'Orsay,main-
tained that no-one took Mussolini seriously at Territet or Lausanne:
'Poincare and Curzon scarcely hid their disdain. His success was con-
sidered ephemeral.'43 But recent scholarship has arrived at a more
realisticjudgment: Alan Casselsconcludes that Mussolini'saccomplish-
ments at Lausannewere considerable.He had mitigated some of the
suspicions in England and France about his belligerent speech of 17
November by showing his willingness to continue the entente in the
eastern Mediterraneanand, simultaneously,he had compelled two of
Europe's most influential statesmen to bow to his whim at Territet.
'The deferenceshown to Mussoliniby Curzonand Poincareset the tone
for the rest of the Europeandiplomatic community.'44 Such a sweep-
ing judgment may be somewhat exaggerated,but it cannot be denied
that France became increasinglymore deferentialto the Italian leader
as tensions with Englandmounted over the Germanquestion.
The prevailingtone of the dispatchesfrom the French Embassyin
Rome throughout November and December 1922 reveals increasing
admirationfor the completely altered social situation in Italy. Charles-
Roux reminded Poincare on severaloccasions that increasingnumbers
of Italians were rallying to Mussolini'ssupport. To assess the signifi-
cance of such a situation for France, he argued,one must comparethe
present calm and stability with the situation of the previoustwo years
of governmentaldecrepitude, strikes and socialist and communist de-
fiance of law and order, when the red flag floated from factory roofs,
whose doors were defended by red guards. . .' In contrast, Mussolini's
movement is describedas one of 'audacity,will, decision, authority.'45
The extent of the impact of Mussolini'sarrivalin power on the socialist
activity, which had so upset Barrere, Charles-Roux and the Quai
d'Orsay, can be gauged by the French document collection. Those
dealing with the ItalianPartis politiques, socialistes, action pacifiste et
revolutionnairefrom June 1918 to 28 October 1922 occupy almost the
whole of five bound volumes. From the day of the fascist takeover,
however, until the Law of Exception of November 1926 outlawed all
other political parties, socialist and revolutionaryactivities formed the
602 WilliamI. Shorrock

subject of only some seventy-two pages of documents.46 Clearly,the

fascists put an end to one of the most serious obstacles to Franco-
Italianunderstanding,so far as the Frenchwere concerned.
Equally important to the French was the renewed possibility of
integrating Italy into a common policy vis-a-vis Germany. Barrere
worked diligentlyto foster a more conciliatoryatmospherebetween the
two countries duringthe early days of fascist power, arranginga special
audience of the Duce with a group of exclusively Frenchjournalists,in
which Mussolinirespondedto all domestic and foreignpolicy questions
'with simplicity and frankness'.Since it was the Italianpremier'susual
practice to meet all foreign journaliststogether, Barreredescribedthis
gesture as 'une gracieusete speciale pour la France.47 Events such as
these led to favourable comments in the French press along with
speculation that a new era in Franco-Italianrelationswas emerging.Le
Temps commented on several occasions about the common desire of
both countries to cooperate in the MiddleEast, concert their efforts on
behalf of Austrianindependenceand deal effectively with the German
question. Thus it appearedthat relationscould become even closer and
more friendly.48
The diplomatic possibilities were stated even more explicitly when
Charles-Rouxresponded on 18 December 1922 to Poincare'srequest
for detailed biographicalinformation on Mussoliniby closing his dis-
patch with the observationthat ever since the peace conference,fascist
policy 'has taken an anti-Germanattitude in the question of reparations
and disarmamentand of the execution of the Treaty of Versailles.'49
The suggestionthat Italy's support might be valuablefor Francein the
emergingshowdown with Englandover the question of Germanrepara-
tions was very thinly veiled. The theme of a possible Franco-Italian
entente reappearedin two important telegramsfrom Charles-Rouxto
Poincar6 on 5 and 7 January 1923, the eve of the Franco-Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr. The first of these noted that virtually all the
Roman and provincial newspapers had commented favourably and
extensively on New Year's Day speeches by himself and the French
ambassadorto the Holy See, which he interpreted as proof of the
ameliorationin Italian public opinion toward France,since some of the
newspapers 'have underlined particularlythe necessity for a Franco-
Italian entente.' Two days later, the French charge reported that
Contarini,the Italian permanentundersecretaryof state, had expressed
his own personal interest in closer Franco-Italianrelations and also
commentedthat Francehas 'everythingto gain since the ... disposition
of fascism [is] currently favourableto the entente between the two
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 603

countries.'5
The documents cited above indicate clearlythat Francewas anxious
to welcome the new fascist regimein exchangefor Italianacquiescence
in the French thesis on reparations.51 Poincare presentedhis bill for
the indulgent French attitude at the London Conference on repara-
tions, which opened on 7 December 1922. JacquesChastenet,a former
official of the French Foreign Ministry, maintains that as late as the
London Conference, Mussolini, a 'parnenu whose shaved head and
green-edgedwhite spats bring smiles to the faces of the correct diplo-
mats of the Foreign Office,' was not yet taken seriously.52 Such
assertions, however, are not consistent with those presented by the
Comte de Saint-Aulaire,the French ambassadorin London, who at-
tended the conference on reparationsand who maintainedthat Poin-
care, as a lawyer, had no sympathy for Mussolini'stendency to hold
himself above the law. But the systematic wooing of fascist Italy
toward a common policy with Franceon the Germanquestion beganin
London. Poincare neglected nothing to consolidate the co-operation
with Mussolini achieved the previous month at the Lausanne Con-
ference. Saint-Aulaire maintained that the French foreign minister
hoped, by building a Franco-Italianbloc, to goad the recalcitrant
English into a common allied front on the Germanquestion - or at
least to achievea benevolentneutralityfrom England.53
The London Conference broke up in disarray:the French firmly
maintained that Germany must pay reparationsin full voluntarilyor
else be coerced to do so; the English, on the other hand, urged a
moratorium. A further conference was scheduled for January 1923 in
Paris. There was some concern at the Quai d'Orsayabout the possible
consequences of alienating England too severely on the matter of
reparationsand the President, Alexandre Millerand,even suggestedin
two personalletters to Barrerethat Englandmight be brought around
to the hard-line French position on reparationsin exchange for a
solution convenient to her in the Middle East.s4 A deal such as this
never materialized,however, which only served to magnifythe import-
ance of the position that the Italianswere likely to take on this matter.
Since Belgium was allied to France, the Italian vote in the Reparations
Commission would be decisive. There were those who feared that a
direct clash between Englandand France would encouragethe Italians
to adopt their historic diplomatic position of always maintainingclose
relations with England.55 In general, such fears were well-grounded,
but in this particular situation, the foundations for Franco-Italian
co-operation had been well-prepared.Mussoliniwas flattered by the
604 WilliamI. Shorrock

enthusiastic reception his new regimehad received in France. In addi-

tion several solid Italian interests dictated her alignment with the
French. Although in the long run fascist Italy was not averseto seeing
Germany recover some of her strength in order to balance French
hegemony on the continent, for the moment Italy appreciatedthat
France had power and the will to use it. If France should succeed in
coercing Germany, Italian interests would clearly be best served by
supportingthe Frenchposition. Hence, the decision was taken in Rome
in December 1922, to support the Franco-Belgianoccupation of the
Ruhr as a means of forcing Germanyto pay reparations.Italy would
send no troops, but her presence was to be assuredby sending several
technicians and observers. This policy also found approval among
northern Italian industrialists,who, havinghelped Mussolinito power,
were absolutely dependent upon continued coal deliveries from the
Ruhr. It was felt that if the French were alienated on the reparations
question, they might use their exclusive position in the Ruhr to place
pressureon Italy by hinderingthe flow of coal acrossthe Alps.56
The Duce himself indicated the final Italian position on this matter
in a conversationwith Charles-Rouxon 26 December 1922, 'My posi-
tion is that Germany must pay.' He went on to denounce Germany
enthusiasticallyand to label the current xenophobia of the Germansas
'bestial'. Charles-Rouxconcluded: 'I must say that during the seven
years I have been here, I have never heard an Italian minister speak in
such a tone about Germany.'59The charge'schronology included the
war years and must have been warmly receivedin Paris. On the same
day, Louis Barthou, France'sdelegate to the ReparationsCommission,
put two motions to a vote before that body. The first simply noted that
Germany had not entirely executed her responsibilityfor the delivery
of timber to France in 1922; it was adopted unanimouslyas a simple
statement of fact. Barthou's second motion, however, labelled Ger-
many's non-execution of her reparationsresponsibilitiesas a default
accordingto Paragraph17 of Annexe II of the Treaty of Versailles.The
British delegate strenuously opposed the motion, since its passage
would empower the Commissionto consider the use of coercive sanc-
tions on Germany.The French, Belgian and Italiandelegates,however,
supported the motion, and Germany was declared officially in de-
fault.58 The Paris Conferenceon reparationsmet from 2 to 4 January
1923 and failed to resolve the Franco-Britishdeadlock, and when the
Reparations Commission met again on 9 January, Italy once again
voted with France and Belgium to authorize the latters'joint occupa-
tion of the Ruhr: the troops, along with several Italian technicians,
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 605

entered on 11 January. France had secured Italian support against

British opposition in one of the most serious issues of the immediate
post-warperiod.
Although it is quite true that the Italian enthusiasmfor the Ruhr
occupation waned in the following months as fascist leadersbegan to
fear that a Germanfinancial collapse might prejudicereparationsalto-
gether, there were other strikingexamples of Franco-Italianco-opera-
tion. The most fascinatingwas the behind-the-scenesFrench effort to
secure a face-savingoutcome for Italy in the Corfuaffairof September
1923, an incident which however, goes beyond the scope of this essay,
although it does justify the observationthat Franco-Italianrelations
had rarely been as peaceful and courteous as they were during the
opening months of the fascist regime.One Frenchobservercommented
that:

official Franco-Italian relations were ameliorated under the fascist regime and
were no longer troubled by the very frequent coarse demonstrations which
occurred before October 1922.59

French policy toward the Italian fascistsin the period from 1920 to
1923 representeda first attempt to deal with what John C. Caimshas
labelled the 'Italian enigma'within the Europeanforeign policy struc-
ture of the interwar period.60 The French documents illustrate quite
clearly that the initial French admirationfor the fascists derivedfrom
the anti-socialistactivities of the fasci di combattimento and the ex-
pectation that they would contribute to returning Italy to some
semblance of order, a necessary condition for the maintenance of a
viable foreign policy. When it was perceivedin Paristhat fascist Italy
could be enrolled in an anti-Germancombinationwith France on the
reparationsissue, relations between the two states became even more
cordial. But the French attitude toward Mussolini'sgovernment,even
among those who were most enthusiasticabout a close Franco-Italian
entente, was based upon more than optimistic expectations. The in-
creasingly tepid Italian support for the Ruhr adventure implied a
warningfor France. In the long run, the entire Ruhrepisode, although
technically a diplomatic victory for France, revealed the dangersof
conducting her foreign policy in opposition to that of England.This,
coupled with the historically close relationship between Italy and
England, encouragedthose who were most anxious to bring about a
Franco-Italianentente to view it in terms of the state of relations
between Franceand England.Barrere,for example, advisedPoincar6on
19 February 1924, fifteen months after Mussolini'sadvent to power,
606 WilliamI. Shorrock

that so long as the fascist regimesurvivedin Italy:

Franco-Italianrelationswill always be conditioned by the state of our rela-
tions with England.With a Franco-Britishentente, if it is solid and based on
the regulationof political interests,like the Entente Cordiale,the effect will
be to modify profoundlyour relationswith Italy and largelyto diminishthe
importance of the differences which could arise in the Mediterraneanas a
resultof the excessivepretensionsof Italianpolicy.6'

Such thinking was to form the germ of the Locarnocoalition in 1925,

where Englandand Italy served as guarantorsof the Rhine frontier.In
this instance the Franco-Italo-Britishcombination was designed to
appease Germany. But Barrere'sformula, after a hiatus of nearly a
decade, was retrievedin 1934 and 1935, when France attempted to
erect a western coalition designedto contain Germanexpansion.
Thus, there were severalinfluential voices calling for the continued
appeasementof fascist Italy in the era immediatelyfollowing the rise of
Mussolini. The communications of both Barrere and Charles-Roux
depict Italian fascism as a stabilizingforce which, if handled properly,
could be enrolled in an anti-Germanfront - preferablyin combination
with Englandbut if necessaryin opposition to her. The Italianreaction
to the occupation of the Ruhr appearedto bear out their assessments.
In addition, political figures of the stature of Henry de Jouvenel, who
was to become ambassadorto Rome in the 1930s, advocateda number
of economic concessions to Italy in 1923 in order 'to fortify . . .her
economic resistance against Germany.'He proposed Italian participa-
tion in the coal and iron wealth of France;expansion of job openings
for Italians in French colonies; the maintenanceof Italian nationality
rights in Tunisia;a Franco-Italianassociationto exploit oil resourcesin
Turkey and southern Russia;and a customs agreementgivingreciprocal
tradingadvantagesto France and Italy.62 Chastenetmaintainsthat by
1923 fascism exercised a certain attraction on all partiesof the rightin
France.6 3
But despite substantial support for continued efforts to maintain
close relations with Italy, the Quai d'Orsay abandoned this policy.
Throughoutthe late 1920s and early 1930s, it was underthe control of
Aristide Briandand Philippe Berthelot,who, as secretarygeneralof the
Foreign Ministryfrom 1920 until 1934 (except for a period of disgrace
from 1922 to 1925 duringthe Poincareand Herriotministries),wielded
enormous influence over French foreign policy: his hostility to Italy
was well-known.64 Briand, whose uninterruptedtenure at the Quai
d'Orsayextended from 1925 until his retirementin 1.932,was obsessed
France and the Rise of Fascism 607

with seeking securite through reconciliationwith Germany,ratherthan

throughbuildinga front againsther. The Briand-Berthelotcombination,
therefore, tended to ignore Franco-Italianrelations, and the issues
which had plagued the two states in the pre-fascistera surfacedagainin
intensified form. The 'pro-Italians' gained control of the Foreign
Ministryonly in 1932, and underthe directionof JosephPaul-Boncour
(December 1932-January 1934) and Pierre Laval (November
1934-January1936) attempted to recapturethe policies advocatedby
Barrereand instituted by the Poincare ministry in the crucial period
following the inception of the fascist regime in Italy. By that time,
however, it was too late for the Anglo-Franco-Britishcombination to
work effectively againstGermantreaty violations. The 'Italianenigma'
was more enigmaticthan ever: althoughthe appealof such a diplomatic
construct remainedpervasivein certainFrenchcircles,the 'Stresafront'
against Germany created during the Laval stewardship of the Quai
d'Orsay was short-lived, failing tragically to contain the expansion of
the ThirdReich.

NOTES

1. France, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, S6rie 'Europe, 1918-1929',

Sous-serie Italie, Z 374-4, 96, 34-38. These unpublished documents, declassified
in 1972, are located in the Archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres in
Paris. (Hereafter abbreviated: MAE, Italie.)
2. Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique francaise, 1919-1940 (Paris 1947), 14.
Flandin was to become premier twice and foreign minister once during the
turbulent period from 1934 to 1936.
3. Charles Monchicourt, Les Italiens de Tunisie et l'accord Laval-Mussolini
(Paris 1938), 8-16.
4. Carlo Sforza, Les Freres ennemies (Paris 1933), 228.
5. MAE, Papiers Barrre, VII, 127-133.
6. Ibid., 114-117; see also Georges Suarez, Briand, sa vie, son oeuvre, V
(Paris 1941), 209.
7. MAE, Papiers Barrere, VII, 66-72 (from Barrere's notes on the San Remo
Conference of April 1920).
8. For example see MAE, Italie, Z 375-1, 212, 12, 53-54, 59. In fact this
608 WilliamL Shorrock

entire volume is devoted to German propaganda activities in Italy from 1918 to

1929.
9. MAE, Papiers Barrere, I, 151-52.
10. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 79, 83-88 (dispatch from Charles-Roux to Mille-
rand). Barrere also sounded an optimistic note in a letter to Millerand on 22 June
1920. MAE, Papiers Barrere, VI, 108.
11. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 17-19 (Barrere to Briand, 22 February
1921); 61 (Communique to Quai d'Orsay from Surete Generale, 3 May 1921); Z
374-1, 79, 140-145 (Barrire to Briand, 15 March 1921).
12. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 60, 20-25.
13. Ibid., 59, 56-58 (20 April 1920), 67-69 (10 May 1920).
14. Ibid., 60, 9-12.
15. Ibid., 31-35.
16. Ibid., 87-89.
17. Ibid., 121-23.
18. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 21 (1 March 1921).
19. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 60, 141-42 (22 March 1921).
20. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 72-75 (4 July 1921).
21. William A. Renzi, 'Mussolini's Sources of Financial Support, 1914-1915'
in History, LVI (June 1971), 189-206. French subsidies were designed to en-
courage Mussolini's interventionist campaign in II Popolo d'Italia after his dis-
missal as editor of the socialist newspaper, Avanti! See also Jacques Chastenet,
Histoire de la Troisieme Republique, V (Paris 1952), 100.
22. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 60, 185-86.
23. Ibid., 61, 41-43.
24. Ibid., 131-32 (5 June 1922). The telegram describes a deal made by
Mussolini with other parliamentary leaders regarding the seating of twelve fascist
deputies who had been elected before attaining legal age. It was agreed that those
who had attained legal age since the election could keep their seats. The fascists,
therefore, lost only two seats instead of all twelve.
25. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 61, 166-67.
26. Ibid., 169.
27. Ibid., 62, 5-6.
28. MAE, Italie, Z 374-9, 125, 51-52.
29. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 43-44 (Barrere to Poincar6, 11 October 1922).
30. Le Temps, 25 October 1922.
31. Le Petit Parisien, 28 October 1922.
32. Le Matin, 24 October 1922.
33. Le Gaulois, 24 October 1922.
34. Flandin, op. cit., 90.
35. Mussolini was shortly to move the offices of the Foreign Ministry from
the Consulta to the Palazzo Chigi.
36. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 31; Z 372-1, 62, 120, 122, 142-45.
37. John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America (Prince-
ton 1972), 22-29. Diggins shows that a number of leading American newspapers,
as well as mass circulation magazines like the Saturday Evening Post, took an
initially favourable view of the nascent fascist experiment.
38. For example see leading editorials in the following: La Petite Republique,
29 October 1922; Le Temps, 1 and 2 November; Le Matin, 31 October; L'Intran-
Franceand the Rise of Fascism 609

sigeant, 31 October and 2 and 5 November; Le Gaulois, 31 October and 1

November; Le Petit Parisien, 3 November.
39. Comte Carlo Sforza, Illusions et realites de l'Europe (Neuchatel 1944),
22-24.
40. Paul Cambon, Correspondance, III (Paris 1946), 421; Alan Cassels, Musso-
lini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton 1970), 9.
41. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 33, 34-35 (two telegrams from Charles-Roux to
Poincare on 1 November 1922); Cassels, op. cit., 9; Raffaele Guariglia, La
Diplomatie difficile, Memoires, 1922-1946 (Paris 1955), 4.
42. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 252-55 (dispatch from Charles-Roux to Poin-
car6, 17 November 1922).
43. Jules Laroche, Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincare, 1913-1926 (Paris
1937), 167.
44. Cassels, op. cit., 15-16.
45. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 188-89 (3 November 1922); see also 196-204 (6
November 1922), 232-42 (15 November 1922). The theme of governmental
stability in Italy as a desirable prerequisite for the reestablishment of closer
Italo-French relations can also be found in Le Temps, 7 December 1922. This
leading article was written by Ludovic Naudeau, whose advocacy of an Italo-
French entente is pursued in his book, L 'Italie fasciste ou l'autre danger (Paris
1927), especially chapter V.
46. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 70-74.
47. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 224 (telegram from Barrere to Poincare, 11
November 1922).
48. Le Temps, 11, 12, 18 November 1922.
49. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 63, 64-73.
50. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 93, 14-15, 22-23.
51. Franqois Charles-Roux, 'La France et l'Italie des armistices a Locarno' in
Revue des deux mondes (1 March 1926), 194-96; Cassels, op. cit., 16, 47.
52. Chastenet, op. cit., 101.
53. Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Confession d'un vieux diplomat (Paris 1953),
643-44.
54. MAE, Papiers Barrere, III, 218, 219. Letters dated 7 and 12 December
1922.
55. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 90-95. Charles-Roux expressed this possibility
in a dispatch to Poincare on 13 December 1922. See also: Rene Albrecht-Carrie,
France, Europe and the Two World Wars(Geneva 1960), 133.
56. Cassels, op. cit., 54-56.
57. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 101-05 (telegram to Poincare).
58. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London
1927), 192-93.
59. Naudeau, op. cit., 78-79.
60. Professor Cairns used the expression in an article entitled 'March 7, 1936,
Again: The View from Paris: in International Journal, XX (Spring 1965), 230-46.
61. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 83, 34-42.
62. MAE, Italie, Z 374-4, 93, 48-52. Jouvenel's proposals had originally
appeared in an article in Le Matin. They were reproduced in this Foreign Ministry
Note for the Director of Political Affairs with instructions that they be communi-
cated to the French Embassy in Rome.
610 WilliamI. Shorrock

63. Chastenet, op. cit., 262.

64. See for example: Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: Souvenirs sur
la troisieme Republique, II (Paris 1945), 337-40; Flandin, op. cit., 94-95.

ANTI-RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION

A Study of Mass Persuasion
David E Powell
This study concentrates on the attempts in the Soviet Union to repress the
Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish and Moslem faiths through education, propaganda
and agitation, giving information based on official Soviet documents, Soviet
scholarly research and the insights of Western social science. The book focuses on
the programmed use of the mass media; indoctrination in schools; lectures aimed
at older audiences; substitution of secular equivalents for religious concepts,
institutions and rites; and efforts of agitators to promote "scientific atheism"
through face-to-face contact with individual believers. The author finds that, from
the Soviet viewpoint, such measures have been at best of limited success and at
worst counterproductive. Published September ?13.75.

WATCHMEN IN THE NIGHT

Presidential Accountability after Watergate
Theodore C Sorenson
In this examination of what Nixon's reign and resignation mean to the American
presidency, Theodore Sorenson refutes some currently popular beliefs. Specific-
ally, he attacks the notions that Nixon's departure ended the problem of presi-
dential misconduct for another decade or more; that Nixon was a strong President
and thus proof of the dangers of a strong presidency; that Nixon's ouster will
cause future presidents to be weak; that Nixon's pardon will cause future
presidents to be reckless. Sorenson sorts out what was new and different about
Watergate, including some frank admissions about the Kennedy White House.
?4.50.

THE M I T PRESS 126 Buckingham Palace Road, London SW1W 9SD