Dorotheo v.

CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Thereafter, her
husband Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding
for the probate of Alejandros last will and testament. The children of spouses filed
theiropposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the will is
intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdesfiled
a Motion for Consideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since
she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although they were not legally married
to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for
her failure to wile the same within the extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in
an order that has become final and executor still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened
no matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to the
concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In
this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such
has become final and executor. The only instance where a party interested in
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.
RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

111 SCRA 82
FACTS:
Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez,
a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1 st part to
the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as
to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de
Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to
Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the
acquisition of lands by aliens.
ISSUE:
WON the ground for the opposition is correct.
HELD:
No, it is not correct.
The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor
of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
No. L-65995

July 23, 1987

PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and JOSE

CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in
Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
G.R. No. 41171
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13,
1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left
by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as
executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The
document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the
deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto
Leonardo who acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial,
the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was
a forgery.
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of
the will was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v.
Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several
parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs
of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
The following petitions or claims were filed:
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a
petition for declaration of heirs and determination of heirship. There was no
opposition filed against said petition.
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for declaration as
heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition to this
petition.
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, Ramon
Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora
Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for declaration
of heirs and determination of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose
and Cosme Borromeo.
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo, Hermenegilda
Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim.

Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos
Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following
facts were established:
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter having
predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children, namely,
Jose Ma. Borromeo

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA

January 31, 2005
FACTS:
Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in 1940. It was asserted that
the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect
known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary
public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
What law shall govern the validity of the will?
HELD:
The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil
Procedure. Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and
Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills
before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed
Article 685 of the Old Civil Code.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the

intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will. Abadas will
does not require acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made.
Lopez vs. Liboro

81 PHIL 429 Succession Pagination of the Will Witnesses to a Will Language

of the Will Thumb Mark as Signature
In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir.
Agustin Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground,
among others:
1.

The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in
Arabic numerals.

2.

That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.

3.

That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.

4.

There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by
Don Sixto Lopez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD: Yes, the will is valid.

1.

The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional
numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first
page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of
the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the
second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament,
before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Further, the first pages is captioned Testamento.

2.

The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set

out in Liboros appelants brief are incidents not all of which every one of the
witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in
which they occurred.

3.

Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his
name. The reason for this was that he was suffering from partial paralysis. There
is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark

as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both
ways are good.
4.

There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly

placed in the will that the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a
matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Abangan vs. Abangan Digest

Abangan v. Abangan
Facts:
1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's
will executed on July 1916. It is from this decision which the opponent
appealed. It is alleged that the records do not show the testatrix knew the
dialect in which the will was written.

10.
11.Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated
12.
13.YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was executed in
Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is
enough to presume that she knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to
the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it
seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that
the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of
execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said
locality
Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil 660
DIGESTED CASE: ACOP vs. PIRASO January 16, 1929
FACTS: Sixto alleged on appeal that the lower court erred in saying that in order to
be valid, the will in question should have been drawn up in the Ilocano dialect. The
evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect. It has been proved
that the deceased Piraso did not know English.
HELD: The will is not valid. The decedents alleged will, being written in English, a
language unknown to the decedent, cannot be probated because it is prohibited by
the law, which clearly requires that the will be written in the language or dialect
known the testator. Nor can the presumption in favor of a will established by the SC
in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan to the effect that the testator is presumed to
know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the
contrary. First, it was not proven that English is the language of Baguio where the
deceased lived and where the will was drawn. The record contains positive proof

that the testator knew no other language other than the Igorrote dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano. He did not know the English language in which the will was
written.

SUROZA VS. HONRADO

10 SCRA 388 Succession Will Should be Written in a Language Known to the
Testator
In 1973, Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will bequeathing her
house and lot to a certain Marilyn Suroza. In 1974, Marcelina died. Marina Paje was
named as the executrix in the said will and she petitioned before CFI Rizal that the
will be admitted to probate. The presiding judge, Honrado admitted the will to
probate and assigned Paje as the administratrix. Honrado also issued an ejectment
order against the occupants of the house and lot subject of the will.
Nenita Suroza, daughter in law of Marcelina (her husband, son of Marcelina was
confined in the Veterans Hospital), learned of the probate proceeding when she
received the ejectment order (as she was residing in said house and lot).
Nenita opposed the probate proceeding. She alleged that the said notarial will is
void because (a) the instituted heir therein Marilyn Suroza is actually Marilyn Sy and
she is a stranger to Marcelina, (b) the only son of Marcelina, Agapito Suroza, is still
alive and is the compulsory heir, (c) the notarial will is written in English a language
not known to Marcelina because the latter was illiterate so much so that she merely
thumbmarked the will, (d) the notary public who notarized will admitted that
Marcelina never appeared before him and that he notarized the said will merely to
accommodate the request of a lawyer friend but with the understanding that
Marcelina should later appear before him but that never happened.
Honrado still continued with the probate despite the opposition until testamentary
proceeding closed and the property transferred to Marilyn Sy.
Nenita then filed this administrative case against Honrado on the ground of
misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not Honrado is guilty of misconduct for admitting into probate a
void will.
HELD: Yes. Despite the valid claim raised by Nenita, he still continued with the
testamentary proceeding, this showed his wrongful intent. He may even be
criminally liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order
or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
The will is written in English and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate
Marcelina. This could have readily been perceived by Honrado that that the will is
void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
understood and known to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix and translated into Filipino language.
That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of
Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Had Honrado been careful and observant, he could
have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there
was something wrong in instituting to Marilyn Sy as sole heiress and giving nothing
at all to Agapito who was still alive.
Honrado was fined by the Supreme Court.

Icasiano v. Icasiano Digest

Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and
for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the
testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through
the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the
original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan.
One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but
admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the

will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other
witnesses in his presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his
signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will
RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere
inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the
omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may
still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law,
there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be
probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no
control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the
testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will
should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was
regular in all respects.
Barut v. Cabacungan Digest
Barut vs. Cabacungan
G.R. L-6825 Febriary 15, 1912
Ponente: SC Justice Moreland
Facts:
1.Pedro Barut applied for the probate of the will of Maria Salomon. It is alleged in
the petition that testatrix died on Nov. 1908 in Sinait, Ilocos Sur leaving the will
dated March 3, 1907. The said will was witnessed by 3 persons. From the terms it
appears that the petitioner received a larger part of decedent's property. After this
disposition, the testatrix revoked all other wills and stated that since she is unable
to read nor write, the will was read to her and that she has instructed Severino
Agapan, one of the witnesses to sign her name in her behalf.
2. The lower court ruled that the will is not entitled to probate on the sole ground
that the handwriting of the person who signed the name of the testatrix does not
appear to be that of Agapan but that of another witness.
Issue: Whether or not a will's validity is affected when the person instructed by a
testator to write his name did not sign his name
HELD: No, it is immaterial who wrote the name of the testator provided it is written
at her request and in her present, and in the presence of the witnesses. This is the
only requirement under Sec. 618 of the Civil Code of procedure at that time.

IN RE WILL OF TAN DIUCO

45 Phil 807

FACTS:
1. Mamerta Base instituted an action for the probate of the will of Chinaman Tan
Duico.
2. The court denied the probate of the will on the ground that said will was not
signed by three instrumental witnesses.
3. The document was signed by Simplicia Sala by order of the testator, whose name
is before the said signature, by reason of the latters incapacity on account of his
weakness and the trembling of his hand.
4. The testator also stated that he directed Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name and
in the presence of three witnesses who also signed with him at the bottom of said
document, and on the left margin of each of its three pages correlatively numbered
in letter by Simplicio Sala in the name of the testator Tan Duico and by the three
other witnesses.
ISSUE:
Was the will not signed by three instrumental witnesses?
HELD:
In dealing with attestation, the law does not say that the instrumental witnesses
must be different from those who signed the attestation clause, for in the first part
of said section, after speaking of the signature of the testator or the person signing
in his place, it adds and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other, from which it clearly
follows that the same witnesses who signed on the left margin of each page of the
document presented by the testator to them as his will, must be the ones who
should sign the attestation clause, inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to
be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the
testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the
will and affirm that it was signed under his express direction in the presence of said
witnesses and that all the sheets thereof had also been signed by them in the
presence of said testator and of each of them.
GARCIA VS. LACUESTA
90 Phil 189 Succession Signing Using an X Mark
Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been
signed by Atty. Florentino Javier as he wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his

name for the testatior on the will. HOWEVER, immediately after Antero Mercados
will, Mercado himself placed an X mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation
clause states that all pages of the will were signed in the presence of the testator
and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each
and every one of us witnesses. The attestation clause however did not indicate
that Javier wrote Antero Mercados name.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD: No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero
Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testators name under his
express direction, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
But is there really a need for such to be included in the attestation clause
considering that even though Javier signed for Antero, Antero himself placed his
signature by virtue of the X mark, and by that, Javiers signature is merely a
surplusage? That the placing of the X mark is the same as placing Anteros thumb
mark.
No. Its not the same as placing the testators thumb mark. It would have been
different had it been proven that the X mark was Anteros usual signature or was
even one of the ways by which he signs his name. If this were so, failure to state the
writing by somebody else would have been immaterial, since he would be
considered to have signed the will himself.

Balonan vs. Abellana GR No. L-15153, August 31, 1960

Facts: A 2-page Will and Testament by the testatrix Anacleta Abellana was sought to
be probated at rhe CFI of Zamboanga City. ON the second page, which is the last
page of the Will, on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose
name appears handwritten the following phrase 'Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana'
(for the tetattrix Anacleta Abellana). (The CFI admitted the probate of the will.
Hence, this appeal, the petitioner contending that the signature of Juan A. Abello on
top of the phrase por la tetadora Anacleta Abellana did not comply with the
requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which it ill be executed.)

ISSUE: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement
"Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the
requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed?
HELD: The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:
"Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another." (Italics
supplied.)
In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held that the important thing
is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction; it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix
signs his own or not. Cases of the same import are as follows: (Ex Parte Juan
Ondevilla, 13 Phil., 479, Caluya vs. Domingo, 27 Phil., 330; Garcia vs. Lacuesta, 90
Phil., 489).
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear
written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is,
therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the
testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by Some
other person in his presence and by his express direction.
It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are
constrained to declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not
be admitted to probate.

Wills Case Doctrines

Art. 774
Estate of K. H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety (1956) [6]
The responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the
value of the inheritance they receive from him. Heirs succeed not only to the rights
of the deceased but also to his obligations.
General rule: a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
Exceptions under Art. 1311:
1) Nature of the obligation
2) Intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties
3) Obligation is not transmissible by operation of law
Art. 777

Unson v. Del Rosario (1953) [12]

The law in force at the time of the decedents death will determine who the heirs
should be.
Art. 2253 provides that rights which are declared for the first time by the new Civil
Code shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new
rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. In instant
case, Ms right of ownership over the lands became vested in 1945 upon the death
of her husband. The new right in favor of the illegitimate children by the deceased
cannot be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of M over the lands in
dispute.
De Borja v. Vda de Borja (1972) [14]
Ownership passes to the heir at the very moment of death, who therefore, from that
moment acquires the right to dispose of his share
Hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from
the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest. Thus, there is
no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Bonilla v. Barcena (1976) [16]
The heirs have the right to be substituted for the deceased as party on an action
that survives.
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. Thus, when F
died, her claim or right to the parcel s of land in litigation was not extinguished by
her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus
acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties-in-interest in the
case.
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for.
1) Survive: wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental
2) Not survive: injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.
In instant case, an action to quiet title over land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, and therefore is one that survives even
after Fs death.
Art. 804
Suroza v. Honrado (1981) [41]

Art. 804 provisions are mandatory. Consequently, failure to comply with the two
requirements nullifies the will.
The will on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to
the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the
attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary
himself.
A judge who admits to probate such a will should face disciplinary action. In the
absence of opposition, the judge should have personally conducted the hearing on
the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was
validly executed.
Abangan v. Abangan (1919) [46]
It may sometimes be presumed that the testator knew the language in which the
will was written.
The circumstance appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in Cebu
and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor [sic] is enough,
in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in
which the will was written.
RFB: same ruling in Gonzales v. Laurel (1923). On the authority of these cases it
seems that, in order for the presumption to apply, the following must appear:
1) The will must be in language or dialect generally spoken in the place of
execution; and
2) The testator must be a native or resident of said locality
Art. 806
Payad v. Tolentino (1936) [49]
Thumb mark as signature.
Testatrix, assisted by counsel, placed her thumb mark on each and every page of
the questioned will and that said counsel merely wrote her name to indicate the
place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words, counsel did not sign for
the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page
thereof. A statute requiring a will to be signed is satisfied if the signature is made
by the testators mark. It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the
attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested her counsel
to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance
with law.
Matias v. Salud (1958) [50]
The legal requisite that the will should be signed by testator is satisfied by a
thumbprint or other mark affixed by him; and that where such mark is affixed by the
decedent, it is unnecessary to state in the attestation clause that another person
wrote the testators name at his request.
In the instant case, it was shown that the herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm

and shoulder of the testatrix made writing a difficult and painful act, to the extent
that, after writing one signature on the second page, she dropped the pen because
of an attack of pain that lasted many minutes, and evidently discouraged attempts
to sign.
It is to be conceded that where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing,
and both the attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is
a factor to be considered against the authenticity of the testament; but the failure
to describe the unusual signature by itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate
when the evidence for the proponent fully satisfies the court that the will was
executed and witnessed as required by law.
Garcia v. Lacuesta (1951) [54]
A cross as signature.
It is not here presented that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature
of the testator or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. The mere sing
of a cross cannot be likened to a thumbmark, because the cross cannot and does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
Barut v. Cabacungan (1912) [56]
When agent must write.
As regards the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes
the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly
appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the
presence of the three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other.
It may be wise, as a practical matter that the one who signs the testators name
signs also hi own; but that is not essential to the validity of the will.
Nera v. Raymundo (1911) [61]
Signing in the presence of witnesses
Jaboneta v. Gustilo:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a
will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have
seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature must be such that they may see each other sign if
they choose to do so. Jaboneta doctrine: the question whether the testator and the
subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon
the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that
moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such

that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign.
Icasiano v. Icasiano (1964) [64]
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is
not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. That the failure of the witness to
sign page three was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony
as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures
in every page.
RFB: The Icasiano holding cannot, and should not, be taken as a departure from the
rule that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon
duplicate was regular in all aspects. A cavalier disregard of the formal requirements
of wills in reliance on Icasiano is not recommended.
DIGESTED CASE: GABRIEL vs. MATEO December 16, 1927

FACTS: According to the oppositors, the attesting witnesses testified that the
decedent signed before they did. However, based on the will, the attesting
witnesses signed before the testator since the latters signature tend to rise when it
reaches a level with an attesting witnesses signature. The testator had to write her
surname upwards in order to avoid interfering with that Felicisimo, one of the
witnesses. It was also contended that there were apparently different kinds of ink
used by the testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses.

HELD: The will is valid. It may be inferred with equal, if not greater, logic that the
testatrix signed before him, and when it came to the witness Gabriel's turn, he,
finding the space below the testatrix's signature free, signed his name there. On the
other hand, it may be noted that the testatrix's other signature at the bottom of the
will also shows a more or less marked tendency to rise, notwithstanding the fact
that there was no signature with which she might interfere if she continued to write
in a straight horizontal line.

(According to Maams notes: The witnesses may sign ahead of the decedent and
vice-versa as long as it is done in one single, contemporaneous or continuous act.
The order of the signing is of no material so long as the execution of the will
constitutes only one single transaction.) At all events, even admitting that there is a
certain question as to whether the attesting witnesses signed before or after the
testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are details

of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the
date on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set
aside the will for this reason alone.
DIGESTED CASE: IN RE ESTATE OF SAGUINSIN:

Facts:
This involves the petition for probate of the will of Remigia Saguinsin. The will was
contained in 3 pages in 2 sheets of paper. The first and third pages were signed on
the left margin by the testatrix and 3 witnesses. However, the second page on the
reverse side of the first page in the first sheet, was not signed. The pages were also
not numbered. LC declared that it could not be admitted into probate for not being
numbered. It ruled that what was written on the second page engenders doubt
whether what was written thereon was ordered written by the testatrix or only
subsequently added.

Issue: May the will be probated? NO.

Rationale:
Act No. 2645 requires that The testator or the person required by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign on each and every
page thereof, on the
left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters, placed on the
upper part of each sheet. In this case, the second page lacks authenticity for not
having the required signatures on the second page. What must be signed is each
page, including the reverse side if used, not merely each sheet. This is to ensure
that no fraudulent insertion was made and to guarantee the authenticity of all that
is written.

COMPARED TO ABANGAN CASE:

Facts:
A will consisted of 2 pages. The 1st page is the disposition signed by the testator at
the bottom. Second page is the attestation signed by the witnesses.

Issue:
There were no signatures on the left margin. According to the oppositors the
signatures should also appear on the left margin.

Ruling:
It is enough that the signatures appear on each and every page of the will. The
purpose here is to identify that indeed the testator and the witnesses signed the
will.
No dissenting opinion
CAGRO CASE:
Facts:
The signatures instead at the bottom, the signatures were on the margin.
Issue:
The signatures should be at the bottom so that there were signatures on the left
and at the bottom.
Ruling:
The main text of Cagro v. Cagro, it was considered a Fatal defect by the Supreme
Court. According to the SC, these signatures in order to be in compliance with
requirement of the law, aside from signatures on the left margin, you should still
sign at the bottom. However, there were strong dissenting opinions to the effect
that to require that the signatures of the witnesses aside from the left margin
should also appear at the bottom is TOO TECHNICAL. It will not serve the purpose of
the law because what is important is that the signature should appear on each and
every page and this purpose is accomplished by affixing the signature on the left.
Cagro v. Cagro (1953) [68]
The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the attestation clause.
Fact: signature of the three witnesses do not appear on the bottom of the
attestation clause, but the page containing the clause is signed by the witnesses on
the left-hand margin.
The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signature. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be

considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signature at the
bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The signatures on the left-hand margin cannot be deemed as their signature to the
clause because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the
will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not
signed by the witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be
easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of
the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
Dissenting opinion of Bautista Angelo: (a) substantial compliance; (b) the
uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses that the clause was already written in
the will when the same was signed obviates fear of the majority that the clause may
have been only added on a subsequent occasion and not at the signing of the will.
Javellana v. Ledesma (1955) [70]
Acknowledgement before a notary public.
Fact: Codicil signed by testatrix and witnesses at the hospital; the notary public
brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgement in the
presence of the testatrix and the witnesses does not affect the validity of the
codicil. The Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses
and notary should be accomplished in one single act.
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the
testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is not part of the
acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act.
RFB: (a) ratio: The certification of acknowledgement need not be signed in the
presence of the testator and the witnesses; (b) obiter: Art. 806 does not require that
the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge on the same day that it was
executed.
Cruz v. Villasor (1973) [72]
The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attesting witnesses.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered
as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his
having signed the will. If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would
have to avow, assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This
cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will
appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
Furthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others, to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary
public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For then he would be
interested in sustaining the validity of his own act.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the Article 805 requiring at

least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that
the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the will.
Art. 808
Garcia v. Vasquez (1970) [75]
Provision of Article 808 mandatory.
Fact: testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading
print.
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was not unlike a
blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of
Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator
if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to
make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they
are not in accordance with his wishes.
Alvarado v. Gaviola (1993) [80]
The requirement has been liberally applied, the SC declaring substantial compliance
to be sufficient.
Facts: The lawyer who drafted the will and subsequent codicil read them aloud in
the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them.
Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, because the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to
protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be
so rigid and inflexible as to destroy testamentary privilege.
It was not only the lawyer who read the documents. The notary public and the
three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. With
four persons following the reading word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him
(those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms
actually appearing in the typewritten documents.
Art. 809
Caneda v. CA (1993) [87]
Fact: petitioners aver that the attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to
specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator
signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
SC agrees with petitioners. The absence of a statement that the witnesses signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is
a fatal defect which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. Such
defect in the attestation clause cannot be characterized as merely involving form of

the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule contemplated in Art. 809. The defect is not only in the
form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific
element required by Art. 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause.
Proper interpretation of the substantial compliance rule in Art. 809: Omission
which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of
resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde (from another
source, from elsewhere, from outside source) would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Art. 810
Roxas v. De Jesus (1985) [103]
Issue: whether FEB./61 appearing in the holographic will is a valid compliance
with Art. 810.
A complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the
day on which a will was executed. There is no contingency in this case.
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month,
and year of its execution. However, when, as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity
of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB./91 is a
valid compliance with Art. 810, probate of the holographic will should be allowed
under the principle of substantial compliance.
Labrador v. CA (1990) [105]
Fact: date appears in the body of the holographic will.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in
the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in
the hand of the testator. Both requirements are present in the subject will.
Art. 811
Azaola v. Singson (1960) [110]
The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not
mandatory.
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, proponent was not required to
produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, Art. 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under the
penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will,

none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent.
Art. 811 foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to
the authenticity of the will, and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency. Such resort to expert evidence is conditioned by if the Court deem it
necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should
be convinced of the wills authenticity. Since the law leaves it to the trial court to
decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a
partys failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
SCs conclusion: the rule of Art. 811, par. 1, is merely directory and is not
mandatory.
Codoy v.Calugay (1999)
Fact: holographic will challenged for forgery. 6 witnesses of proponent did not
categorically state that they know the handwriting and signature of the testatrix;
whereas, 2 did so.
Issue: whether the provisions of Art. 811 is mandatory, i.e., for probate of
contested holographic will at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in
the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
SC (Pardo): We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811is
mandatory. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
that the word shall when used in a statute is mandatory. Case remanded because
the Court found that the testimony of the aforesaid 2 witnesses was not convincing.
Query: has this ruling reversed Azaola, supra.?
1) Azaola is not on all fours with this case. Here, the will was contested (ground:
forgery), in Azaola the will was not contested.
2) RFBs personal view: No, because the basis of the remandthat the Court did not
find the testimony of the 2 witnesses satisfactoryis perfectly consistent with
Azaola that quality of the testimony, not the quantity of the witnesses, is the
criterion. Thus, SCs statement that three-witness rule is mandatory is an obiter. We
can read Azaola and Godoy together.
Gan v. Yap (1958) [114]
In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced.
Therefore, a lost holographic will cannot be probated.
When the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition and of assessing the
evidence, are not available. And then, the only guaranty of authenticitythe
testators handwritinghas disappeared.
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

 Ordinary vs. holographic wills. The difference lies in the nature of wills. In
holographic wills, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in
ordinary wills, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses and of the
notary. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof;
if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
Rodelas v. Aranza (1982) [122]
Exception to the Gan ruling.
Issue: whether a lost holographic will can be proved by means of a photostatic
copy.
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will
may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can
be determined by the probate court (i.e., comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator.
Art. 814
Kalaw v. Relova (1984) [125]
Effect of non-compliance.
Issue: whether the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by full signature
of the testatrix, should be probated or not.
Velasco v. Lopez: when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature,
the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words, erased, or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the
full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could
remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required
by lay by affixing her full signature.
Velasco ruling must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words
themselves but not the essence and validity of the will itself.
Subsection 4-Witnesses to Wills
Article 821
Gonzales vs. CA
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or

at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation
for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such
that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony, or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he
is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of
the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code. The attributes of the good standing of the witness in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness are
presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing
party.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for
they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution.
Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts
from or upon hearsay.

Subsection 6
Article 830
Maloto vs. CA
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does
not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical
destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it
goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself."Animus
revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last
will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
Gago vs. Mamuyac
The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of the will to
be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the cancellation or
revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place
must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the

presumption is in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the
testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will
not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
knowledge or authority of the testator.
Subsection 8- Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
Article 838
Guevara vs. Guevara
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to
the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. Although not contested, the due execution of the will and
the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing
mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and
given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and
attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested
copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of
deeds of the province in which the land lies. It will readily be seen from the above
provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy.
The heirs may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the
court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public
policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory,
De la Cerna vs. Potot
In a case where a joint will between husband and wife was executed and the will
was probated when the husband died before the effectivity of the Civil Code, the
final decree of probate has conclusive effect as to the last will and testament,
despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding
upon the whole world and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk
of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law. The probate decree of the will of the husband could only affect the
share of the deceased husband. It could not include the disposition of the share of
the wife who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties
the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not

then be in issue. It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of
the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de
novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus, probate
of the wifes will is denied as joint wills are now prohibited by the Civil Code.

Gallanosa vs. Arcangel

A decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of a will.
That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts
cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal
action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue
as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
The following are included in the term formal validity and therefore are conclusively
settled by a final decree of probate:
i. that the testator was of sound and disposing mind
ii. that his consent was not vitiated
iii. that the will was signed by the requisite number of witnesses
iv. that the will is genuine

Nepomuceno vs. CA
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass
upon certain provisions of the Will. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.

SECTION 2- Institution of Heir

Article 850
Austria vs. Reyes
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code,
the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must
be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must
appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

Article 854
Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu
If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in the will, and
the testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime, there is no
preterition. There is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir received something
from the inheritance. The remedy is for completion of legitime under Articles 906
and 907.
Aznar vs. Duncan
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting
him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties. In a case where the testator left to one who was a forced heir a

legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir
or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, it was held
that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitimate be completed.
Acain vs. IAC
An adopted child, if totally omitted in the inheritance, is preterited and can invoke
its protection and consequences. Since an adopted child is given by law the same
rights as a legitimate child, the adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article
854 in the same manner a legitimate child can.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
To 'annul' means to abrogate, to make void. The word annul employed in the statute
(Article 854) means that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such
institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in the will
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in
clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an
expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. (Note that
what was involved here was a universal institution of a sole heir, nothing more.
Article 854 annuls his institution, thus no more heirs are left. Hence, the entire will is
void.)

SECTION 3-Substitution of Heirs

Article 863
Palacios vs. Ramirez
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as
follows:
"Scaevola, Maura, and Traviesas construe 'degree' as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one transmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell, and Sanchez
Roman, however, construe the word 'degree' as generation, and the present Code
has obviously followed this interpretation, by providing that the substitution shall
not go beyond one degree 'from the heir originally instituted.' The Code thus clearly

indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the
first heir.
"From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent
of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from
the fiduciary."
PCI Bank vs. Escolin
If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the
property and transmit it to a second heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution
is not necessarily void; it may be valid as some other disposition, but it is not a
fideicomisaria.

SECTION 5- Legitime
Article 887
Rosales vs. Rosales
The surviving spouse referred to in Article 887 who is entitled to the legitime, is the
spouse of the decedent and not the spouse of a child who has predeceased the
decedent.

Lapuz vs. Eufemio

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is
purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party
to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum
persona. Thus, death of either party during the pendency of a petition for legal
separation results in the dismissal of the case.
Nial vs. Badayog
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death? Petitions for the declaration of the voidability of a
marriage can only be brought during the lifetime of the parties and not after the
death of either. A void marriage, on the other hand, can be brought even after the
death of either party. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Any proper interested party (heirs of the deceased husband)
may attack a void marriage.
Baritua vs. CA

Legitimate ascendants (parents of the deceased) succeed only when the

descendant dies without a legitimate ascendant. The surviving spouse concurs with
all classes of heirs. Thus, where an obligation has been paid to the spouse and
descendants, the obligation is extinguished and the legitimate ascendants have no
right to claim upon the obligation.
Article 891
Solivio vs. CA
The reserva troncal only applies to properties inherited by an ascendant or a brother
or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Padura vs. Baldovino
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives
of the inheriting ascendant.
The reserva merely determines the group of relatives to whom the property should
be returned; but within that group the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891
does not specify otherwise. (RFB: Those reservatarios nearer in degree to the
prepositus will exclude the more remotely related.)
Florentino vs. Florentino
I Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are
living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the
legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which
constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards,
all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the
reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by
operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir
who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs.
This property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at
the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third
degree to the line from which such property came.
The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right

granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives
of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
(RFB: Actually there will be only one instance of representation among the
reservatarios, i.e., a case of the Prepositus being survived by brothers/sisters and
children of a predeceased or incapacitated brother or sister.)
Edroso vs. Sablan
1. The reservistas right over the reserved property is one of ownership.
2. The ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e. the existence of
reservatarios at the time of the reservistas death.
3. The right of ownership is alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition.
4. The reservistas right of ownership is registrable.
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the
reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before
them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within
the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy.
Sienes vs. Esparcia
1. The reservatarios have a right of expectancy over the property.
2. The right is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the expectancy ripens into
ownership if the reservatarios survive the reservista.
3. The right is alienable, but subject to the same suspensive condition.
4. The right is registrable.

(Query: Edroso case says reservatarios right is not alienable, Sienes says it is.
Resolve. Personally, I think Sienes is right.)
Gonzales vs. CFI
Can a reservista convey by will, reservable property to relervatarios in the third
degree and by-pass those in the second? NO. Article 891 clearly indicates that the
reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
The reservable property does not form part of the reservistas estate and should be
given to all the seven reservatarios or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the
third degree. While it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reservatario, it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise
true that the reservista was only one of the reservatarios and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why the other reservatarios should be deprived of
their shares in the reservable property. The property passes by strict operation of
law.
Cano vs. Director
Upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. That property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even
answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be
entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the
basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the
reservable property cannot be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own
successors mortis causa, so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the
prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence
when the reservista dies.

Chapter 3 Legal or Intestate Succession

Article 977
Section 1 General Provisions
Subsection 2 Right of Representation
Teotico vs. Del Val
The relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the
adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted

child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence,
the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Thus,
an adopted can neither represent nor be represented.
Section 2 Order of Intestate Sucession
Subsection 1 Descending Direct Line
Article 979
Sayson vs. CA
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in
acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love
for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
There is no question that a legitimate daughter of a person who predeceased his
parents, and thus their granddaughter, has a right to represent her deceased father
in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she
is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached for persons to whom the grandparents
were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include
the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party.
Subsection 3 Illegitimate Children
Article 992
Corpus vs. Administrator
There is a successional barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of
the deceased. The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code
which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid
further grounds of resentment

Leonardo vs. CA
An illegitimate cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the legitimate relatives left by his father considering that, as found again by the
Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not
yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.
At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.
Diaz vs. CA
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. So that while Art, 992 prevents the illegitimate issue
of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so.
Diaz vs. CA
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done
by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such
a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child
to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case
because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
The word "relative" as used in Article 992 is broad enough to comprehend all the
kindred of the person spoken of. The word "relatives" should be construed in its
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term
in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Subsection 4 Surviving Spouse
Article 996
Santillon vs. Miranda
There is a conflict with what the Civil Code provides as legitime of a spouse and
what he or she may receive by way of intestacy. Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls
under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the
chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the
surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession.
While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a
child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the
amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs.
Thus, upon intestacy, the provisions of Art. 996 applies.
Chapter 4 Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
Section 2 Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Article 1025
Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church vs. Rigor
Where a priest makes a provision in his will that certain legacies shall pass to his
nearest male relative who pursues priesthood, it is said to be limited to those living
at the time of the execution of the will. We hold that the said bequest refers to the
testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any
indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
Section 5 Collation
Article 1061
Vizconde vs. CA
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common
mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made
according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory

heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights
received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The
purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it
is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance
on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his
heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not
impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation.
What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value
of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is
a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase
in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
Thus, it is an error to require a son-in-law of the decedent to be included in the
collation as he is not a compulsory heir.
Section 6 Partition and Distribution of the Estate
Subsection 1 Partition
Fajardo vs. Fajardo
There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act
inter vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed.
If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in
writing in a public instrument, because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last
will and testament, the legal requisites should have been observed.
Chavez vs. IAC
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition
of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes a partition
by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the
provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need
not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs. (RFB: This ruling should not be used as it raises
eyebrows very high. It gives a partition an irrevocable character and allows a
conveyance of the compulsory heirs of their legitimes even during their lifetimes.)
Legasto vs. Verzosa
A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a
will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for
without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the
partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that

property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property
gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word
"testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely donates
his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
Article 1082
Tuason vs. Tuason Jr.
Where heirs contracted with a third person to develop their co-owned lot, with the
stipulation that the co-ownership shall subsist until all the lots have been sold, is not
a violation of Art. 400, and is only a mere incident to the main object of the
partnership, which is to dissolve the co-ownership.
Article 1088
Garcia vs. Calaliman
Written notice is required for the period of onemonth for the other co-heirs to
redeem begins to run. Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against
any attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including
therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. Written notice is
indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as
exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its
validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not
having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive,
though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption