interview

Liu Binyan

The Future of China

Could you begin by telling us something about your background and life in China?
I was born in 1925 in northeast China and grew up in Harbin, a city greatly
influenced by Russian culture. My father had lived in Russia for many years,
and on his return to China became a Russian interpreter in a railway office.
This Russian-oriented family background was a formative influence in my
early life. I began to develop a serious interest in Marxism at the age of fourteen through a reading group organized by Communists. I participated in
the underground resistance movement against Japan when I was eighteen,
and subsequently became a Communist Party member in 1944. I worked as
a journalist from 1951, but was condemned as an anti-Party/socialist rightist
in 1957 for advocating freedom of the press and the right to criticize, and for
exposing in my writings the dark side of society. After being expelled from
the Party, I became a pariah, living a simple, modest existence for twentytwo years without any political rights. I was officially rehabilitated in 1979
5

and began writing again in much the same spirit for the Peoples Daily
and some major literary journals. I was expelled from the Party for the
second time, and for the same reasons, in 1987. As a persecuted
person in 1957 I was absolutely isolated, but thirty years later, after
being purged again, I attracted popular sympathy and supportwhat
a contrast! I have been visiting the United States since 1988 and am
currently working at Princeton University. My recent publications in
English are AutobiographyA Higher Kind of Loyalty, Tell the World, and
Chinas Crisis, Chinas Hope. It is my wish to return to China sooner
rather than later.
China is today among the few remaining countries in the world, and certainly
the major one, whose Communist regime remains in place, claiming economic
success and a degree of popular support. How do you explain this fact in contrast
to the fate of Communism in the former USSR and Eastern Europe?
First, Chinas historical trajectory is very different from that of either
the Soviet Union or the other East European countries. For more than
two decades prior to the seizure of power in 1949 the Chinese Communists had heroically resisted the ruling landlord class and the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and opposed the occupation of the country
by Japan, in tenacious military struggles. Their credit for this and
their achievements in the first few years of the Peoples Republicthe
elimination of unemployment and inflation, as well as such longstanding social problems as widespread opium addiction, prostitution and
banditrycontrasted sharply with the corrupt and incompetent Guomindang regime. Selfless and principled service on the part of Communist officials further strengthened the image of the Communist
Party as the great liberator of the people. By 1953, the restoration
and reconstruction of the national economy, and the rural cooperative
movement, which was a big step forward in land reform, had proved
very successful. Meanwhile, the social position of poor peasants and
workerswho made up the majority of the populationwas radically
transformed through the priority given to them and their children in
education, employment and political preferment; they also benefited
from the welfare system for state employees, including free medical
care. These changes established conditions that, to this day, serve to
legitimize the Communist Partys grip on power.
Secondly, Chinas current stability is testimony to the regimes effective screening of information and its system of ideological control,
which filter out much of what has really happened in the last forty
years. Scattered reports or dispersed protests never come together:
they remain fragmentary and contingentdisconnected events that
fail to cohere into any form of systematic understanding or become
public knowledge. The political system has prevented the emergence
of any organized opposition inside or outside the Party, leaving no
room for an alternative. It is very difficult to challenge a totalitarian
power in a country that lacks a democratic tradition and an independent intelligentsia.
Thirdly, we should bear in mind Chinas considerable economic
success. Although the 1989 democracy movement arose in direct
response to a perceived increase in corruption and social inequality, it
is nevertheless the case that the remarkable improvement in living
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standards brought about by economic reform has greatly enhanced

the standing of the Communist regime.
These are convincing explanations. When you say that the early achievements of
the regime remain factors favourable to its continuation, are you thereby indicating that Communist rule has not yet lost its legitimacy, despite severe official
corruption and social polarization? Or can one make a distinction between the
regime and long-term social achievements? What is the root of the drastic and
seemingly fatal process of Communist degeneration? Is the historic role of the
Communist Party a justification for intellectuals to identify themselves with the
government?
To respond first to the question about the regimes legitimacy. As
early as the mid 1970s, Communism, as represented by the Gang of
Four, had lost its legitimacy. The reforms carried out after the death
of Mao gave the Party a chance to recover some credit. For many
people, however, the crackdown on the student movement of 1989
marked the end of Communist legitimacy. Yet the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union has done the Chinese regime a
great service. Afraid of chaos, the breakup of the country, and the
economic hardship that characterizes the current situation in the
former Soviet empire, the Chinese people are now giving the Communist government another chance.
Nevertheless, it has to be said that the old image of a benign Communism is long gone in China as well. All other factors aside, knowledge of the
great tragedies and failures for which the Communist Party was
responsible has become increasingly widespreadevents such as the
famine of 196062 that cost millions of lives; the waste of the so-called
third-line and other barely functioning industries, which drew sweat
and toil from the workers; the endless political campaigns that produced
numerous injustices; the inhuman conditions of the labour camps that
incarcerated innocent people. The execution of young dissidents was
even more flagrant, as many had been inspired by Marxism. Of course,
public attitudes toward the Party vary greatlybetween different
generations, occupations and professions, vested interests, and so on.
I do not think the pusillanimity and subservience of Chinas intellectuals can be justified. Most of us joined the Party when and because it
led the struggle for the liberation of the exploited and the oppressed
and for national independence. But past achievements cannot compensate for its recent mistakes and crimes. The lack of a critical
faculty among many intellectuals is a fundamental failing of our cultural tradition.
Let us return to the question of the weakness of Chinas intellectuals later. For
the present could you say more about the impact of the Soviet collapse on China?
Specifically, do people in China tend to consider that Deng has been proved right
and Gorbachev wrong, by contrasting Chinas economic progress and political
stability with the difficult and confused transition to nowhere in Russia and
other former Soviet republics?
The impact has been twofold. On the one hand, the collapse of Stalinist socialism elsewhere confirms our own experience in China: such a
system will come to no good end anywhere. But on the other hand,
anti-Communist policiesacts of revenge and discrimination against
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Communists in Russia, East Germany or Czechoslovakia, for example

have disturbed many Chinese Communists and encouraged in them
a defensive attitude, which for the moment helps consolidate the unity
of the Party. My sense is that we are unlikely to see a Gorbachev-style
attempt to reform Chinese Communism, because that attempt failed
Communism was not reformed but totally defeated.
Does the plight of Russia also help to strengthen nationalism, or a feeling of
national pride, in China, as people feel a sense of shame for the Russians, who
abandoned the entire culture of a revolutionary tradition somehow too easily
and blindly?
Firstly, I do not believe socialism is dead, even in Russia; a false picture is created by the Western media, which chooses not to report, for
instance, on the activities of the left opposition there, or on the work
of socialists within the Communist Parties in those post-socialist
countries. On the substantive point, there is, for me, nothing to celebrate in that kind of Chinese national pride. Nationalism is the last
card of the reactionary conservatives, who can still effectively use it to
mobilize many people in the interests of a totalitarian politics.
Nationalism within such a context is repugnant and dangerous.
As to Chinas economic performance over the last ten or fifteen years
which has succeeded in raising the standard of livingI want to
stress one factor that is often neglected: it was less to the credit of the
government than to ordinary Chinese people that the reform has
taken place and worked. The decollectivization movement was initiated by the peasants. At the beginning it was opposed by the Party
leadership, who therefore did not formulate suitable policies to
encourage the process until it had already made considerable headway. The same is true of the rapid development of village and township industries. I am still inclined to believe that cooperatives organized on a truly voluntary basis represent the way out for Chinas so far
largely unmechanized agriculture, and that the peasants are again
likely to take the initiative in that future reorganizing process.
The reform policy was resisted by the conservatives, causing major setbacks, but
eventually reform carried the day. What is the real significance of the changes,
and what is the relationship between economic and political reform? Do
the repressive features of the Beijing regime explain economic dynamism?
Alternatively, is continued economic advance threatened by the old power
structure, which remains intact? Or will that advance itself bring about political change?
The advantage of Chinas economic reform is that the basic concern
of ordinary people to become materially better off, and the fundamental commitment of the Party to the maintenance of its power, coincide. In fact, only a small minority within the Party have so far
opposed economic reform. Even some who originally opposed the
market in the name of socialism subsequently changed their minds
as they found themselves benefiting from its introduction. The lack of
resistance to the market-oriented reform reflects in the ccp a much
less dogmatic ideology than that of its Soviet counterpart. We do not
have an individual champion of reform of the standing of Gorbachev
or Dub ek; nevertheless, strong support for thoroughgoing reform
mainly economic (the use of a market mechanism), but also political
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(the extension of democracy)can be found at all levels of the Party,

despite the persistence of arguments concerning tactical or technical
issues and differing views about its proper direction.
Our reform is, nonetheless, gravely disadvantaged by Chinas long
history of government-run commerce and manufacture: the transformation of the privileged Party bureaucrats into a bureaucratcomprador bourgeoisie is already under way. The answer to the
mystery of why communism does not worry about capitalism is
simply that the group with the prime vested interest in economic
reform consists of the leaders and their families. Using legal or illegal
means, they obtain access to the state treasury and thereby control an
immense amount of social wealth.
Does this phenomenon resemble the four big families of the pre-liberation period
under the Guomindang regime?
Yes, to some extent, although the two historical contexts are obviously
quite different. The combination today of national and foreign capital
in the hands of those who, as officials, are public servants, and yet
who, as businessmen, are at once in search of personal gain, is by far
the most serious form of widespread corruption, and a source of mass
discontent and therefore of potential crisis. I would add, though, that
as reform progresses it seems likely that social forces will have to
realign, and that a splitting up of the Party is likely.
Can you elaborate on this speculation? Do you consider Communism to be
reformable in China, and could you specify the forces at work inside the Party
today? Are there any reasons to suppose that reformed Communism could be any
more successful in China than it has been elsewhere?
One result of Dengs reform of the 1980s which proposed recruitment
of younger and better-educated cadres is that at present most of those
of middle rank (vice-ministers or assistant provincial governors
downwards) are in their forties and early fifties and possess formal
qualifications. Their outlook and way of thinking are quite different
from those of the veteran leaders, and they are much better informed
about the outside world and new trends. Some are tempted by the
West, but those familiar with the realities of life in China and who
retain a belief in the original impulse and ideals of the revolution, and
yet are themselves committed reformers, remain sceptical about a
capitalist solution with its demand for full-scale privatization. Both
groups, from their differing perspectives, oppose economic reform
that in essence leads toward capitalism with Chinese characteristics
the combination of indigenous bureaucracy and imported capitalismand advocate instead political reform, beyond Dengs programme,
directed toward democracy. My point is that foreign observers tend to
confine their attention to a few central leaders and the power struggle
within that small circle, and ignore those newly emerged people at
lower and local levels who have sustained the reform.
Moreover, it is no longer appropriate to concentrate only on the Party and
on inner-Party conflicts. The growth of technocracy, in economic development but also in politics and culture, must be taken into account,
for example. Another significant group is the so-called thinking generationthose, now in their late thirties to late forties, whose formative
9

years included the period of the Cultural Revolution. Their experiences

firstly as Maos Red Guards and, in many cases, subsequently as
objects of official opprobrium for opposing purges and social dislocation; living with the peasants or workers and championing the cause
of the least privileged; receiving their education in a chaotic but nevertheless innovative periodhave together afforded them a deep understanding of the countrys real conditions, and thereby enabled them to
develop their own proposals for change. Our best writers, reporters, film
makers, entrepreneurs and Party cadres, as well as key elements in the
administration and the army, are of this generation, which now forms
the backbone of Chinese society. The attitude of workers on the state
payroll toward reform is also very important in determining its future
direction: it is still an open question as to what should replace the now
much criticized iron rice bowl system of jobs for life.
Has there been any discussion of workers control?
No, not yet. There was in the early 1980s a movement from above for
workers participationpart of Dengs reluctant political reform. In
1988, there was even an attempt, again from above, to grant the trade
unions independence. But since the overall framework of Party
control is intended to be beyond challenge, any move toward workers representative committees, or any other form of so-called democratic management, can be no more than empty talk, a mere gesture.
However, the movement now looks set to be revived from below. On
the one hand, workers are likely to be enthusiastic about political
gains, seeing them as compensation for their loss of economic security
the sharing of power over production and distribution will especially be in their interest. On the other hand, the position of the Party
has been considerably weakened over the last few years, as the process
of its separation from administration and direct intervention in
economic affairs has continued.
Are you saying that in terms of everyday life the Party is no longer the decisive
institution? Can it be said that the present regime corresponds to the classical
Communist model as established in the Soviet Union? Would you give us a
sketch of the political structure in China and how it works?
Communism in peasant China differed from the Soviet model from
the very beginning. The long struggle between the Comintern-trained
one-hundred-per-cent Bolsheviks and Maos countrified Marxists
ended with the victory of the latter. Though China copied almost the
entire set of Soviet systems in the 1950s, Mao always put the emphasis
on Chinese characteristics, following a different path from that of
the ussr in, say, buying out, rather than expropriating, the national
bourgeoisie, and in the approach to collectivization, which was much
less violent in China. Another example is the attitude adopted toward
non-Communist parties that were the allies of the ccp in the revolution; these were allowed to continue to exist, though by no means as
independent oppositions.
Then there followed the Cultural Revolution in the second half of the
1960s, which dealt the Party machine a heavy blow. Despite the
enormous effort made in the post-Mao period to restore that machine,
it seems that what made it function in the past, its rigorous discipline, high prestige among the masses, and unswerving ideological
10

commitment, are all beyond repair. A pattern has become established

whereby local cadres overtly comply with, but covertly oppose, those
instructions given by the centre which they do not like; and a certain
understanding nowadays informs relations between the leaders and
the led at almost all levelsfriction can be avoided by observing the
most perfunctory compliance with protocol. In accordance with the
general relaxation of the Party organization, internal debate and
disagreement is now well publicized through various channels. This
important change enables those at the grass roots to have more
influence on the decisions made in the Politburo.
Another matter of note is that in recent years, since retired high Party
officials at central and local levels have moved into the Peoples
Congress or the Peoples Political Consultative Conference in Beijing
and other parts of the country, the power of these two formerly
rubber-stamp institutions has effectively increased. Their supposed
role of supervising the ruling Communist Party is gaining some real
meaning.
Your sketch is very enlightening. Would you further explain the balance of
institutional forces within the regime by adding a word on the military? Is it
true that the military still plays a considerable part in determining Chinas
fate? Have Dengs links with the army been a decisive factor in his continuing
power? There is an apparent tension between the powerful position of the military commanders on the one hand, and the drastic reduction in the size of the
army and the military estate on the other.
It is true that China has reduced its forces by a million troops and
converted a large proportion of military-production facilities to
civilian use, aiming at modernization of its armed forces and a release
from the burden of military expenditure. However unpleasant this
slimming down was for the army people, it is important to recall that
the long-standing and deep-rooted strength of the army was built
during the years of three civil wars, the war against Japan and the
Korean War. Communist political power in China, in Maos words,
grew out of the barrel of a gun in the rural bases. If Deng were not
himself an army man with very close connections to high-ranking
military personnel, he would be unable to succeed either in his overall
reform project or in the reorganization of the army.
Like the Party, the army has long existed as a somewhat problematic
unity. One of the legacies of the Chinese Communists peculiar path
to power is what we used to call mountain-stronghold mentality, a
reference to the sectarianism originating from the differences between
bases, areas or army groups, and the fact of their shared interests and
common cause. The art of politics, then, has been to a great extent the
balancing of factions. Mao was a superb tactician in this regard and
enjoyed such supreme power and personal prestige that he could act
at will. Dengs power cannot be compared with that of Mao, yet since
the latters death he alone has possessed the skill and credentials, and
is senior enough to keep control of, as well as obtain support from,
the military. The army, like the Party, has been involved in business
deals sanctioned by the reform policies, and is well known for its even
bolder though less extensive corruption. This has produced a polarization between the senior commanders, who benefit the most, and
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rank-and-file soldiers and junior officers. My hope is that change will

follow the promotion of better-educated and younger officers.
What is the relation between area commands and local authorities? That is,
how do you reconcile centralized control of the military with the authority of the
regional powers?
I am unable to generalize. The single case I know of is based on shared
economic interests: the military and the Party administration in the
Guangdong area have united to demand more autonomy and rights
from the centre.
But where might this kind of demand lead? We have seen in Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union the break-up of Communist federations and empires; might
similar forms of separatism develop in Chinafor example, could the southern
provinces try to split off? Is there currently any serious nationalist movement
among the minorities? What is your assessment of the effects of the Guangdongstyle separatist tendencies?
I have always believed in the right to self-determination. The only way
to hold together a multiethnic country like China, and to ensure its
economic and cultural development, is to safeguard this right. Fortunately so far we have not been confronted with a national conflict of
the Yugoslav or Soviet kind. As for separatism, I am sympathetic to
the claim for regional autonomy because it assists democratization of
the Communist system. In other words, in the absence of any organized opposition, confrontation between the centre and the localities
has a vital function: it has actually helped to check totalitarianism.
Due to the Chinese tradition of a unified state, I do not think any
province of Han nationality (the Hans account for 96 per cent of the
population) will declare independence. Decentralization of economic
and political power is nevertheless now an irreversible trend.
You made a very interesting observation on the oppositional function of the
development of local power. In this connection, would you comment on the
influence of Taiwan and Hong Kong on the mainland? In particular, what is
the popular response to the growing independence movement in Taiwan?
I feel special gratitude toward the people of Hong Kong, whom
among overseas Chinese demonstrated the strongest support for the
1989 democracy movement. Hong Kong has been a safe haven for
persecuted mainlanders since the early years of the revolutionfor
Communists and fellow travellers under the Guomindang regime, and
dissidents under Communism alike. Taiwans influence, on the other
hand, has been mainly economic. Democratic reform there has had
little impact on the mainland: the population at large seems to have
little interest in the issue of Chinas unification. Nevertheless, the two
ruling parties, ccp and kmt, will probably resume cooperative relations before too long. One matter that is of some immediate concern,
it should be said, is the effect of commercial and colonial cultures on
our coastal areas, especially in the special economic zones.
You sound somewhat nostalgic. Perhaps we could now turn to the question of
culturespecifically the realm of social psychology or popular consciousness.
What is your impression of the gravity of Chinas ideological crisis and the
social problems accompanying the reform process? Do you attribute them solely to
the open door policy and foreign influence?
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I must say that I have no nostalgia for the core of Chinese Communist
ideology, which has denied individuality and effectively instrumentalized people and cultural life over the past several decades. It is
precisely because of the paucity and hypocrisy of that extreme asceticism that the low culture of commercial advertising, pornography and
the fetishism of money so readily finds adherents today. As I mentioned earlier, although China copied the Soviet system, it never quite
followed that road of economic and political development. One
striking distinction between the two societies is the effectiveness in
China of using ethical concepts to impose ideological control and,
more, to mobilize people in mass movements of self-education or
self-reconstruction in a way that convinces them that such compliance in fact represents volition. For a long time we believed in the
idea of being the Partys docile instrument, of individualism as the
root of all evil, of fearing neither hardship nor deathindeed many
of us deliberately sought hardship and even death, which were seen as
essential constituents of life, if not virtues and goals in themselves.
Any concern with the self was politically unacceptable.
All this has its origin in Chinas military-Communist tradition: in the
same way that brutal wars lack any respect for human life, so cruel
conditions imposed and policed by an immensely strong enemy prevent the growth of a free spirit and of trust. The price paid for the
liberation of the people and the nation in a genuine revolution was the
absolute repression of individual humanity. The armed revolution
rationalized such repressioncalling it the revolutionary tradition
in the peaceful post-revolutionary period. It was clear from my own
experience of living in a liberated area for three years, before the
Communists seized state power, that the revolution would assuredly
bring people a better material life, but that it might not achieve freedom and happiness beyond that. This seemed to follow from the
heavy military flavour, and from the fact that Mao and the Communists did not believe that men could be free without at once regressing
to a debased state. My anticipation of a military-camp-style socialism
has regrettably proved to be correct.
Was the propaganda campaign against bourgeois humanism also important
in building such an anti-individualist mentality?
Yes, very important. That campaign lasted thirty years, aiming at the
ultimate instrumentalization of human individuals. Even the much
celebrated and short-lived policy of a hundred flowers was directed
toward the same end, referring only to the variety of forms and styles,
not contents. But how, we might ask, can there be a socialism with no
individuals and only machines? What is socialism for and how can it
be built without people? This paradox reveals the fundamental flaw in
Maoist socialism.
I see the degraded morality of Chinas reform period as in part a reaction to, or compensation for, the mistaken denunciation of humanism,
rather than as a result of corrosive external influence. Once the old
doctrine collapsed, many committed people became passive, apathetic
and cynical, some very bitter. I have been astonished at the development, since the mid 1980s, of what can only be described as a desperate consumerism and ethos of pleasure-seeking, at the wholesale
13

plunder of society and other people, the flood of crimes, the waves of
overseas migration, the apparently aimless destruction of public and
state propertyantisocial behaviour fuelled by naked egoism and
blind worship of anything foreign. For the first time in my life I am
meeting ordinary Chinese people who no longer regard this country as
their own; indeed, many regard it as an object of hate or contempt.
If, as you suggest, the entire society is degenerating, where can we find resources
for change? Do you think you are perhaps overly pessimistic?
No, I dont think I am. My point is that in the present conjuncture
moral decline and the awakening of self-consciousness are coterminous. The Cultural Revolution had the effect of challenging the foundation of our slave mentality. One of the gains of the more recent
reform, which began with the movement of emancipating the mind,
was the further purging of Chinese citizens servility toward the state
a process which has had and will continue to have considerable
political implications. The liberation of peasants from communes, for
example, was a significant achievement in this regard: serving to
diminish citizens personal attachment to the state and encouraging
the growth of an ethic of independence.
It is still unclear what precisely lay behind the doctrine of anti-(bourgeois)
humanism. It seems a clear verdict of history that the CCP was mistaken to
resist CPSU-led de-Stalinization in the late 1950s, and that this mistake was
decisive and fatal. Had it not done so, China would probably not have gone so
far in the direction of Stalinism, given Maos lack of respect for both Stalin and
the Comintern; and maybe the international Communist movement would then
have taken a course of reform and renewal rather than defeat. What assessment would you make of this important background factor?
I think you are right to stress the significance of the SinoSoviet split.
The slogan put forward in the Khrushchev era was Everything for
Man. The Chinese Partys criticism of modern revisionism was bound
to counter that slogan. This also explains why the so-called issue of
human rights was not recognized in China until very recently. What
was at stake, after all, was the guarantee of the Partys absolute power,
which required the elimination of any independent thinking.
To take up your mention of human rights: do you concur with the charges made
against China on this issue? How would you comment on the Chinese governments attempts to defend itself?
Nobody can defend the indefensible. No honest government official
can deny that China has a poor record with regard to human rights.
This matter cannot simply be dismissed as mere Western opinion; it
is a matter of vital importance that we ourselves in China must face.
The operation of a system of personal rule rather than the rule of law
has permitted all kinds of physical and psychological violations
against those living and working in rural villages as much as against
those in the Zhongnanhai offices, during the course of well-intentioned
social experiments as well as ill-motivated power struggles. The voluntarist push for socialist transformation at any cost outweighed the
gains of economic construction and seriously affected our quality of
life, not to mention its contribution to factors like runaway population growth and large-scale environmental damage. I acknowledged
14

earlier that in some ways the Communist Party has made a valuable
contribution to the nations well-being. Had it been able also to
understand and respect human rights, many disasters and much
suffering would have been avoided and people in China would have
lived a more satisfying and happier life.
I would like to return to the subject of intellectuals. What is the current situation within Chinas literary and press circles? Who actually runs the media in
different parts of the country?
The official mediain effect the only formal channel of information
are run by the Party propaganda departments both in Beijing and at the
provincial and lower levels. The State Ministry of Broadcast, Television
and Film is instructed by the Party Central Committees special group
in charge of propaganda and cultural affairs. But China is such a huge
country, with a tradition known as the sky is so high and the emperor
so far away, that central Party control cannot always be tightly maintained. Also, because we lack any formal organ of press censorship,
the quality of a newspaper, for example, is heavily dependent upon the
abilities and judgment of its editor. In the 1980s, the political climate
directly determined the degree of press freedom. Consequently, those
in this sector of the mass media suffered greatly during the crackdown
against the protest movement of 1989. Many friends have spoken of
the bitterness felt by conscientious journalists since that time, especially because their colleagues languish in prison, a few serving long
sentences, and nothing can be done to effect their release.
The situation of the literary circles is a little better. Influential writers
have managed to protest by recourse to civil disobedience: they have
either stopped writing or now only write for local publications beyond
the reach of the conservative ideologues. They also find excuses to avoid
attendance at official meetings. Keenly aware of this opposition, the
authorities have not to this day dared to call the fifth Conference of the
All-China Writers Union, which was originally scheduled for 1989.
But if they have stopped writing altogether, or indeed even if they have simply
ceased to write for the important journals, their influence diminishes. If we
recall the authoritative role that critical social literature played in the postCultural Revolution period, doesnt this abnegation represent a great loss?
In fact, a strong tendency or fashion emerged in the wake of the Cultural
Revolution to escape the immediate reality of Chinese society and to
write either in an outdated spirit of art for arts sake or with an eye on
the Western market. This tendency, which is very different from my
own, has unquestionably had a negative impact on the development
of Chinas literature and art. There are, however, currently some signs
of revival of a vigorous and critical journalism and literature, resulting from a shift in favour of reform following Dengs trip to the South
early this year. There is good reason to believe that a relatively relaxed
climate will now set in, such as was seen from time to time in the 1980s.
So you are of the view that the forces of reform are growing in strength. Can you
tell us what lies behind this belief? Are you referring to the forthcoming Party
conference? What particular outcome are you expecting?
The fourteenth Party Congress is likely to be a turning point, in that it
15

will reveal the outcome of the strugglemainly in the political and

ideological realmsbetween reform Communists and die-hard Stalinists. The arguments over the necessity for a thoroughgoing economic
reformthough not the manner of its concrete implementation
have already largely been settled. As a result of the retirement of the
first two Communist generations, significant changes of personnel
could be decided at the Congress; these will very possibly be to the
reformers advantage. It is likely that the inner-Party struggles that are
unfolding as the Party Congress approaches could produce greater
press freedoma direct result of the need both sides have to publicize
their causes and garner support.
What do you think will happen following the death of Deng?
I do not wish to give an impression that Chinas destiny hinges on one
individual. For, as I said before, without the extensive and broadbased search for an alternative, reform would not have been initiated.
Nevertheless, the balance of the currently contending forces within
the Party does critically depend on Dengs strength. There might be
unrest in some areas after his death but, so long as the leadership does
not turn its back on change, there need not be widespread disorder or
a breakdown. China can maintain a course of peaceful transformation. Even if one day other parties are allowed to exist, I believe a
renewed Communist Party, free of both its Stalinist and bureaucraticcapitalist components, could still be a major force.
Perhaps you would say a word here about the loosely organized overseas democracy movement led by the political exiles who fled the post-Tiananmen Square
crackdown, which seeks a multi-party system and a free-market economy for
China?
In short, it is my view that there is little to be done outside the country. My support goes to those leading participants of the 1989 movement who have stayed in China, suffering persecution but retaining
their commitment to democratic reform. They have my greatest
respect.
A final question about yourself. Have you ever regretted being a Communist for
nearly half a century? What hope do you have for the future of your people and
country?
As I told you at the beginning, I began to read Marxism seriously at
the age of fourteen and joined the Communist Party at nineteen.
What I had sought was a free and flourishing new China, a society
without exploitation and repression. Looking back, I feel no regret for
the path I choseneither my participation in the revolution and complicated relationship with the Party, nor the influence on me of
Marxism. My experience between 1957 and 1979 of being at the
bottom of society made me a loyal member of the working people. I
am proud of my efforts against the privileged bureaucrats and social
injustice in general. I believe China will find her own path to a
credible socialism. The past failures and successes have prepared the
ground for, rather than destroyed, such a future.
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