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For twenty years, the Missouri State Debate Institute has offered an excellent
educational experience in the middle of the high school topic. MSDI is distinct from
other camps in six ways. First, our skills focus assures that a typical 2-week debater
gets nearly 80 speeches, including over 20 debates. Second, we emphasize the
largest cases on topic, with students getting both aff and neg rounds on each. Third,
our senior faculty are comparable with top lab leaders in any camp. Fourth, MSDI
students can earn highly transferable college credit in public speaking for a minimal
cost. Fifth, we respect variance in home debate circuits our goal is to improve line
by line debating in ways that will help students no matter who judges in their home
circuit. Finally, our price is below any comparable camp and far below most camps.
Our 2016 information will be available shortly at:
http://debate.missouristate.edu/camp.htm.
Missouri State University is a large comprehensive university (enrollment over 24k),
with nearly any major you might want. The university has excellent academic
scholarship support most debaters combine academic entitlement scholarships
(guaranteed based on GPA/test scores) with debate scholarships. The Spicer Debate
Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: NDT and NFA-LD. Weve
national semis or finals in both in the last decade. Our debaters have an average
GPA over 3.5, a 97% graduation rate, and 70% complete law/grad school afterward.
Our program is a high-impact academic experience with an exceptional alumni
network. Please contact Dr. Eric Morris for more information
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1AC Inherency
The USA Freedom Act recently passed and included a number
of reforms to the FISA Court system, including a limited role
for an amici and appellate review, but issues remain.
Jodie Liu Wednesday, June 3, 2015, 5:29 PM So What Does the USA Freedom
Act Do Anyway?
http://www.lawfareblog.com/so-what-does-usa-freedom-act-do-anyway
Now that the Senate has passedand the President has signedthe USA FREEDOM
Act, we thought it might be a good idea to recap what exactly the new law does and
does not do. Thanks to efforts by Senators Patrick Leahy and Mike Lee, among
others, to defeat proposed amendments to the bill, the version passed by the
Senate is the same as that which passed the House a couple weeks back. See our
summary of the bill from a couple weeks ago for a detailed account and a
comparison to the previous Senate bill proposed by Senator Leahy nearly a year
ago. But heres a quick overview of the key provisions of the bill that yesterday
became law. Under Title I, the bill bans the current system of bulk collection under
Section 215. Instead, it requires that the government base any applications for call
detail records on a specific selection terma term that specifically identifies a
person, account, address, or personal device in a way that limit[s], to the greatest
extent reasonably practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent with
the purpose for seeking the tangible things. The government can apply for records
within the first hop of the specific selection term if it (1) states reasonable grounds
to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced based on [a] specific
selection term . . . are relevant to [an authorized] investigation, and (2) has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the selection term is associated with a
foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor. To apply for records within the second hop, the
government must state session-identifying information or a telephone calling card
number identified by the specific selection term used to produce call detail records
within the first hop. As a safeguard against overbroad collection, the Act requires
the government to adopt minimization procedures calling for the prompt
destruction of all call detail records determined not to be foreign intelligence
information. FISA court judges may, moreover, impose additional, particularized
minimization procedures with respect to any nonpublicly available information
concerning unconsenting United States person. Title II of the act, concerning pen
registers and trap and trace devices, is brief. In similar manner as Title I bans bulk
business records collection except by way of application based on a specific
selection term, Title II bans pen registers and trap and trace devices except by way
of application based on a specific selection term. It adopts the same definition of
specific selection term as in Title I. Similarly, Title V reforms the National Security
Letter program by extending the ban on bulk collection, except by way of
application based on a specific selection term, to various provisions in the U.S.
Code that would otherwise permit the FBI to issue the bulk collection of national
security letters. See this post by Tim Edgar from over the weekend for an
explanation why these little-discussed provisions are actually very important. Titles
III and VII of the Act deal with collection under Section 702. Title III prohibits the use,
in court proceedings, of information obtained under Section 702 through procedures
deemed by a FISA Court to be deficient concerning any United States person. Nor
may the government use[] or disclose[] in any other manner such information.
Title VII, conversely, attempts to correct for several concerns regarding the
targeting of non-United States persons. First, it creates an emergency exception
allowing the government to continue targeting roamerspeople lawfully targeted
as non-United States persons located outside the United States, but who suddenly
show up in the United Statesfor a brief period of time after they show up in the
United States, so long as a lapse in the targeting of such non-United States person
poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. Second, it expands
the definition of agent of a foreign power, as applied to non-United States
persons, in order to include non-United States persons who are lawful targets under
traditional FISA warrants but might otherwise become improper targets when they
leave the country. Third, it also expands the definition of agent of a foreign power
to include a non-United States person who engages in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor,
for or on behalf of a foreign power, or knowingly aids or abets or knowingly
conspires with any person in activities related to the international proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction In these areas, the USA Freedom Act actually does
modestly expand surveillance authorities. Title IV is concerned with reform of the
FISA Court. Broadly speaking, the new law provides for the appointment of amici
curiae to assist the FISA Court, but it creates a fairly limited role for those amici. For
instance, amici may provide assistance with respect to legal arguments or
information regarding any . . . area relevant to the issue presented to the court, but
only if the FISA Court deems such information relevant and only in certain matters
that, for instance, present[] a novel or significant interpretation of the law in the
eyes of the FISA Court. Title IV also provides for limited appellate review of FISA
Court decisions, as well as limited Supreme Court review of FISA Court of Review
decisions. Finally, Title IV also requires the DNI to perform declassification review of
FISA Court opinions that include[] a significant construction or interpretation of
any provision of law and, following such declassification review, make certain parts
of FISA Court opinion publicly available.
in 2006, Congress took a series of steps to revise FISA; the most current of those
changes, the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), was passed in 2008 and renewed in
2012. Section 702 of the FAA creates a new authority for targeting non-U.S. persons
or groups reasonably believed to be located overseas. Under the FAA, the attorney
general and the director of national intelligence jointly certify that the target is a
non-U.S. person or entity reasonably believed to be overseas. The FISC reviews the
certification, whether the procedures in place are reasonably designed to prevent
targeting people in the U.S. or obtaining purely domestic communications, and
whether the minimization procedures meet the statutory definition of minimization
procedures. So long as the government reasonably believes that the target is not an
American and is overseas, and it is not conducting the surveillance with the
subjective intention of learning about an American (something no court could ever
really review), the FISC must grant an order authorizing surveillance. The FISC does
not approve the targets, which need not be suspected of wrongdoing or be agents
of foreign powers. The FISC can review applicable targeting and minimization
procedures, but the court is not required to look behind the assertions made in the
certification. The FISC does not approve the directives or the individuals to be
monitored via those directives. Once the FISC issues its order, the government can
use it for up to a year, sending top-secret directives to Internet companies like
Google and Facebook specifying whose calls, emails, video and voice chats, photos,
voice-over-IP calls (Skype, for example), and social-networking information it wants.
The FISC trusts the government to follow the targeting procedures allowing
collection of Americans messages and calls with friends overseas while avoiding
collection of purely domestic communications. In sum, the FISC issues a blanket
surveillance order whenever the government mouths the correct wordsthat it is
collecting foreign-intelligence information relevant to a non-U.S. target. The FISC
provides very little independent oversight of the surveillance itself. The history of
the FISC can be summarized very compactly. Initially the FISC was a secret court
that assessed probable cause for targeted surveillance of foreign powers and their
agents. After the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the FISC mutated into a secret
kangaroo court that legitimates mass surveillance of Americans communications
with employers, friends, and family in other countries by lending it the appearance,
but not the substance, of judicial oversight. In sum, the FISC is now playing a
completely new and much wider role: authorizing mass surveillance programs
rather than approving specific surveillance targets. Yet it is simply impossible for the
FISC, or any secret court, to decide when and how our nation should conduct
surveillance consistent with our democratic principles and constitutional norms.
Theres no security need for those programmatic policy decisions to be kept secret,
and the secrecy ensures that the FISC will make the wrong decisions.
environmental laws relating to water, air, our soils and energy are critical to
narrowing the widening gap between the rich and poor of the world. Development
may be seen as the bridge to narrow that gap but it is one that is riddled with dangers and
contradictions. We cannot bridge the gap with materials stolen from future generations .
Fundamental
Truly sustainable development can only take place in harmony with the environment. Importantly we must not allow
sustainable development to be duchessed and bastardized.
A role for judges?
It is in striking the balance between development and the environment that the
courts have a role. Of course, this role imposes on judges a significant trust . The
balancing of the rights and needs of citizens, present and future, with development, is a
delicate one. It is a balance often between powerful interests (private and public) and the voiceless poor. In a
way judges are the meat in the sandwich but, difficult as it is, we must not shirk our duty. Pg. 53-54
Blunt, Biocentric Discussion on Avoiding Global Ecosystem Collapse and Achieving Global Ecological Sustainability
The
collapse of the biosphere and complex life, or eventually even all life, is a possibility that
needs to be better understood and mitigated against. A tentative case has been presented here that
connectivity reviewed here shows clearly that ecological collapse is occurring at spatially extensive scales.
terrestrial
There exists a major need for further research into how much land must be maintained in a natural
naturally evolving ecosystems, including old-growth forests, to provide the context and top-down ecological
regulation of both human agroecological, and reduced impact and appropriately scaled industrial activities.
Given the stakes, it is proper for political ecologists and other Earth scientists to willingly speak bluntly if we are to
have any chance of averting global ecosystem collapse. A case has been presented that Earth is already well
beyond carrying capacity in terms of amount of natural ecosystem habitat that can be lost before the continued
existence of healthy regional ecosystems and the global biosphere itself may not be possible. Cautious and
justifiably conservative science must still be able to rise to the occasion of global ecological emergencies that may
threaten our very survival as a species and planet.
Those knowledgeable about planetary boundariesand abrupt climate change and terrestrial ecosystem loss in
particularmust be more bold and insistent in conveying the range and possible severity of threats of global
ecosystem collapse, while proposing sufficient solutions. It is not possible to do controlled experiments on the Earth
system; all we have is observation based upon science and trained intuition to diagnose the state of Earth's
biosphere and suggest sufficient ecological sciencebased remedies.
If Gaia is alive, she can die. Given the strength of life-reducing trends across biological systems and scales, there is
a need for a rigorous research agenda to understand at what point the biosphere may perish and Earth die, and to
learn what configuration of ecosystems and other boundary conditions may prevent her from doing so. We see
death of cells, organisms, plant communities, wildlife populations, and whole ecosystems all the time in nature
extreme cases being desertification and ocean dead zones.
hand that the Earth System could die if critical thresholds are crossed . We need as
Earth scientists to better understand how this may occur and bring knowledge to bear to avoid global ecosystem
and biosphere collapse or more extreme outcomes such as biological homogenization and the loss of most or even
all life. To what extent can a homogenized Earth of dandelions, rats, and extremophiles be said to be alive, can it
ever recover, and how long can it last?
global
ecological sustainability have been understated for decades . If indeed there is some
possibility that our shared biosphere could be collapsing, there needs to be further investigation of what sorts of
sociopolitical responses are valid in such a situation. Dry, unemotional scientific inquiry into such matters is
necessaryyet more proactive and evocative political ecological language may be justified as well. We must
remember
we are speaking of
species,
ecosystems, humans, and perhaps all being. It is not clear whether this global ecological
emergency is avoidable or recoverable. It may not be. But we must follow and seek truth wherever it leads us.
Planetary boundaries have been quite anthropocentric, focusing upon human safety and giving relatively little
attention to other species and the biosphere's needs other than serving humans. Planetary boundaries need to be
set that, while including human needs, go beyond them to meet the needs of ecosystems and all their constituent
species and their aggregation into a living biosphere. Planetary boundary thinking needs to be more biocentric.
I concur with Williams (2000) that what is needed is an Earth Systembased conservation ethicbased upon an
"Earth narrative" of natural and human historywhich seeks as its objective the "complete preservation of the
Earth's biotic inheritance." Humans are in no position to be indicating which species and ecosystems can be lost
without harm to their own intrinsic right to exist, as well as the needs of the biosphere. For us to survive as a
species, logic and reason must prevail (Williams 2000).
Those who deny limits to growth are unaware of biological realities (Vitousek 1986). There are strong indications
humanity may undergo societal collapse and pull down the biosphere with it. The longer dramatic reductions in
fossil fuel emissions and a halt to old-growth logging are put off, the worse the risk of abrupt and irreversible
climate change becomes, and the less likely we are to survive and thrive as a species. Human survivalentirely
dependent upon the natural worlddepends critically upon both keeping carbon emissions below 350 ppm and
maintaining at least 66% of the landscape as natural ecological core areas and agroecological transitions and
buffers. Much of the world has already fallen below this proportion, and in sum the biosphere's terrestrial ecosystem
loss almost certainly has been surpassed, yet it must be the goal for habitat transition in remaining relatively wild
lands undergoing development such as the Amazon, and for habitat restoration and protection in severely
fragmented natural habitat areas such as the Western Ghats.
The human family faces an unprecedented global ecological emergency as reckless growth destroys the
ecosystems and the biosphere on which all life depends. Where is the sense of urgency, and what are proper
scientific responses if in fact Earth is dying? Not speaking of worst-case scenariosthe collapse of the biosphere
and loss of a living Earth, and mass ecosystem collapse and death in places like Keralais intellectually dishonest.
We must consider the real possibility that we are pulling the biosphere down with us, setting back or eliminating
complex life.
The 66% / 44% / 22% threshold of terrestrial ecosystems in total, natural core areas, and agroecological buffers
gets at the critical need to maintain large and expansive ecosystems across at least 50% of the land so as to keep
nature connected and fully functional. We need an approach to planetary boundaries that is more sensitive to deep
ecology to ensure that habitable conditions for all life and natural evolutionary change continue. A terrestrial
ecosystem boundary which protects primary forests and seeks to recover old-growth forests elsewhere is critical in
this regard. In old forests and all their life lie both the history of Earth's life, and the hope for its future. The end of
their industrial destruction is a global ecological imperative.
Much-needed dialogue is beginning to focus on how humanity may face systematic social and ecological collapse
and what sort of community resilience is possible. There have been ecologically mediated periods of societal
collapse from human damage to ecosystems in the past (Kuecker and Hall 2011). What makes it different this time
is that the human species may have the scale and prowess to pull down the biosphere with them. It is fitting at this
juncture for political ecologists to concern themselves with both legal regulatory measures, as well as revolutionary
processes of social change, which may bring about the social norms necessary to maintain the biosphere.
Rockstrm and colleagues (2009b) refer to the need for "novel and adaptive governance" without using the word
revolution. Scientists need to take greater latitude in proposing solutions that lie outside the current political
paradigms and sovereign powers.
Even the Blue Planet Laureates' remarkable analysis (Brundtland et al. 2012), which notes the potential for climate
change, ecosystem loss, and inequitable development patterns neither directly states nor investigates in depth the
potential for global ecosystem collapse, or discusses revolutionary responses. UNEP (2012) notes abrupt and
irreversible ecological change, which they say may impact life-support systems, but are not more explicit regarding
the profound human and ecological implications of biosphere collapse, or the full range of sociopolitical responses
to such predictions. More scientific investigations are needed regarding alternative governing structures optimal for
pursuit and achievement of bioregional, continental, and global sustainability if we are maintain a fully operable
biosphere forever. An economic system based upon endless growth that views ecosystems necessary for planetary
habitability primarily as resources to be consumed cannot exist for long.
Planetary boundaries offer a profoundly difficult challenge for global governance, particularly as increased scientific
salience does not appear to be sufficient to trigger international action to sustain ecosystems (Galaz et al. 2012). If
indeed the safe operating space for humanity is closing, or the biosphere even collapsing and dying, might not
discussion of revolutionary social change be acceptable? Particularly, if there is a lack of consensus by atomized
actors, who are unable to legislate the required social change within the current socioeconomic system. By not even
speaking of revolutionary action, we dismiss any means outside the dominant growth-based oligarchies.
In the author's opinion, it is shockingly irresponsible for Earth System scientists to speak of geoengineering a
climate without being willing to academically investigate revolutionary social and economic change as well. It is
desirable that the current political and economic systems should reform themselves to be ecologically sustainable,
establishing laws and institutions for doing so. Yet there is nothing sacrosanct about current political economy
arrangements, particularly if they are collapsing the biosphere. Earth requires all enlightened and knowledgeable
voices to consider the full range of possible responses now more than ever.
One possible solution to the critical issues of terrestrial ecosystem loss and abrupt climate change is a
massive and global, natural ecosystem protection and restoration programfunded by a carbon taxto
further establish protected large and connected core ecological sustainability areas,
buffers, and agro-ecological transition zones throughout all of Earth's bioregions. Fossil fuel
emission reductions must also be a priority. It is critical that humanity both stop burning fossil fuels and destroying
natural ecosystems, as fast as possible, to avoid surpassing nearly all the planetary boundaries.
In summation,
ecosystem widely impactful, yet with the loss of the biosphere all life may be
gone . Global ecosystems when connected for life's material flows provide the all-encompassing context within
The miracle of life is that life begets life, and the tragedy is that
across scales when enough life is lost beyond thresholds, living systems die .
which life is possible.
sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important
banc, so there really is potential for judges to get together and vote on tough
questions the way divided appellate courts do.49 Moreover, FISC decisions are
nearly always final in fact. The FISCR has only ever heard two cases, and the
Supreme Court has never once reviewed a case originating in the FISC.50 These are
costs to the political separation of powers as well. As an Associate White House
Counsel in the Reagan Administration, the future Chief Justice Roberts once wrote a
scathing critique of a proposal for a new tribunal below the Supreme Court to
resolve circuit splits. Roberts found particularly offensive the proposal that the
Chief Justice designate the members of the tribunal, believing that to be an
unprecedented infringement on the Presidents appointment powers.51 Because
the Chief Justices appointments would have required the approval of a majority of
the Supreme Court (unlike FISA court selections), Roberts posited that the new court
would be either bland or polarized, and [i]n either case the new court will
assuredly not represent the Presidents judicial philosophy.52 These same
criticisms apply to the FISA courts. The power to appoint judges is one of the core
constitutional powers of the President. When that power is given to someone else,
someone he may not even have appointed himself, it undermines his influence and
that of the voters who elected him. Of course President Reagan would not want to
sacrifice [his] Constitutionally-based appointment power by creating a court
composed of judges chosen by someone else, to provide nationally-binding legal
interpretations reviewable only by the Supreme Court.53 That is, however,
precisely what the FISA courts are. Every judge in the history of the FISA courts
been chosen unilaterally by either Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, or
Chief Justice Roberts. All three were white, male, Midwestern, Republican
appointees;54 no Democrat, woman, or person of color has ever had a voice in
selecting a FISA judge. All three Chief Justices previously served as high-ranking
Presidential appointees at the Department of Justice in Republican
administrations.55 Each has influenced his successor; Chief Justice Roberts clerked
for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who served as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court
for over a decade.56 Because Chief Justice Roberts has been in office for over seven
years, he has necessarily chosen every current FISA judge (as had Rehnquist and
Burger before him). Nine of the eleven current FISC judges were appointed to their
district courts by Republican Presidents, and half are former prosecutors.57 These
patterns are especially notable because the FISC nearly always rules in favor of the
Executive Branch. Thus, the FISA courts composition undermines all three
branches: the executive branch (which has an appointment prerogative), the
legislative branch (as the Senate confirms appointments), and the judicial branch
(as the FISC is unrepresentative of the judiciarys ideological balance and accused
of being a rubber stamp59).
rule
of law. The law we honor is the basis and foundation of our nations freedom and the freedom for
the individual, which exists here. And to Americans our freedom is more important than our very lives. The rule of
law has been the bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities,
the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands
as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about justice under our rule of law, the
absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about freedom for the individual,
yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving
America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so
appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Mans relation to man is the most neglected field of
study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic
fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased
strength today resides in mans mindnot his muscle. We lawyers of the world must take the idea of peace under
the rule of law and make it a force superior to weapons and thus outlaw wars of weapons. Law offers the best hope
for order in a disordered world. The law of force or the force of law will rule the world. In the field of human conduct
the law has never confessed failure. The struggle for a world ruled by law must go on with increased intensity.
must prove that the genius of man in the field of science and technology has not so far outstripped his
inventiveness in the sphere of human relations as to make catastrophe inevitable. If man
We
can also solve the need for legal machinery to insure universal and lasting peace. In our
country ignorance of the value of law in international relations and what it could do for the people of the world is
appalling. A major purpose of Law Day-U.S.A. is therefore to demonstrate to our people that the need for law in
the world community is the greatest gap in the growing structure of civilization. And we lawyers of America are
anxious to work with lawyers and men of good of all nations in filling this gap in that structure. We believe that no
greater challenge exists for any profession and that
no greater service
to mankind
can be performed.
leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with
natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around
stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security
protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the
United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the
Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding
American political order in the half century after World War II was in important
respects an "empire by invitation."(n5) The remarkable global reach of American
postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of European and
Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and
use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast
system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the
United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it
nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter
most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's
mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a
relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way
in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other
states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental
separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the
process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive
moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also
provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and
determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed,
frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long
term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies
that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.
curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and
imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas
largely filled the cultural void.
regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its
culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects
American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and
middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "cocacolonization."40
After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to
facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic
advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market
and interstate system in the hegemon's own image . The interests of the leader are
projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world.
The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states
emulate it . Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic
project.41 Since wealth depended on peace
that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution . U.S. benevolent
hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII.
U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable
political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or
Kants
Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because
then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic
states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself
peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international
primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful
means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of
highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order,
the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on
U.S. leadership in the traditional sense . U.S. leadership takes the form of
providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving
disputes
America as a big
and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is
considered legitimate by the other states . It is not in a hegemonic leader's
interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material
capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based
on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the
political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a
hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order,
it must articulate principles and norms , and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very
little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well,
it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas:
colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a
hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a
wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that
legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than
in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense
of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is
bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly
discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural
leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct
the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size
are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony.
If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The
relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its
hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It
had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in
1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide
range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century,
Institutional
leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place
principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the
interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations
that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints
that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the
realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world
it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2)
economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of
American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that " institutions themselves
much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are
internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international
institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain
how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and
mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act.
They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic
leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation
quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see
specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state,
that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign
minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state
interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is
characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of
its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its
position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is
assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to
Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They
collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the U nited S tates, in so doing, was
providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially)
collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of
the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with
"national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it
was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals .
Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the
basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist
principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While
such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or
region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is
known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that
exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's
population . It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic
alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americansand far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by
the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A
more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth
than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any
other country shaping global affairs. 51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is
still in place. It is this macro political system -a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that
remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what
people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony .52 If the U.S. retreats from
its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world and certainly not the
United Nations. Unfortunately,
utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age . Moreover, the alternative
to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity a global
vacuum of power .53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant
leadership as been unique; it has not been
tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has
leader politically, economically and military. But its
forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power . The
strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far
greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of
the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of
nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions.
That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put
it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54
several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the
actions of a group toward a collective end. 55 By validating regimes and norms of international
behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors , small and large, in the international arena to
behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable
international system . Woodrow Wilsons zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his
jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a
quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to
extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the
ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not
tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must
be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation
have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting
communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and
reducing the costs of transactions,
one being filled with instability and higher chances of great power
conflict . The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to WWI is
an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars. I further posit that
U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony
because of its reliance on consent and its mutilaterist nature
. The most
significant would be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution .
It is
If
Since the end of WWII the majority of the states that are represented in the core have come
to depend on the security that U.S. hegemony has provided , so although they have their own
national interest, they forgo short term gains to maintain U.S. hegemony . Why would other
states forgo a leadership role to a foreign hegemon because it is in their interests; one particularly ambitious
application is Gilpin's analysis of war and hegemonic stability. He argues that
the presence of a
in the
international system. Much of Gilpin's argument resembles his own and Krasner's earlier thesis that hegemonic
states provide an international order that furthers their own self-interest. Gilpin now elaborates the thesis with the
claim that international order is a public good, benefiting subordinate states . This is, of
course, the essence of the theory of hegemonic stability. But Gilpin adds a novel twist: the dominant power not only
provides the good, it is capable of extracting contributions toward the good from subordinate states. In effect, the
hegemonic power constitutes a quasigovernment by providing public goods and taxing other states to pay for them.
Subordinate states will be reluctant to be taxed but, because of the hegemonic state's preponderant power, will
succumb. Indeed,
and so reinforce its performance and position . During the 19th century several countries
U.S. has also provided a
similar stability and security that as made smaller powers thrive in the international
system. The model presumes that the (military) dominance of the hegemonic state, which gives it the capacity to
benefited from British hegemony particularly its rule of the seas, since WWII the
enforce an international order, also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as to lower the
costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract contributions from other members of
the system.
no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that, but for the
existence of separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question
is whether we wish to take that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that
In summary,
might result. Given both the relatively limited cost imposed by use of separation of
powers and the great severity of the harm sought to be avoided , one should not
demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. For just
as in the case of the threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, I
told you so.
1AC Plan
The United States Federal Government should substantially
curtail its domestic surveillance by changing the composition
of the FISA Courts to make them like other Article III Courts.
Full time judges will be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate to permanent judgeships.
1AC Solvency
Plan solves FISA Courts should look like other Article 3 Courts
allows democracy, separation of powers, ideological balance
and expertise demonstrating legitimacy.
Douglas E. Lindner* N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION & PUBLIC POLICY QUORUM
*J.D./M.P.A. (Public Policy Analysis) Candidate, New York University, 2015;
REVISITING THE FISA COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS http://www.nyujlpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Lindner-2015-nyujlpp-28.pdf
The clearest proposal to change the composition of the FISA courts would be to
make them look more like other Article III courts: full-time judges appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate to permanent judgeships on
these courts. This would alleviate the losses to representative democracy,
separation of powers, ideological balance, and expertise inherent in designation by
the Chief Justice. Allowing judges to devote their full attention to specializing in one
area is more important for FISA law than for other subjects because the law is
secret, the proceedings are ex parte, and individual rulings directly touch upon
millions of peoples constitutional rights. The Federal Circuit and Court of
International Trade provide working examples of Article III courts of special subject
matter whose judges are appointed directly, with life tenure on the specialist courts,
and with careers of experience in the areas of law for which they are responsible.
Their technical expertise and their democratic legitimacy are worth emulating. Of
course, this approach is not without drawbacks. A full-time FISC would need fewer
judges, increasing the influence of each judge.84 Unlike the district judges who
currently compose the FISC, full-time FISC judges would grow accustomed to a
system decidedly unlike traditional Anglo-American courts, in which the government
is the only party, decisions are made in secret, courts engage in informal dialogue
with government over policy minutiae, and the answer to the governments request
is nearly always yes.85 Through no fault of their own, full-time FISC judges might
become less skeptical of government requests and less vigilant about anticipating
contrary arguments. But the opposite phenomena are just as likely. Perhaps full-time
FISC judges would gain the expertise, experience, and confidence to assert a more
vigorous role in questioning the governments assertions. One need not take any
particular position on the proper extent of surveillance to realize the benefits of
having full-time, permanent FISA judges appointed through the regular
constitutional process. That said, if ones goal is to create a FISC more skeptical of
executive power, there appears little room to regress. A full-time FISCR, however,
would find three appellate judges with an empty docket for years on end. In that
case, I would abolish the FISCR rather than have full-time judges with an empty
docket. To replace it, I would suggest making greater use of the en banc FISC, with
appellate jurisdiction transferred to either the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court.
The FISCRs workload is so light that either of those courts could easily take it on,
though getting involved in this might damage their reputations. In particular, the
specter of secret, ex parte Supreme Court cases is an unpleasant possibility. Yet the
Supreme Court already has the power and responsibility to review FISCR
decisions.86 And to the degree that secret, ex parte proceedings sound unseemly,
one should question their suitability for any constitutional courtincluding the FISC.
Were Congress to adopt some version of the special advocate system that has been
debated,87 my proposal would become even more palatable. Routine involvement
of a privacy-protective counterparty could dramatically increase the frequency of
appeals, leading to a fully utilized FISCR. The presence of special advocates would
alleviate many of the concerns over full-time FISC judges, giving them a more
traditional adversarial process to preside over. Regardless of any change in
appointment or composition, special advocates would relieve FISA judges of the
burden of imagining contrary arguments and raising privacy concerns on their own.
No proposed legislation would effect a system of traditional presidential
appointment. Likewise, none of the proposed bills would create full-time FISA courts
or life tenure for their judges. Thus, the only FISA court composition problems that
Congress is even proposing to address are those stemming from the Chief Justices
unilateral selection power. Yet, as is so often the case, the simplest solution is the
best one. The FISA courts should look as much like other Article III courts as
possible.
publicof what their roles would be. District and circuit judges sit on generalist
courts whose proceedings and dockets are open to the public, in which the public
may participate, with sub-national jurisdiction, and with appellate review by higher
courts. It is for those reasons that lower court appointments garner less political and
public attention than higher court appointments, and that individual Senators wield
substantial power over the selection of judges in the jurisdictions they represent.39
These initial appointment decisions are qualitatively unlike what the political
process would go through for direct appointments to secret courts with exclusive,
national jurisdiction over complex and highly salient constitutional questions, in
which only the executive branch is represented, and whose decisions are never
reviewed by any other court.
Harvard Law School professor and Bloomberg View columnist Cass R. Sunstein has
found that judges are more ideologically rigid when their fellow judges are from the
same party, and more moderate when fellow judges are from the other party.
Federal judges (no less than the rest of us) are subject to group polarization, he
wrote. The FISA court is composed of federal judges. All are appointed by the same
man. All but one hail from the same political party. And unlike judges in normal
courts, FISA judges dont hear opposing testimony or feel pressure from colleagues
or the public to moderate their rulings. Under these circumstances, group
polarization is almost a certainty. Theres the real possibility that these judges
become more extreme over time, even when they had only a mild bias to begin
with, Catos Sanchez said.
constituency appearing before them, theyre subject to capture and bias, said
Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and
National Security Program. A Reuters investigation found that from 2001 to 2012,
FISA judges approved 20,909 surveillance and property search warrants while
rejecting only 10. Almost 1,000 of the approved requests required modification, and
26 were withdrawn by the government before a ruling. Thats a startling win rate for
the government.
thinking about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the
withdrawal of recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis . In domestic
politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether passive or active and armed.
legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar order and the
kinds of orders a unipole can construct. Yes, unipoles can impose their
will, but only to an extent . The willingness of others to recognize the
legitimacy of a unipoles actions and defer to its wishes or judgment
shapes the character of the order that will emerge. Unipolar power
without any underlying legitimacy
policies
Cooperation will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is
obviously an expensive system to run and few unipoles have tried to do so.
and by extension the executive branch, faces much weaker external constraints on its
exercise of power than in the past. n332 Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S.
matter now more than any other nations' have in history
. n333 And
it is these
The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system as a whole. n338 The
hegemon possesses not only superior command of military and economic resources but "soft" power,
the ability to guide other states' preferences and interests. n339 The durability
and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance
the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism and
confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345
The legitimacy of
American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and
markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. n350
are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens . The Alien Tort Statute is
emerging as an [*144] important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among noncitizens in U.S. courts. n355 Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires
consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure, " with an imperial core - the preeminent state ruling the periphery through intermediaries. n356 The core institutionalizes its control through distinct,
asymmetrical bargains (heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. n357 Ties among peripheries
(the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire
potential challengers. n360 Divide-and-rule strategies include using resources from one part of the empire against
challengers in another part and multi-vocal communication - legitimating imperial rule by signaling "different
identities ... to different audiences." n361 Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies only
in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations scholars question the comparison. n362
However, the U.S. does exercise informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the foreign
policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, economic, or political support" if they refuse to comply.
n363 The "Status of Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military
personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided. n364 And the U.S. occupations in
Iraq and Afghanistan had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on American support. n365
communicate with one another. The U.S. is less able control "the flow of information ... about its bargains and
activities around the world." n366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force Agreement between the U.S. and
Iraq were the subject of intense media scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. n367 Another
classic imperial tactic - the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate resistance to imperial rule - is also
cause." n368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's
"brand" and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. n369 Imperial
rule, like hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy.
B. Constructing a
Hegemonic Model International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current era. The U.S.-led
international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from
The U.S. is
not the same as other states; it performs unique functions in the world and has a
government open and accessible to foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system
traditional realist assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more hierarchical.
depends more on successful functioning of the U.S. government as a whole than it does on balancing alliances
crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. " World
[*146] One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using insights
from a major alternative theory of international relations - liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal
characteristics of states - in particular, the form of government - dictate states' behavior, and that democracies do
not go to war against one another. n371 Liberalists also regard economic interdependence and international
institutions as important for maintaining peace and stability in the world. n372 Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter has
proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal, democratic states and non-democratic states. n373
Because domestic and foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter reasons, the
courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the political branches' powers. n374 With respect to non-liberal
states, the position of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of deference. n375 One
strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication.
Professor Nzelibe has observed that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which countries are
liberal democracies. n376 But even if courts are capable of making these determinations, they would still face the
same dilemmas adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the appropriate boundary between
foreign affairs and domestic matters? How much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights
and accountability values are at stake? To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be
applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a new realist model, it is worth recalling
that the functional justifications for special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of role
effectiveness - which allocation of power among the branches will best achieve general governmental effectiveness
in foreign affairs. In the twenty-first century,
respects it is - the problems of imperial management will be far different from the problems of managing relations
recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus among realists about the precise nature of the current
international order. n377 The hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR frameworks unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial - described above. First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of
U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and
better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives.
The courts'
The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the
infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the
deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different functional
considerations - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - against one another is made less
intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly
grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.
Since 1945,
further. Nuclear weapons have
concentrated the minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related
process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade,
but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always sufficiently large and rich in natural
resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist
economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the
feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the
collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a fleeting
one. The probability of major wars within the developed world remains low
because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the
deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more radical
notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate
victory of democracy; and that in an affluent and democratic world, major conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously
prepared for. This notion, however, is fast eroding with the return of capitalist nondemocratic great powers that have been absent from the international
system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose
massive growth represents the greatest change in the global balance of power.
Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming
an increasingly authoritarian character. Authoritarian capitalism may be
more viable than people tend to assume . 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were
potentially larger than the democracies, because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist
authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the first half of the twentieth
century, Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efficient economically
as, and if anything more successful militarily than, their democratic
counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the exceptional continental
size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the new nondemocratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the
largest player in the international system in terms of population and is
showing spectacular economic growth that within a generation or two is likely to make it a true nondemocratic superpower. Although the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers does
not necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony
since the Soviet Unions collapse could be short-lived and that a
universal democratic peace may still be far off . The new capitalist authoritarian powers are
deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic
cause. Thus, it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such
as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the
openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it grows
wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. With the possible exception of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to
be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may
relations will probably vary from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they
may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.
and to
growing recognition over the centuries that, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, human beings have "certain inalienable rights" and that "it is to secure these rights that governments are instituted."
LIBERALIZING FOREIGN POLICY A proper appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain humility. While it is easy to
impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step. Without
appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step. Recognizing this, governments and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide array of measures designed to bolster constitutional liberalism in
developing countries. The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements, and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. In the end,
however, elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin, Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and symbols,
elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there. Conversely, the absence of free and fair elections should be viewed as one flaw, not
the definition of tyranny. Elections are an important virtue of governance, but they are not the only virtue. Governments should be judged by yardsticks related to constitutional liberalism as well. Economic, civil, and religious
liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy steadily expands these freedoms, it should not be branded a dictatorship. Despite the limited political choice they offer, countries like
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand provide a better environment for the life, liberty, and happiness of their citizens than do either dictatorships like Iraq and Libya or illiberal democracies like Slovakia or Ghana. And the pressures of
global capitalism can push the process of liberalization forward. Markets and morals can work together. Even China, which remains a deeply repressive regime, has given its citizens more autonomy and economic liberty than they
have had in generations. Much more needs to change before China can even be called a liberalizing autocracy, but that should not mask the fact that much has changed. Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the
overemphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries. Constitutionalism, as it was understood by its greatest eighteenth century exponents, such as Montesquieu
and Madison, is a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumulation of power and the abuse of office. This is done not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which
government will not violate those rights. Various groups must be included and empowered because, as Madison explained, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
Constitutions were
, creating not simply democratic but also deliberative government. Unfortunately, the rich variety of
unelected bodies, indirect voting, federal arrangements, and checks and balances that characterized so many of the formal and informal constitutions of Europe are now regarded with suspicion. What could be called the Weimar
syndrome -- named after interwar Germany's beautifully constructed constitution, which failed to avert fascism -- has made people regard constitutions as simply paperwork that cannot make much difference. (As if any political
system in Germany would have easily weathered military defeat, social revolution, the Great Depression, and hyperinflation.) Procedures that inhibit direct democracy are seen as inauthentic, muzzling the voice of the people. Today
around the world we see variations on the same majoritarian theme. But the trouble with these winner-take-all systems is that, in most democratizing countries, the winner really does take all. DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS
We
Through much of human history the danger to an individual's life, liberty and happiness came from the absolutism of monarchies, the dogma of churches, the terror
There
Thus the
of dictatorships, and the iron grip of totalitarianism. Dictators and a few straggling totalitarian regimes still persist, but increasingly they are anachronisms in a world of global markets, information, and media.
This makes them more difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in the mantle of legitimacy. Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably
be unprecedented.
, many of whom were initially popular and even elected. Today, in the face of a
spreading virus of illiberalism, the most useful role that the international community, and most importantly the United States, can play is -- instead of searching for new lands to democratize and new places to hold elections -- to
consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing
with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took America into the twentieth century with a challenge, to make the world safe for democracy. As we approach the
next century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world.
War now seems to be confined to the less-developed parts of the globe, the
worlds zone of war, where countries that have so far failed to embrace
modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be engaged in wars among
themselves, as well as with developed countries. While the trend is very real, one wonders if the near
peace.
be a fleeting
one.
world remains lowbecause of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and
interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has
been based on the far more radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled
the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy; and that in an affluent and democratic world, major
conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for.
with the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been absent
from the international system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast
industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents the greatest change
in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist
liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character . Authoritarian
capitalism may be more viable than people tend to assume . 8 The communist great
powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the democracies, because their economic systems
exceptional continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second
as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial
protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world
economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist,
as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. With the possible exception
of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany
as
China grows in power, it is likely to become more assertive, flex its muscles, and
behave like a superpower, even if it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and
non-democratic powers may coexist more or less peacefully , albeit warily, side by side,
and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be more problematic. However,
armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called security dilemma, and against worst-case
scenarios.
ideological rivalry, potential and actual conflict, intensified arms races, and even
new cold wars, with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions. Although great power relations will probably vary
from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the
same, they may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.
SOP L Ext
FISA Courts allow for unchecked executive power
Goitein and Patel, 2015 What went wrong WITH THE FISA COURT Elizabeth
Goitein and Faiza Patel Foreword by Judge James Robertson Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein
co-directs the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and National Security Program.
Faiza Patel serves as co-director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and
National Security Program. http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-wentwrong-fisa-court
Moreover, under current law, the FISA Court does not provide the check on
executive action that the Fourth Amendment demands. Interception of Americans
communications generally requires the government to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause of criminal activity. Although some courts have held that a
traditional warrant is not needed to collect foreign intelligence, they have imposed
strict limits on the scope of such surveillance and have emphasized the importance
of close judicial scrutiny in policing these limits. The FISA Courts minimal
involvement in overseeing programmatic surveillance does not meet these
constitutional standards.
Perhaps most importantly, the FISC has a strong practical incentive to find a way to
say yes to the government. The FISC conducts its review knowing that the
government is heavily committed to mass surveillance already and has been for a
long time. The Bush administration collected phone calls and emails in secret
without a warrant for years, and both the Bush and Obama administrations sucked
in phone and Internet traffic dataat first with no court orders and then on
questionable legal authority. In a sense, the government has gotten away with
massive violations of the law for so long that the institutional cost of reining them in
now is enormous. And so the FISCand perhaps other federal courtswill cave
rather than fight.
The recent leaks about government spying programs have focused attention on the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and its role in deciding how intrusive the government can be in the name of national security.
Less mentioned has been the person who has been quietly reshaping the secret court: Chief Justice John G. Roberts
In making assignments to the court, Chief Justice Roberts , more than his predecessors,
has chosen judges with conservative and executive branch backgrounds that critics say
make the court more likely to defer to government arguments that domestic spying
programs are necessary. Ten of the courts 11 judges all assigned by Chief Justice Roberts were
Jr.
appointed to the bench by Republican presidents; six once worked for the federal government. Since the chief
ideologically diverse, according to an analysis by The New York Times of a list of every judge who has served on the
Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat and one of several lawmakers who have sought to change the
way the courts judges are selected
Selection and Composition of the FISC. Under FISA, the judges on the FISC are
selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. In theory, this method of selection
has significant advantages. Concentration of the power of appointment in one
person can make the process more orderly and organized. But that approach has
drawn two legitimate criticisms. The first involves the potential risks associated with
giving a single person, even the Chief Justice, the authority to select all of the
members of an important court. The second involves the fact that ten of the eleven
current FISC judges, all of whom were appointed by the current Chief Justice, were
appointed to the federal bench by Republican presidents. Although the role of a
judge is to follow the law and not to make political judgments, Republican-appointed
and Democratic-appointed judges sometimes have divergent views, including on
issues involving privacy, civil liberties, and claims of national security. There is
therefore a legitimate reason for concern if, as is now the case, the judges on the
FISC turn out to come disproportionately from either Republican or Democratic
appointees.
unbelievable than these vast numbers killed in war during the lifetime of some still living, and largely
unknown, is this shocking fact. This century's total killed by absolutist governments
already far exceeds that for all wars, domestic and international. Indeed, this number
already approximates the number that might be killed in a nuclear war . Table 1 provides the
relevant totals and classifies these by type of government (following Freedom House's definitions) and war. By government killed is meant any direct or
indirect killing by government officials, or government acquiescence in the killing by others, of more than 1,000 people, except execution for what are
conventionally considered criminal acts (murder, rape, spying, treason, and the like). This killing is apart from the pursuit of any ongoing military action or
campaign, or as part of any conflict event. For example, the Jews that Hitler slaughtered during World War II would be counted, since their merciless and
systematic killing was unrelated to and actually conflicted with Hitler's pursuit of the war. The totals in the Table are based on a nation-by-nation
assessment and are absolute minimal figures that may under estimate the true total by ten percent or more. Moreover, these figures do not even include
the 1921-1922 and 1958-1961 famines in the Soviet Union and China causing about 4 million and 27 million dead, respectably. The former famine was
mainly due to the imposition of a command agricultural economy, forced requisitions of food by the Soviets, and the liquidation campaigns of the Cheka;
the latter was wholly caused by Mao's agriculturally destructive Great Leap Forward and collectivization. However, Table 1 does include the Soviet
government's planned and administered starvation of the Ukraine begun in 1932 as a way of breaking peasant opposition to collectivization and
destroying Ukrainian nationalism. As many as ten million may have been starved to death or succumbed to famine related diseases; I estimate eight
million died. Had these people all been shot, the Soviet government's moral responsibility could be no greater. The Table lists 831 thousand people killed
by free -- democratic -- governments, which should startle most readers. This figure involves the French massacres in Algeria before and during the
Algerian war (36,000 killed, at a minimum), and those killed by the Soviets after being forcibly repatriated to them by the Allied Democracies during and
after World War II. It is outrageous that in line with and even often surpassing in zeal the letter of the Yalta Agreement signed by Stalin, Churchill, and
Roosevelt, the Allied Democracies, particularly Great Britain and the United States, turned over to Soviet authorities more than 2,250,000 Soviet citizens,
prisoners of war, and Russian exiles (who were not Soviet citizens) found in the Allied zones of occupation in Europe. Most of these people were terrified of
the consequences of repatriation and refused to cooperate in their repatriation; often whole families preferred suicide. Of those the Allied Democracies
repatriation, an estimated 795,000 were executed, or died in slave-labor camps or in transit to them. If a government is to be held responsible for those
prisoners who die in freight cars or in their camps from privation, surely those democratic governments that turned helpless people over to totalitarian
rulers with foreknowledge of their peril, also should be held responsible. Concerning now the overall mortality statistics shown in the table, it is sad that
hundreds of thousands of people can be killed by governments with hardly an international murmur, while a war killing several thousand people can cause
an immediate world outcry and global reaction. Simply contrast the international focus on the relatively minor Falkland Islands War of Britain and
Argentina with the widescale lack of interest in Burundi's killing or acquiescence in such killing of about 100,000 Hutu in 1972, of Indonesia slaughtering a
likely 600,000 "communists" in 1965, and of Pakistan, in an initially well planned massacre, eventually killing from one to three million Bengalis in 1971. A
most noteworthy and still sensitive example of this double standard is the Vietnam War. The international community was outraged at the American
attempt to militarily prevent North Vietnam from taking over South Vietnam and ultimately Laos and Cambodia. "Stop the killing" was the cry, and
eventually, the pressure of foreign and domestic opposition forced an American withdrawal. The overall number killed in the Vietnam War on all sides was
about 1,216,000 people. With the United States subsequently refusing them even modest military aid, South Vietnam was militarily defeated by the North
and completely swallowed; and Cambodia was taken over by the communist Khmer Rouge, who in trying to recreate a primitive communist agricultural
society slaughtered from one to three million Cambodians. If we take a middle two-million as the best estimate, then in four years the government of this
small nation of seven million alone killed 64 percent more people than died in the ten-year Vietnam War. Overall, the best estimate of those killed after
the Vietnam War by the victorious communists in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is 2,270,000. Now totaling almost twice as many as died in the Vietnam
War, this communist killing still continues. To view this double standard from another perspective, both World Wars cost twenty-four million battle deaths.
But from 1918 to 1953, the Soviet government executed, slaughtered, starved, beat or tortured to death, or otherwise killed 39,500,000 of its own people
(my best estimate among figures ranging from a minimum of twenty million killed by Stalin to a total over the whole communist period of eighty-three
million). For China under Mao Tse-tung, the communist government eliminated, as an average figure between estimates, 45,000,000 Chinese. The number
killed for just these two nations is about 84,500,000 human beings, or a lethality of 252 percent more than both World Wars together. Yet, have the world
community and intellectuals generally shown anything like the same horror, the same outrage, the same out pouring of anti-killing literature, over these
Soviet and Chinese megakillings as has been directed at the much less deadly World Wars? As can be seen from Table 1, communist governments are
overall almost four times more lethal to their citizens than non-communist ones, and in per capita terms nearly twice as lethal (even considering the huge
populations of the USSR and China). However, as large as the per capita killed is for communist governments, it is nearly the same as for other non-free
governments. This is due to the massacres and widescale killing in the very small country of East Timor, where since 1975 Indonesia has eliminated (aside
from the guerrilla war and associated violence) an estimated 100 thousan d Timorese out of a population of 600 thousand. Omitting this
country alone would reduce the average killed by noncommunist, nonfree governments to 397 per 10,000, or significantly less than
mass killing in the colony of Algeria, where compared to Frenchmen the Algerians were second class citizens, without the right to
vote in French elections. In the other case the Allied Democracies acted during and just after wartime, under strict secrecy, to turn
over foreigners to a communist government. These foreigners, of course, had no rights as citizens that would protect them in the
democracies. In no case have I found a democratic government carrying out massacres, genocide, and mass executions of its own
citizens; nor have I found a case where such a government's policies have knowingly and directly resulted in the large scale deaths
empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy . A coming retreat into fortified cities.
the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly
find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the
ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound
to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the
harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction , too, so it
These are
is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for
commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the
process through tyranny or civil war. The
worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in
the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, The New Rules: The Rise of the
Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory, World Politics Review, online:
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-restspells-u-s-strategic-victory
over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision
of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other
rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty
concept today. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy,
don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. Meanwhile, the Chinese do their
First the absurdity: A few of the most
stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources
somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's
universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II.
chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as
America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not
intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden.
The rest, as they say, is history. The follow-on irony of
revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines
and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big
wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central
Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely
because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006
the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need
to manage this global era. But, of course, that can all be tossed into the
dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow
the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world
history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered
not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth
ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen.
Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great
power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the
world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power
to manage what's yet to come. As always, the choice is ours.
midterm election. But
nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the
20th century did not produce a new dark agethough if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might
sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the
present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current
economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist
G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive."
believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers
like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international
system." And there are elements across the political spectrumRepublicans who call for retrenchment,
The commentator Fareed Zakaria
Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutionswho don't imagine that a "post-American world"
would look very different from the American world.
The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences.
If
the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will
change to suit their interests and preferences . Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a
post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve
it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the
world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the
new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democraciesBrazil, India,
Turkey, South Africapicked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to
What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that
China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in
preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs . Unfortunately, they
might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order
has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open
trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to
maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas , would other nations take on the
do it.
burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global
commonsor rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater
competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill
into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one
in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers
could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic
order. And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the
largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but
in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over
$40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic
forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly
where Slovenia and Greece are today. As Arvind Subramanian and other economists have pointed out, this will
make for a historically unique situation. In the past, the largest and most dominant economies in the world have
also been the richest. Nations whose peoples are such obvious winners in a relatively unfettered economic system
have less temptation to pursue protectionist measures and have more of an incentive to keep the system open.
China's leaders, presiding over a poorer and still developing country, may prove less willing to
open their economy. They have already begun closing some sectors to foreign
competition and are likely to close others in the future. Even optimists like Mr. Subramanian believe that the
liberal economic order will require "some insurance" against a scenario in which "China exercises its dominance by
either reversing its previous policies or failing to open areas of the economy that are now highly protected."
American economic dominance has been welcomed by much of the world because,
like the mobster Hyman Roth in "The Godfather," the U.S. has always made money
for its partners. Chinese economic dominance may get a different reception. Another problem is that
China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal
of preserving the rule of the Communist Party. Unlike the eras of British and American preeminence, when the leading economic powers were dominated largely by private individuals or companies, China's
international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their
priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays
it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American
powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in
French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of
great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was
a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine
other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian
War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were
killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition,
numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the
most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W.
Tucker has observed, "Such
rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They
experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing
science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms"
of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of
governmentforces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to believe
that our preferred order survives because it is right and justnot only for us but for everyone. We assume that the
triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better
system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so
attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The
idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But
international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over othersin
America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that
supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and
capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine
providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no
guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and
liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the
republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal
economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a
better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and
norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse
altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that
the
U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the
alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and
catastrophewhich is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.
joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power
conflicts . However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so
will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international
order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more
readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history
attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation .
For example, in the late 19th century Americas emergence as a regional power saw
it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th
century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the
American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain rules the waves . Such
a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemispheres security to
become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this
US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of
As a
result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial
mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought
opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations .
However, what will happen to these advances as Americas influence declines? Given
that Americas authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across
much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of
Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global
society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated
that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional
blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry . Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as
the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations . For
powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society.
example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washingtons withering leadership
late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European
economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive.
A2 Politics
FISA Court reforms are the most popular of surveillance
reforms.
Pema Levy July 17 2013 9:36 AM EDT NSA FISA Controversy: Congress Looks To
Reform Secret Court
http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-fisa-controversy-congress-looks-reform-secret-court1348875
Beginning last month, numerous bills have been put forward to make the court
more transparent and trustworthy. On Wednesday, a House Judiciary Hearing will
examine how the federal government is running programs that were approved by
the FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) court. Though some lawmakers have
been sounding alarm bells about the court for a few years, current bipartisan
interest in the courts activities put the FISC (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court)
at the center of possible congressional responses to Snowdens leaks. I think the
public is extremely concerned about the metadata that is being collected, said Rep.
Steve Cohen, D-Tenn., who has put forward a proposal to reform the secret court. I
think because of that massive concern, that because the Snowden situation has
maintained itself in the news, questions about the court have not been as frontburner as they are now, Cohen said. Civil liberties advocates also feel that the FISA
court is where they are most likely to win reforms, particularly when it comes to
increasing transparency. "In terms of issues that have bipartisan support and are
more likely than others to go forward, I would agree that this is one of those issues,
said Sharon Bradford Franklin, a senior counsel at the Constitution Project, a
nonpartisan legal research and advocacy group.
T
The FISA Courts are the best point of origin for discussions of
how to effectively curtail federal surveillance power.
Daniel Cetina Summer 2014 Balancing Security and Privacy in 21st Century
America: A Framework for FISA Court Reform, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1453 (2014)
There is no one supreme legislative grant augmenting federal surveillance powers.
n30 Surveillance authority grew over time and through various, often unrelated bills.
There is no effective point of origin from which to begin analyzing legislative
conferrals of surveillance authority. But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA") n31 is perhaps the logical starting point because it established the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISA Court"), n32 which is currently under
scrutiny for its centrality in [*1459] President Obama's overall surveillance
scheme. n33 Congress amended FISA numerous times, most importantly in 2001,
n34 2007, n35 and 2008. n36 The FISA Court is presently the body empowered to
curb federal surveillance power: it considers governmental requests for surveillance
warrants. n37 But, arguably, this deliberation is strictly nominal and an unsatisfying
check on potentially unlimited governmental power in the surveillance realm. n38