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In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to
dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion
since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he
submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.
Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007.
On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor
daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala
Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts
that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide
monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of
expenses for medication and education.
Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing
the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired when respondent
Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support
of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is
not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the
resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment
of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances
relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal
separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.
Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the
implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch
sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to
implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the
sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged into the home of Francisco
Ocampos parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants therein. At that
time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy
Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the
will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned
that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused
from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his
minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay
the support of P50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco
that he did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go
with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go
with him.
Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex
parte motion to recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions
were denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007.
The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as
follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo,
respondent therein, despite overwhelming evidence submitted that therein
petitioner was not a resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the hearing of the
case immediately a day after the summons was served on therein respondent; (3)
she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer
had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis;
and (5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even
designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday.
These, coupled with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge
demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against her.
In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No.
M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure
Order was issued on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service by
the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was
attempted to be served twice by the Process Server on December 11, 2006, a
Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there.
On December 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to by the Process Server.
Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier
since the court calendar was full, nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the
last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the
presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed
by the suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judge professed that she did not
have such intention. The nature of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate
action by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have been served on
him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was unsuccessful.
Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt
harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he could have complained during the
hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the
attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4)
months after the fact. At any rate, the scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006 did
not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the same
day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss)
on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was
denied and the TPO was issued on the same day.
Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the
provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into
account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal
with the right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children
and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampos
contention in his Answer that he was not contesting his wifes claim that the subject
minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over
the subject minors to his wife, Milan.
Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the
implementation of the TPO, as the law itself mandates that the court order the
immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed
the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4, 2007, and it was received
by Milan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized
to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and
her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer action on
Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it would
have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that
the Petition was filed as early as November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the
merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion to
Dismiss. In fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007
court on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that
such order should be issued. Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO,
based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as early
as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing
of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period within which to file it
before issuing the TPO.
Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in favor
of Milan alone as the legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an
Order dated April 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her Petition was for an
award of monthly support of not less than P150,000.00, but the court awarded
only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate, the
support granted by the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant
Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to give support as
alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely
because the court was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a
TPO. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the
award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already
held in abeyance in the Order dated May 2, 2007.
Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations
regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and the legal separation case do not
have any bearing on SP No.M-6375.
She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of
action taken by the counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to
normal rules of procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex
Parte Motion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24,
2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April
26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007
with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24,
2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
asseverated that from all appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for
the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No.M6375. Three, on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which
was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really have any genuine
administrative cause of action against her. As things turned out, all that
complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was their declaration
that they preferred to stay with their mother.
144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be issued or that the sheriff be
permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to search for the child and then
bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
issued
an
order
authorizing
the
sheriff to enter the open premises where subject minor may be found
for
the
purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is admonished to maintain peace
and order in the conduct thereof.
According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua
received money from Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts
clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing the TPO. Her speedy issuance of the
Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest
in the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted
to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with
the OIC of Branch 144.
OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge
displayed unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles
of RTC, Branch 143, Makati City issued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352,
entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment for hearing on May 9, 2007. In
view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was
later designated as the pairing judge. OnApril 20, 2007, respondent, as pairing
judge, cancelled the previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-scheduled
the hearing to April 23, 2007, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly
suspicious in respondents actuation was that there was really no urgency in the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
In her Comment[4] dated June 9, 2007, respondent Judge explained that SP
No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was
originally raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was reraffled to her branch on April 30, 2007, and the records of the case were
transmitted to her on the same day.
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under
Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC,
which specifically applies to a petition for custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs
finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not
contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent
Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was
explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based
on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the
many abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child
abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to the Petition. Other
annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence
committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements
of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report
of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.
of absence of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the
previous year. To expedite the resolution of motions and preparation of decisions,
and to avoid being saddled with much work on her return from her leave, she had
been reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No.
M-6373 was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as
well. Her study of SP No. M-6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007, which
culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost lunchtime of the same day.
Granting that the one week period in which she issued the May 7, 2007 Order may
be considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken against her as she
was really a fast worker. She was accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and
decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court Attorney for
13 years.
Respondent
Judge maintained
that
it
was
necessary
to
implement the Order dated May 7, 2007 at once, because the courts are so
mandated to cause the immediate implementation of the TPO under Section 15,
R.A. No. 9262.
As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of
Branch 144, respondent Judge surmised that the same could be merely concocted,
as it was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors
of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it
really transpired.
Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007,
she gave a directive holding in abeyance further implementation of the May 7,
2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she really received money or anything from
Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would have ensured complete
implementation of the Order datedMay 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance.
Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and her counsel guilty of the indirect
contempt charge against them if it were really true that she received money from
Chang Tan.
Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in
rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order in her branch, she and her family would
not have found themselves in such state of financial drain after she had been
preventively suspended.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial audit was
conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which
was the salapresided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of
alleged irregularities committed by respondent.
In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock submitted for the
Courts consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the
Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC
of Makati City.
The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the
Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24hour basis.Before the audit team began its audit on May 15, 2007, the members
made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora and the court personnel present that
actions on the records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no
records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.
At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel Gregorio and
Alexander Dayap, noticed Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144,
disposing a plastic bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag
from a trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was surrendered to
the audit team and was found to contain copies of marriage certificates of
marriages solemnized by Judge Chua numbering to hundreds. When confronted,
Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents upon respondent Judge's
instruction made several days ago. He could not offer any explanation why he
chose to dispose of the documents that morning despite the ongoing audit. He,
nonetheless, disclosed that there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the
room where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office.
The bags, when retrieved, turned out to contain more copies of marriage
certificates. Jamora explained to the audit team that she was aware of the copies of
marriage certificates being kept inside their room. However, she alleged that she
had no control over them, because matters pertaining to solemnization of marriages
were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in
connection with the 1,975 copies of marriage certificates for marriages she
solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the following
acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of
the said copies of marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization
fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages as verified from the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City
and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the
total amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos
(P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and (3)
for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases.[6]
In a Resolution[7] dated September 16, 2008, the Court resolved to consider
the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against
respondent Judge; require respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to
comment on the Memorandum within 10 days from notice thereof; and refer A.M.
OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her Affidavit, [8] in lieu of
Comment, on the OCA Memorandum dated August 10, 2007.
Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr. to dispose of the copies of
marriage certificates
plastic bags and placed them in the small room that was between her chambers and
the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it would be easy to add or
get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home as he was
then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him the bags of
scratch papers out of her chambers to be thrown away. The following morning, she
noticed that there were red patches on the face and arms of Umipig so she did not
ask him anymore for help. She removed the official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped them with approximately
six paper bundles then placed them inside the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates.
In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that
the transfer to the Makati City Hall would not push through yet because the
furnitures were not complete and portions of the holding room were still being
painted. She was told to just standby and to wait for an update about the schedule
of transfer. With that advice, she did not find it necessary to return the files of
marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees inside
the steel cabinet.
About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that the bags of
garbage had accumulated, she reminded Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away.
On May 15, 2007, she was placed under preventive suspension. On May 18, 2007,
Indicio told her, through telephone, that he was caught the previous day throwing
marriage certificates that were placed in plastic bags. He explained that he thought
those bags contained the garbage that she asked him to throw away the previous
week. She was then outraged by the news and scolded Indicio, telling him that
under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage certificates being the
solemnizing officer. In fact, Indicio stated in his affidavit that her specific
instruction was "to dispose all the garbage which were stocked" in her sala and "it
just turned out that what the plastic bag contained were copies of marriage
contracts." Thus, Indicio simply mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees to be the
garbage that she instructed him the previous week to throw away.
Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not have ordered
Indicio to dispose of the copies of the marriage certificates, citing the haphazard
manner in which Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that she had nothing to
hide and that she would gain nothing by the disposal thereof.
Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees
Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of payment of the marriage
solemnization fees were the official receipts. She categorically stated that all the
official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees were inside the plastic bags,
together with the marriage certificates.
She stressed that she could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage
solemnization fees, because it is of public knowledge that she had been
solemnizing a big number of weddings per day, aside from the fact that she had
solemnized weddings of several celebrities, which also included celebrities as
sponsors; thus, attracting the attention of many court employees. She was also
aware of the consequences of solemnizing a marriage without the solemnization
fee so she was very meticulous when it came to checking, among other things,
whether there was an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also
knew that the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow the
registration of a marriage certificate if there was no accompanying official receipt
of payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the
pervading financial crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money
without demanding an official receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained
about the absence of the official receipt of the marriage solemnization fee. Further,
the Audit Team found from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all
the marriage certificates of the weddings that she solemnized were duly registered
therein.
Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the
OCC of the MeTC and RTC adopted a wrong and unreliable procedure in verifying
from their records whether there was payment of the marriage solemnization fees,
simply because most of the dates of the wedding indicated in the marriage
certificates were not the same as the dates indicated in the official receipts. She
explained that a couple would often pay the solemnization fee at a certain date, but
the solemnization of the wedding would take place on another date for one reason
or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court
checked the dates from the copies of their official receipts on file, the dates did not
reflect payment of the fees, because payments were made on dates different from
the wedding dates.
Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases
Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases were typed by
her staff, namely: Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and Criminal-in-Charge
Mary Jane Rafael. As regards the number of marriages solemnized, they would
inquire from her and she would then give them the figure as stated in her own
logbook. When the Reports were turned over to her for signature, she would first
verify
the
entries
from
her
own
logbook before affixing her signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned
that the Courts copy of the Reports contained incorrect figures and was different
from that which she signed.
She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the correct number of
marriages in the Monthly Reports, because apart from the fact that she was very
meticulous in the accuracy of the entries, she had nothing to gain by not reflecting
the correct figures of solemnized marriages.
She believed that the blank and incorrect figures appearing in the number of
marriages solemnized in the Monthly Reports from January 2004 to March 2007
were the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably tampered the same, because of
a serious grudge against her. She added that it was also Umipig who transferred the
plastic bags of marriage certificates and official receipts from the small room to the
stenographer's room in an attempt to expose the big number of weddings that she
had solemnized, which, through his machinations, were not reflected in the
Monthly Reports.
Re: Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of
Circular No. 9-98[9]
Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages inside her
chambers or courtroom, and as proof thereof, she pointed to the entry in the
marriage certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On few occasions, she
faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for TPO
requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-doing, fraud,
bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge.
According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the
TPO had no leg to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that
the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the application after ex
parte determination by the judge that the same be issued. This is in accordance
with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection
Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the court on the
date of filing of the application after ex partedetermination that such
order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30)
days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior
to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order
the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the
hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. [18]
Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before
complainant Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent
Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified
the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the
illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived
through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or
ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent
provision of the Family Code states:
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with
the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate
children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or
ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them
before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
motion to dismiss. She clarified that the date ofthe hearing on the motion for
reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's counsel
himself. The following day, April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she directed the
implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing
improper or wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the
case. There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance
of the TPO during the Holy Week, as it was complainant Ocampo's counsel
himself who, wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the
urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent
Judge caused its immediate implementation.
Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge could not have
been privy to the brazen manner in which the TPO was served by the designated
sheriff. In the first place, it was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco,
who was administratively charged by complainant Ocampo for the allegedly
offensive manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge,
such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco.
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation
of bribery against respondent Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted
by Justice Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant Ocampo
confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua.
Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630RTJ (the Ocampo Case) should be dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy,
in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.
[21]
She cited Espaol v. Mupas,[22] which held thus:
x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or
omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or
diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, nonetheless, we have
repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua allegedly displayed in the said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando
found no substantial evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's
Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that respondent
Judge received money from Chang Tan.
Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally
witnessed the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, except for their secondhand accounts that
they heard that such incident actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found
it speculative to attribute the commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on such account. The Investigating Justice stated that
respondent Judge appeared to have no personal or actual participation in that
incident, because the "heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the
OIC, Victoria Jamora.
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in the RCBC Case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no
evidence against respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the
case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which
she studied and evaluated the application for the writ. Justice Salazar-Fernando
was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily
issued the ex parte hearing on the application having been held on a Friday,
followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on the succeeding business day, a
Mondaythere was really nothing impossible or irregular in such feat. Per
respondents account, she had been unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays
during that time and she did not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the
purpose of ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering
respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court,
Justice Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance
to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Investigating
Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment to be apt.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of evidence that she was
motivated by any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her
duties. She cited, thus:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his
complaint. Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the
performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue
interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred
allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to
any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich. In a long line of
cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are
not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.
In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and partiality.Extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the
palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order
itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision
itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. [26]
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage Certificates and Monthly
Reports)
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial evidence of an
anomaly in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of marriages in her
court and failure to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly
Reports.
The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the
marriage certificates, which were said to have been contained in four (4) plastic
bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time the judicial audit was
being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the fact that she
ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage
contained in blue plastic bags. However, as regards the timing of disposal, she
explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week of
May, days before the judicial audit.[27] Such fact was confirmed by Indicio in his
testimony.[28] He testified that he was ordered by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to
dispose of the garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage was due for
disposal on May 14, 2007, but since it was election day, the disposal of the garbage
was postponed until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the plastic bags
caught the attention of the security detail of the Supreme Court.
The Investigating Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the
order to dispose of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing
why such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic bags,
which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several
days. Why no attempt to dispose of the supposed garbage was made on May 9, 10,
and 11 (May 12 & 13 were Saturday and Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was
Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was the period of judicial audit) was not
sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the order to dispose could not
have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when the judicial audit was
already being conducted. Such conclusion jibes with the account of Atty. Fe
Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members of the judicial audit team, that upon being
immediately confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of the
supposed garbage despite the ongoing audit, Indicio "could not offer any
explanation."[29]Indicio could not remember the exact date when the order to
dispose of the garbage was made by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. He testified,
thus:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
JUDGE CHUA:
You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you
executed an Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was
also done at 8:00 oclock in the morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When
did I give my instruction to you to throw away the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
You told me before the audit to throw all your trash.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you know when that particular day was?
MR. INDICIO:
That was election day, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Election day of May, 2007?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE CHUA:
May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was
subscribed to on May 17. So the last week that you mentioned here was a
week before May 17. You mentioned here that last week, I was instructed by
the Presiding Judge to dispose of the garbage which were stocked in her
branch. Do you confirm the statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?
MR. INDICIO:
Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election day.
JUDGE CHUA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight.
May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here
that the said garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May 14,
2007. However, since it was election day, same was not collected.
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, maam, it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was
only on May 17 that he had an opportunity to throw it.
JUDGE CHUA:
To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to
throw away the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
I was told before the audit.
JUDGE CHUA:
The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May 17. Based on paragraph 2 of
your Affidavit, I gave the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I gave
the instruction to you probably on May 10, is that what you are saying?
MR. INDICIO:
I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge Chua.
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
When you told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already
instructed you to throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographers
room, how many days after that instruction was given to you did you comply
with her instruction?
MR. INDICIO:
Eight (8) days, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if you instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8
that would be May 9, is that correct?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, your Honor.[30]
according to Indicio himself were really not too heavy,[31] only one was taken out
by the janitor to be disposed, leaving three other plastic bags inside the courtroom.
Taking out the plastic bags one by one could have been purposely sought to
surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and avoid detection by
the security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team.
dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they verified the payment of solemnization
fees based on the names of the contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent
portions of the testimonies of Magsombol and Ticman state as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
xxxx
ATTY. BUGTAS:
So how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua?
MR. MAGSOMBOL;
I checked the names that were handed to me one by one.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Did you check all the records?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first
day of January 2004 up to the last day of office of December 2005.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Are your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to
December 2005?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
How about the other basis which you said, receipts?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you also check those OR numbers and the receipts?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought
with me, Your Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC
Judge were supposed to be recorded in your daily cash collection
book?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if they are not paid, they do not appear in your book?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, we dont know if the marriage happened or not.
xxxx
(Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman)
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the
marriages that were listed in the document were paid?
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the result of your verification?
MS. TICMAN:
Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Only 20? Twenty out of?
ATTY. BUGTAS:
MS. TICMAN:
We examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given
by the Supreme Court.[33]
stated that apart from the fact that it could not be established that it was indeed
Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of the text messages did not show
that Umipig was the author of all the anomalies relating to the marriage certificates
and monthly reports. Respondent Judge quoted Umipig saying, "Hindi bale, may
ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo," which, according to her, could only betray
the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to something. According to Justice
Salazar-Fernando, Umipigs statement could only confirm the existence of the
anomalies in respondent Judges court, rather than attribute authorship to Umipig
for the anomalies pertaining to the marriage certificates and monthly reports.
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge ArcayaChuas procedure of signing the monthly reports ahead of her OIC to be irregular,
since it is contrary to prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the monthly reports first before her OIC,
Ms. Mabalot, during her stint in the MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC.
Respondent Judge testified, thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Could you repeat the statement?
JUDGE CHUA:
I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and
then the following morning at around 8:00 o clock, I would see the reports on top
of the table of Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus
was on the typewritten name of Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
And you expect the reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you
signed?
JUDGE CHUA:
Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael
that I have signed the monthly reports.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
JUDGE CHUA:
With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of
court of MeTC Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to
the OCC a few months ago and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would
rather do the checking myself, sign and then require them to affix their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge would sign last?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
In your case, you sign first before the OIC?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.[34]
The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge ArcayaChua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared
with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office. Just to mention a
portion of the evidence submitted against her: In April 2004, she reported[38] that
she did not solemnized any marriage, but there were 29 marriage certificates issued
on the said month contained in the plastic bags that were taken from her office.
[39]
In May 2004, she reported[40] that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 36
marriage certificates issued on the said month were found in the same plastic bags.
[41]
In June 2004, she likewise reported[42] that she did not solemnize any marriage,
but 45 marriage certificates issued on the said month were contained in the plastic
bags.[43] From
November
2005
to
March
2007,
her
Monthly
Reports[44] indicated that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 1,068 marriage
certificates issued by her during the said period are in the custody of the Court.[45]
Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC, Makati City, in his
Certification[46] dated June 8, 2007, stated that only 146 of the marriages
solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005 paid the
corresponding marriage fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of
Court VII, OCC, RTC, Makati City, declared in his Certification[47] dated June 8,
2007 that from the list furnished by this Court of marriages solemnized by Judge
Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the said office per RTC official
receipts covering the period from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence, out of the
1,975 marriage certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total of 166 marriages
were paid.
In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame
to Noel Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the
Monthly Reports.
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144
from July 2005 to April 2007.[48] It is incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC, was
unaware ofthe big number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge from
November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated
marriage certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said period
that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice correctly
stated that she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect,
but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if she was not
actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty
of gross misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds
the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert
Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a
man against his wife underR.A. No. 9292, known as the AntiViolence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge
Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains
the recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the
absence ofsubstantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the
charge of harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge ArcayaChua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
In its Resolution[55] dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's
compliance was not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with court processes. The
Court then resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more
severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of the
same offense; recall theResolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen
the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice Rebecca D. Salvador [56] to
conduct an investigation and submit her report and recommendation; and directed
complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under pain of
contempt of court.
In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador
found sufficient grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged
and recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for grave
misconduct and dishonesty.
Justice Salvadors findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13,
2009, are as follows:
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present
substantial evidence in support of her complaint against respondent;
while respondent denied that she asked for and received from
complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on
Muoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her
office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such
meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the protests
against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred
complainant's ire for declining complainants request for favors in June
2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant
asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant
asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa before; however, it was
respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that
complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on
absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the
Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a
strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muoz
prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua
(Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muoz was introduced to them
by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with
her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing never
cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20,
2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it
cannot be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been
served complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27,
2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer, to reply to
complainants first demand letter, was unusual; considering complainants
advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that complainant's
motive for filing the administrative case was respondent's refusal to give
in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter's friend-was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to expend
the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the administrative
case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainants
compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show
cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded
complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint
were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of
respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that
she gave up her complaint against respondent. [57]
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation
counsel.
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed
on September 7, 2007, and which had been marked as Exhibits
"1," "1-A," "l-B" and submarkings for respondent. You stated in
MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan
na kamit nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming
hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya
ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila,
ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka
ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which
you misunderstood or misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa
pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho
nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong
katotohanan, Justice.[61]
These testimonies on record are evidence against respondent Judge ArcayaChua. The Investigating Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found
her a credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of investigating
magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.
[62]
The Court found no reason to depart from such rule since Justice Salvadors
observations and findings are supported by the records.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-082141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Administrative Sanctions
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based
on
the
provisions
of
Rule
140
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
[63]
while disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include
gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross
ignorance of the law or procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent
Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided,
however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct
is classified as a grave offense and punished with dismissal for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent
Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141.
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent
Judges motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
The Court has held:
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the
exhortation that the administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest
to the highest levels, are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon
lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the
ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression.
Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity have no place in the judiciary. xxx This Court will not withhold penalty
when called for to uphold the peoples faith in the judiciary.[64]
On official leave
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Link: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/07-2630-RTJ
%20.htm