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2015 NDI 6WS - - FISC Reform

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Contention 1 Separation of Powers


Separation of powers conflict now-- lack of clear authority has
allowed Obama huge overreach in war policyrevitalizing
Congressional checks independent of the parlor game is key
- Executive overreach expanding now in the area of war
powers
- Not just about this president this is about precedent
- Re-establishing checks and balances in general solves
flexibility issues
- Congress doesnt want to take minimal steps
Nichols 14 (John, writes about politics for The Nation magazine as its Washington
correspondent, Rand Paul Points to Some Real Executive Overreach: Undeclared
Wars, November 24 2014, http://www.thenation.com/article/real-executiveoverreach-waging-war-without-congressional-declaration/)
In moving to force Congress to formally decide whether to declare war on
the Islamic State militants that the United States is already fighting, the senator from Kentucky
is highlighting the failure of Republican congressional leaders (or, for the most part,
their Democratic counterparts) to take seriously what should always be the most concerning
example of executive overreach. This is the executive action that troubled
the founders above all others: warmaking by presidents in the absence of
a declaration of war by the Congress. Conservatives are mad at (Obama) about immigration.
And theyre mad about him using executive authority on Obamacare, says Paul. But this is another example
where he doesnt have much respect for Congress, and some conservatives dont quite get that. Paul should

warmaking without the authorization of Congress is not


another example of executive authority being extended into troubling territory. It is, by
far, the most significant example. Paul should also acknowledge that the disrespect shown by
acknowledge that

presidents for Congress with regard to declarations of war did not begin with Obama. It extends back decades and
has been evidenced by Republican and Democratic presidents. Pauls proposal to have Congress declare
that a state of war exists between the organization identifying itself as the Islamic State and the government and
the people of the United States is flawed on many levels. For instance, despite the senators
protestations to the contrary, it opens too much space for the assignment of ground troops to a fight in a region

Yet what Paul is


doing is important, in that he is challenging the parlor game wherein
leaders of Congress consult with presidents and then allow them to
wage war with anything akin to the congressional oversight required by the
where most Americans are exceptionally disinclined to engage in another full-scale war.

Constitution. This parlor game has been going on for a long time. The United States has not formally declared war

many of the same Republicans who are now screaming about the
president issuing an executive order with regard to immigration as Republican
Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush did before him have engaged in the warand-peace parlor game quite willingly. Indeed, interventionist Republicans such
as Arizona Senator John McCain and South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham are frequently
heard urging presidents to be more aggressive and unilaterally inclined in
their executive warmaking. The war hawks have been aided and abetted
by Republican congressional leadersalong with Democratswho have declined to take
since World War II. And

even the most minimal steps to check and balance presidential warmaking
since the days when George W. Bush began overreaching. When President Obama began ramping up the current
fight with Islamic State militants in September, a CNN poll found that, while Americans were alarmed and
concerned about reports of conflict in Iraq and Syria, they were also skeptical about getting too deeply engaged
in that conflict. Specifically the poll found that: 1. Americans want limits placed on the US military response to the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and to the broader political challenges that have developed in those countries.
For instance, a majority of Americans, 61 percent of Americans oppose placing US troops on the ground in Iraq and
Syria. 2. More than 70 percent of Americans believe that President Obama should seek congressional authorization
for military strikes against ISIL. Amid all the examples of alarm and concern, the American people remain wary
about any rush to war. They believe that Congressnot just the presidentshould have a say with regard to
expansion of military action. And, make no mistake, what President Obama has embarked upon involves a dramatic
expansion of US military involvement and action in Iraq and Syria. As Congresswoman Barbara Lee, D-California,
said in a statement in September, The facts are clear. We are no longer talking about limited strikes to prevent
genocide and protect US personnel. We are talking about sustained bombing and the use of military force. The US
troop presence in the region has risen steadily since September. Yet even now, House Speaker John Boehner, who
so noisily objects to executive initiatives on the domestic front, remains cautious about challenging executive
warmaking. As such Obama simply says, I have the authority to address the threat from ISIL. But I believe we are
strongest as a nation when the President and Congress work together. So I welcome congressional support for this

Translation: While
the president is happy to accept endorsements of his actionsand may, in fact,
get from this Congress or the nexthe is in no rush to seek the congressional advice and
consent on matters of war and peace that is imagined and intended by the
Constitution. Congressman Jim McDermott, D-Washington, has described the presidents
I welcome congressional support line as really kind of condescending .
Yet, Congress has been absurdly slow in asserting its clear authority as a
co-equal branch of government to debate and vote on plans for war and, through the
power of the purse, to define the scope and character of warmaking . While
effort in order to show the world that Americans are united in confronting this danger.

Republican and Democratic leaders have been derelict in their duty, there are members of the House and Senate
who continue to voice concerns about the lack of clear congressional authorization for military action in Iraq and
Syria. Congresswoman Lee has long championed the view that the Constitution requires Congress to vote on the

This is not about this President . This is about any President


and any Congress. We must re-establish the checks and balances laid out
by the Constitution. Shes right. And she has allies. Congressional Progressive Caucus co-chairs Raul
use of military force.

Grijalva, D-Arizona, and Keith Ellison, D-Minnesota, have joined Lee in asking for immediate and genuine debate.
The voices of the American people must be heard during a full and robust debate in Congress on the use of
military force, they have said. Speaker Boehner should put legislation authorizing military action on the floor of
the House of Representatives before Congress leaves for the upcoming district work period. House Armed Services
Committee member John Garamendi, D-California, has for months been specific in arguing that the U.S.
Constitution and War Powers Resolution are clear: Congress is obligated to weigh in on extended U.S. military
actions. No matter how noble the cause, no matter how just the engagement, Congress voice and vote are required
within a 60-90 day window. The sixty-to-ninety-day window that Garamendi spoke of in that September statement
has passed. For months, Speaker Boehner and other congressional leaders have ignored what the California
congressman correctly describes as our Constitutionally-required duty. Now, it appears that Congress may finally
send a signal regarding its sentiments. But, as The New York Times notes: Some (Republican) conservatives may
balk at setting up a narrow set of parameters for the president. Senator James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma, the senior
Republican on the Armed Services Committee, has introduced a resolution that would give the president all
necessary and appropriate force to defend the country against the Islamic State but would require him to report
back to Congress on the effort every 90 days. The debate will probably continue into the next Congress.
Republicans will then control both chambers, which is likely to make it more difficult to pass a resolution that sets
major limits. Congress has ceded to successive presidents immense authority to act on domestic and foreign-policy
concerns. This has created a confusing circumstance that favors the executive. The White House has broad
authority to act when emergencies arise, and when crises go unaddressed by obstructionist or dysfunctional

In many areas of domestic policy, the courts and Congress have helped to
define for presidents a good deal of flexibility. Yet when it comes to
matters of war and peace, there has been little in the war of responsible
defintion. Instead, the power of presidents has expanded to a point where
congresses.

Congress now tends to be a spectatorrather than separate-but-equal


branch of government.

Statutory action is inevitable, but only targeted reform key to


get the right balance
- Statutory curtailment inevitable
- Targeted reform necessary for efective intelligence
- Targeted reform balances security and privacy
- Only statutory reform solves 12333 will circumvent the
court
- Only statutory reform solves 12333 circumvents agency
self-discretion
- Current intelligence inefective information hoarding by
extraordinary means
Patel 15 (Faiza, Co-Director, Liberty & National Security Program at Brennan
Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, JD NYU (6/25/15, When Will Surveillance
Reform Stop Being Just Cool?, Brennan Center for Justice @ NYU School of Law,
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/when-will-surveillance-reform-stop-being-justcool) HC
Hayden declared that he was cool with the
recently enacted USA Freedom Act, which reined in government bulk collection of Americans phone records . His
characterization of that program as little is no doubt accurate. Information from the
Last week, former National Security Agency Director Michael

archive of documents released by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden has revealed many other programs that
pose equal or greater risks to Americans privacy.But Hayden is too quick to assume that the phone records

The passage of the USA Freedom Act is the first curtailment


of intelligence authorities since the 9/11 attacks and should mark the beginning
not the end of reform . Its no surprise that Congress chose to tackle the
phone record program first. It is relatively straightforward for people to understand,
and its goal of amassing a vast database of information about Americans is patently
difficult to square with our constitutional values. Two review boards found it to be of
minimal counterterrorism value, and a federal appeals court declared it illegal. Even
the intelligence community and the president were amenable to reform. But Congress is well aware that
this reform is insufficient. Many of the votes against the act in the House and
Senate came from lawmakers who believe it didnt go far enough . Several NSA
programs are carried out under 2008s FISA Amendments Act, which permits the
agency to collect information in the U.S. as long as it is targeting foreigners who are
thought to be overseas. Despite their purported foreign focus, these programs
undoubtedly pull in huge pools of Americans communications . International
program will be the only reform.

communications have grown exponentially in the last years as it has become easier and cheaper to talk and text
with people abroad. In our increasingly interconnected world ,

the notion that surveillance targeted at


foreigners overseas pulls in only a negligible amount of Americans private
correspondence is simply outdated. Nor is the NSA limited to targeting terrorism suspects. It is
permitted to collect foreign intelligence information, a capacious category that
includes the open-ended class of material relevant to foreign affairs. This allows the
NSA to scan all our international communications and keep those that it thinks are

interesting. E-mails sent by a Human Rights Watch lawyer to a researcher in Nigeria


would be scanned, even if neither is suspected of involvement in wrongdoing. If they
mention something about the political situation there of interest to the NSA, they could be retained. A text
message from an American journalist to a colleague in Turkey asking a question
about the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant could be picked up as well. We dont know
how many NSA databases of Americans information exist or how large they are. We do know that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation dips into these archives of emails, texts, videos and chat messages with few constraints. In

information collected without any type of warrant or judicial review for


intelligence purposes can be obtained by a U.S. law enforcement agency and used
in a domestic criminal proceeding. The House of Representatives recently passed an amendment to
other words,

the defense appropriations bill (the National Defense Authorization Act) that would end these backdoor searches by

lawmakers will have another chance to stop


the program when the extraordinary and controversial grant of powers in the FISA
Amendments Act expires in 2017. Even that would just be skimming the surface.
The vast majority of U.S. surveillance doesnt take place under any law passed by
Congress. When our intelligence agencies collect information overseas for example, by tapping into fiber optic
defunding them. While this initiative might not pass,

cables to scoop up all information that flows through them they operate under an order issued by President

Executive Order 12333, which gives the NSA even greater


latitude to collect information with even fewer privacy safeguards than any
legislation . Just because information is collected from a cable overseas doesnt
mean that it concerns only foreigners . Purely domestic emails may be
routed through another country and picked up. Copies of documents are stored by cloud
Ronald Reagan in 1981,

providers overseas, sometimes in multiple locations. Domestic websites often have ads, pop-ups and other such
links that are hosted on foreign servers, effectively sending search queries into the international ether. Americans

privacy is just as afected by overseas collection as it is by what happens


on U.S. soil. Of course, the NSA must retain the capacity to collect information
necessary for the national defense and security. The question that needs
urgent attention is whether it needs quite as much as it is currently hoarding or
whether a more targeted approach would keep us both safe and free from the
fear that our every move is being watched.

FISA creates legislative battles about separation of powers


branches are all attempting to claim power
Cole and Nolan 14 (Jared P. Cole, Andrew Nolan, legislative attorneys for the
Congressional Research Service, 3/31/14, Reform of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Courts: A Brief Overview, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43451.pdf)
FISA proposals seek to reduce the secretive nature of the FISA
Courts by requiring the public disclosure of FISA opinions.127 Such legislation
might raise separation of powers questions because both Congress and
the executive branch claim some power in this area. The central question to
resolve is the extent to which Congress may regulate control over national
security information, including requiring the executive branch to disclose specific documentsa
question not definitively resolved by the courts.128 Legislation compelling the executive
branch to release FISA opinions directs the President to release information he may intend to keep
secret and thus implicates the Presidents power under Article II of the
Constitution.129 On the one hand, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized Congresss power to require
Several other

the mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive Branch.130 However, the executive
branch has argued that the Commander-in-Chief Clause of Article II bestows upon the President independent power

Congresss
generally broad ability to require disclosure of agency documents may be
constrained when it implicates national security.132 The executive branch has typically
to control access to national security information.131 As such, according to this line of reasoning,

exercised discretion to determine what particular information should be classified; and the Supreme Court has
observed in dicta that the President is Commander in Chief, and his authority to classify and control access to
information bearing on national security ... flows primarily from this Constitutional investment of power in the

courts have
crafted common law privileges that protect the executive branch from
revealing certain military secrets.134 Nonetheless, Supreme Court
jurisprudence does not establish absolute power by any branch over
classified information135 and recognizes room for Congress to impose
classification procedures .136 Moreover, Congress, pursuant to its
oversight function, requires consistent disclosure of sensitive national
security information to the relevant intelligence and defense committees
and has regulated control over access to national security information.137
President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.133 In addition,

Pursuant to these statutes, courts have required the executive branch to disclose information to the public and the

proposals that allow the executive branch to first redact


classified information from FISA opinions before public release appear to
be on firm constitutional ground; while a proposal that mandated all past
FISA opinions be released in their entiretywithout any redactions by the
executive branchmight raise a separation of powers issue.
judiciary.138 Consequently,

Its the key issue for separation of powers and spills over
AT: FISC Fails/Inefective No authority now, plan gives it
authority. Youve read uniqueness args for us.
HLRA 3 (Harvard Law Review Association, May 2003, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEPARATION OF POWERS - FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW HOLDS THAT PROSECUTORS MAY SPY ON
AMERICAN AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS WITHOUT A WARRANT,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2477-fisc--harvard-law-reviewpdf)
The review court's narrow conception of the FISA court's statutory and
constitutional authority raises serious Fourth Amendment and separation
of powers concerns. First, it potentially blindfolds the FISA court to blatant violations
of the Fourth Amendment. The review court recognized in Sealed Case that FISA surveillance
conducted primarily to gather evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing," as
opposed to a foreign intelligence crime, would clearly violate both FISA and the
Fourth Amendment.60 The court also recognized that any "manifestation of such a purpose ... would continue to
disqualify an application."6' Nevertheless, the review court denounced any "FISA court inquiry into
the origins of the investigation [or] examination of the personnel involved" as judicial usurpation of executive
prerogative62 - even though such an inquiry may well reveal a blatantly unconstitutional purpose . Second, by demanding
virtually unqualified deference to the Attorney General, the review court's opinion
"impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch "63 and thus
violates the spirit of Article III, which "serves both to protect the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of

tripartite government and to safeguard litigants' right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination

The institutional independence of the FISA court is


especially important because it provides the only real check on the
executive's power over foreign intelligence surveillance , as the Attorney General's
discretion under FISA is largely exempt from adversarial testing: Surveillance orders must be issued ex
parte, and only the government may file appeals.66 Moreover, while FISA authorizes civil
suits for damages that result from a violation of its terms,67 such suits are unlikely
because notice to the target is not required, even after surveillance ends.68 And although FISA provides for
by other branches of government."64

discovery and suppression of information obtained through surveillance when the government intends to use it in a trial or other
proceeding,69 motions to disclose or suppress must be reviewed in camera and ex parte if the Attorney General determines that

the institutional
independence of the FISA court is crucial to the constitutionality of the surveillance
that it approves. The review court noted in Sealed Case that FISA surveillance is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment partly because it must be approved by a neutral and detached
magistrate.7' But if a FISA judge has no real authority to question executive
procedures for conducting foreign intelligence surveillance, he or she functions
more like "a compliant arm of the government"72 than like a neutral and detached magistrate.
According to the Supreme Court, "the greatest security against tyranny - the accumulation of excessive
authority in a single Branch lies not in a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a
carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch ."73 By
erroneously interpreting the separation of powers doctrine to require a
hermetic division between the FISA court and the Justice Department, the
review court's opinion in Sealed Case threatens not only privacy interests but
also the separation of powers itself.
"disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States."70 Finally,

Rebalancing branches allows Congress more oversight on


foreign surveillancekey stop instability in Latin America,
Asia, Africa
- Obama expanding military power to foreign countries now
- Congress wants to reign in executive administration
- Accountability solves separation of powers
- Military intimately connected to surveillance
- Stops the war on terror
FCNL 14 (FCNL, Quaker Interest Lobby Group, Ending the Endless Wars, 2014,
http://fcnl.org/assets/pubs/newsletter/2013/FCNL_NL_Sept_Oct_2013_WEB.pdf, last
updated May 10th, 2014)
Drones and surveillance are just the surface of President Obamas expanded
use of the military as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. The New York Times reported in May that
U.S. Special Operations forces are testing how to expand their operations
in regions where they have not operated in large numbers for the past
decade, especially Asia, Africa and Latin America . In the continent of Africa alone,
an investigation by TomDispatch.com found U.S. military involvement with 49 of the
54 countries on the African continent. And as the map on page 2 shows, the U.S. military is quietly
exerting its influence in nearly every country in the world by deploying personnel widely. These military activities

Congress has begun to rein in runaway


Pentagon spending. Yet even the $1 trillion cut in Pentagon spending over the next 10
years that FCNL has been working to convince Congress to maintain would
still leave the U.S. military budget at about the same level in inflation-adjusted terms as during
are a substantial drain on our countrys resources.

the height of the Cold War. Our countrys overinvestment in the Pentagon makes it more difficult to invest in other

Congress Can Scale


Back the Endless War To justify many of these activities, the Obama administration
relies on many of the same laws that President Bush used to underpin the U.S. invasions
of Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than accept this new form of endless war, Congress should
listen to and act on the public skepticism about military force as a tool of foreign policy. As a
significant first step, Congress should take the opportunity of the end of U.S. military activity in
Afghanistan to declare an end to the war on terror and to repeal the 2001
A uthorization for the U se of M ilitary F orce. Congress also needs to exercise more
oversight of the expanding U.S. military activity around the world. Members need to
demand greater accountability from the administration about the
justification for and practical use of everything from drones to government surveillance
parts of the economy that create more jobs and build sustainable communities.

and detention without trial.

Specifically stopping US-Chad cooperation is key to Sahel


stabilityChad power brokering causes regional instability
Absent external checks current U.S. involvement in Chad is bad
- Chad eager to dominate Africa right now
- U.S. military AND intelligence support increases Chad
regional power which leads to instability
- Hot spot for terrorism and extremist groups
- Chad causes structural violence in local communities.
Matfess 3/6 (Hilary, masters candidate at Johns Hopkins Universitys School of
Advanced International Studies, US support for Chad may destabilize the Sahel,
March 6, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/us-support-for-chadmay-destabilize-the-sahel.html)
On Feb. 16, the United States Africa Command began its annual Exercise Flintlock in West Africa. The three-week
military drill features more than 1,200 soldiers from 28 African and Western countries, including Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. The exercise coincides with the African Unionbacked

all eyes are on the host country,


Chad, which has taken a strong leadership role in the U.S.-funded TransSaharan Counterterrorism Partnership, which aims to enhance the capacity of
governments in the Sahel to confront the threat of terrorism. Chad appears eager to assert itself
as a regional power broker. But the United States must be cautious before
lending undue support to the Chadian military. Chad has a history of meddling in
regional conflicts. U.S. eforts to stabilize the region and eradicate the threat of armed
insurgencies may boost Chads ability to undermine its neighbors . Weak
capacity and regional rivalries continue to hamper cooperation in the Sahel. U.S.
military support could fuel further instability. US interests in Chad As Reuters Emma Farge noted last year, Chad
campaign against the Nigerian armed group Boko Haram. But

lies between jihadist fighters prowling Libyas deserts to the north, AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb active in the west and rebels and janjaweed
militia battling in Sudans Darfur region to the east. Chadian President Idriss Dby, who came
to power in a 1990 coup, has used these security threats to strengthen ties with
foreign powers, particularly France and the United States. The Flintlock exercise is intended to bolster
border security and help limit the movement of rebel groups, human traffickers and criminal networks. Toward that

U.S. support will focus on improving Chads telecommunications and


intelligence services . In addition to Boko Haram, the U.S. is concerned about
persistent instability across the Sahel and West Africa as well as the proliferation of
militias and armed groups in Mali, the Central African Republic and Niger. However,
Washingtons support for Dby assumes U.S. interests in the region align with
Chads. U.S. policymakers should realize, however, that Chad has
demonstrated a vested interest in promoting instability and empowering
regional militias . Far from a bulwark of stability, Chad has proved a purveyor of
chaos . Chad has been a staunch U.S. ally in the war on terrorism since 9/11. Washingtons reliance on the
end,

country has only grown in recent years. TomDispatchs Nick Turse pointed out last year: The United States has for
more than a decade poured copious amounts of money, time and effort into making Chad a stable regional
counterterrorism partner, sending troops there, training and equipping its army, counseling its military leaders,
providing tens of millions of dollars in aid, funding its military expeditions, supplying its army with equipment
ranging from tents to trucks, donating additional equipment for its domestic security forces, providing a surveillance
and security system for its border security agents and looking the other way when its military employed child
soldiers. Oil imports from Chad hardly justify such a robust security partnership .
But Chads willingness to intervene in regional crises helps Washington to avoid getting dragged into African

Dby
has used regional turmoil to strengthen ties with Western allies and flex Chads muscle. In
conflicts. Chad has proved useful in carrying out the tasks that the United States is unwilling to take on.

2013, Chad played a key role in the French-led offensive to wrest control back from armed Islamic groups in
northern Mali. In July 2014, France chose Chad as the primary base for Operation Barkhane, a 3,000-strong
permanent French force meant to counter terrorism and ethnic strife in the Sahel. Similarly, in April 2014, the U.S.
used Chadian bases to operate drones and conduct surveillance to help find Nigerias Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped
by Boko Haram. In

November, Dby unsuccessfully attempted to broker the


release of the Chibok girls and a truce between Boko Haram and the
Nigerian government. Earlier this month, Chad took a leading role in the African coalition organized to
counter Boko Haram. Chads offensive against the Nigerian insurgent group has been relentless. In late January, the
Chadian military entered Nigeria unilaterally to push Boko Haram back. On March 3, Chadian troops gained the
control of the northeastern Nigerian town of Dikwa from the group. Chadian troops claim to have killed more than
200 Boko Haram fighters and liberated 200 miles of roadside towns in the region. Meddling in regional crises Chads
intervention in Nigeria and its eagerness to attract Western support has an economic dimension. A poor, landlocked
nation of 11.4 million people, Chad is desperate to protect trade threatened by regional instability. Militants
squeezed paths used by herdsmen who walk one of Chads main exports cattle to market in Nigeria, Michael
M. Phillips and Drew Hinshaw, recently wrote in The Wall Street Journal. Boko Haram also choked off the flow of
manufactured goods into Chads capital, NDjamena. Prices for everyday imports like plastic tubs have

While the U.S. and France might be relieved to have a battlehardened military ally in the region, Chads previous involvements in regional
conflicts should give them pause. True, Chad is relatively stable among its
conflict-ridden neighbors, which include the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya and Sudan. But
NDjamena has been responsible for a significant amount of the instability
in those countries . In 2013, Dby allegedly facilitated the coup against
President Franois Bozize in the Central African Republic by lending support to the Seleka
rebels. The situation there has since devolved into brutal fighting between rival armed groups,
skyrocketed.

resulting in a humanitarian crisis and a flood of refugees and internally displaced people. (Ten years earlier, Dby
provided sanctuary for Bozize during his attempt to overthrow then-President Ange-Felix Patasse.) Having facilitated
the crisis,

Chadian troops were then sent into the Central African Republic as a part

of the United Nations peacekeeping mission, only to be withdrawn in April after


soldiers opened fire on civilians. Similarly, in 2005 relations between Chad and Sudan hardened
over Dbys support for Sudanese rebel groups and proxy militias in Darfur. By the time Chad and Sudan settled
their differences, the rebel groups were difficult to control, defecting from their patrons to pursue local grievances.

Chads support
for rebel groups in Sudan and the Central Africa Republic has spun out of
control and devastated local communities . And its enthusiastic military
intervention in Nigeria is being viewed with suspicion . Some Nigerians have
even suggested that Dby has provided support for Boko Haram. The claim
Chads eastern region and Sudans west have become deeply divided and ungovernable.

illustrates Chads tainted history of regional excursions.

Africa is a global hotspot for conflict and terror draws in


international powers
- Africa is a global hotspot for conflict draws in
international powers
- Conflict occurs because of regional instability (caused by
Chad)
Quintana and Florance 15 (Ana Quintana, Policy Analyst in the Allison
Center, Charlotte Florance, contributor to The Daily Signal. She previously worked at
The Heritage Foundation as a research associate, Regions of Enduring Interest:
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, 2015,
http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/important-essays-analysis/regionsenduring-interest-latin-america-caribbean-africa/)
Africa is a global center of emerging threats. The dangerous mix of
religious extremism, ethnic conflicts, authoritarian regimes, ungoverned
space, and arms proliferation is driving modern-day conflict in the region.
Furthermore, historical divisions manifest themselves to the benefit of global Islamist
terrorists. Local grievances (whether perceived or real) that were previously believed to be
locally contained conflicts in places such as northern Mali or northern Nigeria have been coopted and exacerbated by terrorist groups and affiliates linked to al-Qaeda. Terrorists
threaten not only U.S. partners in Africa, but U.S. citizens and assets, as evidenced by the
September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. Al-Qaeda has a history of attacking U.S. interests in
Africa, including the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, where more than 230

For global terrorists, much of Africa is ripe for the


picking. For example, poor governance, untrained and inexperienced militaries,
and a disgruntled and growing youth population provide fertile ground for
a group like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although such organizations have been frustrated
people were killed, including 12 Americans.

in their operations as a result of the U.N.-backed French intervention in Mali (for which strategic airlift and refueling
were provided by the U.S. in coordination with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden), the threat from Islamist

This
arc extends from the coast of West Africa, across the Sahelian zone, along
the northern reaches of the continent, and down through East Africa to
include Ethiopia and Somalia. As a result of cross-border raids and kidnappings, Islamist
terrorism is bleeding into Cameroon. The metamorphosis of the conflict in the
Central African Republic for control of state resources and a vast illicit economy21
terrorists remains real and credible, particularly within the zone known as the arc of instability in Africa.

into a conflict that is defined primarily in religious terms highlights the extent to
which religious extremism and ethnic conflicts are mixing to create an
even more dangerous threat to regional stability.

Contention 2 NATO
U.S. surveillance practices short circuit intelligence sharing
with all of Europe -- surveillance reform is a prerequisite to
new agreements.
- Spying pause in the status quo due to U.S. surveillance
practices to their own citizens
- Surveillance reforms are a pre-requisite to intelligence
sharing agreements
- Lack of intelligence sharing afects NATO coordination all
across Europe
Eichensehr 14 (Kristen, graduate of Harvard University, the University of
Cambridge, and Yale Law School, United States Stops Spying on Western Europe
for Now, September 23, 2014, http://justsecurity.org/15414/united-states-stopsspying-western-europe-for/)//ghs-VA
It seems highly unlikely that restrictions would be unilateral or total, as the pause
appears to be. It makes little sense for the U.S. to engage in unilateral
intelligence disarmament when it could bargain for mutual intelligence
restrictions and increased intelligence sharing. Moreover, given the lack of precedent for
a total no-spy agreement, the Obama Administration is unlikely to relinquish the right to spy, even on allies, in

A more likely outcome would be a series of Five-Eyes


style intelligence partnership agreements that ensure mutual benefit from
intelligence-sharing and some limits, but not a total ban, on spying on the agreement party or parties.
particular circumstances.

Although Germany apparently rejected a similar offer in July, the espionage pause may provide room for diplomacy
and scope for negotiation that were not possible in the midst of the spying scandal over the summer. Another
question is which countries might get the Five Eyes-style deal. Although Ive focused on the recent history with

the pause
reaches beyond Germany to friendly governments in Western Europe . (It

Germany and events in Germany reportedly triggered the pause, the AP report indicates that

does not specify which governments or indicate whether it means all friendly Western European governments.) But

Countries, including
Germany and France, whose publics have been incensed by reports of U.S. spying
on their citizens have incentives to publicize any agreement that limits
U.S. collection activities vis--vis their citizens. The disclosure of any new
agreements with particular countries could create diplomatic strife for the
U.S. with other countries that want, but have not been offered, the same deal. When the no-spy
from the perspective of other friendly governments, why stop with Western Europe?

agreement issue arose last fall, Stewart Baker proposed in congressional testimony substantive and procedural
criteria for entering spying agreements, and in December, the Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and

Even if the U.S.


were to deploy neutral, substantively reasonable criteria for vetting potential
agreement partners, it could still find itself with a new set of diplomatic
difficulties with countries that want into intelligence sharing and out of
the scope of U.S. espionage.
Communications Technologies proposed other substantive criteria (Pages 174-176).

Latest allegations wreck relations NATO is worried.


Mazzetti and Landler 14 (Mark Mazzetti, correspondent for The New York
Times, Mark Landler, White House correspondent for The New York Times, Spying
Case Left Obama in Dark, U.S. Officials Say, JULY 8, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/europe/spying-case-left-obama-in-darkus-officials-say.html?_r=0)//ghs-VA
WASHINGTON When President Obama placed a call to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany last Thursday, he
had a busy agenda: to consult with a close ally and to mobilize wavering Europeans to put more pressure on Russia
to end its covert incursions in Ukraine. What Mr. Obama did not know was that a day earlier, a young German
intelligence operative had been arrested and had admitted that he had been passing secrets to the Central

the president
was kept in the dark about the blown spying operation at a particularly
delicate moment in American relations with Germany has led frustrated White House
Intelligence Agency. While Ms. Merkel chose not to raise the issue during the call, the fact that

officials to question who in the C.I.A.s chain of command was aware of the case and why that information did not
make it to the Oval Office before the call. The details of this spying case remain murky. Intelligence officials have

the
episode sheds light on the tensions that arise from the colliding cultures
of spycraft and statecraft one driven by the need to vacuum as much secret material as possible;
declined to comment, and it is still not clear what the German operative has told the authorities. But

the other giving primacy to diplomatic objectives. It also reinforces the problem that surfaced a year ago in the
wake of revelations about National Security Agency surveillance practices from the rogue contractor Edward J.
Snowden: whether the costs of spying on close allies outweigh the gains. At the White House, senior officials have

latest allegations could set back relations with Germany


just as Mr. Obama and Ms. Merkel are struggling to move past the distrust
generated by the Snowden disclosures, including the revelation that the N.S.A. had tapped Ms. Merkels
expressed concern that the

cellphone. What is particularly baffling to these officials is that the C.I.A. did not inform the White House that its
agent a 31-year-old employee of Germanys federal intelligence service, the BND had been compromised,
given his arrest the day before the two leaders spoke. According to German news media reports, the agency may
have been aware three weeks before the arrest that the German authorities were monitoring the man. A central
question, one American official said, is how high the information about the agent went in the C.I.A.s command
whether it was bottled up at the level of the station chief in Berlin or transmitted to senior officials, including the
director, John O. Brennan, who is responsible for briefing the White House. For all his concerns, Mr. Obama does not
plan any extraordinary outreach to Ms. Merkel, an official said, noting that some in the administration also feel that
Germany should not overreact to the case or conflate it with the privacy issues raised by the N.S.A.s surveillance.

tensions betray a lack of attention in Washington to its


relationship with Berlin. Bush and especially Obama have treated it as a solved problem requiring no
Some experts say the recent

further American involvement, said John C. Kornblum, a former American ambassador to Germany. Recent events
have demonstrated that just the opposite is the case. Germany is still deeply conflicted about itself and about the
world around it. The White House and the C.I.A. both declined to comment on the case, with a spokeswoman for
the National Security Council, Caitlin M. Hayden, saying, Were certainly not going to discuss who knew what and
when in regards to the allegations. On Tuesday, the chairwoman and the ranking member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee said in separate interviews that Mr. Brennan had briefed them about the matter, but they
refused to divulge any details of the conversations. Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who is
chairwoman of the committee, expressed concern about the damage that could come to American-German
relations. We need to relook at this whole situation, how we handle our allies, said Ms. Feinstein, who said she met
with German Parliament members who she said were very upset by the reports. The ranking Republican, Senator
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, sounded a note of caution about the allegations. Im not sure how much of it is true,
he said. Thats going to dictate how serious it is. Over the past year, the German government has tried to use the
Snowden revelations chiefly the embarrassing disclosure about Ms. Merkels cellphone as leverage to
negotiate a non-spying pact between the United States and Germany. The United States has such arrangements
with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. But the White House has resisted, in part because officials worry
that it would prompt other countries to request similar deals. In early 2010, the director of national intelligence,
Dennis C. Blair, explored a nonspying pact with French intelligence officials, partly because Mr. Blair believed such a
deal would ease the burden on the F.B.I., which has the task of hunting French spies in the United States. The
French are reputed to be particularly aggressive in pursuing American industrial secrets. In contrast, current and
former American officials said that German operatives are far less active in the United States, making the benefits
of a nonspying deal with Berlin less obvious. Likewise, some question the value of spying on Germany.

Such

operations threaten the close intelligence-sharing relationship

that American
and German spies have developed in recent years. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the BND has aggressively pursued
terror suspects in Germany and played a role in the crippling Stuxnet cyberattack on Irans nuclear program.
Theres only so much that spying on the Germans is going to get you, said a former C.I.A. official once posted in
Europe. Its not like the Germans are planning to establish relations with Iran. Last weeks disclosure came at a
delicate moment: Mr. Obama needs Ms. Merkels support to impose additional sanctions against Russia for its role in
the Ukraine crisis. Germany, with extensive energy ties to Russia, has many reasons to resist, though Ms. Merkel
has signaled she is running out of patience with President Vladimir V. Putin. The American authorities are also
pursuing heavy financial penalties from German banks, including Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, for dealing
with Iran and other countries that are blacklisted by the United States. The German government owns 17 percent of

The prospect of new strains between


the United States and Germany drew an expression of concern from the
secretary general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who met with Mr. Obama at the White House on
Commerzbank, raising the prospect of further tensions.

Tuesday.

NATO is facing complex emerging threats threat of war with


Russia, failed states, terrorism, cyber-attacks and nuclear
proliferation surveillance is the crucial weakness
specifically, the US is the only nation in the position to conduct
adequate surveillance yet intelligence sharing is insufficient
the af solves that
- Russia expansionism
- Failed states
- Iran Prolif
- Cyber-attacks
- Conventional Terrorism
- Intelligence sharing, not just gathering, key
- U.S. surveillance capabilities key
- Has surveillance but not sharing now
Wickett and McInnis 14 (Xenia Wickett, Project Director, US; Dean, The
Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, Kathleen J.
McInnis, NATO expert at the Chatham House, NATO: Charting the Way Forward,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140
721NATO1.pdf
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as a fundamental
cornerstone for the security of the West. It has weathered many internal political
storms, stood strong against powerful adversaries, and conducted crisismanagement operations within and beyond Europe. It has served as an indispensable forum for
dialogue among its members, and a platform for military cooperation between members and nonmembers. It is for these reasons that many see NATO as the most powerful and capable military
alliance in the worlds history. And it is also for these reasons that adversaries and allies alike are
interested to see how NATO responds to the myriad challenges before it. The world will
therefore be closely watching as the 28 Heads of State and Government of NATO meet in Wales in September 2014. The international
security landscape has evolved in a considerably more dangerous direction since
the leaders last met in Chicago in 2012, and particularly during the last year. In
2010, NATO agreed upon a new Strategic Concept that articulated a broad set of
For 65 years,

roles and missions for the alliance. Unfortunately, the document is so general that it
provides little guidance as new challenges emerge, leaving member states still
debating the institutions responsibilities and priorities . With the support of NATOs Public Diplomacy
Division, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Canadian Department of National Defence, the US Project at Chatham House held three
roundtables to discuss the way forward for NATO. The discussions culminated in this paper, which aims to inform debate leading up to the September
summit in Wales. The paper briefly lays out the principal external challenges that NATO members face, what tasks are required of the institution, its
current resources and capabilities, the gaps between strategy and capabilities, and what actions NATO needs to take to fill these gaps. Starting from the
threats that the NATO member states prioritize, and remaining in the confines of the Strategic Concept, the paper is intended to offer a path forward for
NATO. It provides guidance on how the alliance can move ahead in the coming years to address current and emerging challenges. Over the past few

events have challenged the assumptions that many NATO members have made
regarding the stability of the international environment and, accordingly, their own
national security. The grand strategic project to make Europe whole and free and at peace with itself, once considered complete, is now
months,

very much in question largely as a result of Russian aggression.4 To Europes southeast, the Syrian conflict has metastasized to dangerous levels and has
spilled over into Iraq, with profoundly worrying counter-terrorism implications for Turkey (a key NATO member) and Europe.5 While it is absolutely vital

NATO members respond to the pressing nature of the above concerns, they must also keep in mind the
longer-term strategic and future trends that will affect them . The organization needs to be able to react
that

to the former while making progress on others, including overthe-horizon, critical issues such as grappling with natural resource constraints (particularly in

Key national security priorities are largely a function of geopolitical


realities. While there are some challenges on the importance of which the vast majority of NATO member states can agree, others are more a factor
of specific interests or geography. Thus the urgency of the Russian threat diminishes the further
from Russias borders a member is located. Similarly, the exigency of crises in North Africa is more palpable for
energy) and cyber attacks.

Mediterranean members contending with refugee inflows stemming from instability in the region. In order to understand whether, and how, countries
differ in their views of the emerging threat environment, Chatham House asked national security experts how their respective countries prioritized their
security requirements. Table 1, derived from a combination of their responses as well as relevant government policy statements, reflects the similarities
and differences of opinion on critical national security priorities across the alliance.6 It is important to note that Table 1 reflects issues that both national
security experts and national strategy documents deemed critically core interests of their countries. As such, it necessarily excludes other issues that are
important, but not considered truly crucial by those surveyed. It is illustrative rather than definitive. In some cases the respondents did not prioritize
issues such as violations of national territorial integrity, probably not because they are unimportant but because they are, in the minds of those
commenting, so unlikely to occur as to be irrelevant. Discussed below are the principal challenges that most member states studied here could agree are
critical to their national interests. While this paper largely follows the organization of Table 1, some categories have been merged given the significant
overlap, such as attacks on allies, violations of territorial integrity, and Russia; and crises emanating from failed and failing states, and Middle East and

Top priorities Attacks on allies While Russia is not the only possible
adversary for NATO members, it is certainly the most potent one today. Since the end
North Africa.

of the Cold War, NATO has placed significant emphasis on engaging with it. In 1994, Russia joined the NATO-led Partnership for Peace, a programme
designed to promote democratic values, strengthen military-to-military ties, and help reform security institutions in former Warsaw Pact countries. Building
on that partnership, and despite frictions associated with NATOs operations in the Balkans (and in Kosovo specifically), the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was
established in 2004 to promote transparency and cooperation between the two former adversaries, and to allow NATO and Russia to discuss matters of
mutual concern. While NRC talks were suspended in 2008 following Russian incursions into Georgia, by 2010 the two parties had agreed to begin
reconvening such meetings. Over the past few months, however, Russia has taken actions in Ukraine that emphasize that its interests go against the

In February 2014, following


the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine, Russia invaded Crimea, in order to, in
fundamental objectives of NATO, and show the continued high level of its distrust of the institution.

President Vladimir Putins words, protect Crimea, [which] has always been an inseparable part of Russia.7 Apparently in order to continue to ensure

Russia has conducted large-scale military exercises (at


their height involving approximately 40,000 troops) along their common border, making many in the region
and beyond uncertain of its intentions regarding the acquisition of further
territory. Russias activities along, and within, Ukraines borders have caused many
NATO leaders to reconsider their post-Cold War assumptions about it, as well as
about peace and stability in Europe more broadly. Putins use of asymmetric
tactics, and the speed with which he was able to bring them to bear (thereby changing
the facts on the ground before the alliance had the opportunity to respond
meaningfully) set an entirely new challenge for NATO. By blurring the lines between
civilian and military actors, utilizing a shrewd public relations campaign and
conducting military exercises on the border with Ukraine without crossing it (with the
exception of Crimea), Putin has made it extremely difficult for the alliance to formulate a
rapid and coherent response. In so doing, he challenged directly the viability of NATOs security relationships with its
partners. While Putin has not directly tested the credibility of NATOs Article V, he has
raised the level of uncertainty over whether the organization would respond
adequately if he did so. He also made NATOs partners question whether they gained any tangible improvements in security from their
Ukraine remains an unstable buffer state,

Many believe that in the coming months, Putin will further probe the
alliances solidarity. And many NATO members and partners alike now worry
that probing might in time lead to territorial loss. What makes this challenge difficult to manage are
relationship with it.

the levels of economic and energy interdependence between Russia and some European countries. Russian individuals and firms have invested heavily in
Europe, making both sides increasingly reliant on one another and Europe loath to risk the economic consequences of sanctioning Russian entities or
individuals (although Russia is more dependent upon Europe than the reverse).8 As such it becomes even more difficult to organize a coherent,
crossgovernmental response to Russias assertive behaviour. Given the urgency and attention that recent Russian moves have inspired within NATO and
its member states, it is perhaps surprising that there is less strategic consensus among those surveyed about the degree to which it presents an
overwhelming threat to national interests. However, this is likely to be due in large part to the economic and energy ties that Russia has with many of the
member states, making it a necessary partner as well as a cause of concern. It also reflects the geopolitical realities of different member states: the
further a NATO member is from Russias borders, the less likely that the latters moves will be seen as a critical and direct national security threat. More

protecting allies is perhaps today all the more pertinent given the broadening
array of possible forms of attack, and the recognition that borders are porous an
attack against one can have real implications for its neighbours . However, strategic-level agreement
broadly,

belies some likely disconnects among allies as to what the Article V provision means in practice. With the rise of asymmetric threats and non-traditional
challenges such as cyber security, serious questions have been levelled as to what today might constitute an attack on allies, and what the appropriate

NATO has
become involved in a number of military operations designed to tackle the
challenges posed by failing states .9 Susceptible to disruptive actors such as insurgent or terrorist groups, and in the absence
of legitimate governance, these territories can be used as launching points for terrorist attacks
and other regionally, if not globally, destabilizing activities (as was demonstrated in the 11 September
2001 attacks). As a result, NATO and its member states have conducted interventions in the
Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as counter-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa .
Unfortunately, over that period, the world, and particularly Europes near neighbourhood, has become significantly less stable. Governments
and civil society institutions are being shaken to their foundations and in many
instances, terrorist and other radical groups are filling the void created by
the absence of state institutions. Looking forward, instability is increasing across the Middle
East and in subSaharan Africa areas that are deemed critically important to
several NATO member states. While the region is outside the European theatre, most NATO member states have critical
responses might be to those attacks. Crises emanating from failed and failing states Particularly since the end of the Cold War,

interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Among other things this is due to its proximity to Europes southern and southeastern borders,
cultural ties between citizens on either side of the Mediterranean and particularly between France and Algeria, energy supplies, shipping routes through

interests have
increasingly been at risk given the instability in the broader MENA region . Egypt, a longstanding ally of the United States, has been through six governments over the past three
years and continues to be disrupted by competition between vastly differing
groups, each with differing interests that would like to lead it in divergent directions. Despite a NATO-led intervention to protect Libyan citizens in
anti-Gaddafi areas of Libya (most notably Benghazi), which subsequently led to the overthrow of the regime, instability in Libya
continues. Events in Syria are perhaps of most concern and raise tensions
with regard to humanitarian, refugee and terrorism issues. The conflict has recently
spilled into northern and central Iraq (which has remained unsettled following the exit of US and other foreign troops in
the Suez Canal and around the Horn of Africa and, recently, operations in Iraq. Since the Arab revolutions in 2011, these

2011), and raised the spectre of a radical jihadist group, in this case the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/L), once again having control over

Somewhat related to developments in the


Middle East and North Africa and to failing states, terrorism remains a critical
concern for many NATO member states. Yet for many this is not a new threat:
Britains experience with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Spanish
experience with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) being notable examples . However, the
catastrophic impact that newer terrorist groups can have, combined with the
radical jihadist inspirations for such attacks, are relatively new. This was highlighted during the
significant territory from which to operate against the West.10 Terrorism

11 September 2001 attacks on the United States perpetrated by Al-Qaeda. And despite interventions in Afghanistan and elsewhere to eradicate the Al-

the organization has evolved into a series of loosely affiliated (or franchised)
groups, each with its own objectives. Some states feel the threat of terrorism more
than others, and the direction from which it emanates is different. For example, of
particular concern to France is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which has been
Qaeda threat,

working to destabilize key areas in North Africa , and which led to Frances intervention in Mali. The United
States and the United Kingdom are more focused on ISIS/L in Iraq and Syria as well
as radical groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cyber attacks In 2007, following the relocation of a
Russian war monument, Estonia experienced a massive denial of service attack that crippled
many of its governmental websites for several days, an act that was particularly
damaging, as a relatively high number of Estonias governmental functions are conducted online. While Russia denied involvement, it did
suggest that Russian patriot hackers beyond the states control might bear some
responsibility for the attacks.11 Less visibly, but no less importantly, cyber attacks
against allied governments, as well as private companies, are on the rise. In 2012, the United
States alone contended with over 10 million attacks against its military networks every day.12 More broadly, cyber attacks appear
increasingly to have become a feature of conflict ; the escalation of physical
hostilities between Russia and Ukraine has been mirrored by a commensurate
increase in online attacks.13 They have also been used by other actors beyond the region including, allegedly, the Chinese and North
Korean governments, and Israel and the US against Irans nuclear programme.14 Given the increasing propensity for government systems, processes and

a central interest
of NATO member states was to prevent and deter the use of weapons of mass
destruction. This is still on the minds of most of them. However, while historically the fear was focused on
Russias potential use of nuclear weapons against NATO members, today it is on
Iran (although given the recent concerns about Russian aggression discussed above, many countries are increasingly
worried about Russias recent moves to modernize its nuclear arsenal ).15 The
question of Irans nuclear capabilities whether they are truly civilian or military in nature has been much
debated since shortly after the overthrow of the shahs regime in 1979 . Regardless of the
nuclear programmes ultimate intent, Iran has also worked to improve its long-range ballistic missile
capabilities, and several of its Shahab missile configurations are capable of reaching
European soil.16 While there is little evidence to suggest that Iran would target Europe with a nuclear capability (if acquired), it appears that
its desire for such a capability stems from the belief that it will both enhance its
security (against regime change by the United States or Israel, for example) and support its aspiration to regional
leadership. It is clear that a nuclear Iran would have a significantly destabilizing
effect on its region. It is not in the Wests interests to have any one power dominate
the Middle East. And the likelihood of further proliferation would increase
significantly were Iran able to gain nuclear weapons capabilities . Critical challenges
information to be put online, this challenge is of growing concern to many. WMD and missile proliferation For decades,

with less consensus Insecurity of natural resources, particularly energy Instability in the Middle East, combined with Russian aggression in its
neighbourhood, have prompted many NATO member states to question the reliability of their energy supplies. This is particularly true with respect to
Europes reliance on Russian natural gas (which accounted for 34 per cent of its imports in 2012), as Moscow has been willing to use its leverage
aggressively in the energy sector to advance its own strategic objectives. Notably, Russia shut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2009, and June 2014
a tactic it has used with some regularity, including against Ukraine in 2006.17 While Russia cited commercial disputes in 2009, several observers at the
time argued that the shutoff was a proxy for much more fundamental issues between the two countries, in particular Ukraines attempts to forge stronger
relations with the West.18 Furthermore, according to its 2030 Energy Strategy, Russia is working actively to diversify away from its reliance upon the
European gas market for its exports. In particular, it is exploring options for building its infrastructure to support increased exports to China and the
Central Asian states.19 If successful, this would translate into significantly less Russian dependence on Europe. Although Europe is working to further
diversify its energy supplies, if it fails to do so adequately, it could in fact become more dependent upon Russia.20 Organized crime Given the
comparative porousness of Europes borders, and the relative ease of illicit transit across the Mediterranean Sea, it is hardly surprising that organized
crime is of paramount concern to a number of NATOs members. Gangs and other organized crime actors can not only corrupt legitimate state institutions
but also construct illicit trans-shipment networks for smuggling anything from drugs to weapons to people. Further, as gangs become more powerful, they
can challenge state authority, especially as addressing their activities often blurs the lines between military and police responses. The US experience with
Central America, and particularly Mexico, is a notable example of how serious organized crime can raise fundamental questions about the ability of a state
to provide security and stability to its population, and have profound consequences for its relations with its neighbours. 3. What Functions Are Needed to
Address These Diverse Challenges? Meeting the security needs laid out above will require NATO to focus on five major functions that, taken together,
provide the capabilities to address them. These are: deterrence and reassurance, crisis management, public diplomacy, resilience, and

reassurance (among allies) is required to counter


the challenges posed by Russia, WMD use, terrorism or cyber attacks . Challenges stemming from
instability in the Middle East are handled, principally, through crisis management. At the same time, NATO members should
endeavour to prevent crises or attacks taking place, or to prepare for them
adequately, through early warning and intelligence-gathering, and crucially,
intelligence-sharing. The alliance must also mitigate the consequences of being unable to do so by building resilience among
early warning and intelligence. For example, deterrence and

members but also with their neighbours and partners. And finally, NATO and its member states will require much more sophisticated public diplomacy

capabilities if they are to explain to their citizens the alliances enduring relevance as well as countering the narratives of adversaries. Deterrence and

Defending the territorial integrity of all members remains one of NATOs


foremost tasks. It will require the alliance to deter aggression as well as reassure
members. However, deterrence was never, and will never be, easy to execute, requiring
NATO to demonstrate capability and credibility.21 Complicating this challenge is the fact that deterrence
needs to work against many types of actors, and the strategies for doing so can differ and require a variety of assets. Deterrence and
reassurance are necessary tasks against states such as Russia as well as non-state
actors including terrorist groups such as ISIS/L and Al-Qaeda . Given the decline in military spending
among NATO members over recent years, many have questioned whether the alliance has the
capability to deter its adversaries. This is particularly true in the case of Russia where, as Secretary General Anders Fogh
reassurance

Rasmussen noted recently at Chatham House, since 2008, Russia has increased its defence spending by around 50 per cent while, on average, NATO

While NATO members together still spend 10 times


more on their armed forces than Russia does on its military, the picture is
significantly less imbalanced if one takes out the US contribution .23 Perhaps
of more concern, however, are worries over the alliances will to use its assets
and, given the size of the coalition at 28 members and the consensus decision-making structure, the speed with which it is
able to do so. Following Russias actions over Ukraine, many countries in Europe have found making decisions to act against it tough to make
politically, given their dependence on it for energy supplies. Thus NATO must have the capability to target an
adversarys critical points of vulnerability as well as to demonstrate its political
resolve to take action. Many have suggested that in the past two decades, following the end of the Cold
War, NATO has forgotten how to deter. Such lessons need to be relearned to
restore credibility. However, while there are some key lessons from the Cold War experience that may be applicable for deterrence
today, NATO and its member states must be careful not to over-rely upon that playbook. As the situation in Ukraine shows, adversaries,
including in this case Russia, have also learned lessons from history, and are finding
ways to work in the grey areas for which specific actions by NATO have not been
defined and where divisions can potentially be created among the allies. NATO
needs to prepare for contingencies politically and militarily that are blurry (or
nonlinear, hybrid warfare), to respond to asymmetric tactics. It must understand the kinds of military capabilities, or
allies have decreased theirs by about 20 per cent.22

combinations of capabilities, that will most effectively deter aggression and develop full-spectrum deterrence. It is likely that a wide variety of tools,
military (from Special Operations Forces to nuclear, and air and sea policing) and non-military, will be necessary. NATO will also need to coordinate its
actions with non-military organizations such as the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the World Bank, that are

In addition to military
resources, a robust public relations strategy will be necessary to underscore the
alliances political credibility, consensus and the international legitimacy of any
actions taken. It will also have to respond to the public narrative of an adversary (something that Russia has used very effectively over the past
better positioned to leverage economic and other instruments to bring greater pressure to bear on an adversary.

decade, if not longer) and make transparent not just to elites but also to the public the intentions and objectives of the NATO response and limit any sense
of provocation. As noted, it is not just states that need deterring. So too do terrorist groups or other non-state actors that might use weapons such as
cyber attacks against NATO members. In many respects these actors are harder to deter. It is often more difficult to prove that they are the instigator of

deterring them is
likely to require fewer large-scale military capabilities but far more
targeted resources , including, as will be elaborated below, intelligence
and resilience. However, being able to identify and then act against these
groups is a necessary part of the deterrence portfolio. Crisis management Crisis management
will also remain a fundamental task for NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become involved in or
led a number of such operations. All of these missions from Bosnia and
Herzegovina to Kosovo and Libya have been responses to mounting instability,
and have translated into a variety of different mission types, from peacekeeping
(Bosnia) to peace enforcement (Bosnia and Kosovo) to preventing mass atrocities
(Kosovo and, to some extent, Libya). All these missions have required rapidly
deployable expeditionary capabilities. And, with the exception of Libya, the initial intervention was followed by a
any attack, and targeting them is more challenging as they often lack a clearly defined territory. Therefore,

longer-term ground force presence. As noted above, todays crisis-management challenges are focused principally around the Middle East and North
Africa. Yet the experience in Afghanistan, as well as other operations, indicates that success on the ground requires a comprehensive effort involving the
provision of military security as well as commensurate improvements in local governance and, in some instances, economic conditions. These latter tasks
are well beyond NATOs military remit. Therefore, the organization must not only be capable of performing expeditionary military operations; it must also
be able to work closely and effectively with other partners on the ground, including host governments, other international organizations such as the United
Nations, the EU or the African Union, nongovernmental organizations and non-NATO partners, in order to manage crises effectively and prevent their

Ensuring the longer-term success of future NATO crisis-management


operations will still require a number of capabilities that are rapidly deployable,
sustainable and able to operate effectively in the grey areas that characterize that
space between war and peace which is most often found in crisis-management
scenarios. These include intelligence-gathering capabilities focused on
understanding the interpersonal and inter-tribal dynamics of local populations as
well as personnel capable of helping military forces plan, liaise and coordinate with
non-NATO actors on areas outside its core competence . As with deterrence, crisis
management also requires quick decision-making in order to respond to swiftly
changing environments. This is true in the political and military arenas. NATO must find ways to improve on its decision-making
recurrence.

structures and processes, to allow it to respond more effectively to such events. While much progress has been made (as Secretary General Rasmussen
noted recently, it took six months for NATO to agree to respond to the events in Bosnia, but only six days to respond to those in Libya24), much more is
still needed. This is particularly true with respect to how NATOs crisismanagement operations are conducted: political-level consensus has often been
required for approval on operational or tactical-level matters, often constraining the ability of military commanders to act or react quickly to changing
developments on the ground. Resilience A necessary, yet often overlooked aspect of defence planning pertains to a states ability to withstand and
recover from a catastrophic attack or accident. By demonstrating that such an event would not critically impair its functioning or change its decisionmaking, the rationale for an attack is ultimately undermined. Building resilience is therefore a critical task for NATO as a whole, as well as for its partners;
NATO can and should assist with the latter. Building resilience within NATO Given the myriad strategic challenges that NATO members face, resilience to
threats must be built in a number of areas, including withstanding an attack on a members territorial integrity as well as the ability to recover from cyber
and terrorist attacks. It further includes managing the consequences of restricted energy supplies and economic shocks or downturns, which can often be
used as an instrument of leverage against NATO members (or partners). Increasingly, given the instability on NATOs eastern and southern flanks, member

In many, if not most, cases


NATO will not take the lead on activities to build resilience. It must partner
with other agencies, including the justice ministries, foreign offices,
treasuries and intelligence agencies of member states, in order to build a
cohesive and coherent resilience strategy. NATO must also work with other multilateral organizations, such
states must also be able to handle potentially significant migration and refugee flows.

as the United Nations, World Bank and EU as it does so. Effective consequence management does have an important military component, particularly in
the event of a catastrophic attack where military forces are often called upon to support first responders, such as fire brigades and police. But there are
also aspects of resilience for which the military must lead cross-governmental emergency responses. Building the capacity to respond to and counter a
radiological or nuclear device starts with the military. So too, resilience in the cyber world requires strong engagement between the military, civilian
government and private sector. One of the most important aspects of resilience, particularly among NATO members, is political in nature. While there is a
strong role for the military in building resilience in advance, it is often the political response to an attack, which the military can support, that matters
most. Military actions provide the reassurance to politicians that they will be able to withstand such an attack. But this requires significant political
coordination and collaboration among allies and partners before a crisis takes place. Without this, political leaders are left responding on the hoof and are
thus more uncertain at times when what is most needed is clarity. This, however, can be provided if there is a firm understanding of appropriate
procedures in advance. NATO should thus consider testing more routinely the North Atlantic Councils ability to respond to a crisis (perhaps in coordination
with others such as the EU), particularly through scenario-based exercises on matters that are likely to require a strong military component, such as a
radiological or nuclear attack. Building resilience with partners and neighbours As the events in Ukraine have shown, NATO also needs to strengthen
further the resilience of its immediate neighbours and other friends and partners, not least with respect to their own military and security capabilities.
NATO has already done much work in this area: over the past two decades, it has built working relationships with several countries, particularly former
Soviet states but also Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to build their defence institutions and underscore key principles, such as civilian authority over
military instruments. These activities are broadly labelled security sector reform. In so doing, NATO members have also established valuable military-tomilitary connections and partnerships. Instability along Europes periphery is due in part to weakening state institutions. As government entities become
less capable of managing internal security, non-state actors including terrorist and insurgent groups are finding ways to fill the vacuum. Thus it is
important for NATO to invest in enhancing and supporting the security establishments of its neighbours. Recent events in Iraq, where the Iraqi Security
Forces collapsed in the face of a smaller group of ISIS/L fighters, demonstrate not only how difficult it can be to build and sustain security institutions
effectively, but also the importance NATO must give to such missions. Failure to build effective institutions can have significant strategic repercussions for
NATO and its member states. Building the capabilities of NATOs partners and neighbours thus has the benefit of minimizing the chance that members
might be called on to act outside NATOs geographic area. It also ensures that NATO can augment its capabilities through good relationships with militaries
beyond its membership wherever this is needed or useful. Furthermore, as threats and challenges are not necessarily constrained by borders, the
resilience of NATOs partners has significant repercussions for that of member states. Building this resilience in traditional and non-traditional areas is thus

The ability of NATO and its


member states to predict when the next crisis will occur has been somewhat
lacking; as General H.R. McMaster noted in May 2012, We have a perfect record in predicting future wars [...] And that record is zero percent.25 The
a vital task for NATO to meet current and future challenges Early warning and intelligence

tendency to predict and prepare for the next attack on the basis of the manner in which the last crisis unfolded is strong. It is vital that NATO learns from,
and builds on, lessons from Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine. But the alliance also needs to draw from much of the longer-term thinking that it and its
member states have been doing to focus on the less immediate but still tangible threats ahead. This requires better intelligence and early-warning
capabilities. Many NATO member states, including the United States, have recognized the decline of their intelligence on, and understanding of, Russia

While it is impossible to say whether recent events could have


been prevented had there been more and/or better intelligence and early warning,
it is likely that actions could have been taken early that might have either deterred
since the end of the Cold War.

Russia or prevented the fait accompli in Crimea and protected the eastern part of
Ukraine from what might now develop into a civil war . Equally, improving the understanding of events taking
place in the Middle East and North Africa (and working with other countries in the region and further afield to do this) in order to prevent conflicts from
breaking out or to mitigate them will be increasingly important. Another lesson learned from the recent events in Ukraine is that while the threat there
was not on the screens of NATO or of many Western European countries, those members that are geographically closer to Russia were very aware of it and

It is thus necessary not just to have intelligence, but also


to be able to share it among all members. It seems clear from recent events that a better
balance is needed. At the same time, even if the intelligence is shared, the member
states and NATO must be willing to act on it. Sharing intelligence inevitably causes some security concerns, however,
of scenarios that might unfold.

bearing in mind, for example, that a senior Estonian defence official was discovered to be a Russian mole (four Russian moles have been found in Estonias

intelligence, surveillance and


reconnaissance capabilities are significantly lacking among NATO member
states apart from the United States. The ability to know what is happening on
the ground and then to be able to define the right response and target it accurately
is a vital part of military operations, particularly when they are being conducted in a
civilian environment.
government in recent years).26 Finally, as seen in the operation in Libya,

Russian invasion absent the af causes disintegration of NATO


small concessions to Putin escalate into nuclear strikes
deterrence doesnt apply because Putin perceives that NATO
will abandon Eastern European nations intelligence sharing is
independently necessary to sustain hegemony
- Russia War destroys U.S. Hegemony
- Russia would strike European cities drawing in great
powers
- Low threshold for nuclear war even plebiscite
- Tensions rising now
Tayler 2014 Jeffery Tayler, editor for the Atlantic, cites Andrei Piontkovsky,
former executive director of the Strategic Studies Center in Moscow, 9/4/14, Would
Russia's president really be willing to start World War III?,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/04/putins-nuclear-option/?wp_login_redirect=0
Ever the one to administer bracing doses of Geopolitics 101 to his opponents, especially those inclined to underestimate his nerve,

Putin, at a youth forum north of Moscow last week, reminded the world that "Russia is
one of the most powerful nuclear nations. This is a reality, not just words ." (Indeed it is.)
Fifteen days earlier, on Aug. 14, at a conference in Yalta, the Russian president had told the
assembled factions of the State Duma that he soon planned to "surprise the West with our
new developments in ofensive nuclear weapons about which we do not talk
yet." This came as Russian strategic nuclear bombers and fighter jets have been accused
of violating the airspace of the United States and Western European countries with
mounting frequency, while under the surface of the worlds seas Russian and U.S. nuclear
submarines have been involved in confrontations recalling the worst days of the
Cold War. As NATO leaders convene for their summit in Wales, Russia just announced that its strategic
nuclear forces will hold exercises of unprecedented dimensions this month. And the
President Vladimir

Kremlin, for its part, just declared that it will amend its military doctrine to reflect Russias growing tensions with NATO. What this
means exactly remains unclear, but in view of the rising tensions with the Western alliance, it cannot be good. Russia

has

also been purportedly breaching the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear


Forces Treaty, which prohibits Russia (and the United States) from possessing the
sort of missiles that could be used against targets in Europe . If Barack Obama
entered the White House hoping to reduce atomic weapons stockpiles and make the world a
safer place, it looks like he will leave it with a Russia boasting a more lethal arsenal of
nuclear weapons than at any time since the Cold War . But Putin would never actually use nuclear
weapons, would he? The scientist and longtime Putin critic Andrei Piontkovsky, a former executive director of the Strategic Studies

Piontkovsky
published a troubling account of what he believes Putin might do to win the current
standoff with the West and, in one blow, destroy NATO as an organization and
finish off whats left of Americas credibility as the worlds guardian of peace. In view of the Russian
Center in Moscow and a political commentator for the BBC World Service, believes he might. In August,

leaders recent remarks and provocative actions, the scenario Piontkovsky lays out becomes terrifyingly relevant. Worse, if the

Piontkovsky explains the


positions of the two camps presenting Putin with advice about how to resolve the Ukraine crisis.
The first, the "Peace Party," as he calls it, composed of those occupying posts in influential think tanks, including, in
this case, Sergey Karaganov, the head of Moscows Higher School of Economics, urges Putin to declare victory in
Ukraine now and thereby end the conflict. Having taken note of the lengths to which Moscow will go to
prevent Ukraine from slipping out of its orbit, NATO will almost certainly never invite the former
Soviet republic to join its ranks, the Peace Party argues. And Russia has already won tacit
acceptance from the international community of its acquisition of Crimea . Piontkovsky
dismisses out of hand the possibility of Putin pursuing this solution. If Putin chose to go this route, he would
look defeated, and looming before him would be the fate of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was deposed and forced
trigger events described come to pass, it becomes logical, maybe even inevitable.

into retirement following his failed, and nearly catastrophic, 1962 attempt to secure communism in Cuba by stationing nuclear

the "War Party," however, gives the president


two options. The first, writes Piontkovsky, is a "romantic and inspiring scenario: World War IV between the Orthodox Russian
missiles there. The other camp putting pressure on Putin,

World, now risen from its knees, against the rotting and decadent Anglo-Saxon World." (World War III, in his view, has already
happened: the Cold War.) This World War IV would be a conventional war with NATO and it would
not go well. Given NATOs superior armed forces and Russias comparative economic, scientific, and technological weaknesses, a
conventional campaign would, Piontkovsky concludes, end with Russias defeat. That leaves Putin only one option: a nuclear attack.
Not a massive launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United States or Western Europe, which would bring about a suicidal
atomic holocaust, but a small, tactical strike or two against a NATO member that few in the West would be willing to die to protect.
Piontkovsky surmises that, in such a conflict, the nuclear-armed country with the "superior political will" to alter the geopolitical
"status quo" and most importantly with the "greater indifference to values concerning human lives" would prevail. Any guesses

what would trigger a Russian attack? According to Piontkovskys scenario, it


could be something as simple as a plebiscite: the Estonian city of Narva,
overwhelmingly ethnically Russian and adjacent to Russia, deciding to hold a
referendum on joining the Motherland. To help them "freely express their will" at the
polls, Russia could send in a brigade of "little green men armed to the teeth," much like
it did in Crimea in March. Estonia would thereupon invoke Article 5 of the NATO charter " an
armed attack against one or more [NATO members] shall be considered an attack
against them all" and demand that the alliance defend it. Speaking in the Estonian capital of Tallinn on the eve of NATOs
which country that would be? But

summit in Wales, this is just what Obama promised. "The defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense

Suddenly, the most terrifying nightmare becomes


reality: NATO faces war with Russia. How would Putin then react? Piontkovsky believes that NATO
would balk at attacking Moscow over a small country remote from NATOs heartland
and the hearts of its citizens. Piontkovsky imagines the course of action open to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Obama
of Berlin and Paris and London," he said.

as he contemplates unleashing a planetary holocaust over a "damned little city no one has even heard of" while the American public
cries out, "We dont want to die for fucking Narva, Mr. President!" Piontkovsky also cites a German public opinion poll asking what
Berlin should do if Estonia enters an armed conflict with Russia: 70 percent would want their country to remain neutral.

Piontkovsky then tries to envision the situation in which Putin would find himself if
NATO intervened to drive his little green men from Narva. Would Putin commit
suicide by letting his missiles fly against the United States? No. Rather, he would

respond with a limited nuclear strike against a couple of European capitals not
London or Paris, but smaller ones, presumably in Eastern European countries that
have only recently joined NATO. Warsaw, against which Russia has already conducted a drill simulating a Russian
nuclear attack, first comes to mind. Or, say, Vilnius, Lithuanias capital. The point is, Putin would bet on decisionmakers in Washington, Berlin, London, and Paris not retaliating with nuclear weapons against
Russia if it had "only" hit a city or two most Westerners have barely heard of and
certainly do not want to die for. The outcome of Putins putative gambit is that NATO
efectively capitulates. The alliances credibility as guarantor of security
for its member states would be utterly destroyed, as would U.S.
hegemony, which largely rests on the threat of using force. Putin would then be free to do what
he wanted in Ukraine and anywhere else he perceived Russias interests to be threatened.

Legitimate unipolarity is key to a stable world order


Finnemore 9, professor of political science and international affairs at George
Washington University
Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole
Isnt All Its Cracked Up to Be, World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1,
http://home.gwu.edu/~finnemor/articles/2009_unipolarity_wp.pdf, EC
Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and
relational phenomenon. Ones position or power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The
concept only has meaning in a particular social context. Actors, even unipoles, cannot
create legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be given by others. It is conferred either by peers, as
The Legitimacy of Power and the Power of Legitimacy

when great powers accept or reject the actions of another power, or by those upon whom power is exercised.

Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout history. Tradition, blood, and claims of
divine right have all provided reasons to confer legitimacy, although in contemporary politics conformity with
international norms and law is more influential in determining which actors and actions will be accepted as

Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not mean these others necessarily
like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit acceptance of the
social structure in which power is exercised. One may not like the inequalities of global capitalism
legitimate. 9

but still believe that markets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful economic growth. One may
not like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but still understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this
concession to power asymmetries. We can see the importance of legitimacy by thinking about its absence.

Active rejection of social structures and the withdrawal of recognition of their


legitimacy create a crisis. In domestic politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises
face resistance, whether passive or active and armed. Internationally, systems
suffering legitimacy crises tend to be violent and noncooperative. Post-Reformation
Europe might be an example of such a system. Without at least tacit acceptance of powers legitimacy, the
wheels of international social life get derailed. Material force alone remains to
impose order, and order creation or maintenance by that means is difficult, even
under unipolarity. Successful and stable orders require the grease of some legitimation structure to persist
and prosper.10 The social and relational character of legitimacy thus strongly colors the nature of any unipolar
order and the kinds of orders a unipole can construct. Yes, unipoles can impose their will, but only to an extent.

The willingness of others to recognize the legitimacy of a unipoles actions and


defer to its wishes or judgment shapes the character of the order that will emerge.
Unipolar power without any underlying legitimacy will have a very particular character. The unipoles policies will
meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn. Cooperation will be induced only through material
quid pro quo payoffs. Trust will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run and few

More often unipoles attempt to articulate some set of values


and shared interests that induce acquiescence or support from others, thereby
unipoles have tried to do so.

legitimating their power and policies . In part this invocation of values may be strategic;
acceptance by or overt support from others makes exercise of power by the unipole cheaper
and more effective. Smart leaders know how to sell their policies. Wrapping policies in
shared values or interests smoothes the path to policy success by reassuring skeptics.11 Rhetoric about shared
interests in prosperity and economic growth accompanies efforts to push free trade deals on unwilling partners

Rhetoric about shared love of human rights and democracy accompanies


pushes for political reforms in other states. In their examination of debates leading up to the
and publics.

2003 Iraq war in this issue of World Politics, Jack Snyder, Robert Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon provide an example
of unipolar attempts to create legitimacy through strategic use of rhetoric. They show how evocative and evasive
rhetoric allowed proponents of the war to imply links between the 9/11 attacks, weapons of mass destruction, and
Saddam Husseins regime. Potentially unpopular or controversial policies were rationalized by situating them in a
larger strategic vision built on more widely held values, as when the authors of the 2002 National Security
Strategy memorandum wove together the global war on terror, the promotion of American democratic values
abroad, and the struggle against authoritarian regimes to create a justification for preventive war.12 Indeed, as
Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson argue, rhetorical sales pitches of this kind can be highly coercive. Examining
the same case (the selling of the Iraq war), Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz show how the administrations war-onterror discourse, which cast the U.S. as a blameless victim (attacked for who we are rather than anything we
did), was designed in such a way as to leave opponents with very few arguments they could use to rally effective

Decision makers
and publics in the unipole actually hold these values and believe their own rhetoric
to some significant degree. Unipole states, like all states, are social creatures. They are composed of
opposition in Congress.13 Usually this articulation of values is not simply a strategic ploy.

domestic societies that cohere around some set of national beliefs. Their leaders are products of those societies
and often share those beliefs. Even where leaders may be skeptical, they likely became leaders by virtue of their
abilities to rally publics around shared goals and to construct foreign and domestic policies that reflect domestic
values. Even authoritarian (and certainly totalitarian) regimes articulate shared goals and function only because
of the web of social ties that knit people together. Certainly all recent and contemporary strong states that could
be candidates for unipolesthe U.S., China, Russia, Germany, and Britaindo.14 Thus unipole states, like all
states, find naked self-aggrandizement or even the prescriptions of Machiavellian virt difficult to pursue.15

Even
national interest as most people and states conceive of it involves some broader
vision of social good beyond mere self-aggrandizement. Americans like to see democracy
Unipoles and the people who lead them pursue a variety of goals derived from many different values.

spread around the world in part for instrumental reasonsthey believe a world of democracies is a safer, more
prosperous world for Americansand also for normative onesthey believe in the virtues of democracy for all.
Likewise, Americans like to see markets open in part for instrumental reasonsthey believe a world of markets
will make Americans richerand also for normative onesthey believe that markets are the ticket out of poverty.
Much of unipolar politics is thus likely to revolve around the degree to which policies promoting the unipoles goals
are accepted or resisted by others. Other states and foreign publics may need to be persuaded, but often
influential domestic constituencies must also be brought on board. Channels for such persuasion are many and
varied, as is evident from past U.S. diplomatic efforts to sell its policies under bipolarity. The shift from laissezfaire to what John Ruggie terms the embedded liberal compromise as the basis for the U.S.-led economic order
after WWII required extensive diplomatic effort to persuade other states and New Yorks financial elite to go along.
The tools of influence used to accomplish this were sometimes material but also intellectual and ideological. It

the shared social purposes of these economic arrangements that gave them
legitimacy among both state and societal actors cross-nationally.16 A unipoles policies
are thus circumscribed on two fronts. The policies must reflect values held at home, making
them legitimate domestically. At the same time, in order to induce acquiescence or
support from abroad, they must appeal to the leaders and publics of other states.
was

Constructing policies across these two spheresdomestic and internationalmay be more or less difficult,

range of choices satisfying both constituencies is


unlikely to be large. Widespread disaffection on either front is likely to create
significant legitimacy costs to leaders, either as electoral or stability threats domestically or as
depending on circumstances, but the

decreased cooperation and increased resistance internationally. Creating legitimacy for its policies is thus essential
for the unipole but it is also difficult, dangerous, and prone to unforeseen consequences. Domestically, the need
to cement winning coalitions in place has polarized U.S. politics, creating incentives to exploit wedge issues and
ideological narratives. As Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon describe, neoconservatives, particularly after 9/11,
used these tools to great effect to generate support for the Bush administrations policies. Such ideologicallydriven persuasion efforts entail risks, however. Constructing coherent ideological narratives often involves

sidelining inconvenient facts, what Snyder and his coauthors call fact bulldozing. This is more than just
highlighting some facts at the expense of others. It may (or may not) begin with that aim, but it can also involve
changing the facts people believe to be true, as when large numbers of people came to believe that weapons of
mass destruction were indeed found in Iraq. Thus, to the degree that these persuasion efforts are successful, if
their ideology does not allow them to entertain contrary facts, policymakers and publics may make decisions
based on bad information. This kind of self-delusion would seem unlikely to result in smart policy. To the extent
that ideological narratives become entrenched, these delusions may extend to future generations of policymakers
and make them victims of blowback. Even if successors come to terms with the facts, they may be entrapped by
the powerful legitimating rhetoric constructed by their predecessors.17

Transparency is key to overall intel cooperation


Seagle 15 (Adriana N. Seagle, 5/15/2015, adjunct prof. international relations @
Virginia Tech, Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School
Perspective, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Volume
28, Issue 3, 2015)
Some argue that the future of information belongs, not to the greatest
collectors of information, but to those who share the information
efectively with their partners.40 Most of the concerns regarding intelligence sharing expressed by
policymakers reveal that intelligence sharing is not open, transparent, or
frequent . Mistrust, lack of common infrastructure, and technology are
among the key barriers to greater efficiency in intelligence sharing.
Though a necessary security capability in the 21st century networked
world, the shift from need to know to need to share has not been
smooth. Even in the U.S., sharing has occurred in intermittent stages that
involve information provided with a lack of context, information
decentralization, and distribution and flexibility across agency lines that
inhibit attempts to understand the meaning of information . Henceforth, U.S.
practitioners argue that the creation of a bigger picture is now possible, as the virtual reorganization of information
sharing and automatic alerts to enable data to find data.41

1AC Plan
The United States federal government should require de novo
review of FISC domestic surveillance determinations that
involve significant construction of any statue or judicial
precedent by the FISCR including:
- a rebuttable presumption in favor of curtailing
surveillance after a statutory 180 day review period, and
- a requirement that FISCR publicly releases the legal
justification for any determination that contravenes a
person's expectation of privacy

Contention 3 Solvency
Plans process of reform is key it rebalances separation of
powers and efectively constrains surveillance
McNeal 2/16 (Gregory McNeal PhD, professor of law at Pepperdine University
School of Law, 2/16/15, REFORMING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURTS INTERPRETIVE SECRECY PROBLEM, http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/McNeal_Final.pdf)
The government cannot be faulted for
following the system that was put into place by Congress, but the system
is nevertheless faulty. Congress created a structure whereby the
government can argue in an ex parte proceeding for an expansive interpretation of a
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE FISCS STATUTORY ANALYSIS

statute, the initial application will only be reviewed by one judge, and that judge can issue an order in secret,

That system is destined to fail because it


lacks democratic accountability. It is also suboptimal as it is bound to create poorly reasoned
without fearing appellate review or public rebuke.

judgments and opinions. The PCLOBs analysis and critique of the governments relevance arguments

independent review of substantive decisions can yield more


careful opinions. The PCLOB looked at the governments interpretation of relevance and wrote, no
case that we have found supports the interpretation of relevance
embodied in the NSAs program.53 Moreover, the PCLOB stated, none of the
governments arguments, in our view, supports a definition of relevant
as broad as the one the government profers.54 Examining the statutory requirement for
demonstrates how

relevance, the PCLOB wrote: First, had Congress wished to inscribe a standard of relevance in Section 215 even
less exacting than those developed in analogous legal contexts, it could have done so. But contemporary
statements from legislators, highlighted by the government itself, evince an intent to match Section 215 to the
standards used in those contexts. The reference to grand jury subpoenas added to the statute in 2006 was meant
to reassure those with concerns about the scope of Section 215 that the statute was consistent with practice in
other fields.55 This statement by the PCLOB is not remarkable on its face. In fact it is the type of analysis one

Thus it is
remarkable that this argument did not occur to the FISC. But, when
presented with only one side of an argument, and not fearing appellate
review , one can understand how the FISC got their analysis wrong .
would expect an opposing party to raise in court, or a judge to raise on appellate review.

Furthermore, the PCLOB looked at the statutory reasonable grounds to believe standard, again engaging in basic statutory analysis
of the type that an opposing party or appellate court would engage in. The PCLOB stated: By demanding only reasonable grounds
to believe, rather than certainty, that items sought are relevant to an investigation, the statute ensures that Section 215 is
consistent with the analogous civil and criminal contextswhere the requester need not show that every item sought actually is
relevant in an evidentiary sense, but merely that the items reasonably may be. The statutes reference to a reasonable belief about
the items requested shows that it contemplates the same scenario faced in the subpoena and discovery arenas: the government
seeks a category of items that it reasonably suspects, but cannot be sure, includes material pertinent to its investigation. That
scenario, and the legal standards that govern it, still require some factual correlation between the category of documents defined by
the government and the circumstances of the investigation for which they are sought.56 Again, the PCLOB engaged in statutory
analysis, not complex legal reasoning. In so doing, it found that not only was the governments definition of relevance too expansive,
but it also found that compelling providers to continuously hand over records to the government was also incompatible with the
statutory text. While the PCLOB recognized the compelling nature of national security threats, such considerations in the view of the
PCLOB did not call for the wholesale elimination of rele- vance as a meaningful check on the governments acquisition of items.57
In other words, the statutory protections Congress created (specifically relevance) were important to the statutory scheme Congress
contemplated and that the public expects. The PCLOB made reference to the statutory text and the changes Congress made to
that text, noting in a footnote that: Congress amended Section 215 to clarify that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that
records obtained under the statute are relevant to an investigation, not merely sought for an investigation; it further required a
statement of facts supporting that belief . . . . It inserted the concept of relevance into the statute not to broaden it, but to

No
matter how critical national security investigations are, therefore, some
reassure those with concerns that the statute was tethered to concepts well known in other areas.58 The PCLOB continued:

articulable principle must connect the items sought to those


investigations, or else the word relevant is robbed of meaning . Congress
added a relevance requirement to Section 215 in 2006 knowing full well that the statute governs national security
investigations. It cannot, therefore, have meant for the importance of such investigations to efface that requirement

how could the FISC have missed the ball on the


statutory analysis of section 215? The problem is structural. When a court
is presented with only one side of an argument, it is solely on that judge
to get the argument right. One potential solution would be to have an independent advocate appear
entirely.59 In light of this reasoning,

before the court. Another solution that can serve a similar function would be to require appellate review and
presumptive transparency on all significant FISC opinions; presumptive appellate review is the subject of the next
V. INTERPRETIVE SECRECY AND THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND REVIEWABILITY Interpretive
secrecy is a significant problem in terms of democratic accountability . As
Senator Ron Wyden once said, secret operations and secret law are very diferent
things . . . . Secret law is wrong. Our laws are supposed to be public.60 That quote draws into focus the dividing

section.

line for determining the appropriateness of secrecy on the FISC. While there are good arguments for keeping

secrecy must give way when a circumstance like that


witnessed in the section 215 program results in unelected judges with life
tenure interpreting laws in such a way that they go against the text of the
law as written. Laws simply should not be interpreted in secret, without an opportunity for the public to
matters before the FISC secret,

know that the law that is on the books differs substantially from the law that is actually being used to justify a
surveillance program. If the nation is to have democratic accountability, it requires appellate review of judgments
and orders that do not comport with the law as it is written, and transparency regarding those judgments or orders.

When a secret court accepts a


counterintuitive reading of a law one that could not possibly be guessed
by reading the statutory language alone, and which invests the
government with significant new powers permitting congressional
reenactment to enshrine that novel interpretation deprives the public of
any ability to know that the law is, much less have any voice in changing
it.61 In light of the problems outlined above, this essay makes two arguments. First, all
FISC orders and opinions which rely upon or create a significant legal
construction or interpretation should be subject to automatic de novo
review by the FISCR. Second, all FISC orders and opinions should be
presumptively public, subject to appropriate redactions, with such
redactions automatically subject to de novo review by the FISCR . These two
proposals will not solve all of the problems associated with the FISC, however they will serve to
enhance the accountability of the FISC, will promote transparency, and
will ensure better outcomes. It is axiomatic to suggest that when a judge
knows that his or her opinion is subject to review and disclosure, he or she
will write in a way to address all sides of an argument . VI. A PROPOSED
TRIGGER FOR PRESUMPTIVE REVIEW FISA already includes a standard for
significant legal interpretations albeit one for disclosure of matters before
the FISC and FISCR to Congress, not one for presumptive appellate review;
however that standard could be adopted to create a trigger for presumptive
review of FISC opinions. The significant legal interpretations standard was written into law in the
As the PCLOB stated in their review of the section 215 program:

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).62 That law required the Attorney General to
provide a summary of significant legal interpretations of FISA involving matters before the FISC or the Court of
Review.63 The summary must include interpretations presented in applications or pleadings filed with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review by the Department of
Justice.64 The law requires disclosure of opinions or orders if they include significant construction or
interpretation of FISA.65

This standard of significant construction or

interpretation of FISA could be modified to become a trigger for


appellate review by requiring that all opinions of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that involve significant construction or interpretation of
any statute or judicial precedent are subject to de novo review by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review . Automatic review of
lower court opinions is not unheard of in the national security cases. For
example, in courts martial proceedings, trials that result in a conviction are auto- matically reviewed by the
convening authority, and the convening authority has discretion to mitigate the findings and sentence.66
Furthermore, if the sentence imposed by the convening authority includes death, dishonorable or bad conduct
discharge, or confinement for one year or more, the case is automatically reviewed by an intermediate court.67

A de novo
standard of review is appropriate for surveillance activities as it allows
multijudge panels that permit reflective dialogue and collective judgment with regard
to legal issues.68 As the Supreme Court has explained, [i]ndependent appellate review of
legal issues best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and
economy of judicial administration, and while the Supreme Court was not
speaking of surveillance, its admonitions regarding appellate review are
perhaps stronger in the context of national security.69 However, national security
Those courts review cases for legal error, factual sufficiency and sentence appropriateness.

surveillance oftentimes requires rapid action on the part of the courts; thus while this essay argues that FISC
opinions should be presumptively reviewed, the order or opinion issued by the FISC should be immediately

A FISC judge should have the ability to


stay his order or opinion, subject to FISCR review, but absent such an
order by the judge, the opinion or order on the substantive surveillance
matter should be efective immediately. This idea draws from concepts
found in the ordinary course of appellate review of administrative action
where appellate review is only available after an administrative action is
final.70 In fact, under the Administrative Procedure Act, final agency action is a prerequisite to most causes
effective, and finalized pending review by the FISCR.

of action.71 Again, an analogy to administrative law practice can help to make clear how the reviewability here

two
conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be final: First, the
action must mark the consummation of the agencys decisionmaking
processit must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And
second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow .72 This essays
proposal of automatic appellate review upon issuing of an opinion or order
satisfies the finality standard of Bennett in that once the FISC authorizes a
surveillance activity, the agency is free to act on the opinion or order, and
legal consequences clearly flow from actions on that opinion or order. The
would function. Consider what the Supreme Court held in Bennett v. Spear: As a general matter,

only issue raised by this essays proposed process is that the opinion or order has the effects of a final order, but is
not in fact finalized until the FISCR completes its review. VII. PRESUMPTIVE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS With regard

all opinions and orders of the FISC should


be presumptively published, subject to appropriate redactions, and such
redactions may require non-publication of entire opinions . However, all redaction
to publication of opinions, this essay argues that

and non-publication decisions are, like the significant legal interpretations discussed above, subject to automatic

The rationale supporting this presumption of publication is, in


part, the same as that which supports the presumptive publication of
significant legal interpretations, specifically, judges who know their
opinions are going to be reviewed will write those opinions in a way that is
intended to survive judicial review. Second, by statutorily presuming that opinions are to be
appellate review.

published, subject to appropriate redactions, the FISCR is now placed in the position of seeking ways to publish

opinions, making only those redactions that are necessary to protect national security. This is admittedly a more
difficult task for the FISCR than the task of reviewing orders and opinions. Consider what David Kris and J. Douglas

Some of
the most significant legal issues under FISA arise at the intersection of
(old) law and (new) technology , and FISA applications must discuss such
issues if the Intelligence Community develops a new classified source or
method of acquiring information that is subject to FISA . To take a fanciful case for
Wilson have written with regard to disclosure of FISA related information to the Judiciary Committees:

purposes of illustration, imagine that the National Security Agency develops a new device that can read minds from
a distance, like a kind of mental boom microphone. Information concerning this device would surely be classified

Before NSA could


deploy the device inside the United States, government lawyers would
need to confront the question whether its use constitutes electronic
surveillance under FISA. If, as seems likely, the lawyers concluded that such use is electronic
surveillance, they would file an application with the FISC explaining the new
technology and proposing minimization procedures for its operation . A
Top Secret and also designated as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

summary of that FISA application, or of the interpretation of FISA from within it, would be hard to create without
revealing the existence of the device. Such a revelation, of course, could compromise the use of the device, as
spies, terrorists, and ordinary persons who value their privacy would immediately don tin-foil hats as a
countermeasure.73

FISC is currently a rubber stamp court reforms are key


Conor Clarke, 2/28/2014, J.D. Candidate @ Yale Law School, Is the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and
the FISC Win Rate, 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 125,
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-courtreally-rubber-stamp-ex-parte-proceedings-and-fisc-win
A striking feature of proceedings at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is that the
executive always wins. Between 1979 and 2012the first thirty-three years of the FISCs existence
federal agencies submitted 33,900 ex parte requests to the court.[1] The judges denied eleven and granted the

a 99.97% rate of approval. This win rate, enviable even to the Harlem
Globetrotters, is almost always interpreted as evidence that that the court is failing
to do its job. In the media, in legal scholarship, and in Congress, there is a
widespread sense that a court in which the executive always wins can be nothing more than a
rubber stamp.[2] That perception is now helping fuel legislative reforms . Both the
House and Senate are considering bills to reform the FISC .[3] In January 2014, President
Obama added wind to their sails by endorsing a proposal to let outside advocates
appear before the court.[4] And, in a nod to the fact that FISC skepticism runs deep,
the President expressed openness to working with Congress on a broader set of
changes at the court.
rest:

Your disads are nonunique surveillance bills are being passed


and debated in Congress
- Disad non-unique: Surveillance bills have already been
debated and passed in Congress
- No link Plan popular with the public
- Bipartisan support for the plan
- Intelligence capabilities can be balanced with privacy
concerns
- Momentum for curtailment reforms now
JENNIFER STEINHAUER and JONATHAN WEISMAN, 6/2/2015, reporters @
NYT, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is Sharply Limited, NYT,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passeshurdle-but-showdown-looms.html?_r=0
In a significant scaling back of national security policy formed after
the Senate on Tuesday approved legislation curtailing
the federal governments sweeping surveillance of American phone
records, and President Obama signed the measure hours later. The passage of
the bill achieved over the fierce opposition of the Senate majority leader will allow the
government to restart surveillance operations, but with new restrictions.
The legislation signaled a cultural turning point for the nation , almost 14 years
after the Sept. 11 attacks heralded the construction of a powerful national security apparatus. The shift
against the security state began with the revelation by Edward J. Snowden, a
former National Security Agency contractor, about the bulk collection of phone records . The
WASHINGTON

the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,

backlash was aided by the growth of interconnected communication networks run by companies that have felt

the
government must petition a special federal court for permission to search
them. Even with the congressional action, the government will continue to maintain
robust surveillance power, an authority highlighted by Senator Rand Paul, Republican of
Kentucky, whose opposition to the phone records program forced it to be shut
down at 12:01 a.m. Monday. Mr. Paul and other critics of the legislation
said the governments reach into individuals lives remained too intrusive.
manhandled by government prying. The storage of those records now shifts to the phone companies, and

The bill cleared the Senate 67 to 32 after a fierce floor fight; at least four of the opponents voted no because they

Obama was quick to praise passage of the


legislation and to scold those who opposed it. After a needless delay and inexcusable

felt the bill did not go far enough. Mr.

lapse in important national security authorities, my administration will work expeditiously to ensure our national
security professionals again have the full set of vital tools they need to continue protecting the country, Mr. Obama
said. Just as important, enactment of this legislation will strengthen civil liberty safeguards and provide greater
public confidence in these programs. The Senates longest-serving member, Patrick J. Leahy, the seven-term

the legislation, which he co-sponsored, represented the most


significant surveillance reform in decades. The fight for the changes was led largely by
Democrat of Vermont, said

Democrats and a new generation of Republicans in the House and the Senate who were elected a decade after the

privacy concerns, stoked by reports of


widespread computer security breaches at private companies, have shifted public opinion.
National security and privacy are not mutually exclusive , said Senator James
terrorist attacks. Even as threats have multiplied since then,

Lankford, Republican of Oklahoma, a freshman who like several other younger Republicans voted against the senior

senator from his state. They

can both be accomplished through responsible


intelligence gathering and careful respect for the freedoms of law-abiding
Americans. Advertisement Continue reading the main story Tuesdays vote was a rebuke to Senator Mitch
McConnell, Republican of Kentucky and the majority leader, who, until the end in a bitter floor speech, maintained
the bill was a dangerous diminishment of national security. Lawmakers in both parties beat back amendments
one by one that he insisted were necessary to blunt some of the bills controls on government spying. Mr.

McConnell blasted his fellow senators and by association Speaker John


A. Boehner, who heartily endorsed the measure as taking one more tool away from
those who defend our country every day. This is a significant weakening of the tools that
were put in place in the wake of 9/11 to protect the country, he said. I think Congress is misreading the public

even scores of
senators who loathed the actions of Mr. Snowden voted for the legislation .
The legislations goals are twofold: to rein in aspects of the governments
data collection authority and to crack open the workings of the secret
national security court that oversees it. After six months, the phone companies,
not the N.S.A., will hold the bulk phone records logs of calls placed from one number to
another, and the time and the duration of those contacts , but not the content of what was said. A
new kind of court order will permit the government to swiftly analyze them.
mood if they think Americans are concerned about the privacy implications. But

Photo Senators Patrick J. Leahy and Mike Lee conferring outside the Senate chamber while amendments to the
surveillance bill were being wrangled and rejected. Credit Stephen Crowley/The New York Times The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, for the first time, will be required to declassify some of its most significant decisions,

The battle
over the legislation, the USA Freedom Act, made for unusual alliances. Mr.
Boehner joined forces with Mr. Obama, the bipartisan leadership of the
House Judiciary Committee, and a bipartisan coalition of senators against
Mr. McConnell and his Intelligence Committee chairman, Senator Richard
Burr, Republican of North Carolina. Mr. McConnell made a series of
miscalculations, stretching back to last year, when he filibustered a similar
surveillance overhaul measure. Last month, after Republicans blocked consideration of the
and outside voices will be allowed to argue for privacy rights before the court in certain cases.

Freedom Act, Mr. McConnell sent the Senate on a weeklong Memorial Day recess, pushing Washington up against a

That empowered Mr. Paul, who


promised supporters of his presidential campaign that he would singlehandedly ensure that surveillance authority lapsed, a promise on which he delivered.
June 1 deadline, when surveillance authority would lapse.

When Mr. McConnell then argued in favor of amending the Freedom Act, senators in both parties even some who

Mr.
McConnell dragged senators back for an unusual Sunday session, only to
end up with the very bill he tried to kill. This should have been planned on over a week
supported him said any changes would only extend the surveillance blackout and risk the countrys security.

ago, said Senator Bill Nelson, Democrat of Florida, who had backed Mr. McConnells efforts but found his timing
untenable. In a heated meeting of House Republicans on Tuesday morning, one of the architects of the post-Sept.
11 USA Patriot Act, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, angrily told Senator John Barrasso of Wyoming,
an emissary from the Senate leadership, to deliver a message to his colleagues: Any change to the House bill would
be flatly rejected. About a dozen Republican senators most of them recent House members took the warning
to heart, joined Democrats and voted down all of Mr. McConnells proposed changes. As the debate over the bulk
phone records program unfolded, supporters and opponents both trotted out worst case scenarios to make their
argument. Opponents warned that the government could root through the records to learn who was calling
psychiatrists and political groups, while supporters said ending it would lead to terrorist attacks on the United
States. Neither of those warnings was supported by how the program had performed in its nearly 14 years of
existence. Repeated studies found no evidence of intentional abuse for personal or political gain, but also found no
evidence that it had ever thwarted a terrorist attack. Still, the debaters on each side also made other points.
Opponents said that the mere collection of Americans calling records by the government was a privacy violation
and that it risked being abused in the future. Supporters said it had helped flesh out investigations in other ways,
and could still prove to be crucial in the future. Senator Mike Lee, a Utah Republican, and Senator Leahy made it

clear after passage that curtailing the phone sweeps might be only the beginning. The two are collaborating on
legislation to undo a provision in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 that allows the government to
read the contents of email over six months old. House members and senators from both parties are already eyeing
a section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that they say has also been abused by the government. But

opponents of the law said they imagined further fights going forward for
their positions, too. Senator Susan Collins, Republican of Maine, said she
and others would continue to seek reforms and oversight . Its not the
end, she said.

2AC Uniqueness Generic

Legislation

Legislation Inevitable
Litigation over surveillance is high now in all levels of the
federal courts huge list of cases are pending acceptance.
Vladeck 15 Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Scholarship, American University, Washington College of Law, co-authored an
amicus brief on behalf of the Petitioner in In re EPIC, 2015 (THE CASE FOR A FISA
SPECIAL ADVOCATE, Utah Bar, January 5th, Available Online at:
http://litigation.utahbar.org/assets/materials/2015FedSymposium/3b_The%20Case
%20for%20a%20FISA%20special%20advocate.pdf, Accessed: 7-5-2015)
the Snowden disclosures also precipitated a wave of litigation , primarily
focused on the telephone metadata program under section 215. Although the
Supreme Court turned away an early effort by the Electronic Privacy Information
Center to seek direct review of the underlying FISC production orders, three
different district courts have allowed private plaintiffs to challenge the
constitutionality of the metadata program, with the first two dividing as to the merits of the
plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims in decisions handed down 11 days apart in December 2013. Appeals in all
three of those cases are now pending in the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, respectively.
Separate statutory and constitutional challenges to various of the governments
foreign intelligence surveillance activities have also begun to surface in criminal cases,
Unsurprisingly,

especially in light of the Solicitor Generals admission that the Justice Department had not always provided the
notice to criminal defendants required by Congress in cases in which evidence derived from FISA was utilized.

Data leaks and rising executive authority have led to an


increase in challenges to the court.
Greene 14 Michael Greene, Head of eLearning Tools and Strategy Duke
University, Adjunct Faculty Rappahannock Community College, 2014 (WHERE HAS
PRIVACY GONE? HOW SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS THREATEN EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY, Tech and Privacy, Vol 30, Available Online at:
http://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1750&context=jitpl,
Accessed: 7-11-2015)
The initial litigation of the constitutional legitimacy of the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 was met with swift resistance from the executive
branch and the Department of Justice.82 Clapper is the controlling holding and has dealt
a significant blow to what privacy advocates believe is an insurmountable
hurdle.83 These lawsuits did not address the balance of privacy and
national security. The holding in Clapper stopped before discussing the
constitutionality of the FAA, which has left fewer chances for subsequent
litigation to be presented. The challenge for plaintiffs remains establishing an injury in fact to establish Article III
standing. III. ANALYSIS In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the executive branch set
out to bolster the abilities of the various clandestine surveillance
organizations that fall under the umbrella of the NSA.84 As earlier stated, the
actions of the executive branch were to swiftly enlarge the breadth and

capabilities of these surveillance agencies to collect, store, and seek out information or identify
those involved with the terrorist groups or those who had a substantial part in planning or executing the attacks.85 However,
the impact of these newly granted powers has precipitated an extreme
backlash from concerned citizens who feel that their liberties had been
quickly ignored or abandoned. The conflict of these previously secret
programs is deeply rooted in a catch-22 of how to ensure fundamental
rights of privacy while maintaining national security. What is required to
maintain the protection of privacy and the civil liberties of U.S. citizens is
an open forum of debate and a clearly established legal framework for
plaintifs to challenge the substantive processes of NSA surveillance
programs collection of information.88 Public debate is necessary to uphold the nature of why these
programs were created in the first place. As Stephen Baker, former general counsel at the NSA, states: Doing something through
legislation requires that you have an open debate about exactly what limits you're imposing. But if you're going to have an open
debate about what limits you're imposing, you're going to have to talk a lot about your capabilities. And the difficulty we have had
engaging in intelligence under law has been that the debate has gradually revealed more and more of sources and methods, to the
point that it's not clear that we have intelligence under law because we can't gather that much intelligence due to the loss of our
sources and methods ... you have to ask yourself, if I were a target of intelligence, what could I learn from the disclosures to this
point? And almost every one of these disclosures allows you to avoid the intelligence-gathering if you're a target.89 Therefore,
without a public debate or at least discussion of the policies of the various organizations conducting surveillance, the social and

In the months
following Clapper, there has been a deluge of leaked court documents,
memos, NSA documents, and other classified information that shows the
extent of NSA surveillance programs under the FAA.90 The leak of PowerPoint slides,
political backlash from these programs will undermine the reason for the programs' creation.

detailing how the NSA uses its program PRISM to collect and store communications, by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, has
shown that the threat of U.S. persons being swept up in the broad drag net surveillance conducted is a highly likely scenario.9'

These leaks and the subsequent backlash since The Guardian published the PowerPoint slides
have shown enough information for previous plaintifs to reassert their
claims of injury and rechallenge the constitutionality of the FAA.92 The leaks by
Snowden will not be directly addressed in this Comment, but they are important to understand the evolution of the discussion and
the increase in public interest.9

Lawsuits Now
Governmental lawsuits escalating now due to increased
transparency.
Goitein and Patel 15 Elizabeth Goitein, co-directs the Brennan Center for
Justices Liberty and National Security Program. Before coming to the Brennan
Center, Ms. Goitein served as counsel to Sen. Russell Feingold, Chairman of the
Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. and Faiza Patel,
serves as co-director of the Brennan Center for Justices Liberty and National
Security Program. She has testified before Congress opposing the dragnet
surveillance of Muslims, organized advocacy efforts against state laws designed to
incite fear of Islam, and developed legislation creating an independent Inspector
General for the NYPD. Before joining the Brennan Center, Ms. Patel worked as a
senior policy officer at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
2015 (What went wrong with the FISA Court, Brennan Center for Justice, Available
Online at:
http://litigation.utahbar.org/assets/materials/2015FedSymposium/3c_What_Went_
%20Wrong_With_The_FISA_Court.pdf, Accessed: 7-11-2015)
The special procedures governing a defendants access to FISA application
materials, under which a defendant is almost never given any hint of their contents,
should be jettisoned. Instead, the process under the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA)280 which has been used successfully in the most sensitive
national security and espionage cases, and which allows the government to use
summaries or admissions of fact in place of classified information should
apply.281 WhAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT | 47 Finally, the
governments attempt to shut down every civil lawsuit that has been
brought to challenge the constitutionality of foreign intelligence
surveillance must end. Even where plaintifs have had reasonable grounds
to fear that they were being surveilled282 indeed, even where they have
had irrefutable proof283 the government has tried to have the lawsuit
dismissed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked evidence or that the evidence
contained state secrets. Today, after Snowdens disclosures, many secret
programs are public knowledge and dismissing plaintifs fears of
surveillance as speculative is increasingly disingenuous. Moreover,
warrantless surveillance is no longer a secret, it is the law and, given the
broad scope of collection, acknowledging that a plaintif has standing to
challenge FISA surveillance does not reveal the identity of any
investigations target. If ever the governments jurisdictional and national
security defenses had merit, they no longer do.

Regulations Inefective Now

AT: FISC Courts


FISC is perceived as a rubber stamp---that means reforms will
inevitably roll back surveillance because of public outrage
Conor Clarke, 2/28/2014, J.D. Candidate @ Yale Law School, Is the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and
the FISC Win Rate, 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 125,
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-courtreally-rubber-stamp-ex-parte-proceedings-and-fisc-win
A striking feature of proceedings at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is that the
executive always wins. Between 1979 and 2012the first thirty-three years of the FISCs existence
federal agencies submitted 33,900 ex parte requests to the court.[1] The judges denied eleven and granted the

a 99.97% rate of approval. This win rate, enviable even to the Harlem
Globetrotters, is almost always interpreted as evidence that that the court is failing
to do its job. In the media, in legal scholarship, and in Congress, there is a
widespread sense that a court in which the executive always wins can be nothing more than a
rubber stamp.[2] That perception is now helping fuel legislative reforms . Both the
House and Senate are considering bills to reform the FISC .[3] In January 2014, President
Obama added wind to their sails by endorsing a proposal to let outside advocates
appear before the court.[4] And, in a nod to the fact that FISC skepticism runs deep,
the President expressed openness to working with Congress on a broader set of
changes at the court.
rest:

Statutory reform is not enough-still can be exploited.


Sanchez 15 (Julian, senior fellow at Cato Institute (The Symbolic Sunset &
Whats Next for the USA Freedom Act, CATO Institute,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/symbolic-sunset-whats-next-usafreedom-act) HC
From an operational and policy perspective, the sunset really doesnt matter. The bulk
telephony metadata program will end, but they started winding that down a week ago, and will also have to end it
under the USA Freedom Act. For all other purposes ,

grandfather clauses will allow the government


to keep using the expired authorities for all their existing investigations, and even
without that, as I observed at Vices Motherboard last week, theyve got plenty of overlapping
authorities that would allow them to obtain most of the same information . The real
significance of the sunset is symbolic and political: Mitch McConnell clearly believed the same script hes been
reading from for the past decade would still work, that he could fill the Senate schedule with trade promotion
authority and oil pipelines until the eve of the sunset, then use the crisis hed manufactured to strongarm
senators into foregoing substantive debate on reform and voting for reauthorization without any changes, lest our
spies go dark and the terrorist boogeyman du jour lay waste to the homeland. But it turns out Americans arent

The Patriot Act hasnt expiredthree provisions have


lapsed quite temporarilybut the scaremongering strategy that birthed it is now,
happily, well past its sell-by date and starting to emit a noxious odor. That will be
quite so scared of the dark anymore.

important as we head to 2017 and the debate over reauthorization of the FISA
Amendments Act. It now seems plain the USA Freedom Act will pass: the Senate voted to move forward on
the bill by a vote of 7717, opposed only by the strange bedfellows coalition of Rand Paul and 16 of the Senates
most hardcore NSA cheerleaders. McConnell has proposed an array of amendments weakening or diluting it, though
perhaps less because he think theyll pass than because doing so fills the tree for amendments and prevents folks
like Ron Wyden or Rand Paul from offering amendments that would strengthen the bill. Among these are a data
retention notice mandate (which would compel phone companies to notify the government in advance if they plan
to retain call records for less than 18 months, a way of encouraging without strictly requiring retention) and

an

amendment stripping away the crucial transparency provision that requires


publication of significant FISA Court opinions, which is necessary to ensure that new
safeguards cant be secretly reinterpreted into irrelevance the same way the court
secretly transformed 214 and 215 into bulk collection authorities . While unfortunately
there are probably quite a few senators in the yes column on USA Freedom who would also favor these changes,
theyre likely to meet strong opposition from both technology companies and civil liberties groups, and it seems at
the very least doubtful theyd make it through the House. For those who purport to think its essential to extend the
expiring powers quickly, that should be a powerful argument for just moving with the language the House has
already approved, so it can go speedily to the Presidents desk. The real significance of the sunset is symbolic and
political. As I noted above, all of the pro-privacy Senators but Rand Paul are on board with the USA Freedom Act,
but it may be worth elaborating a bit on why I think their concerns are largely misguided. As I argued in my Vice
piece,

we should distinguish between fundamentally strategic arguments for letting


Patriot provisions sunset, of the sort weve heard from the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the kind of substantive objections weve heard from grassroots activists
and a handful of legislators, though very few actual policy experts. This is the
argument, as Robyn Greene summarized it at Slate, that USA Freedom is a fake
reform that actually codifies bulk collection rather than restraining it. Certainly the
track record of the FISC provides ample reason to fear that statutory ambiguities
risks being exploited to expand surveillance powers, and I absolutely agreed with
those fears about previous versions of the bill. But the drafters of USA Freedom in its latest
incarnation have done everything you could reasonably want to forestall that possibility.

FISC courts have free reign-need binding and stricter oversight


from SCOTUS and the appellate level
Savage 6/30-Charlie, Washington correspondent for NYT covering
presidential powers and national security, 2007 Pulitzer Prize winner
for presidential reporting (Surveillance Court Rules That N.S.A. Can
Resume Bulk Data Collection, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-courtrules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html?_r=0) HC
The

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled late Monday that the National
Security Agency may temporarily resume its once-secret program that
systematically collects records of Americans domestic phone calls in bulk. But the
American Civil Liberties Union said Tuesday that it would ask the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which had ruled that the surveillance program was illegal, to issue an injunction to halt the program, setting
up a potential conflict between the two courts. The program lapsed on June 1, when a law on which it was based,
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, expired. Congress revived that provision on June 2 with a bill called the USA
Freedom Act, which said the provision could not be used for bulk collection after six months. The six-month period
was intended to give intelligence agencies time to move to a new system in which the phone records which
include information like phone numbers and the duration of calls but not the contents of conversations would
stay in the hands of phone companies. Under those rules, the agency would still be able to gain access to the

records to analyze links between callers and suspected terrorists. But, complicating matters, in May the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, ruled in a lawsuit brought by the A.C.L.U. that Section 215 of the Patriot

Congress did not include


language in the Freedom Act contradicting the Second Circuit ruling or authorizing
bulk collection even for the six-month transition. As a result, it was unclear whether
the program had a lawful basis to resume in the interim . After President Obama signed the
Act could not legitimately be interpreted as permitting bulk collection at all.

Freedom Act on June 2, his administration applied to restart the program for six months. But a conservative and
libertarian advocacy group, FreedomWorks, filed a motion in the surveillance court saying it had no legal authority
to permit the program to resume, even for the interim period. In a 26-page opinion made public on Tuesday, Judge
Michael W. Mosman of the surveillance court rejected the challenge by FreedomWorks, which was represented by a
former Virginia attorney general, Ken Cuccinelli, a Republican. And Judge Mosman said the Second Circuit was

Second Circuit rulings are not binding on the surveillance court, he wrote,
and this court respectfully disagrees with that courts analysis, especially in view of
the intervening enactment of the USA Freedom Act. When the Second Circuit
issued its ruling that the program was illegal, it did not issue any injunction ordering
the program halted, saying it would be prudent to see what Congress did as Section
215 neared its June 1 expiration. Jameel Jaffer, an A.C.L.U. lawyer, said on Tuesday that the group would
wrong, too.

now ask for one. Neither the statute nor the Constitution permits the government to subject millions of innocent
people to this kind of intrusive surveillance, Mr. Jaffer said. We intend to ask the court to prohibit the surveillance
and to order the N.S.A. to purge the records its already collected. The bulk phone records program traces back to
October 2001, when the Bush administration secretly authorized the N.S.A. to collect records of Americans
domestic phone calls in bulk as part of a broader set of post-Sept. 11 counterterrorism efforts. The program began
on the basis of presidential power alone. In 2006, the Bush administration persuaded the surveillance court to begin
blessing it under of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which says the government may collect records that are
relevant to a national security investigation. The program was declassified in June 2013 after its existence was
disclosed by the former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden. It remains unclear whether the Second Circuit
still considers the surveillance program to be illegal during this six-month transition period. The basis for its ruling in
May was that Congress had never intended for Section 215 to authorize bulk collection. In his ruling, Judge Mosman
said that because Congress knew how the surveillance court was interpreting Section 215 when it passed the
Freedom Act, lawmakers implicitly authorized bulk collection to resume for the transition period. Congress

could have prohibited bulk data collection effective immediately, he wrote.


Instead, after lengthy public debate, and with crystal-clear knowledge of the fact of
ongoing bulk collection of call detail records, it chose to allow a 180-day
transitional period during which such collection could continue, he wrote. The
surveillance court is subject to review by its own appeals panel, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Both the Second Circuit and the
surveillance review court are in turn subject to the Supreme Court, which resolves
conflicts between appeals courts. Wyn Hornbuckle, a Justice Department spokesman, said in a written
statement that the Obama administration agreed with Judge Mosman. Since the program was made public, plaintiffs
have filed several lawsuits before regular courts, which hear arguments from each side before issuing rulings, unlike
the surveillance courts usual practice, which is to hear only from the government. Judge Mosmans disagreement
with the Second Circuit is the second time that the surveillance court has rejected a contrary ruling about the
program by a judge in the regular court system. In a lawsuit challenging the program that was brought by the
conservative legal advocate Larry Klayman, Judge Richard J. Leon of Federal District Court in the District of
Columbia ruled in December 2013 that the program most likely violated the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. But in March 2014, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, a Federal District Court judge
who also sits on the secret surveillance court, rejected Judge Leons reasoning and permitted the program to keep
going. The Obama administration has appealed Judge Leons decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of

The Freedom Act also contains a provision saying that whenever the
surveillance court addresses a novel and significant legal issue, it must either
appoint an outside friend of the court who can offer arguments contrary to what
the government is saying, or explain why appointing one is not appropriate. The first
Columbia.

test of that reform came last month when another judge on the court, F. Dennis Saylor IV, addressed a separate
issue raised by the passage of the Freedom Act. Judge Saylor acknowledged that it was novel and significant, but

declined to appoint an outside advocate, saying the answer to the legal question was sufficiently clear to him
without hearing from one.

The Freedom Act does almost nothing FISA reform is still


necessary
Gross 6/5 Grant Gross, covers surveillance policy for IDG news service, 6/5/15,
Don't expect major changes to NSA surveillance from Congress,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dont-expect-major-changes-to-nsasurveillance-from-congress.html
the U.S. Congress approved what critics have called modest limits on the National
Security Agencys collection of domestic telephone records , many lawmakers may be reluctant to
After

further change the governments surveillance programs. The Senate this week passed the USA Freedom Act, which aims to end the
NSAs mass collection of domestic phone records, and President Barack Obama signed the bill hours later. After that action, expect
Republican leaders in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to resist further calls for surveillance reform. That
resistance is at odds with many rank-and-file lawmakers, including many House Republicans, who want to further limit NSA

Civil liberties groups and privacy


advocates also promise to push for more changes . It may be difficult to get
broad, sweeping reform through Congress, but many lawmakers seem
ready to push for more changes, said Adam Eisgrau, managing director of the office of government relations
for the American Library Association. The ALA has charged the NSA surveillance programs violate
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. Congress is not allowed to be tired of surveillance reform
unless its prepared to say its tired of the Fourth Amendment , Eisgrau said. The American
programs brought to light by former agency contractor Edward Snowden.

public will not accept that. Other activists are less optimistic about more congressional action. It will a long slog getting more
restraints, J. Kirk Wiebe, a former NSA analyst and whistleblower said by email. The length of that journey will depend on public

With the USA Freedom Act, elected officials


have opted to reach for low-hanging fruit, said Bill Blunden, a cybersecurity researcher and
surveillance critic. The theater weve just witnessed allows decision makers to
boast to their constituents about reforming mass surveillance while spies
understand that whats actually transpired is hardly major change. The
actual physical mechanisms of surveillance programs remain largely
intact. Blunden added by email. Politicians may dither around the periphery but they are unlikely to institute fundamental
outcrythat is the one thing that is hard to gauge.

changes. Whats in the USA Freedom Act? Some critics have blasted the USA Freedom Act as fake reform, while supporters have
called it the biggest overhaul of U.S. surveillance program in decades. Many civil liberties and privacy groups have come down in the

The law aims to end the


NSAs decade-plus practice of collecting U.S. telephone records in bulk, while
allowing the agency to search those records in a more targeted manner. The law
also moves the phone records database from the NSA to telecom carriers, and
requires the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to consult with tech and privacy
experts when ruling on major new data collection requests from the NSA. It also requires all significant FISC orders from the last
middle of those two views, calling it modest reform of the counterterrorism Patriot Act.

12 years to be released to the public. The new law limits bulk collection of U.S. telephone and business records by requiring the FBI,
the agency that applies for data collection, to use a specific selection term when asking the surveillance court to authorize records
searches. The law prohibits the FBI and NSA from using a broad geographic region, including a city, county, state or zip code, as a

The
surveillance court could allow, for example, AT&T as a specific search
term and give the NSA the authority to collect all of the carriers customer
records. Such a ruling from FISC would seem to run counter to congressional intent, but this is the same
court that defined all U.S. phone records as relevant to a
counterterrorism investigation under the old version of the Patriot Acts Section 215. The USA
search term, but it doesnt otherwise define specific search term. Thats a problem, according to critics.

Freedom Act also does nothing to limit the NSAs surveillance of overseas
Internet traffic, including the content of emails and IP voice calls. Significantly limiting that NSA program, called Prism in
2013 Snowden leaks, will be a difficult task in Congress, with many lawmakers unconcerned about the privacy rights of people who

Still, the section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance


Act that authorizes those NSA foreign surveillance programs sunsets in
2017, and that deadline will force Congress to look at FISA, although
lawmakers may wait until the last minute, as they did with the expiring sections of the Patriot Act
dont vote in U.S. elections.

covered in the USA Freedom Act. The House Judiciary Committee will continue its oversight of U.S. surveillance programs, and the
committee will address FISA before its provisions expire, an aide to the committee said.

AT: Freedom Act Solves


Freedom act fails it gives the government the legal basis to
expand surveillance
Amnesty International 6/5 NGO concerned with human rights, 6/5/15, TWO
YEARS AFTER SNOWDEN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF MASS
SURVEILLANCE, https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Two
%20Years%20After%20Snowden_Final%20Report_EN.pdf
Courts in a number of countries ruled against mass surveillance and intelligence sharing
practices. In the United Kingdom, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruled that, prior to the Tribunals judgements handed down in
December 2014 and February 2015, the regime governing the soliciting, receiving, storing and transmitting by UK authorities of
private communications of individuals located in the UK, which have been obtained by US authorities pursuant to the Prism and

In the USA, a federal court of


appeal ruled in May 2015 that the mass collection of US phone records was illegal .
Many of the worlds largest technology companies have also spoken out against
mass surveillance. In 2013, ten companies including Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo!
launched the Reform Global Government Surveillance Coalition, advocating for an
end to bulk collection practices under the USA Patriot Act, among other legal reforms. Several major companies
Upstream programmes, contravened the European Convention on Human Rights.

took more tangible steps against surveillance, increasing the default security and encryption provided to users on their platforms

There are also


signs of limited legal reforms. For example, the USA Freedom Act, which was passed
by the House of Representatives in May, attempts to end government bulk
collection of US phone records.1 However, the law would also require companies to
hold, search, and analyse certain data at the request of the government,
arguably expanding the statutory basis for largescale data collection
rather than ending it. Additionally, many other aspects of US surveillance remain underregulated and unaccountable under the new law including the mass surveillance
of millions of people outside of the US. Pressure is needed to ensure that governments dismantle these
extraordinarily invasive surveillance systems at home and abroad. A first step in this regard is to recognise that privacy
rights are owed equally to persons abroad as to those present in ones own country .
Companies have a responsibility to respect the right to privacy online. To live up to this responsibility they should take
far bolder steps to increase security on their platforms and services , so that private user data
and services, better protecting the privacy of internet users against indiscriminate mass surveillance.

is not made freely available for harvesting by governments.

Reform is popular, but the Freedom act was insufficient


further reform is necessary
Froomkin 6/2 Dan Froomkin, writer for the Intercept, 6/2/15, USA FREEDOM
ACT: SMALL STEP FOR POST-SNOWDEN REFORM, GIANT LEAP FOR CONGRESS,
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/02/one-small-step-toward-post-snowdensurveillance-reform-one-giant-step-congress/
The USA Freedom Act passed the House in an overwhelming, bipartisan vote three
weeks ago. After hardliner Republicans lost a prolonged game of legislative chicken,
the Senate gave its approval Tuesday afternoon as well, by a 67 to 32 margin. The
bill officially ends 14 years of unprecedented bulk collection of domestic phone

records by the NSA, replacing it with a program that requires the government to make specific requests to
the phone companies. After Snowdens leak of NSA documents revealed it, the program was repeatedly
found to violate the law, first by legal experts and blue-ribbon panels, and just last month by a federal
appellate court. Its rejection by Congress is hardly a radical act it simply
reasserts the meaning of the word relevant (the language of the statute) as distinct from
everything (how the government interpreted it). At the same time, the Freedom Act explicitly
reauthorizes or, rather, reinstates, since they technically expired at midnight May 31 other
programs involving the collection of business records that the Bush and Obama administrations
claimed were authorized by Section 215 of the Patriot Act. In fact, even the bulk collection of phone records, which
was abruptly wound down last week in anticipation of a possible expiration, may wind up again, because the

while the Freedom Act


contains a few other modest reform provisions such as more disclosure
and a public advocate for the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, it does absolutely nothing to restrain the vast majority of the
intrusive surveillance revealed by Snowden. It leaves untouched formerly secret
programs the NSA says are authorized under section 702 of the FISA Amendments
Act, and that while ostensibly targeted at foreigners nonetheless collect vast amounts of American
Freedom Act allows it to continue for a six-month transition period. And

communications. It wont in any way limit the agencys mass surveillance of non-American communications. As I
wrote after Sunday nights legislative action, which paved the way for Tuesdays vote, this marks the end of a vast

the
Freedom Act represents the single greatest surveillance reform package
since the 1970s. But thats a low bar. After 14 years of rubber-stamping executive-branch
requests for pretty much anything related to terrorism, Congress had an extraordinary moment of
opportunity to pass genuine reform. The Snowden revelations had changed the publics attitude about
expansion in surveillance authorities that began almost immediately after the 9/11 terror attacks. Indeed,

government surveillance. And three provisions of the Patriot Act were set to expire.

Further reform is necessary (solvency advocate but not that


good)
Taglang 6/5 Kevin Taglang, senior policy analyst, Benton Foundation, What Just
Happened to NSA Reform?, https://www.benton.org/blog/what-just-happened-nsareform
What Comes Next? The question now: Is that all for surveillance reform or is the movement
just gaining momentum? On the heels of the passage and signing this week, were already seeing developments
on the new laws impact, more action by Congress , and looking ahead to the next big issues. In the House this week,
the Commerce, Justice and Science (CJS) Appropriations Act included measures to rein
in snooping from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), National Security
Agency (NSA) and other agencies. The $51.4 billion CJS bill passed through the House 242-183 on June 3. It includes an
amendment, offered by Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) and adopted without opposition, that would ban the use of StingRay
devices without a court order. The tools, also known as IMSI catchers, replicate cellphone towers and scoop up information about peoples phone
data and location. Rep. Jared Polis (D-CO), meanwhile, added an amendment prohibiting the DEA from ever restarting a previously secret program collecting bulk records about peoples
phone calls. The program which was revealed just earlier this year was halted in 2013. Two other amendments included in the bill would ban the government from forcing tech
companies to place back doors to get around their security measures, and limit the NSA 's ability to weaken encryption security guidelines. The Guardian reported June 3 that the

The USA FREEDOM Act


provides a six-month grace period to prepare the surveillance and legal
bureaucracies for a world in which the NSA is no longer the repository of bulk US
phone metadata. During that time, the acts ban on bulk collection will not yet take effect. But the NSA stopped its 14-year-old collection of US phone records on June
1, when provisions of the Patriot Act lapsed. The government will argue it needs to restart the program in
Department of Justice intends to use part of the new law to temporarily restart the bulk collection of US phone records.

order to end it. We are taking the appropriate steps to obtain a court order reauthorizing the program. If such an order is granted, well make an appropriate
announcement at that time as we have with respect to past renewal applications, said Marc Raimondi, the Justice Departments national security spokesman. [Senate Majority Leader
Mitch] McConnells gamble on a clean reauthorization of [parts of the Patriot Act] without reform and his further attempts to weaken the privacy protections contained in the USA
Freedom Act has caused this ridiculous situation in which the bulk metadata program is being reanimated in order to be shut down for good, said Amie Stepanovich, an attorney with

While the USA Freedom Act allows for a period of six months
to transition the collection of data outside of the NSA, the administration should
actively work to move the program as quickly as possible. If the NSA takes the
entire six months to stop indiscriminately collecting our data it is in violation of the
spirit of the transition and needlessly continues to harm the privacy of users en
masse. We need to move to the targeted collection codified by the USA Freedom Act without any delay. Unclear is whether or not the
FISA court will hear arguments from the newly established amicus, who will be
empowered by the new law to contest the governments contentions before the
previously non-adversarial court. The law permits the amicus to argue before the court in novel circumstances. Whether the NSA can restart this
bulk collection is a novel question, and this decision should not be made in secret. The FISA court should appoint an amicus
thats what this provision of USA Freedom is for . And the decision and its reasoning should be made public, said Jennifer
Granick, director of civil liberties at the Stanford University Law Schools Center on Internet and Society. The start-up to shutdown question
will be decided against the backdrop over continuing debate over government
surveillance. While reformers hope this weeks victory is an appetizer to a multiple-course meal to rein in the NSA, security hawksmany of them Republicans vying for the
the digital-rights group Access. Stepanovich added:

White Househope to halt the post-Snowden momentum behind surveillance reform. And some already are talking about unraveling the new law. Sen. Ron Wyden, a civil-liberties

There is a lot more to


do whenin effectyou can ensure you protect the country's safety without
sacrificing our liberty." He used USA FREEDOM Act passage to call for additional
intelligence-gathering reforms that he has long advocated, such as closing the socalled "backdoor search loophole" that allows U.S. spies to "incidentally" and
warrantlessly sweep up the e-mail and phone communicationsincluding some
contentof Americans who correspond with foreigners . He added he plans to move
quickly on reworking Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act , before Congress
is backed up against its renewal deadline in 2017. He also supports tech companies in their ongoing tussle with
the administration over smartphone encryption as a key priority. While Google and Apple have begun to
stalwart who serves on the intelligence committee and has worked for more than a decade to reform government surveillance, said "

build their phones with "too-tough-to-crack" encryption standards, the FBI has warned that the technology locks out the bad guys and the goodand can impede law-enforcement
investigations.

By a 67-32 margin Tuesday, Congress passed the USA Freedom Act a significant
milestone in our efforts to rein in NSA surveillance. The bill marks the first time
since passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978 that Congress has
taken steps to restrict rather than expand the governments surveillance
authority.

USA Freedom Act is insufficient to restore trustbolstering


encryption eforts and policy transparency is key
Lever 15 (Rob, citing ITIF in Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance
Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness, Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S.
Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness, June 9 2015,
http://phys.org/news/2015-06-snowden-revelations-costly-tech-firms.html)
Castro said the passage of a reform measure last week called the USA Freedom Act
is not sufficient to repair the reputation of US tech firms. The report recommends

further reforms including boosting transparency of surveillance practices, opposing


government efforts to weaken encryption and strengthening its mutual legal
assistance treaties with other nations. "Over the last few years, the US
government's failure to meaningfully reform its surveillance practices has taken a
serious economic toll on the US tech sector and the total cost continues to grow
each day," Castro said. Castro said the USA Freedom Act, which curbs bulk data
collection among its reforms, is "good legislation and a step in the right direction.
We have ignored the economic impact of US surveillance."

2AC Separation of Powers

Uniqueness

Overreach Now Freedom Act


USA Freedom Act is a guise to legitimate executive
surveillance overreachit just adds on a procedure which the
IC has no qualms about and leaves plethora of technical and
legal tools in placeproves curtailment is inevitable but
inefective
Farivar 15 (Cyrus, SENIOR BUSINESS EDITOR at Ars Technica, Even former NSA
chief thinks USA Freedom Act was a pointless change?, June 17 2015,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/even-former-nsa-chief-thinks-usafreedom-act-was-a-pointless-change/)
former director of the National Security Agency isnt particularly concerned about the
loss of the governments bulk metadata collection under Section 215 of the Patriot
Act. As Gen. Michael Hayden pointed out in an interview at a Wall Street Journal conference on
Monday, the only change that has happened is that data has moved to being held by
phone companies, and the government can get it under a court order.
Hayden said: If somebody would come up to me and say, Look, Hayden, heres the thing: This Snowden
thing is going to be a nightmare for you guys for about two years. And when we get
all done with it, what youre going to be required to do is that little 215 program about American telephony
metadataand by the way, you can still have access to it, but you got to go to the
court and get access to it from the companies, rather than keep it to yourself I go: And this is it
after two years? Cool! The NSA and the intelligence community as a whole still
have many other technical and legal tools at their disposal , including the littleunderstood Executive Order 12333 , among others. That document, known in government
The

circles as "twelve triple three," gives incredible leeway to intelligence agencies sweeping up vast quantities of
Americans' data. That data ranges from e-mail content to Facebook messages, from Skype chats to practically
anything that passes over the Internet on an incidental basis. In other words, EO 12333 protects the tangential
collection of Americans' data even when Americans aren't specifically targetedotherwise it would be forbidden
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.

Overreach Now9/11
Congress has abdicated its role in foreign policyintricacies of
surveillance and special ops warfare has only made that worse
http://nationalinterest.org/article/congressional-abdication-8138
But in the aftermath of the analytically simpler challenges of the Cold War,
present-day crises have become more complicated to explain with any
expertise, even as the electoral process has become more obsessed with the
necessities of fund-raising and as the political messages themselves have been
reduced to blunt one-line phrases. As former House Speaker Thomas P. Tip ONeill
famously put it decades ago, most politics are local, and most politicians learn
about the essentials of foreign policy only after they have been elected, if at all.
This dichotomy explains the nearly total absence of any real foreign-policy debate in
our electoral process, whether at the congressional or presidential level. Nowhere is
this truth more self-evident than in the national discussions that have emerged in
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Despite more than ten years of
ongoing combat operations, and despite the frequent congressional trips to
places such as Iraq and Afghanistan (usually on highly structured visits lasting only
a few hours, or at the most a day or two), Congress has become largely
irrelevant to the shaping, execution and future of our foreign policy. Detailed
PowerPoint briefings may be given by colonels and generals in the battle zones.
Adversarial confrontations might mark certain congressional hearings. Reports
might be demanded. Passionate speeches might be made on the floor of the House
and the Senate. But on the issues of who should decide when and where to
use force and for how long, and what our countrys long-term relations should
consist of in the aftermath, Congress is mostly tolerated and frequently
ignored. The few exceptions come when certain members are adamant in
their determination to stop something from happening, but even then they do not
truly participate in the shaping of policy. The failure of Congress to meet its
historical obligations while the president unilaterally engaged in combat
operations in Libya promises even deeper consequences for future crises. In
many international situations the future promises a diferent kind of warfare,
made possible (and politically more complex) by the use of specialoperations
forces, cia operatives, drones and precision munitions, thus removing the
average American from the consequences and even the direct knowledge of
military actions that a president might undertake at his or her sole discretion. But
to what extent should this cleaner way of war also remove Congress as
an arbiter of when and where our nation should become involved in overseas
hostilities? The inherent right of self-defense allows the president, as commander in
chief, to order strikes anywhere in the world against legitimate terrorist targets if
the country in which they operate either cannot or will not take appropriate action
itself. But this is a different concept than unilaterally commencing hostilities in
situations that do not directly threaten our country. When we examine the
conditions under which the president ordered our military into action in Libya, we
are faced with the prospect of a very troubling, if not downright odd, historical
precedent that has the potential to haunt us for decades.

Ex Overreach Erodes Judicial Independence


Executive overreach has eroded judicial independence
Wayne McCormack, Winter 2014, E.W. Thode Prof. Law. @ Utah, U.S. Judicial
Independence: Victim in the War on Terror, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 305,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4374&context=wlulr
One of the principal victims in the United States so-called war on terror has been
the independence of the U.S. Judiciary . Time and again, challenges to assertedly illegal
conduct on the part of government officials have been turned aside , either because of
overt deference to the government or because of special doctrines such as the state
secrets privilege and standing requirements . I have even described the behavior of the United
States since 9/11 as a war on the rule of law.1 This Article catalogs the principal cases first by
the nature of the government action challenged and then by the special doctrines invoked. What I attempt to show

the Judiciary has virtually relinquished its valuable role in the U.S. system of
governance, which depends on judicial review . In the face of governmental claims of crisis and
national security needs, the courts have refused to examine, or have examined with
undue deference, the actions of government officials. Oddly enough, the mostly Republican
is that

Supreme Court has shown more stiff 1. Wayne McCormack, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 5095, 5110 (2010). U.S. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 307 resistance than most of the lower courts,2 but still
has ducked some significant issues.3 In the cases considered here, the U.S. government has taken the position that
inquiry by the Judiciary into a variety of actions against alleged malfeasors would threaten the safety of the nation.4

This is pressure that amounts to intimidation . When this level of pressure is


mounted to create exceptions to established rules of law, it undermines
due process of law. Perhaps one or two examples of government warnings about the consequences of a
judicial decision would be within the domain of legal argument. But a long pattern of threats and
intimidation to depart from established law undermines judicial independence . That
has been the course of the U.S. war on terror for over a decade now.

Court Rulings Overreach


A series of court rulings in foreign policy have ruled executive
foreign afairs authority is extra-constitutional and therefore
untouchable by other branchesthe plan is K2 to reverse this
detraction of constitutional interpretation
AFR 06 (Encyclopedia of American Foreign Relations, Judiciary Power and
Practice - The courts and foreign policy, November 24 2006,
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Judiciary-Power-and-Practice-Thecourts-and-foreign-policy.html)
For several reasons, thenan

explicit constitutional role for Congress confined to


treaties, the exclusion of individual states from traditional foreign policy, and
judicial deference to the political branches in such matters the president
and executive branch have been the principle beneficiaries of Court rulings
in foreign policy matters. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936)
was a landmark case that confirmed the president's lead role in foreign
afairs. In this case, Congress approved a joint resolution authorizing President Roosevelt to embargo arms
shipments to Paraguay and Bolivia, if doing so might contribute to ending the war. After Roosevelt declared an

Curtiss-Wright was subsequently convicted of selling weapons to Bolivia in violation of


challenged the constitutionality of the resolution,
arguing that it was an improper delegation of congressional power to the
president. Given that the Court had already struck down major New Deal programs, there was some
expectation that it would do the same with respect to arms embargoes. However, in his 71 majority
opinion, Justice George Sutherland presented an original and controversial
defense of presidential authority in foreign afairs . Sutherland argued that
independence from Britain fused the thirteen original colonies into a sovereign
nation. He also distinguished between internal (domestic policy) and external
(foreign policy) powers of the federal government. Internal powers, he argued, lay with the
individual states and are conferred upon the federal government by the Constitution. External powers,
however, derive the sovereignty that all countries enjoy , and sovereignty was passed
from Britain to the union of states upon independence. Since the powers of the United States to
conduct its foreign relations do not derive from, nor are enumerated in, the
Constitution, it is impossible to identify or infer them from constitutional
language . As a result, the Court's view was that delegation of power to the
president in foreign afairs was not to be judged by the same standards as
delegation of power over domestic matters. Consequently, the "president alone has the
power to speak as a representative of the nation." Sutherland's opinion is open to criticism
from several angles. If the federal government derives powers from
sources other than the Constitution, neither the Constitution nor the
courts provide guidance in the distribution of such powers between the
branches. The implication that foreign afairs powers of the federal government are
extra-constitutional goes beyond previous Court opinions that, less controversially,
embargo in effect,

the embargo. The company

found foreign affairs powers to be vested in the federal government by the Constitution. Further, the notion that the
federal government was to have major powers outside the Constitution is not insinuated in the document itself, the

Sutherland's
opinion is grounded in sovereignty, but it is also possible to interpret the
Declaration of Independence as creating thirteen sovereign states, and many
did conduct their own foreign relations until the Articles of Confederation. Sutherland's reliance on
political philosophy and international law, rather than constitutional
interpretation , as a basis for foreign policy powers is also controversial. Finally, drawing a clear
records of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, or contemporary debates.

distinction between foreign and domestic policy is becoming increasingly difficult to do, and an approach that
derives different sources of power for each is bound to generate legal challenges. Sutherland's position holds up
best if one takes the view that the Constitution is a document whose principle objective is to distribute power
between the states and federal government, and among the branches of the federal government. Despite the
criticisms, Curtiss-Wright is a landmark case in the broadening of federal and, in particular, presidential authority in
foreign affairs. Presidents have found additional means to increase their foreign policy powers. One is to use
executive agreements, since they do not require Senate ratification but have been held by the Court to have the
same legal status as treaties ( United States v. Pink, 1942). Executive agreements are of two forms: those
authorized by Congress and those made on presidential initiative. Authorized executive agreements have provided
authority for presidents to negotiate the lowering of tariff barriers and trade agreements. The Lend-Lease Act
(1941) granted President Roosevelt the power to enter into executive agreements that would provide war material
to "any country deemed vital to the defense of the United States." Numerous executive agreements have been

Executive agreements
made on presidential initiative have often been obtained during
international conflict, including the ending of the Spanish-American War and the deployment of troops
during China's Boxer Rebellion. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Belmont (1937),
upheld Roosevelt's use of an executive agreement to formalize his
decision to recognize the Soviet Union, noting that it had the efect of a
treaty and overruled conflicting state laws . Roosevelt used executive agreements
negotiated regarding the stationing of U.S. military forces in other countries.

extensively in the years leading up to World War II and to negotiate agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta
conferences. President Lyndon Johnson made many secret agreements with Asian countries during the 1960s, and
President Jimmy Carter used executive agreements that constituted the financial arrangement necessary to free

In Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), the Supreme Court


ruled that Presidents Carter and Reagan had acted consistently with
emergency powers granted by statute to use executive agreements to
suspend the financial claims of Americans against Iran, in return for the safe release
American hostages in Iran.

of the hostages seized during the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Africom Unpopular
Africom is unpopular in Congressperceived as inefective and
cumbersome
Burgess 08 (Stephen F, Associate Professor, Department of International
Security, U.S. Air War College, US AFRICA COMMAND, CHANGING SECURITY
DYNAMICS, AND
PERCEPTIONS OF US AFRICA POLICY, 2008)
In the wake of the AU summit. US officials pressed on towards AFRICOM's full
operational capability on October 1, 2008. However, in response to strong
African resistance to the prospect of an enhanced US military presence on
the continent, the directive to place an AFRICOM headquarters somewhere
in Africa was shelved.5 Even more modest proposals for AFRICOM -regional
integration teams" or -regional offices", which would work with sub- regional
organizations, were dropped.6 It was hoped that these changes would make it
easier for AFRICOM to engage with African countries and regional organizations.
With the end of plans to expeditiously place AFRICOM headquarters on the
continent, resistance diminished in some African countries, and with offers of
training and other forms of assistance, states began to engage AFRICOM. Even so.
AFRICOM faces an uphill struggle to succeed as a combatant command. It
is probable that Congress will not be wholly convinced about AFRICOM S
strategic importance and will not provide adequate funding; and African
leaders will be disappointed at the commands inability to provide the level
of training and other services that EUCOM and CEXTCOM do presently for
African countries.

Perceived importance of other commands means Africom will


be the first on the chopping blockSOUTHCOM proves
Burgess 08 (Stephen F, Associate Professor, Department of International
Security, U.S. Air War College, US AFRICA COMMAND, CHANGING SECURITY
DYNAMICS, AND
PERCEPTIONS OF US AFRICA POLICY, 2008)

PACOM. EUCOM and CENTCOM have been well-funded by Congress due to


their
strategic importance in dealing with threats to US national security
interests. However. SOUTHCOM was never as strategically important and has
not been fully resourced. SOUTHCOM was founded in 1963 in the wake of the
Cuban missile crisis and Soviet entry into the region in order to manage US military
engagement in Central and South America. Well before 1963. Latin American states

were accustomed to US military presence in Panama and Cuba and intervention in


Central America and the Caribbean, so the creation of SOUTHCOM did not generate
much protest. Many leaders were quite familiar with US presence in the region. In
contrast, a new generation of radical leaders was violently opposed. In terms of
funding, there were never any substantial or existential threats to US national
security interests in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, so it was never funded
adequately by Congress, and SOUTHCOM continues to struggle today.28 Given
the preceding analysis of geographical combatant commands, it would
appear that AFRICOM was created at the wrong time and was proposed to be
located in the wrong place. DOD assumed the legitimacy of combatant
commands without doing the proper homework for AFRICOM. which
demonstrates a lack of empathy.

Officials cant prove Africas strategic importanceat best,


proves other Commands are more important
Burgess 08 (Stephen F, Associate Professor, Department of International
Security, U.S. Air War College, US AFRICA COMMAND, CHANGING SECURITY
DYNAMICS, AND
PERCEPTIONS OF US AFRICA POLICY, 2008)

The viability of AFRICOM in the face of Congressional scrutiny raises the


possibility that the new command will not be fully funded. It is probable that
African leaders will be disappointed at the likely sub-optimal performance of
AFRICOM. As has been demonstrated. US officials visiting African capitals presented
messages that AFRICOM would be non-threatening and -non-kinetic" and would
serve African interests by assuming from EUCOM responsibility for peacekeeping
and other training and humanitarian activities.14' In assuring African leaders
that AFRICOM would bring no major changes in US policy and posture on
the continent. American officials have found it difficult to assert to Congress
that the new command would advance US strategic interests . Nevertheless,
in order to convince Congress to allocate hundreds of millions of dollars to AFRICOM
and its operations, officials stress that the new command would be helping to
advance US interests by leading in the war on terror as well as implying that the
new command would help protect oil assets and counter China's rise. Officials have
emphasized the strategic importance of Africa and stressed that AFRICOM would be
as important as other regional combatant commands in protecting and advancing
US interests.148 Thus. US officials have been at cross-purposes in regard to
AFRICOM.

2AC NATO

Uniqueness

Russia Expose
Recent intelligence scandals have wrecked relations conflict
is inevitable in the status quo.
Farmer 6/14 (Ben, Defence Correspondent, Russia 'could expose British agents
to its allies after Snowden files cracked', June 14 th, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11674201/Russia-couldexpose-British-agents-to-its-allies-after-Snowden-files-cracked.html)//ghs-VA
Russia may expose British intelligence agents to its allies around the world after
Kremlin spies have reportedly cracked the top-secret cache of files stolen by the fugitive US whistle blower Edward
Snowden, a former security minister has said. The British intelligence agency MI6 has
been forced to pull agents out of live operations in hostile countries, after Moscow
gained access to more than 1 million classified files held by the former American security contractor. Senior
government sources say China has also cracked the encrypted documents, which contain secret intelligence
techniques and information that could allow British and American spies to be identified, the Sunday Times reported.
As well as potentially endangering agents in Russia or China, Lord West, a former security minister and First Sea
Lord, said the intelligence could be shared with Russian allies such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The Russians would
do that if it was of benefit to them, he said. Agents in the Middle East are at risk one Russia
expert said, because of long-standing intelligence sharing with the Kremlins allies and proxies in the area. Andrew
Mitchell, the former Tory cabinet minister, said it was "no accident" it had come in the wake of last weeks review by
David Anderson QC, and amid controversy over the revival of communications interception legislation dubbed a
"snoopers' charter. Asked if the disclosure of Russia and China breaking the Snowden files was part of a
Government propaganda drive, he said: "Well, there is a big debate going on, you know. Sir David Omand, a former

Russia and China gaining access to Snowdens material was


a "huge strategic setback" that was "harming" to Britain, America and
their Nato allies . While Downing Street said there was no evidence of anyone being harmed by the
director of GCHQ, said

intelligence, a senior Home Office official accused Snowden of having blood on his hands. A British intelligence
source added: "We know Russia and China have access to Snowden's material and will be going through it for years
to come, searching for clues to identify potential targets. "Snowden has done incalculable damage. In some cases

agencies have been forced to intervene and lift their agents from
operations to prevent them from being identified and killed ." Snowden has
the

previously said his files were encrypted and could not be uncoded by any intelligence agencies. Lord West
described Mr Snowden as a slightly foolish traitor. He added: "If it was wartime, he would have been shot". He
said the information would be also be vital in Eastern Europe. He said Vladimir Putin would now be seeing all sorts
of intelligence which will enable him to see what we are doing, how we are doing it and enable him to be one step
ahead, he said. Dr Igor Sutyagin, a Russia expert at the Royal United Services Institute, said he expected that

British agents in the Middle East could have been afected. He said: I suspect that
now when Britain says that they pull people out of hostile nations, thats not Russia or China, thats something like
Lebanon or Syria.

Intel Inefective Now


Intel Sharing is inefective now.
Dalton 14 (Matthew, Reporter, The Wall Street Journal, NATO War Game Tests
Intelligence- Sharing, May 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-war-gametests-intelligence-sharing-1401455206)//ghs-VA
Inability to share intelligence efectively among member countries has
been a big problem, NATO officials say . In April 2011, it was the cause of a mistaken air strike
by NATO forces that killed Libyan rebels NATO was trying to protect as they overthrew Moammar Gadhafi. The
rebels had captured Libyan armored vehicles. There was intelligence that indicated the tanks had been captured by
rebels, but it wasn't shared quickly enough to prevent an airstrike, a NATO official said. A report by Human Rights
Watch said 72 civilians were killed by NATO airstrikes during the Libya campaign, while complaints about civilian
deaths in Afghanistan have dogged the alliance for years. The NATO official wouldn't confirm the number of civilians
hurt or killed in Libya but said the alliance took extensive measures to avoid civilian casualties during the
campaign. After the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan rose sharply in 2006 through 2008, NATO
commanders adopted stricter rules for engagement that have helped reduce such incidents, the official said. " If

the things that we're trying out in this trial work and we're able to
incorporate them into NATO doctrine, NATO processes, then absolutely it will
help us mitigate collateral damage," said Lt. Col. Matt J. Martin, a U.S. Air Force officer who acted
as the overall commander in the trial. "We'll have a much better understanding of the
environment that we're operating in." The challenge facing NATO intelligence-sharing is how to
blend information from many different sources operated by the alliance's 28 nations into one database . This
trial tested whether information provided by equipment including drones
from the U.S. and elsewhere, NATO Awacs radar planes and Romanian-operated spy balloons can be fed into
a single system. In this test, NATO commanders had to then use the information to launch simulated attacks using
Norwegian F-16s, artillery, or a high-speed attack boat.

Germany
NATO Alliance shaky now recent events have caused
controversy.
Rosen and Kelley 14 (Armin Rosen Business, Insider's defense and military
editor, Michael Kelley, senior news editor, The Worst Crisis In Modern US-German
Relations Was Based On Something That May Be False, Dec. 12, 2014,
http://www.businessinsider.com/der-spiegel-and-nsa-phone-tapping-story-201412)//ghs-VA
This development is astonishing considering the stir that the Merkel
phone tap caused at the time it was reported, and its continuing impact on
US-German relations. "The German press has worked itself into a state of self-righteous hysteria; the
German foreign minister is talking about severing alliances and
suspending trade discussions ," author and columnist Anne Applebaum wrote in November 2013,
calling the controversy "the worst crisis in German-American relations in decades ."
In a profile of Merkel in the New Yorker this month, George Packer chronicled the still-unfolding consequences of the
NSA revelation. "With the German public the sense of betrayal was deep ... particularly because Obama, while
promising that the eavesdropping had stopped, never publicly apologized," Packer wrote. He reported that Germany
asked for a "no-spy agreement" with the US and was refused. This past July, Germany expelled the CIA station chief
in Berlin after a bureaucrat for Germany's intelligence service was caught passing documents to the agency. The
NSA uproar gave deeper public and political resonance to what would might have been an otherwise-minor incident.
As Packer put it, "The

spying scandals have undermined German public support


for the NATO alliance just when its needed most in the standof with
Russia." They've also badly eroded a longstanding sense of trust in the US, forcing
US and German officials to "agree to create a framework for clearer rules about spying and intelligence sharing."
Today, "barely half the German public now expresses a favorable view of the US the lowest level in Europe, other
than in perpetually hostile Greece."

Spying Pause
Recent revelations have created a spying pause that wrecks
intelligence sharing.
Eichensehr 14 (Kristen, graduate of Harvard University, the University of
Cambridge, and Yale Law School, United States Stops Spying on Western Europe
for Now, September 23, 2014, http://justsecurity.org/15414/united-states-stopsspying-western-europe-for/)//ghs-VA
It seems highly unlikely that restrictions would be unilateral or total, as the pause
appears to be. It makes little sense for the U.S. to engage in unilateral intelligence disarmament when it could
bargain for mutual intelligence restrictions and increased intelligence sharing. Moreover, given the lack of
precedent for a total no-spy agreement, the Obama Administration is unlikely to relinquish the right to spy, even on

A more likely outcome would be a series of FiveEyes style intelligence partnership agreements that ensure mutual benefit
from intelligence-sharing and some limits, but not a total ban, on spying on the agreement party or
allies, in particular circumstances.

parties. Although Germany apparently rejected a similar offer in July, the espionage pause may provide room for
diplomacy and scope for negotiation that were not possible in the midst of the spying scandal over the summer.
Another question is which countries might get the Five Eyes-style deal. Although Ive focused on the recent history

the pause
reaches beyond Germany to friendly governments in Western Europe . (It

with Germany and events in Germany reportedly triggered the pause, the AP report indicates that

does not specify which governments or indicate whether it means all friendly Western European governments.) But

Countries, including
whose publics have been incensed by reports of U.S. spying
on their citizens have incentives to publicize any agreement that limits
U.S. collection activities vis--vis their citizens . The disclosure of any new
agreements with particular countries could create diplomatic strife for the
U.S. with other countries that want, but have not been offered, the same deal. When the no-spy
from the perspective of other friendly governments, why stop with Western Europe?
Germany and France,

agreement issue arose last fall, Stewart Baker proposed in congressional testimony substantive and procedural
criteria for entering spying agreements, and in December, the Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and

Even if the U.S.


were to deploy neutral, substantively reasonable criteria for vetting potential
agreement partners, it could still find itself with a new set of diplomatic
difficulties with countries that want into intelligence sharing and out of
the scope of U.S. espionage.
Communications Technologies proposed other substantive criteria (Pages 174-176).

Public Forcing Disruption


Public perception forces a decrease in cooperation.
Morrissey 14 (Ed, writer @ New York Post, Germany expels US embassy official
over spying row, JULY 10, 2014, http://hotair.com/archives/2014/07/10/germanyexpels-us-embassy-official-over-spying-row/)//ghs-VA
One has to assume that the Germans are not so blinded by outrage here as the public stances might suggest, as
they know well how the intelligence game is played. The French have been stealing industrial secrets for years,
even though the two nations work much more closely together on the EU project than the US and Germany do in

When these details about business-as-usual get made


embarrassingly public, it forces everyone to make a public show of the
outrage. Removing a key link in the partnership through the mechanism of a diplomatic
expulsion, though, goes a bit farther than contrived outrage. Thats a step one would expect to
see between two antagonists, or two loosely-affiliated nations, not between close partners like the
US and Germany. This may at least temporarily disrupt some of the intelligence sharing
that has become key to Western security. Germany apparently feels that the
risk of disruption is worth taking, which is a measure of their non-contrived anger over the
other areas.

revelations. Plus, Germany is probably going to conduct a mole-hunt or two, which will distract their intelligence
services and potentially impact their effectiveness, and thats bad news all over. Normally, wed see a tit-for-tat
expulsion after this kind of move, but the Obama administration will likely let this slide. The US and Germany have
too many common security interests to allow for a really serious breach to develop, and there should be some
leeway given to Merkel under the circumstances. So far, the White House is keeping their collective lips sealed:

Perception Harm Relations

Latest allegations wreck relations NATO is worried.


Mazzetti and Landler 14 (Mark Mazzetti, correspondent for The New York
Times, Mark Landler, White House correspondent for The New York Times, Spying
Case Left Obama in Dark, U.S. Officials Say, JULY 8, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/europe/spying-case-left-obama-in-darkus-officials-say.html?_r=0)//ghs-VA
WASHINGTON When President Obama placed a call to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany last Thursday, he
had a busy agenda: to consult with a close ally and to mobilize wavering Europeans to put more pressure on Russia
to end its covert incursions in Ukraine. What Mr. Obama did not know was that a day earlier, a young German
intelligence operative had been arrested and had admitted that he had been passing secrets to the Central

the president
was kept in the dark about the blown spying operation at a particularly
delicate moment in American relations with Germany has led frustrated White House
Intelligence Agency. While Ms. Merkel chose not to raise the issue during the call, the fact that

officials to question who in the C.I.A.s chain of command was aware of the case and why that information did not
make it to the Oval Office before the call. The details of this spying case remain murky. Intelligence officials have

the
episode sheds light on the tensions that arise from the colliding cultures
of spycraft and statecraft one driven by the need to vacuum as much secret material as possible;
declined to comment, and it is still not clear what the German operative has told the authorities. But

the other giving primacy to diplomatic objectives. It also reinforces the problem that surfaced a year ago in the
wake of revelations about National Security Agency surveillance practices from the rogue contractor Edward J.
Snowden: whether the costs of spying on close allies outweigh the gains. At the White House, senior officials have

latest allegations could set back relations with Germany


Obama and Ms. Merkel are struggling to move past the distrust
generated by the Snowden disclosures, including the revelation that the N.S.A. had tapped Ms. Merkels
expressed concern that the
just as Mr.

cellphone. What is particularly baffling to these officials is that the C.I.A. did not inform the White House that its
agent a 31-year-old employee of Germanys federal intelligence service, the BND had been compromised,
given his arrest the day before the two leaders spoke. According to German news media reports, the agency may
have been aware three weeks before the arrest that the German authorities were monitoring the man. A central
question, one American official said, is how high the information about the agent went in the C.I.A.s command
whether it was bottled up at the level of the station chief in Berlin or transmitted to senior officials, including the
director, John O. Brennan, who is responsible for briefing the White House. For all his concerns, Mr. Obama does not
plan any extraordinary outreach to Ms. Merkel, an official said, noting that some in the administration also feel that
Germany should not overreact to the case or conflate it with the privacy issues raised by the N.S.A.s surveillance.

tensions betray a lack of attention in Washington to its


relationship with Berlin. Bush and especially Obama have treated it as a solved problem requiring no
Some experts say the recent

further American involvement, said John C. Kornblum, a former American ambassador to Germany. Recent events
have demonstrated that just the opposite is the case. Germany is still deeply conflicted about itself and about the
world around it. The White House and the C.I.A. both declined to comment on the case, with a spokeswoman for
the National Security Council, Caitlin M. Hayden, saying, Were certainly not going to discuss who knew what and
when in regards to the allegations. On Tuesday, the chairwoman and the ranking member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee said in separate interviews that Mr. Brennan had briefed them about the matter, but they
refused to divulge any details of the conversations. Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who is
chairwoman of the committee, expressed concern about the damage that could come to American-German
relations. We need to relook at this whole situation, how we handle our allies, said Ms. Feinstein, who said she met
with German Parliament members who she said were very upset by the reports. The ranking Republican, Senator
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, sounded a note of caution about the allegations. Im not sure how much of it is true,
he said. Thats going to dictate how serious it is. Over the past year, the German government has tried to use the
Snowden revelations chiefly the embarrassing disclosure about Ms. Merkels cellphone as leverage to
negotiate a non-spying pact between the United States and Germany. The United States has such arrangements
with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. But the White House has resisted, in part because officials worry

that it would prompt other countries to request similar deals. In early 2010, the director of national intelligence,
Dennis C. Blair, explored a nonspying pact with French intelligence officials, partly because Mr. Blair believed such a
deal would ease the burden on the F.B.I., which has the task of hunting French spies in the United States. The
French are reputed to be particularly aggressive in pursuing American industrial secrets. In contrast, current and
former American officials said that German operatives are far less active in the United States, making the benefits
of a nonspying deal with Berlin less obvious. Likewise, some question the value of spying on Germany.

Such

operations threaten the close intelligence-sharing relationship

that American
and German spies have developed in recent years. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the BND has aggressively pursued
terror suspects in Germany and played a role in the crippling Stuxnet cyberattack on Irans nuclear program.
Theres only so much that spying on the Germans is going to get you, said a former C.I.A. official once posted in
Europe. Its not like the Germans are planning to establish relations with Iran. Last weeks disclosure came at a
delicate moment: Mr. Obama needs Ms. Merkels support to impose additional sanctions against Russia for its role in
the Ukraine crisis. Germany, with extensive energy ties to Russia, has many reasons to resist, though Ms. Merkel
has signaled she is running out of patience with President Vladimir V. Putin. The American authorities are also
pursuing heavy financial penalties from German banks, including Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, for dealing
with Iran and other countries that are blacklisted by the United States. The German government owns 17 percent of

The prospect of new strains between


the United States and Germany drew an expression of concern from the
secretary general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who met with Mr. Obama at the White House on
Commerzbank, raising the prospect of further tensions.

Tuesday.

Recent intelligence scandals have wrecked relations existing


leaks have already created tensions with allies
- Russia wants to expose agents now
- Snowden info harmful to NATO relations
- China has increasing distrust for the U.S.
- Surveillance is relevant now China and Russia have
Snowdens material
Farmer 6/14 (Ben, Defence Correspondent, Russia 'could expose British agents
to its allies after Snowden files cracked', June 14 th, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11674201/Russia-couldexpose-British-agents-to-its-allies-after-Snowden-files-cracked.html)//ghs-VA
Russia may expose British intelligence agents to its allies around the world after
Kremlin spies have reportedly cracked the top-secret cache of files stolen by the fugitive US whistle blower Edward
Snowden, a former security minister has said. The British intelligence agency MI6 has
been forced to pull agents out of live operations in hostile countries, after Moscow
gained access to more than 1 million classified files held by the former American security contractor. Senior
government sources say China has also cracked the encrypted documents, which contain secret intelligence
techniques and information that could allow British and American spies to be identified, the Sunday Times reported.
As well as potentially endangering agents in Russia or China, Lord West, a former security minister and First Sea
Lord, said the intelligence could be shared with Russian allies such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The Russians would
do that if it was of benefit to them, he said. Agents in the Middle East are at risk one Russia
expert said, because of long-standing intelligence sharing with the Kremlins allies and proxies in the area. Andrew
Mitchell, the former Tory cabinet minister, said it was "no accident" it had come in the wake of last weeks review by
David Anderson QC, and amid controversy over the revival of communications interception legislation dubbed a
"snoopers' charter. Asked if the disclosure of Russia and China breaking the Snowden files was part of a
Government propaganda drive, he said: "Well, there is a big debate going on, you know. Sir David Omand, a former

Russia and China gaining access to Snowdens material was


a "huge strategic setback" that was "harming" to Britain, America and
their Nato allies . While Downing Street said there was no evidence of anyone being harmed by the
director of GCHQ, said

intelligence, a senior Home Office official accused Snowden of having blood on his hands. A British intelligence

Russia and China have access to Snowden's material and


will be going through it for years to come, searching for clues to identify
potential targets. "Snowden has done incalculable damage. In some cases the agencies have
been forced to intervene and lift their agents from operations to prevent
them from being identified and killed." Snowden has previously said his files were encrypted
source added: "We know

and could not be uncoded by any intelligence agencies. Lord West described Mr Snowden as a slightly foolish
traitor. He added: "If it was wartime, he would have been shot". He said the information would be also be vital in
Eastern Europe. He said Vladimir Putin would now be seeing all sorts of intelligence which will enable him to see
what we are doing, how we are doing it and enable him to be one step ahead, he said. Dr Igor Sutyagin, a Russia
expert at the Royal United Services Institute, said he expected that

British agents in the Middle

East could have been afected. He said: I suspect that now when Britain says that they pull people
out of hostile nations, thats not Russia or China, thats something like Lebanon or Syria.

WSJ Germany
European nations have curtailed intelligence sharing because
of recent scandals U.S. legitimacy is critical to rectify public
outcry.
Troianovski 5/7 (Anton, writes about German politics, economics, and society
for The Wall Street Journals Berlin bureau, Germany Halts Some Intelligence
Sharing With U.S. Berlin moves amid controversy over accusations Germany helped
NSA spy on European allies, 07 May 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanyrestricts-some-data-sharing-with-u-s-1431021158)//ghs-VA
BERLIN-- Germany

has curtailed its intelligence sharing with the U.S., amid


accusations that it helped the U.S. spy on European allies , German officials said.

Germany's foreign intelligence service, known as the BND, will no longer provide the U.S. with Internet surveillance data from a
Bavarian satellite eavesdropping post that has been at the center of a recent espionage controversy, a parliamentary official briefed
on the matter said. A second German official, though, stressed the decision only affected the outpost in Bavaria, which he described
as a small part of the BND's intelligence sharing with the U.S. The decision to ease back on the data-sharing, starting this week,
came after law makers said the German government had disclosed that the BND had eavesdropped on European allies as part of an
intelligence-sharing agreement with the U.S. National Security Agency. "It's clear the emergency brake has been pulled here," said
Konstantin von Notz, a member of parliament representing the opposition Greens who co-chairs a special committee investigating

Revelations about American surveillance abroad have


particularly resonated in Germany, whose history with Nazi and East German regimes have made its
NSA activities in Germany.

populace especially sensitive to privacy issues. In 2013, in the wake of accusations that the NSA had monitored Chancellor Angela
Merkel's cellphone, Ms. Merkel declared that spying "among friends" was unacceptable. The newest disclosures, though, have turned
the spotlight onto her own government's policies. Newsweekly Der Spiegel put an image of Ms. Merkel and two other senior officials

Merkel's government is now scrambling to


contain the political damage at home without harming its overall alliance with the U.S., which the
on its cover last weekend headlined "The Betrayal." Ms.

chancellor has said is vital to German security. Government officials haven't commented publicly on the decision to curtail sharing
with the U.S. of intelligence from the Bavarian listening post, which was disclosed in a classified briefing to select members of
parliament on Wednesday. It wasn't immediately clear who ordered the move, though the Chancellery officially oversees Germany's
intelligence agencies. Though she repeated that allies shouldn't spy on each other, Ms. Merkel said this week that "the government
will do all it can to allow the intelligence agencies to do their work, which must include cooperation with other intelligence agencies,
given the threat of international terrorism. That certainly includes, in part, the NSA."

This week's action springs

from a controversy rooted in a 2002 intelligence-sharing agreement between the U.S. and Germany that allowed the NSA
to provide phone numbers, email addresses and other so-called selectors to be targeted by the BND's satellite listening post in the
Bavarian town of Bad Aibling. The U.S. established the facility, which features an array of huge satellite dishes masked by golf-balllike hulls, as a communications-monitoring station during the Cold War to listen in on the Soviets. The BND, which helped operate
the station for years and officially took over in 2004, has used the Bad Aibling site to intercept satellite communications in crisis
regions such as the Middle East and Afghanistan, German officials said. The point of the 2002 agreement, German officials say, was

members of parliament
investigating NSA activities have raised questions about whether Bad
Aibling was also used to spy on European or German targets on behalf of the
NSA.
to share resources in pursuing terrorism and arms smuggling. But the

Internal Links

Intel Sharing
Intelligence sharing with NATO is necessary to fight hybrid
wars and counteract emerging threats like Russia
Korkisch 2010 Friedrich W. Korkisch, PhD, expert in military and international
law, April 2010, NATO Gets Better Intelligence,
http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/NATO_Gets_Better_Intell_April_PDP_0.pd
f
Hybrid Wars Interventions

of U.S. and NATO forces in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq


were facing a war, which is a hybrid of different kinds of threats, characterized by
an absence of ius in bello or ius ad bellum (the rules of the Hague Agreements or of
any Geneva Conventions), sees neither peace nor war, is a mix of
regular/conventional and irregular war with mainly asymmetric attacks plus
civil war. Pacified regions can exist next to war zones, but can become war zones again or see terrorist attacks.
Hybrid war is war without borders; there is no declaration of war, no formal ending
of war, and no peace treaty. There is no separation of soldieries, civilians, terrorists,
insurgents, religious fanatics and criminal killers. Hybrid war will include terrorism
and cyber war, and can last for a decade and more . Is traditional warfare centred on the
enemys government and military, irregular war or hybrid war is aimed foremost on the population (which must be

A government and its forces supported by


blue alliance forces will usually be targeted . Irregular warfare is also without a clear Center of
Gravity. Hybrid war has a dramatic impact on intelligence. Counterinsurgency operations and
tactics are the main tool in fighting such wars. It is based on good
tactical/comprehensive intelligence, and requires constant communication with
the population. The U.S. government and the new CENTCOM military leadership
considered by both sides at least as partially hostile).

(Generals David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, Raymond Odierno) and new strategy papers and field manuals like

are reminders that knowledge and


experiences won in limited and counterinsurgency wars (COIN), all well established in World
War II and Vietnam, were all forgotten. Long War Short War One typical error of all war planners since
Joint Publication 3-05.1,21 FM 3-24, 22 or AFDD 2-3,23

1900 is the assumption that always the next war would be short; after victory, life would go on undisturbed and
troops would go home. In fact, most wars are long, like Korea, Vietnam or now Iraq (finally winding down) or
Afghanistan. The Gulf War of 1991 was very short, pre-decided by airpower, so was the air war against Serbia in
1999. Iraq in 2003 was in Phase III a short war, but it did not end as anticipated. The war in Iraq lasts now for more
than six years, even when now winding down it still has the potency to escalate again. The civil war in Somalia had
no clear beginning and sees no end either. U.S. Intelligence Guidance for NATO Earlier Intelligence

NATO is dominated by the United States, and NATO intelligence is


dominated by U.S. intelligence intentions and procedures. The United States in the years after the
Reorganizations

National Security Act of 1947 saw always a need for military reform, but besides the creation of the CIA, NSA and DIA many decades ago, changed the
military and civilian intelligence organizations only sporadically.24 Even when the powerful National Security Council was reorganized by each President,
the intelligence structure below was rarely altered, and if, mainly administrative issues. Many commissions and boards (so under Eaton, Schlesinger,
Taylor, Childs, Murphy, Church, Pike, Simon and others) recommended minor or larger changes, but they were mainly ignored. The National Security
Agency (NSA) was created in 1952, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961. Small changes did occur during the presidency of Eisenhower, Nixon
and Ford. Of consequence were E.O. 11905 and E.O. 12036, but many changes came with E.O. 12333 of December 4, 1981, signed by President Reagan,
which extended the scope of intelligence and operations. Congress (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence) often demanded not only budgetary oversight, but also supervision of activities and even of secret operations as written into the Hughes
Ryan Act of December 1974, and proposed by the Church Committee report in 1975. Congress also debated for decades about improvements in
intelligence, voted for the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, which demanded prior information of Congress about major clandestine operations, followed
by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991. These must be seen as fallouts from the Watergate affair, but intelligence knew how to overcome such
demands and rules: The White House and the intelligence organizations insisted on their right to keep top secret documents locked, and sensitive
activities out of reach of any Congressional oversight. The large number of organizations and reorganizations, and hundreds of ongoing operations, made
supervision anyway impossible. Recent Intelligence Reorganizations 30 different organizations today have a budget of 75 Bio. US $,25 and employ some
290.000 people.26 Many of these reforms had an impact on NATO. Non-Military Intelligence Reforms President Clinton looked into a more innovative

the 9/11 attacks initiated a


number of reorganizations, some based on the Patriot Act of 2001,28 some on
Executive Orders signed by the President. 29 In 2002, the joint National Commission on
intelligence structure in 1996,27 but the agencies were slow in changing their habits. However ,

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States recommended a far-reaching intelligence


reform, which resulted in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act (IRTA) of 2004, who saw the
creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and of a National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC, (400 employees) located next to the CIA
compound. Other laws were amended, like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.30 The Secret Service and Coast Guard Intelligence were
moved to the new Department of Homeland Security, a move that was not really understood. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is the successor of
the National Intelligence Council (NIC)31 and was shifted from the CIA to the DNI: It is a rather small instrument of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), and will finalize estimates which in fact are basically CIA estimates.32 President Bush also installed with PDD 75 a National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX).33 In 2005 and in 2008, more changes came along with additional revisions of E.O. 12333, which altered again some of the revisions
made in 2004.34 However, changes in the organization alone were not being the only answer to improve conditions.35 9/11 was not only an intelligence
failure, but also one of established airport and airline security policies and procedures. However, organizational changes like the ones of 2003/2004 could
not overcome all inadequacies,36 therefore, new approaches were needed, and especially the CollinsLieberman Bill (July 2004) had a tremendous impact
on Congress and the intelligence community. In summer of 2009, the CIA Director Leon Panetta was in a fight against Congress and accusations against
the CIA.37 Panetta in public statements had attacked House Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi. Other issues were the different opinions on intelligence
priorities between the DNI, the Director of CIA and the, the Director of the FBI, with James Jones as National Security Adviser in the role of mediator.38 The
CIA won over DNI Denis Blair, when Blair insisted to have its own personnel stationed in U.S. embassies. Only the intelligence and security branches of
the State Department (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, USIA, AID, Embassy Security and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security) remained unchanged and
also remained fully civilian. Military Intelligence Reforms In 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense implemented new directives for the military
agencies, which had an impact on organizations, hierarchies and reporting. The military also protected its intelligence services and their roles, and even
inside the armed forces the intelligence branch expanded and remained untouched by Congress.39 A number of intelligence reforms were implemented.
The Department of Defense saw the creation of the Director of Defense Intelligence, a position that was combined in May 2007 with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, created in 2004 by the IRTA.40 For the first time, all Department of Defense intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, DSS, National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, the intelligence organizations of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and the attached
intelligence branch of the US Coast Guard), came under one supervisory authority, which is basically a budgetoversight. Quite interesting is the fact, that
generals and admirals gained control of all major civilian agencies with exemption of the FBI. LtGen James R. Clapper, the former Director of the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and of the DIA, became the powerful Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. The current Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates spent 27 years in intelligence and was Director of the CIA from 1986 to 1989. U.S. military intelligence certainly outreached over the last years, and
one has to add the tight cooperation between U.S. and British intelligence, the British-French cooperation, and the German and Italian services with their
detailed knowledge of various regions in Europe, Asia and Africa. Australian intelligence with their listening posts directed to Southeastern Asia, is an
important source for U.S. and British agencies, and therefore also for NATO, so are Japanese and South Korean findings. France is one of the best sources
of sensitive data regarding a number of hot areas in Africa and the Middle East. Further Changes Many authors complain that the last round of
reorganizations had not resulted in any measurable improvement.41 Admiral Eric Olson, commander Special Operations Command (SOCOM), was recently
discussing the war in Afghanistan in Washington, DC, (NDU/NESA Center) and reminded the audience that industry is developing numerous systems to
find, analyse, track, and communicate information, but the troops must be adequately trained to use this equipment and combine sensors, computers and
personnel. Here he sees room for improvement. Others see the future in a homogenized combination of OSINT, HUMINT and UAVs.42 Another issue is
cyberspace security and the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), as an additional unified command of the Defense Department.43 A
United States Strategic Cyberspace Strategy will be published in 2010.44 Relevant intelligence regulations include JP 2 series, FM 2 series, AFDD 2 series,
OPNAV manuals etc. Presidential Findings Ordering clandestine operations requires a Presidential overview and consent. According to Section 622 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President must approve or order intelligence covert actions (special activities, see also Section 501, National
Security Act of 1947) by a written Presidential Findings (PF) document, which is based on a Memorandum of Notification (MON), usually written by the CIA
or the DNI.45 Such binds the CIA or any other intelligence organization; if such an activity has to be altered or cancelled, the President must approve any
such change as well. It is understood that routine operations are not subject of any forwarded Notification and Findings.46 Intelligence and the NSC

the NSC is the main arbitrator for intelligence activities and is more or less
also the final authority. Many changes have altered responsibilities and supervision .
Since 1947,

Various NSC committees and planning groups often changed their names and structures, but involved always the
President, Vice President, National Security Adviser, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA,
(and since 2004) the DNI, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Counsellor to the President. Others, like experts, the Director of the OMB, the Attorney General, or the Director of

NATO is basically
providing the important link between U.S. and European security requirements in
the Northern Atlantic-EUCOM region. From a U.S. geopolitical-geostrategic point of view, it permits
the U.S. to control of the opposite coast, which is seen by strategy experts as a
paramount U.S. security requirement. NATO is fulfilling this task, and the U.S. is paying back
with security guarantees. Seen from a geopolitical point of view, the United States wanted after 1945 to
the FBI might attend. The Links Between U.S. Defense Requirements and NATO

contain any power or any combination of powers on the Eurasian landmass, which might become a dangerous

The improving relationship between NATO and


the European Union will have an impact on the sharing of intelligence as well .47
Russia is emerging again as antagonist to the west and to NATO; this
fundamental and geopolitical change will have a decisive impact on national
intelligence and NATO intelligence and new strategy papers. For Europe, NATO is a
nearly perfect security umbrella against contemporary and future threats from the
east, south, and southeast. This umbrella includes political cooperation , links to the
challenge for the security of the United States.

European Union and other nations, which are cooperative partners, either within NATO or in other regions of the

linkages include security agreements, nuclear weapons, conventional


forces and also the sharing of intelligence .48 As the U.S. has extended EUCOM and NATO to
globe. These

CENTCOM and AFRICOM, the same governments who send troops to Afghanistan were as EU-members insisting on a
different agenda, based on Soft Power, international law and humanitarian considerations, with a public that
strangely accepts NATO operations but declines military interventions by the EU.49

NATO Solves Every Impact Ever

Proliferation
Proliferation causes extinction it destabilizes hegemony and
all other nations and escalates to nuclear war deterrence
doesnt account for irrational actors
Maass 10 Richard Maass, working for his Ph. D. in political science at Notre dame
University, currently teaches classes there on International Relations, 2010,
Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,
http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf
On August 29, 1949, The Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear fission
bomb, signaling the end of U.S. hegemony in the international arena. On
September 11th, 2001, the worlds single most powerful nation watched in awe as
the very symbols of its prosperity fell to rubble in the streets of New York City. The
United States undisputedly has a greater share of world power than any other
country in history (Brooks and Wolforth, 2008, pg. 2). Yet even a global hegemon is
ultimately fallible and vulnerable to rash acts of violence as it conducts itself in a
rational manner and assumes the same from other states . Conventional strategic thought and
military action no longer prevail in an era of increased globalization. Developing states and irrational
actors play increasingly influential roles in the international arena . Beginning with the
U.S.S.R. in 1949, nuclear proliferation has exponentially increased states
relative military capabilities as well as global levels of political instability .
Through ideas such as nuclear peace theory, liberal political scholars developed
several models under which nuclear weapons not only maintain but increase global
tranquility. These philosophies assume rationality on the part of political actors in an
increasingly irrational world plagued by terrorism, despotic totalitarianism, geopolitical instability and failed international institutionalism. Realistically,
proliferation of nuclear [weapons]constitutes a threat to international peace and
security (UN Security Council, 2006, pg. 1). Nuclear security threats arise in four forms: the
threat of existing arsenals, the emergence of new nuclear states, the collapse of
international non-proliferation regimes and the rise of nuclear terrorism. Due to
their asymmetric destabilizing and equalizing efects, nuclear weapons erode
the unipolarity of the international system by balancing political actors
relative military power and security. In the face of this inevitable nuclear proliferation and its
effects on relative power, the United States must accept a position of declining hegemony .
Despite nuclear proliferations controversial nature, states continue to develop the technologies requisite for
constructing nuclear weapons. What motivates men to create the most terrifying weapons ever created by human
kindunique in their destructive power and in their lack of direct military utility(Cirincione, 2007, pg. 47)? Why

nuclear weapons
comprise a symbolic asset of strength and as a prerequisite for great power status
then do states pursue the controversial and costly path of proliferation? To states,

(Cirincione, 2007, pg. 47). On a simplistic level, nuclear weapons make states feel more powerful, respected and

states develop nuclear capabilities to


ensure their own sovereignty and to potentially deter other states from attacking.
According to realist thinkers, nuclear weapons provide the ultimate security
guarantor in an anarchic international system (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 51). Proliferation
optimists and rational deterrence theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue
influential in world politics. When it is in their best interest,

proliferation stabilizes international security and promotes peace. Rational


deterrence theory states that nations refrain from nuclear conflict because of the
extraordinarily high cost. Arguably the most powerful military technology ever developed by man, nuclear
weapons have only twice been deployed in actual conflict, due to the devastation they incur. Nuclear weapons
increase the potential damage of any given military conflict due to their immense destructive capabilities.
Summarizing rational deterrence framework, Waltz asserts states are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe
damage and by their inability to do much to limit it (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg 32). According to the rational
deterrence framework, political actors refrain from both conventional and nuclear conflict because of the
unacceptably high costs. Ultimately an assumption, rational deterrence theory lacks any empirically tested

Nuclear proliferation exponentially increases the possibility of nonproliferation regime collapse and nuclear conflict, reducing all states relative power.
Nuclear peace theory seems plausible, but like any mathematical model it may only
marginally apply to world politics and the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, due to
the fact that international security is not reducible to the theory of mathematical
games (Bracken, 2002, pg. 403). Rather, the spread of nuclear weapons exponentially
decreases the stability of regional and global politics by intensifying regional
rivalries and political tensions, both of which may potentially catalyze a nuclear
catastrophe. Frustrated with a lack of results through conventional conflict, desperate states may look to
nuclear arsenals as a source of absolute resolution for any given conflict. The use of nuclear weapons,
even in a limited theater, could plausibly trigger chain reactions rippling across the
globe. With their interests and sovereignty threatened, other nuclear states will
eventually use their own weapons in an effort to ensure national security . President
evidence.

Kennedy warned of the danger of nuclear proliferation in 1963: I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it
would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countriesthere would be no rest for
anyone then, no stability, no real securitythere would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an
increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts

Proliferation decreases the relative security of all states not


only through the possibility of direct conflict, but also by threatening foreign and
domestic interests. As the sole international hegemon, the U.S. seeks to use its
power to insure its security and influence international politics in a way that reflects
its own interests and values (Huntington, 1993, pg. 70). In addition to creating a direct
security threat, further proliferation jeopardizes the United States ability to project
its primacy and promote its interests internationally
(Cirincione, 2007, pg. 103).

Proliferation is uniquely likely in the coming years makes


arms races and conflicts uniquely likely
Friedberg 2015 Aaron L. Friedberg, served from 2003 to 2005 as deputy
assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy planning, PhD in
government, January 2015, The Evolving Nuclear Order: Implications for
Proliferation, Arms Racing, and Stability, http://muse.jhu.edu/login?
auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/asia_policy/v019/19.friedberg.pdf, p. 44-48
The 25 years since the end of the Cold War have seen several notable shifts in the
global distribution of nuclear capabilities : The Soviet Union (now Russia) and the
United States have slashed their arsenals by roughly 75% from 20,00030,000 warheads to 7,000
8,000.1 France and Britain have also made substantial cuts, reducing their nuclear forces from 500 weapons at
their peak to roughly 300 and 200, respectively. Of the Cold War big five (the United States, Britain, France,

only China has not reduced its stockpile , which is estimated at 250
warheads. Beijing has also made significant investments in modernizing its forces ,
Soviet Union, and China),

developing new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Three new countries (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have joined the list of
acknowledged nuclear weapons states , and one (South Africa) has been removed. Finally, in recent
years a series of aspirants (Iraq, Libya, and Syria) have seen their nuclear ambitions foiled, while one (Iran)

What are the implications of these developments


for the conduct of international relations, and, in particular, how are they likely to
shape events in eastern Eurasia, a zone of strategic interaction that extends from the Korean Peninsula,
continues to press on toward the finish line.

down through the South Asian subcontinent, and into the Persian Gulf region? The essays in this roundtable have

the
further spread of nuclear weapons, the next chapters of the story in the broader
Middle East will depend a great deal on what happens in Iran. If Tehran succeeds in
developing nuclear weapons, other states may feel compelled to follow suit , including
helped shed light on three aspects of this question: proliferation, arms racing, and stability. Regarding

Saudi Arabia and Turkey. If it does not, Israel may remain the regions only nuclear weapons state. In East Asia,

states most likely to contemplate pursuing nuclear status are also anxious
friends and allies of the United States. Japan, South Korea, and (albeit implicitly) Taiwan
have until now been content to take shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But
they could come to doubt the reliability of U.S. guarantees in the face of North
Koreas new capabilities, Chinas nuclear modernization programs, or, especially in
the case of Japan, both developments taken together. While this once-taboo topic has been
discussed more openly in both Japan and South Korea in recent years, neither country shows any overt
signs of moving to acquire its own nuclear forces. Still, as Noboru Yamaguchi
explains in his essay, there is nothing in Japans peace constitution that absolutely
precludes the possibility, should the nations leaders deem it necessary for selfdefense. Like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has shown an interest in acquiring rocket and cruise missile
those

technology that could someday serve as the basis for an independent deterrent force. For the moment, however,

One of the main features


of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was
the interaction between their respective armaments efforts, including their offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons programs . Although there are a number of competitive dyads emerging in Asia, and
the potential for further proliferation in East Asia remains latent. Arms Racing

while the possibility exists for even more complex arrangements, the degree of interaction among the actors to date remains limited. As Benjamin Schreer
describes, Chinas modernization of its long-range nuclear forces appears to be motivated in large part by a desire to reduce its vulnerability to a possible
U.S. conventional precision strike. An increase in the number of weapons deployed, perhaps on multiple warhead delivery systems, could also reflect
concern over the possible thickening of the U.S. national missile defenses. For the moment, however, there is no strong evidence to support the view that
China aims eventually to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. Nor are there any indications to suggest that Washington will respond to Beijings

India and
Pakistan are following distinct paths in developing their nuclear capacities, with the
former seeking a secure second-strike force to deter attack on its troops or territory
and the latter attempting to acquire weapons that could be used to offset its
inferiority in conventional ground and air forces . Singh asserts that the two states are not
currently engaged in a nuclear arms race, but he notes the possibility that their programs could
become more closely coupled, especially if China continues to provide nuclear assistance to Pakistan
limited buildup with measures designed to retain (or reacquire) a viable damage-limiting option against China. According to P.K. Singh,

while its own forces expand beyond currently projected levels. This development, in particular, would likely have an
impact on the United States, and perhaps on Russia as well, setting in motion a genuinely multisided rivalry, with
Pakistan and India responding to one another; China interacting with the United States and Russia, as well as India;

Ultimately
the most important question that must be asked about recent developments is
whether they will increase or decrease the risk of war, including the possibility
of nuclear war. As Rajesh Basrur makes clear, there are plausible theoretical arguments that can be made
and Russia and the United States once again engaged in an active nuclear competition. Stability

on either side of this question. On the one hand, it is possible that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons will

nuclear-armed
nations may feel emboldened to engage in provocations or conventional aggression,
impose extreme caution on states that might otherwise be prone to conflict. On the other hand,

even against other nuclear powers. The empirical evidence regarding this issue is sparse and subject to varying
interpretations. North Korea has behaved aggressively toward the South on several occasions since conducting its first nuclear tests, but it did so often in
the past as well. For the most part, as Kang Chois essay suggests, the North Korean regime seems to regard its small arsenal as the ultimate insurance

Pakistans leaders appear to


believe that nuclear weapons reduce the risk of large-scale conventional retaliation
and thus provide a backstop for their continued support of terrorist groups operating
against India. But Islamabad has not thrown caution to the winds, and, as Basrur suggests, both Pakistan and India may at times be tempted to
policy rather than a useful new tool with which to fulfill its grandiose self-proclaimed ambitions.

manipulate the risk of escalation to get the United States to exert pressure on their behalf. Even when its own forces were smaller and less secure,

Chinese strategists appear to have believed that they were sufficient to discourage
the United States from ever using nuclear weapons against their country. Beijings
modernization programs may be intended simply to bolster that confidence in the
face of growing U.S. precision-strike capabilities . Now that China is developing similar conventional capabilities of
its own, however, it has options for the use of force that it previously lacked and that it may be more likely to exercise if it believes it can deter the United
States from nuclear escalation. This is a possibility about which U.S. and Japanese strategists have begun to worry and to which they will likely devote

Is the world approaching critical mass, a point at which the


number and size of nuclear arsenals and the dangers associated with them will
grow with explosive speed? The evidence presented here suggests that the answer
is mixed. While superpower stockpiles have dwindled, the roster of nuclear weapons
states has grown, and further horizontal proliferation is a distinct possibility in both
Asia and the Middle East. At least for the moment, the plans and programs of the nuclear
powers remain loosely coupled, but this too could change quickly, resulting in a
truly multisided arms competition that is more complex and potentially
more difficult to control than the Cold War arms race. The acquisition of nuclear
more attention in the years ahead.

weapons (in the case of India, Pakistan, and North Korea) and the development of more secure arsenals (in the case
of China) have not resulted in radically increased recklessness. But there are indications that states equipped with
such capabilities may assess that they provide a backstop for greater assertiveness. Such beliefs could raise the
risk of conventional conflict and bring the world much closer to critical mass than it appears to be at present.

AT: MAD
Mutually Assured Destruction fails nations are given
incentives to threaten nuclear war in exchange for geopolitical
advantages this increases the risk of nuclear war
Kroenig 2012 Matthew Kroenig, proliferation expert, 5/26/12, The History of
Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?
aid=1182&rtid=2
The proliferation optimist position has a distinguished
pedigree, and provides a useful rationale for actors interested in developing
strategic deterrence with limited means, but it provides a weaker intellectual
framework for comprehensively understanding the likely effects of nuclear
proliferation on international politics. Scott Sagan and other contemporary
proliferation pessimists have provided systematic and thoroughgoing critiques of
the proliferation optimism position.32 Sagan shows that the spread of nuclear
weapons leads to greater levels of international instability because: states
might conduct preventive strikes on the nuclear facilities of proliferant states,
proliferant states might not take the necessary steps to build a secure, secondstrike capability, and organizational pathologies within nuclear states could lead
to accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch .33 As Frank Gavin writes in his review of the
Proliferation through Rose-Colored Glasses.

optimism/pessimism debate, The real problem, however, is that Sagan plays small ball in his debate with Waltz, conceding the big
issues. Why not challenge Waltz on his core arguments about deterrence and stability?34 Rather than repeat the substantial efforts
of previous pessimists, therefore, I will take up Gavins challenge and focus on three big issues. In particular, this section maintains

proliferation optimists: present an oversimplified version of nuclear deterrence


theory, follow a line of argumentation that contains an internal logical contradiction,
and do not address the concerns of U.S. foreign policymakers. First and foremost, proliferation
optimists present an oversimplified view of nuclear deterrence theory. Optimists
argue that since the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear war
would mean national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would ever choose to start one. Furthermore, they
argue that the requirements for rationality are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own survival and the
survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a nuclear war would threaten those values. Many analysts
and policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question
whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully rational .35 Yet, these debate
overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence theorists believe that nuclear proliferation
contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a situation of Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD) among rational states.36 Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend
that

on peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping MAD.37 Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand that

some risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to function . To


be sure, in the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear
deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.38 After all, great power political competition does not end with

nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed


adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but
they still want to coerce their adversaries . This leads to a credibility problem: how can states
credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has
nuclear weapons. And

been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.39 And their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas
Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.40 He argued that

leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a threat that
leaves something to chance.41 They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis,

which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved
adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing
probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an
inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange . As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the
incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently
credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of
nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis, as long as it does not end in
catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a competition in risk
taking.42 This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each

They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an
important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but
stage of the crisis.

only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been twenty high stakes nuclear crises in
which rational states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war. 43 By asking whether states can be

what risk of
nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given
crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed Iran will not intentionally
commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the
United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear
weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran
would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power . It is
deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is:

also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its

If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel were to have a


geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Irans client Hezbollah,
the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that
Iran would immediately capitulate ? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly
brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the
latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and
objectives.

proliferation optimists are wrong to dismiss it out of hand. An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even
in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not

leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in


nuclear-armed states also have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that
nuclear weapons might be used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in
crises, such as placing nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch
authority to low-level commanders, to purposely increase the risk of nuclear
war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down . Moreover, not even the
used. But this objection ignores the fact that

optimists first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally

Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt,


but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader
would rather face a country with five nuclear weapons than one with five thousand .
Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against
the former state than against the latter. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that states are willing to run
devastating.44

greater risks and are, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents.45
Proliferation optimists might be correct that no rational leader would choose to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the
context, any sane leader would almost certainly be willing to risk one.

Russia
The US is prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons against
Russia if NATO conflict occurs even a small conflict kills
hundreds of millions
Gaist 6/26 Thomas Gaist, reporter citing ongoing talks about NATO nuclear
policy, published by the International Committee of the Fourth International,
6/26/15, US, NATO powers intensify preparations for nuclear war,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/06/26/nuke-j26.html
The NATO military alliance is preparing to implement a more aggressive nuclear
weapons strategy in response to alleged Russian aggression , according to NATO sources
cited by the Guardian Wednesday evening. Proposed changes include provisions for greater
involvement of nuclear forces in ongoing NATO military exercises along Russias borders and
new guidelines for nuclear escalation against Russia , according to the NATO officials.
The alliances nuclear doctrine has been the subject of quiet, informal discussions
on the sidelines of the ongoing NATO summit. The new policies will be confirmed
at an upcoming conference of the alliances Nuclear Planning Group , which was
rescheduled for an earlier date this week as word got around about the secretive planning. There is very
real concern about the way in which Russia publicly bandies around nuclear stuff. So
there are quite a lot of deliberations in the alliance about nuclear weapons, an
unnamed NATO diplomat told the Guardian. The claim that discussion about a revision of
nuclear weapons policy is in response to Russian aggression turns reality on its
head. In the aftermath of the US and NATO-backed coup in Ukraine last year, the
major imperialist powers have engaged in a relentless militarization of Eastern
Europe, including the establishment of a rapid reaction force of 40,000 troops. This week, US Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter announced that the US would permanently deploy tanks, military
vehicles and other equipment to countries bordering Russia. There are also ongoing
discussions about directly arming Ukraine, beyond the extensive assistance the
right-wing government already receives. NATO is now planning to respond to any
attempt by Russia to maintain or counter US imperialisms aggressive moves in
Eastern Europe with even more massive military response, including nuclear
weapons. An indication of the thinking of NATO strategists was provided by a report in the Financial Times. In
the event of a conflict involving one of the Baltic countries, Russia mightaccuse
the alliance of escalating the conflict and threaten to use intermediate range
nuclear weapons. The Times quotes Elbridge Colby, of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS):
NATO does not need a total nuclear rethink. But it needs to be realistic about how
it would respond and willing to show Putin that he would not get away with it. This
scenario builds on allegations from the US that Russia has violated the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

US officials have stated that the


Pentagon is preparing to launch preemptive attacks against missiles or other
targets in Russia, including with nuclear weapons, in response to Moscows
alleged violation of the treaty. The announcement of major revisions to NATOs
nuclear strategy came just days after the publication of an extensive report, Project
Atom: Defining US Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025-2050, by the Center for
(INF), allegations that the Russian government has denied.

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The main portions of the report were authored by a
career US government strategist and senior CSIS analyst, Clark Murdock, a man who previously worked in high-level
strategy jobs at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the US Air Force and the
National War College. The report included contributions from a large team of researchers and experts, including

The thrust of the CSIS


analysis is that the US must make its nuclear arsenal easier to use in a war with
Russia, China or some other power. The military must adopt a US nuclear strategy
designed for twenty-first century realities , based on new generations of tactical warheads and
delivery systems. More advanced tactical nuclear weapons will enable Washington to
threaten and launch small nuclear wars, without being self-deterred by concerns that its actions
would lead to a nuclear holocaust, the CSIS report argues. The United States needs to develop and
deploy more employable nuclear weapons, the CSIS wrote, including low collateral
damage, enhanced radiation, earth penetration, electromagnetic pulse , and
others as technology advances. Such advances, the report argues, are the only way to counter the
panels from the CNAS and the National Institution for Public Policy (NIPP).

erosion of American technological superiority by the growth of the Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals, together
with the addition of as many as nine new governments to the nuclear club. Under the Measured Response
theory advocated by the CSIS and Murdock, these types of highly mobile nuclear strike forces could engage in
controlled nuclear operations, firing low yield, accurate, special effects nukes against enemy targets without

By forward deploying a robust set of discriminate nuclear


response options, the US could launch tactical nuclear strikes at all rungs of the
nuclear escalation ladder, Murdock wrote. Such small-scale nuclear conflicts
would inevitably claim tens, if not hundreds of millions of lives, even assuming
they did not escalate into a global nuclear war.
leading to a full-scale nuclear war.

Terror
Terrorists attacks cause nuclear war finger-pointing and
retaliation
Ayson 2010 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies, PhD in War Studies,
6/21/10, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756?
journalCode=uter20#.VaKMWflViko
But these two nuclear worldsa

non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate


nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable . It is just possible that some sort of
terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a
chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between
two or more of the states that possess them . In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist
groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new
state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war
between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew
about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially

in the
event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered
just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or
encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of
plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example,

terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For

how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the
fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks ,40
example,

and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a
particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting
from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and
collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and,

if the act of nuclear


terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe
that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift
immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and
most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively,

probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran
if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes

if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop


of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time
when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials
and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of
this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved
in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were
confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these
developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too:
should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of
heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow
and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United
States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a
game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular,

terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia

and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S.
president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a
tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might
mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a

Washington
might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or
disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or
states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets,
Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their
comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even
on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington
devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier)

that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with

American pressure on
that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might
require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found
itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nucleararmed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that
special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and
what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42

China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security

there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or
China is less automatic in some cases than in others . For example, what would happen if the United
Council. But

States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the
responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were

If the terrorist
group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of
the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that
Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what
conclusions might it then draw about their culpability.
in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange.

2AC Solvency

Lower Courts

Spillover
FISA reform creates more efective review over surveillance
within the lower courts and provides coherence within the
judicial system.
McNeal 15 Gregory S. McNeal, J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law,
Pepperdine, University School of Law, 2015 (REFORMING THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS INTERPRETIVE SECRECY PROBLEM,
Federalist Edition, Vol.2, 2015, Available Online at: http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/McNeal_Final.pdf, Accessed: 7-6-2015)
This standard of significant construction or interpretation of FISA could be
modified to become a trigger for appellate review by requiring that all opinions of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that involve significant construction or
interpretation of any statute or judicial precedent are subject to de novo review by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Automatic review of lower
court opinions is not unheard of in the national security cases. For example, in
courts martial proceedings, trials that result in a conviction are auto-matically
reviewed by the convening authority, and the convening authority has discretion to
mitigate the findings and sentence.66 Furthermore, if the sentence imposed by the
convening authority includes death, dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, or
confinement for one year or more, the case is automatically reviewed by an
intermediate court.67 Those courts review cases for legal error, factual sufficiency
and sentence appropriateness. A de novo standard of review is appropriate for
surveillance activities as it allows multijudge panels that permit reflective dialogue
and collective judgment with regard to legal issues.68 As the Supreme Court has
explained, [i]ndependent appellate review of legal issues best serves the dual
goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial administration, and while the
Supreme Court was not speaking of surveillance, its admonitions regarding
appellate review are perhaps stronger in the context of national security.69
However, national security surveillance oftentimes requires rapid action on the part
of the courts; thus while this essay argues that FISC opinions should be
presumptively reviewed, the order or opinion issued by the FISC should be
immediately effective, and finalized pending review by the FISCR. A FISC judge
should have the ability to stay his order or opinion, subject to FISCR review, but
absent such an order by the judge, the opinion or order on the substantive
surveillance matter should be effective immediately. This idea draws from concepts
found in the ordinary course of appellate review of administrative action where
appellate review is only available after an administrative action is final.70 In fact,
under the Administrative Procedure Act, final agency action is a prerequisite to
most causes of action.

Solvency Mechanism

Revitalizes Competition
The plan revitalizes US company interest back homeit
recreates operational and reputational advantages that makes
companies return
Eoyang and Bishai 15 (Mieke, Director of Third Way's National Security
Program, Chrissy, Restoring Trust between U.S. Companies and Their Government
on Surveillance Issues, March 19 2015, http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoringtrust-between-us-companies-and-their-government-on-surveillance-issues)
Others have argued that the FAA shifts the burden of cooperation solely onto the
company, which will suffer greater reputational harm as a more witting participant
in affirmatively granting the governments requests. However, companies have
suffered reputational harm as a result of allegations of unwitting cooperation.
Making the cooperation known, even if its secret, gives the companies the
opportunity to account for it in their own planning. The move by certain U.S.
companies to place subsidiaries in foreign ownership to resist requests by the U.S.
government presents an interesting twist on this idea. In shifting the balance back
to increased protections for U.S. companies, this legislation would change the
incentives so that claiming U.S. law would have operational advantages in
giving companies uniformity of law for all their data. This would also encourage the
use of a single choice of law for all data governed by a companythat of the
nationality of incorporationrather than encouraging a choice of law patchwork to
govern the data as it flows around the world. Finally, some foreign multinational
companies operating in the U.S. and abroad may argue that this is inconsistent with
principles that we treat all companies operating in the U.S. the same way for
purposes of law. While that would remain true under this proposal, it would create a
difference in how the U.S. treats U.S. companies operating abroad compared to how
it treats foreign companies abroad. But stretching the U.S. Constitution to foreign
companies abroad is to stretch the document too far. If, on the other hand, those
companies see advantage in changing their nationality to U.S. in order to claim
protections of those laws, then that is the corporate version of the kind of
immigration patterns that America has seen since its founding.

Medina Solves
The plan solves declassification and the sunset clause
legitimizes the courts.
Medine 2014 David Medine, chairman of PCLOB, 2/4/2014,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO REFORM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS,
https://www.pclob.gov/library/Medine-Testimony-20140204House_Judiciary_Comm.pdf
Congress should enact legislation to expand the opportunities
for appellate review of FISC decisions by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, and for
review of those decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. Providing for greater appellate review of
rulings by the FISC and by its companion appellate court , the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review (FISCR), will strengthen the integrity of judicial review under FISA . Providing a role for
Recommendation 4:

the Special Advocate in seeking that appellate review will further increase public confidence in the integrity of the process.

FISC should take full advantage of existing authorities to obtain


technical assistance and expand opportunities for legal input from outside parties. FISC
judges should take advantage of their ability to appoint Special Masters or
other technical experts to assist them in reviewing voluminous or technical materials, either in connection with
Recommendation 5: The

initial applications or in compliance reviews. In addition, the FISC and the FISCR should develop procedures to facilitate amicus
participation by third parties in cases involving questions that are of broad public interest, where it is feasible to do so consistent

the government
should create and release with minimal redactions declassified versions of new
decisions, orders and opinions by the FISC and FISCR in cases involving novel interpretations of FISA or
other significant questions of law, technology or compliance. FISC judges should continue their recent
practice of drafting opinions in cases involving novel issues and other significant
decisions in the expectation that declassified versions will be released to the public .
with national security. Recommendation 6: To the maximum extent consistent with national security,

The government should promptly create and release declassified versions of these FISC opinions. Recommendation 7: Regarding

the government should perform a declassification review of


decisions, orders and opinions by the FISC and FISCR that have not yet been released to
the public and that involve novel interpretations of FISA or other significant
questions of law, technology or compliance . Although it may be more difficult to
declassify older FISC opinions drafted without expectation of public release , the release of
such older opinions is still important to facilitate public understanding of the development of the law under FISA. The
government should create and release declassified versions of older opinions in
novel or significant cases to the greatest extent possible consistent with protection
of national security. This should cover programs that have been discontinued, where
the legal interpretations justifying such programs have ongoing relevance.
previously written opinions,

2AC Add Ons

China Add On
Squo surveillance policy allows China to justify protectionist
measures which intensifies on going US-China tensions
Castro and McQuinn 15 (Daniel, vice President of the Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation and Director of the Center for Data Innovation, Alan,
Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S.
Competitiveness, June 2015, http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usa-freedomact.pdf)

Protectionist policies in China have further strained the U.S. tech industry. In January
2015, the Chinese government adopted new regulations that forced companies that
sold equipment to Chinese banks to turn over secret source code, submit to
aggressive audits, and build encryption keys into their products.38 While ostensibly
an attempt to strengthen cybersecurity in critical Chinese industries, many western
tech companies saw these policies as a shot across the bow trying to force them out
of Chinas markets. After all, the Chinese government had already launched a deIOE movementIOE stands for IBM, Oracle and EMC to convince its state-owned
banks to stop buying from these U.S. tech giants. 39 To be sure, the Chinese
government recently halted this policy under U.S. pressure.40 However, the halted
policy can be seen as a part of a larger clash between China and the United States
over trade and cybersecurity. Indeed, these proposed barriers were in part a quid
pro quo from China, after the United States barred Huawei, a major Chinese
computer maker, from selling its products in the United States due to the fear that
this equipment had back doors for the Chinese government.41 Since the Snowden
revelations essentially gave them cover, Chinese lawmakers have openly called for
the use of domestic tech products over foreign goods both to boost the Chinese
economy and in response to U.S. surveillance tactics. This system of retaliation has
not only led to a degradation of business interests for U.S. tech companies in China,
but also disrupted the dialogue between the U.S. government and China on
cybersecurity issues.42

Competitiveness/Econ Add On
Direct correlation with sales lossforeign companies have
made US surveillance a centerpiece of their sales strategy
turns away corporate and individual customers
Castro and McQuinn 15 (Daniel, vice President of the Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation and Director of the Center for Data Innovation, Alan,
Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S.
Competitiveness, June 2015, http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usa-freedomact.pdf)
At the same time, foreign companies have made the U.S. digital surveillance policy
a centerpiece of their own effective marketing strategy. Some European companies
have begun to highlight where their digital services are hosted as an alternative to
U.S. companies. German cloud companies like Hortnetsecurity bill themselves as
Cloud Services: Made in Germany, while French companies like Cloudwatt have
joined the Sovereign Cloud, a service advertised as resistant to NSA spying. 23 In
another example, F-Secure, the European online cloud storage company whose
service resembles that of Dropbox, has leveraged government surveillance into a
sales pitch. Based out of Finland, FSecure has made the promise that it will never
share an individuals data with other companies or governments. As a result, FSecure signed up over one million users within its first 9 months.24 Similarly, the
French telecommunications company Orange has also leveraged the perceived
belief that European companies protect privacy better than U.S. alternatives to
make deeper inroads into European markets. 25

Snowden allegations gut US tech and communications


companies and customers moved ofshore
Eoyang and Bishai 15 (Mieke, Director of Third Way's National Security
Program, Chrissy, Restoring Trust between U.S. Companies and Their Government
on Surveillance Issues, March 19 2015, http://www.thirdway.org/report/restoringtrust-between-us-companies-and-their-government-on-surveillance-issues)
Beyond the broad implications for civil liberties and diplomacy, these fears led to
two immediate consequences for the industry: First, many U.S. companies shifted
to an adversarial relationship with their own government. They moved to secure
and encrypt their data to protect the privacy rights of their customers.6 They are
pushing for reform.7 They are building state-of-the-art data centers in Europe and
staffing their high-paying jobs with Europeans, not Americans.8 They are
challenging the government in court.9 Second, international customers of U.S.
technology and communications companies began taking their business elsewhere.
Brazil decided against a $4.5 billion Boeing deal and cancelled Microsoft
contracts.10 Germany dropped Verizon in favor of Deutsche Telekom.11 Both of
these examples suggest that if even friendly governments can go to the expense
and trouble of dropping American companies, foreign individual and corporate

customers could certainly decide to switch their data providers for greater privacy
protection. Simply put, the reputational harm had a direct impact on
American companies competitivenesssome estimate that it has cost U.S.
tech firms $180 billion thus far.12 Defenders of the programs may argue that the
Snowden allegations are overblown or that foreign companies are just using the
revelations for their own protectionist purposes. But it doesnt matter if the
allegations are actually true because the global public believes them to be true, and
they are therefore real in their consequences. In many ways, the Snowden
revelations have created a sense of betrayal among American companies. Some
had been providing information to the NSA through existing legislative means
either under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act,13 or under Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act (FAA).14 It was unsettling to read stories that, outside of this
statutorily compelled cooperation, the government had been getting access to huge
amounts of their data in other unauthorized ways. As one tech employee said, the
back door makes a mockery of the front door.

Cloud Computing
But expansion isnt possible because American businesses look
like pawns of the USFGspecifically undermines cloud
computing and mergers and acquisitions
Sensenbrenner 13 (Jim, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations, The NSA overreach poses a
serious threat to our economy, November 20 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/20/jim-sensenbrenner-nsaoverreach-hurts-business)
The overreach by the National Security Agency (NSA) does more than infringe on
American civil liberties. It poses a serious threat to our economic vitality. Reports
from the business community are clear: indiscriminate collection of data by the NSA
damages American companies' growth, credibility, competitive advantage and
bottom line. US companies seeking to expand to lucrative markets in Europe and
Asia will find regulatory environments much less receptive to mergers and
acquisitions because of NSA programs. German regulatory officials have made it
clear, for instance, that AT&T, a massive American telecommunications company
that provided customer telephone numbers to the NSA as ordered by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (known as the Fisa court), would undergo intense
scrutiny to ensure it complies with German privacy laws before it can acquire a
German telecommunications company. This mandate would certainly impede efforts
to expand its presence in the region. Of course, US tech companies do not exist in a
vacuum, free from competition. Companies like Google, which exhibit clear
dominance in the United States, compete intensely with foreign competitors around
the world. American businesses will lose considerable market share if foreign
competitors and regulators paint them as pawns of the US intelligence
community. Cisco Systems warned that its revenues could fall by as much as 10%
because of the level of uncertainty or concerns engendered by NSA operations.
Cisco saw its new orders fall by 12% in the developing world, 25% in Brazil and 30%
in Russia. This is in contrast to the 8% growth Cisco saw in the previous quarter. The
cloud computing industry will also suffer. Since many industries rely heavily on
this technology, any disruption would ripple across all segments of the national
economy. According to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, the
US cloud computing industry could lose between $22 and $35bn (pdf) over the next
three years because of the NSA's overreach. And smaller cloud service providers
that partner with U.S. companies have already cancelled contracts.

Terror Add On

FISA Inefficiencies Increase Threat


Current counter terror eforts on the part of FISA are
inefective its only a matter of when an attack occurs
because of probable clause standards
Blum 2009 Stephanie Cooper Blum, DHS and DoJ, specializes in writing about
Security Studies, 6/25/09, Public Interest Law Journal, Vol. 18, What Really is at
Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance
Reform, p. 289-292,
https://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/pilj/vol18no2/documents/18
-2BlumArticle.pdf
To what extent can FISA, created during the Cold War, protect U.S.
national security interests in a world of transnational terrorism where the
government may not have probable cause that individuals are
connected with a foreign power or international terrorism? According to former Deputy
Director of Na- tional Intelligence, General Michael Hayden, who was the NSA leader during the TSP, [the TSP
was] successful in detecting and preventing attacks inside the United States .131 The
question then becomes why FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, was not
a sufficient tool to stop terrorist attacks? Why did the Bush administration feel that it needed a
warrantless surveillance program that targeted Americans international communications with alleged al Qaeda operatives?
Between 1978 and September 11, 2001,

attorney generals issued forty-seven emergency

authorizations under FISA.132 In the first eighteen months after 9/ 11, the attorney general issued more than 170
emergency authorizations.133 Furthermore, the FISC rejected and modified more FISA warrants in
2003 and 2004 than even before in its history . The FISA judges modified 179 of the 5645 requests for
court-ordered surveillance and rejected or deferred at least six [warrant requests] the first outright rejections in the courts

This history supports the proposition that


complying with FISA caused some perceived obstacles for the Bush
administration. Or, perhaps, FISA was operating effectively and reigning in, albeit marginally (the number of requests
history during the Bush administration.134

modified still shows much deference to the executive), improper surveillance requests. Regardless, no matter how one interprets the

FISA was insufficient to meet the terrorist


threat. To what extent did the administrations fears justify the secret way it went
about handling the matter? Perhaps the Bush administration felt it needed to bypass
FISA because it did not have probable cause that the targets it sought were agents
of foreign powers, or believed it did have probable cause but felt it did not have
adequate time to comply with seeking a FISA warrant .135 In other words, the rationale for the TSP
data, it is clear that the Bush administration felt that

may have been based on a belief that the substantive probable cause standard was too demanding, or the TSP was preferred in
order to simply bypass the procedural requirements of FISA in seeking a warrant. The reality may be a little of both. Although
Gonzales stated in 2005 that the TSP required the Bush administration have a reasonable basis for believing that one party to the

it is unresolved whether reasonable basis was closer to the


predicate probable cause required by FISA or the lesser standard of reasonable
suspicion.137 The administration has argued both positions. While Gonzales stated that reasonable basis was essentially
call was a terrorist,136

the same as probable cause under the Fourth Amendment,138 reports indicate that General Hayden stated that the Bush
administration had adopted a reasonable suspicion standard in applying the TSP because the probable cause standard in FISA was
too onerous.139 Complicating matters more, in 2002, a senator tried to change the probable cause standard to reasonable
suspicion for non-US persons under FISA, but the Justice Department did not support the change, arguing that the probable cause
standard was not an obstacle to effective use of FISA and that the change to reasonable suspicion would probably be
unconstitutional.140 Such a revelation is especially troubling given General Haydens statement regarding adopting reasonable
suspicion as the TSP standard. In essence,

it appears that the Bush administration

purposefully opted for the lower reasonable suspicion standard with no


FISA oversight at all. Hence, there appear to be two primary rationales for the TSP: (1) that the probable cause
standard is too high and (2) that the procedural requirements seeking a FISA warrant are too burdensome. Each potential

To what extent is the probable cause


standard under FISA sufficient to counter the terrorist threat? As explained previously, unlike Title
III, FISA does not require probable cause that a crime is being, has been, or is about
to occur before the issuance of a warrant, but rather probable cause that the target
is an agent of a foreign power or terrorist group (and for U.S. persons, the additional requirement that the
U.S. person may be engaging in activities that knowingly could be a crime).141 Despite the lower burden under
FISA, several policy makers and lawyers argue that requiring probable cause that
the target is an agent of a foreign power is too onerous and does not appreciate
the complexities in detecting terrorist activity. According to former Deputy Attorney General
explanation is addressed in turn. A. Substantive Probable Cause Standard

John Yoo, because FISA assumes that the government already has [probable cause] to believe that a target is the agent of the
foreign power before it even asks for a warrant, FISA works well when the foreign agents are easy to detect like foreign embassy,

Al Qaeda poses
a diferent challenge, however; its members do not work for embassies
and are not part of any one nation. Yoos claims are also supported by former federal prosecutor Andrew
McCarthy,143 and Seventh Circuit appellate judge Richard Posner.144 As McCarthy explains, To have probable-cause
on a target is to know already that he is dangerous. Thats too late. Todays
challenge is to discover the unknown Mohamed Atta in our midst, something that
cant be done unless surveillance begins whenever it is reasonable to suspect a
foreign operative.145 As Yoo describes, counterterrorism agencies must search for clues among millions of potentially
officials working for a hostile nation, or a Soviet KGB agent operating undercover as a diplomat.142

innocent connections, communications, and links.146 Judge Posner observes that innocent people may not even be aware that

[t]he intelligence services must cast a wide net with


a fine mesh to catch the clues that may enable the next attack to be
prevented.147 Hence, according to Yoo, McCarthy, and Posner, U.S. intelligence agents need to
be able to follow leads quickly and must act fast on educated guesses.
they know or are abetting a terrorist:

Information Overload Now


Information overload is occurring within US surveillance now
makes counterterror less efective
Mueller and Stewart 14 John Mueller, Department of Political Science Ohio
State University, Mark Stewart, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, Secret without Reason
and Costly without Accomplishment: Questioning the National Security Agencys
Metadata Program, p. 10-12
Important in this have been increases in intelligence and policing as the
questing enterprise, central to which is the NSA, continues to be
expanded, searching for the needle by adding more and more hay. In the process,
information has been folded into a Threat Matrix, an itemized catalogue of
all the threatsor more accurately leadsneeding to be followed up . As Garrett Graff
explains, the government pursues upwards of 5,000 threats per day. 45 Impelled by what some have called
The 9/11 Commission Syndromean obsession with the career dangers in failing to connect the dots it is in no ones interest to cull the
threats because it was possible youd cull the wrong threat and end up, after the
next attack, at the green felt witness table before the next congressional inquiry. 46
Consequently, the Threat Matrix tracks all the unfolding terrorist plots and
intelligence rumors and is filled to the brim with whispers, rumors, and
vacuous, unconfirmed information.47 In result, claims that ordinarily wouldnt have
made it past the intake agent, claims that wouldnt even be written down weeks
earlier, suddenly became the subject of briefs to the President in the Oval Office.48 Graff supplies an example. One entry in the Threat
Matrix is crisply cited as a threat from the Philippines to attack the United States
unless blackmail money was paid. It turns out that this entry was based on an email that said, Dear America. I will attack you if you dont pay me
999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 dollars.
MUHAHAHA.49 If, aided by the Threat Matrix, the government pursues some 5000 threats or leads each day, and if each lead takes an average of a half a
week to investigate, the FBI has pursued some six million or more of them over the
years since 9/11a process that has led to, at the very most, a few
hundred prosecutions, most of them on quite minor charges.50 Moreover,
whatever the ratio of needle to hay, living with the Threat Matrix seems to take a
psychological toll on its daily readers. As Graff vividly describes the process, the Threat Matrix comes off
as a catalogue of horrors, as the daily looming prognoses of Armageddon, and as a seeming tidal wave of Islamic extremist anger that threatened to
unhinge American society, and it could become all-consuming and paralyzingas one reader puts it, Your mind comes to be dominated by the horrific consequences of lowprobability events.51 In essence, it is like being barricaded in an apartment and listening only to the police radio. Or one reader offers another comparison: Reading the Threat Matrix

after a while, you begin to sufer from


sensory overload and become paranoid about the threat.52 Recalls
former CIA Director George Tenet, You could drive yourself crazy
believing all or even half of what was in it.53
every day is like being stuck in a room listening to loud Led Zeppelin music, and,

Middle East Modeling Add On


The model of high level courts and separation of powers is tied
to the success of democracy in the Middle East
IDEA 2014 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
intergovernmental organization that supports democracy, Spring 2014,
Constitutional Courts After the Arab Spring, http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Constitutional-Courts-after-the-Arab-Spring-HighResolution.pdf, p. 9-10
The Middle East-North Africa (MENA)

region is experiencing an unprecedented moment of


constitutional transition. Among other constitutional reforms, many countries in the region have
adopted, are considering adopting or have strengthened systems of constitutional
judicial review as a way of signalling the governments commitment to the rule of
law. While constitutional judicial review is not new to the region, many countries have established a
constitutional courta specialist judicial body with exclusive jurisdiction
over constitutional judicial reviewin an attempt to strengthen the role of
the courts in interpreting and enforcing the constitution. A constitutional court plays
many important roles, including promoting the rule of law, protecting individual rights, providing a forum for resolving disputes,
enforcing the separation of powers, holding different political players accountable to their constitutional commitments, serving as

The success of
constitutional courts is closely tied to the success of constitutional
democracy in the region. Constitutional courts are often called upon to decide on a countrys
political insurance for opposition parties and symbolizing the end of a period of authoritarian rule.

most pressing political issues, including questions about electoral laws and results, regulating the activities of political parties,

enforcing the separation of powers among the branches of government,


reforming the legal system after a period of authoritarian rule and overseeing constitutional amendment
procedures. The litigants in these disputes are often political parties. Even if the cases do not frame the issues in this way,
constitutional interpretation is a site of partisan political conflict among political parties, which constitutional courts are called upon
to resolve. The process of appointing judges is central to establishing or reforming a constitutional court. The judicial appointments

constitutional court
appointment procedures can be designed to promote both judicial independence
and judicial accountability to a democratically elected government . The fact that
process determines who will interpret the constitution. This report investigates how

constitutional courts cannot avoid adjudicating disputes with partisan dimensions logically suggests that political actors should play
a role in selecting constitutional court judges. Involving a wide range of political actors in the appointments process fosters a broad
sense of political investment in the court, so that all actors have an incentive to continue supporting the court even when they are
on the losing side of its decisions. Another reason to involve a broad variety of political actors in the appointment process is that
although judges strive to interpret the law fairly and issue impartial decisions, they are only human, and a judges political ideology
will naturally play some role in how he or she views the law. The appointments process should be designed to strike an appropriate
balance between the constitutional courts independence (insulating the court from political interference) and its need to be
responsive to the democratic society in which it operates. This report refers to this balance as relative judicial independence. In the

the executive has historically dominated constitutional court


appointments. Often, the executive controlled both appointments to the
court and changes to the courts composition, adding judges to a court or
removing them at will, which gave it tremendous influence over the
courts judgements. Failing to involve other political actors in
constitutional court appointments damaged the courts legitimacy in the
eyes of political parties and the general public , and constitutional court decisions often
MENA region,

protected the interests of the executive or the small group of elites that formed the court. Even in the midst of the Arab Spring,
many of the newly formed constitutional courts in the region continue to give the executive significant, or even total, control over
court appointments.

Middle Eastern governance structures are still up in the air a


successful model is necessary to create stable democracy
Perry 2013 Dan Perry, Cairo AP, 10/5/13, published by the Huffington Post, 3
Years After Arab Spring, Democracy's Future In Middle East Still Uncertain,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/05/arab-spring-democracy_n_4049414.html
In Egypt and around the Middle East, after a summer of violence and upheaval, the
discussion, however, is still going strong. And almost three years into the Arab
Spring revolts, profound uncertainties remain. That became shatteringly clear
on July 3, when Egyptian generals ousted the country's first freely elected president,
Mohammed Morsi, installing a technocratic government in the wake of massive
street protests calling for the Islamist leader to step down . He had ruled incompetently for one year and badly
overstepped his bounds, they argued. A crackdown on his Muslim Brotherhood has put more than 2,000
of its members in jail and left hundreds dead, and a court has ordered an outright
ban on the group. Although new elections are promised, the plans are extremely
vague. All this happened with strong public support, especially among the educated
classes where one might expect a strong yearning for democracy. Foreigners in Egypt were frequently
stunned at how little many Egyptians cared that Morsi had been democratically elected. How could that be? Around the region people are asking the question, and the stirrings of a

Few people not even the absolute rulers who still cling to power in some places would openly
argue against democracy as a worthy goal. And people bristle at any suggestion
that the region's culture is somehow at odds with freedom. But with the most
populous Arab nation having stumbled so badly in its first attempt, there is now an
audience for those saying total democracy must grow from the ground up, needs
time to evolve, and need not be the same everywhere. "Democracy is not a matter
of principle or faith for most people" in the region, said political scientist Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center. " It
is something they believe in to the extent that it brings good results. ... If
democracy does not bring those things, then people lose faith in the
democratic process."
rethink, subtle but persistent, are starting to be felt.

Absent democracy conflict is inevitable the US influence on


Middle Eastern democracies is crucial
Lagon 2011 Mark Lagon, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States
and the International Community, http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promotingdemocracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090
democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip
service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States
and indeed the world in the spread of democracynamely, greater peace,
prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and
frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this
truth. Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet
one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that
established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy
realists advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests ,
irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable
stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful
Furthering

competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments. There has long
been controversy about whether democracy enhances economic development. The
dramatic growth of China certainly challenges this notion. Still, history will likely show that democracy
yields the most prosperity. Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of the past three years,
democracys elements facilitate long-term economic growth. These elements
include above all freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule of law to foster
predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good governance as

These elements have unleashed new emerging powers


such as India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for impoverished
peoples. Those who argue that economic development will eventually yield
political freedoms may be reversing the order of influencesor at least
discounting the reciprocal relationship between political and economic
liberalization. Finally, democracy affords all groups equal access to justice and equal
the enabler of development.

opportunity to shine as assets in a countrys economy. Democracys support for pluralism prevents human assetsincluding

Indeed, a shortage of
economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed
significantly to the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism is also
precisely what is needed to stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc
on the world. Evolving U.S. Policy To say there are major interests in democracys enlargementthat central concept
religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrantsfrom being squandered.

in both national security strategy blueprints of the Clinton presidencydoes not settle what role the United States should play and
what policy tools are appropriate. These are the questions not of why but of how. A look at waves of U.S. policy since World War II

the United States played a significant role in deepening and


widening democracy in Western Europe. The United States encouraged European integration to stabilize the
offers apt lessons. After World War II,

West European democracies, and NATO was a bulwark within which Italy, West Germany, Portugal, and Spain democratized. Later,
after the Cold War, the twin institutions of NATO and an integrated Europe together created powerful incentives for emerging East
European democracies to join Western multilateral institutions. Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, however, frequently led
the United States to support illiberal governments. (President Franklin D. Roosevelts revealing quip about Nicaraguan dictator
Anastasio SomozaHe may be a bastard, but hes our bastardtoo often became U.S. policy during the Cold War years.)
Eventually, a consensus emerged in the 1980sarguably President Ronald Reagans greatest legacythat the United States had
strategic interests in urging its autocratic Latin American and East Asian allies toward democracy. And so, in the 1980s, the United
States supported land reforms in El Salvador that were deeply unpopular among ruling elites; facilitated the departure of General
Augusto Pinochet as Chiles leader; and pushed Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the direction of veritable electoral
democracy. After 9/11, President George W.

Bush elevated democratization in the Middle East as a

strategic priority. This apt aim, however, was undermined by several factors : the association of
democracy promotion with military intervention in Iraq (which did not yield democracy with ease); the use of harsh counterterrorism
measures that undercut the symbolism of freedom; the tendency to flinch when likely winners of elections were worrisome (such as

The
protests sweeping the Middle East in early 2011, which have so far caused
the ouster of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and rocked the government
of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, are now confronting President Barack
Obama with a familiar challenge. In Egypt, the United States appears to face a
classic dilemma: how to handle the potential demise of a friendly autocrat in a
strategically important country. On the one hand, President Obama is under pressure to
offer more vocal support to those demanding democracy on the streets of Cairo and
call for an early change of leadership. On the other, many argue that President Mubarak has protected
in the Palestinian territories); and the failure to meet democracy rhetoric with action in places like Egypt and Pakistan.

American interests in the Middle East for thirty years, and there is no guarantee that a new democratic government in Egypt would
do the same if the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood should be elected.

***2AC Blocks***

2AC Topicality Blocks

T Surveillance

Defense of publication

C/I: Indefinite v Definite


FISA draws a legal distinction between surveillance and
indefinite surveillance that means the af curtails surveillance
US Code 1978 Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act, 50 USC 1801, Section
104 (a), effective October 25, 1978
Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance
under this title shall be made by a Federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction under
section 103. Each application shall require the approval of the Attorney General based upon his
finding that it satisfies the criteria and requirements of such application as set forth
in this title. It shall include (1) the identity of the Federal officer making the application; (2) the authority
SEC. 104. (a)

conferred on the Attorney General by the President of the United States and the approval of the Attorney General to make the
application; (3) the identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance; (4) a statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon by The applicant to justify his belief that (A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power; and (B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used,
or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (5) a statement of the proposed minimization
procedures; (6) a detailed description of the nature of the information sought and the type of communications or activities to be
subjected to the surveillance; (7) a certification or certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an
executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in the area of
national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (A) that the certifying
official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence information; (B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information; (C) that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; (D)
that designates the type of foreign intelligence information being sought according to the categories described in section 101 (e);
and (E) including a statement of the basis for the certification that (i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence
information designated; and (ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; (8) a
statement of the means by which the surveillance will be effected and a statement whether physical entry is required to effect the
surveillance: (9) a statement of the facts concerning all previous applications that have been made to any judge under this title
involving any of the persons, facilities, or places specified in the application, and the action taken on each previous application;
(10)

a statement of the period of time for which the electronic surveillance is required
to be maintained, and if the nature of the intelligence gathering is such that
the approval of the use of electronic surveillance under this title should
not automatically terminate when the described type of information has first been obtained, a
description of facts supporting the belief that additional information of
the same type will be obtained thereafter ; and (11) whenever more than one electronic,
mechanical or other surveillance device is to be used with respect to a particular proposed electronic surveillance, the coverage of
the devices involved and what minimization procedures apply to information acquired by each device.

2AC Disad Blocks

Turkey DA

UQ Turkey Exec Power Low


The June 7 elections killed Erdogans dreams of the executive
presidency any other statistics are inaccurate
Candar 6/29 Cengiz Candar, columnist for Al-Monitor, 6/29/15, Post-election
th

Erdogan cannot regain power he lost, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-post-election-erdogan-cannot-regainpower-lost.html#


the June 7 parliamentary election results have ended
President Recep Tayyip Erdogans dreams of the executive presidency , introducing an increasingly
authoritarian one-man rule. The election results have restrained Erdogan's ambitions
and brought optimism that Turkeys democratic experiment could ultimately be
successful. Turkish democracy proved that it is much more resilient than many thought
prior to the elections. Erdogans dreams were shattered on June 7, but no sane mind in Turkey ever thought
that the president would respect the election results and continue to function within
the constitutional limits of his post. According to the Turkish Constitution, the president does not
have executive powers. If not all, the overwhelming majority of the observers , including those
who know him well, were sure that Erdogan would try to fight back to regain his lost power
with an unmistakable survival instinct. According to some, primarily non-Turkish, observers,
he can. Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution ended his essay titled Down, but not out: The essential resilience of Erdogan
There is a quasi consensus in Turkey that

and the AKP as follows: Demonstrating that coalition governments are less stable and effective is what Erdogan may now be
hoping for. Some Turkish voters may already be feeling buyers (or sellers) remorse. One post-election poll suggested that the AKP
[Justice and Development Party] would increase its vote share from 41% to 45% if snap elections were held. However, what Hamid
says is totally incorrect as the one post-election poll he cited was held by a staunchly pro-AKP company. Having not much

If these nonTurkish observers were to be true Turkey experts or patient enough to wait for the
findings of credible pollsters, they would reach diferent and better
analyses. For instance, one of the most credible pollsters in Turkey, Metropoll, shared its findings on June 26. According to
the survey, confidence in President Erdogan is at its lowest level ever. This poll,
which was conducted in the aftermath of the June 7 elections, indicates that the public confidence in Erdogan
stands at 37.5%. This figure was as high as 71.7% in December 2011 and around
49% in 2014, right after the March 30 local elections. According to the same survey, 50.6% of the electorate
put the blame for the AKPs election failure on Erdogan , while 11% blamed Ahmet Davutoglu, the
credibility, its findings allegedly based on a June 8 poll did not get much attention from the Turkish public.

partys chairman and prime minister. In an interview with influential daily Hurriyet, Ozer Sencer, the director of the Metropoll
Strategic and Social Research Center, disclosed the findings of another survey that the center conducted in the post-election period,

a possible re-election would not yield much different results than those
of the June 7 elections. Sencer, whose polling company had the most accurate forecast of the June 7 elections, said in
case of a possible re-run elections the result would be as follows: 41.6% for the AKP; 25.1%
which indicates that

for the Republican People's Party; 16.2% for the Nationalist Action Party; and 12.9% for the Peoples Democratic Party. These figures

suggest very minimal deviation from the June 7 elections. Erdogan is banking on
the failure of the parties to form a coalition government within the legal period. This
would lead to a crisis, with snap elections to likely be held in November. This
scenario presumes that Erdogan can make a comeback in order to push his agenda of an
executive presidency once again; he would ask for a safe AKP majority, saying that otherwise the country would enter
an insurmountable political and economical crisis. Seemingly, Turkey may end up with snap elections, as
the parties elected may be unable to form a government because of their incapacity
and democratic immaturity.

Erdogan wont overreach recent election means that he


doesnt have the votes or public support
Bandow 6/27 Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institiute, 6/27/15, Why
Both Erdoganism and Kemalism May Finally Be Dead in Turkey,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/why-both-erdoganism-andk_b_7677712.html
protestors took over the streets of Istanbul, Turkey's first city. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan beat them down and last year was elected president. His critics feared his
plan to invest the largely ceremonial post with Putin-like authority. Three weeks ago,
however, Turkish voters revoked his party's majority . A new government has yet to form. The Justice
and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. Erdogan initially allied with liberals to
systematically dismantle the authoritarian, nationalistic, coup-prone system that had
replaced the Ottoman Empire. Military leader Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who achieved distinction defending against
Two years ago,

the allies in the infamous Gallipoli campaign, rose to power in World War I's tumultuous aftermath. He became the first president of
the Republic of Turkey and took on the name Ataturk ("Father of the Turks"), which parliament reserved for him. His ubiquitous
image dominates the landscape; his mausoleum and memorial cover an entire city block in the capital of Ankara. The only
comparable personality cult which I've seen is in North Korea. Ataturk was no self-effacing republican. He ruthlessly modernized,
enforced secularism, and constructed a one-party state. After his death there were elections but the politicians didn't really rule. The
military staged three hard coups, the last in 1980, and a softer putsch in 1997. The generals executed and jailed opponents. Even
criticism of Ataturk and "Kemalism" resulted in prosecution. Academics and journalists risked their jobs. Ruthless repression of the
Kurds (which Ankara denied were a separate people) led to a 30-year war which cost 40,000 lives. In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus,
seized nearly 40 percent of the island, and ethnically cleansed the occupied zone of Greeks; the division of the island lives on four
decades later. Religious minorities, such as the Armenian and Greek Orthodox, were marginalized. The military attempted to
suppress even moderate Islamic sentiments. As Istanbul mayor Erdogan read an Islamist poem in public, for which he was ousted

Eventually, the nationalist establishment imploded. Weak coalition


governments tolerated corruption and delivered economic malaise. In 2002 the AKP
won a dramatic victory. The party delivered liberty and prosperity. The AKP
dismantled repressive elements of the "Deep State," put the military back in its barracks, created a
and imprisoned briefly.

more business-friendly environment, moved towards Europe, and pushed social reforms. A few years ago, a female journalist told
me that the mildly-Islamic AKP paid more attention to problems of domestic violence than had previous nationalist-secularist
regimes. Author Graham Fuller argued that the AKP's first decade was "extraordinary" and "may have been the best government
Turkey has ever had since it adopted democratic rule in the 1950s." Turkey grew wealthier and more influential, and the Turkish

Erdogan had foreshadowed an


uglier future when he declared a couple decades ago: "Democracy, for us, is a train
you get off once you reach your destination." He apparently believed he reached his destination by 2011,
people rewarded the AKP with a steadily larger proportion of their votes. However,

when Fuller dates Erdogan's shift. That year the AKP purged more moderate members. By then several more liberal Turks told me

Erdogan denounces critics


domestic and foreign, using every repressive tool of the state against them. He
dallies with Islamist and terrorist forces as he tries to make Turkey into a regional
Weltmacht. He waxes paternalistic, discussing what Turks should eat and drink, and how many children they should have.
they were becoming increasingly concerned over the government's direction. Today,

While switching positions, he constructed a $615 million presidential palace, four times the size of Versailles. No Sultan lived so

past accomplishments are fading. Widespread prosperity cemented his rule,


but the Turkish economic engine is slowing : Growth is down, unemployment is up, consumer confidence has
opulently. Even Turks see that his

fallen, the current account deficit is the biggest in the OECD, stock values have declined, and the lira has lost some 40 percent of its
value compared to the dollar since 2013. Growth greatly increased opportunities for corruption .
Charges of misconduct reached the cabinet and Erdogan, as prosecutors began investigating. After stealth recordings of damning
conversations leaked to the public, Erdogan blamed an earlier ally, cleric Fethullah Gulen, and purged police, prosecutors and
judges. The charges were dropped. Although elections remain free,

political rights and civil liberties are only

middling. Overall Freedom House rated Turkey as partly free. The organization downgraded Ankara in its latest report because
of the government's "more pronounced political interference in anticorruption mechanisms and judicial processes, and greater

The State Department's human rights


assessment includes a list of depressing particulars . For instance, the government interferes with
tensions between majority Sunni Muslims and minority Alevis."

freedom of assembly and expression, uses excessive force in breaking up protests, makes arbitrary arrests, politicizes the judiciary,
maintains impunity for security forces despite claims of torture and unlawful killings, and provides inadequate protection for

vulnerable populations. Despite some reforms, noted State, "The penal code and antiterror law retain multiple articles that restrict
freedom of expression, the press, and the internet." After battling against misuse of security laws, including against himself, Erdogan
deployed the legislation against military officers and civilians. The government claimed improbably vast conspiracies, most notably
the Diyarbakir KCK (Kurdish), Ergenekon (nationalist), and Sledgehammer (military) cases. Roughly 500 people were arrested and
300 charged in the Ergenekon case alone. Although some of the convictions were ultimately overturned, many defendants spent

Ergodan has led a particularly virulent campaign of intimidation


against journalists, with Turkey for years leading the world in the number of imprisoned journalists. As of last October,
years in jail awaiting trial.

roughly 150 awaited trial. In its latest media freedom report, Freedom House ranked Turkey as "not free" and 142 out of 199
countries. The group noted that press freedom continued to fall "as the government moved more aggressively to close the space for
dissent." Turkey registered the ninth biggest drop worldwide from 2010 to 2014. Of course, officials denied any impropriety and
regime supporters insisted to me that the media was conspiring with the military. However, the New Yorker's Dexter Filkins cited

reporters and columnists with whom I spoke feared


criticizing the prime minister; their editors were reluctant to pursue stories against the government. A number of
"an extraordinary climate of fear among journalists." Several

journalists lost their jobs. Affirmed Freedom House: "Government harassment of journalists is also common, leading to self-

The government also applies sustained though often invisible


pressure on media organizations, including the threat of public investigations and loss of television licenses. Last
censorship and dismissals."

month a government prosecutor sought to ban two television stations associated with Fethullah Gulen. Businessmen privately admit
that they fear political retaliation. The dearth of coverage of the 2013 protests and disproportionate attention given the supposedly
nonpartisan President Erdogan campaigning for the AKP in the recent election demonstrate government tactics at work. After
taming the traditional press the Erdogan government began targeting internet freedoms, with, noted Freedom House, "an overall
strategy of demonizing and discrediting social media." Although half of Turks are online, Freedom House rated Turkey as only partly
free. People face significant obstacles to access, limits on content, and restrictions on use. In recent months the government has
blocked access to Soundcloud, Twitter, Vimeo and YouTube as well as thousands of websites, arrested dozens of individuals for
comments on social media, prosecuted bloggers and websites for postings, and mandated access to user information through ISPs.
Those charged include a former Miss Turkey and 16-year-old student. Government critics also suffer from organized online attacks,
including denial-of-service assaults on newspapers. While relaxing unfair restrictions on Muslims -- such as the ban on women
wearing headscarves -- the government has yet to address the lack of legal protection for religious worship and practice by every
faith. Indeed, individuals critical of Islam or the Prophet Mohammed face prosecution under the blasphemy statute. Religious
minorities remain particularly vulnerable to arbitrary state decisions. For instance, the government continues to interfere with
internal operation of the Armenian and Greek Orthodox churches. Ankara has returned a number of confiscated religious properties,
but the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary, remains closed despite government promises to act. Jews can worship freely but, warned
the latest report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, "they remain concerned about rising anti-Semitism in
society and in the media and occasional derogatory comments by government officials." One Turkish Jew hoping to emigrate told the

In short, Turkey is
headed in a dangerous direction, toward a corrupt, authoritarian state. The
country needs an Arab Spring of sorts , but within the democratic process. An electoral revolution,
not a street putsch. The use of the rule of law to end an illiberal government. The ballot box
must make political power accountable. On Sunday that process began. One article last
week pessimistically warned: "This might be Turkey's last election." However, the AKP received less than 41
percent of the vote, down from roughly 50 percent four years ago (and 52 percent in last
year's presidential contest). The ruling party fell 18 seats short of a majority in the 550-member Grand
National Assembly. None of the opposition parties is a likely coalition partner , though
New York Times: "last year the level of hate speech in Turkey reached an unnerving level."

the lure of power might prove attractive. The Republican People's Party (CHP) upholds the Kemalist vision and is nationalist and
social democratic. More extreme is the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), described as "a stone's throw from fascist" by Aaron Stein of
the RUSI think tank. Making a dramatic entrance in fourth place was the People's Democratic Party (HDP), a liberal-left Kurdishbased coalition which came together less than three years ago. But these parties also are unlikely to form a countervailing coalition.
The AKP could establish a minority ministry and dare its opponents to oust it or trigger early elections. In any case, Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu may not survive, despite claiming victory and calling the AKP the "backbone of Turkey." Certainly

Erdogan's vision of an enhanced presidency appears dead . Said Selahattin Demitras,


head of the HDP: "The discussion of executive presidency and dictatorship has come to an
end in Turkey with these elections." Even half of AKP members oppose the idea.
The government no longer can even pass common legislation if the opposition unites. The
electoral result also is likely to embolden Erdogan's opponents. For the first time in more
than a decade AKP rule no longer appears to be inevitable . Indeed, Erdogan may find it
hard to control his party. Past prime ministers turned presidents such as Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel lost
influence. Some AKP members indicate privately that they do not like being asked to
subordinate their beliefs to Erdogan's ambitions. Moreover, Prime Minister Davutoglu holds the stronger
institutional position and may have grown to enjoy making his own decisions. After the president criticized some government actions
and policies, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc responded that "we love our president," but added: "please do not forget that there
is a government in this country." That sparked a call for Arinc's resignation.

ImpactTurkey Accession Good


Turkey is accession forces other European nations to make
structural changes thats key to EU cohesion
Charalambides 2009 Ioannis Charalambou Charalambides, researcher for
Middlesex University, April 2009, Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the
European Union, the structural changes and EU cohesion,
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/2696/1/Charalambides__Evaluation_of_the_Turkish_accession_to__the_EU..pdf
Turkey will meet its
obligations, thereby showing its readiness to join the EU as a full member state.
Its positive contributions to the EU will result in a normal redistribution of
power, and the structural changes that occur will be the result of reforms implemented
to facilitate Turkey's integration into the EU. In this scenario the EU as well will be ready to
promote and fulfil new reforms and structural changes (Bge 2007; Chapter 4). If the following
factors-variables are implemented with positive effects, then the risk of upsetting the balance of power
and giving rise to conflicting national interests will be reduced: 1)Turkey's economic, social,
cultural, or militarily contribution, 2)the redistribution of power and 3) structural changes . In
addition, common interests could restrain conflicting national interests . At the same time,
such a scenario would have a positive affect on EU Institutions and on the decisions
of the EU, thereby maintaining EU cohesion. In this case, in the context of a normal Enlargement we
may take a step further towards European regional integration , as suggested by the theories of
The second scenario draws on the theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. In this scenario,

Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. However, this result is not certain. Why? Because whether or not this step towards regional
integration will occur depend on the structural changes which will take place on the institutional level in particular - the level at

one of the main


preconditions of achieving regional integration is the progressive limitation -or even full
conference- of state sovereignty to supranational Institutions . Consequently, if the EU member-states, in
which the relations and the power games of the EU member-states are most evident. Therefore,

the context of their power games, have no political intention of undertaking such structural changes which will eventually lead to

How can one


allege that state's role in the international system will be replaced by enhanced
supranational Institutions? At the same time, the EU Enlargements depend on successful structural changes upon
less state sovereignty, then, how can one allege that an enlarged Europe moves towards regional integration?

which the absorption capacity can be constructed. Otherwise, the EU can not proceed towards normal and successful

the scenario of having a new Turkey acting in the


context of a democratic political system may become a reality . In light of this, Turkey will
not only be a full member state of the EU but will also be : 1) A leading country of
the EU due to its territorial size, its young and large population, its military power,
its economy and its pivotal geopolitical and geostrategic position situating it
as a bridge between Asia and Europe as well as one of the main energy crossroads (see Chapters 4.4 and
4.9.2). 2) A democratic country playing a dominant role within the EU, with extensive political
Enlargements. In case of a normal Enlargement,

and institutional power within the Institutions of the EU. If this occurs Turkey will play a regional or even global role of high

Muslim
European citizens will turn to Turkey, as a powerful member state of the EU, for protection and
promotion of their interests. As Muslims, they feel close to Ankara or Istanbul, which will be turned
into their second unofficial capital of the EU, after the official one, i.e. Brussels. They will
have more confidence in Turkey unless their interests impose them a different reaction. However, it is not
importance (see Chapter 4.9.2 and 4.10). 3) A centre of attraction for Muslims living in Europe and elsewhere.

certain whether the other European countries will feel comfortable with such a development.

Turkey No Accession
Human rights violations, Cyprus and international politics
mean that Turkey will never join the EU
Riegert 2013 Bernd Riegert, Deutsche Welle reporter specializing in European
policy, 5/11/2013, Turkey stumbles over Cyprus on way to EU,
http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-stumbles-over-cyprus-on-way-to-eu/a-17204257
The EU is restarting negotiations with Turkey over membership , but only halfheartedly. Turkish occupation of part of the island of Cyprus remains the biggest obstacle. But
Turkey's human rights record doesn't help. Talks between the European Union and Turkey on Tuesday
(05.11.2013), where negotiations over Turkish accession were resumed after a gap of
three years, were set to last just one hour: a couple of speeches, a photo and a press conference. It's a
symbolic meeting where little of substance was to be discussed. The topic of the meeting, the consideration of a new "chapter" in
accession negotiations, is scarcely controversial. It deals with regional policy and the possibility of EU support for rural areas if

EU
Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fle has issued a positive report on Turkish progress, although he
recognized deficits in the fields of freedom of expression and religion and the
independence of the judiciary. But the violent suppression of demonstrations in May and June
led some of the foreign ministers to refuse to take up discussions on more difficult
issues, such as human rights or the judicial system . Fle has advised member states to withdraw their
Turkey should become a member. This is the 14th of a grand total of 35 chapters which have to be discussed.

objections. "If we want Turkey to address issues of fundamental freedoms and rights, let's use the most effective instrument we

Cyprus conflict Accession negotiations began


in 2005 after decades of preparation. They've been progressing sluggishly ever
since, and none of the chapters in the negotiations has been legally wrapped up.
Fourteen chapters are blocked, either by an EU resolution or by a veto by
Cyprus, which, although a member of the EU , is not recognized by Turkey. The northern third
of Cyprus has been under Turkish military occupation since 1974 . In April 2004, just before
have for that purpose," he said - and that's negotiations.

Cyprus was due to join the EU, a referendum over a reunification plan drawn up by the United Nations was defeated when the Greek
Cypriots of the south voted against it.

This unresolved conflict, says the EU Parliament's rapporteur on Turkey, Ria

Oomen-Ruijten, acts as a total brake on the negotiations . Although there are talks between the two
ethnic groups in North and South Cyprus, she thinks Turkey ought to put more effort into the process. North-South mediation

Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon, who has been mediating the conflict for years, said last
Friday that he was hopeful the two sides would soon put aside their differences of
opinion. A new round of talks was to have begun by the end of the October, but negotiators couldn't agree on a joint statement.
This week, the UN is planning to continue its efforts to bring the two sides together. Political scientist Hubert Faustmann, who heads
the German Friedrich Ebert political foundation in the Cypriot capital Nicosia, sees multifarious interests at work.

Turkey has

little reason to give way, but "it could relatively quickly move things forward a lot if it wanted to." It's also not
clear where things are going in relations between the EU and Turkey. "But it's clear that the Cyprus problem is a
significant hurdle in the whole story, " he said. Conditions unfulfilled Before leaving for the
talks in Brussels, the Turkish minister for European affairs, Egemen Bagis, wrote in the Turkish newspaper "Hrriyet" that Turkey
had been waiting longer for membership in the EU than any other country . He saw the
new chapter as a "late, but positive step," and hoped "that the senseless political blockade of other chapters will be lifted as soon as
possible." As far as the EU is concerned, Turkey itself could make a contribution to this process if it
were at least to recognize Cyprus indirectly. In the so-called Ankara Protocol, Turkey committed itself to allowing Cypriot ships and
planes into its country. So far, it has not done so. On Monday, Cypriot's interior minister, Socratis Hasikos, told the "Cyprus Mail"

the government did not want the talks between the two groups on the island to
break down. That meant they had to be very careful - and thoroughly prepared. He called on Turkey to show
more commitment. The EU, he argued, should also play a role. 'Full membership
impossible' All this does not meet with the approval of the German conservative
that

member of European Parliament, Markus Ferber. He told "Forbes" magazine that he wanted Chancellor Angela
Merkel to change direction. Up to now, the German government has always supported the talks,
but pointed out that they did not necessarily have to end with full Turkish
membership. Ferber says the government should cease to do anything which could
move towards accession: Turkey, he says, cannot become a full member. The
German Left party also opposes the continuation of talks , but for different reasons. Sevim Dagdelen,
a member of German parliament whose parents immigrated to Germany from Turkey, says, " There's a fatal
impression that the government of Prime Minister Erdogan is being rewarded for its
policy of moving towards a repressive Islamist state ." No new chapters should be
opened, Dagdelen says, so long as police violence and serious human rights abuses
continue.

ThumperGreece
Negotiations over Greek debt are failing now that collapses
the EU
Jones 2/9 Gavin Jones, journalist for Reuters, 2/9/15, Greek finance minister says
euro will collapse if Greece exits, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/useurozone-greece-varoufakis-idUSKBN0LC0QO20150209
If Greece is forced out of the euro zone, other countries will inevitably follow and the
currency bloc will collapse, Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis said on Sunday, in comments which drew a
rebuke from Italy. Greece's new leftist government is trying to re-negotiate its debt
repayments and has begun to roll back austerity policies agreed with its international
creditors. In an interview with Italian state television network RAI, Varoufakis said Greece's debt problems must
be solved as part of a rejection of austerity policies for the euro zone as a whole . He
called for a massive "new deal" investment program funded by the European Investment Bank. "The euro is fragile,
it's like building a castle of cards, if you take out the Greek card the others
will collapse." Varoufakis said according to an Italian transcript of the interview released by RAI ahead of broadcast.
The euro zone faces a risk of fragmentation and "de-construction" unless it
faces up to the fact that Greece, and not only Greece, is unable to pay back its debt
under the current terms, Varoufakis said. "I would warn anyone who is considering strategically amputating Greece
from Europe because this is very dangerous," he said. "Who will be next after us? Portugal? What will happen when Italy discovers it
is impossible to remain inside the straitjacket of austerity?" Varoufakis and his

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras received

friendly words but no support for debt re-negotiation from their Italian counterparts when they visited Rome last
week. But Varoufakis said things were different behind the scenes. "Italian officials, I can't tell you from which big institution,
approached me to tell me they backed us but they can't tell the truth because Italy also risks bankruptcy and they are afraid of the
reaction from Germany," he said. "Let's face it, Italy's debt situation is unsustainable ," he added, a comment
that drew a sharp response from Italian Economy Minister Pier Carlo Padoan, who said in a tweet that Italy's debt was "solid and
sustainable."

AT EU War
No EU conflict political will and mindset shift
Bacevich 2010 Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations, 2/11/10,
Let Europe be Europe, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/let-europe-be-europe/
Over the course of the disastrous 20th century, inhabitants of the liberal
democratic world in ever-increasing numbers reached this conclusion: War
doesnt pay and usually doesnt work. As recounted by historian James J. Sheehan in his excellent book,
Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?, the countries possessing the greatest capability to
employ force to further their political aims lost their enthusiasm for doing
so . Over time, they turned away from war. Of course, there were lingering exceptions. The United States and Israel have
remained adamant in their determination to harness war and demonstrate its utility. Europe, however, is another
matter. By the dawn of this century, Europeans had long since lost their stomach for
battle . The change was not simply political. It was profoundly cultural.
The cradle of Western civilization and incubator of ambitions that
drenched the contemporary age in blood had become thoroughly
debellicized. As a consequence, however willing they are to spend money updating military museums or
maintaining war memorials, present-day Europeans have become altogether stingy when it
comes to raising and equipping fighting armies. This pacification of
Europe is quite likely to prove irreversible . Yet even if reigniting an affinity for war among the
people of, say, Germany and France were possible, why would any sane person even try? Why not
allow Europeans to busy themselves with their never-ending European unification project? It keeps them out of mischief.

Elections
Disad non-unique: Surveillance bills have already been
debated and passed in Congress thats Steinhauer and
Weisman
No link Plan popular with the public thats Steinhauer and
Weisman

Politics
Disad non-unique: Surveillance bills have already been
debated and passed in Congress thats Steinhauer and
Weisman
No link - bipartisan support for the plan theres momentum
for privacy now thats Steinhauer and Weisman
Further reform is key plan is popular
ACLU 6/6 American Civil Liberties Union, 6/6/15, Whats Next For Surveillance
Reform After The USA Freedom Act, http://www.mintpressnews.com/whats-next-forsurveillance-reform-after-the-usa-freedom-act/206315/
To be clear, the bill that passed is not as strong as we wanted . It is markedly weaker than the
original version of the USA Freedom Act that the ACLU first supported in 2013, which itself left many serious surveillance abuses

we were a vocal
critic of its shortcomings and supported a sunset of the provisions in an
efort to advance more comprehensive reform. Notwithstanding this, however, it is very clear
that the USA Freedom Act is a historic step forward. On the road to its passage, pro-reform advocates beat back
efforts led by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) to simply extend expiring Patriot Act
provisions. A week before the scheduled expiration, he failed to garner enough support for even a
one-day extension. Opposition came from many within his own party, with senator after senator taking the floor in
untouched. And while the ACLU was neutral on the version of USA Freedom that ultimately passed,

support of reforming surveillance laws. When gridlock resulted in a temporary sunset of the provisions, a majority of the Senate

Such defeats would


have been unthinkable just a couple of years ago. They demonstrate that the post9/11 panic, in which members of Congress and the public were willing to sacrifice
civil liberties in the face of nebulous national security claims, is fading. Rep. John Conyers
again refused to accede to efforts to water down the USA Freedom Act or extend the provisions.

(D-Wis.) and Sens. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), who were once lone voices expressing concern over the Patriot Act,
have now been joined by a broad coalition, including Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Ill.) and Sens. Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Al Franken (DMinn.), among others. For nearly two years, this coalition crafted and shepherded the USA Freedom Act through Congress, ignoring

a
new technologically savvy generation is increasingly concerned that unchecked
intelligence agencies threaten technological progress, the economy, and the global
free flow of ideas. They are overwhelmingly supportive of a new era in which
intelligence practices comport with Americas democratic values. The USA Freedom
Act, we hope, is only the beginning of this new era. The coalition that helped to advance the USA
Freedom Act must now work to advance additional reforms. This includes: Urging both the president and
Congress to rein in surveillance under Executive Order 12333 , which has been used
to collect information about millions of Americans absent any judicial process Reforming Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (set to expire in 2017), which allows the government to collect the
content of Americans communications with individuals abroad Reforming other authorities, such as
the administrative subpoena statutes, which have been used for bulk
collection in the past Further reforming the authorities addressed in the
USA Freedom Act, including Section 215, FISAs pen-register and trap-andtrace provisions, and national security letters Rejecting eforts to expand
surveillance through cybersecurity information-sharing legislation .
the calls to abandon surveillance reform in the face of ever more heated national security rhetoric around ISIS. At the same time,

NSA compliance / court clog DA


Disad non-unique: Surveillance bills have already been
debated and passed in Congress thats Steinhauer and
Weisman
Momentum for curtailment reforms now thats Steinhauer
and Weisman

Circumvention
Only statutory reform solves 12333 will circumvent the court/
self-discretion thats Patel
FISC is a rubber stamp now it has no legal authority to curtail
because of previous precedents de novo review solves
because it allows the court to create genuine review the
courts have the authority to check back the executive thats
HLRA

Terror DA
Information overload is occurring within US surveillance now
makes counterterror less efective
Mueller and Stewart 14 John Mueller, Department of Political Science Ohio
State University, Mark Stewart, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, Secret without Reason
and Costly without Accomplishment: Questioning the National Security Agencys
Metadata Program, p. 10-12
Important in this have been increases in intelligence and policing as the
questing enterprise, central to which is the NSA, continues to be
expanded, searching for the needle by adding more and more hay. In the process,
information has been folded into a Threat Matrix, an itemized catalogue of
all the threatsor more accurately leadsneeding to be followed up . As Garrett Graff
explains, the government pursues upwards of 5,000 threats per day. 45 Impelled by what some have called
The 9/11 Commission Syndromean obsession with the career dangers in failing to connect the dots it is in no ones interest to cull the
threats because it was possible youd cull the wrong threat and end up, after the
next attack, at the green felt witness table before the next congressional inquiry. 46
Consequently, the Threat Matrix tracks all the unfolding terrorist plots and
intelligence rumors and is filled to the brim with whispers, rumors, and
vacuous, unconfirmed information.47 In result, claims that ordinarily wouldnt have
made it past the intake agent, claims that wouldnt even be written down weeks
earlier, suddenly became the subject of briefs to the President in the Oval Office.48 Graff supplies an example. One entry in the Threat
Matrix is crisply cited as a threat from the Philippines to attack the United States
unless blackmail money was paid. It turns out that this entry was based on an email that said, Dear America. I will attack you if you dont pay me
999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 dollars.
MUHAHAHA.49 If, aided by the Threat Matrix, the government pursues some 5000 threats or leads each day, and if each lead takes an average of a half a
week to investigate, the FBI has pursued some six million or more of them over the
years since 9/11a process that has led to, at the very most, a few
hundred prosecutions, most of them on quite minor charges.50 Moreover,
whatever the ratio of needle to hay, living with the Threat Matrix seems to take a
psychological toll on its daily readers. As Graff vividly describes the process, the Threat Matrix comes off
as a catalogue of horrors, as the daily looming prognoses of Armageddon, and as a seeming tidal wave of Islamic extremist anger that threatened to
unhinge American society, and it could become all-consuming and paralyzingas one reader puts it, Your mind comes to be dominated by the horrific consequences of lowprobability events.51 In essence, it is like being barricaded in an apartment and listening only to the police radio. Or one reader offers another comparison: Reading the Threat Matrix

after a while, you begin to sufer from


sensory overload and become paranoid about the threat.52 Recalls
former CIA Director George Tenet, You could drive yourself crazy
believing all or even half of what was in it.53
every day is like being stuck in a room listening to loud Led Zeppelin music, and,

Statutory curtailment inevitable thats Patel


Targeted reform necessary for efective intelligence and
balances security and privacy thats Patel
Targeted reform balances security and privacy thats Patel
Current intelligence inefective information hoarding by
extraordinary means thats Patel
Disad non-unique: Surveillance bills have already been
debated and passed in Congress thats Steinhauer and
Weisman
Intelligence capabilities can be balanced with privacy concerns
thats Steinhauer and Weisman
Momentum for curtailment reforms now thats Steinhauer
and Weisman

2AC Counterplan Blocks

De Novo PIC

De Novo Good K2 Solve Af Impacts


De Novo review is key doctrinal entrenchment prevents antisurveillance ruling in the status quo because FISCR review set
precedents
Boeglin and Taranto 2015 Jack Boeglin, research fellow for Stanford, Julius
Taranto, writing for the Yale Law Journal, volume 124, number 6, April 2015, Stare
Decisis and Secret Law: On Precedent and Publication in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/stare-decisis-andsecret-law
Congress and the public have taken a harder look at
the work of the courts created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
focusing in particular on the secret body of law1 they have created in the process of authorizing,
modifying, and denying government surveillance requests. Numerous commentators have bemoaned both
the FISA courts secretive nature and the content of specific legal
interpretations revealed in their leaked opinions .2 But an overlooked yet fundamental problem with
the FISA courts work is that judge-made law can be generated only through stare
decisis,3 a doctrine that we argue is not justified when applied to secret opinions of
the type the FISA courts produce. As a result, we conclude that the FISA courts should either
publish all opinions that are precedential or cease writing precedential
opinions at all. This Comment joins other work in arguing that the legitimacy of stare decisis
depends upon widespread publication.4 The doctrine of stare decisis itself
emerged only with the consistent and reliable publication of court opinions,5 and
legal processes that do not result in the issuance of publicly available opinions, such
as settlements and arbitrations, generally lack stare decisis norms altogether .6
In the wake of the Snowden disclosures, both

Although previous scholarship has discussed the proper role of stare decisis in the context of unpublished opinions,7 which make
up around eighty percent of all United States courts of appeals opinions8 (and are usually publicly available despite their name),9

this Comment provides the first examination of the tenability of stare decisis as
applied to truly secret opinions like those of the FISC . Many have noted that stare decisis typically
comes with both costs and benefits. But, we argue, in the absence of publication these costs are
exacerbated and the benefits are substantially reduced . Therefore, without publication, stare decisis
becomes harder to justify and should be avoided when it comes to truly secret opinions of the type the FISA courts produce. Part I
provides general background on the FISA courts and examines when and how they generate binding precedent. Part II proceeds by
discussing the nature of stare decisis: its central role in creating judge-made law and its costs and justifications, particularly as
applied to secret opinions. We ultimately determine that FISA judges should either label an opinion as binding precedent and publish
it or mark the opinion as non-precedential and retain discretion not to publish it. Part III concludes with concrete recommendations
for implementing our suggestions in the FISA courts. I. PRECEDENT IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS A. The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, enacted in 1978,10 sets up the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized Article III court with the power to hear and grant government requests for

The FISCs work consists almost entirely of ex parte proceedings


granting, modifying, and denying government requests for the authority to conduct
surveillance or searches, or to compel the production of tangible things.12 Pursuant to the statute, the FISC consists
foreign surveillance.11

of eleven Article III district court judges, selected by the Chief Justice of the United States.13 All applications are considered by a
single judge and cannot be reheard by another judge of the FISC except when the court sits en banc.14 FISA provides for both en
banc consideration and appeals to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Court of Review). En bancreview involves a
panel of all eleven FISC judges and must be ordered by a majority of the FISC judges based on a determination that (i) en banc
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the courts decisions; or (ii) the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.15 According to public records, the FISC has sat en banc only once,16 but it is impossible to know how
many sittings and opinions remain secret. The Court of Review, which consists of three district or circuit judges also designated by
the Chief Justice, has issued only two public decisions.17 B. Stare Decisis and the FISA Courts In terms of its core function,

the

FISC is effectively a federal district court.18 The vast majority of its work involves a single judges
determinations of the legality of government requests to authorize surveillance or compel production. Although it is hard to be

certain without more publicly available information, FISC judges likely treat their opinions as non-precedential, as is standard

The relatively few public FISC opinions do cite earlier FISC


opinions and principles of law,20 but we have seen no clear evidence to suggest
that the judges feel formally bound by those earlier opinions in any manner that
would set them apart from other Article III district courts . In contrast, en banc opinions
and Court of Review opinions apparently do have the force of stare decisis .
With en banc rulings, this point is evident from the statute: the court may sit en banc only
to secure or maintain uniformity or to decide a question of exceptional
importance.21 These bases for en banc jurisdiction suggest that individual FISC judges must give stare
decisis effect to any en banc panel decision that is not overturned by the Court of
Review because, absent such a practice, the en banc panels would not fulfill one of
their two statutory purposes: to secure or maintain uniformity. Court of Review
opinions can be precedential, but they are not necessarily precedential . The Court of
Review is an appellate court, and like other Article III appellate courts, it has the power to bind both
lower courts (in this case, the FISC) and later Court of Review panels.22 The Court of Review
practice for federal district courts.19

probably has the same discretion as federal courts of appeals to designate opinions as precedential and non-precedential; at least,
no statutory provision declares otherwise.23 The two public Court of Review opinions are published in redacted form in the Federal

these published Court of Review


cases are certainly precedential.25 We do not know the volume, if any, of secret
non-precedential Court of Review opinions, or whether there are non-public Court of
Review opinions that are nonetheless treated as precedential. As we have demonstrated in this
Part, the FISA courts currently generate at least some amount of formally
binding precedent that they are under no legal obligation to publish .26 In Part
Reporter.24 As with the published case of the FISC sitting en banc,

II, we take up the task of determining whether the justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis support affording secret opinions of

Judges
power to bind future judges to the reasoning and interpretations of law advanced in
their opinions comes from the doctrine of stare decisis,27 Latin for to stand by
decided matters.28 Stare decisis can operate either horizontally, by binding other judges on the issuing court, or
vertically, by binding judges at lower levels of the judicial hierarchy.29 Stare decisis gives a panel of judges
the power to make law within any jurisdiction where they have horizontal or vertical
stare decisis authority, because judges in that jurisdiction will be obligated to
respect precedent even when they would otherwise be inclined to reason
differently. A. The Costs of Stare Decisis in the FISA Context The benefits of and justifications for stare decisis are discussed
this type binding precedential force. We conclude, ultimately, that they do not. II. STARE DECISIS AND SECRET LAW

in the next Part, but it is important to establish as an initial matter that stare decisis also involves serious costs, which are

Stare decisiss most prominent cost


is binding judges to interpretations of law that they find unpersuasive,
raising the fundamental question of when and why such a restraint on
judges decision-making autonomy is justified.30 In an ideal world, stare
decisis would insulate valid principles of law from arbitrary and unprincipled revision
without entrenching bad precedent against further review .31 In reality, stare decisis
hinders defection from both appealing and unappealing precedent. This
cost of stare decisis is heightened in the secret law context, because the incentive
to invest extra effort in writing opinions is less powerful without the promise, and
constraints, of public scrutiny.32 The general principle, evidenced by the congressional testimony of Judge Kozinski
of the Ninth Circuit,33 is that publication induces judges to write more thorough,
carefully reasoned opinions. Secrecy deprives FISA court judges of helpful external feedback from scholars,34
the public, and Congress. Because secrecy reduces judges incentives and ability to make
good precedent, the risk of entrenching bad precedent is unusually high in
exacerbated by the FISA courts secrecy and institutional context.

the context of the FISA courts. Moreover, doctrinal entrenchment is


particularly problematic in the FISA courts, where secrecy and
institutional context indicate that outside eforts at doctrinal reform are
less likely to be efective than they are with courts that publish their
opinions.35 Unlike published opinions, secret opinions cannot provoke the public into lobbying
for a legislative override36 or judicial overruling 37two important paths of legal reform.38 Perhaps to
hedge against the risks of limited external oversight, FISA limits FISC and Court of Review judges to non-renewable, seven-year
terms,39 a provision suggesting that Congress envisioned a FISA court whose membership would be responsive to shifting factual

Stare decisis, which requires judges to adhere to


interpretations of law that they might otherwise reject as unjust or unpersuasive,
constrains these judges ability to adapt to such factual and policy shifts.
Consequently, doctrinal entrenchment, by undermining FISAs statutory design and
cramping efforts at reform from within, further exacerbates the costs of stare
decisis in the FISA context.
circumstances and policy priorities.40

Chevron Bad-- Circumvention


Doesnt solve surveillance decrease---Chevron deference
allows agencies to side skirt the rule of law with adjudications
on a case by case basisthat guts credibility and allows court
decisions to be reversed by agencies
Rappaport 15 (Mike, Darling Foundation Professor of Law at the University of
San Diego, where he also serves as the Director of the Center for the Study of
Constitutional Originalism, Reforming Regulation: Article III Administrative Judges
and More Radical Changes, March 13 2015,
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/03/31/18293/)
Of course, if one wanted to depart from the constraint of what might actually be
enacted in the short term, one could contemplate more radical reforms that might
be desirable. For example, one serious problem with present administrative
law is that it allows agencies to adjudicate matters on a case by case basis.
These adjudications decide not only matters of law, but also questions of
fact. And while these adjudications are subject to judicial review, the factual
findings of the agency are reversed only if they lack substantial evidence
and the legal findings are reversed only if they fail Chevron deference .
Thus, in a retrospective adjudication, agency officials, who are not
independent, can decide matters on a case by case basis subject only to
limited judicial review. This arrangement could be reformed by using Article III
administrative judges. At present, adjudications ordinarily are conducted by
administrative law judges (ALJs) who do not have the constitutional
protection of life tenure. Instead of employing ALJs, one could create a new
position of administrative judge, who would be an Article III judge possessing life
tenure. Significantly, if adjudications were conducted by Article III judges,
the Constitution would prohibit their decisions from being reviewed and
reversed by the administrative agency. Under current practice, administrative
agencies often review and reverse such ALJ decisions. As a consequence,
administrative adjudications conducted by Article III administrative judges would be
independent. In such a world, the agency could not use its adjudicatory
function to pursue policy. Instead, it would have to employ rules to
exercise policy. This would provide agencies with additional incentives to
use rules rather than adjudications. Moreover, one might combine these
policy reforms with the elimination of Chevron and Seminole Rock deference,
which respectively confer deference on agency interpretations of statutes
and rules. The combination of eliminating such deference along with
establishing Article III Administrative Courts would go a long way towards
subjecting administrative agencies to a strong version of the rule of law. Yet,
it would not prevent the administrative state from operating, because
agencies could continue to issue rules and agency adjudications would not
crowd the ordinary federal courts, but instead would be in special Article III
administrative courts.

Courts CP
Only statutory reform solves 12333 will circumvent the court
absent an increase in authority thats Patel

Executive Self Restraint


Statutory reform is necessary to reestablish separation of
powers the executive is currently overstepping its authority
thats HLRA
Counterplan doesnt solve NATO US collection activities are
being undermined by NATO as a way to protest US spying on
its citizens publication of legal documents pertaining to FISA
rulings are necessary to restore NATO citizens confidence
thats Eichensehr

PCLOB

CP = Squo
The counterplan is the status quo FISC reforms have already
been proposed and were not implemented kills solvency
PCLOB 2015 Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, 1/29/15, Fact Sheet: PCLOB
Recommendations and Their Implementation,
https://www.pclob.gov/library/Recommendations_Assessment-FactSheet.pdf
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board issued detailed reports on
two government intelligence surveillance programs . The first report addressed the NSAs bulk
In January and July of 2014,

collection of telephone calling records under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, as well as the operations of the Foreign

The second report addressed


surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act , which
Intelligence Surveillance Court and transparency regarding surveillance.

authorizes collection by the NSA, CIA, and FBI of the contents of communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be

the Board made twenty-two


recommendations to the President, Congress, and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to enhance the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The Board has
now assessed how fully its recommendations have been adopted to date, and its conclusions are as follows: Overall, the
Administration has been responsive to the Boards input. The Administration has accepted virtually
located outside the United States. Between the two reports,

all recommendations in the Boards Section 702 report and has made substantial progress toward implementing many of them,
while also accepting most of the recommendations in the Boards Section 215 report. Most recommendations directed at the
Administration are still in the process of being implemented, however, or have only been accepted in principle, without substantial
progress yet made toward their implementation. We note that only six months have elapsed since the release of the Section 702

However, the Administration has not halted


the NSAs Section 215 telephone records program , which it could do at any time without congressional
report, so there has been less time for implementation.

involvement, but instead has continued the program, with modifications. At the same time, the Administration has supported
legislation, which has not yet been enacted, to create a new system for government access to telephone records under Section

Congress has not yet enacted legislation that would, consistent with
the Boards recommendation, reform the operations of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. The Administration has made substantial progress in implementing some
215.

of the Boards recommendations regarding transparency. The Board has established a productive relationship with elements of
the Intelligence Community and looks forward to working constructively with them on the implementation of its recommendations.
SECTION 215 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS Bulk Telephone Records Program 1 End the NSAs Bulk Telephone Records Program Not
Implemented (Legislation Proposed) 2 Immediately Add Additional Privacy Safeguards to the Bulk Telephone Records Program

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 3 Enable the FISC to Hear


Independent Views on Novel and Significant Matters Not Implemented (Legislation
Proposed) 4 Expand Opportunities for Appellate Review of FISC Decisions Not
Implemented (Legislation Proposed)
Implemented in Part

2AC K Blocks

Expectation of Privacy