G.R. No.

193707
December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,
Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondentmade a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). 7 However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. 10 To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. 13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. 14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against
herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally
due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also filed
a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. 19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, 21 dismissing the instant criminal
case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the respondent who is analien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty ishereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation to
support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure todo so makes him liable under R.A.
No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligors nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a
foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parents duty and
obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his
alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law
which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact
that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar
Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to
wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court,
in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found
themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan,
the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated
to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response thereto concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign
national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be
held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the
liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal
laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present
case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for
future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency
and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his
minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner
that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also added that by
reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support. 33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically

the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their
personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf.
Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of
a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well
as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of
status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is
notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to support his
child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said
law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in
Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law
should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of
the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that
is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support
his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the

latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former
wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioners son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or
her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioners
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies
to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all
of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal
basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished
on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners child calls for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts
being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction
over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124371
November 23, 2000

FACTS
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon
the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the
Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula
gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers
name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union,
suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo
returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo
married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In
1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating
that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to
Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate
the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal
administrator of the estate.
ISSUE
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.
RULING
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign law. The CA
and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC
for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014, SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES
LUNA, REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, RESPONDENTS
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven
children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live
separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty.
Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same
day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna
obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the
condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares. When the law
office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names of the owners, with Atty.
Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Lunas
death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio,
his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the
properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no children,
3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half bequeathed to
her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage,
except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.

In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement
For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual,
hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce decree
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending parties were
entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the
spouses are residing abroad.Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code
clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, their property
relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership:
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void
ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on coownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and

competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we
ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of coownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without
basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject of the case, the
subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
Petition denied.
SSS v AZOTE
Facts:
In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as beneficiaries. When
he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a deceased member but it was
denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his
former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo
was previously married to another woman. She then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was
sent to Rosemarie but she made no answer. The SSC dismissed Ednas petition because the SSS Form E-4
designating Rosemarie and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be
the legal wife as Edna could not proved that Edgardos previous marriage was annulled or divorced.
Issue: W/N Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member
Held:
No. The law in force at the time of Edgardos death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) thereof,
only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latters SS benefits.
Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as
evidenced by their marriage contract.
Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code was already in
force. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that
the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Edna
could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved
or whether there was a declaration of Rosemaries presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo.
What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show
that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the
beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is required by
Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that the
benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries
QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Short summary: A Filipina wife divorced her Filipino husband then remarried twice. When her former
husband (who also remarried and had kids) died, she now claims a share from his estate, claiming that the
divorce decree she obtained is not valid as she is a Filipino national. Court held that the 2nd wife of the
decedent was not the surviving spouse because they were married even before the divorce decree was
obtained by the 1st wife. The court remanded the case just to determine WON the 1st wife was already an
US citizen when divorce decree granted.
Facts:

-Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan (both Filipinos) were married May 1941.
-Arturo Padlan married Blandina Dandad April 1947.
-Fe Quita obtained a divorce decree in California in July 1954. She remarried 2x
-1972: Arturo died intestate, leaving his 2nd family and Fe
WHO WAS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE? FE OR BLANDINA? Secret!
-Blandina's side implied that Fe was no longer a Filipino citizen when she acquired a divorce decree.
However, not threshed out during the trial so remand the case (the TC merely said that since divorce is not
valid in RP, divorce decree was also not valid)
-However, as the marriage between Blandina and Arturo was contracted when the 1st marriage between
Arturo and Fe was still subsisting, it is considered bigamous and thus void. Blandina is clearly not the
surviving spouse.
-but as the children of Blandina were all recognized by Arturo as his children, these children are assured of
shares in the intestate estate
While The Civil Code Expressly Provides That Civil Personality May Be Extinguished By Death,
It Does Not Explicitly State That Only Those Who Have Acquired Juridical Personality Could
Die
April 21, 2015 by The Lawyer's Post
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO
and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS
IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
The Facts:
Rolando, an employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporaton (Continental) and a member of the
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines For
empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for paternity leave, bereavement leave, and accident
insurance for dependent, under the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
company and the union. The claim was based on the death of Rolandos unborn child, when his wife
Marivic had a miscarriage in her 38th week of pregnancy. The company immediately granted Rolandos
claim for paternity benefit but denied his claim for entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits. The union then resorted to the grievance machinery under the CBA to reverse the denial of the
claims, but no settlement was reached, hence the union filed a Notice to Arbitrate with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, with the parties agreeing on the sole issued to be resolved on whether
Rolando is entitled to death benefits under the provisions of Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section
4.3 of the CBA.
In their pleadings, the Union averred that Rolando is entitiled to bereavement leave and death benefits, as
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have been first born alive or acquired juridical
capacity so that his subsequent death could be covered by CBA benefits, and cited the case of other
employees of Continentals sister companies who were granted the benefits. They also invoked Article
1702 of the Civil Code which mandated that all doubts should be resolved in favour of labor. On the other
hand, the company argued that the express provisions of the CBA did not provide for a still born child; and
two elements must be present so that the benefits may be availed of: a) death; and b) status as legitimate
child of the employee, none of which existed in Rolandos case. Relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code, Continental argued that only one who acquired juridical capacity could die. Thus an unborn
child could not die because it never acquired juridical capacity at all; a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person and could not have acquired the status of a dependent, since it
never needed any support nor did it acquire the right to be supported.
Atty. Montano, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favour of Rolando and the Union, ruling that the fetus
acquired the right to be supported by the parents from the moment he/she was conceived. Therefore the
fetus was already a dependent even though he/she died during delivery or childbirth. There was also no
question that Rolando and his wife were married, hence the fetus was a legitimate dependent.
The company filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to reverse the ruling of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, averring that what the CBA contemplated was the death of a legal person not a fetus, bolstered
by the wording in the CBA that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It

asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had.
The CA affirmed Atty. Montanos ruling, holding that a dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything
less than loss of human life, especially for the expectant parents. Bereavement leave and death benefits
are meant to assuage the employee and the latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support,
rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child.
Continental Steel filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the CA decision
and arguing that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should
be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical
personality.
The Courts ruling:
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are:
(1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an
employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of
a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA
are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement
leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and
dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then
there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel
itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death
is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and
Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions
on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by
the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while
the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life[1]. Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception[2] that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else. Under said general definition[3] even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA
provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or
the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In
Angeles v. Maglaya[4] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the
Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel[5], we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code. Now, there are only two classes of children legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted,
have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent
illegitimacy of
Hortillano and
hence, making

that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to
death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA,
Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to,
and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It
cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in
this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor[6]. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be
interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission[7], we
pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that when the
pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled
in favor of labor. While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code
shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the
State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are,
likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated
that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9
May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred ThirtyNine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively,
grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation