1. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hyatt v.

Bacungan
582 SCRA 369 March 25, 2009
FACTS:
-In 1995 and 1996 Dacles and Valencia assumed their duties as glass
cleaners at Hyatt Regency Manila pursuant to a cleaning service contract
between Hyatt Regency and City Service Corporation. Meanwhile,
Dalmacio and Dazo were hired on a casual basis as florist/sales clerk and
helper/driver, respectively. Dalmacio and Dazo renewed their contracts
with Hyatt upon its expiration.
- During the Labor Management Committee meeting, the Union questioned
the non-regular status of the four (4) people mentioned.
-Both parties agreed to submit the matter for resolution through the
grievance machinery as provided in the CBA. The Union claimed that the
four (4) should be considered regular employees due to the nature and
length of their service. Hyatt maintained that Dalmacio and Dazo were
project employees and their employment was coterminous with the flower
shop, while Dacles and Valencia were employees of independent contractor
City Service Corp.
-Hyatt dismissed Dacles and Valencia on the ground that the service
contract has been terminated.
-The parties were unable to settle the dispute so they elevated the case to
a voluntary arbitrator (VA), Dean Bacungan.
-VA Ruling : Dacles and Valencia are employees of City Service Corp.
Dalmacio and Dazo cannot be legally terminated unless the
Hotel closes down the flower shop or for cause provided by law.
MR denied.
- The case was appealed to the CA via petition for certiorari, but was
dismissed because the proper mode is a petition for review. In addition,
the case was filed out of time. The Order dated July 10, 2000 was
served to the party on July 20, 2000. So, they had until July 25, 2000 to
file. The case filed only in September 8, 2000, forty-five days beyond
the reglementary period.
- MR and contention of Union: The decision was rendered under the Labor
Code and, therefore, is not covered by Rule 43.
Denied.
ISSUE: Was the CA correct in dismissing the case?
RULING:
-The Court citing Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees ruled that, a decision or award of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to
the CA in line with the procedure in Revised Administrative Circular No. 195 now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules.
-On some occasions, the rules of procedure may be relaxed and the CA
could have treated the petition for certiorari as a petition for review under
Rule 43, but the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing
a petition for review under Rule 43. It is elementary in remedial law that
the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is a cause for dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, but such petition is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.

-Dacles and Valencia cannot be considered as employees of respondent

Hyatt in the absence of evidence to prove that CSC had been engaged in
labor-only contracting.
-Dalmacio and Dazo are project employees and can be terminated only
upon closure of the flower shop.
-Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies are
generally binding upon the Court unless there is grave abuse of discretion
or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record.
2. G&M (Phil.), Inc. v. Rivera GR No. 141802, 29 January 2007
Facts: Petitioner deployed Lorenzo Rivera, respondents husband, to work
as equipment driver for its foreign principal in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for 2
years. After working for more than a year, Lorenzo met an accident & died.
Respondent filed w/ the LA a complaint for unpaid salary differentials for
her late husband. Petitioner assailed the genuineness of the computation
of Final Settlement as it lacked proper authentication & it also assailed
respondents basis for filing the complaint as she was not privy to her
husbands working conditions abroad.
The LA decided in favor of
respondent & ordered petitioner to pay the unpaid salary, salary differental
& attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC, affirmed the LAs judgment.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, a petition for
certiorari was filed before the CA contending grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the LA. The CA sustained the findings of the LA & the NLRC
further holding that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof as to
the amount actually received by Lorenzo. Petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review alleging that the CA erred in applying the rule on
burden of proof against petitioner inasmuch as non-payment of salaries,
as claimed by respondent, was not sufficiently shown & that no evidence
supports the amount it was ordered to pay to respondent.
Issue: Whether the petition for review filed before the SC should be given
due course
Held: No. The issues raised are essentially factual. Elementary is the
principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases
does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which its labor officials findings rest. As such, the findings of fact and
conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and
respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 3 This is because it is
not the function of the SC to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below; or reevaluate the credibility
of witnesses; or substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal
which has expertise in its special field. In this case, the defers to the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, who is deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within his jurisdiction, especially since his findings
were affirmed in toto by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. 4

While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, there are no grounds to
warrant departure from the common findings of the three tribunals below.
3. EMILIO E. DIOKNO, et.al. v. HON. HANS LEO J. CACDAC
(G.R. No. 168475 - July 4, 2007)
Facts
The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a
legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco.
Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES.
The petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC, which was created for
the conduct of May 7, 2003 union elections, seeking the disqualification of
Edgardo Daya and 14 others for allowing themselves to be assisted by nonunion members, and committed acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the
interest of FLAMES. The COMELEC issued a decision disqualifying them to
run and/or to participate in the May 7 FLAMES elections. According to the
COMELEC, Daya, et al., violated Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES
Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) by allowing non-members to aid them in
their campaign. Their acts of solicitation for support from non-union
members were deemed inimical to the interest of FLAMES.
On May 7, the COMELEC proclaimed the winners of the elections, including
Diokno as President and some others who are petitioners.
On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., filed with the MedArbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition to: a) Nullify Order of
Disqualification; b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes; c)
Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare Holding of New Election to be
Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE.
Meanwhile, a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004, which was
participated in and won by herein private respondents Daya, et al.
The Med-Arbiter issued a decision in favor of the private respondents. He
reversed the disqualification imposed by the COMELEC against Daya et al.
and the declared the election of union officers of FLAMES on May 7, 2003 a
failure and ordered a new election to be conducted. The BLR Director and
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Med- Arbiter.
Issues
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the jurisdiction of the BLR to take
cognizance of the case on the following grounds:
a. Daya, et al., prematurely sought the BLRs jurisdiction on the ground
that they failed to exhaust administrative remedies
b. The complaint filed in the Med- Arbiter failed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirement because it was not supported by at least thirty
percent (30%) of the members of the union
2.

Held
1.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion when it upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and MedArbiter, a) nullifying the COMELECs order of disqualification of
private respondents Daya et al., and b) annulling the 7 May 2003
FLAMES elections
No. The BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all interunion and intra-union conflicts. The Petition which was initiated by

private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly

within its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute. It involves a
dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. It must also be
stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that private
respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of non-members of the
union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the
same does not detract from the real character of the controversy. It
remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution
and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of
the union.
a. One of the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is where the facts show that there
was a violation of due process. There is a clear indication
that Daya, et al were deprived of due process when the
COMELEC failed to receive Daya et al.s motion for
reconsideration of the order of their disqualification and
refused to receive their written protest in violation of the
unions CBL.
b. Section 1 of Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of Book V
mandates the thirty percent (30%) requirement only in
cases where the issue involves the entire membership of
the union, which is clearly not the case before us. The issue
is obviously limited to the disqualification from
participation in the elections by particular union members.
2.

No. a.) There was a blatant misapplication by the COMELEC of the

FLAMES CBL.. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC erroneously
relied on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) because the same does not
contemplate the situation of private respondents Daya, et al. The
latter are not sought to be expelled or dismissed by the Executive
Board. They were brought before the COMELEC to be disqualified
as candidates in the 7 May 2003 elections. The aforecited provision
evidently enunciates with clarity the procedural course that should
be taken to dismiss and expel a member from FLAMES. The
unmistakable directive is that in cases of expulsion and dismissal,
due process must be observed as laid down in the CBL. In all
respects, they were denied due process. The disqualification ruled
by the COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al., must not
be allowed to abridge a clear procedural policy established in the
FLAMES CBL. If we uphold the COMELEC, we are countenancing a
clear case of denial of due process which is anathema to the
Constitution of the Philippines which safeguards the right to due
process.

b) The erroneous disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al.,

constituted a case of disenfranchisement on the part of the member-voters
of FLAMES. By wrongfully excluding them from the 7 May 2003 elections,
the options afforded to the union members were clipped. Hence, the
mandate of the union cannot be said to have been rightfully determined.
The factual irregularities in the FLAMES elections clearly provide proper
bases for the annulment of the union elections of 7 May 2003.

4. Erwin Reyes. v. National Labor Relations Commission and CocaCola Bottlers Phils. And/Or Rotaida Taguibao
G.R. No. 180551 February 10, 2009
FACTS: The present Petition arose from a Complaint for illegal dismissal
with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees filed by
petitioner against respondents Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines (CCBP) and
Rotaida Taguibao (Taguibao) before the Labor Arbiter. CCBP is a corporation
engaged in the business of production and distribution of carbonated
drinks, and Taguibao is its Human Resource Manager. Petitioner alleged
that he was first employed by respondent CCBP, through Interserve
Manpower Agency (Interserve), as a Leadman in February 1988. Petitioner
was initially assigned to the Mendiola Sales Office of respondent CCBP.
Petitioners employment contract was renewed every five months and he
was assigned a different task every time. Such an arrangement continued
until petitioner was directly hired by respondent CCBP as a Route Salesman
on 15 September 2000. Exactly one year from the time of petitioners
employment as a Route Salesman, respondent CCBP, thru Taguibao,
terminated his services. Since he already acquired the status of a regular
employee, petitioner asserted that his dismissal from employment without
the benefit of due process was unlawful.
Respondent CCBP refuted petitioners allegation that he was a regular
employee. Petitioners employment was for a fixed period of three months,
which was subsequently extended with petitioners consent. Petitioner was
employed pursuant to the mini-bodega project of respondent CCBP wherein
respondent CCBP sought to extend its market to areas that cannot be
serviced by its regular salesmen. After the viability of this marketing
scheme was found to be unsuccessful, respondent CCBP was constrained
to discontinue petitioners fixed-term employment. In addition, respondent
Taguibao had no liability for terminating petitioners employment when it
was not effected in bad faith.
Labor Arbiter favored the petitioner, since there was insufficient evidence
that petitioners employment was for a fixed period; that respondents
CCBP and Taguibao failed to present a copy of petitioners purported
Contract of Employment. The only evidence adduced by respondents
CCBP and Taguibao to buttress their contention of petitioners fixed-period
employment was the Affidavit of respondent Taguibao herself, which could
not be afforded any evidentiary weight in the absence of independent
corroborating evidence.
CCBP and Taguibao immediately reinstated petitioner to his former position
as Route Salesman. CCBP and Taguibao, by filing a Memorandum of Appeal
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and posting the
corresponding Supersedeas Bond, sought the stay of the execution of the
monetary awards made by the Labor Arbiter; that petitioner was merely
employed for a particular project which turned out to be not viable.
Petitioner was subsequently terminated from work on account of the

expiration of his employment contract.

dismissal was, therefore, tenuous.

Petitioners claim of illegal

NLRC dismissed the appeal of respondents CCBP and Taguibao and

affirming with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
reduced the amount of backwages awarded to petitioner underscoring the
latters unexplained delay (more than three years) in filing his Complaint
for illegal dismissal. NLRC reckoned the computation of backwages only
from the time petitioner filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter; further modified the Labor Arbiters Decision by deleting the
order reinstating petitioner to his former position in view of the confidential
nature of the latters employment as a salesman, which exposed him to
voluminous financial transactions involving the property of respondent
CCBP. The NLRC likewise deleted the Labor Arbiters award for attorneys
fees.
All the parties, namely petitioner and respondents CCBP and Taguibao,
moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing NLRC Decision. Petitioner,
on one hand, maintained that the reckoning point for the computation of
his backwages must be from the time his employment was unlawfully
terminated, and not from the institution of his Complaint for illegal
dismissal. Respondents CCBP and Taguibao, on the other hand, reiterated
their previous position that petitioners employment was terminated only
after the expiration of the fixed period for the same; and prayed that the
NLRC vacate its previous finding of illegal dismissal. NLRC denied the
Motions for Reconsideration of all the parties for lack of a valid reason to
disturb its earlier disposition.
Only petitioner elevated his case before the Court of Appeals by filing a
Petition for Certiorari which dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari for
his failure to give any explanation why a copy of the said Petition was not
personally served upon the counsel of the adverse parties. Since petitioner
failed to timely file a Motion for Reconsideration, it became final and
executory, and an Entry of Judgment was made.
Petitioner, through his new counsel, sought for the liberality of the Court of
Appeals, faulting his former counsel for the procedural defects of his
Petition and for his failure to seasonably seek reconsideration. CA denied
petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF BACKWAGES AWARDED COMPUTED
FROM THE TIME THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL WAS
FILED.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF
REINSTATEMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

DELETING THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEYS FEE.

Salesman was confidential in nature and that the relationship between

petitioner and respondents CCBP and Taguibao was already strained.

Held: The Court is convinced beyond cavil that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
modifying the 30 April 2005 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, for in so doing,
the NLRC not only disregarded the elementary statutory and jurisprudential
principles, but also violated the basic principles of social justice and
protection to labor enshrined in the Constitution.

To protect the employees security of tenure, the Court has emphasized

that the doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not
to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement.
Neither can we sustain the NLRCs conclusion that petitioners position is
confidential in nature. Receipt of proceeds from sales of respondent
CCBPs products does not make petitioner a confidential employee. A
confidential employee is one who (1) assists or acts in a confidential
capacity, in regard to (2) persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies specifically in the field of labor relations. Verily,
petitioners job as a salesman does not fall under this qualification.

Backwages had to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty

he had to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. It was to be computed
from the time of the employees illegal dismissal (or from the time his
compensation was withheld from him) up to the time of his reinstatement.
One of the natural consequences of a finding that an employee has been
illegally dismissed is the payment of backwages corresponding to the
period from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The statutory intent
of this matter is clearly discernible. The payment of backwages allows the
employee to recover from the employer that which he has lost by way of
wages as a result of his dismissal.[18] Logically, it must be computed from
the date of petitioners illegal dismissal up to the time of actual
reinstatement. There can be no gap or interruption, lest we defeat the
very reason of the law in granting the same. That petitioner did not
immediately file his Complaint should not affect or diminish his right to
backwages, for it is a right clearly granted to him by law -- should he be
found to have been illegally dismissed -- and for as long as his cause of
action has not been barred by prescription.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four
years from the time of his illegal dismissal within which to institute the
complaint. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which
states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must
be brought within four years. The four-year prescriptive period shall
commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker.
Here, petitioner was dismissed from service on 15 September 2001. He
filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on 14 June 2004. Clearly, then, the
instant case was filed within the prescriptive period.
Herein petitioner, having been unjustly dismissed from work, is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their
monetary equivalents computed from the time compensation was withheld
up to the time of actual reinstatement.[23] Accordingly, backwages must
be awarded to petitioner in the amount to be computed from the time his
employment was unlawfully terminated by respondents CCBP and Taguibao
on 15 September 2001 up to the time he was actually reinstated on 1
March 2006. We also do not agree with the NLRC in deleting the directive
of the Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement of petitioner to his former
position, on the flimsy excuse that the petitioners position as Route

Finally, the Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor Arbiters
award for attorneys fees to petitioner. Petitioner is evidently entitled to
attorneys fees, since he was compelled to litigate to protect his interest by
reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of his employment by
respondents CCBP and Taguibao.
WHEREFORE,
GRANTED.

premises

considered,

the

instant

Petition

is

5. FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ,

BILLY ARNAIZ, ROLLY ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG
and NICANOR LABUEN, vs. RIZALINO UY
G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005
Facts: As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the
Supreme Court which affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC,
hearings were conducted to determine the amount of wage differentials
due the eight petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution. Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be
terminated and closed, stating that the judgment award as computed had
been complied with to the satisfaction of petitioners. Said Manifestation
was also signed by the eight petitioners. Together with the manifestation is
a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of petitioners, attesting to the receipt of
payment from respondent and waiving all other benefits due them in
connection with their complaint. On October 20, 1997, six of the eight
petitioners filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be considered
closed and terminated as they are already satisfied of what they have
received from respondent. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint
Affidavit in the local dialect, of the six petitioners attesting that they have
no more collectible amount from respondent and if there is any, they are
abandoning and waiving the same.
On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the
motion for issuance of writ of execution and [considered] the cases closed
and terminated. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and directed the immediate issuance of a writ of execution, holding

that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that
quitclaims and releases are normally frowned upon as contrary to public
policy.
The CA held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after
a final judgment.[6] Thus, petitioners validly released respondent from any
claims, upon the voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the
compromise agreement. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time. Hence, this Petition.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the
Supreme Court could be subject to compromise settlement;
2. Whether or not the petitioners affidavit waiving their awards in the
labor case executed without the assistance of their counsel and labor
arbiter is valid.
3. Whether or not the ignorance of the jurisprudence by the Court of
Appeals and its erroneous counting of the period to file [a] motion for
reconsideration constitute a denial of the petitioners right to due process.
Held: The petition is without merit.
1. There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely
because it was entered into after final judgment. The validity of the
agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles
of contracts, not by when it was entered into.
Petitioners voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement, as shown
by the following facts: (1) they signed respondents Manifestation (filed
with the labor arbiter) that the judgment award had been satisfied; (2) they
executed a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997, attesting to the receipt of
payment and the waiver of all other benefits due them; and (3) 6 of the 8
petitioners filed a Manifestation with the labor arbiter on October 20, 1997,
requesting that the cases be terminated because of their receipt of
payment in full satisfaction of their claims. These circumstances also
reveal that respondent has already complied with its obligation pursuant to
the compromise agreement.
Having already benefited from the
agreement, estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it.
2. The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does
not determine its validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a
counsel to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was executed
voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the consideration for it
was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in to
annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present
any evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated. The Court
declines to rule on the allegation that respondents counsels encroached
upon the professional employment of petitioners lawyer when they
facilitated the waivers. The present action is not the proper forum in which

to raise any charge of professional misconduct.

petitioners failed to present any supporting evidence.

More important,

3. The third issue, which refers to the timely filing of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the CA, will no longer be discussed because this
Courts decision has resolved the case on the merits.
6. EUROTECH HAIR SYSTEMS, INC., LUTZ KUNACK, and
JOSE BARIN vs ANTONIO S. G G.R. No. 160913
August 31, 2006

DOCTRINE: A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reas

signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering in
the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal and specific
contrary to respondents contention, the employees counsel need not be present
of the compromise agreement.
FACTS: Petitioner Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. is a domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacture and export of wigs and toupees. Petitioners
Lutz Kunack and Jose E. Barin are the companys president and general
manager, respectively. Respondent Antonio S. Go served as Eurotechs
operations manager from September 2, 1996 until he was dismissed
onSeptember 27, 1999.
Petitioners issued several memoranda reminding the respondent to
improve his performance as the company is experiencing production
shortfalls and asking him to explain why they are experiencing such
shortfalls. Eurotech relieved respondent as operations manager pending
evaluation of his performance. Eurotech issued yet another memorandum
reminding respondent of his failure to submit his written explanation and
granting him another 24 hours to submit such explanation. The second 24hour period lapsed without respondents explanation. On Petitioner Kunack
finally issued respondent a termination letter citing loss of trust and
confidence.
Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal, separation pay,
backwages, and damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled for respondent. The
NLRC reversed the LAs decision. The CA set aside the decision of the NLRC
and essentially reinstated the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent
received said Decision of the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2003. Prior to
such receipt, he had executed a quitclaim in consideration
of P450,000. Hence, on July 16, 2003, the Labor Arbiter issued an
Order dismissing with prejudice the complaint for illegal dismissal in view
of the said waiver.
ISSUE: Is the compromise agreement entered into by the parties valid?
RULING: YES. In this case, we find the consideration of P450,000 fair and
reasonable under the circumstances. In addition, records show that
respondent gave his personal and specific individual consent with a full

understanding of the stakes involved. In our view, the compromise

agreement in this case does not suffer from the badges of invalidity.
The fact that the Order, which dismissed the case in view of the
compromise agreement, was issued during the pendency of the petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals does not divest the Labor Arbiter of
jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari is an original action and does not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding. The Labor Arbiter thus acted well
within his jurisdiction. Therefore, the Labor Arbiters Order dismissing the
case with prejudice in view of the compromise agreement entered into by
the parties must be upheld.
7. Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. CA (2002)
Facts: Petitioner is the owner of properties located in the compound and
building of Artex Development Corp which were erroneously and unlawfully
levied upon by the sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of a labor dispute
decision rendered by the NLRC which the petitioner was not a party of. It
filed a 3rd party claim with the Labor Arbiter but was dismissed. It filed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the NLRC but was also dismissed. It filed
recovery of property and damages with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
case. In the CA, the court dismissed the petition on the ground of forum
shopping and that the proper remedy was appeal in due course, not
certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed a MR and argued that the filing of
a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it
is a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose properties were
subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor
dispute in which it was not a party). The MR was denied. Hence, petitioner
filed this appeal.
Issues: 1)Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of forum shopping and
2) Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petitioners accion
reinvindicatoria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.
Held: First: No. In the case at bar, there was no identity of parites, rights
and causes of actions and relief sought. The case before the NLRC where
LA Reyes issued a writ of execution on the property of the petitioner was a
labor dispute between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to
the case. The only issue of the petitioner that was raised before the NLRC
was whether or not the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbite could
be satisfied against the property of petitioner who is not a party to the
labor case.
The case filed by the petitioner, accion reinvindicatoria, in the RTC was to
recover property illegaly levied. Hence, a different cause of action.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, the same circumstances. It must also raise identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues.
Second: YES. A third party whose property has been levied upon by a
sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with
several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may
avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not
preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative
remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of.
Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the
denial to the NLRC.
Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a
proper action with a competent court to recover ownership of the
property illegally seized by the sheriff.
The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not
preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of
property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of
such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping.
A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of property would not
constitute interference with the powers or processes of the Arbiter and the
NLRC which rendered the judgment to enforce and execute upon the
levied properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is not
subject to levy. Thus a separate action for recovery cannot be considered
as interference.
8. CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL.,vs. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA,
G.R. No. 85333 February 26, 1990
Facts: Respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union (Union), as the
collective bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers and
relief helpers of the Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. concluded a new collective
bargaining agreement with the latter. Among the compensation benefits
granted to the employees was a general salary increase to be given in
lump sum including recomputation of actual commissions earned based on
the new rates of increase. On the same day, the ratification by the union
members (672 authorized while 173 opposed out of 800 members) of the
new CBA was submitted to the company together with the authorization for

the latter to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or

P20.00 every month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment,
from the CBA lump-sum pay granted to the union members. The purpose
of the said special assessment sought to be levied as embodied in the
Board Resolution of the Union is to put up a cooperative and credit union;
purchase vehicles and other items needed for the benefit of the officers
and the general membership; and for the payment for services rendered
by union officers, consultants and others. Subsequently, 355 of the
members who originally authorized the deduction of any amount from their
CBA lump sum disauthorized the same. The company because of the
above-mentioned disauthorization, in order to resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of Labor
Relations. Petitioners regular rank and file employees of the company and
bona fide members of the Union filed a motion for intervention and
assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241(o) in
relation to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code. The Union countered that it
has complied with the legal requirements of Article 241(n) and (o) of the
Labor Code in that the board resolution of the Union imposing the
questioned special assessment had been duly approved in a general
membership meeting and that the collection of a special fund for labor
education and research is mandated.
Issue: Whether or not a special assessment can be validly deducted by a
labor union from the lump-sum of its members granted under a CBA,
notwithstanding a subsequent disauthorization of the same by a majority
of the union members.
Held: No. The deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was
not made in accordance with the requirements provided by law. The
respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by petitioners in
the manner of compliance with the legal requirements as "insignificant
technicalities." On the contrary, the failure of the Union to comply strictly
with the requirements set out by the law invalidates the questioned special
assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of the fact that
the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union
members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must be
obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be
followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. The applicable provisions
are clear. The Union itself admits that both paragraphs (n) and (o) of Article
241 apply. Paragraph (n) refers to "levy" while paragraph (o) refers to
"check-off" of a special assessment. Both provisions must be complied
with. Under paragraph (n), the Union must submit to the Company a
written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general
membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary
of the organization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn,
must include, among others, the list of all the members present as well as
the votes cast. It submitted only minutes of the local membership
meetings when what is required is a written resolution adopted at the

general meeting. Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings
held were recorded by a union director and not by the union secretary. The
minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of the members
present and no record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the
Union did not comply with the law at every turn, the only conclusion that
may be made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of the special
assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor Code.
Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written
authorization duly signed by every employee in order that a special
assessment may be validly checked-off. Even assuming that the special
assessment was validly levied pursuant to paragraph (n), and granting that
individual written authorizations were obtained by the Union, nevertheless
there can be no valid check-off considering that the majority of the union
members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A
withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at
all.
9.) ERNESTO C. VERCELES vs.BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONSDEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 152322,
February 15, 2005
FACTS: Rodel E. Dalupan, Efren J. De Ocampo, Proceso Totto, Jr., Elizabeth
Alarca, and Elvira S. Manalo are members of the University of the East
Employees Association (UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each
received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging them with spreading
false rumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said
association. They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the
Memorandum to submit their Answer.Through a collective reply dated they
denied the allegations. Thereafter, they sent a letter to the Chairman and
Members of UEEAs Disciplinary Committee, informing them that the
Memorandum was vague and without legal basis, therefore, no intelligent
answer may be made by them. They likewise stated that any sanction that
will be imposed by the committee would be violative of their right to due
process.The Disciplinary Committee issued another Memorandum, giving
the respondents another seventy-two hours from receipt within which to
properly reply, explaining that the collective reply letter and supplemental
answer which were earlier submitted were not responsive to the first
Memorandum. Their failure would be construed as an admission of the
truthfulness and veracity of the charges. The respondents issued a denial
for the second time, and inquired from the Disciplinary Committee as to
whether they were being formally charged. After which, , Ernesto Verceles,
in his capacity as president of the association, through a Memorandum,
informed Rodel Dalupan, et al., that their membership in the association
has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt

thereof. Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committees

finding of a prima facie case against them.
A complaint was thereafter filed for illegal suspension, willful and unlawful
violation of UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal to render financial and
other reports, deliberate refusal to call general and special meetings,
illegal holdover of terms and damages was filed by the respondents
against herein petitioners Ernesto C. Verceles, Diosdado F. Trinidad,
Salvador G. Blancia, Rosemarie De Lumban, Felicitas Ramos, Miguel Teao,
Jaime Bautista and Fidel Acero before the Department of Labor and
Employment, National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR).
A decision was rendered by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim, adverse to
petitioners, ordering them to:
1. to immediately lift suspension imposed upon the complainants;
2. to hold a general membership meeting wherein they
(respondents) make open and available the unions/associations
books of accounts and other documents pertaining to the union
funds [and] thereby explain the financial status of the union;
3. to regularly conduct special and general membership meetings
in accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws;
4. to immediately hold/conduct an election of officers in
accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws.
The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Department of Labor and Employment (BLR-DOLE). The appeal, however,
was dismissed for lack of merit .A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed
by the petitioners with the BLR-DOLE, but was denied.
A special civil action for certiorari was thereafter filed before the Court of
Appeals citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright for failure
to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3,
Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed which was granted reinstating the petition.1awphi1.ntThe Court
of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition. Another Motion for
Reconsideration was thereafter filed by the petitioners. The Court of
Appeals modified its earlier decision. The decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of this court is MODIFIED. The 22

September 2000 and 15 January 2001 resolutions of the BLR insofar as
they affirmed the part of the 22 November 1999 decision of the Regional
Director of DOLE-NCR ordering the immediate holding of election are
HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. All the other aspects of the assailed
Resolutions are AFFIRMED.
Not satisfied, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari24 before
this Court.
ISSUE: do you need a 30% support requirement to report violations of
rights and conditions of union membership (art. 241)?
HELD: The respondent Directors ruling, however, that the assent of 30% of
the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code, was
mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any violation of
rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization (such as the
arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here complained of),
cannot be affirmed and will be reversed. The very article relied upon
militates against the proposition. It states that a report of a violation of
rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization maybe made
by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any
member or members specially concerned." The use of the permissive
"may" in the provision at once negates the notion that the assent of 30%
of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the
provision expressly declares that the report may be made, alternatively
by "any member or members specially concerned." And further
confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in
the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished
by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional
Offices of the Department of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor management relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such
30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the
power to act "on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) " upon request
of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their own initiative."
10. Acedera vs. International Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(ICTSI)
G.R. No. 146073, January 13, 2003
Facts Petitioners Jerry Acedera et al. are employees of private respondent
ICTSI and are officers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers
Union-ICTSI Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI).

When ICTSI started its operations in 1988, it determined the rate of pay of
its employees by using 304 days, the number of days of work of the
employees in a year, as divisor. In 1990, ICTSI entered into its Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with APCWU wherein the employees work
week was reduced to five days or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI,
however, continued using the 304-day divisor in computing the wages of
the employees. Following the implementation of the new wage order, ICTSI
stopped using 304 days as divisor and started using 365 days in
determining the daily wage of its employees and other consequential
compensation, even if the employees work week consisted of only five
days as agreed upon in the CBA

ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees.
This prompted the APCWU to file a notice of strike which included as cause
of action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also ICTSI's use
of 365 days as divisor in the computation of wages, even if the employees'
work week consisted only of five days as agreed upon in the CBA. The
dispute respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise
settlement, while that respecting the computation of wages was referred to
the Labor Arbiter.

Subsequently, APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees

similarly situated, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI
which was dismissed. Petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaintin-Intervention with Motion to Intervene, but the same was denied upon
finding that they are already well represented by APCWU. The denial of
petitioners' intervention was affirmed by the NLRC. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which referred the petition to
the CA. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this present petition.

Issue Whether petitioners have a legal right to intervene and pursue the
case
Held No. A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its
members under Article 242 (a) of the Labor Code which provides that a
union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of

collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its

members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That
APCWU acted in a representative capacity for and in behalf of its Union
members and other employees similarly situated.

While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be

permitted to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are
already represented will not be permitted to do the same except when
there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not
act in good faith for the protection of all interests represented by him.

Petitioners cite the dismissal of the case filed by APCWU-ICTSI, first by the
Labor Arbiter, and later by the CA. The dismissal of the case does not,
however, by itself show the existence of fraud or collusion or a lack of good
faith on the part of APCWU. There must be clear and convincing evidence
of fraud or collusion or lack of good faith independently of the dismissal.
This petitioners failed to proffer.

To reiterate, for a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a

representative action, fraud or collusion or lack of good faith on the part of
the representative must be proven. It must be based on facts borne on
record. Mere assertions, as what petitioners-appellants proffer, do not
suffice.
11. [G.R. Nos. 113666-68, January 19, 2000.] Golden Donuts, Inc. v.
NLRC
Facts: Complainants, Macandog, Hontiveros, Tamargo, Tegio and
Magtarayo, were employees of petitioner Golden Donuts, Inc. and were
members of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Dunkin Donut-CFW (KMDDCFW, for short) whose collective bargaining agreement with the
corporation expired on November 16, 1989. During the freedom period, or
on October 17, 1989 respondents informed the President of the Union that
the initial CBA negotiation was on October 26, 1989 and, at the same time,
requested for the confirmation of the people who shall be the regular
members of the union panel in order to avoid any misunderstanding. At
which date however, despite the absence of the management
representative, and the President of the Union, both panels were able to
agree on the rules regarding the negotiation. On November 7, 1989, date
of the scheduled CBA negotiations, the management panel arrived thirty
five minutes late, thus prompting the union panel to walkout. A day after,
the management addressed a letter of apology to the union and requested

that the CBA negotiation be resumed on November 9, 15 and 17, 1989.

Despite the management letters advising the former about the CBA
meetings the union panel did not show up. The union struck on December
18, 1989.
A complaint was filed by Golden Donuts to declare the strike illegal.
Counsel for the union and strikers pleaded for a compromise whereupon
both parties would desist from continuing their cases against each other.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision upholding the dismissal of private
respondents and ruling that they were bound by the compromise
agreement entered into by the union with petitioners. Private respondents
appealed to the NLRC, claiming that the union had no authority to waive or
compromise their individualrights and they were not bound by the
compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners. On
October 29, 1993, the NLRC issued a resolution modifying the Labor
Arbiters decision, and ordering respondent to reinstate complainants to
their former positions without loss of seniority rights and back-wages
limited to three years from the time of their dismissal up to the time of
reinstatement. On January 31, 1994, the NLRC denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the resolution, for lack of an assignment of
"palpable" or "patent" errors.

Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution requesting PLDT to

deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal services extended to the Union
by Atty. Espinas however the petitioners initiallynumbering 600 and finally
5,258, filed a letter-complaint before the MOLE through their
authorizedrepresentative, petitioner Galvadores assailing the imposition of
P130.00 (later corrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of
respondents counsel. Petitioners took the position that the attorney's fees
of respondent counsel were not only unreasonable but also in violation of
Article 241(o) of the Labor Codeand that the deductions cannot be given
legal effect by a mere Board resolution but needs the ratification by the
general membership of the Union. Later, the Minister of Labor referred the
dispute to the BLR.Meanwhile a Manifestation was submitted attesting that
plebiscite was conducted for the ratification of the aforementioned
resolution. This was questioned by the petitioners alleging that the
question
no.
2
inthe plebiscite was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there wa
s no dispute regarding thededuction of attorney's fees from the monetary
benefits awarded to PLDT employees. Director, Trajanodismissed
petitioners' complaint reasoning that the outcome of the plebiscite negates
any further questionon the right of the union counsel to collect the amount
of P115 from each of the employees involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not a union may compromise or waive the right

to security of tenure and money claims of its minority members, without
the latters consent

Issues: Whether or not the check-off for attorneys fees from the benefits
awarded to PLDTs employeesamounting to P1M, more or less is legal and
in affirmative answer, the same should be taken from Unionfunds.

HELD: No. Absent a showing of the unions special authority to

compromise the individual claims of private respondents for reinstatement
and backwages, there is no valid waiver of the aforesaid rights. The
judgment of the Labor Arbiter based on the compromiseagreement does
not have the effect of res judicata upon private respondents who did not
agree thereto since the requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied. A
judgment upon a compromiseagreement has all the force and effect of any
other judgment and is conclusive only upon parties thereto and their
privies. Private respondents have not waived their right to security of
tenure nor can they be barred from entitlement of their individual claims.
Since there was no evidence that private respondents committed any
illegal act, petitioners failure to reinstate them after the settlement of the
strike amounts to illegal dismissal.

Held:
The
provisions of Article 222(b), Article 241
(o) of the Labor Code and Omnibus RulesImplementing the Labor Code are
clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be
effectedwithout individual written authorizations duly signed by the
employee specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the
deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are
wanting.In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting. The
question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that
there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.Contrary to respondent
Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to PLDT employees

13.GALVADORES vs. TRAJANO; G.R. No. 70067; September 15, 1986;

Facts:
Atty. Jose C. Espinas has
been the
legal
counsel of Free
Telephone Workers Union nowManggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas
(Union for brevity), since 1964. For his services, he washired on a case to
case contingent fee basis.He was again hired by the union in the labor
dispute at PLDTregarding the PLDTs last offer to the deadlock in CBA
negotiations which is expected by the union toresult in compulsory
arbitration.In the compulsory arbitration, the Minister of Labor awarded
across-the-board wage increasesand other fringe benefits. As will be noted,
there were improvements obtained from PLDT's "last offer."Thereafter, the

still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations

although placed already under compulsoryarbitration. This is not the
"mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual
writtenauthorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory"
nature. It is a judicial process of settlingdisputes laid down by law. Besides,
Article 222(b) does not except a CBA
, later placed under compulsoryarbitration, from the ambit of its
prohibition. The attorney's fees herein involved may be charged
againstUnion funds pursuant to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as may
be agreed upon between them.

14. AMBROCIO VENGCO, RAMON MOISES, EUGENIA REYES, RAFAEL

WAGAS and 80 others per attached list, petitioners vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations and EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO,
respondents.
FACTS: Sometime in the latter part of 1981, the Management of the AngloAmerican Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa
Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (FOITAF) entered into a compromise
agreement whereby the company will pay to the union members the sum
of P150,000.00 for their claims arising from the unpaid emergency cost of
living allowance (ECOLA) and other benefits which were the subject of their
complaint before the Ministry of Labor. Respondent Emmanuel Timbungco
(Timbungco, for short) who is the union president received the money
which was paid in installments. Thereafter, he distributed the amount
among the union members. Petitioners Ambrocio Vengco, Ramon Moises,
Rafael Wagas and 80 others (Vengco, et al., for short) who are union
members noted that Timbungco was not authorized by the union workers
to get the money; and that ten percent (10%) of the P150,000.00 had been
deducted to pay for attorney's fees without their written authorization in
violation of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code. So, they demanded from
Timbungco an accounting of how the P150,000.00 was distributed to the
members. Timbungco did not give in to their demand. Thus Vengco, et al.
filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor praying for: "(1) the expulsion
of Emmanuel Timbungco as president of the union for violation of (the)
union constitution and by-laws and the rights and conditions of union
members under the Labor Code; (2) an order to require Timbungco to
render an accounting of how the P150,000.00 was distributed; and (3) an
order to require private respondent to publish in the bulletin board the list
of the members and the corresponding amount they each received from
the P150,000.00."
ISSUE: Whether or not Timbungco is guilty of illegally deducting 10%
attorneys' fees from petitioners' backwages
HELD: Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code states that other than for
mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney's
fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off
from any amount due an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by an employee. The authorization should
specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
It is very clear from the above-quoted provision that attorney's fees
may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee
without his written consent except for mandatory activities under the
Code. A mandatory activity has been defined as a judicial process of
settling dispute laid down by the law. In the instant case, the amicable
settlement entered into by the management and the union can not be
considered as a mandatory activity under the Code. It is true that the union
filed a claim for emergency cost of living allowance and other benefits

before the Ministry of Labor. But this case never reached its conclusion in
view of the parties' agreement.
Moreover, the law is explicit. It requires the individual written
authorization of each employee concerned, to make the deduction of
attorney's fees valid. The Kapasiyahan cannot be construed to confer
upon Timbungco the authority to receive the fringe benefits for the
workers. Absent such authority, Timbungco should not have kept the
money to himself but should have turned it over to the Union Treasurer. He,
therefore, exceeded his authority as President of the Union.
Moreover, Book III, Rule VIII, Section II of the Implementing Rules
cited by Timbungco which dispenses with the required written
authorization from the employees concerned does not apply in this case.
This provision envisions a situation where there is a judicial or
administrative proceeding for recovery of wages. In the herein case, the
fringe benefits received by the union members consist of back payments of
their unpaid emergency cost of living allowances which are totally distinct
from their wages. In addition, the payment of the fringe benefits was
effected through an amicable settlement and not in an administrative
proceeding.
15. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEUNUBE), petitioner,
vs. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK and ANNEMARIE DURBIN, in her
capacity as Chief Executive Officer, Philippines, Standard
Chartered Bank, respondents.
G.R. No. 161933
April 22, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began
negotiating for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in May 2000
as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. Due to a deadlock in the
negotiations, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
On May 31, 2001, Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an Order directing Standard
Chartered Bank and the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union to
execute their collective bargaining agreement effective 01 April 2001 until
30 March 2003 incorporating therein the foregoing dispositions and the
agreements they reached in the course of negotiations and conciliation.
The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from
the appropriate bargaining unit and the adjustment of remuneration for
employees serving in an acting capacity for one month. In their proposal,
petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the
appropriate bargaining unit all managers who are vested with the right to
hire and fire employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor
relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the
Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff.

The Secretary, however, maintained that the petitioner failed to show that
the employees sought to be removed from the list qualify for exclusion.
With regard to the remuneration of employees working in an acting
capacity, it was petitioner's position that additional pay should be given to
an employee who has been serving in a temporary/acting capacity for one
week. The Secretary likewise rejected petitioner's proposal and instead,
allowed additional pay for those who had been working in such capacity for
one month. The Secretary agreed with the Bank's position that a restrictive
provision would curtail management's prerogative, and at the same time,
recognized that employees should not be made to work in an acting
capacity for long periods of time without adequate compensation.
The Secretary's disposition of the issues raised by petitioner were affirmed
by the CA. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the issue on whether employees sought to be
excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit are confidential employees
is a proper issue under petition for review, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
2. Whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers,
personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential
employees, such that they should be excluded.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that a
one-month or less temporary occupation of a position (acting capacity)
does not merit adjustment in remuneration.
HELD:
1. NO. The Court reiterates the doctrine that the office of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it
shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when
supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of
their expertise in their respective fields. Judicial review of labor cases does
not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor
official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over
again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties
to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here,
the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in
this case at bar.
The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from
joining a bargaining unit for rank and file employees is already wellentrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential
employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are
required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees
and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
2. YES. Petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to be removed
from the list of exclusions are actually rank and file employees who are not
managerial or confidential in status and should, accordingly, be included in

the appropriate bargaining unit. Absent any proof that Chief Cashiers and
Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex department and one (1) HR Staff
have mutuality of interest with the other rank and file employees, then
they are rightfully excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.
As
regards
the
qualification
of bank
cashiers as
confidential
employees, the Court already declared on its previous rulings that they are
confidential employees having control, custody and/or access to
confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of
financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers,
demand drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4
of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, and therefore,
disqualified from joining or assisting a union; or joining, assisting or
forming any other labor organization.
Meanwhile, another case stated that "confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to
confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said
employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective
bargaining agreement."
Finally, the Court designated personnel staff, in which human resources
staff may be qualified, as confidential employees because by the very
nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to,
or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial
functions in the field of labor relations.
3. No. The Court affirms the decision of the CA which upholds the public
respondent's Order that no employee should be temporarily placed in a
position (acting capacity) for more than one month without the
corresponding adjustment in the salary. Such order of the public
respondent is not in violation of the "equal pay for equal work" principle,
considering that after one (1) month, the employee performing the job in
an acting capacity will be entitled to salary corresponding to such position.

16. Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology vs. Court

of Appeals
G.R. No. 164060, June 15, 2007 Quisumbing, J.
Facts
Petitioner and private respondent Mapua Institute of Technology
entered into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement, incorporating the new
faculty ranking instrument which they had agreed to in previous
negotiations. A month after the CBA took effect, private respondent Mapua

called petitioners attention to what it perceived as flaws or omissions in

the CBA and requested amendments thereto. The petitioner rejected the
proposed amendments asserting that the changes would constitute a
violation of the ratified 2001 CBA as it would result in the diminution of
rank and benefits of petitioner.
In the meantime, respondent Mapua made changes in the
curriculum during the school year 2000-2001 which resulted in changes in
the number of hours for certain subjects. This in turn changed the basis of
the computation of the employees salaries from rate per load to a rate per
hour basis, a formula which petitioner opposed. Respondent Mapua
maintained that it was within its right to change the pay formula used.
Issue
Does respondent Mapua have the right to amend the CBA and
change the pay formula used?
Ruling
No. As provided by Article 253 of the Labor Code, a collective
bargaining agreement cannot be terminated or modified during its lifetime.
Hence, until a new CBA is executed by the parties, they are duty-bound to
adhere to such agreement and to continue in full force and effect the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement. The CBA during its lifetime binds
all the parties. The provisions of the CBA must be respected since its terms
and conditions "constitute the law between the parties." Those who are
entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an
obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right
to go to court and ask redress. The CBA is the norm of conduct between
petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated
by the express policy of the law.
Thus, respondent Mapua cannot amend the already existing CBA
until its termination and subsequent renegotiation. Neither does Mapua
have the power to unilaterally change the pay formula since it was agreed
by the parties in their CBA that the basis for the computation is rate per
load of the teachers, and not rate per hour.

correction of the wage distortion for November 1999. The last paragraph,
on the other hand, states the specific condition that the wage/salary
increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive of the
mandated minimum wage increases under future wage orders, that may
be issued after WO No. 7, and shall be considered as correction of the
wage distortions that may be brought about by the said future wage
orders.
On January 1, 2000, all the regular rank-and-file employees of TSPIC
received a 10% increase in their salary. Accordingly, the respondents who
were already regular employees received the said increase in their salary.
On October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board
issued Wage Order which raised the daily minimum wage from PhP 223.50
to PhP 250 effective November 1, 2000. Conformably, the wages of 17
probationary employees were increased to PhP 250.00 effective November
1, 2000.
On various dates during the last quarter of 2000, the above 17 employees
attained regular employment and received 25% of 10% of their salaries as
granted under the provision on regularization increase of the CBA.
In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage rates as mandated by
the CBA.
On January 19, 2001, a few weeks after the salary increase for the year
2001 became effective, TSPIC's Human Resources Department notified 24
employees that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they were
overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their salaries in a
staggered basis, starting February 2001. TSPIC explained that the
correction of the erroneous computation was based on the crediting
provision of the CBA.

TSPIC

The Union, on the other hand, asserted that there was no error and the
deduction of the alleged overpayment from employees constituted
diminution of pay. The issue was brought to the grievance machinery, but
TSPIC and the Union failed to reach an agreement.

FACTS: TSPIC is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, and

marketing integrated circuits to serve the communication, automotive,
data processing, and aerospace industries. Respondent TSPIC Employees
Union (FFW) (Union), on the other hand, is the registered bargaining agent
of the rank-and-file employees of TSPIC. The respondents are all members
of the Union.

Consequently, TSPIC and the Union agreed to undergo voluntary arbitration

on the solitary issue of whether or not the acts of the management in
making deductions from the salaries of the affected employees constituted
diminution of pay.

17.
G.R.
No.
163419
:
February
CORPORATION v. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION

13,

2008

In 1999, TSPIC and the Union entered into a CBA for the years 2000 to
2004. The CBA included a provision on yearly salary increases from 2000
to 2002. The CBA provides that the salary increase for the year 2000 shall
not include the increase in salary granted under WO No. 7 and the

On September 13, 2001, Arbitrator Jimenez rendered a Decision holding

that the unilateral deduction made by TSPIC violated Art. 100 of the Labor
Code.
TSPIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

Aggrieved, TSPIC filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 43.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. TSPIC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
TSPIC filed the instant petition which raises this sole issue for our
resolution.
TSPIC maintains that the formula proposed by the Union, adopted by the
arbitrator and affirmed by the CA, was flawed, inasmuch as it completely
disregarded the "crediting provision" contained in the the CBA.
ISSUE: Does the TSPIC's decision to deduct the alleged overpayment from
the salaries of the affected members of the Union constitute diminution of
benefits in violation of the Labor Code?
HELD: SC finds TSPIC's contention meritorious.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement is the law between the parties
It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law
between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract
between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in
a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
As a general rule, in the interpretation of a contract, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued. Considering that the parties have unequivocally
agreed to substitute the benefits granted under the CBA with those
granted under wage orders, the agreement must prevail and be given full
effect.

it may be reasonably concluded that TSPIC granted the salary increases

under the condition that any wage order that may be subsequently issued
shall be credited against the previously granted increase. The intention of
the parties is clear: As long as an employee is qualified to receive the 12%
increase in salary, the employee shall be granted the increase; and as long
as an employee is granted the 12% increase, the amount shall be credited
against any wage order issued after WO No. 7.
Diminution of benefits
TSPIC also maintains that charging the overpayments made to the 16
respondents through staggered deductions from their salaries does not
constitute diminution of benefits.
Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of
benefits already enjoyed by the employees. There is diminution of benefits
when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has
ripened into a practice over a long period; (2) the practice is consistent and
deliberate; (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution
or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer. As correctly pointed
out by TSPIC, the overpayment of its employees was a result of an error.
This error was immediately rectified by TSPIC upon its discovery.
Absent clear administrative guidelines, Petitioner Corporation cannot be
faulted for erroneous application of the law. Payment may be said to have
been made by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a
"doubtful or difficult question of law. Since it is a past error that is being
corrected, no vested right may be said to have arisen nor any diminution of
benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code may be said to have resulted
by virtue of the correction.
In resolving disputes between labor and capital, fairness and justice should
always
prevail.
Social
justice
does
not,
however,
mandate
that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. In any
case, justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of
the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
18. G.R. No. 161713 August 20, 2008

The CBA shall be given full effect. Thus, the wage/salary increases in 2001
and 2002 shall be deemed as compliance to future wage orders after WO
No. 7.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

LEPANTO LOCAL STAFF UNION, respondent.
Petitioner is a domestic mining corporation. Respondent is the duly
certified bargaining agent of petitioner's employees occupying staff
positions. Petitioner and respondent entered into their fourth Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Paragraph 3 of Article VIII, Section 3 of the CBA

provides that for overtime work, which extends beyond the regular day
shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.), there [will] be no night differential pay
added before the overtime pay is calculated.
Respondent filed a complaint with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board alleging that petitioner failed to pay the night shift differential and
longevity pay of respondent's members as provided in the 4 th CBA.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of respondent. Interpreting
paragraph 3, Section 3, Article VIII of the 4 th CBA, the Voluntary Arbitrator
ruled that it only meant that an employee who extends work beyond the
second shift shall receive overtime pay which shall be computed before the
night shift differential pay. In other words, it excludes the night shift
differential in the computation of overtime pay.
The Voluntary Arbitrator denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Voluntary Arbitrator's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that paragraph 3, Section 3, Article VIII was
clear and unequivocal. It grants night shift differential pay to employees of
the second shift for work rendered beyond their regular day shift. However,
the night shift differential was excluded in the computation of the overtime
pay.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the records of the case revealed
that during the effectivity of the 4 th CBA, petitioner voluntarily complied
with paragraph 3, Section 3, Article VIII by paying night shift differential to
employees for hours worked beyond 3:00 p.m. Petitioner's act disclosed
the parties' intent to include employees in the second shift in the payment
of night shift differential.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Voluntary
Arbitrator's interpretation of the 4th CBA that the employees in the second
shift are entitled to night shift differential.

HELD: NO. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract

constitute the law between the parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear
and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall prevail.
The first paragraph of Section 3 provides that petitioner shall continue to
pay night shift differential to workers of the first and third shifts. It does not
provide that workers who performed work beyond the second shift shall not
be entitled to night shift differential. The inclusion of the third paragraph is
not intended to exclude the regular day shift workers from receiving night
shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It only provides that
the night shift differential pay shall be excluded in the computation of the
overtime pay.
It is settled that in order to ascertain the intention of the contracting
parties, the Voluntary Arbitrator shall principally consider their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts as well as their negotiating and
contractual history and evidence of past practices. In this case, the
Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals both found that the provision
in question was contained in the 1 st, 2nd, and 3rd CBAs between petitioner
and respondent. During the effectivity of the first three CBAs, petitioner
paid night shift differentials to other workers who were members of
respondent for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. Petitioner also paid night
shift differential for work beyond 3:00 p.m. during the effectivity of the 4 th
CBA. Petitioner alleges that the payment of night shift differential for work
performed beyond 3:00 p.m. during the 4 th CBA was a mistake on the part
of its accounting department. However, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing evidence to prove
that the payment was erroneous. In fact, the Court of Appeals found that
even after the promulgation of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision and while
the case was pending appeal, petitioner still paid night shift differential for
work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It affirms the intention of the parties to
the CBA to grant night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00
p.m.