1

Submitted by: Nur-Aina Cabrido Waja

Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968

Facts:

A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is

raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American
corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He
would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the
United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.

Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond
our

jurisdictional

function

to

tax.

Held: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there of
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its
laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent
of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its
sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction
of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does
the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does
not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

2
Western Mindanao State University
Colloge of Law
LLB 1C
Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2
People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476
G.R. No. L-36409
FACTS: The accuse Loreta Gozo brought a house and lot located inside the US Naval
Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the
house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another
house. Then, she was charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord
No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or
construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower
court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative
jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not, does the city government has administrative jurisdiction and
should enforce its Municipal Ordinance over the US Naval Reservation?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not
granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in
the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not
exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.

3
Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3)
Case: Magallona v Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
FACTS: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act
3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged
until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law
shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. The
petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9522 (AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC
BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) is constitutional.
HELD: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and
made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and
continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. The Court found that the
framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the
Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of
Islands and the Scarborough.

4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS
Tondo Medical vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioners Tondo Medical filed for the petition , assailing the decision of the Court of
appeals after it was denied for the nullification of the Health sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA).That such collection would add burden to the economically disadvantaged
citizens.
Issue:
Whether or not the Health sector Reform Agenda run counter to the provisions of
the Constitution.
Held:
The Court denied the petition of the petitioner and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

5
Alsam B. Adjilul
LLB 1C
College of Law WMSU
Bases conversion and development authority vs. Comission on election
580 SCRA 295
Facts:
On May 22, 1996, State Auditor Nida M. Blanco of the COA, disallowed in
audit the Loyalty Service Award for 1995, the Children's Allowance for the period
January to December of 1995, the Anniversary Bonus for 1995, and the 8 th step
salary increase effective January, 1995, for being excessive and/or illegal and not in
accordance with the Central Bank benefit package. Petitioner claims that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
affirming the disallowance of the (1) Loyalty Service Award, (2) 8 th step increment,
and (3) Children's Allowance.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Commission On
Audit (COA) Decision No. 99-057 dated March 23, 1999 and Resolution No. 2000-89
dated March 7, 2000, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes, the petition is partly granted. The assailed Decision No. 99-057 dated March 23,
1999 and Resolution No. 2000-89 dated March 7, 2000 issued by the COA are
modified in the sense that the disapproval of the Childrens Allowance is set aside.
We hold that respondent COA, in disallowing the Childrens Allowance, committed
grave abuse of discretion.

6
Case Digest :
589

In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno, 210 SCRA

FACTS:
1. On November 14,1990, Associate Justice Reynato Puno wrote the Court
seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
As a background, petitioner was first appointed as Assoc. Justice of the Court of
Appeals on June 20,1980 and took his oath of office for the said position on
November 29,1982.
2. On Jan. 17,1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa 129. Subsequently, the
petitioner was appointed as Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases
Division of the IAC.
3. On Nov. 7,1984, the petitioner accepted his appointment as Deputy Minister
of Justice ceasing his membership in the Judiciary.
4. After the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, President Corazon
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, affecting reorganization in the
Judiciary.
5. A Screening Committee recommended the return of the petitioner as AJ of the
new Court of Appeals and listed him as number 11 in the roster of Appellate
Court Justices. However, when the appointment papers were signed by
President Aquino on July 28,1986, Justice Punos seniority ranking changed
from No. 11 to No. 26.
6. On Nov. 29,1990, the Court en banc issued a Resolution granting the
petitioners request.
7. Later, Associate Justices Jose Campos Jr. and Luis Javellana, two (2) of the
justices affected by the ordered correction, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the present CA is a new court and that the courts where the
petitioner was previously appointed have already ceased to exist and
therefore the petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court nor
claim that he was returning to his former court.
8. When the Court asked the petitioner to comment on the motion for
reconsideration, Justice Puno argued that, by virtue of E.O. 33 read in relation
to BP 129 and by President Aquinos pledged at the issuance of Proclamation
No. 3 (Freedom Constitution) that no right provided in the ungratified 1973
Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution, his seniority
ranking should now be at number 5.

Petitioner likewise claimed that although he power of appointment is executive in

character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the government, such
power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this
case, by the limits set by EO 33 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in
violation of law.
ISSUE:
The main issue is whether or not the present Court of Appeals is now a new
court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority.
HELD:
The Court granted the motion for reconsideration and recognized and upheld
the seniority ranking of the members of the Court of Appeals, including that of
Assoc. Justice Puno, at the time the appointments were approved by President
Aquino in 1986.

7
Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani
Case no. 7 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan GR no. 104768, July 21, 2003
FACTS:
President Aquino issued Executive Order no. 1, creating a Presidential
Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) task to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinate and close
associates. Based on the mandate of EO no. 1, AFP board investigated reports of
alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major Josephus Q. Ramas and alleged
mistress Elizabeth Dimaano.
They confiscated sum of money, communication equipments, jewelries and
land titles in a search they conducted at the house of Ms. Elizabeth Dimaano on 3
March 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the confiscated items is valid.
HELD:
No, since the government under Pres. Cory Aquino is a revolutionary
government established by the authority of the legitimate sovereign, and
established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. The action taken by the PCGG are
not in accordance with law. Sec.1 of Art. II provides that The Philippines is a
Democratic and Republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

8
Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC
Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh
75

PHIL

113

FACT
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation,
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the
American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case,
saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines
and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
ISSUES
Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de
facto government.
HELD
Yes, civil case filed can be continued since the the government establish during the
Japanese occupation is a de facto, all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de
facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in
nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said
government remain good.

9
ACCFA vs CUGCO
Facts:

On 4 Sept 1961 a CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA.
The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to nonimplementation of the CBA the unions held a strike on 25 Oct 1962. And 5 days
later CUGCO, the mother union of ASA and AWA filed a complaint against ACCFA due
to unfair labor practices among others which CUGCO was able to win in court. On 25
Apr1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, RA 3844
was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. On 17 Mar 1964, ASA and AWA
then petitioned that they may have sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this
petition was not yet decided upon, on 19 March 1964, EO 75 was also passed which
placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the
latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA
and AWA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA.

HELD:

The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA
and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the
government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA
can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been
doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern society
have
rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not
obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that the government must
undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and
move towards a greater socialization of economic forces.

10
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003]
Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners, vs. Hon. ARTURO G. TAYAG as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Malolos, Bulacan; and the
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.
[G.R. No. 145846 April 3, 2003]
Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners, vs. Hon. BASILIO A. GABO JR. as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan; and the
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and controlled
corporation, is exempt from paying appellate docket fees when it sues or is sued in
relation to its governmental function of providing mass housing. It is likewise
exempt from filing a supersedeas bond that will stay the execution of a forcible
entry case. In order to have some bases for fixing the reasonable amount of rent in
a forcible entry case, courts must rely on the evidence presented by the parties.
The Case
Before us are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside two rulings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan. The first one is the July 19, 2000 Order 1[1] issued by Branch 79 in Case No.
P-410-M-2000, annulling both the May 23, 2000 Order 2[2] and the May 30, 2000
Writ of Execution3[3] issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. The dispositive portion of this assailed RTC Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the [O]rder of the [t]riaI [c]ourt dated May 23, 2000 is hereby
annulled.
The [W]rit of [E]xecution issued by the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of
San Jose del Monte Bulacan is also annulled.
Prohibiting the [t]rial [c]ourt from enforcing the [W]rit; and commanding the
Municipal Trial Court to transmit the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan together with the Money Order of [t]wo hundred [p]esos Annex I and 1-2
as appellate docket fee and the alleged Supersedeas Bond per [Annex] A, A-1, A2 to A-3 of the OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CLARIFY (with manifestation) filed by
Petitioner NHA received by this [C]ourt on July 17, 2000 although dated July 14,
2000.4[4]

1
2
3
4

The second ruling being contested is the October 23, 2000 Decision 5[5] of Branch
11 in Civil Case No. 512-M-2000, which modified the February 1, 2000 Decision 6[6]
of the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The challenged RTC Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendants are
ordered to vacate plaintiffs property and return the possession thereof to the latter
and to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally P20,000.00 for attorneys fees and
P20,000.00 for litigation expenses and to pay the costs are concerned. 7[7]
Since the parties were the same and the issues related, the two Petitions were
consolidated by this Court in its Resolution of October 17, 2001. 8[8]
The Facts
Petitioners are plaintiffs in a forcible entry/ejectment case docketed as Civil Case
No. 263-94 in the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, entitled Spouses Oscar and
Haydee Badillo v. Triad Construction and Development Corporation and National
Housing Authority. In its February 1, 2000 Decision, 9[9] the MTC ordered the NHA to
vacate the disputed land; to return possession thereof to petitioners; to pay rental
for its use and occupation at the rate of P10 per square meter per month; and to
shoulder the attorneys fees, the litigation expenses and the costs of suit.
The disputed parcel of land was part of the Bagong Silang Resettlement Project
(BSRP) of the NHA. The NHA contended that the property was part of the Tala Estate
and was among the 598 hectares reserved by the government for its housing
resettlement site, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.

5
6
7
8
9

11

12
Submitted by: MR BASAEZ, DIOSCORO A. GROUP 12
CASE: People V Gozo
GR No. L-36409

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Lozeta Gozo was charged by the City Engineers Office of the City of
Olongapo for violating a municipal ordinance which required residents to secure
mayors permit prior to the construction, demolition or repair of a building in the
city. Court of First Instance of the said city convicted her. She appealed the decision
and argued that the local government unit of the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the Naval Base of Americans where her house was
erected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the local city government has administrative jurisdiction over
naval bases of foreign country located within the city?
HELD: Yes. There is no portion in the Philippine territory that is not ours, and beyond
our power and control. Within our territory, any statutory powers maybe exercised
freely and legally. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over
the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses commiteed therein. The consent to the bases of foreign
countries were given/ granted on the basis of comity, courtesy and expediency.
Military bases are not and cannot be of foreign territory.

13
Submitted by : Johnny D. Mendoza
Group 13
Case : Agustin versus Edu, 88 SCRA 195

June 26, 2013

FACTS : Petitioner Agustin asserts that Letter of Instruction 229 and Administration
Number 1 issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos and LTO Commissioner
respectively requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning
devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is
disabled , are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due
process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent
Administrative
Order
issued
are
unconstitutional
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition as the LOI and
LTO Admin order are not unconstitutional. The LOI was based on theresolutions of
the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on
traffic safety by the United Nations, and hence the SC adopted this International
Law as part of the law of the land on the basis of the provisions on the 1987
Philippine Constitution in Article II Section 2.

14
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR No. 653,Oct. 25,1983 (Case No. 1)
Facts: Petitioner retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition
[ABC], sought a permit from the city of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on
Oct. 26, 1983 from 2-5pm, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gate of the
U.S. Embassy. However, such permit was denied due to police intelligence reports
which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time
and at the place applied for.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners may able to exercise their constitutional rights to
free speech and assembly, with an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of
their rights, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful
march and rally."
Held: Negative. On the grand that the holding of rally in front of the U.S. Embassy
violates Ordinance No. 7295 of the city of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging
of rallies or demonstration within the radius of five hundred (500) feet from the
foreign mission or chancery; and for other purposes.

15
Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18
G.R. No. 118295.
FACTS: Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued and contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the
WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy
of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
ISSUES: Whether or not, does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization?
HELD: NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating
in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization.
[The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.]
[The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does
not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community.]

16
Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C
Case: BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
FACTS
The Philippines and United States joined into an agreement until its expiration in
1991 but the defense and security relationship continued between RP-US pursuant
to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997, there were negotiations by both
panels and eventually the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was approved by
President Fidel V. Ramos. It was later on ratified on October 5, 1998 by President
Joseph E. Estrada, which was transmitted to the Senate thru Executive Secretary
Zamora and agreed by the Senate where it was approved by a 2/3 vote of its
members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange
of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
ISSUE
Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
HELD
No. The VFA is not unconstitutional. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains
provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international
agreements. Sec. 2, Art. II some generally accepted principles have been
incorporated in treaties. It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement
is as binding as a treaty.
Sec. 21, Art VII No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 24, Art.
XVIII provides After the expiration in 1991of the agreement between RP and the US
concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the
other contracting state.

17
Donita Lou A. Bemida
Consti Law I-C
1. Lim vs. Executive Secretary, GR 151445, April 11, 2002
Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by
Arthur Lim and
Paulino Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo Reyes, to bar the
holding of
Balikatan Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US Armed Forces started to
send and deploy their troops in the Philippines. The petitioners said that under the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, mutual military assistance can only be held in case
of an armed external attack. However, under the Visiting Force Agreement, the US
Armed Forces are allowed to engage in activities but not in combat operations
except for self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents in the case have committed grave abuse of
discretion by
holding Balikatan 02-1.
Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms of
the Visiting Force Agreement. The US Armed Forces can engage in any activity
except combat operations.

18
Mijares v. Ranada
Group 5

G. R. No. 139325
Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human
rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor
against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in
compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in
the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on
Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of
the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject
matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a
foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee
was
P472M,
which
Petitioners
had
not
paid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
HELD:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount
required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding
that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the
stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged
against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final
Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the
Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this
point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court
(MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the
B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refer to
instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of
rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign
judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveal that the complaint for13 enforcement of
judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of
the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on
judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141.
What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the
enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving
property.

19
SHANGRI-LA V DEVELOPERS
GR NO.159938 March 31, 2006
Facts:
At the core of the controversy are the Shangri-la mark and S logo. Respondent,
Developers Group of Companies, Inc (DGCI) claims ownership of the said mark and
logo in the Philippines. They filed its registration on October 18, 1982 with the
Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) pursuant to sections
2 and 4 of RA 166.
On the other hand, Kuok Group of Companies has used the name Shangri-la in all
Shangri-la hotels and hotel-related establishments around the world as well as the
S logo.
The Petitioner (Shangri-la), contends that they own the Shangri-la mark and S
logo for they have been using it since 1962 not in the Philippines but in other parts
of the world before the respondent even registered the said mark and logo.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are entitled to protection under both RA 166 (the old
trademark law) and Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
HELD:
The Petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means
imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rule of
international law are given standing equal not superior, to national legislative
enactments. However, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as
well as bad faith in the respondents registration of the mark, it is evident that the
petitioners cannot be guilty of infringement.

20
Pharmaceutical vs. DOH GR 173034

Mangaliman, Aileen P.

Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and

Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents
issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the pr J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing,
GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983eambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the
law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages
of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was
to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of
the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must
be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

21
Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C GROUP 8
21_INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, 338
SCRA 81 2000
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime
prevention and suppression. The IBP questioned the validity of the order on the
grounds that the deployment of Philippine Marines is in derogation of ARTICLE II,
SECTION 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy.
HELD:
No. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause
nor does it infringe the civilian character of the Police force. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed.

22
DonitaLouA Bemida
Consti class I-C
Lim v Executive Secretary, GR 15445, April 11, 2002
Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by
Arthur Lim and Paulino Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo
Reye, to bar the holding of Balikatan Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US
Armed Forces started to send and deploy their troops in the Philippines. The
petitioners said that under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, mutual military
assistance can only be held in case of an armed external attack. However, under
the visiting Force Agreement, the US Aimed Forces are allowed to engage in
activities but not in combat operations except for self-defense
Issue: whether or not the respondents in the case have committed grave abuse of
discretion by holding Balikatan 02-1.
Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms or
the Visiting Force Agreement. The Us Armed Forces can engage in any activity
except combat operations.

23
CASE DIGEST:
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
I.

FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated
as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph
Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine
Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines
the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
II.

ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III.

HELD

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

Submitted by:
ABDULLAH, Abdulhaq A.
Group 10

24

25
Group 12
Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 25: Meyer V. Nebraska, 262 US 390 ( 1992 )
Fact : In 1919 Nebraska passed a law prohibiting anyone from teaching any subject
in any other language except English. In addition, foreign languages could be taught
only after the child had passed the eighth grade. Robert T. Meyer, the Plaintiff, an
instructor in Zion Parochial School, who taught in German to a ten-year-old child ,
was convicted under this law and claiming that his rights and the rights of parents
were violated.
Issue : Whether or not the law violated people's liberty, as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held : Yes, the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. The legislative purpose of the law
was to promote assimilation and civic development. But such restriction does
violence to both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.

26
Case Digested & Submitted by : JOHNNY D. MENDOZA
24, 2013
CASE : Pierce v Society of Sisters,

Group 13

June

268 US 510

FACT : Two appellees, non-public schools -Society of Sisters and Hill Military
Academy, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from
enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and
guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The
appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Oregons Compulsory Education Act unreasonably
interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control?
HELD :The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected
liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the
competency of the state.The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents
and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for
their children.

27
Submitted by: Nur-Aina Cabrido Waja
CASE # 3.) WISCONSIN V YODER 406 U.S 205
FACTS:
Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Amish Church and
respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Mennonite Church. They were charged,
tried and convicted of violating the compulsory-attendance law because they did
not enrol their children in a public or private high school.
Three Amish students, from different families, ceased to attend New Glarus High
School in New Glarus, Wisconsin following completion of 8th grade. The students
stopped attending school as per request of their parentseach students parent
requested that the youths stop attending school because of their religious beliefs.
Issue:
Does a state law requiring children to attend school until the age of 16 violate
Amish rights under the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment?
HELD:
After the school district brought a complaint against them, Yoder, Miller, and Yutzy
were charged with violating Wisconsins compulsory school attendance law. The
Amish argued that the law violated their free exercise of religion as guaranteed by
the First Amendment. Trial testimony showed the Amish believed that sending their
children to high school would not only expose them to censure by the church
community but also would endanger their salvation as well as that of their children.
The trial court determined that the states law did interfere with the Amish freedom
to act in accordance with their sincere religious beliefs but that the requirement of
high school attendance until age 16 was a reasonable and constitutional exercise of
governmental power. The parents were convicted and fined $5 each. They appealed
to a Wisconsin Circuit Court, which affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, however, agreed with the parents First Amendment argument and reversed
their convictions. The state then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

28
Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629 (1968)
FACTS: Appellant, who operates a stationery store and luncheonette, was convicted
of selling "girlie" magazines to a 16-year-old boy in violation of 484-h of the New
York Penal Law. Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not
have the power to classify two different sets of the population in regards to obscene
material and that it was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. Appellant's
conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court. He was denied
leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: Whether or not, does the New York government deprives the freedom of the
boy?
HELD: No, the New York government does not violates the freedom of the 16-yearold boy as provided by the constitution that the government shall support the duty
of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character.

29
OPOSA V. FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
.
FACTS:
An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the
Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing
Timber License agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was
claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated
their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (sec. 15
and 16, Article II of the Constitution).The petitioners asserted that they represented
others of their generation as well as for the future generation. The case was
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it
was brought to the Supreme Court for a writ of review issued by a higher court to a
lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the minors have a legal standing to file the case?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal
standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
particularly in cases related to ecology and the environment. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the
succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on
behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of
contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the
interest of public welfare.

30
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No.

120865-71

Facts:
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other
aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those
declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended
by
PD
813.
Issue:
Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
Yes, The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay.

31
Al-mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman
LLB- 1 C

Prof. Atty. Edilwasif T. Baddiri

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

CASE: MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008
FACTS:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed
acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against severalgove
rnment agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan
of action for the purpose. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila
Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, which was confirmed
by DENRs Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water samples
collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of
fecal coli form content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number
(MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR
Administrative Order No. 3490.The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commissi
on [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and
in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held
petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore
its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.
Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the
pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning
of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also
asserted
thatthe cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled b
ymandamus.The CA sustained RTCs decision stressing that petitioners were not
required to do tasks outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading
of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or
are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
2. Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a
ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924
(the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated to put up an adequate
and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other

alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area of
solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA
9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be
compelled by mandamus.

32
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990
FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its
have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in
Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan,
the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to
Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and
others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the
investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are
the ones who risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the
application of the investors without considering the national interest
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in
Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle
actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987
Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its
conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting
the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could
have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great
Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.
Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not
well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a
certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended
application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not
make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the
President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the
1987 Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution
does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations,
such as in this case.

33
Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab
Group 7
1C
Tanada vs Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of
the Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine
Government to submit to its respective authorities the WTO ( World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994,
Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate ratifying such WTO
agreement. This petition was filed questioning the constitutionality of the WTO
Agreement as it violates Sec.19, Art II of the constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO is
contrary to the provisions of sec.19, Art. II of the constitution.
Held:
No, it is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favour
of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity, and limits protection of Filipino interest against foreign competition and
trade practice that are unfair.
Furthermore, the Constitution policy of a self-reliant and independent
national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services.

34
Pamatong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Petitioner: Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political
party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that
the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the Constitutional Provision Article II,
Section 26.
Held:
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason
for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26,
Article II of the Constitution is misplaced.

35
Araneta v Gatmaitan
Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and
the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor
among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the
said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of
trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to
restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said
E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise
of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held:
VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or
catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of
Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be
deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry
into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for
the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in
consonance and strict conformity with law.

36
Submitted by: Peaflor, Rijan C.
LLB 1 Section C
Case: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008
Facts:
The Provincial Board of Mindoro approved a resolution which required all Mangyans
to stay in one permanent settlement. The said resolution was agreed by the
Secretary of Interior as required under Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative
Code. This provision authorized the establishment of non-Christian sites to be
designated by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now herein charged
on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial
officials.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid.
Held: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is
permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are
of purely local concerns.

37

38
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA(166 SCRA 533)
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power
EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines
with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which
stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker.
Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular.
Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2is a violation of non-delegation of
power
HELD:
SC held that there was valid delegation of powers .In questioning the validity of the
memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no
authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle,
is not subject to delegation.

39
Submitted by : JOHNNY D. MENDOZA, Group 13

June 26, 2013

CASE :Tablarin versus Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 (1987)

FACTS :The petitioners Tablarin, et. al., tried to stop the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from
requiring prospective medical students the taking and passing of the NMAT
( National Medical Admission Test ) as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission to a medical college.
ISSUES :Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD : Yes. The NMAT requirement is constitutional as a condition to the admission
to a medical college on the basis of the Medical Act of 1959 in which the basic
objectives are to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.

40
Submitted by: Pritzel Ann A. Reyes,
LLB 1c
Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. Vs Drilon, 176 SCRA 24(1989)
FACTS:
The Assistant Regional director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of 200 in
monthly salary and 231 in 13th month pay of its employees for the period stated.
The petitioner protested the order of the Regional Director on the ground that the
anniversary wage increase under the CBA can credit against the wage increase
mandated by RA NO.6640, hence petitioner contended that in as much as it was
liable for a salary differential of 62pesos and 13 th month pay differential of 31pesos.
Petitioner argued that the payment of the differentials constitutes full com0pliance
with RA 6640. Apparently the protest was not entertained. Petitioner brought the
case immediately to this court without appealing the matter the Sec. Of Labor and
Employment on May 91988, court order a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Assistant Regional Director from forcing the order dated April 7, 1988
ISSUE:
Whether or not section 8, R.A No.6640 is constitutional.
HELD:
The petitioner is hereby granted! The petitioner is directed to pay its 208 employees
so entitled the amount of 62 pesos each salary differential for two months and 31
pesos as 13th month pays in full compliance.

41
Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Case: Osmea v. Orbos. 220 SCRA 703
Fact:
Petitioner John H. Osmea assailed that the delegation of legislative authority to the
ERC violates Sec. 28 of Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, the appellant appealed
that there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB of
the exercise of the power of taxation.
Held:
No, The SC finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to levy
additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which
the authority must be exercised.

42
Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3)
Case: Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)
FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress Passed RA 6734, the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an
autonomous region. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, section 13
or RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to
guide the Presidents discretion.
HELD: No, Congress merely allowed the pattern set in previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the
President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the
direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional
offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.

43
RODRIGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
309 SCRA 661
Facts:
The Petitioner is the Mayor of san Nicholas, who represented the people in an
agreement to a construction company that provides electrification of the barangays
in the municipality.
The ground for notice is there is misrepresentation on the amounts presented in the
reports in comparison to the petitioner and the Audit of COA.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the case on grounds that the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), received an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether or not there was invalid delegation of the legislative power to the
DBM.
Held:
No, The court ruled that there was no undue delegation of powers. The rule is that
the powers delegated cannot be delegated to another.

44
Alsam B.Adjilul
LLB 1C
College of Law WMSU
People vs. Vera 65 Phil 56
Facts:
Petitioners Juan Vera, Expedito Serrano and Romeo Plantado, including intervenor
Alfredo Oliveros, were found guilty of the crime of homicide by CFI of Camarines Sur
dated July 25, 1966. However, at the time the decision of the respondent CFI was
promulgated and read to petitioners on August 23, 1966, the judge who rendered
and signed it, the Honorable Jose T. Surtida, had ceased to hold office as of July 31,
1966. On appeal, all the herein petitioners including intervenor, no jurisdictional
question was included among the alleged errors. Then came the decision of
respondent CA on February 13, 1969. Thereafter, the present petitioners, including
the intervener, filed petition for certiorari before Supreme Court on July 2, 1969 to
review the aforesaid decision of respondent CA. Three legal questions were raised,
in such petition. Again, no jurisdictional question was raised. Two motions for
reconsideration were thereafter filed, however both motions for reconsideration
were denied on August 26, 1969.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners could still raise the question that Judge Surtida having
retired previous to the promulgation of the sentence, it must be declared null and
void.
Held:
It is assumed, of course, that the court that renders the sentence is one
of competent jurisdiction. It is an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur, presided by the then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was
vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners. The canons
of fairness are not thereby set at naught. Petitioners cannot rightfully complain
of having been the victims of arbitrary governmental action. They were given all the
opportunity to defend themselves not only before the respondent Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur but likewise before respondent Court of Appeals. In an
earlier petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent CA, they did not
meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate that they failed to
receive the protection that due process accords every accused. What was said
by Justice Cardozo fits the occasion

45
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R.
CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG
Facts:
This case is a petition assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 in the exercise of such delegated power to local
government acting only as agents of the national legislature.
The petitioners, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Stephen A. Monsanto, Dan R. Calderon,
and Grandy N. Triestesent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation
of their drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. The respondents,
Metropolitan Manila Authority enacted Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, which
gives them authority to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila which whichappear to be in conflict with the decision
of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that
the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43.
The said ordinance, as well as Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the
basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government
Code. However, the flaw in the measure was that they violated existing law,
specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal
of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series
of 1998 in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as
agents of the national legislature are valid
Held:
Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of
the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan
Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized
under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said
area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations
was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following
requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene theConstitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or

discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. PD 1605
does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They
are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must
obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which
has the force and effect of a statute.

46
Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani
Case no. 46 Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima 562 SCRA 251
FACT:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335.
petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval
of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress has the legislative power to settle the dispute.
HELD:
No, although in Sec.1 Art. VI state that The Legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum
There is a limit in a legislative power, the procedural limits curtail the manner of
passing law.

47
Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC
United States v. Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil 1
Fact
Act no. 2868, "An act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution
and sale of the said products and authorizing the Governor General, with consent of
the council of state, to issue necessary rules and regulations. On August 1, 1919,
the Governor General issued EO 53, which was publish August 20, 1919. The said
EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tong Ho, a rice dealer, sold
ganta of rice at 80 centivos. The said amount was higher than what is prescribed in
the EO, the sale was done August 6, 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged in
violation of the said EO, he was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus 500 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
Issue
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
Held
Yes, the conviction of Ang Tong must be reversed since the act is done prior the EO
is published. The law contains no guide for the Governor General in determining if
the rise in price is extraordinary and for determining what the price should be, it
fails to present conditions to be consider in promulgating the law, lastly the said act
authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the
Governor General.

48
SUBMITTED BY: CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO (Group 9)
CASE 48: Employers Confederation v National Wages and Productivity Commission
GR No.96196
FACTS:
On 15 October 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued
Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the
National Capital Region.
On 23 October 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending
Wage Order No. NCR-01. Provided, that all workers and employees in the private
sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory
minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day
shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates is
constitutional.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines and DENIED the petition of Employers Confederation of the Philippines.

49
People of the Philippines vs Rosenthal
Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO
Oil Company. The main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and
sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were
found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets.
Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation
of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that every person,
partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines
speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file
previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated
therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. Sec 5, on the other hand,
provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied,
either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person,
partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities
as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to
such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting
that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the
provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation,
its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or
permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in
his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and
that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the
period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is
unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said
official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued,
thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the
result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act
No. 2581 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the
Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or
cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under
the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or
permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581
have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular
Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding
that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and
purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in
fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold that public interest in this case is a
sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term

public interest is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the
delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this
is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context
of the provision in question show the contrary. . .

50

51
Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 51 : Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
Fact : The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
for violation of E.O. No. 626-A.
Issue : Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process?
Held : Whereas Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional,
because due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his
defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights.

52
United states vs. Panlilio, 28 PHIL 608
FACTS:
The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of
animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and
without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos
exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be
taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one
place to another.
ISSUE:
Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture?
HELD:
NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of
such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the
provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections
of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and
5. This case does not fall within any of them.

Case Digested &Submitted by: Jonelle Tom Dua

Group 13

53
SUBMITTED BY: NUR-AINA C. WAJA
G.R. No. 135808
October 6, 2008
CASE # 5
SEC v INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION ( 567 SCRA 354)
FACTS:
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The agreement also stipulates that
GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power
Corporation. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock
of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44
million. The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors,
respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider
information. On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that
IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old
Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations
with GHB.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision on 20 August 1998. It determined that
there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider
trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the
respondents allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no
statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.
ISSUE: WON ABSENCE OF IRR WOULD INVALIDATE THE PROVISIONS OF LAW
HELD:
The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of
law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. To rule
that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress,
such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to
defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules.
Its refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or
administrative case may be filed against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate
authority under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for
violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. The petition is
GRANTED. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents
for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be
undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations
Code. No costs.

54
Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Case: Gerochi v. DENR, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Fact:
Petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi assailed the provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A 9136 E lectric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge a nd Sec. 2, Rule
18 of the IRR be declared unconstitutional. The appellant appealed that there is
unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERC. The universal charge provided for
under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said
law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power
to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The
assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved
by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

Issue:
Whether or not there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to tax on the
part of the ERC.
Held:
No. All

that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate

legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec.
34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains

Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid
delegation of legislative power.
sufficient standards.

As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards
the following: "interest of law and order;"[51] "adequate and efficient
instruction;"[52] "public interest;"[53] "justice and equity;"[54] "public convenience and
welfare;"[55] "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"[56] "standardization and
regulation of medical education;"[57] and "fair and equitable employment
practices."[58] Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability
of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed rehabilitation and

management[60] meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.

55
PSL Inc., v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442
Facts:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the
business of laundry services. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality
Management Division of Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners
effluent which
showed non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed
to conform tothe regulatory standards. Another wastewater sampling which was
conducted on 5 June 2002, inresponse to the 17 May 2002 request for re-sampling
received by LLDA, finally showed compliancewith the effluent standard in all
parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein
that the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial sampling to the date the
request for re-sampling was received by the Authority Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the LLDA denied.
Issue:
WON the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on
non-delegation of legislative powers.
HELD: LLDAs power to impose fines is not unrestricted. It was only after the
investigation finding the petitioner failing to meet the established water and
effluent quality standards that the LLDA imposed the penalty of P 1,000.00 per day.
The P 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed
under PD 984.

56
DonitaLouA Bemida
Consti class I-C
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640
Facts: Que Po Lay who was in possession of a $7,000 worth foreign exchange like
U.S dollars, checks and money orders, was sentenced to a six month imprisonment
with 1,000php fine and subsidiary imprisonment after he was found guilty of
violating the Central Bank Circular No. 20. The Solicitor General said that under the
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930, the publication of the circular in the Official
Gazette is not required for force and effect
Issue: Whether or not circulars should be published for it to become effective.
Held: Yes, because circulars prescribe a penalty for violation and should therefore be
published before the public sees its content. The people have to be informed of its
contents and penalties.

57
People vs. Dacuycuy
Group 5

173 SCRA 90
Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a
fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not
an undue of delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.
HELD:
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the
courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dept. The
exercise of judicial powers not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe
and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing
laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of
powers and non-delegability of legislative powers

58
Carbonilla vs Board of Airllines Representatives
657 SCRA 775

FACTS:

The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No/ 1-2005

(CAO 1-2005) amending CAO 7-92. The Department of finance approve CAO 1-2005
on 9 February on 23 August 2004, CAO 7-92 AND CAO 1-2005 were promulgated
pursuant to section 3506 in relation to section 608 of the Tariff and Costumes Code
of the Philippines (TCCP).

BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005
reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 03
March 2005, the Acting District Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary of
Finance already approved CaO 1-2005 on 09 February 2005. As such, the increase in
the overtime rates became effective on 16 March 2005. BAR still requested for an
audience with the Secretary of Finance which was granted on 12 October 2005.

On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Eugenio L De Leon,

Chief, Bonded Warehouse Division, BOC NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to
the proposed increase in the overtime rates. BAR further requested for a meeting to
discuss the matter.

The BOC then sent a letter to BAR's member airlines demanding payment of
overtime services to BOC personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BAR's
member airlines refused and manifested their intention to file a petition with the
Commissioner of Customs and/or the Secretary of Finance to suspend the
implementation of CAO 1-2005.
.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the CAO 1-2005 in the exercise of such delegated power valid.

HELD:

The SC did not agree with the Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Section
3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives
authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides
that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by
the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private
enterprise.

59
Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Mangaliman, Aileen P.

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of
the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:
1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one
bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1)
the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of
the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition
of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution.
3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners'
assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number
of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which

drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
60
Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C GROUP 8
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as
taxpayers, assail certain provisions of R.A. No. 7854, An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati, as unconstitutional on the ground that Sec. 52 of R.A. No. 7854 violates
Art.VI Sec.5(4) and not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art. VI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The reapportionment of the legislative districts may be made through a special
law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than general reapportionment law. The
petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art.VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said Section provides that a city with
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement
of 250,000.

61
SUBMITTED BY: CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO(GROUP 9)
CASE 61 : Sema v COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
FACTS:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly by merits
of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the
eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City
in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province" under MMA Act 201.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 maintaining the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. Thus,COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No.
07-0407 by renaming the legislative district as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
ISSUE:
Whether: 1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces is constitutional. 2. That affirms, whether a
province created by ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives, and Comelec Resolution 7902
HELD:
1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL in granting the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; 2. MMA Act 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is VOID and COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.

62
Submitted by: Peaflor, Rijan C.
LLB 1 Section C
Case: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008
FACT: Cagayan de Oro City has only 1 Legislative District and so R.A. 9371 also
known as AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE LONE LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO was passed increasing the Citys
Legislative District into two. Resolution No. 7837 was then promulgated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) implementing the said Law. According to
Petitioner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, the said Resolution cannot be implemented without
a Plebiscite. Petitoner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the grounds
that it is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary for the implementation of the Law
which provides for apportionment of a legislative district.
HELD: Conduct of a Plebiscite is no longer required since Cagayan de Oro City
constitutionally remains a single unit and its administration is not distributed along
territorial lines. Its zone remains fully intact; there is only the addition of one more
legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purpose of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly
apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

63

64
Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 64 : Aldaba V. Comelec, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Fact : On May 01, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City, by
creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City
was 223, 069. The population of Malolos City on May 01, 2009 is a contested fact
but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification
issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254, 030 by the year
2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Issue : Whether or not the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250, 000 for
the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos?
Held : Whereas the Supreme Court declaring Republic Act 9591 unconstitutional for
being violative of Section 5 (3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitutio. Because it did not
satisfy the 250, 000 population requirement.

65
Submitted by : Johnny D. Mendoza
Group 13
WMSU ConsLaw 1 Case #
65
Case : Ocampo versus HRET, GR No. 158466, June 15 2004

Facts: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he
was elected for lack of residency in the district and was ordered to vacate his office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was declared as such, he
should be declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number of votes.

Issue: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as winner considering that the duly-elected representative is
not eligible for the office.

Ruling: No. The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or ineligible for office does not give rise
to the right of the candidate who garnered the second highest vote to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most basic
precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.

66
Pritzel Ann A. Reyes
LLB 1c
Case No.66 Ang Bagong Bayani Vs Comelec, 359 SCRA 698 (2001)
FACT:
Ang Bagong Bayani and Akbayan citizens party filed before the comelec a petition
under the rule 65 of the rule of the court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.3785
issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner seek the disqualification of private respondent,
requiring mainly that the party-list system was intended the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties. The none marginalized and
overrepresented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omnibus Resolution No.3785 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES! Political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list election.
under the constitution and R.A 7941. Private respondent cannot be disqualified from
the party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties.

67
Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Case: VC Candangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009
Fact: Petitioner filed a petition for registration as sectoral organization under R.A
7941. Further, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution denying the
petitioners petition for registration. Incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show
that the COMELEC in denying the petition for registration gravely abused its
discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion for denying their petition
for registration.
Held:
The COMELEC En Banc ruled for the dismissal of the petition. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such unreliable and fanciful exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that the COMELEC, through
the questioned issuances, gravely abused its discretion.

68

Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C

Case: VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP) VS. COMELEC

Facts
On June 1998, COMELEC proclaimed thirteen party list representatives from 12 parties
and organizations. Petitioner assailed ordering the proclamation of additional thirty-eight
previously defeated parties to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RE 7941, The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list
Issue
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

Held
No, the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is merely a ceiling and not
mandatory. This is to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list
representatives.
However, it is necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions to have
obtained at least two percent of the total cast votes for the party-list system in order to
be entitled a party-list seat. Those who obtained more than two percent will have
additional seats but not more than three seats

Note:
The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list, computed as follows:
No. of party-list =

No. of District representatives To be electedx .20

.80 representatives

Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order,
according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast
nationwide, formula shown below:
% of cast votes =

Votes Cast for the Party

Total Cast Votes Nationwide

x 100

(The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining
the total votes cast for the party-list system)

69
Donita Lou A. Bemida
Consti Law I-C
Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2013
Facts: A Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation was filed on June 22, 2004 by
petitioners Partido Manggagawa and Butil together with CIBAC against the
respondent Commission en banc, asking for the proclamation of new elected
members and an additional seat for each party. On July 31 of the same year, the
Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011failing to resolve the
petitioner's issue. Petitioners Partido Manggagawa and Butil filed an immediate
petition on August 18, 2004, seeking for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec en banc can apply the November 23, 2009
resolution in Ang
Bagong Bayani case.
Held: No. Because in the November 20, 2003 Resolution, the Court granted an
additional seat to
BUHAY because it has obtained more than 4% of the entire votes.

70
Al-mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman
Prof. Atty. Edilwasif T,
Baddiri
LLB-1 C
Consti Law 1
Case: G.R. No. 180443
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,
CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.
Fact:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari
and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution
of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, 1 otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated
July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007
elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's
Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party,
Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations
and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054 thuswise:
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves
the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil
Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution
thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi
Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's
nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the
president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such;
that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to
oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the
party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well
as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president
of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative
and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of
withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished
with the Boards acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the
party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second
nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
As a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.

Issues:
The issues are the following:
a. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
b. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
c. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and
violates the Party-List System Act; and
d. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of
the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of
nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of
the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
Held:
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent
that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee
once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving
Citizens Battle Against Corruptions withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin,
Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees,
respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as
second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the
House of Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin,
Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in
the House of Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

71
Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 71 : Aquino V. Comelec, 243 SCRA 400 ( 1995 )
Facts : Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for Congressman.
Issue : Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for Congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution?
Held : Yes, what is required is not just temporary residence but domicile as this has
been defined in jurisprudence. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

72
Sub. By: Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab
Case # 72: Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 ( 1995)
Facts:
On March 8,1995 petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Officer, providing the information in item number 8: RESIDENCE
IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHER I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: ---- years and seven months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position
filed a petition for the Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging
that the petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
On March 29, 1995 petitioner filed an amended/ corrected certificate of
candidacy changing the entry seven months to since childhood.
On April 24, 1995, the second division of the commission on election
( COMELEC) by a vote of 2-1, came up with a resolution finding private respondents
petition for disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious, striking out the petitioners
corrected/amended certificate of candidacy of March 31,1995 and cancelling her
original certificate of candidacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner had complied the residency requirement as
provided for in Art VI, Sec. 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
Yes, the petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. A perusal of the
resolution of the COMELECs Second Division reveals a starting confusion in the
application settled concepts of Domicile and Residence in election law.
In Co vs Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court concluded that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution adhere to the definition given to the term residence in
election law regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.

73

Domino v. COMELEC
July 19, 1999 (310 SCRA 546)
Petitioners: Juan Domino
Respondent: Commission on Elections, Grafilo, Java, et. al.
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani but
the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified for
lack of the one-year residency requirement.
Domino filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied
by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence
requirement.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1
year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Held:
No. He did not meet the residency requirement. The term residence, as
used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The contract of lease of a
house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile.
While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned
from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997,
that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22
October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon
City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997,
Domino still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the
constitution.

74
SUBMITTED BY:CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO (Group 9)
CASE 74: Maquera vs. Boraa, 15 SCRA 7
FACTS:
Republic Act 4421 requiring all candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices shall post a surety bond equivalent to one year salary to which he
is a candidate.
ISSUE:
The Court was asked to rule on whether Republic Act 4421 is constitutional
HELD:
Republic Act 4421 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As democratic form of government
requires that political rights be enjoyed by the citizens regardless of social or
economic distinctions. Among the political rights of a Filipino citizen is the right to
vote and be voted for a public office.

75
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and
other consolidated petitions), November 3, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and
tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private offices; and
(4) persons charged before the prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x
x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x
x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the
school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having
an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national
or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II.

THE ISSUES

1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an

additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a
law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution?
2.

Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also
PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently enjoined all the
concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress
CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution,
to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify
these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of
a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be,
as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a precondition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senatorelect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.

36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another

qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment,
as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for noncompliance with the drug-testing requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following
principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to
their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and
are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
(3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and wellbeing of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view
and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,
the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private
offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has
been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government
search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause
to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for
employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and
informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or
even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness
of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or

workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees'
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a
search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees
or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in
a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be
a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when
and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys
work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to
the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate
chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the
drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on
the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the
search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities
in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test

requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test
for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable
at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutors
office with a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than 6 years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no
valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the
case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing
a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

76

77
EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE Farinas vs Executive Secretary
GR No.147387December 10,2003
Facts:
Before the court is a petition to declare as unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA9006 (The
fair election act) insofar as it expressly repeals Sec.67 of BP 881(The Omnibus
Election Code) filed by Farinas et al, minority members of the minority bloc in the
HR. Impleaded as respondents are the Executive sec, Speaker of the House etal.
Issue/s:1.
WON the effectivity clause which states .This Act shall take effect upon its approval
(Sec.16) is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution
Held:1.
An effectivity clause which provides that the law shall take immediately upon its
approval is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall take
effect fiftten day safter its publication in the OG or newspaper of general circulation.
In Tanada vs Tuvera, the court laid down the rule: The clause, unless otherwise
provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself.Publication isi ndispensable in every case

78
Quinto vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive
officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from
Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing
Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective
officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the
substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation
of the equal protection clause.

79
Case No. (3) Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
Facts: Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. in the May 14,
2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Filed a
Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation, stating there is clear and convincing
evidence showing that the petitioner is undoubtedly guilty of the charges for
indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. To which the
petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results
showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against Locsins 53,447 votes. Instead By
virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were
declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. Ma. Victoria L. Locsin
was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. And issued a Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the
House of Representatives. The petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation[42] stating
that he was deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the
documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for
the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division
instead proclaimed ruled on in favor of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin. After granting the
petition of the petitioner to declare as null and void the proclamation, the petitioner
wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing
the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en bancresolution annulling the
proclamation of Rep. Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. [
Issue: 1.Whether or not the petitioner is not guilty of violation Section 68 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code.
2. Whether or not Petition for Mandamus and Memorandum [59] dated October
8, 2001 for Speaker De Venecia, stating that there is no legal obstacle to
complying with the duly promulgated be compelled.
Held: 1. Affirmative, Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner
was denied of due process during the entire proceedings.
2. Affirmative. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of
chaos and confusion. Thus, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA, SR.

80
Al-khajer K. Jawadil
Tolentino v. COMELEC G.R. 148334
FACTS:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator
Guingona) as Vice-President.Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.
ISSUES:
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate
seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
HELD:
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to
conduct the special election within the confines of R.A.No. 6645, merely chose to
adopt the Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84.This Court has
consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in
adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or
do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

81
No. L-25554. October 4, 1966
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., petitioner, vs.
Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, respondents
Facts:
The Philippine Constitution Association has filed a suit against the Auditor General
of the Philippines, Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act
No.4131 (approved June 10, 1964) to the speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969.
Republic Act No.4131 authorized the increase in salary of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives. Section 1 of the said Act expressly provides that the
salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution. Section 7 of the same Act provides that the salary increase of
the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
take effect on the effectively of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution require that not only the
term of all the members of the House of Representatives but also that of all the
Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective.
Held:
The court granted the Writ of prohibition.
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision
refers to all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives in
the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between
them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of
the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved
the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in
the terms of office thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature.

82
People vs Jalosjos
Facts:
The accused appellant Jalosjos, pleads that he be allowed to fully discharge his
public duties as a congressman despite having been convicted.
Issue:
Whether or not the fuctions of a public official in Congress may exempt him from
the rules that apply to convicted people in general.
Held:
The Court held that elected as a public official in congress is NOT a reasonable
classification in a criminal law enforcement. The court denied the motion filed.

83
Alsam B. Adjilul
LLB 1C
College of Law WMSU
Nicanor T. Jimenez VS Bartolome Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876
FACTS:
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in
the open letter of Cabangbang to the President. Bartolome Cabangbang member
of the House of Representatives and wrote the letter to the President of the
Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-Congressman
caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines . A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for
the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang. The letter
contains information that: 1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build
up; 2. There is a planned coup dtat; 3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the
President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and
men of the AFP behind General Arellano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
2. Whether or not it is libelous.
HELD:
1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because
the publication: a. was an open letter, b. the Congress was not in session; c. it was
not a discharge of an official function or duty.
2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were
not the planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part. The order
appealed is confirmed.

84
86 ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70)
The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that
are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress.
FACTS:
Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the
loss of LP candidateto the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then
Secretary of Public Works and Communicationsto the independent LP candidate
which divided the LP votes. Antonino was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when
he said that had not Valencia sabotaged and double-crossed the LP, its official
candidate would have won. On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate
session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate the actions of
Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Communications in connection with
acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of the formal request
was furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be
considered in passing upon Valencias appointment to the Cabinet. Two-page press
release was issued by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents
were published or reported on the front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The
press release depicted Antonino as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high
public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and
pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in
violation of the Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Antonino then
filed the present civil action against Valencia. Valencia filed a counterclaim and
claims that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release and that
they were made in good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly
privileged in character. Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused
and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in
the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel.
Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the appeal, Antonino died in a plane
crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix substituted her husband as plaintiffappelle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is
protected as a qualified privilege communication?
HELD:
Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in
nature where malice in law is presumed because they were against the honor,
integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant Valencia made his imputations
against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially as to be qualifiedly privileged. The

malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that had
the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of malice, the
charges should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees and not
publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers. Defendant-appellants claim of
defensive libel is likewise rejected because his argument that he had been libeled
by the plaintiff and accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libel is
based upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff Antoninos act was not libelous because the
letter he sent was a privileged communication because the defendant was charged
by the plaintiff in his capacity as a Secretary of Public Works and Communications
and the same were filed privately and officially to the Senate and Commission on
Appointments.
Judgment affirmed

85
Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani
85 Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago AC no. 7399, August 25, 2009
FACT:
Senator/Atty. Mirriam Defensor Santiago crossed the limit of decency and
good professional conduct due to the rejection of her nomination as Chief Justice of
the Phil. Supreme Court made by the JBC. She uttered humiliating words to the
Philippine Chief Justice in her privilege speech at the House of Senate, she was
quoted as stating I want to spit in the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts of the Supreme Court, and calling the Supreme Court as Supreme Court
of Idiots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Senator Mirriam Defensor Santiago be criminally liable or be
subjected to disciplinary actions.
HELD:
No, as Art. VI, Sec. 11of the Constitution provides that A Senator or member
of the House of the Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privilege from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be question nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
The Constitution enshrined parliamentary immunity over the lady Senator, but as
being a lawyer she violated Canon 8 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

86
Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC
Liban v. Gordon
GR. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Fact
Dante Liban filed a petition to the supreme court declaring Richard Gordon has
having forfeited his seat in the Senate. Respondent incumbency as member of the
Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February
23, 2006 meeting of the Board of Governors, petitioner allege accepting the
Chairmanship of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate
provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue
Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office
in a GOCC.
Held
No, PNRC is a private organization performing a public functions/services, PNRC
Chairman is elected by Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or
by any subordinate government official.
Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat or function, when he was elected as Chairman during his
incumbency as Senator.

87
Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO
Group: 9
CASE: Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. 113 SCRA 31March 25, 1982

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Justice Istanislao Fernandez, a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa

entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero group to which the
petitioner Puyat group objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman
could appear as counsel before any administrative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may
intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec.II Art.VIII (Now Sec.14 Art.VI) of the
Constitution.
HELD: No. Assemblyman Fernandez could not be said to be appearing as counsel.
His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10
shares of the matter in litigation.

88
Jan 25, 2010
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad
were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen.
Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the majority, while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party number 7 and, thus,
also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners
filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in
the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of
legislative procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring
to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total. The plain and unambiguous words
of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does
it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the
said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind
other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of

votes, not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as
plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority,
while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant
minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition
of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select
the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that [e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to
determine the rules of its proceedings. xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints
of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject

to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.

Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide
for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This
Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court
from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

89

90
Submitted by: MR BASAEZ, DIOSCORO A.
CASE: People v Jalosjos
GR. No. 132875-76

GROUP 12

June 26, 2013

FACTS: The accused-appellant Romeo F. Jalosjos, a full pledged member of the

Congress who was confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of the house of
representatives, including attending at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on
the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant be allowed to attend Congressional
sessions and committee hearings despite being convicted of a non-bailable offense.
HELD: No. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
years, is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundation.

91
Submitted by: CymerMohamad
Arroyo VS De venecia 277 SCRA 268
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are
members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chaircalled out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was
saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chairand Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled billwas signed into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasureof the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in
a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum

had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

92
Pritzel Ann A. Reyes
LLB 1c
Case No.92 Osmea vs Pendatum 109 PHIL 863 (1960)
FACTS:
Osmea filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary junction against Congressman Pendatum and 14 others in their capacity
as a member of the Special Committee created by the House of Resolution #59.
Osmea filed the abatement of the Resolution #59, requiring the petitioner to
establish by proof or evidence his charges against the President. Osmea was
suspended for 15th months for the serious disorderly behaviour.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its member.
HELD:
For unparliamentarily conduct, members of the congress have been or could be
censured, committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

93
Al-khajer K. Jawadil
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636
Facts:
On 20 April 2001, private respondent Dr. Celia P. Morales (Morales) filed an AffidavitComplaint against petitioners Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Orlando O.
Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. de la Cruz (Mangahas, et al.) for violation of
Sec. 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
complaint was docketed as OMB-1-01-0382-D.
In her complaint, private respondent Morales basically alleged that:
1. On June 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, thru the initiative of Councilor Zaldy G. Matias (nephew of Mr. and Mrs.
Edgardo Manalastas), seconded by Councilor Carlos R. Malaca, persuaded to pass
and enact KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998, granting the request of Mr. and Mrs.
Edgardo Manalastas for the conversion of their agricultural land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-125720 into a memorial garden despite insufficiency of
the requirements thereof as provided by law;
2. After receiving a copy of the said Kapasyahan, it appeared that the conversion of
the agricultural land of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas into a memorial garden
was hurriedly done and apparently not in accord with the necessary legal
requirements based on their failure to: (a) notify the adjacent residential lot owners
of the said plan and/or development; (b) secure proper recommendation(s) and
permit from different government departments, bureaus and agencies concerned;
and (c) follow and comply with the proper procedures as prescribed by law;
3. In questioning the same, my son sent a letter dated 13 April 1999 addressed to
the SB and prayed, among others the immediate REVOCATION and CANCELLATION
of the said Kapasyahan;
4. Secretary of the Sanggunian,admitted therein that KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998
was only a DRAFT RESOLUTION;
6. On 20 April 1999, another KapasyahanBlg. 34, taon 1999 was issued by the SB
refraining or stopping the Manalastas to further develop their project without first
securing the proper permits and certification from the different government
departments and bureaus concerned, unfortunately, however, the same was never
implemented;
7. On 14 May 1999, my son decided to send another letter addressed to the SB and
prayed the issuance of a permanent revocation of KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998 in
lieu of a temporary revocation previously issued;
8. My daughter, Felicitas Morales sent another letter dated 28 September 2000
addressed to the SB, informing them of the presence of persons who had continued
and still continue to develop the project of Manalastas despite the prohibition
previously issued to that effect. However, to our prejudice, no action whatsoever
was taken by the said public officials concerned, thereby extending undue favor to
the Manalastas;
9. The undersigned was forced to send another letter dated 24 January 2001
addressed to the SB
10. On 12 March 2001, another letter was sent by the undersigned addressed to the
SB, requesting that I be given a chance to be heard in a form of public hearing in
order to air my grievances against the illegal conversion of the land and for the

unfair, unjust and oppressive treatment which we suffered and continue to suffer up
to the present;
11. Four (4) days prior to the scheduled public hearing on 6 April 2001, the Office of
the Sanggunian headed by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.I. Alvarez sent a notice to
all the members of the SB, namely, Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Danilo A.
de Guzman, Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla, Jocelyn dela Cruz,
Crisanto V. Velayo II, Alfredo M. Alejandria, Jr. and Alejandro C. Velayo, for purpose(s)
of informing them of the said public hearing;
12. When the notice was served to the following councilors, namely: Leoncio D.
Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla and
Jocelyn R. dela Cruz, I was informed by the Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L. Alvarez
and the Secretary of the Sanggunian, Mr. Eduardo H. Almera, that the said
councilors have maliciously refused to sign the said notice, thereby giving undue
advantage in favor of the Manalastas who up to this present time has been
continuously developing their project despite the prohibition thereof;
13. However, despite the fact that they were properly notified, the above-named
councilors in the preceding paragraph have deliberately and maliciously neglected
and/or refused to attend the scheduled public hearing last 6 April 2001, thereby
unjustly and oppressively discriminating the undersigned without sufficient
justification whatsoever;
14. Due to the unlawful acts committed by the six (6) councilors, the undersigned
most respectfully submits that they be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(f) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act (R.A. 3019 as amended by R.A. 3047, P.D. 77 and
B.P. 195) which provides that: Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on matter pending
before him for purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
15. As of this date, no public hearing yet has ever been conducted, hence, to the
prejudice of the undersigned;
16. With full sincerity and honesty, I believe that there will be no more public
hearing that will be conducted due (to) the admission made by Hon. Vice-Mayor
Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and Mr. Eduardo H. Almera as contained in their Joint
Affidavit.
ISSUES:
A.Actuations of the CA
1. Court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition for having been late for a day
2. Court of appeals erred in denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that no copy of petition wad furnished to the offive of the solicitor general.
B. Actuations in the court
1. The court abused its discretion when it denies the motion to quash and ordered
to suspend the petitioners
HELD:
Premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

94
Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3)
Case: (par. 4) US v. Pons, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)
FACTS: Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer
Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The
said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels
to Pons house. the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering
that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading
and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally
and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the
Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved
while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his
witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since
this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to
determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the
SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC
passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

95
Donita Lou A. Bemida
Consti Law I-C
Casco Phil Commercial Co. v. Giminez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, on July 1, 1959, imposed a 25% uniform
margin fee for foreign transactions and issued a memorandum declaring the
exemptions of charging. Petitioner Casco Philippine Commercial Co., manufacturer
of synthetic resin glues, in November and December 1959 paid a sum of P33,765.42
for the margin fee of the imported urea and formaldehyde. Upon Resolution No.
1529, the petitioner asked for a refund of the amount. The Central Bank refused to
grant the reimbursement and said that what was exempted was urea
Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempted from payment.
Held: No. Because urea and formaldehyde are raw materials for glues and urea
formalhyde is a
synthetic resin.

96
Astorga vs. Villegas
Group 5

56 SCRA 714 (1974)

Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate.
Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by
the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its
approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the
bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino
made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong
version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew
their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the
authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bills
due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures
therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An
importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of
the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to
verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were
introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted
and did not become a law.

97
Philippines Judges Association vs. Prado
G.R. No.105371, November 11,1993
FACTS:
THE PHILIPPINES JUDGE ASSOCIATION, President , BERNANDO P ABISAMIS
NATIONAL CONFIDERATION OF THE JUDGES OF THE PHILIPPINES ,petitioner vs.
HONORABLE PETE PRADO Secretary of DOTC, respondent. Petitioners assailed that
statute violates Article VI section26 of the constitution with the presumption the Bill
have not undergone a careful study among the legislature and executive branch.
The most serious challenging of petition of RA 7354 specifically sec 35 violates the
EQUAL PROTECTECTION CLAUSE of the constitution Article III section I
However, respondent assert we are complying the contention of the petitioner
as far as the procedure of deliberation is concern. Accordingly requiring every end
and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to express in its Title could not only be unreasonable but would actually
renders legislation impossible
ISSUES:
Whether the R.A. 7354 specifically SECTION 35 repealing clause violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
DECISION:
The petition partially GRANTED and SECTION 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE privilege shall be RESTORED.
Temporarily restraining order dated June 02, 1992 is made permanent. SO ORDERED

98
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
Mangaliman, Aileen P.
Facts:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer
and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have
acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House
Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other,
with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation
because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for
the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no
pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that
the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence
thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision
cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the
constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24
of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not
connected with VAT.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to
the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the
recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given
to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently
required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a
property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT
is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the
State cannot remove.
Issue:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?
Held:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as
the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of
the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its

expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool
by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a
property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax
is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit
the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of
R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a
public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end
shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within
constitutional bounds.
The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

99
Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C
99_PIMENTEL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, 644 SCRA 741
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting
further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706. It was on the ground that the rules adopted
by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed
by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due
process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI Sec. 16(2) of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of
the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI Sec.16(2) of the Constitution.
HELD:
No. The referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator
Villars right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate
Committee of the Whole of the Rules of Ethics Committee does not violate Senator
Villars right to due process. And as Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution states: Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.

100
Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO
Case: Angara vs. Electoral Commission63PHIL134

Group: 9
1936

June 26, 2013

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for
the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On
October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as memberelect of National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
ISSUE: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over Electoral Commission and the
subject of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD: Yes, the Electoral Commission has just acted within its legitimate exercise of
its constitutional Prerogative. Therefore the petition for a writ of probation against
the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.

101
Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil 192)
August 31, 1946
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero, petitioners
Jose A. Avelino et al., respondents
Facts:
1. On May 25, 1946, a pendum resolution was submitted ordering the
following candidates: Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero to
their seats as members of chamber. Furthermore, they should not swear
into office for their success on the elections was proposed to be invalid.
The resolution was passed by their constituents who questioned the
validity of the votes they garnered.
2. It was reported that during the National Elections, provinces Nueva Ecija,
Pampanga, Tarlac and Bulacan was under terrorism. Moreover, the
election returns of the said provinces were null or void for they believe
that the great majority of voters were coerced or intimidated suffered
from the paralysis of judgment, the people were deprived of their right to
suffrage.
3. The ballot boxes from Nueva Ecija were stolen by armed bands in the
barrios of municipalities of Bongabon, Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba.
4. Many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished
themselves from their home towns to avoid being victimized or losing
their lives. Moreover, bodies were found with notes attached to their
necks Bumoto kami kay Roxas after the election.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the powers to intervene with the
petition
2. Whether or not the petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
Vera should be deferred to seat as members of the chamber

Held:
1. No. The Supreme Court refused to intervene with the petition. According
to the constitution, there should be separation of powers with the three
branches namely: the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. Each is

independent from each other and each has specific roles to perform. The
role of judiciary is to foresee that the laws are properly delivered to the
society and that these laws are constitutional. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court held that the case was not a contest and affirmed the inherent right
of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for as mentioned above, the
legislative has the power to determine who shall be admitted to its
membership. Also, no man or group of men be permitted to profit from the
results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and contrary
to the principle of freedom of choice.

102

103
SUBMITTED BY: Arajil, Saldon A
Group 6
CASE: Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move
Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKASNUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period
not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution
HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only
that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a
resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that
time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his
parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be
indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

104
Submitted by: CymerMohamad
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 166 SCRA 377
Facts:This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the
Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27,
1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition
and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit
themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested
parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining
members coming from the judiciary.
Issue:
WON the SET can function without the Senator members.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and
affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or
disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of
a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment.

105
Case No. (2) Bondoc v. Pineda,201 SCRA 792 (1991)
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidate of Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
Who lost the elections held on May 11, 1987. Filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine
(9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining
six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. of LDP is one of the
members in the Tribunal, insisted on a re-appreciation and recount of the ballots
cast in some precincts which lead the petitioner to won over the respondent by 23
votes.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP
be granted.
Held: Negative. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as
a member of the House Electoral Tribunal was declared null and void ab initio for
being violative of the Constitution. And Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, Members
of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure.

106
Al-khajer K. Jawadil
Robles v. HRET 181 SCRA 780 (1990)
FACTS:
The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for
brevity) as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in
many cases. (Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391; Robles v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780). The power of the HRET, as the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its
members is beyond dispute.
ISSUES:
Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate
of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of Southern
Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of candidacy she gave her full
name as "Rosette YniguesLerias". Her maiden name is Rosette Ynigues. Respondent
Roger G. Mercado was the administration candidate for the same position.During
the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass
from the Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the
ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the candidates who received the
two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with 34,442 votes and
Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes. In the provincial board's copy of the certificate
of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while
Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the
canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793
votes, giving Lerias a winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of
canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained erasures,
alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the
canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the
members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were
made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of the
certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the
nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no
objection.
HELD:
The decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner Rosette YniguezLerias is the duly
elected representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte.

107
Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C
Case: Case Digest on Arroyo vs. HRET, Syjuco GR. No. 118597 July 14, 1995
Facts
Congressional candidate private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., filed an election
protest before public respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
five days after the Makati board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker P. Arroyo
the duly elected congressman for the lone district of Makati in the May 11, 1992
national and local elections. Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of ballots
then resulted to declaring Protestant Augusto l. Syjuco, jr. as the duly elected
Representative, Lone District of Makati. Tasked by public respondent HRET to
investigate on the matter, now retired Supreme Court Justice Emilio Gancayco
confirmed the irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and
personnel, they found out that Arroyo votes were consistently reduced at the
revision and the deducted votes were found and included in the stray ballots, while
Syjuco was always constant and there were instances where ballots were deducted
from the protestee (Arroyo) and that another modus operandi is to falsify the
revision reports by intercalation, false entries or simply switching of true results of
the counting.
Issue
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Supreme Court can intervene the creation of the Electoral
Tribunal.
Held
Yes, the Supreme Court can intervene, Section 17, Art VI. The Supreme Court
granted Makati Cong. Joker Arroyos petition to declare that public respondent HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
proceeded to decide in favor of his rival Augusto Syjuco, Jr.s election protest based
on the latters precinct level document based anomalies/evidence theory. On this
basis, the Supreme Court has invalidated a final vote tally made by the Electoral
Tribunal.

108
Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002
Facts:
Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary
injunction were filed before the court that the respondents be
ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the
composition of the HRET and CA to include part-list representatives
in accordance with the Party List System Act (RA 7941) and Sec 17 and
18, Art VI.
Having in mind that out of 220 members of the House, 14 of
which are party-list representatives (PLR), the petitioners put
forward that LP reps (having a total of 13 members) be ousted and be
replaced by PLR nominees.
Issue:
(I) Whether or not the present composition of HRET and CA
violates the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because no party-list representatives are members
thereof.
Held:
No. There has no violation.
The court dismissed the case on the following grounds:
(I) The present composition of the HRET and CA does not violate
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because:
a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to the House the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members will occupy the seats allotted to the House in HRET and
CA. And even if the PLR comprise the sufficient no. and have their
own nominees, their primary recourse would be the House (and not the
Supreme Court) in accordance with the doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction.
b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the case, thus failed
to meet the requirements set forth for judicial review. The
petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats in HRET and CA and
neither were they nominees to take the seat.

109
Submitted by: Al- mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman
Case: AGGABAO vs. COMELEC No. 163756 Jan 26, 2005
Facts:
The petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao is a candidate for Congressional for the 4 th
District of Isabela and respondent Anthony Miranda is a rival for the same during
the May 10, 2004 elections. Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1 st copy of the
COCV on grounds 1. Tampered 2. Prepared under duress 3. Deffered from other
authentic copies and 4. Contained manifest errors. Petitioner objected that the
ground raise by latter are for pre-proclamation controversy which is not allowed in
election for the member of House of Representatives. May 22, 2004. The Provicial
Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded the contested COCVs and used instead the 4 th
and &th copies of the COCVs and Base on result Miranda garnered the highest
number of votes for congressman. Aggabao asserted that PBC acted without
jurisdiction, hence he filed petition assailing Resolution No.7233 claimed COMELEC
En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Mirandas proclamation
considering that the Second Division has not yet resolved the appeal.
Issue:
WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies [ NO]
Held:
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec.17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organization registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

110
SUBMITTED BY: Arajil, Saldon A
Group 6
CASE: Limkaichong v. COMELEC, GR No. 17883

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.

Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases
against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her
mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs
dad. . About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as
a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their
proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation
announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is
in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a
petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras petitioned arguing that
since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise
jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction
from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or
not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong
timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for
the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as
the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

111
Sub. By:
Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab
Case #111: BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No: 177508 August 7, 2009
FACTS:
The Congress passed a bill and signed into law as RA 9369 less than four months
before the May 14, 2007 local elections.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner filed a petition alleging that RA 9369 violated Sec. 26(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution, assailing among others the constitutionality of the
provisions contained in Sec. 37.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 37 of RA 9369 violates Sec. 17, Art.VI, of the Constitution.
HELD:
No, it does not violate Sec. 17, Art. VI, of the constitution. The Congress and
COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET (Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) and SET ( Senate Electoral Tribunal), since the powers are
exercised in different occasion and for different purpose.

112
Drilon, et al v. Speaker
GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009
Petitioner: Franklin Drilon et al
Respondent: Jose de Venecia et al
GR No. 183055, July 31, 2009
Petitioner: Sen. Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal
Respondents: Sen. Manuel Villar et al
Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents
to the Commission on Appointments. The petitioner went to respondent then
Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for Liberal Party in the CA. Because the
LP was not represented in the CA, it spawned the filing for prohibition, mandamus,
and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.
Issue:
Whether the House of Representatives respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in constituting the Commission
on Appointments in contravention of the required proportional constitution by
depriving Liberal Party of its constitutional entitlement to one seat in the CA.
Held:
The first petition GR No.180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the
designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as
prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition GR no. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show
that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition
does not in fact allege that her party was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or
PDP Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on he/ it locus
standi.
The constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative,
within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET
and the CA.
Thus, even assuming that party list representative comprise a sufficient number and
have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary
recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not of this Court.

113
Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO
CASE : Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004

Group: 9
June 26, 2013
July26, 200

FACT: Guillermo Ruiz sough to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. On may 8, 1998, Farinas
filed his Certificate of Candidacy substituting Chevylle Farinas who widrew on April
3, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the
election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the determination of the validity of certificate of candidacy of
respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HOUSE OF
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELECs decision
to discontinue exercising jurisdiction.

114
CASE DIGEST:
Garcia v. HRET, GR No. 134792, August 12, 1999
I.
FACTS
On May 29, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against private respondent. The petition
attacked the ineligibility of private respondent to hold office as Member of the
House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Upon
filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required filing fee. On June 10, 1998,
the HRET dismissed the petition for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit
required by its Rules. Thereafter, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid
the cash deposit on June 26, 1998, at the same time seeking a reconsideration of
the dismissal. The HRET, however, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
II.
1.
2.

ISSUES
whether or not HRET can take cognizance of the petition, and
whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in
summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto and in refusing to
reinstate the same even after payment of the required cash deposit.

III.
HELD
Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar
the Supreme Court from entertaining petitions which charge HRET with grave abuse
of discretion. That the Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the
complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may be
inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing fees, a
petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal. The cash deposit required in quo
warranto cases must be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is
filed. In the case at bar, petitioners paid the required cash deposit after the
dismissal of the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28)
days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and
certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET, which is clearly
authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on wellfounded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the Tribunal. Therefore, the Court found that the HRET did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition
for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition for certioraricannot prosper.
Submitted by:
ABDULLAH, Abdulhaq A.
Group 10

115

116
Case Digested and submitted by: Jingle B. Puasa Group:12 June 26, 2013
Daza vs Singson 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
Facts:
Daza was removed from the Commission on Appoinments and assumed by
Singson On December 5, 1988, after the chamber elected a new set of
representatives.
Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been
validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to
assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

117
Submitted by: CymerMohamad
COSETENG VS MITRA 187SCRA 377
Facts: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of
Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a
member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal a request
backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added RoqueAblan, Jr. as the twelfth member,
representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also
organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in
CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep.
Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction)
praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the
rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority
(LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by
their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the
support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political
question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the
proportional representation clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner
was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a
political question but because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on
proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members
in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a
rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next
largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the
majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng
represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her
a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are
not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival,
Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been
nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by
their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in DazavsSingson in that
the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine

whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has

been committed by the other government branches.