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Daniel J. Pochoda
dpochoda@acluaz.org
Brenda Muoz Furnish
bmfurnish@acluaz.org
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
3707 N. 7th Street, Suite 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
Facsimile: (602) 650-1376
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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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v.
Joseph M. Arpaio, et al.,
Defendant.
NO. CV 07-02513-PHX-GMS
PARTIES JOINT
MEMORANDUM RE: INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS
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Julia Gomez*
jgomez@maldef.org
Pursuant to the Courts order during a conference on May 31, 2016, the parties
jointly submit this memorandum stating their respective positions on the internal
that should apply in such investigations. See Findings of Fact (Doc. 1677), 902-07.
Plaintiffs and the United States note that, after providing Defendants with a draft of
Plaintiffs and the United States sections of the memorandum and conducting a
telephonic conference, Defendants provided their sections of this joint memorandum late
on the date of filing and did not advise Plaintiffs that Defendants intended to include
briefing and legal argument. Plaintiffs and the United States note that the Parties have
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already had an opportunity to brief these issues in their May 27 memoranda and that
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Defendants submission is beyond the scope of the Courts direction for the instant
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memorandum. Plaintiffs and the United States respectfully request leave to file a response
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brief if helpful to the Courts consideration of the matters herein. Defendants disagree
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with Plaintiffs characterization of the timing and content of Defendants portion of the
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Joint Memorandum. If the Court allows Plaintiffs to file a responsive brief, as Plaintiffs
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request, Defendants request that the Court grant them the opportunity to file a reply to
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Plaintiffs response.
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pursuant to Paragraph 903 or initiated pursuant to Paragraphs 904 or 905. In the rare case
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in which members of the Monitor team have a conflict that cannot be resolved through the
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IDs in Sergeant Knapps possession), Plaintiffs and the United States request that the
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Court appoint another independent authority, with no ties to Defendants, to conduct the
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investigation.
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Plaintiffs and the United States also maintain that the Monitor, or another
independent authority where one is appointed by the Court, should have ultimate authority
to determine discipline according to the applicable MCSO discipline matrix in cases re-
opened under Paragraph 903 or initiated under Paragraphs 904 and 905. In such cases,
Plaintiffs and the United States propose that if the Monitor (or other independent
termination, the employee should receive a letter notifying him or her of the proposed
hearing before the Monitor (or independent authority, if appointed). This process will be
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adequate to protect the employees due process rights under Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
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Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). After the Monitor (or independent authority, if
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appointed) imposes final discipline, employees should be afforded the right to appeal the
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final decision of the Monitor (or independent authority, if appointed) to the Maricopa
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Employees have a right to such an appeal under state law, which this Court may supplant
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upon a showing that the state law stands as an impediment to the enforcement of federal
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court orders or federal law. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-53 (1990)
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(finding that a district court order imposing a tax increase to fund a desegregation plan
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contravened the principles of comity that must govern the exercise of the District Courts
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equitable discretion because the district court could have ordered the local governmental
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authority to raise the necessary revenue itself). The Monitors (or if applicable, the
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County Merit Commission. If the County Merit Commission alters or rescinds any
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findings or discipline, Defendants should inform the Court and the other parties, and the
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Court may then determine whether the Commissions decision stands as an impediment to
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the enforcement of the Courts orders or federal law and enter any appropriate orders.
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Plaintiffs and the United States also submit that the Court should make a finding
that, for investigations to be re-done pursuant to Paragraph 903 of the Findings of Fact
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(Doc. 1677), the 180-day statute of limitations under A.R.S. 38-1110 is an impediment
to the enforcement of federal law and the Courts orders. This finding is amply supported
by the Courts previous Findings of Fact and implicit in its order that investigations found
void must be re-done. The Court should also order the County Merit Commission not to
Plaintiffs and the United States submit that all findings of fact made by this Court
in the contempt proceeding (Doc. 1677), after a full evidentiary hearing, may be cited as
the basis for findings in internal investigations (i.e., Sustained, Not Sustained, Exonerated,
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Plaintiffs and the United States request that the Court order procedures that authorize the
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Monitor to conduct such IA investigations and to determine discipline (with the same
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Remedies for Civil Contempt (Doc. 1684) at 8-9. However, in order to provide MCSO
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personnel with training and guidance for sustainable reform, Plaintiffs and the United
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States submit that the Court should grant the Monitor the authority to delegate those
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and supervision by the Monitor. Consistent with this Courts Order of November 20,
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2014 (Doc. 795) at 18, individual members of the Monitor team who become involved in
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conducting investigations should be walled off from other members of the Monitor team.2
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Plaintiffs and the United States further submit that any recently initiated IA
investigations based upon the review of newly reviewed Armendariz-related video files
(see, e.g., Doc. 1710) should be subject to the procedures ordered by the Court under
Paragraph 905.
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II.
as contemnors and therefore had an opportunity to be heard (Chief Deputy Sheridan and
Lieutenant Sousa), the Monitor or the Court immediately determine appropriate discipline
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injunction. The Courts contempt findings thoroughly address the facts underlying those
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Plaintiffs and the United States also request that the Monitor or the Court
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immediately determine appropriate discipline for the making of willful false statements
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made to the Court and the Monitor by Chief Deputy Sheridan (Doc. 1677, 87, 229-30,
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Plaintiffs and the United States also submit that all final disciplinary decisions
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related investigations (Doc. 1673-1 and Doc. 1674) should be immediately examined by
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the Monitor to determine whether the facts as set forth in the IA files comport with the
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discipline imposed and the applicable MCSO discipline matrix. This process, which is
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focused on compliance with the discipline matrix in these IA cases, should not preclude
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re-investigation of any of the facts underlying these matters as set forth below and in
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III.
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A.
underlying these two investigations other than Chief Deputy Sheridan and Lieutenant
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Zebro, and any other MCSO personnel for violations of MCSO policy in the handling of
1) The IA cases found by this Court to have been invalid, void, or deficient,
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against fellow deputies in the IA 12-11 case. See Ex. 2521; Tr. of Sept.
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Two of the IA cases listed in Doc. 1685 were mislabeled. The reference to IA #2015541 should be 2014-541. And the case labeled as IA #2014-021 should be 2015-21.
ground that he was not the only deputy involved in the mishandling of
categorized under the MCSO discipline matrix. See Ex. 2037, 2038; Tr.
C.
Truthfulness Violations
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statements made to the Court and the Monitor by Chief Trombi and
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Captain Bailey. See Doc. 1677, 87, 229-30, 326, 333-39, 348, 385,
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816, 832.
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2) Investigation of any MCSO personnel who have claimed that IDs found
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D.
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Documents
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traffic stops involving members of the Plaintiff class. The Court found
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eyewitnesses (the passengers in the vehicle). Ex. 2784; Tr. of Oct. 28,
2015, at 3845-48.
reviewing MCSO lieutenant believed there was no apparent basis for the
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F.
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the possible theft of $260. The Court found this matter was improperly
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The Court found that these matters all involved members of the Plaintiff
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license plate from a Plaintiff class member and the improper handling of
IV.
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Investigation
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Plaintiffs and the United States request that the Court permit the parties and the
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Monitor to identify additional matters for investigation as the foregoing matters are
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investigated and facts are developed and disclosed. Plaintiffs and the United States
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parties, subject to any appropriate protective orders, after the investigations are completed
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A.
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Cognizant that the Court wishes to swiftly see the appointment of an independent
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third party to oversee both new and re-opened IA investigations set forth in its Findings
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This procedure is an accelerated one that will permit the parties to provide the Court with
candidates from each party for the Courts consideration.
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B.
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The independent third party can impose discipline pursuant to the appropriate
MCSO disciplinary matrix.4 In addition, any determination made by the independent third
party regarding the IAs ordered by the Court should be final, subject to any available
administrative and/or appellate process provided under Arizona state law.
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II.
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A.
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1.
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While the Court has inherent power to invoke the weight of the judicial authority
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if state and local authorities, who have the primary responsibility for curing constitutional
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Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977), there are limits to the Courts inherent
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power to do so. Under Article III, the judicial power granted to federal courts is not an
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Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (D. Neb.
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2010). Injunctive relief must be tailored to the actual harm proven at trial. See Lewis v.
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Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996). Moreover, a courts exercise of its contempt authority
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must be constrained by the principle that only the least possible power adequate to
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achieve the end proposed should be used in contempt cases. Young v. U.S. ex rel.
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Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), is instructive on this issue. At issue in Rizzo
were allegations that the Mayor, Police Commissioner of Philadelphia, and others
minority citizens and other residents. Id. at 366. The district court imposed a
comprehensive program for addressing such complaints. Id. at 362-63. The Supreme
Court struck down the district courts injunction, holding that the district court had
important part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments
. . . [w]hen it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of
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this state agency, the District Court departed from these precepts. Id. at 380 (emphasis
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Id. at 378 (citations and quotations omitted).5 This delicate balance requires government
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to have the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs. Id. at 378-79, citing
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Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
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The failure to protect these sovereign choices is a failure to abide by the Guarantee
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Clause in Article IV, 4, the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
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ignores the federal judiciarys duty to preserve the healthy balance of power between the
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States and the Federal Government [designed to] reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
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from either front. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 463 (1991) (citations omitted)
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See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)
(It is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal
court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.); City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (jurisprudential concerns of equity, comity
and federalism sharply constrict federal judicial oversight of state law enforcement
authorities.); id. at 113 (comity counsels in favor of permitting state judiciary systems to
oversee state law enforcement practices); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)
(same).
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(quoting U.S. Const. art. IV, 4).6 The overarching concern is particularly manifest here,
given that Arizona county sheriffs derive their powers directly from the Arizona
traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-79 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 52 (1990) (local officials should at least have the opportunity to
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devise their own solutions to [their own] problems before intervention by a federal
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district court). Nevertheless, in a good faith effort to reconcile the Courts view of
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remedial efforts required to restore the Courts and the communitys confidence in MCSO
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processes and the required latitude afforded to MCSO in handling its internal affairs,
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Sheriff Arpaio agrees to vest such authority in an independent objective third party.
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2.
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Sheriff Arpaio also reiterates to the Court his constitutional due process concerns
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regarding re-opening closed IA investigations and potential issues involving future IAs.
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A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's
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showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution. Wedges/Ledges of
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California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Board of
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Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir.
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1989). A protected property interest is present where an individual has a reasonable
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Arizona Courts have also refused to permit independent agencies to supervise and
impose discipline on County officers. In Hounshell v. White, 202 P.3d 466 (Ariz. App.
2008), the Court of Appeals of Arizona considered whether an Arizona Board of
Supervisors has power to supervise and impose discipline on employees of other
county officers, concluding it does not: The Arizona legislature knows how to expressly
grant a board of supervisors the power to supervise and impose discipline when it wishes
to do so. It has not done so with respect to deputies and employees of other county
officers, and we can only conclude that its choice in this regard was intentional. Id. at
471.
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expectation of entitlement deriving from existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. A reasonable
expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the
Co. Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L.Ed.2d 458 (1984). Although procedural requirements
ordinarily do not transform a unilateral expectation into a protected property interest, such
substantive restriction on ... decision making. Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820
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The Ninth Circuit has found that various state statutes and city codes create
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constitutionally protected due process rights. See Wedges, 24 F.3d at 63 (property interest
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is created by the Phoenix City Code requiring the city to issue an operating license if a
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City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding constitutionally protected
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property interest in merit pay where city grievance procedure implicitly restricted the
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Similarly, Defendant Arpaio reiterates that the Arizona Police Officers Bill of
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this statutory scheme is to provide special protections for law enforcement officers,
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including those at MCSO, who are subject to an internal affairs investigation and/or
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disciplinary action. See A.R.S. 38-1101(8)(c) (Law enforcement officer means [a]
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Accord Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 657 (9th Cir.1983) (Court held that the
criteria for vacating plotted city streets created a property interest); see also T.T. v.
Bellevue Sch. Dist., 376 Fed. Appx. 769, 771 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding to trial court to
determine whether the Washington Administrative Code (the Code) gave T.T. a
reasonable expectation of a protected entitlement because the mandatory nature of the
Code sections created a significant substantive restriction on the school district's decision
making.).
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nonprobationary regularly appointed and paid deputy sheriff of a county.). This statutory
scheme, in part, ensures that officers receive adequate notice of an internal investigation
(A.R.S. 38-1104(A)), the names of all individuals associated with the investigation
(A.R.S. 38-1104(E)), just cause for termination (A.R.S. 1101(7), specific time limits
for conducting an IA investigation (A.R.S. 38-1110), and specific appellate rights from
protected due process rights because they stem from state law and contain particularized
standards or criteria to create a property interest. Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.3d
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367, 370 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Gates, 716 F.2d at 734.
With respect to 903-905 of the Courts Findings of Fact (Doc. 1677), A.R.S.
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38-1110 provides that an employer shall make a good faith effort to complete any
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investigation of employee misconduct within one hundred eighty calendar days after the
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one hundred eighty calendar days may result in the appeal board dismissing any discipline
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ordered if it is determined that the employer did not make a good faith effort to complete
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the investigation within one hundred eighty calendar days. A.R.S. 38-1110(C). In
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awarded monetary damages and attorneys fees. See A.R.S. 38-1106(J); 38-1107(C)-
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decisions by MCSO and instituting new ones in their place might violate the timeliness
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provisions of the statutory scheme. Likewise, the new investigations outlined in 904
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might violate the 180-day deadline where MCSO received notice of an allegation by a
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Finally, to the extent an individual exercises his or her right to appeal discipline
imposed as a result of an IA ordered by this Court to the Maricopa County Law
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Enforcement Merit System Counsel8 or an Arizona court, and such discipline is reversed,
it is questionable whether this Court can lawfully invalidate that decision.9 See In re
Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (Thus, it follows that federal district courts
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In order to accommodate the due process rights stated in the sections above, any IA
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investigations ordered by this Court should be wholly separate, and independent from the
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Courts Findings of Fact (Doc. 1677). Sheriff Arpaio, Chief Deputy Sheridan, Joseph
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Sousa, and the other unnamed parties in this action were never on notice that the purpose
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of the contempt proceedings was to conduct a fact finding investigation into the adequacy
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of MCSOs internal affairs investigations, or the adequacy of discipline imposed as a
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result of those investigations. [See Doc. 880 (setting forth the issues to be decided in the
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contempt proceeding as follows: (1) failing to implement and comply with the Courts
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County.
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preliminary injunction; (2) violating discovery obligations; and (3) acting in derogation of
As such, the civil contemnors and others did not have a full and fair opportunity to
address the full gamut of the issues involved in the IA investigations invalidated by this
Court and future ones that the Court has contemplated in its Findings of Fact.
suggested additional investigations on the basis that [a]n effective and honest internal
affairs policy is a necessary element of the MCSOs self-regulation and that the IAs
litigated for the court were relevant to assessing relief in the contempt proceedings.
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[Doc. 1677 at 889]. Therefore, given that the Courts Findings of Fact regarding IA
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investigations went to the remedy the Court would order as part of the three clearly
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defined topics in the Courts Order to Show Cause, and were not intended to be a final
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independent fact finding and investigation should occur during any new IA ordered by the
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Court.
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4.
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Although the Courts Findings of Fact indicates that the Court fully advised
Defendants and several non-party contemnors that the adequacy and good faith of their
investigations would be subject to the evaluation by the Parties and the Court, this topic
was not addressed in the Courts Order to Show Cause, which is the critical pleading
providing Defendants notice and opportunity to be meaningfully heard on the issues to be
litigated during these contempt proceedings.
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in light of the due process concerns expressed in the preceding sections, any future
review of the facts, and carried out by an independent authority that has absolutely no
Sheriff Arpaio reiterates that during the May 31, 2016 hearing, the Court plainly
stated that it will carefully consider Sheriff Arpaios proposals on this issue and that to the
extent the Court and the Sheriff can arrive at an agreement, that the Court and the Sheriff
ought to make that effort. [5/31/16 RT at 75-76]. In light of the concerns raised by the
Sheriff regarding the independence of the Courts Monitor, Sheriff Arpaio believes that a
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reasonable middle ground for the IAs that the Court is going to order as a result of its
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Findings of Fact is that they should be performed by the independent third party.12
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5.
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Of course, as stated above, this does not divest that individual of their appellate
rights under the Arizona Police Officers Bill of Rights.
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district
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B.
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As stated above, Sheriff Arpaios position on this issue is that the new IAs
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conducted by either the independent third party or MCSO cannot rely on the Courts
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Findings of Fact, especially when direct application of the Courts Findings of Fact may
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continued employment and, therefore, he may not be terminated without due process.
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Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Board
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Although Sheriff Arpaio initially suggested the complete removal of the Chief
Deputy from any involvement in the IA process, pursuant to this Courts encouragement
that the Chief Deputy continues to be involved in the IA process, Sheriff Arpaio has
modified his proposal out of respect for the Courts recommendation. [See 5/31/16 RT at
101, 103].
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Application of the Courts Findings of Fact, particularly those that involve its
simply move straight to imposing discipline. This is not the kind of due process that the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit has held is required for such a significant
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (the root requirement
of the Due Process Clause is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing
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III.
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this Court should order to be investigated. Without waiving any rights to challenge the
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Courts authority to invalidate or institute new IA investigations, Sheriff Arpaio does not
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contest the institution of any IA ordered by this Court pursuant to its Findings of Fact,
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with the exception outlined below regarding the Chief Deputy.14 However, Sheriff
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new IAs ordered by this Court based on any applicable state or federal law.
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IV.
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Sheriff Arpaio reiterates that any investigations ordered by the Court involving
MCSO command staff or the interests of the plaintiff class should be done by an
Independent Third Party Authority. Any investigations unrelated to the interests of the
Plaintiff class should be done by MSCO with reporting to the Courts monitor.
In addition, Sheriff Arpaio believes that this is one area that expert opinion on
whether the IA investigations suggested by the Plaintiff class are necessary because
they were improperly conducted.
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matrices because he is an unclassified employee and that only the Sheriff can discipline
the Chief Deputy. [See MCAO Opinion No. 2016-001, attached as Exhibit A].
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority stated in MCAO Op. No. 2016-001, the Chief
Deputy will not agree to be subject to discipline pursuant to MCSOs disciplinary matrix
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Although not required, the Chief Deputy will accept the original policy violation
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findings of Donald Vogel that Chief Michael Olson previously sustained, a suspension of
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40 hours, (but then overturned following Chief Sheridans name clearing hearing), as
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outlined in the Courts Findings of Fact at paragraph 435. As a gesture of goodwill, in
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light of the Courts Findings of Fact, Chief Deputy Sheridan will accept the discipline
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previously imposed (a suspension of 40 hours) for these findings pursuant to MCSOs
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disciplinary matrix.15
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*
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DATED this 14th day of June, 2016.
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While Defendants are committed to doing everything in their power to assist the
Court and Plaintiffs in resolving this case to everyones satisfaction, they note that the
Courts Findings of Fact remain unchallenged. Defendants are well aware of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(5) (A party may later question the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the findings, whether or not the party requested findings, objected to them,
moved to amend them, or moved for partial findings.), and reserve the right to challenge
the Courts Findings of Fact in this Court or on appeal, notwithstanding any consent to, or
agreement with, the Court re-opening of old IA investigations pursuant to its Findings of
Fact, instituting new IA investigations involving members of MCSO, or involving an
independent third party to oversee these IA investigations and impose discipline.
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Daniel Pochoda
Brenda Muoz Furnish
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of June, 2016, I caused the foregoing
document to be filed electronically with the Clerk of Court through the CM/ECF System
for filing; and served on counsel of record via the Courts CM/ECF system.
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SHERIFF ARPAIO
EXHIBIT A
301 WESTJEFFERSON
[Government Advice
Joseph M. Arpaio
Maricopa County Sheriff
550 W. Jackson St.
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
SYLLABUS:
Sheriff Arpaio
June 14, 2016
Page 2
You have asked for an opinion about the legal status of the Chief Deputy
position with respect to: the Chief Deputy's employment status; whether the
Chief Deputy is subject to the Disciplinary Policy and its matrices; and a
summary of the Chief Deputy's statutory duties.
Sheriff Arpaio
June 14,2016
Page 3
Also applicable to your inquiry are the following Arizona Revised Statutes
from Title 38:
S 3B-1 101 . Definitions
not
preempt agreements that supplant, revise or otherwise deviate from
the provisions of this article, including written agreements between
the employer and the law enforcement officer or the law
enforcement officer's lawful representative association.
to
the
SheriffArpaio
June 14, 2016
Page 4
Pay,
F.
When a vacancy occurs in the otfice of sheriff the chief deputy shall
execute the office untilthe vacancy is filled.
Collectively, the statutes, case law, policy, and employment agreement
are relevant to your inquiry because they govern the issues presented for
analysis below.
il
of the Chief De
Emplovment Status.
Sheriff Arpaio
June 14, 2016
Page 5
38,
specifically A.R.S. SS 38-1101 and 1102, are also relevant to the Chief Deputy's
employment status. The Chief Deputy is a law enforcement officer pursuant to
38-1101(8Xa) because he is "an individual, other than a probationary employee,
who is certified by the Arizona peace officer standards and training board. " The
Chief Deputy, however, is not covered by the peace officers bill of rights because
his agreed upon unclassified (i.e., at-will) employment status effectively
"supplants" the provisions of Title 38 in accordance with A.R.S. S 38-1102 ("This
article does not preempt agreements that supplant, revise or othenvise deviate
from the provisions of this article, including wrtten agreements between the
employer and the law enforcement officer, "). As a result, the Chief Deputy is a
law enforcement officer but his employment agreement preempts the provisions
of the peace officers bill of rights. Similarly, the Law Enforcement Officers Merit
System does not apply to Chief Deputy Sheridan's employment; the Chief
Deputy position is specifically exempted from the Merit System's coverage.
P
Sheriff Arpaio
June 14,2016
Page 6
receives under the applicable County Merit System when occupyng a position of
the classified service following the successful completion of the initial probation
period." ln shoil, only classified employees have "regular status". Unclassified
employees do not have "regular status" and are not subject to the disciplinary
matrices in the policy. Thus, the Chief Deputy, an unclassified employee, is not
subject to the disciplinary matrices.
V.
The duties of the Chief Deputy are generally subject to the discretion of
the Sheriff in executing the powers and duties assigned to him by A.R.S. Title 11,
Chapter 3, Aicle 2 Sheriff, primarily A.R.S. S 11-441, One statute, however,
applies specifically to the Chief Deputy, A.R.S. g 11-443, which provides, "When
a vacancy occurs in the office of sheriff the chief deputy shall execute the office
until the vacancy is filled." As a result, unlike vacancies in other county officer
positions, the statute automatically promotes the Chief Deputy to Sheriff in the
event of a vacancy until it is filled, likely in order to ensure public safety during an
unexpected vacancy. Aside from this statute, the Chief Deputy does not have
any specific statutory duties.