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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

1.De leon vs. Esguerra


153 Scra 602
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of
the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over
their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June
7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue
of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov
on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly,
Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore,
the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982
should still govern.
2.Gonzales vs. Comelec 21 SCRA 774 Political Law
Amendment to the Constitution Political Question vs Justiciable Question
Facts: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It
was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that

the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that
this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the
people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election
rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when
they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of
Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend
as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not
constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to
the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when
Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so
as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a
legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a
general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
3.IMBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two
delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed
Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall
be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative
district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which
previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5,
and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality
of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set

the parameters of such convention?


2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1.
The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing
details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within
the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2.
The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application
with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due
process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the
Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office
in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.
4.Occena vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of
three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes
further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena
and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are
suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the
Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and
filed, respectively.
Ruling: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973
Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,
dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification,
this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It
could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force
and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only
entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is
the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is
that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As
was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme
Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only
nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the
latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices.
That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court
has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.
Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
5.Tolentino vs. Comelec
41 SCRA 702 Political Law

Amendment to the Constitution Doctrine of Proper Submission


Facts: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite
concerning only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even
before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been
approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper
submission to the people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification.
Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted
for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a
proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the
time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and
therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the
entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the
ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.
6.SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law
Amendment to the Constitution
Facts: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum
on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers
of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing
for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the
court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency
to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments
thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself.
The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a
delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
7.DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend
the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative.
He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter
set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a
motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by
the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel
Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the
following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law
has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision,
therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted
the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a
revision or an amendment of the Constitution.
Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, thus, without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of
the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions
of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional
guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the
Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a
revision or amendment has become academic.
8.Republic Act No. 6735
August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
I. General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum
Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called
for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution
or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a


proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two
classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or
reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or
reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the
required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and
submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal
Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be
exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum,
at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same
with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;


c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed
by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is
deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city
is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality
in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall
be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten
per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every
barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is
deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a
special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or
referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum.
Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

The

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall,
upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the
date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45)
days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission
of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The
Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law
shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the
registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval,

or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion


of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the
proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of
the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be
rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes
cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15)
days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an
initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are
specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as
defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary
of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be
enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the
enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except
that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative
measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand
(2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in
case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty
(50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30)
days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and

registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice


thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The
Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend
assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of
autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty
(60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays,
from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number
of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies
concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government
unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many
places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on
Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall
certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been
obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall
then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted
to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their
approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the
Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous
regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45)
days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The
initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof
shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved
by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification
by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative
shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the
legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled.
However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative
in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local

legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may
be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3)
years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the
expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4
hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of
autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval
or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude
the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the
initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in
the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held
invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid
and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved: August 4, 1989

B. CONCEPT OF THE STATE


1.BACANI VS NACOCO G.R. No. L-6957, November 29, 1956
FACTS: Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.
In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they requested
for the services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for the said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page, amounting to P714 in total.

However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor General
disallowed the payment of such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts
paid. Consequently, the AG required the petitioners to reimburse the amounts
invoking that the National Coconut Corporation is a government entity within the
purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which states that:
The Government of the Philippine Islands is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said
Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or
municipal branches or other form of local government., hence, exempted from the
payment of the fees in question.
ISSUE: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the
payments in question?
RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the
government namely: constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to
the bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more on
public welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety. From such, we
may infer that there are functions which our government is required to exercise to
promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by
it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely
the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.
The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the
economic life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the governmentowned and controlled corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the peoples welfare, however,
it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term Government of the Republic of the
Philippines used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as
an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government.
Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of
fees in question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.
Petition GRANTED.
2.Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al.
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
Facts:
Private respondents alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in
excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay
them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations and raising the
special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The respondent
Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime
services and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid.
There was a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the respondent Court.

Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration contends that it is beyond the


jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that
it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Held:
Yes, the Petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The
Supreme Court ruled that a reference to the enactments creating Petitioner
Corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioners plea that it performs
governmental and not proprietary functions.
Under Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives are: "(a) To promote the
effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so
that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security;
(b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia
tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will
insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus
reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create,
establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in
suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the
farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their investments;
(d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and
inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic
conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry."
3.Government of the Philippine Islands Vs. Monte de Piedad
35 Phil 728- Parens Patriae
Facts: On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The
Spanish Dominions then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was
received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it
was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount
in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said
amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that the
Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of
the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint
against the respondent bank?
HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de
Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government
being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to
enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the government has the
right to take back the money intended for the people.
4.Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil 113
Facts:Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated during the time of
the Japanese occupation. After the liberation of Manila Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on his case saying that the proclamation of Gen Douglas
MacArthur has invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
courts of the Philippines and without the enabling law, lower courts have no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct


Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese.
Issues:
1
Whether or Not judicial proceedings and decisions during the Japanese
Occupation were valid and remained valid.
2
Whether or not the proclamation of General MacArthur declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other Government other than that of the
commonwealth are null and void, invalidated and all judgments and judicial acts
proceeding from the courts.
3
Whether or not of they were invalidated (reference to No.2), the courts can
continue hearing the cases pending before them
Held:
1
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and
proceedings and non-political judgments of a de facto government are good and
valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments,
it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid,
and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
2
It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention
of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other
government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said
principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is
that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
proceedings. "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains. "If a belligerent occupant is required to
establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the
nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing there in their civil rights, by necessary
implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored
government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by
said courts in their litigation during the period of occupation.
3. The proceedings in cases then pending in said court may continue, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become the laws and
courts of Japan by being continued as required by the law of nations. Same courts
may continue exercising the same jurisdictions and cases pending therein before
the restoration of the commonwealth until abolished and replaced by the said
government.
DECISION: WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS ISSUED to the judge of the Court Of First
Instance of Manila ordering him to take cognizance and continue to final judgment
the proceedings in Case No. 3012.
3 Kinds of De Facto Government:
1. Established through Rebellion
Governments gets possession and control through the force of the voice of the
majority and maintains itself rightful government
2. Established through Occupation
(PARAMOUNT FORCE)Maintained by the military forces who invade and occupythe
territory of the enemy.
3. Established through Insurrection

Established as anindependent government by the inhabitants of thecountry who


rise in insurrection against the parent state.
5.People vs Gozo
53 SCRA 476 Political Law Sovereignty
Facts: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval
Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the
advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished
the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later
on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineers Office for
violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition
and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the
lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a
foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also
all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their
own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its
sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative
jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

6.ANASTACIO LAUREL vs. ERIBERTO MISA


G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE
GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION. WHETHER THE
PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
HELD: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the
unending allegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person
who owes permanent allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of
a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated (repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty
of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It
remains vested in the legitimate government. (Article II, section 1, of the
Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.") What may be suspended is the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by
the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe
the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended in abeyance during military occupation. The petitioner is subject to the

Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to
the same government and same sovereign people. (Art. 114. Treason. Any
person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the
Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall
be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed
P20,000 pesos.)
7.Ruffy v Chief of Staff
75 Phil 857
Facts:
During the Japanese occupation, Ramon Ruffy, et al., petitioner, a provincial
commander of the Philippine Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of
surrendering to the enemy. He is organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as bolo
combat tea, or bolo area. The said Bolo area was a contingent of the 6thh military
district, which has been recognized and placed under the operational control of the
US army in the South pacific. Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of
command in the bolo area. Major ruffy who was then acting as commanding officer
for the Bolo area was relieved of his position. Later on or on Oct 19, 1944. Lieut. Col.
Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. It was this murder which gave rise to
petitioners trial. The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filled this instant
petition with the contention that he was not subject to military law at the time of
the offense for which he had been placed on trial was committed. Petitioners
contended that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the national defense act
and all laws and regulations creation the existence of the Philippine Army including
the articles of war were suspended during such occupation.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged
offense was committed.
Held: YES, petitioners were subject to military law at the time the alleged offense
was committed. The rule that laws of political in nature or affecting relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended
for governing of the civil inhabitants of occupied territory. It is not intended for and
does not bind the enemies in arms (such as Philippine army).

PEOPLE
8.Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa
to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00
to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if
the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to
be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person
is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao
al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
9. G.R. No. L-32398

January 27, 1992

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PO YO BI TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE


PHILIPPINES: PO YO BI, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellant.
Gualberto C. Opong for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:


In this appeal from the Order 1 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo
dated 8 January 1966 in Naturalization Case No. 85 allowing the petitioner-appellee to take his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to its decision 2 of 15 October 1963, appellant Republic of the
Philippines urges this Court to overturn both the decision and the order because the trial court erred:
I
. . . in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization was not published in accordance with
the requirements of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
II
. . . in not finding that the amended petition failed to allege that petitioner is a person of good moral
character.
III
. . . in not finding that the amended petition for naturalization does not state petitioners' former
residence in Manila.
IV
. . . in not finding that petitioner is not exempt from the filing of a declaration of intention.
V
. . . in not finding that petitioner's character witnesses are not credible persons within the
contemplation of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
VI
. . . in not finding that petitioner failed to submit a permission to renounce his Chinese citizenship from

the Minister of Interior of the Republic of China. 3


The factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this appeal are not controverted.
On 9 February 1957, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization, attaching thereto, among other
documents, the joint affidavit of two (2) of his character witnesses, Atty. Pablo Oro and Dr. Rafael
Jarantilla, and the joint affidavit of his other character witnesses, Dr. Antonio San Agustin and Uy
Chong. 4
On 5 March 1959, the trial court, through the Deputy Clerk of Court, issued a Notice of Petition for
Philippine Citizenship setting the hearing of the petition to 18 January 1960 5 and ordering the
publication and posting of the notice.
Petitioner filed a motion to amend his petition 6 on 15 January 1960, citing as among the reasons
therefor the fact that important allegations had been overlooked in the original petition. Attached to
the motion was the Amended Petition. 7
On 18 January 1960, the trial court, through the Deputy Clerk of Court, issued an Amended Notice of
Petition 8 setting the hearing of the petition to 12 October 1960 and ordering the publication of the
said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the YUHUM, a
newspaper of general circulation in the province/city of Iloilo, and its posting in a public and
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court.
Subsequently, on 19 June 1961, petitioner once again moved 9 to amend his petition. A copy of the
Amended Petition, 10 to which is in reality the Second amended petition, was attached to the motion.
This second Amended Petition contains the following amendments:
1.
In the third paragraph, insertions of the clause "From said employment I am now receiving a
salary of P350.00 a month;" of the figure P1,900.00 as the annual average income of his wife from the
Chinese Commercial School in Iloilo City and of his capital investment in the Bio Guan Company in the
amount of P39,943.71 as of 31 December 1960;
2.
In the Seventh paragraph, incorporation of the following information: he had resided
continuously in Iloilo City for 23 years preceding the date of the Amended Petition and up to the
present time; although he stayed in Manila (Salazar Street) when he studied in the Chiang Kai Shek
High School from June 1939 to 1942, he did not consider this as interruption of the continuity of his
residence in Iloilo City because he always returned to Iloilo City during all the summers, Christmases
and New Year's day celebration within said period.
3.
In the Eighth paragraph, insertion of the word "read" between the words speak and write in
reference to the English language and to Hiligaynon, the latter being one (1) of the principal Philippine
languages.
4.
In the Ninth paragraph, insertion of the opening sentence: "My children are enrolled in the
following schools: Alice Po (eldest) at the Chinese Commercial School, Iloilo City, and presently Grade
II; My second child, Enrique Po, is enrolled in the same school but only in the Kindergarten Department
of the same for he is only 5 years old; my youngest and third child, Floresca Po, is not yet of school
age."
5.
In the Eleventh paragraph, insertion of the sentence "My children, except only the youngest
who is not of school age, are all enrolled in the proper school contemplated by the Naturalization Laws
of the Philippines as hereinafter alleged."
6.
In the Twelfth paragraph, insertion of the words "and freely" between mingled socially and with
the Filipinos.
In none of the above petitions did petitioner state that he is a person of good moral character.
On 26 June 1961, the trial court, through the Deputy Clerk of Court, issued an Amended Notice of
Petition for Philippine Citizenship setting the hearing of the petition to 26 February 1962 11 and
directing the publication of the order in the Official Gazette and in the GUARDIAN, a newspaper of
general circulation in the province/city of Iloilo. This amended notice of petition was published in the
10, 17 and 24 July 1961 (nos. 28, 29 and 30, vol. 57) 12 issues of the Official Gazette and in the 1, 8
and 15 July 1961 issues of the GUARDIAN. 13
The second Amended Petition itself was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province and city of Iloilo. There is, as well, no evidence of its posting in a
public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court or in the building where such office is
located.
The Record on Appeal fails to disclose any order of the trial court granting the first and the second
motions to amend or directing the publication of the second amended petition.
After trial, the court a quo, per Judge F. Imperial Reyes, handed down on 15 October 1963 its decision
14 granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

POR TANTO, encontrando satisfactoria mente probadas las alegaciones de la solicitud enmendada,
se dicta esta decision;
a)

Declarando al solicitante Po Yo Bi como Ciudadano filipino; y

b)
Ordenado que, una vez firme esta decision, se expida por el Escribano de este Juzgado el
Certificado de Naturalizacion correspondiente que, oportunamente, se inscribira en la Oficina del
Registro Civil.
Esta decision no adquirira caracter firme hasta despues del transcurso de dos (2) aos a contar desde
esta fecha y, previa vista, se encuentre a satisfaccion del Juzgado que el solicitante, durante dicho
periodo de tiempo dos aos a contar desde esta fecha (1) no ha salido de Filipinas; (2) se ha
dedicado continuamente a un trabajo o profesion licita (lawful); (3) no ha sido convicto de algun delito
o infraccion de reglamentos promulgados por el govierno; y (4) no ha cometido algun acto prejudicial a
los intereses del pais o contrario a la politica anunciada por el gobierno.
The facts upon which the trial court based its decision are as follows:
Se ha probado que el solicitante es un ciudadano chino, nacido de padres chinos en esta Ciudad el 31
de agosto de 1923; que ahora reside en la Calle Arroyo, No. 169, de esta Ciudad; que, antes de ahora,
el ha residido en la misma calle, No. 29, que fue cambaido despues con el No. 157; que desde su
nacimiento hasta ahora solo se ha susentado de Filipinas una sola vez, de 1933 a 1938, cuando se fue
a China; que esta casado con aida Lee Chiu (Exh. M), con quien tiene tres hijos llamados Alice, Enrique
y Florence, apellidados "Po", todos nacidos en el St. Mary's Hospital de esta Ciudad (Exhs. DD, EE y
FF); que los tres fueron bautizados en esta Ciudad (Exhs. GG, HH, y II); que su esposa o hijos viven con
el en la Calle Arroyo, No. 169, de esta Ciudad; que esta registrado como ciudadano chino en la
Embajada de la Republica de China en Manila (Exh. O); que esta provisto de un Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 238247, expedido por el Buro de Inmigracion, ciudad de Iloilo, el 17 de Julio de 1950,
el cual lleva su fotografia (Exh. V); que esta igualmente provisto de un Immigrant Certificate of
Residence No. 102653, tambien expedido por el Buro de Inmigracion, Manila, el 23 de enero de 1952,
el cual lleva igualmente su fotografia (Exh. W); que esta tambien provisto de un Check-Up Certificate,
Serial No. 115747, expedido por el Comandante Provincial de la Constabularia de Iloilo el 2 de
septiembre de 1954 (Exh. BB); que estudio sus cursos elementarios y secondarios en la Iloilo Chinese
Commercial High School ed esta Ciudad y en la Chiang Kai Shek High School de Manila,
respectivamente (Exhs. JJ y KK); que las dos escuelas en las que so ensean Philippine History,
Philippine Government y Philippine Civics estan reconocidas por el gobierno; que en las mismas se
admiten estudiantes sin tener en cuenta su raza, color o religion; que despues de terminar sus cursos
secondarios, el estudio el Comercio en el Iloilo City Colleges de esta Ciudad (Exh. LL); que el ultimo
Colegio tambien esta reconocido por el gobierno; que en el mismo se admiten igualmente estudiantes
sin tener en cuenta su raza, color o religion; que sus hijos Alice y Enrique, apellidados "Po", estan
ahora estudiando en la Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School de esta Ciudad (Exh. MM), la misma
escuela donde estudio sus cursos elementarios (Exh. JJ); que so hija, Florence, no ha llegado aun a la
edad escolar; que habla, lee y escribe el ingles tan es asi que declaro perfectamente en dicho lenguaje
en la vista de su solicitud enmendada; que tambien habla, lee y escribe bien el dialecto Ilongo (Exh.
III); que es fundador, socio y gerente auxiliar de Bio Guan Company de esta Ciudad (Importers &
General Merchants), recibiendo un sueldo de P500.00 al mes, libre casa y comida, incluyendo los
miembros de su familia (Exh. AAA); que su capital invertido en dicha compaia hasta el ao 1962
asciendo a la suma de P43,810.83 (Exh. ZZ-1); que su esposa es "property custodian" de la Iloilo
Chinese Commercial High School de esta Ciudad con un sueldo de P1900.00 al ao (Exh. BBB); que
suele cometer su income tax returns (Exhs. QQ, RR y SS), pagando constantemente su income Tax
correspondiente (Exhs. RR-1 y SS-1); que no debe al gobierno por contribuciones (Exh. H); que ha
pagado su individual residence certificates A y B (Exhs. OO y PP); que su solicitud de fecha 31 de enero
de 1959, que fue enmendada el 13 de enero de 1960 y el 17 de junio de 1961 (Exh. A) es la primera
que habia presentado; que esta exente de presentar una declaracion de intencion para ser
naturalizado como ciudadano filipino por haber nacido en este pais y por haber enviado a sus hijos de
edad escolar a escuelas debidamente reconocida por el gobierno donde se ensean Philippine History,
Philippine Government y Philippine Civics (sic) y on las que se admited estudiantes sin tener en cuenta
su raza, color o religion; y que da contribuciones para fines sociales y caritativos (Exhs. S, S-1 al S-12).
Se han probado igualmente que el solicitante no esta opuesto a todo gobierno organizado, ni esta
afiliado a alguna asociacion o grupo de personas que sostiene o ensea doctrinas subversivas; no
defiendo ni ensea la necesidad o propiedad de la violencia ni del atentado contra las personas, ni del
asesinato para el exito y prodominio de su ideales; no es poligamo, ni cree en la practica de la
poligamia; nunca ha sido acusado o convicto de algun delito que envuelva torpeza moral (Exhs. I, J y
K); no padeco de enagenacion mental o de alguna enfermedad incurable o contagiosa (Exh. L); que
durante todo el periodo de su residencia en Filipinas siempre se ha asociado con los filipinos y ha
alentado el sincero deseo de estudiar y abrazar las costumbres, tradiciones e ideales de estos; que es
su intencion renunciar absoluta y completamente a su lealtad y fidelidad a la Republica de China; y
que su pais, China (Nacionalista), no esta en guerra con la Republica de Filipinas y cuenta con leyes
que conceden a los Filipinos igual privilegio de permitir a estos a ser ciudadanos o subditos chinos
(Exh. N); . . . 15
On 30 October 1963, the Assistant City Fiscal of Iloilo, Vicente P. Gengos, on behalf of the Solicitor
General, filed a motion to reconsider the above decision 16 contending therein that petitioner is not

exempt from filing his declaration of intention, has not complied with Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law and that his witnesses are not competent and credible persons within the
contemplation of law.
However, on 11 December 1963, Assistant City Fiscal Gengos, on behalf of the Solicitor General, filed a
Motion to Withdraw 17 the motion for reconsideration alleging therein that after a deliberate study of
the grounds alleged, he believes that he cannot substantially establish the same.
The Record on Appeal again fails to indicate what action the trial court took on this motion to withdraw.
Petitioner filed a motion on 1 December 1965 alleging therein that more than two (2) years had
elapsed since the rendition of the decision and that he has complied with all the conditions and
requisites imposed by Republic Act No. 530; he then prays that after hearing, the decision be executed
and he be allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen. On 5 January 1966, Assistant City Fiscal Gengos
filed an opposition to this motion, 18 reiterating therein the grounds he earlier alleged in the motion to
reconsider the decision.
On 8 January 1966, the trial court handed down the order quoted earlier, now challenged in this
appeal.
For reasons known only to him, petitioner did not file his Brief and, in the resolution of 12 October
1972, this Court considered the case submitted for decision without such Brief. 19
On 27 January 1988, the parties were required to move in the premises and were informed that should
they fail to make the proper manifestation within a period of thirty (30) days from notice, the case shall
be considered terminated and closed and entry of judgment shall accordingly be made. 20 Only the
Republic filed such a manifestation praying therein that the case be decided in accordance with the
prayer contained in its Brief 21 and informing the Court that on 10 June 1975, petitioner, pursuant to
the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270, filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization of the
Office of the Solicitor General a petition for naturalization, docketed as SCN No. 011317, which is
pending consideration before the committee.
All the assigned errors are impressed with merit. We shall discuss them in the order they are
presented.
1.
As correctly pointed out by the Republic, the second amended petition was not published.
Neither were the original and the amended petitions. What the Office of the Clerk of Court did was to
prepare and issue notices of the petition. It was said notices alone which were ordered to be published
and posted. In respect to the second amended petition, the notice was published in the 10, 17 and 24
July 1961 issues of the Official Gazette and the 1, 8 and 15 July 1961 issues of the GUARDIAN.
Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law 22 requires that the petition itself must be published. It
reads in part as follows:
Sec. 9. Notification and appearance. Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of
the clerk of court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive
weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province
where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of hearing posted
in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located, setting
forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his
arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in
support of his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held until
after six months from the date of the last publication of the notice. . . .
As early as 29 November 1958, or four (4) years, eight (8) months and sixteen (16) days before the
trial court handed down its challenged decision, this Court, in Co y Quing Reyes vs. Republic, 23 ruled
that the above-quoted Section 9 requires that the petition for naturalization be published "once a
week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This provision demands compliance
with the following requirements, namely: (1) the publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three
(3) times; (3) and these must be "consecutive." The Court further ruled that the publication is a
jurisdictional requirement. Thus:
In short, non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of the petition,
affects the jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or
foundation of the authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the
clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel. Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not
cure such defect. (emphasis supplied).
That there was in fact, in the instant case, a notice of petition which was published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks and that the same made references to some date in the petition and
stated the date and place of hearing, did not save the day for both the petitioner and the trial court.
The publication of the notice did not constitute substantial compliance with the cited section. In Ngo
vs. Republic, 24 We stated:
The first assignment of error is predicated upon the undisputed fact that, in violation of Section 9 of

Commonwealth Act No. 473, which provides that


xxx

xxx

xxx

the petition herein has not been so published. Although a notice of the filing of said petition, making
reference to some data therein contained, and stating the date and place of the hearing thereof was
published, this is not sufficient compliance with said legal provision. As a consequence, the lower court
acquired no jurisdiction to hear this case and the decision appealed from is null and void.
In Sy vs. Republic, supra., this Court held that the requirement of Section 9 of C.A. No. 473, as
amended, that a copy of the petition to be posted and published should be a textual or verbatim
restatement of the petition as filed, is jurisdictional. Non-compliance therewith nullifies the
proceedings in the case, including the decision rendered in favor of the applicant.
2.
For reasons also known only to him and his counsel, and despite two (2) amendments to the
original petition, petitioner did not allege in any of his petitions that he is of good moral character. The
third of the six (6) qualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines, as provided for in Section 2 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, is:
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living; . . .
In the Twelfth paragraph of the second amended petition, petitioner practically copied all the words in
the section except for the opening clause on good moral character; thus, he alleges:
Twelfth. I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my
relations with the constituted Government as well as with the community in which I am living.
In Dy vs. Republic, 25 the petition filed therein was denied because, inter alia, the said petition did not
specifically allege that petitioner is of good moral character pursuant to the requirement under Section
7, in relation to paragraph 3 of Section 2 of the law above-quoted. In Chua Bong Chiong vs. Republic,
26 this Court explicitly ruled that:
1.
The law requires that he should allege specifically each of the six qualifications for
naturalization prescribed under Sec. 2 of Com. Act No. 473 (Sec. 7 of Com. Act No. 473). The petition
does not contain the specific averment that he is of good moral character, which omission inevitably
nullifies his petition. (emphasis supplied).
A reading of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of petitioner's testimony on direct examination
reveals that he was not asked about his good moral character. Neither did he refer to it in any manner
in the answers he gave.
3.
Petitioner alleges that he completed his senior year of high school at the Chiang Kai Shek High
School in Manila. In both the original and amended petitions, however, he did not reveal the specific
place in Manila where he resided during that time. In his second amended petition, he declares that he
stayed in Manila from June 1939 to 1942, giving his address as "(Salazar Street)". This is not sufficient
compliance with the requirement of Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law that the petitioner
must allege therein his present and former places of residence. The purpose of the requirement is to
facilitate the checking up on the activities of the petitioner which are material to the proceedings.
"(Salazar Street)" is vague and uncertain. Since neither the given name of Salazar nor its initial is
mentioned, considering that Manila is a big and thickly populated metropolis, and that there is no proof
that only one (1) street in Manila is named after a Salazar, it is obvious that petitioner deliberately
suppressed vital information to make it extremely difficult for the government authorities to locate his
place of residence and check on his activities therein during such time. Besides, a careful reading of
the transcripts of the testimony of petitioner on direct examination 27 reveals that petitioner did not
mention Salazar Street at all. Thus, on this ground alone, his petition should fail.
4.
We likewise agree with the Republic that petitioner was not exempt from filing a declaration of
intention. His claim for exemption is anchored on his having been born in the Philippines; his having
completed his primary and secondary education in schools recognized by the Philippine government
wherein enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality and where Philippine Civics, Philippine
History and Philippine Government are prescribed and taught as part of the school curriculum; and that
his children, except the youngest who is not of school age, are all enrolled in the schools contemplated
by law. He testified that he completed his primary education at the Chinese Commercial School in Iloilo
City and his secondary education at the Chiang Kai Shek High School in Manila. Unfortunately, only his
self-serving declaration supports his claim that these schools are not limited to any race or nationality.
The certification of one James King, Director of the Iloilo Chinese Commercial High School 28 dated 14
August 1963 and merely identified by petitioner, does not make any categorical statement that during
the time that petitioner studied in said school until 1939 when he allegedly finished his elementary
course, the school was not limited to any race or nationality. The certification makes no reference to
the past only the present. It states: "This school is not limited to any race, nationality, creed or

religion." Mr. King was not presented to testify that prior to and during 1939, the school was not limited
to any race or nationality. The certification should not have been admitted inevidence and given credit
as such constitutes hearsay.
In respect to petitioner's high school education, the certification of the Director-Principal of the Chiang
Kai Shek High School, dated 12 January 1962, merely states that petitioner "was enrolled in the Third
year, Senior High School in Chinese Instruction in this school during the school year 1941-1942. He
was graduated from the Chinese Senior High School before the closing of that school year as a result of
the outbreak of World War II. 29 It was petitioner himself who identified this certification. The DirectorPrincipal was not even presented as a witness to be cross-examined. Clearly, this certification does not
prove that petitioner did in fact finish his senior year. The "senior high school" stated therein refers to
Chinese Instruction, and not to a general secondary education. Petitioner never attempted to explain
the term "Third Year" and this only casts serious doubts as to his educational attainment at that time.
There is then no proof of completion of a full secondary education. Furthermore, the certification does
not state that in 1941-1942, the school was not limited to a particular race or nationality. Accordingly,
he cannot claim exemption from filing the declaration of intention. 30
5.

On the fifth assigned error, the Republic asserts that:

Petitioner's character witness Antonio San Agustin admitted in (sic) the witness stand that he had no
contact with petitioner during the period the latter studied in Manila (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., October 8,
1963) and during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., August 21, 1963). The
other character witness Pablo Oro also admitted that he came to know the petitioner only since 1944
(p. 19, t.s.n., August 21, 1963). Thus, San Agustin could not vouch for petitioner's moral character and
conduct from 1939 to 1942 when petitioner studied in Manila and from 1942 to 1945 during the
Japanese occupation, or a continuous period of some six (6) years; and Oro since petitioner's return to
the Philippines from China in 1938 until 1944 (p. 24, t.s.n., October 7, 1963).
In addition to the foregoing observation of the Republic, which is supported by the evidence, this Court
notes that in respect to the good moral character or good repute of the petitioner, this is all that the
witness said:
Q
Now, because of your long and close association with the petitioner, could you tell us whether
he was (sic) of good moral character?
A

He is of good moral character and many people say that he is of good repute. 31

He clearly made a distinction between good moral character and good repute. As to the latter, he did
not venture any personal opinion, but merely mentioned what others had been saying. Yet, in his
affidavit, 32 he explicitly stated that he has "personal knowledge that the petitioner aforesaid is and
during all aforesaid periods of his stay in the Philippines, been (sic) a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable." The periods referred to by him are: (a) from birth of the petitioner in 1923 to
1933, when petitioner left the Philippines and (b) from 1938 when petitioner returned to the
Philippines, "to the present." As to the latter period, it is quite obvious that, vis-a-vis the aforequoted
observation by the Republic, the witness did not hesitate to breach the boundaries of truth to help the
petitioner.
In respect to witness Pablo Oro, all that he could state as regards the petitioner's reputation and moral
character is:
Q
Now, during the period of your acquaintanceship (sic) of the petitioner and your close contact
with him as you have testified, could you tell us whether the petitioner is of good repute and morally
irreproachable?
A
Yes, because among the young people in the Chinese community he is one of the best in moral
conduct and also he is one of the brightest young man (sic) I have encountered. 33
This answer was never amplified to enlighten the trial court as to its factual basis. Moreover, it can be
easily noted that the yes answer is actually a qualified one and is not fully responsive. It is limited to
good moral conduct, which is but a part of moral irreproachability. A part is not the whole. The latter
means character of the highest order excellent character. 34 Moreover, there is an apparent attempt
to emphasize such conduct within the Chinese community. The third paragraph of Section 2 of the
Revised Naturalization Law explicitly provides the applicant must have such qualifications during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living. That community is not confined to the Chinese
community; it applies to the community in general for the reason that he is required to mingle socially
with the Filipinos. One who fails to do so is disqualified to be naturalized under Section 4 (f) of the law.
This witness did not likewise categorically answer the "good repute" aspect of the question; instead, he
mentioned the intellectual qualities of the petitioner. Not all "bright" persons are of good repute, and
not all persons of good repute are bright.
It has been held that to establish the qualifications that the applicant must be of good moral character
and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
his residence, the character witnesses must be in a position to testify on the character and good moral
conduct of the applicant during the entire period of the latter's stay in the Philippines as provided by

law. 35
In the instant case, the witnesses utterly failed to do that.
6.
Section 12 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that before a certificate of naturalization
is issued, the petitioner shall renounce "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty." It is settled that a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a
citizen of the Philippines unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous
permission of its Minister of Interior for the renunciation of his nationality. 36 In the instant case,
petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he obtained such permission. The sixth assigned
error then is well-taken.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the decision of the court
below of 15 October 1963 and SETTING ASIDE its Order of 8 February 1966 in Naturalization Case No.
85, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

TERRITORY
10.REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046
(as amended by RA 5446)
AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines describes the national territory as comprising all the territory ceded to
the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on December 10, 1898, the
limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at
Washington, between the United States and Spain on November 7, 1900, and in the treaty concluded between the
United States and Great Britain on January 2, 1930, and all the territory over which the Government of the Philippine
Islands exercised jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
WHEREAS, all the waters within the limits set forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always been regarded as
part of the territory of the Philippine Islands;
WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines archipelago,
irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land
territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set
forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines
joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago; and
WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and described for the information of all
concerned; Now, therefor,
11. (RA 5446) Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:

N. Latitude

E. Longitude

Asimuth

Distance in
Meters

Y'ami Island (E)


Line 1 (Yami I. (E.) Tumaruk Rk.)

2107'03"

12157'24"

35327'

71,656

Tumaruk Rk.
Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk. Balintang Is.)

2028'28"

12202'06"

34713'

58,105

Balintang Island
Line 3 (Balingtang Is. Didicas Rk.)

1957'45"

12209'28"

37505'

97,755

Didicas Rk.
Line 4 (Didicas Rk. - Iligan Pt.)

1904'50"

12212'18"

35039'

86,155

Iligan Pt.
Line 5 (Iligan Pt. - Ditolong Pt.)

1818'45"

12220'15"

35123'

136,030

Ditolong Pt.

1705'50"

12231'44"

1656'

34,378

Line 6 (Ditolong Pt. - Diviuisa Pt.)


Diviuisa Pt.
Line 7 (Diviuisa Pt. - Dijohan Pt.)

1648'00"

12226'06"

2101'

57,781

Dijohan Pt.
Line 7a (Dijohan Pt. - Bulubalik Pt.)

1618'45"

12214'28"

1052'

142,360

Bulubalik Pt.
Line 8 (Bulubalik Pt. - Tinaga I.)

1502'56"

12159'30"

30015'

120,986

Tinaga I.
Line 9 (Tinaga I. - Horadaba Rks.)

1429'45"

12257'40"

28627'

148,690

Horadaba Rks.
Line 10 (Horadaba Rks. Matulin Rk.)

1406'41"

12416'54"

30634'

1,083

Matulin Rk.
Line 11 (Matulin Rk. - Atalaya Pt.)

1406'20"

12417'23"

33146'

178,480

Atalaya Pt.
Line 11a (Atalaya Pt. - Finch Rk.)

1240'59"

12504'02"

31330'

22,268

Finch Rk.
Line 12 (Finch Rk. - SE of Manjud Pt.)

1232'40"

12512'57"

31356'

12,665

SE Manjud pt.
Line 12a (SE of Manjud Pt. - Sora Cay)

1227'54"

12517'59"

32227'

14,225

Sora Cay
Line 13 (Sora Cay - Bunga Pt.)

1221'47"

12522'46"

32103'

22,793

Bunga Pt.
Line 13a (Bunga Pt. - Tubabao I.)

1212'10"

12530'40"

33150'

12,686

Tubabao I.
Line 14 (Tubabao I. - Tugnug Pt.)

2306'06"

12533'58"

35522'

83,235

Tugnug Pt.
Line 15 (Tugnug Pt. - Suluan I.)

1121'06"

12537'40"

33103'

75,326

Suluan Island
Line 16 (Suluan I. - Tuason Pt.)

1045'20"

12557'40"

34751'

107,070

Tuason Pt.
Line 17 (Tuason Pt. - Cauit Pt.)

948'33"

12610'00"

35525'

55,415

Cauit Pt.
Line 18 (Cauit Pt. Arangasa Is.)

918'35"

12612'25"

34244'

49,703

Arangasa Is.
Line 19 Arangasa Is. - Quinablangan I.)

852'50"

12620'28"

34840'

131,330

Quinablangan I.
Line 19a (Quinablangan I. - Above
Languyan R.)

742'58"

12634'30"

35308'

25,619

Above Languyan R.
Line 20 (Above Languyan R. Pusan
Pt.)

729'10"

12636'10"

35652'

22,489

Pusan Pt.
Line 21 (Pusan Pt. - Tuguban Pt.)

716'59"

12636'50"

2639'

36,259

Tuguban Pt.
Line 22 (Tuguban Pt. - Cape S. Agustin
N.)

659'24"

12628'00"

2033'

83,350

Cape San Agustin (N)


Line 22a (Cape S. Agustin (N) Cape
San Agustin (S)

617'03"

12612'08"

3016'

1,707

Cape San Agustin (S)


Line 23 (Cape S. Agustin (S) Panguil

616'15"

12611'40"

3923'

125,100

Bato Pt.)
Panguil Bato Pt.
Line 23a (Panguil Bato Pt. - Tapundo Pt.)

523'45"

12528'42"

6632'

7,484

Tapudo Pt.
Line 24 (Tapundo Pt. - Manamil I.)

522'08"

12524'59"

8919'

7,667

Manamil I.
Line 24a (Manamil I. - Balut I. (W)

522'05"

12520'50"

13901'

3,051

Balut I. (W)
Line 25 (Balut I. (W) - Middle of 3 Rk.
Awash)

523'20"

12519'45"

12447'

149,840

Middle of 3 Rk. Awash


Line 26 (Middle of 3 Rk. Awash
Tongquil I.)

609'39"

12413'02"

8618'

259,400

Tongquil I.
Line 27 (Tongquil I. - Sumbasumba I.)

600'15"

12152'45"

6129'

115,950

Sumbasumba I.
Line 28 (Sumbasumba I. - Kinapusan Is.)

530'10"

12057'35"

4319'

44,445

Kinapusan Is.
Line 29 (Kinapusan Is. - Manuk Manka
I.)

512'37"

12041'05"

6314'

101,290

Manuk Manka I.
Line 30 (Manuk Manka I. - Frances Reef)

447'50"

11952'10"

5830'

80,847

Frances Reef
Line 31 (Frances Reef - Bajapa Reef)

424'54"

11914'54"

13434'

29,330

Bajapa Reef
Line 32 (Bajapa Reef) - Panguan I.)

436'04"

11903'36"

16405'

13,480

Panguan I.
Line 33 (Panguan I. - Omapoy I.)

443'06"

11901'36"

23848'

42,470

Omapoy I.
Line 34 (Omapoy I. - Sanga-Sanga I.)

455'02"

11921'15"

24611'

51,005

Sanga-Sanga I.
Line 35 (Sanga-Sanga I. - Pearl Bank)

506'12"

11946'30"

17005'

80,200

Pearl Bank
Line 36 (Pearl Bank - Baguan I.)

549'04"

11939'01"

10313'

137,050

Baguan I
Line 36a (Banguan I. - Taganak I.)

606'00"

11826'42"

7652'

15,535

Taganak I.
Line 37 (Taganak I. - Gt. Bakkungaan O

604'05"

11818'30"

11839'

24,805

Gt. Bakkungaan
Line 37a (Gt. Bakkungaan - Sibaung I.)

610'32"

11806'42"

13604'

18,470

Sibaung I.
Line 38 (Sibaung - I. Muligi I.

617'45"

11759'45"

21536'

79,915

Mulugi I.
Line 39 (Mulugi I. - Mangsee Is.)

653'00"

11825'00"

11914'

140,541

Mangsee Is.
Line 39a (Mangsee Is. - Cape Melville)

730'10"

11718'20"

13450

48,815

Cape Melville
Line 40 (Cape Melville - Ligas Pt.)

748'50"

11659'30"

15354'

15,665

Ligas Pt.
Line 41 (Ligas Pt. - Cay)

756'28"

11655'45"

17040'

5,666

Cay
Line 41a (Cay-Secam I.)

759'30"

11655'15"

20452'

22,925

Secam I.
Line 42 (Secam I. - N. of Canipan Bay)

810'47"

11700'30"

20909'

54,900

N. of Canipan Bay
Line 43 (N. of Canipan Bay Tatub Pt.)

836'50"

11715'06"

21857'

18,570

Tatub Pt.
Line 44 (Tatub Pt. - Punta Baja)

844'40"

11721'28"

22204'

45,125

Punta Baja
Line 45 (Punta Baja - Malapackun I.)

902'50"

11737'58"

22330'

32,194

Malapackun I.
Line 46 (Malapackun I. - Piedras Pt.)

915'30"

11750'04"

22550'

148,260

Piedras Pt.
Line 47 (Piedras Pt. - Tapuitan I.)

1011'28"

11848'18"

20319'

124,900

Tapuitan I.
Line 48 (Tapuitan I. - Pinnacle Rk.)

1113'40"

11915'28"

20847'

136,590

Pincle Rk.
Line 49 (Pinnacle Rk. - Cape Calavite

1218'34"

11951'45"

20040'

134,230

Cape Calavite
Line 50 (Cape Calavite - Cabra I.)

1326'40"

12018'00"

14812'

58,235

Cabra I.
Line 51 (Cabra I. - Capones Is.)

1353'30"

12000'58"

17926'

113,400

Capones Is.
Line 52 (Capones Is. - Pa-Lauig Pt.)

1455'00"

12000'20"

16809'

58,100

Palauig Pt.
Line 53 (Palauig. - Hermana Mayor I.)

1525'50"

11953'40"

16417'

40,870

Hermana Mayor I.
Line 53a (Hermana Mayor Tambobo
Pt.)

1547'10"

11947'28"

16710'

20,490

Tambobo Pt.
Line 54 (Tambobo Pt. - Rena Pt.)

1558'00"

11944'55"

18143'

22,910

Rena Pt.
Line 54a (Rena Pt. - Cape Bolinao

1610'25"

11945'18"

19139'

18,675

Cape Bolinao
Line 55 (Cape Bolinao - Darigayos Pt.)

1620'20"

11947'25"

22620'

80,016

Darigayos Pt.
Line 56 (Darigayos Pt. - Dile Pt.)

1650'15"

12020'00"

17958'

81,616

Dile Pt.
Line 56a (Disle Pt. - Pinget I.)

1734'30"

12019'58"

18827'

12,060

Pinget I.
Line 56b (Pinget I. - Badoc I.)

1740'58"

12020'58"

19246'

27,170

Badoc I.
Line 57 (Badoc I. - Cape Bojeador)

1755'20"

12024'22"

19503'

65,270

Cape Bojeador
Line 58 (Cape Bojeador - Dalupiri I.)

1829'30"

12034'00"

22216'

101,740

Dalupiri I.
Line 59 (Dalupiri I. - Catanapan Pt.)

1910'15"

12113'02"

21329'

25,075

Catanapan Pt.
Line 60 (Catanapan Pt. - Dequey I.)

1921'35"

12120'56"

20227'

116,870

Dequey I.

2920'06"

12146'35"

18047'

42,255

Line 61 (Dequey I. - Raile)


Raile
Line 62 (Raile - Y'ami I. (W)

2043'00"

12146'55"

20030'

48,140

Y'ami I.(W)
Line 63 (Y'ami I. (W) - Y'ami I. (M)

2107'26"

12156'39"

23840'

237

Y'ami I. (M)
Line 64 (Y'ami I.(M) - Y'ami I. (E)

2107'30"

12156'46"

30708'

1,376

Y'ami I. (E)

2107'03"

12157'24"

Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters
of the Philippines.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 17, 1961.
12. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1599
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
WHEREAS, an exclusive economic zone extending to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the
baselines from which the territorial sea is measured is vital to the economic survival and development
of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, such a zone is now a recognized principle of international law;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order:
Section 1. There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines. The exclusive economic zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles
beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured: Provided, That, where the
outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or
neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state
concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of international law on
delimitation.
Section 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over it territorial sea and
continental shelf, it shall have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established herein the
following;
(a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management
of the natural resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the seabed, including the subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands,
off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including
the prevention and control of pollution, and scientific research;
(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice.
Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the Republic of
the Philippines or of any license granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines, no
person shall, in relation to the exclusive economic zone:
(a) explore or exploit any resources;
(b) carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:

(c) conduct any research;


(d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation or other structure
or device; or
(e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign
rights and jurisdiction herein provided.
Nothing herein shall be deemed a prohibition on a citizen of the Philippines, whether natural or
juridical, against the performance of any of the foregoing acts, if allowed under existing laws.
Section 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to
navigation and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications.
Section 5. (a) The President may authorize the appropriate government office/agency to make and
promulgate such rules and regulations which may be deemed proper and necessary for carrying out
the purposes of this degree.
(b) Any person who shall violate any provision of this decree or of any rule or regulation promulgated
hereunder and approved by the President shall be subject to a fine which shall not be less than two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) nor be more than one hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months to ten (10) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court. Vessels and other equipment or articles used in connection therewith shall
be subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Section 6. This Decree shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette.
13. Republic Act No. 9522

March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as
follows:

Basepoint
Number

Station
Name

Location

World Geodetic System of


(WGS 84)
Coordinates

Latitude (N)

Longitude (E)

1984 Distance to
next
basepoint
(M)

PAB-01

Amianan Is.

21657.73"

1215727.71"

70.08

PAB-02

Balintang Is.

195738.19"

122946.32"

99.17

PAB-04

Bigan Pt.

181835.30"

1222019.07"

71.83

PAB-05A

Ditolong Pt.

17716.30"

1223128.34"

1.05

PAB-05B

Ditolong Pt.

17614.79"

1223143.84"

0.39

PAB-05

Ditolong Pt.

17551.31"

1223142.66"

3.29

PAB-06

Spires Is.

17236.91"

122313.28"

9.74

PAB-06B

Digollorin Pt.

165918.03"

1222756.61"

3.51

PAB-06C

Digollorin Rk.

164956.11"

1222650.78"

2.40

10

PAB-07

Divimisa Pt.

164738.86"

122264.40"

30.94

11

PAB-08

Dinoban Pt.

161844.33"

1221406.69"

116.26

12

PAB-10A

Tinaga Is.

142954.43"

1225751.15"

80.29

13

PAB-11

Horodaba Rk.

146.29.91"

1241659.21"

0.54

14

PAB-12

Matulin Rk.

146.10.40"

1241726.28"

96.04

15

PAB-13

Atalaya Pt.

12416.37"

125353.71"

6.79

16

PAB-13A

Bacan Is.

123618.41"

125850.19"

5.52

17

PAB-14

Finch Rk.

1232.33.62"

1251259.70"

0.80

18

PAB-14A

Cube Rk.

1231.57.45"

1251332.37"

4.90

19

PAB-14D

NW Manjud Pt.

122836.42"

1251712.32"

1.30

20

PAB-15

SE Manjud Pt.

122737.51"

125185.23"

7.09

21

PAB-16A

S Sorz Cay

122141.64"

125237.41"

5.68

22

PAB-16B

Panablihon

121727.17"

125270.12"

5.21

23

PAB-16C

Alugon

121321.95"

1253019.47"

1.94

24

PAB-16D

N Bunga Pt.

121148.16"

1253130.88"

0.54

25

PAB-17

E Bunga Pt.

121120.67"

1253148.29"

5.71

26

PAB-18A

SE Tobabao Is.

1267.00"

1253411.94"

83.94

27

PAB-19C

Suluan Is.

104516.70"

125588.78"

56.28

28

PAB-19D

N Tuason Pt.

94959.58"

126106.39"

57.44

29

PAB-20A

Arangasa Is.

85316.62"

1262048.81"

40.69

30

PAB-21B

Sanco Pt.

81311.53"

1262853.25"

30.80

31

PAB-22

Bagoso Is

74245.02"

1263429.08"

12.95

32

PAB-22C

Languyan

72949.47"

1263559.24"

0.54

33

PAB-23

Languyan

72916.93"

1263559.50"

0.76

34

PAB-23B

Languyan

72830.97"

1263557.30"

1.2

35

PAB-23C

N Baculin Pt.

72729.42"

1263551.31"

10.12

36

PAB-24

Pusan Pt.

71719.80"

1263618.26"

1.14

37

PAB-24A

S Pusan Pt.

71614.43"

1263557.20"

63.28

38

PAB-25B

Cape San Agustin

61714.73"

1261214.40"

1.28

39

PAB-25

Cape San Agustin

6168.35"

1261135.06"

67.65

40

PAB-26

SE Sarangani Is.

52334.20"

1252842.11"

0.43

41

PAB-27

Pangil Bato Pt.

52321.80"

1252819.59"

3.44

42

PAB-28

Tapundo Pt.

62155.66"

1262511.21"

3.31

43

PAB-29

W Calia Pt.

52158.48"

1252152.03"

0.87

44

PAB-30

Manamil Is.

5222.91"

1252059.73"

1.79

45

PAB-31

Marampog Pt.

52320.18"

1251944.29"

78.42

46

PAB-32

Pola Pt.

698.44"

1241542.81"

122.88

47

PAB-33A

Kantuan Is

62647.22"

12213.34.50"

29.44

48

PAB-34A

Tongguil Is.

6233.77"

1215636.20"

2.38

49

PAB-35

Tongquil Is

618.51"

1215441.45"

1.72

50

PAB-35A

Tongquil Is.

6017.88"

1216311.17"

85.94

51

PAB-38A

Kirapusan Is

512.8.70"

1204138.14"

55.24

52

PAB-39

Manuk Manka Is.

44739.24"

1195158.08"

43.44

53

PAB-40

Frances Reef

42453.84"

1191450.71

0.61

54

PAB-40A

Frances Reef

4253.83"

1191415.15"

15.48

55

PAB-41A

Bajapa Reef

436"9.01"

119322.75"

6.88

56

PAB-42A

Paguan Is.

44252.07"

119144.04"

8.40

57

PAB-43

Alice Reef

44555.25"

119315.19"

2.28

58

PAB-44

Alice Reef

4475.36"

119512.94"

18.60

59

PAB-45

Omapoy Rk.

45510.45"

119221.30

23.37

60

PAB-46

Bukut Lapis Pt.

5223.73"

1194418.14"

44.20

61

PAB-47

Pearl Bank

54635.15"

1193951.77"

75.17

62

PAB-48

Bagnan Is.

6558.41"

1182657.30"

8.54

63

PAB-48A

Taganak Is

6414.08"

1181833.33"

13.46

64

PAB-49

Great Bakkungaan Is.

6114.65"

118654.15"

3.97

65

PAB-50

Libiman Is.

61339.90"

118352.09"

5.53

66

PAB-51

Sibaung Is.

61743.99"

11805.44"

41.60

67

PAB-52

Muligi Is.

65214.53"

1182340.49"

75.06

68

PAB-53

South Mangsee Is.

73026.05"

1171833.75"

26.00

69

PAB-54

Balabac Is.

74830.69"

1165939.18"

6.08

70

PAB-54A

Balabac Great Reef

75127.17"

1165417.19"

1.18

71

PAB-54B

Balabac Great Reef

75219.86"

1165328.73"

2.27

72

PAB-55

Balabac Great Reef

75436.35"

1165316.64"

5.42

73

PAB-60

Ada Reef

820.26"

1165410.04"

10.85

74

PAB.61

Secam Is.

81118.36"

1165951.87"

30.88

75

PAB-62

Latua Pt.

88756.37"

1171551.23"

7.91

76

PAB-63

SW Tatub Pt.

84417.40"

1172039.37"

11.89

77

PAB-63A

W Sicud Pt.

85332.20"

1172815.78"

13.20

78

PAB-64

Tarumpitao Pt.

92.57.47"

1173738.88"

81.12

79

PAB.64B

Dry Is.

95922.54"

1183653.61"

82.76

80

PAB-65C

Sinangcolan Pt.

111319.82"

1191517.74"

74.65

81

PAB-67

Pinnacle Rk.

121935.22"

1195056.00

93.88

82

PAB-68

Cabra Is

135324.45"

12015.86"

115.69

83

PAB-71

Hermana Mayor Is.

154843.61"

1194656.09"

9.30

84

PAB-72

Tambobo Pt.

155761.67"

1194455.32"

12.06

85

PAB-72B

Rena Pt.

16957.90"

11945.15.76"

0.25

86

PAB-73

Rena Pt.

161012.42"

1194511.95"

6.43

87

PAB-74

Rocky Ledge

161634.46"

1194619.50"

0.65

88

PAB-74A

Piedra Pt.

163712.70"

1194628.62"

1.30

89

PAB-75

Piedra Pt.

161829.49"

1194644.94"

1.04

90

PAB-75C

Piedra Pt.

161928.20"

119477.69"

0.63

91

PAB-75D

Piedra Pt.

16204.38"

1194720.48"

80.60

92

PAB-76

Dile Pt.

173424.94"

1202033.36"

6.86

93

PAB-77

Pinget Is.

174117.56"

120212.20"

14.15

94

PAB-78

Baboc Is.

17554.13"

1202440.56"

35.40

95

PAB-79

Cape Bojeador

182932.42"

1203342.41"

1.77

96

PAB-79B

Bobon

183052.88"

1203455.35"

58.23

97

PAB-80

Calagangan Pt.

191014.78"

1211252.64"

98.07

98

PAB-82

Itbayat Is.

204315.74"

1214657.80"

25.63

99

PAB-83

Amianan Is

21717.47"

1215643.85"

0.08

100

PAB-84

Amianan Is.

21718.41"

1215648.79"

0.25

101

PAB-85

Amianan Is.

21712.04"

121573.65"

0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all
portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without
limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid
baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish
charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth
in this Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2)
newspaper of general circulation.

14. Magalona et al vs Ermita


655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory
RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was
meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence
the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to
do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law
principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular
lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi.
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it
as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to
our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of
innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal,
as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under
the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own
maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the
main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do
that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of
the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where
we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by
Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
GOVERNMENT
15. Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil 113
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus praying for the respondent judge to continue
the proceedings in a civil case which was initiated under the regime of the so called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation in
the country. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings on
the ground that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur when the
American forces took over the occupation of the island from the Japanese
government, had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all the judicial proceedings

and judgments of the court under the Philippine executive Committee and the
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation.
Respondent further claim that lower courts have no more jurisdiction to take
cognizance and continue the case in courts under a defunct government in the
absence of enabling law granting authority of such courts. Respondent contends
that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.
The principal issues to be resolved now for the court are the following:
1. Whether judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines
under the first government were good and valid and remained so even after the
liberation or occupation by the United States;
2. Whether the proclamation by Gen. MacArthur declaring that all laws, regulations
and processes of any of the government in the Philippines are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said court;
3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings were not been invalidated, will the
present courts under Japanese occupation continue those proceedings pending in
court The court in resolving the issue one by one shed light to the given questions.
Held: In the first issue, the court said that under international and political law, it is
a legal truism that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. Another question now
then needs an answer that is whether or not the government under the Japanese
occupation was a de facto government. And if they were, then all those judicial
proceedings remain good and valid even if there is a change of government. Several
kinds of de facto government were elucidated by the court to find out what is
applicable to the present case at bar.
A Government de facto in a proper legal sense government that gets possession
and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
Government de facto established and maintained by military forces this is by way of
invasion and occupation of a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which
is denominated a government of paramount force.
A Government de facto established as an independent government by inhabitants of
a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state The powers and duties of
de facto government of the second kind are regulated in Section III of the Hague
conventions of 1907, which provides the authority of the legislative power having
actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his
power to re-establish and insure as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. According
to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right
and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military
occupation, he possess all the powers of a de facto government and he can suspend
the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may
see fit, but is enjoined to respect municipal laws in force in the country, those laws
which enforce public order, and regulate social and commercial life in the country.
Laws of political in nature and affecting political relations such as the right of
assembly, right to bear arms, right to travel freely are considered as suspended and
in abeyance during military occupation. Although the local and civil administration
of justice is suspended it is not unusual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his hands. Local courts are authorized to continue administering
justice, and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts. The municipal
laws of a conquered territory or the laws which regulate private rights continue in
force during military occupation except so far as they are suspended or changed by
the acts of conqueror, he nevertheless has all the powers of a de facto government
and can at his pleasure either the existing laws or make new ones. The Philippines

during the Japanese occupation falls under the second kind of de facto government
a civil government established by military forces of occupation. According to Halleck
who wrote a book on international law, the government established over an
enemys territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given
by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered and is subject to all
restrictions which the code imposes. The governments by the Philippine Executive
commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese military
occupation being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts of justice of those government which are not political
complexion were good and valid and by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium)in international law, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by American and Filipino forces.
According to that principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has
been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, does not wipe out the effects done by an invader, which
for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. In the book of Isagani
Cruz, the right of postliminy says Vatel is that in which persons or things taken by
the enemy are restored to the former state on coming actually into the power of the
nation to which they belong. In the present concept jus postliminium now also
imports the reinstatement of the authority of the displaced government once control
of the enemy is lost over the territory affected. In short non-political acts performed
during the occupation (civil rights) remain valid even after the occupation but acts
of political automatically lose their validity upon the end of the occupation. In
Nachuras book, postliminium is explained as the revival or reversion to the old laws
and sovereignty of territory in the belligerent occupation once control of the
belligerent occupant is lost over the territory affected. Side discussion:On the phrase processes of any other government which is the second issue of the
case, still the well-known principles of international law is upheld that is all
judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of political complexion, of the de
facto government during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereignLegal maxim, excepting that of a political nature, Law once established continues
until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by
change of sovereignty. There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the
law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it
must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists
until a change take place and when changed it continues in such condition until the
next change and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an
end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new
sovereign by legislative acts creates a change. (Joseph H. Beale, author cases on
conflict of laws and treatise on conflict of laws.- Respondent judge is ordered
therefore to take cognizance of and continue to the final judgment of the
proceedings.
16. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
FACTS:
1
2

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation


No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis
of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power
of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court
further held that:
1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
17. ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
March 25, 1919
Facts: Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the
morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,
purportedly, to work for a haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined
in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of
night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that
they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero
from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually
prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against
Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of
Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the
respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to
Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women
were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new
domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of
the 170prostitutes.
Issue:
Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.
Held: We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is
no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any
person to change his residence. Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of
the Philippines, entitled tothe same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as
every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for
discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not
authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of
the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled
to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or,
worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban
et al must be severely punished.
SOVEREIGNTY
18. Article 2 Section 1 (1987 Phil. Constitution)
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.

19. Laurel vs Misa


Facts: The Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ of
habeas corpus filed by petitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that 1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and 2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine republic.
Issues: Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was
suspended and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands.
Held: No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience
to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate govern mentor
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the
occupier. Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against
the State Govt. in the same way treason may have been committed during the
Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as well as against the
sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt.
from commonwealth to republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged
with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same govt. and the same sovereign people.
20. WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 Phil 285 | November 12, 1945
FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced
to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National
Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based
on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of
Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE: WON the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of
Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn
entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese
regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence
which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid.
21. RAMON RUFFY, ET AL. v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY
75 Phil 875 | August 20, 1946
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were
assigned at designated military camps all over the country. Japanese forces went to
Mindoro, thus, forcing petitioner and his band to move up the mountains and
organize a guerilla outfit and call it the Bolo area. A certain Captain Beloncio

relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the Bolo area
by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command.
Captain Beloncio was, thus, allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court ruled that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act,
Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of
an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held
petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating
officers, which made them even more eligible for the military courts jurisdiction.