ARTICLE 2 EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

a.) Tanada vs Tuvera

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive
portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they
ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in
the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he
claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the
Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not
have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the
subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these
arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court
required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of
the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules
of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only
for the internal administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication
when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and
that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this
Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing
as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion,
we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by
the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the

legislature could validly provide that a law e effective

immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would
be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every
person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law
has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly
applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not
apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic
may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say,
those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they
are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by,
say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be
made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head
of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This
is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975,
a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information
on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four

justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette
and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere
as long as the people were sufficiently informed. One reserved
his vote and another merely acknowledged the need for due
publication without indicating where it should be made. It is
therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to
arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a
binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need
not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are
more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is
not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we
know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and
we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is
not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our
task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we
have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at
least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to
the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say
the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are
over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they
retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to
ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the
acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette,
to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication,
or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.
b.) De Roy vs Court of Appeals
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and
void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court
of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa
De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and
directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been
filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright
for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the

Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer
from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burnedout building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis
of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy
of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file
an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It
correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461,
that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986
(142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the
rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution,
the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court
of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26,
1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to
restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept.
15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of
said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on
February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which
expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA
306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August
25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas
case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the
non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette
as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of

Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as

the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if
only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded,
since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied
to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to
DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
ARTICLE 4 PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
a.) Atienza vs Brillantes
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he
saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon
inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake
up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions
to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children
and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his
1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on
January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De
Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not
married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and
claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who
called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before
a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of
the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites
in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in
all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter
into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application
of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229
[1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He
made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed
deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five
children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary
before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and
Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and
illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A
public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These
are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice
to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. This decision is immediately executory. SO
ORDERED.
b.) Carlos vs Sandoval
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond
for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of
a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are
unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They
left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:

Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case
No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration. Exemption from the
provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,
situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand
Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot
159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the
S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot
159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090,
being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND
AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd.
de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd.
De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con
la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la
Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el
punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la
Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las
Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is
now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877
and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964.
In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval
of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds

from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes
the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter
portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise
agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in
August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity
of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between
his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in
view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They
denied the material averments of petitioners complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage
to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of
the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated
as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary
judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing
the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan,
certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary
judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case.
Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled
Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her
testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent
Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as

follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
(petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval

and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this
case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff
the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at
the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully
paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name
of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in
the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on
June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in
declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings. SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment
by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as
ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was
appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not
being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine
issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of
the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon
a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the

affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment

practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the
law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees
own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their
marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call
for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule
19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be.
Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant
Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We
are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the
same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on
the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary
evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take
place, neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject
marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage,
it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be
said of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of
the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements.
Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to
prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance
rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II
was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what
could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from
his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the

last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant
the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least
that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly
resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II.[8]

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or

summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage.

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration

and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases
of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity.
The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took
effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following
issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners
Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof,
with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different
from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment
on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures,
or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage
may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity
of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely
within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings.
In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. x x x[11]

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct
the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity
or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of

marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.[14]
(Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested
the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of
the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the
parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene
for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits
to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the
Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression
of evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity
of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by
any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a
right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the
sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of
their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and
actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional
rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale
of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15,
2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the
Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to
be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-ininterest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of

the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the

question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real partyin-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause
of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28]
where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount
of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and
child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs,
to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory
heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does
not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right
to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil
Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive

with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding
to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased
precludes succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be
the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents.
He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally
found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant
to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a
real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If
the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although

the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate
status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child
cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for
causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property,
and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage
in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard
to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the
merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner

to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.

c.) Cheng vs Sy

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally

adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to
ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper
interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found
to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit.
This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or
even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from
inheriting from the decedent.

The antecedents are as follows

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage
is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven
by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to
vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling
of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been
conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as
to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article
167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a
child, to wit:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court of the Order dated January 2, 2006[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No.
05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and
Tessie Sy.

Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC,
Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses William and
Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to
her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762
and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both
of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20,
1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos.
341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the
estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements
of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952
contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.[3]
On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953
contained a statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the
accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in nature.[4]
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the
BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order[5] dated February 7, 2005 on
account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any
pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before
the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint[6] for collection of a
sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based
on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two
PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22
cases.
In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch
18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,

ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of

P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in
the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which the court
denied in its Order[9] dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition,
raising the sole legal issue
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on
the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal
cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where
the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks
against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the
prosecution to identify both the accused (respondents herein)?
[10]

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases

were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should
not apply, as it must be given only prospective application. She
further contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the
criminal action is deemed instituted w0ith the latter
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is
necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even
more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the
civil liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the
right to have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and
not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 31[11] of the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under
Article 29[12] of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any
private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases
against respondents, where the petitioner has not made any
waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not
instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the amount of
P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil
action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.[13]
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both
the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the
civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before
the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada that the possible single civil liability
arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the
subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa
case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22,
simultaneously available to the complaining party, without
traversing the prohibition against forum shopping. Prior to the
judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case,
petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have
elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the
said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other.[16]
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubtwhere
in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement
as regards the civil liability of the accused and in Criminal Case
No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the liability of
the accused was only civil in natureproduced the legal effect of a
reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the
civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following
Article 29 of the Civil Code.[17]
However, although this civil action could have been litigated
separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on
reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also

elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the BP

Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish
the identity of the accused, the question that arises is whether
such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the
dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioners action to
recover respondents civil liability be also allowed to prosper
separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure states
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on

Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP
Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.[18]
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to
recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this
policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a
separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil
case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the
civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the
Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in
the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases,
resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to
appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule
governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code is not applicable.[19]
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the
courts, while not cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and
orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered
to in order to attain this objective.[20]
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears
that petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from
respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This
could prejudice even the petitioners Notice of Claim involving the
same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390
(Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William
Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure
to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time.[21]
Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that
petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover
the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was

not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22
proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public
prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he
failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during
the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed
impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we
agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners
recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would
have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount
loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks.
Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure
to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a
waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of
respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the
prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to
digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission of their counsel.[22] But this rule admits of exceptions
(1) where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the
client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the
counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.[23]
Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls
within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed
of existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless
they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the Bar.[24] Further, lawyers in the government
service are expected to be more conscientious in the
performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are not only members of the Bar but are also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.[25]
Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with
the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases
under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed
to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22
cases, the only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be
able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the
dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure,
petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the
respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial courts observation
when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents,
it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the
inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be
tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may
now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on
account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a
person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably
at anothers expense. One condition for invoking this principle of
unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other
recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or
any other provision of law.[26]
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth,
and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will
give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best
way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and
vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
technicalities.[27] For reasons of substantial justice and equity,
as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to
dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,[28]
we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie
Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.
d.) Carolino vs Senga

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to

reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 25, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103502 and the
Resolution2 dated September 10, 2009 denying reconsideration
thereof.
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's
husband, Retired3 from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order No. 1208
dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340 as amended.
He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of
P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld by
respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a
letter5 addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff asking for the
reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay. In a letter
reply,6 Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and Gratuity
Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias that his
loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the
alpha list of the AFP Pensioners Payroll effective March 5, 2005;
and that he could avail of re-entitlement to his retirement benefits
and the restoration of his name in the AFP Pensioners' Master
list Payroll by complying with the requirements prescribed under
RA No. 9225, or the Dual Citizenship Act.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done
pursuant to Disposition Form7 dated October 29, 2004,which
was approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in
January 2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge
Advocate General opined that under the provisions of Sections
4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired military personnel are
disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapable to
render military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance
to a foreign country. It was also mentioned that termination of
retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638
which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in
consonance with the policy consideration that all retirement laws
inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and
modified accordingly.
On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition for Mandamus against Gen.
Generoso Senga, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brig. Gen.
Fernando Zabat, as Chief of the AFP Finance Center, Comm.
Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP- GHQ Management and
Fiscal Office, and Comm. Emilio Marayag, Pension and Gratuity
Management Officer, Pension and Gratuity Management Center,
AFP Finance Center, seeking reinstatement of his name in the
list of the AFP retired officers, resumption of payment of his
retirement benefits under RA No. 340, and the reimbursement of
all his retirement pay and benefits which accrued from March 5,
2005 up to the time his name is reinstated and, thereafter, with
claim for damages and attorney's fees. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-06-58686, and raffled off to Branch 220.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision10 granting
the petition for mandamus, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering General
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brigadier
General Fernando Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the AFP
Finance Center, Commodore Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the
AFP-GHQ Management and Fiscal Office, and Captain Theresa
M. Nicdao, as Pension and Gratuity Officer of the Pension and
Gratuity Management Center, or any of their respective
successors and those taking instructions from them as agents or
subordinates, to:
a. immediately reinstate the name of petitioner in the list of
retired AFP Officers, and to resume payment of his retirement
benefits under RA 340; and
b. release to [petitioner] all retirement benefits due him under RA
340 which accrued to him from March 2005 continuously up to
the time his name is reinstated in the list of AFP retired
officers.11
The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability of
RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon Jeremias' retirement
benefits. It found that he retired as a commissioned officer of the
AFP in 1976; thus, RA No. 340 is the law applicable in
determining his entitlement to his retirement benefits and not PD
No. 1638 which was issued only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil
Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does not provide for such
retroactive application. Also, it could not have been the

intendment of PD No. 1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a

monthly pension during their old age especially where, as here,
the right had been vested to them through time. RA No. 340
does not provide that the loss of Filipino citizenship would
terminate one's retirement benefits; and that PD No. 1638 does
not reduce whatever benefits that any person has already been
receiving under existing law.
Respondents sought reconsideration,12 but the RTC denied the
same in an Order13 dated May 25, 2007, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED, considering that the
questioned decision has not yet attained its finality. The Motion
for Execution in the meantime is hereby DENIED.14

thus, they should not be treated differently upon the loss of

Filipino citizenship. He argues when there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the two laws of different vintages, i.e., RA No.
340 and PD No. 1638, the latter enactment prevails.
The Solicitor General argues that mandamus will not issue to
enforce a right to compel compliance with a duty which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. In this
case, petitioner's husband does not have a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to continuously receive retirement benefits
after becoming an American citizen. Likewise, the AFP does not
have a clear and imperative duty to grant the said benefits
considering that Section 27 of PD No. 1638 provides that the
name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. After the

submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for decision.

Petitioner filed her reply thereto.

Jeremias died on September 30, 200715 and was substituted by

his wife, herein petitioner. On May 25, 2009, the CA granted
respondents' appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:

Petitioner's husband retired in1976 under RA No. 340. He was

already receiving his monthly retirement benefit in the amount of
P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was terminated in
March 2005. Section 5, RA No. 340 provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVOKED and SET
ASIDE.16

Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall
be subject to the rules and articles of war and to trial by courtmartial for any breach thereof. At any time said officers and
enlisted men may be called to active service by the President.
Refusal on the part of any officer or enlisted man to perform such
services shall terminate his right to further participation in the
benefits of this Act provided he resides in the Philippines and is
physically fit for service. Such fitness for service shall be
determined by applicable regulations.

In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias

retired in 1976 under the provisions of RA No. 340, as amended,
which does not contain any provision anent cessation or loss of
retirement benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No.
1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively repealed RA No.
340, as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which provides
that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall
be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss, was correctly made applicable to
Jeremias' retirement benefits. Logic dictates that since Jeremias
had already renounced his allegiance to the Philippines, he
cannot now be compelled by the State to render active service
and to render compulsory military service when the need arises.
The CA found that for the writ of mandamus to lie, it is essential
that Jeremias should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondents to
perform the act required which petitioner failed to show; thus,
mandamus will not lie.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated September 10, 2009.
Hence, this petition raising the following:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED
DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY 2007 DECISION OF THE QC
RTC BECAUSE:
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used
against petitioner as her husband's retirement and pension were
granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not
superseded by PD 1638, a later statute.
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to
compel the reinstatement of his pension and benefits from the
AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to him.
Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from the active
service in 1976 was pursuant to the provisions of RA No. No.
340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there
was nothing in RA No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military
personnel from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring
foreign citizenship. The concept of retirement benefits is such
that one is entitled to them for services already rendered and not
for those to be made at a future time. Retirement benefits due
petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is an acquired right
which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638
does not expressly provide for its retroactive application.
Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to implement the
provisions of RA No. 340 have neglected their function
thereunder by delisting petitioner's husband as a retiree, thus,
mandamus is proper.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that PD No. 1638
applies to all military personnel in the service of the AFP whether
active or retired; hence, it applies retroactively to petitioner's
husband. Even when a retiree is no longer in the active service,
his being a Filipino still makes him a part of the Citizen Armed
Forces; that whether a military personnel retires under the
provisions of RA No. 340 or under PD No. 1638, he is still in the
service of the military and/or the State only that he is retired,

We find merit in the petition.

The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a retiree's

retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the retiree
refuses to perform active service when called to do so provided
that (1) the retiree resides in the Philippines and (2) is physically
fit for service. There is no other requirement found in the law
which would be the reason for the termination of a retiree's
retirement benefits. Petitioner's husband was never called to
perform active service and refused to do so, however, his
retirement benefit was terminated. The reason for such
termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on Section
27 of PD No. 1638, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11
and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to the
retirement benefits of petitioner's husband.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of the Civil
Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the
future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator
may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions;17
that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case
of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect.18 These
principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its
retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its
language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides
that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. As held in
Parreo v. COA,19 there is no question that PD No. 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation
from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its approval.20 Conversely, PD
No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its
effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is
amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to
all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for
the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11
and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his

retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. (emphasis

supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those aboveenumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No.
340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement
benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the
stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of
employment, age, and length of service.22 Undeniably,
petitioner's husband had complied with the conditions of
eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his
retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated.
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is
protected by the due process clause.23 It is only upon retirement
that military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement
benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under preexisting law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a vested right,
thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173).1wphi1 It is "the privilege to enjoy
property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights
of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note
46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa
vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16
C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5,
citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192
Atl. 2nd 587). 27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his
retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot be
affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which
provides that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement
benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to
the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations after the right has vested.28
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No.1638 recognize such
vested right, to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any
manner to reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or
gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is
heretofore receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions
of existing law.
xxxx

duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully

excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately
or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal
right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of
law.29 A doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that
mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal
right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and
the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same.30
The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty.31 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.32 If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial.33
The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the
RTC was for the payment of his terminated retirement benefits,
which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the
part of the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the
proper remedy to compel such payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for
resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.34
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal.35 This
is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer.36 Appeal to the administrative officer
would only be an exercise in futility.37 Here, the question raised
is purely legal, i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of
retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no
need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial
relief can be sought.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 25, 2009 and the Resolution dated September 10, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
ARTICLE 6 WAIVER OF RIGHTS
a.) Famanila vs Court of Appeals
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 25, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103502 and the
Resolution dated September 10, 2009 denying reconsideration
thereof.
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what

circumstances petition for mandamus may be filed, to wit:

On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's

husband, Retired3 from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order No. 1208
dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340,4 as
amended. He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the
amount of P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was
withheld by respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005,
Jeremias wrote a letter5 addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff
asking for the reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay. In
a letter reply,6 Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and
Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias
that his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his
name in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners Payroll effective
March 5, 2005; and that he could avail of re-entitlement to his
retirement benefits and the restoration of his name in the AFP
Pensioners' Master list Payroll by complying with the
requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual
Citizenship Act.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a

It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done

pursuant to Disposition Form7 dated October 29, 2004,which
was approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in

Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the

provisions of this Decree and to preserve the rights granted to
retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention
to reduce or to revoke whatever retirement benefits being
enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section
35 provides for an exception to what the decree repealed or
modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve the rights
granted to retired or separated military personnel.
We also find that the CA erred in finding that mandamus will not
lie.

January 2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge

Advocate General opined that under the provisions of Sections
4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired military personnel are
disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapable to
render military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance
to a foreign country. It was also mentioned that termination of
retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 16388
which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in
consonance with the policy consideration that all retirement laws
inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and
modified accordingly.
On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition for Mandamus9 against Gen.
Generoso Senga, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brig. Gen.
Fernando Zabat, as Chief of the AFP Finance Center, Comm.
Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP- GHQ Management and
Fiscal Office, and Comm. Emilio Marayag, Pension and Gratuity
Management Officer, Pension and Gratuity Management Center,
AFP Finance Center, seeking reinstatement of his name in the
list of the AFP retired officers, resumption of payment of his
retirement benefits under RA No. 340, and the reimbursement of
all his retirement pay and benefits which accrued from March 5,
2005 up to the time his name is reinstated and, thereafter, with
claim for damages and attorney's fees. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-06-58686, and raffled off to Branch 220.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision10 granting
the petition for mandamus, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering General
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brigadier
General Fernando Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the AFP
Finance Center, Commodore Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the
AFP-GHQ Management and Fiscal Office, and Captain Theresa
M. Nicdao, as Pension and Gratuity Officer of the Pension and
Gratuity Management Center, or any of their respective
successors and those taking instructions from them as agents or
subordinates, to:
a. immediately reinstate the name of petitioner in the list of
retired AFP Officers, and to resume payment of his retirement
benefits under RA 340; and
b. release to [petitioner] all retirement benefits due him under RA
340 which accrued to him from March 2005 continuously up to
the time his name is reinstated in the list of AFP retired
officers.11
The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability of
RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon Jeremias' retirement
benefits. It found that he retired as a commissioned officer of the
AFP in 1976; thus, RA No. 340 is the law applicable in
determining his entitlement to his retirement benefits and not PD
No. 1638 which was issued only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil
Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does not provide for such
retroactive application. Also, it could not have been the
intendment of PD No. 1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a
monthly pension during their old age especially where, as here,
the right had been vested to them through time. RA No. 340
does not provide that the loss of Filipino citizenship would
terminate one's retirement benefits; and that PD No. 1638 does
not reduce whatever benefits that any person has already been
receiving under existing law.
Respondents sought reconsideration,12 but the RTC denied the
same in an Order13 dated May 25, 2007, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED, considering that the
questioned decision has not yet attained its finality. The Motion
for Execution in the meantime is hereby DENIED.14

In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias

retired in 1976 under the provisions of RA No. 340, as amended,
which does not contain any provision anent cessation or loss of
retirement benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No.
1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively repealed RA No.
340, as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which provides
that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall
be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss, was correctly made applicable to
Jeremias' retirement benefits. Logic dictates that since Jeremias
had already renounced his allegiance to the Philippines, he
cannot now be compelled by the State to render active service
and to render compulsory military service when the need arises.
The CA found that for the writ of mandamus to lie, it is essential
that Jeremias should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondents to
perform the act required which petitioner failed to show; thus,
mandamus will not lie.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated September 10, 2009.
Hence, this petition raising the following:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED
DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY 2007 DECISION OF THE QC
RTC BECAUSE:
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used
against petitioner as her husband's retirement and pension were
granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not
superseded by PD 1638, a later statute.
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to
compel the reinstatement of his pension and benefits from the
AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to him.
Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from the active
service in 1976 was pursuant to the provisions of RA No. No.
340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there
was nothing in RA No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military
personnel from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring
foreign citizenship. The concept of retirement benefits is such
that one is entitled to them for services already rendered and not
for those to be made at a future time. Retirement benefits due
petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is an acquired right
which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638
does not expressly provide for its retroactive application.
Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to implement the
provisions of RA No. 340 have neglected their function
thereunder by delisting petitioner's husband as a retiree, thus,
mandamus is proper.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that PD No. 1638
applies to all military personnel in the service of the AFP whether
active or retired; hence, it applies retroactively to petitioner's
husband. Even when a retiree is no longer in the active service,
his being a Filipino still makes him a part of the Citizen Armed
Forces; that whether a military personnel retires under the
provisions of RA No. 340 or under PD No. 1638, he is still in the
service of the military and/or the State only that he is retired,
thus, they should not be treated differently upon the loss of
Filipino citizenship. He argues when there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the two laws of different vintages, i.e., RA No.
340 and PD No. 1638, the latter enactment prevails.
The Solicitor General argues that mandamus will not issue to
enforce a right to compel compliance with a duty which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. In this
case, petitioner's husband does not have a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to continuously receive retirement benefits
after becoming an American citizen. Likewise, the AFP does not
have a clear and imperative duty to grant the said benefits
considering that Section 27 of PD No. 1638 provides that the
name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. After the

submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for decision.

Petitioner filed her reply thereto.

Jeremias died on September 30, 200715 and was substituted by

his wife, herein petitioner. On May 25, 2009, the CA granted
respondents' appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:

Petitioner's husband retired in1976 under RA No. 340. He was

already receiving his monthly retirement benefit in the amount of
P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was terminated in
March 2005. Section 5, RA No. 340 provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVOKED and SET
ASIDE.16

Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall
be subject to the rules and articles of war and to trial by courtmartial for any breach thereof. At any time said officers and
enlisted men may be called to active service by the President.

We find merit in the petition.

Refusal on the part of any officer or enlisted man to perform such

services shall terminate his right to further participation in the
benefits of this Act provided he resides in the Philippines and is
physically fit for service. Such fitness for service shall be
determined by applicable regulations.
The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a retiree's
retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the retiree
refuses to perform active service when called to do so provided
that (1) the retiree resides in the Philippines and (2) is physically
fit for service. There is no other requirement found in the law
which would be the reason for the termination of a retiree's
retirement benefits. Petitioner's husband was never called to
perform active service and refused to do so, however, his
retirement benefit was terminated. The reason for such
termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on Section
27 of PD No. 1638, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11
and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to the
retirement benefits of petitioner's husband.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of the Civil
Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the
future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator
may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions;17
that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case
of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect.18 These
principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its
retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its
language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides
that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. As held in
Parreo v. COA,19 there is no question that PD No. 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation
from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its approval.20 Conversely, PD
No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its
effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is
amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to
all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for
the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11
and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. (emphasis
supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those aboveenumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No.
340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement
benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the
stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of
employment, age, and length of service.22 Undeniably,
petitioner's husband had complied with the conditions of
eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his
retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated.
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is
protected by the due process clause.23 It is only upon retirement
that military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement
benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under preexisting law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a vested right,
thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173).1wphi1 It is "the privilege to enjoy
property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights
of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note
46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has

become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or

controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa
vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16
C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5,
citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192
Atl. 2nd 587). 27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his
retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot be
affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which
provides that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement
benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to
the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations after the right has vested.28
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No.1638 recognize such
vested right, to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any
manner to reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or
gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is
heretofore receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions
of existing law.
xxxx
Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the
provisions of this Decree and to preserve the rights granted to
retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention
to reduce or to revoke whatever retirement benefits being
enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section
35 provides for an exception to what the decree repealed or
modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve the rights
granted to retired or separated military personnel.
We also find that the CA erred in finding that mandamus will not
lie.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what
circumstances petition for mandamus may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately
or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal
right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of
law.29 A doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that
mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal
right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and
the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same.30
The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty.31 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.32 If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial.33

The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the

RTC was for the payment of his terminated retirement benefits,
which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the
part of the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the
proper remedy to compel such payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for
resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.34
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal.35 This
is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer.36 Appeal to the administrative officer
would only be an exercise in futility.37 Here, the question raised
is purely legal, i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of
retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no
need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial
relief can be sought.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 25, 2009 and the Resolution dated September 10, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
b.) Guy vs Court of Appeals
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742,
which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17,
20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in
SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss;
and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against

forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision
dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED,
for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July
21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED.
Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the
controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the private
respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate
estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied
reconsideration, hence, this petition.

petitioner's

motion

for

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing

rules on certification against forum shopping; that the Release
and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and
discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any
claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the
legal personality to institute the petition for letters of
administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the
lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family
Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can
be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises
no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

The facts are as follows:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei
and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration5
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The
case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate
Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati
City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children,
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.
Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate.
They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C.
Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator
of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a
Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel,
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal
of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts
and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. He further argued that private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime
of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on
the ground that the certification against forum shopping should
have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel.
They contended that Remedios should have executed the
certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to
Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993
Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima
Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as
well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while
the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it
had not been established that she was the duly constituted
guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right
occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents'

petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules
on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release
and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private
respondents are barred by prescription from proving their
filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the
certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the
plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the
requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a
liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest
of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we
ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the
certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel
and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in
the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the present
controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of
an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be
considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application
of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same
does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when
its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon
a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights.
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters
"by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and
all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate
of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document
did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share
in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the
hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar
the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property
may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be

accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to
the persons designated by the testator to determine the
beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to
those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16
which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will
not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of
the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of
a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly
waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove
their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to
rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner
claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's
invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be
premature considering that private respondents have yet to
present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the
governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children
was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years
from the finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who
were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the
right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or
taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it
may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be
impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been
no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts.
Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court
after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a
petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not
precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents'
filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status
of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz
v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain
ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion
of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided
always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to
compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and
prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which
that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent
supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well
settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5;
Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his
deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8
Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits
and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take
by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of
heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss;
and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
138 for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 9 DUTY OF THE COURT TO RENDER
a.) Silverio vs Republic
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God;
He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and
she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North

Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In
particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1
Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in
the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001
when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino ReysioCruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines,
who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had
in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of
a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground
to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,

specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to

MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a
decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex
in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his
petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical
features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect
of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioners first name was not within that courts
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was
also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true
and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As
To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical
error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed

in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however,
That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407

of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25
However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil
registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments
of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such
as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of
nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation
(that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person
in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term
status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status.
In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration
of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in
default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f)
such other data as may be required in the regulations to be
issued.
xxx

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and

correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical

record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus,
the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is
immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given
their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used
in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry
(and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male

from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and

female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis
for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or
Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wideranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the
trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37
One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant
the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioners
petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol
on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact
a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life
of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams."
No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
ARTICLE 14 PENAL LAWS

a.) Del Socorro vs Wilsem

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTCCebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counteraffidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her replyaffidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information
for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled
to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or
less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his
son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued
a Hold Departure Order against respondent.16 Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection
Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently,
without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and
(2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed
Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent
on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is
analien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van

Wilsem for his provisional liberty ishereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondents obligation to support their child under
Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure todo so makes
him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all
persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligors nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating
its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of
those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution.
Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parents duty and obligation to
givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein,
hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his
minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance
of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly
lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which
lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties
from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by
writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or
of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence
on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can
be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition

highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to
family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of
the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this
Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future
cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort
and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of
justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of
courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition
meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioners
contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which
provides the parents obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent
is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his
minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as
well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32
Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree,
he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot
rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls
under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that
he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not
obliged to support petitioners son under Article195 of the Family
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the

obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved

in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a
divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce
Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners allegation
that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondents obligation to support his child is specifically
stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation
to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the
ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law
would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a
sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up
of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause
of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parents obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent
is no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with
the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent
may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262
for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioners son,
to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by
force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children
of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x
xx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioners claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections
5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under
Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in
1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has
provided support to petitioners child calls for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated
February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case. SO
ORDERED.
ARTICLE 15 NATIONALITY THEORY
a.) Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended
in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal
infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto
appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their
only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations

between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure
of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local
Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance
of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8,
1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against
the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were
eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 8752435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo
Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary
of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent
fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A
similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through
the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions
and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department
of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not
yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10
As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice.
11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned.
Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent
judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and
the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not
guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on
the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid

order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with

Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move
for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall
accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the
case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for
adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called
exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default
of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did
not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by
law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to
do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of
the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or
those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence
the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within
his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the
action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed
prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but
did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at
the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where
a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in
law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry

;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a

criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders
where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have
the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was
not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending
spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply
in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law
and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of
such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused
must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus,
the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24
after a divorce was granted by a United States court between
Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter
filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business
concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered
to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right
to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on

the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be
successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as
Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court
merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous
the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have
her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless
she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because
such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent
to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration
of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what
was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the
offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant.
Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at
bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion
to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING
the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case
on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO
ORDERED.
b.) Garcia-Recio vs Recio
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada

divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets.
Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have
brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a
danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said
to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the
March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace
J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12,
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and
Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.[9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only
in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he
had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14]
The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15]
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of
both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and
Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in
the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the
basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather,
it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law
allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to
the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient.

Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:

1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the

contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx

2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the
Family Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts.
11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto
capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no
more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous

marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree
of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of
its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a

writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence
and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree
and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she
had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab
initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense,
divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.[46]

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on
the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again.
The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to
his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with
the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March
1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the
City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha
D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We
agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage
to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it
may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand
this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then
the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987
and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and

substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy,
as above discussed. No costs. SO ORDERED.
c.) Quita vs CA
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married
in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however
blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce
proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of
their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third
time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972
Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan,
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of
Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon.
On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan
children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950
private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the
sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto
failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial
court required the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required
documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was
not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider
valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to
lack of judicial approval. On the other hand, it opined that there
was no showing that marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly,
equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children
were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the
children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in
their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988[6]
partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the
estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the
other half.[7] Private respondent was not declared an heir.
Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that
she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage
was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of
his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children
assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial
court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as
to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the

distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,

the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to
sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null
and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it
denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because,
first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to
the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective
shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on established facts and
admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by
respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the
right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the
legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the
parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for
immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth
of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on
declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private
respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in
fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a
Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of
the divorce they obtained. Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the
trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as
well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in
Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that
the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but
failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial
court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but
proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both
petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in
the Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship
pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court
was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen
at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's
citizenship;] it did not merit enlightenment however from
petitioner. In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes
taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of
the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another
trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen

petitioner answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the

decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at
the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by
the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to
inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and
her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the
present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action,
subject matter and issue.[22] The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before
the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and
void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting onehalf (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with
the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of
court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is
DENIED. SO ORDERED.
d.) Elmar Perez vs CA
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside and
declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting
petitioners motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the
Complaint-in-Intervention3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its
January 23, 2004 Resolution4 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez
Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony
was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw
Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took place at the
Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage
produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems
that they decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of a
mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of
the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under
its laws.6
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the
Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of
Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in
the State of Virginia in the United States7 and both lived as
husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.8

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce

decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
was deemed void under Philippine law. When she confronted
Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize
their union after he obtains an annulment of his marriage with
Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would adopt
their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his
estate as that of each of his children with Lily.9
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File
Intervention10 claiming that she has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation because she knows certain information which might
aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the
annulment case, which the trial court granted on September 30,
2002. Petitioners complaint-in-intervention was also ordered
admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals seeking to annul the order dated September 30, 2002
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the
trial court granting the motion for leave to file intervention and
admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in
the annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a
decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the
error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged
in this case, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the said Rules.11 This is based on the premise that in
issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is
considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effect of the judgment and the
acts of the lower court.12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the
Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed
decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may
arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.13 The word
"capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary,"
conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when
seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of
caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person,
not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the
matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to

whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed

or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not.16
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.17 Such interest must
be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of
Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite legal interest
required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was
never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest
has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan
and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved
the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of
the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine
laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his
or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino
regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad,
initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such
absolute divorce.20
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage
was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code21 which took
effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22
we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner
never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her
motion for intervention is based.
Since petitioners motion for leave to file intervention was bereft
of the indispensable requirement of legal interest, the issuance
by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the
complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside and declared as null and void the said order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution dated January 23,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San

Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up
to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at
the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San
Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less;
that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11
denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed
on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home
to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila
which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order
denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his
first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge
Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

e.) San Luis vs San Luis

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and
its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
on December 14, 1973. 6

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying

the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as
widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion
for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because
then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law
on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21
granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and
legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as
his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo
was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee
was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who
was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision
dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity
to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2,
Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in
Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been
obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine
laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist
that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant
to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile"
which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only
have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo
was void and bigamous because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue
that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied

because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void

bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered
the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid,
and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be
filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v.
Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from
domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing
that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center
and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47
letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds
calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court

Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was

validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file
the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering
that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45
L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55
where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not
a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that
where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse,
the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in
1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied.
The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical

background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph
2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering
its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of
no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good
to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad
against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings
in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are
to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68
the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results;
and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule
that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and
we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a

situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and

functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.

through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property

acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging
to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not

unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the

divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we
held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
80 The Court described the property regime under this provision
as follows:

xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That
wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render
justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down
the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the

union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed
to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise
from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his coowner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994
Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. SO ORDERED.
f.) Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement
of property between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A

petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna,
appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA
thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in
the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was
living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque,
Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church
ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA,

they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal,

Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L.
Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and
Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage,
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from
each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement
entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed
to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of
his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in
Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm
named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON)
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA
purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th
Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was
to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed
on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA
and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a
new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same
was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until
the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium
unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found
therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty.
Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium
unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment
became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 991644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they
had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of proindiviso share consisting of her share in the said properties
plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and
thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the
portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned;
that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a
receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject
properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay
attorneys feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial
upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
(517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna"
to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport
and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the
RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR
THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO
HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF
THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENORAPPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND
LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER
ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS
BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX.
THE
LOWER
COURT
ERRED
IN
NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING
THE
INTERVENTION
FOR
FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the
trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA
WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF

PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN
ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT,

ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both

Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10,
1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.15
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed

modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA
until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27,
2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
(sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendantsappellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia ZaballeroLuna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds
and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still
subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or
under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the
entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to
be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on
certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed by
Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their
conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the
Dominican Republic courts approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner
was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e.,
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence
and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the
divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly,
whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna
and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court

1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on

September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both
of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types
of defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void
and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity
ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to
the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to
the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon
the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided
bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into
any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September
10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the
Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of
gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for

any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of
the Civil Code, viz:

legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been

declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered
void ab initio.24

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the

petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article
144 of the Civil Code, viz:

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia
did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was
still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code,
as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of
a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation
of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the
petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well
as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501
shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late
Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that
the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for
divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical
to the grounds raised in the action for divorce.21 With the
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine
law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law,
the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the
lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage
between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband

and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the
burden of proof to confirm such fact.1wphi1 To establish coownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to
offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient
and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired
by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The
claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties
to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because
they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed
money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in
the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such
relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving
it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her
actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in
the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in
direct contributions of P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans
Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate
contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire
share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit
amounting to P362,264.00 of the units purchase price of
P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the
lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that
she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and
purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties
on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from
his law practice.

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent

marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the coownership?

The Court concurs with the CA.

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence

that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New
Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to
cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New
Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was
not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a
void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any
way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each
other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or

incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages
as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the

petitioners assertions on her actual contributions through the
following findings and conclusions, namely:

there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute

community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided
that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were
prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption
to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule
and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The
rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of
gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of
Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965,
15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an
actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed
used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of
the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty.
Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was
thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in
the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco
Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan
of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable
to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the
loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for P4,072.00
was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that
the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the
acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was
simply not established. x x x"

Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the
properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
g.) Noveras vs Noveras
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686,
which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were
married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT.
Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier
service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San
Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the
Philippines and in the USA:

SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of

P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the
same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA,
thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with
his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not
appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was
acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust
Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff
does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761
were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of
the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but
logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law
books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings
from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask
from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the
CA both because they were substantiated by the records and
because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the coownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by Davids parents.

The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged
the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the
couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the
same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the
Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the
Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and
lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in
the presence of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from
the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected
by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the
redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David
shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David
was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed

a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody
of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the
USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation
of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied
on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1)
the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines;
2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the
subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal
properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit
half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment ofP50,000.00 and
P100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of
their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorneys fees of both parties be charged against the
conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts
of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result intothe
forfeiture of the parties properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in
California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner
Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount
to a waiver or forfeiture of the latters property rights over their
conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement
of onehalf of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in
Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests
and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand litigation expenses of
the parties were chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are
entitled to support and presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby
declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe
parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to
respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the
United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the
divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage
of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering
said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the
name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A.
Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome
and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said
properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall
be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first
half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to

them annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of
each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and
Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00
as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their
presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall
take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while
they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due
from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the
needs of the children require and his financial capacity can
afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price
of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby
ordered to pay P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
P405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent
may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall
be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account
tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only
be made by them or by their representative duly authorized with
a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be
made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy
of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be
submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within
the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the
Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the
parties shall be shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens,
the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are those of
the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced
by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June
2005. Under their law, the parties marriage had already been
dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by
Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support
and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial
separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first
classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement
before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75
of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance
with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the
US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does
not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial
separation of properties, the absolute community properties
cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover,
the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment
and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the
reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already
acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the childrens
presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of
the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of
his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts
Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the
common childrens presumptive legitime, the appellate court
ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December 8,
2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case
No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the
parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally between
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America

awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in
paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two
minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on
the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia

Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties.
Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to

them by petitioner annually within the first half of January,

starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana
(sic) are each ordered to pay the amount ofP520,000.00 to their
two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the
receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank
of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latters names. The
payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding
passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a
quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or
their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler,
Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building,
Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children,
Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals
should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded
the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part
of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial
court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the
Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor
of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US
properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia
are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to
their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for
judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce
decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of
the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as
a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of
a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must
beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed
the requirement on certification where we held that "[petitioner
therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears
that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree
was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as
the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements
must be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception
to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially
approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles
66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial
separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared
an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree
ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no
abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code
quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of
not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts within the period of three months from such
abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there
after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been
going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the
relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner
discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of

marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of
their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be
considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia
and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name
of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed for
divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated
for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime,
as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code,
thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did
not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolutecommunity
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
childrens presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the
proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1wphi1 While both claimed
to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the
same is presumed to have come from the community property.
Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on
Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case
of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not
benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
P120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

xxxx
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be
paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of onehalf or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse
in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as
to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of
the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and
Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as
their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
h.) Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August 23, 2012 and the
resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
The Factual Antecedents

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute

community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided
in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of
its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition
of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is
no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious,
we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall
adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial
courts Decision with respect to liquidation.

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki

(Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja
(Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot
at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung
Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident
Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536
[covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186]4
and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118]5 were for
sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the
titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief
negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to
P2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank
of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 833496 for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee.7
On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI
Check No. 83350,8 this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 20039
covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after,
Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot,
and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to
deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in

possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orions Loans Officer) for

safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to
deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left
the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the
properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the
title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations
although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice
President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the
purchase price of Unit. No. 53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11
CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the condominium unit
had no existing encumbrance, except for anannotation under
Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance
or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval
by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although CCT No.
18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2,
1999 representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a
P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled
on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties
remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim12 dated September 8, 2003, withthe Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No.
18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of
the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to
surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orions legal
counsel as its reason.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orions
counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang obtained
another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed
to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in
favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not
register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and
this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking
lots title.

On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orions appeal and

sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld Suzukis right over the
properties. The CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186
pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only
serves as a warning to an SRRV holder about the implications of
a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the RTC
ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses for litigation and
cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA
denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution. Orion then
filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this
Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orions petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null
and void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal
property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the
owners duplicate copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C10186, which prohibits any conveyance or encumbrance of the
property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by
Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal
consent was belatedly raised on appeal. Moreover, proof of
acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua
nonfor the operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a
purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of
the law.
The Courts Ruling

On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific

performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At the pretrial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of
Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by
Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999,
was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186
dated June 16, 2000;
3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT
Nos. 18186 and 9118;
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the
documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en Pago on
October 15, 2003;
5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was
never mortgaged to Orion; and
6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to
obtain possession of the titles.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki
and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to
Suzuki.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value
whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orions. The RTC
further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the
properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe
titles. Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by
way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2)
months after he bought the properties because Orion never
bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos.
18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally
pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit.
Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally
excludes a factual and evidentiary re-evaluation, and the Court
ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of the trial
court and the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the
courts below both arrived at the same conclusion, there appears
tobe an incongruence in their factual findings and the legal
principle they applied to the attendant factual circumstances.
Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual issues in the
exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken
inference that may have been made.19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of
spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however,
because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal
to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and
considered by a reviewing court.20 To consider these belated
arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and
due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues
Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts
on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property its immobility. Immovables are part of the country
and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their
natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal
property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei
sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title
canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost.23 This general principle includes
all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of
wills and other conveyances.24

This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a

deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature
may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to
land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei
sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law
of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity
is undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses.26
However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He is presumed to
know only domestic or the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues
pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be
governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the
South Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It
merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal
nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section
24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approachor processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where
a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to'
Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Kang.32 In other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community
property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse,
were indeed either conjugal or community properties.34
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the
due execution of the Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides
that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the

person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code
presupposes the existence of two or more duly executed
contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated
August 26, 200335 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by
Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzukis witness Ms.
Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26,
2003 was consummated. In a contract of sale, the seller
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate
thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates
himself to pay a price certain to the seller.38 The execution of
the notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of possession
amounted to delivery that produced the legal effect of
transferring ownership to Suzuki.39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under
the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first in time,
stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and due
execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with
submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove the existence of the February
6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion
likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated
September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the
additional P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the
admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its order
dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not identified in
court by any witness."40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence,
Orion failed to make a tender ofexcluded evidence, as provided
under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this
reason alone, we are prevented from seriously considering
Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings
and Exhibit "12" in the present petition, the copious
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and
documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion
that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First, there appears
to be no due and demandable obligation when the Dacion en
Pago was executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orions
witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was in
default in his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination,
he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: Okay, so this loan of P1.8 million, what happened to this loan,
Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest
payment by Mr. Kangand...
Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]
A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank
through loans and we have executed a dacion en pagobecause
Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just execute[d] the
dacion en pago rather than going through the Foreclosure
proceedings.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that
there was nodefault to speak of when the supposed Dacion en
Pagowas executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kangs loan obligation
wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion claim
that Kang had been in default in his installment payments
because the wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he
principal of this loanand its interest and other charges shall be
paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT
LOANS.42 "There was thus no due and demandable loan
obligation when the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.

Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion

en Pago,appears to only have a vague idea of the transaction he
supposedly prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:

A: None sir.

ATTY. DE CASTRO:

A: None sir.

Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr.
witness?

Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way

of payment to the principal, by way ofpayment of interest, there
was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this loan?

Q: No payments?

A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.

A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
xxxx
Q: There was no actual cash?
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the
penalties, interest and surcharge due from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?
A: Its just the principal, sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank
still extended an P800,000.00 additional right?

Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?

A: Yes, sir.47
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We
may actually includethat but....
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the
second party and as of February 10, 2003, the outstanding
obligation which is due and demandable principal and interest
and other charges included amounts to P1,800,000.00 pesos,
sir.
xxxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest
and other charges, based on this document?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the P1,800,000.00
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. However, no
document was ever presented to prove this real estate mortgage
aside from it being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a
supplement to that Credit Line Agreement referring to this 1.8
million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that there
was a subsequent collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung
[Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44
Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2)
months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the delivery of the
titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the
annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it
was only on October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its counsel,
Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion en
Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on
October 1, 2003, when he personally received a letter
demanding the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to
accept the letter and opted to first consult with his lawyer.46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material
inconsistencies in its recital of facts surrounding the execution of
the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on
[September 4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang]
applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility by [Orion] x x
x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,800,000.00)." Perez, however, testified that there was "no
cash movement" in the original P1,000,000.00 loan. In his
testimony, he said:
COURT:
xxxx
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real
estate mortgage for that first P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: Its a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam
Kang of this P1,000,000.00 loan?

Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed

execution of theDacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang
remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing
in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take
possession of the property even six (6) months after the
supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was
even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to
Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon. If
Orion really purchased the condominium unit on February 2,
2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it not assert its
ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why
did it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded
the delivery of the titles? These gaps have remained
unanswered and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of
simulation is the complete absence of anattempt on the part of
the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the property in
question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the
land and occupied the premises. The absence of any attempt on
the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion over the property
allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding
the execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in
possession of the disputed condominium unit from the time of
the execution of the Dacion en Pagountil the propertys
subsequent transfer to Suzuki unmistakably strengthens the
fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in
the documents and testimony of Orions witness, indubitably
prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago
is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to
their execution and are to be considered as containing all the
terms of the agreement.49 While a notarized document enjoys
this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents."50 The presumption of
regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.51
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the
regularity in the execution of the Dacion en Pago and the loan
documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their
prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable
circumstances surrounding their execution.52
Effect of the PRA restriction on
the validity of Suzukis title to the
property
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects
the conveyance to Suzuki. In particular, Orion assails the status
of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the express
PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186.53
We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind,
the PRA restriction cannot affect the conveyance in favor of
Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur withthe following
findings of the CA:
x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who
holds a Special Resident Retirees Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose
his visa if he disposes his property which serves as his
investment in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the
Implementing Investment Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of the

Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Order No. 1037,

Creating the Philippine Retirement Park System Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the
Philippine Retirement Authority) states:

bank, through its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed the

respondents current account effective the evening of April 4,
1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence
of the overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored.

Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment

from the Philippines, or transfer the same to another domestic
enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his condominium unit or
units to another person, natural or juridical without the prior
approval of the Authority, the Special Resident Retirees Visa
issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or children[,] may be
cancelled or revoked by the Philippine Government, through the
appropriate government department or agency, upon
recommendation of the Authority.54

On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank

complaining that the closure of his account was unjustified.
When he did not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the
respondent filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod
City, Branch 54, a complaint for damages against petitioner bank
and Villadelgado. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
4908. The respondent, as complainant therein, alleged that the
closure of his current account by petitioner bank was unjustified
because on the first banking hour of April 5, 1988, he already
deposited an amount sufficient to fund his checks. The
respondent pointed out that Check No. 2434886, in particular,
was delivered to petitioner bank at the close of banking hours on
April 4, 1988 and, following normal banking procedure, it
(petitioner bank) had until the last clearing hour of the following
day, or on April 5, 1988, to honor the check or return it, if not
funded. In disregard of this banking procedure and practice,
however, petitioner bank hastily closed the respondents current
account and dishonored his Check No. 2434886.

Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the

good faith of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction. Orion
knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang.
Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating Kangs request to
cancel the mortgage annotation despite the lack of payment to
circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from
impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on
the basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and
"attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of
the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason for the application of the
rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to
establish the validity of conveyance in his favor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank. SO
ORDERED.
i.) Del Socorro vs Wilselm (Article 14 Case)
ARTICLE 16 REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
a.) Orion Savings vs Suzuki (Article 15 Case)

The respondent further alleged that prior to the closure of his

current account, he had issued several other postdated checks.
The petitioner banks act of closing his current account allegedly
preempted the deposits that he intended to make to fund those
checks. Further, the petitioner banks act exposed him to criminal
prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
According to the respondent, the indecent haste that attended
the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended
to embarrass him. He claimed that he is a Cashier of Prudential
Bank and Trust Company, whose branch office is located just
across that of petitioner bank, and a prominent and respected
leader both in the civic and banking communities. The alleged
malicious acts of petitioner bank besmirched the respondents
reputation and caused him social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights entitling him to an
award of damages.

ARTICLE 19 PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

a.) Far East Bank vs Pacilan Jr.
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by
Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of the Philippines
Islands) seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated August 30,
2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627
which ordered it, together with its branch accountant, Roger
Villadelgado, to pay respondent Themistocles Pacilan, Jr.[2] the
total sum of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. The
assailed decision affirmed with modification that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54,
in Civil Case No. 4908. Likewise sought to be reversed and set
aside is the Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of the appellate
court, denying petitioner banks motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following undisputed facts:
Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner
banks Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980. His account was
denominated as Current Account No. 53208 (0052-00407-4).
The respondent had since then issued several postdated checks
to different payees drawn against the said account. Sometime in
March 1988, the respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the
amount of P680.00 and the same was presented for payment to
petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886 was
dishonored by petitioner bank. The next day, or on April 5, 1988,
the respondent deposited to his current account the amount of
P800.00. The said amount was accepted by petitioner bank;
hence, increasing the balance of the respondents deposit to
P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank
about the dishonor of Check No. 2434866, he discovered that
his current account was closed on the ground that it was
improperly handled. The records of petitioner bank disclosed that
between the period of March 30, 1988 and April 5, 1988, the
respondent issued four checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 for
P6,000.00; Check No. 2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880
for P680.00 and; Check No. 2434886 for P680.00, or a total
amount of P7,410.00. At the time, however, the respondents
current account with petitioner bank only had a deposit of
P6,981.43. Thus, the total amount of the checks presented for
payment on April 4, 1988 exceeded the balance of the
respondents deposit in his account. For this reason, petitioner

In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado maintained that

the respondents current account was subject to petitioner banks
Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and
Operation of Regular Demand Deposits which provide that the
Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor
frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or
uncollected deposits and that the Bank reserves the right at any
time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against
insufficient funds or for any reason.[3]
They showed that the respondent had improperly and irregularly
handled his current account. For example, in 1986, the
respondents account was overdrawn 156 times, in 1987, 117
times and in 1988, 26 times. In all these instances, the account
was overdrawn due to the issuance of checks against insufficient
funds. The respondent had also signed several checks with a
different signature from the specimen on file for dubious reasons.
When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, 1988, it was
obviously to cover for issuances made the previous day against
an insufficiently funded account. When his Check No. 2434886
was presented for payment on April 4, 1988, he had already
incurred an overdraft; hence, petitioner bank rightfully
dishonored the same for insufficiency of funds.
After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered judgment in
favor of the respondent as it ordered the petitioner bank and
Villadelgado, jointly and severally, to pay the respondent the
amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and costs of suit. In so ruling, the court a
quo also cited petitioner banks rules and regulations which state
that a charge of P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor for
any check that is taken up as a returned item due to insufficiency
of funds on the date of receipt from the clearing office even if
said check is honored and/or covered by sufficient deposit the
following banking day. The same rules and regulations also
provide that a check returned for insufficiency of funds for any
reason of similar import may be subsequently recleared for one
more time only, subject to the same charges.
According to the court a quo, following these rules and
regulations, the respondent, as depositor, had the right to put up
sufficient funds for a check that was taken as a returned item for
insufficient funds the day following the receipt of said check from
the clearing office. In fact, the said check could still be recleared
for one more time. In previous instances, petitioner bank notified
the respondent when he incurred an overdraft and he would then

deposit sufficient funds the following day to cover the overdraft.

Petitioner bank thus acted unjustifiably when it immediately
closed the respondents account on April 4, 1988 and deprived
him of the opportunity to reclear his check or deposit sufficient
funds therefor the following day.
As a result of the closure of his current account, several of the
respondents checks were subsequently dishonored and because
of this, the respondent was humiliated, embarrassed and lost his
credit standing in the business community. The court a quo
further ratiocinated that even granting arguendo that petitioner
bank had the right to close the respondents account, the manner
which attended the closure constituted an abuse of the
said right. Citing Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which states that [e]very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith and
Article 20 thereof which states that [e]very person who, contrary
to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same, the court a quo adjudged
petitioner bank of acting in bad faith. It held that, under the
foregoing circumstances, the respondent is entitled to an award
of moral and exemplary damages.

We, however, find excessive the amount of damages awarded

by the RTC. In our view the reduced amount of P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages are in
order. Awards for damages are not meant to enrich the plaintiffappellee [the respondent] at the expense of defendantsappellants [the petitioners], but to obviate the moral suffering he
has undergone. The award is aimed at the restoration, within
limits possible, of the status quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[5]
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00 and the award of
exemplary damages reduced to P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the said decision
but in the assailed Resolution dated January 17, 2003, the
appellate court denied its motion. Hence, the recourse to this
Court.

The decretal portion of the court a quos decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1.Ordering the defendants [petitioner bank and Villadelgado],
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff [the respondent] the sum of
P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs and
expenses of the suit; and

Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing the account of the

respondent in the evening of April 4, 1988, it acted in good faith
and in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the
operation of a
regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank the right to
close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks
against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits. The same
rules and regulations also provide that the depositor is not
entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the
bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the
depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any
reason.

3. Dismissing [the] defendants counterclaim for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August 30,

2002, affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo.
The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual findings of
the court a quo as it held that petitioner bank unjustifiably closed
the respondents account notwithstanding that its own rules and
regulations
allow that a check returned for insufficiency of funds or any
reason of similar import, may be subsequently recleared for one
more time, subject to standard charges. Like the court a quo, the
appellate court observed that in several instances in previous
years, petitioner bank would inform the respondent when he
incurred an overdraft and allowed him to make a timely deposit
to fund the checks that were initially dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. However, on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank immediately
closed the respondents account without even notifying him that
he had incurred an overdraft. Even when they had already
closed his account on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank still accepted
the deposit that the respondent made on April 5, 1988,
supposedly to cover his checks.
Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA declared that
even as it may be conceded that petitioner bank had reserved
the right to close an account for repeated overdrafts by the
respondent, the exercise of that right must never be despotic or
arbitrary. That petitioner bank chose to close the account outright
and return the check, even after accepting a deposit sufficient to
cover the said check, is contrary to its duty to handle the
respondents account with utmost fidelity. The exercise of the
right is not absolute and good faith, at least, is required. The
manner by which petitioner bank closed the account of the
respondent runs afoul of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
enjoins every person, in the exercise of his rights, to give every
one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The CA concluded that petitioner banks precipitate and
imprudent closure of the respondents account had caused him, a
respected officer of several civic and banking associations,
serious anxiety and humiliation. It had, likewise, tainted his credit
standing. Consequently, the award of damages is warranted.
The CA, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded by
the court a quo as it found the same to be excessive:

It cites the numerous instances that the respondent had

overdrawn his account and those instances where he
deliberately signed checks using a signature different from the
specimen on file. Based on these facts, petitioner bank was
constrained to close the respondents account for improper and
irregular handling and returned his Check No. 2434886 which
was presented to the bank for payment on April 4, 1988.
Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law or rule which
gives the respondent a legal right to make good his check or to
deposit the corresponding amount to cover said check within 24
hours after the same is dishonored or returned by the bank for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. It vigorously denies
having violated Article 19 of the Civil Code as it insists that it
acted in good faith and in accordance with the pertinent banking
rules and regulations.
The petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo and the
appellate court show that the award of damages in the
respondents favor was anchored mainly on Article 19 of the Civil
Code which, quoted anew below, reads:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
[7] Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.[8] The
law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to
be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of
proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.[9]
Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another.[10] Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.[11] Malice connotes ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention
to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive.[12]
Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the account of
the respondent based on the following provisions of its Rules
and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of
Regular Demand Deposits:

10) The Bank reserves the right to close an account if the

depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds
and/or uncollected deposits.

12) However, it is clearly understood that the depositor is not

entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the
bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the
depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any
other reason.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate court,
do not establish that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank
committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third
elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the present
case. The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the
existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing the
respondents account on April 4, 1988 because on the said date
the same was already overdrawn. The respondent issued four
checks, all due on April 4, 1988, amounting to P7,410.00 when
the balance of his current account deposit was only P6,981.43.
Thus, he incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the
dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further, petitioner bank
showed that in 1986, the current account of the respondent was
overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of checks against
insufficient funds.[13] In 1987, the said account was overdrawn
117 times for the same
reason.[14] Again, in 1988, 26 times.[15] There were also
several instances when the respondent issued checks
deliberately using a signature different from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner bank.[16] All these circumstances
taken together justified the petitioner banks closure of the
respondents account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling.
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is
petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or any
depositor for that matter, of the closure of the account for
frequently drawing checks against insufficient funds. No malice
or bad faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for so acting
since the records bear out that the respondent had indeed been
improperly and irregularly handling his account not just a few
times but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner
bank could not be faulted for exercising its right in accordance
with the express rules and regulations governing the current
accounts of its depositors. Upon the opening of his account, the
respondent had agreed to be bound by these terms and
conditions.
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made
by the respondent the day following the closure of his account
constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The
same could be characterized as simple negligence by its
personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad faith.
The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of
proving bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or that it was
motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his account on April 4,
1988 and in inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by
petitioner bank with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring
the respondent. It is conceded that the respondent may have
suffered damages as a result of the closure of his current
account. However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. The Court had the occasion to explain the
distinction between damages and injury in this wise:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed
to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that the individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury.[17]

Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a

consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded
checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It was the
respondents repeated improper
and irregular handling of his account which constrained
petitioner bank to close the same in accordance with the rules
and regulations governing its depositors current accounts. The
respondents case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
August 30, 2002 and Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
b.) Uypitching vs Quiamco
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.
To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his
due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying
principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm them in this
petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 26, 2000
decision1 and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by
Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to
amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3
filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red
Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of
registration but the three accused never came to see him again.
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
respondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises,
where it was visible and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold
on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching
Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the
motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan
assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In
September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the
remaining installments and told petitioner corporations collector,
Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken
by respondents men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching,
accompanied by policemen,5 went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises
to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt.
Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for
respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking,
petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his
residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment
to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find
respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and over
the clerks objection, took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor
bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitchings
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in
the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.9 He
sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful
taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark
(that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a
baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and
embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and
integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision10 finding
that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will
when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an
abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft
and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners acts were
found to be contrary to Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for

P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and

P50,000 attorneys fees plus costs.

possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial

foreclosure.18

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the

trial courts decision with modification, reducing the award of
moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000,
respectively.13 Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was
denied. Thus, this petition.

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action

necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the
motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the
course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner
Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the

sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether the filing of
a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs
in favor of respondent.
Petitioners suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for
damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for
taking the motorcycle from respondents establishment in an
abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that
malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a
crime to respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle,
petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of
such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable
for damages to respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we also find that
the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of the
complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners
themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act."15
Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this
connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the
RTC, as adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the
City Prosecutors Office] because Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that
there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint
for qualified theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty.
Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole
the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill
collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,]
Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the
remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because the
motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be
noted that the term used by Wilfredo Verao in informing Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay
for the remaining installment was []taken[], not []unlawfully
taken[] or stolen. Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto
Ramas Uypitching not only executed the [complaint-affidavit]
wherein he named [respondent] as the suspect of the stolen
motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of qualified theft and
fencing activity before the City [Prosecutors] Office of
Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily
signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these
is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not
accuse [respondent] or the latters men of stealing the
motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case for qualified
theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitchings act in charging
[respondent] with qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted
with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid
Gonzaga16 [during one of their conversations] - "why should you
still file a complaint? You have already recovered the
motorcycle"[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To
teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.")17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual
matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the
CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporations exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover
the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right
to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly
mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged
property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right
thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the
recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is
unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale
on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such

No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner

Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the
enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent.
Petitioners acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of
the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or
contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself
to liability.19 It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to
use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice
or injure another.20 The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for damages to
the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at
petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise
of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly
prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any
way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for
which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design to
embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent.
Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice
of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused
damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26,
2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court,
for his improper behavior. SO ORDERED.
c.) Cebu Country Club vs Elizagaque
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated January 31, 2003 and
Resolution dated October 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 71506.
The facts are:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic
corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private
membership club, having its principal place of business in
Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its Board
of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company
proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F.
Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager
for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary
member. The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCIs
Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary
membership. The application was indorsed by CCCIs two (2)
proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano
Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million
range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to sell

respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however,

purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million.
Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary
Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.

The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving

respondents application for proprietary membership with CCCI,
petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so,
whether their liability is joint and several.

During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the
CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondents application for
proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting
held on July 30, 1997, respondents application was voted upon.
Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter
from Julius Z. Neri, CCCIs corporate secretary, informing him
that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary
membership.

Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in

awarding exorbitant damages to respondent despite the lack of
evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the latters
application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque
injuria.

On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent,

wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer,
respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of
reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997,
respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any
member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI
did not reply.

CCCIs Articles of Incorporation provide in part:

Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint
for damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No.
67190.

Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCIs Amended By-Laws

provides:

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14,
2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P2,340,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.
2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and
P80,000.00 as litigation expenses.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial courts Decision with
modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision
dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71,
Pasig City in Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellee the amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages;
2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellee the amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellee the mount of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of the suit.
The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
and motion for leave to set the motion for oral arguments. In its
Resolution[4] dated October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied
the motions for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.

For his part, respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit,
hence, should be denied.

SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership

therein as well as the right of participation in its assets shall be
limited to qualified persons who are duly accredited owners of
Proprietary Ownership Certificates issued by the corporation in
accordance with its By-Laws.

SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED The procedure

for the admission of new members of the Club shall be as
follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another voting
proprietary member, shall submit to the Secretary a written
proposal for the admission of a candidate to the Eligible-forMembership List;
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period
of thirty (30) days on the Club bulletin board during which time
any member may interpose objections to the admission of the
applicant by communicating the same to the Board of Directors;
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no
objections have been filed or if there are, the Board considers
the objections unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified for
inclusion in the Eligible-for-Membership List;
(d) Once included in the Eligible-for-Membership List and after
the candidate shall have acquired in his name a valid POC duly
recorded in the books of the corporation as his own, he shall
become a Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable
admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that admission fees will
only be collected once from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board
may, by unanimous vote of all directors present at a regular or
special meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate in the
Eligible-for-Membership List.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting
known as the black ball system of voting wherein each member
will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents
conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball
means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended, cited
above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When
respondents application for proprietary membership was voted
upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his
application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of
Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an
application for proprietary membership. But such right should not
be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on
the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,[5] we expounded Article 19 and

correlated it with Article 21, thus:

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as

the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
(Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondents application for proprietary membership,
we find that petitioners violated the rules governing human
relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of social
order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving
respondents applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the
same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCIs
Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors
present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What
was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c)
which was silent on the required number of votes needed for
admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the
application form due to economic reasons. We find this excuse
flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being
extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost
twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. We
cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country
club, like the CCCI, whose members are all affluent, did not have
enough money to cause the printing of an updated application
form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not
even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was
required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an
inquiry whether there was an objection to his application,
petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not
deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by San
Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of
CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy
and civility. At the very least, they should have informed him why
his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless
be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is
exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.[6] It bears reiterating that
the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners
disapproval of respondents application is characterized by bad
faith.
As to petitioners reliance on the principle of damnum absque
injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same
is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,[7] we held that this
principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a persons
right, as in this case.
As to the appellate courts award to respondent of moral
damages, we find the same in order. Under Article 2219 of the
New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered, among
others, in acts and actions referred to in Article 21. We believe
respondents testimony that he suffered mental anguish, social
humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary
denial of his application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00
is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining
what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages,
the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.
Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the
wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.[8] Taking into consideration the attending
circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent of
P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is
reasonable.

Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows it by

way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless,
since exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party
or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions,[9] we
reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorneys fees and litigation expenses, Article
2208 of the same Code provides, among others, that attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when
exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered, as in this case. In any event, however,
such award must be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus, we
reduce the amount of attorneys fees (P500,000.00) and litigation
expenses (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively.
Lastly, petitioners argument that they could not be held jointly
and severally liable for damages because only one (1) voted for
the disapproval of respondents application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or
trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation
or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their
duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
(Emphasis ours)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506
are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the award
of moral damages is reduced from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00;
(b) the award of exemplary damages is reduced from
P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorneys
fees and litigation expenses is reduced from P500,000.00 and
P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. Costs
against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
d.) Calatagan Golf Club vs Clemente, Jr.
Seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 1 June 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331 and the
reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No.
04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan)
filed this Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr.
(Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan,
indicating in his application for membership his mailing address
at Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC, complete
residential address, office and residence telephone numbers, as
well as the company (Phimco) with which he was connected,
Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2
May 1990 after paying P120,000.00 for the share.[2]
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet
expenses for general operations, as well as costs for upkeep and
improvement of the grounds and facilities. The provision on
monthly dues is incorporated in Calatagans Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the back of
each certificate of stock.[3] As reproduced in the dorsal side of
Certificate of Stock No. A-01295, the provision reads:
5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to the payment
of monthly dues in an amount as may be prescribed in the bylaws or by the Board of Directors which shall in no case be less
that [sic] P50.00 to meet the expenses for the general operations
of the club, and the maintenance and improvement of its
premises and facilities, in addition to such fees as may be
charged for the actual use of the facilities x x x
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at
P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21 March
1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he
ceased paying the dues. At that point, his balance amounted to
P400.00.[4]

Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to collect
Clementes back accounts by sending a demand letter dated 21
September 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22
October 1992. Both letters were sent to Clementes mailing
address as indicated in his membership application but were
sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had
been closed.[5]
Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay
his monthly dues for more than sixty (60) days, specifically
P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included
Clementes name in the list of delinquent members posted on the
clubs bulletin board. On 1 December 1992, Calatagans board of
directors adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of
shares of delinquent members, including Clementes; and the
public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to
Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate Secretary, Atty.
Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless
Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share would be
included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public
auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to
Clementes mailing address that had already been closed.[6]
On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted on the
Clubs bulletin board, as well as on the clubs premises. The
auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and
Clementes share sold for P64,000.[7] According to the Certificate
of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale, Clementes share was
purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.[8] At the time of the sale,
Clementes accrued monthly dues amounted to P5,200.00.[9] A
notice of foreclosure of Clementes share was published in the 26
May 1993 issue of the Business World.[10]
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of
1997.[11] He filed a claim with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his shareholding in
Calatagan with damages.
On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision dismissing
Clementes complaint. Citing Section 69 of the Corporation Code
which provides that the sale of shares at an auction sale can
only be questioned within six (6) months from the date of sale,
the SEC concluded that Clementes claim, filed four (4) years
after the sale, had already prescribed. The SEC further held that
Calatagan had complied with all the requirements for a valid sale
of the subject share, Clemente having failed to inform Calatagan
that the address he had earlier supplied was no longer his
address. Clemente, the SEC ruled, had acted in bad faith in
assuming as he claimed that his non-payment of monthly dues
would merely render his share inactive.
Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On
1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
reversing the SEC. The appellate court restored Clementes one
share with a directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new share,
and awarded to Clemente a total of P400,000.00 in damages,
less the unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00.
In rejecting the SECs finding that the action had prescribed, the
Court of Appeals cited the SECs own ruling in SEC Case No.
4160, Caram v. Valley Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of
the Corporation Code specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions
to capital stock, and not to any other debt of stockholders. With
the insinuation that Section 69 does not apply to unpaid
membership dues in non-stock corporations, the appellate court
employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the proper rule of
prescription. The provision sets the prescription period of actions
to recover movables at eight (8) years.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that Calatagans
first two demand letters had been returned to it as sender with
the notation about the closure of the mailing address, it very well
knew that its third and final demand letter also sent to the same
mailing address would not be received by Clemente. It noted the
by-law requirement that within ten (10) days after the Board has
ordered the sale at auction of a members share of stock for
indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall notify the owner
thereof and advise the Membership Committee of such fact.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated that a person who is in
danger of the imminent loss of his property has the right to be
notified and be given the chance to prevent the loss.[12]
Hence, the present appeal.

Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had prescribed

pursuant to Section 69 of the Corporation Code, and that the
requisite notices under both the law and the by-laws had been
rendered to Clemente.
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover
delinquent stock sold must be commenced by the filing of a
complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of Title
VIII of the Code entitled Stocks and Stockholders and refers
specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of
which is governed by the immediately preceding Section 68.
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagans and the SECs
reliance on Section 69 by citing another SEC ruling in the case of
Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69, Calatagan
raises a peripheral point made in the SECs Caram ruling. In
Caram, the SEC, using as take-off Section 6 of the Corporation
Code which refers to such rights, privileges or restrictions as
may be stated in the articles of incorporation, pointed out that the
Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not impose any lien,
liability or restriction on the Golf Share [of Caram], but only its
(Valley Golfs) By-Laws does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its
own Articles of Incorporation does provide that the monthly dues
assessed on owners of shares of the corporation, along with all
other obligations of the shareholders to the club, shall constitute
a first lien on the shares and in the event of delinquency such
shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the
manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other
obligations of the shareholders.[13] With its illative but
incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that the
prescriptive period under Section 69 should also apply to the
sale of Clementes share as the lien that Calatagan perceives to
be a restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation and not
only in the by-laws.
We remain unconvinced.
There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence or even
analogy between the sale of delinquent stock under Section 68
and the sale that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of
delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for
the share of stock itself. The stockholder or subscriber has yet to
fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed. In this
case, Clemente had already fully paid for the share in Calatagan
and no longer had any outstanding obligation to deprive him of
full title to his share. Perhaps the analogy could have been made
if Clemente had not yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock
corporation, pursuant to an article or by-law provision designed
to address that situation, decided to sell such share as a
consequence. But that is not the case here, and there is no
purpose for us to apply Section 69 to the case at bar.
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clementes suit is barred
by Article 1146 of the Civil Code which establishes four (4) years
as the prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to the
rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit is purely for
damages. As a second alternative still, Calatagan posits that
Clementes action is governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code
which sets five (5) years as the period of prescription for all other
actions whose prescriptive periods are not fixed in the Civil Code
or in any other law. Neither article is applicable but Article 1140
of the Civil Code which provides that an action to recover
movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years. Calatagans action is
for the recovery of a share of stock, plus damages.
Calatagans advertence to the fact that the constitution of a lien
on the members share by virtue of the explicit provisions in its
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately of
no help to its cause. Calatagans Articles of Incorporation states
that the dues, together with all other obligations of members to
the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to
any lien in favor of the national or local government, and in the
event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by the
Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to
satisfy said dues or other obligations of the stockholders.[14] In
turn, there are several provisions in the By-laws that govern the
payment of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the member, and
the constitution and execution on the lien. We quote these
provisions:
ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT
SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent Members
The Treasurer shall bill al members monthly. As soon as possible
after the end of every month, a statement showing the account
of bill of a member for said month will be prepared and sent to
him. If the bill of any member remains unpaid by the 20th of the
month following that in which the bill was incurred, the Treasurer

shall notify him that if his bill is not paid in full by the end of the
succeeding month his name will be posted as delinquent the
following day at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While posted, a
member, the immediate members of his family, and his guests,
may not avail of the facilities of the Club.
(b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60 days shall
be reported to the Board and their shares or the shares of the
juridical entities they represent shall thereafter be ordered sold
by the Board at auction to satisfy the claims of the Club as
provided for in Section 32 hereon. A member may pay his
overdue account at any time before the auction sale.
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The club shall
have a first lien on every share of stock to secure debts of the
members to the Club. This lien shall be annotated on the
certificates of stock and may be enforced by the Club in the
following manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at
auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness under
Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner
thereof, and shall advise the Membership Committee of such
fact.
(b) The Membership Committee shall then notify all applicants
on the Waiting List and all registered stockholders of the
availability of a share of stock for sale at auction at a specified
date, time and place, and shall post a notice to that effect in the
Club bulletin board for at least ten (10) days prior to the auction
sale.
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership Committee shall
proceed with the auction by viva voce bidding and award the
sale of the share of stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning bidder to the
Club within twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding. The winning
bidder or the representative in the case of a juridical entity shall
become a Regular Member upon payment of the purchase price
and issuance of a new stock certificate in his name or in the
name of the juridical entity he represents. The proceeds of the
sale shall be paid by the Club to the selling stockholder after
deducting his obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder fails to pay the
amount of this bid within twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding,
the auction procedures may be repeated from time to time at the
discretion of the Membership Committee until the share of stock
be sold.
(f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock are not
sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness of the member, the
member shall continue to be obligated to the Club for the unpaid
balance. If the member whose share of stock is sold fails or
refuse to surrender the stock certificate for cancellation,
cancellation shall be effected in the books of the Club based on
a record of the proceedings. Such cancellation shall render the
unsurrendered stock certificate null and void and notice to this
effect shall be duly published.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a clear and
comprehensive procedure to govern the payment of monthly
dues, the declaration of a member as delinquent, and the
constitution of a lien on the shares and its eventual public sale to
answer for the members debts. Under Section 91 of the
Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock corporation shall
be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the
articles of incorporation or the by-laws. The By-law provisions
are elaborate in explaining the manner and the causes for the
termination of membership in Calatagan, through the execution
on the lien of the share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws,
as written, affords due protection to the member by assuring that
the member should be notified by the Secretary of the looming
execution sale that would terminate membership in the club. In
addition, the By-Laws guarantees that after the execution sale,
the proceeds of the sale would be returned to the former
member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If followed
to the letter, the termination of membership under this procedure
outlined in the By-Laws would accord with substantial justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law provisions
when it sold Clementes share? The appellate courts finding on
this point warrants our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third and
final demand letter to Clemente on December 7, 1992. The letter
states that if the amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will

be included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public

auction. This letter was signed by Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr.,
Calatagan Golfs Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to
Clementes mailing address Phimco Industries Inc., P.O. Box
240, MCC Makati. As expected, it was returned because the post
office box had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to give or
cause to be given, all notices required by law or by these ByLaws. .. and keep a record of the addresses of all stockholders.
As quoted above, Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides
that within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at
auction of a members share of stock for indebtedness under
Section 31 (b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner
thereof and shall advise the Membership Committee of such
fact., The records do not disclose what report the Corporate
Secretary transmitted to the Membership Committee to comply
with Section 32(a). Obviously, the reason for this mandatory
requirement is to give the Membership Committee the
opportunity to find out, before the share is sold, if proper notice
has been made to the shareholder member.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is
knowledgeable on the law and on the standards of good faith
and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of corporate
records, he should also have known that the first two letters sent
to Clemente were returned because the P.O. Box had been
closed. Thus, we are surprised given his knowledge of the law
and of corporate records that he would send the third and final
letter Clementes last chance before his share is sold and his
membership lost to the same P.O. Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it exercised due diligence before the
foreclosure sale and sent several notices to Clementes specified
mailing address. We do not agree; we cannot label as due
diligence Calatagans act of sending the December 7, 1992 letter
to Clementes mailing address knowing fully well that the P.O.
Box had been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon
the Corporate Secretary the chief repository of all corporate
records the obligation to check Clementes other address which,
under the By-Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on file.
One obvious purpose of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty
to keep the addresses of members on file is specifically for
matters of this kind, when the member cannot be reached
through his or her mailing address. Significantly, the Corporate
Secretary does not have to do the actual verification of other
addressees on record; a mere clerk can do the very simple task
of checking the files as in fact clerks actually undertake these
tasks. In fact, one telephone call to Clementes phone numbers
on file would have alerted him of his impending loss.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to
duly observe both the spirit and letter of its own by-laws. The bylaw provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the
delinquent member of the impending sale, and not just to provide
an intricate faade that would facilitate Calatagans sale of the
share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. As
found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that
Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous letters had
already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to
the same postal box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears,
as it had known very well that the letter would never actually
reach Clemente.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had
provided his residential address along with his residence and
office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans
By-Laws requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made
solely through the members mailing address. Clemente cites our
aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15] that [a] simple telephone call
and an ounce of good faith x x x could have prevented this
present controversy. That memorable observation is quite apt in
this case.
Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had
resulted not merely in the loss of Clementes privilege to play golf
at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant
pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that
could be thrown Clementes way was his failure to notify
Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we
uphold Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first
place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify the club
of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that
Calatagan was in possession of his home address as well as
residence and office telephone numbers, he had every reason to
assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to
contact him. In addition, according to Clemente, he was not even
aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance of which
was not his responsibility but his employer Phimcos.

The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation

Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code,[16] under the Chapter
on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of
Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for
every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another.
A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that
obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a
corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith
extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter
find themselves contractually bound to perform certain
obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a
charter of dehumanization.
We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual damages
is of course warranted since Clemente has sustained pecuniary
injury by reason of Calatagans wrongful violation of its own ByLaws. It would not be feasible to deliver Clementes original
Certificate of Stock because it had already been cancelled and a
new one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at the
auction who was not impleaded in this case. However, the Court
of Appeals instead directed that Calatagan to issue to Clemente
a new certificate of stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual
damages sustained by Clemente. After all, the certificate of stock
is simply the evidence of the share.
The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente P200,000.00 as
moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. We agree that the award of such
damages is warranted.
The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of Article 32 of
the Civil Code, which allows recovery of damages from any
private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs the right against
deprivation of property without due process of laws. The plain
letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages
from Calatagan. Even without Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still
be bound to pay moral and exemplary damages to Clemente.
The latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained mental
anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings by reason of
Calatagans acts, thereby entitling him to moral damages under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that
Calatagans bad faith as exhibited in the
course of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public
good, thereby justifying exemplary damages under Article 2229
of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO
ORDERED.

(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999,
without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off.
Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District
(COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa
that she was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to
the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February
1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was
March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs.
Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills
(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her
lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who
authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
[respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated
March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her
husband] filed [a] complaint for damages [against petitioner,
COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only
restored and reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999
(Records, p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties,
defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and
observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not
even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by
Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department
of defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3)
days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due
date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act
with justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V.
Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to the present
ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should
have requested before the cutting off of the water supply,
plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did
not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was
plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and
not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:

e.) Ardiente vs Javier

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CAG.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with modification
the August 15, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr.
Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily
Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one
hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring
and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in
consideration of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement
carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be
for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide)
effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of
the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National
Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in
the name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez]
to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr.
Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed
that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because
they were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were
negligent too for which they should be liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision
disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the awarded damages is
reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary
damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to P25,000.00. Costs
against appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal
duty to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied for its

disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and

[injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give
a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the
water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent
spouses Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However,
based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did
not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the
petition was denied via a Resolution10 issued by this Court on
March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality through
this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with
the following Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS
REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL
COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO
WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D.
GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE
UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO
THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT
PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO
EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER
SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE
(3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY
AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT
RESPONDENTS
ARE
GUILTY
OF
CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER
BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME,
WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO
EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY
TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE.

As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed

that the main issues raised by petitioner are factual and it is
settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject
only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant
petition.13 This is especially true when the findings of the RTC
have been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show
that the instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply, because she
had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she
admitted in the present petition that it was she who requested
COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply.
This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim
against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually
discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be
denied that it was through the instance of petitioner that the
Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in the first
place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce
such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent
spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to
the injured party will attach.16 In the present case, intention to
harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested
for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply
without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner
claims that her request for disconnection was based on the
advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement
that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses
before or immediately after submitting her request for
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force
them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of
Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the
fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior
notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides
water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly
an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez.
They are guilty of bad faith.

7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT
RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE
BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE,
GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND
GOOD FAITH.

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the

Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS
AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12

xxxx

At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who
were petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her coappellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the
instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before
the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary
parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to
treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to
do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that
petitioner filed a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez.
Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim
which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC,
petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's
petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court was already
denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently
assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and
Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are
already precluded from participating in the present petition. They
cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as
respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in
their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.

In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila

Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in

the exercise of ones rights as well as in the performance of its
duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a rule
of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to
remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the
effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience"
and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human
conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to
the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.

xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but
also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary
to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.
Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the
Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of
having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent
spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez,
it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending
disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect
respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement
of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on
the provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020
and 2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with
the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although
it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent
spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine
(9) months, and such deprivation would have continued were it
not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the
Civil Code provides, among others, that such fees may be
recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest,
and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
f.) Sesbreno vs CA and VECO
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H.
Sesbreo founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreo accused the
violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the
Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter
with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential
premises. But the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in
Cebu City rendered judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the

claim;1 and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on

March 10, 2003.2
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreo.
Antecedents
At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public utility
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of
electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreo was one of
VECOs customers under the metered service contract they had
entered into on March 2, 1982.3 Respondent Vicente E. Garcia
was VECOs President, General Manager and Chairman of its
Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. Garcia was VECOs
Vice-President, Treasurer and a Member of its Board of
Directors. Respondent Angelita Lhuillier was another Member of
VECOs Board of Directors. Respondent Juan Coromina was
VECOs Assistant Treasurer, while respondent Norberto Abellana
was the Head of VECOs Billing Section whose main function
was to compute back billings of customers found to have violated
their contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and
that none of it meters had been tampered with, VECO employed
respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as
violation of contract (VOC) inspectors.4 Respondent Sgt.
Demetrio Balicha, who belonged to the 341st Constabulary
Company, Cebu Metropolitan Command, Camp Sotero
Cabahug, Cebu City, accompanied and escorted the VOC
inspectors during their inspection of the households of its
customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission order issued
to him.5
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:
x x x. Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this case
are actually simple enough, although the voluminous records
might indicate otherwise. It all has to do with an incident that
occurred at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 11,
1989. On that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC
escort, Balicha, conducted a routine inspection of the houses at
La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo, for illegal connections, meter
tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections,
and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreos maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric
meter and found that it had been turned upside down.
Defendant-appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturned
electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreo and one of
the maids present, they removed said meter and replaced it with
a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo was in his
office and no one called to inform him of the inspection. The
VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcias
permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and
number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and
determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed
the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of
the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team
inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory
test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the
electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo there was nothing
routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team did on May 11,
1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding
premises was effected without his permission and over the
objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their
way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it
upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced
it with a new electric meter. They searched the house and its
rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a
visitor to sign two documents, making her appear to be his
representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his
personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC
Team when they searched the house.6
Judgment of the RTC
On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint.7 It did not accord credence to the testimonies of
Sesbreos witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid, and
Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies on
material points in their respective testimonies. It observed that
Baledio could not make up her mind as to whether Sesbreos
children were in the house when the VOC inspection team
detached and replaced the electric meter. Likewise, it considered
unbelievable that Lopez should hear the exchanges between
Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha, on one hand, and Baledio, on
the other, considering that Lopez could not even hear the
conversation between two persons six feet away from where he

was seated during the simulation done in court, the same

distance he supposedly had from the gate of Sesbreos house
during the incident. It pointed out that Lopezs presence at the
gate during the incident was even contradicted by his own
testimony indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate
for the VECO personnel, because it was Baledio, a lady in her
20s, who had repeatedly stated on her direct and cross
examinations that she had let the VECO personnel in. It
concluded that for Lopez to do nothing at all upon seeing a
person being threatened by another in the manner he described
was simply contrary to human experience.

the VOC Teams claim is Chuchie Garcia herself. It is axiomatic

that he who asserts a fact or claim must prove it. He cannot
transfer that burden to the person against whom he asserts such
fact or claim. When certain evidence is suppressed, the
presumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the party
suppressing it, should it come to light. x x x9

In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the respondents

showing that the VOC inspection team had found the electric
meter in Sesbreos residence turned upside down to prevent
the accurate registering of the electricity consumption of the
household, causing them to detach and replace the meter. It held
as unbelievable that the team forcibly entered the house through
threats and intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric
meter upside down in order to incriminate him for theft of
electricity, because the fact that the team and Sesbreo had not
known each other before then rendered it unlikely for the team to
fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreos nonpresentation of Chuchie Garcia left her allegation of her being
forced to sign the two documents by the team unsubstantiated.

Was Sesbreo entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?

Decision of the CA
Sesbreo appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March 10,
2003,8 holding thusly:
x x x. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreos account is simply too
implausible or far-fetched to be believed. For one thing, the
inspection on his household was just one of many others that the
VOC Team had conducted in that subdivision. Yet, none but
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo complained of the alleged acts of the
VOC Team. Considering that there is no proof that they also
perpetrated the same illegal acts on other customers in the guise
of conducting a Violation of Contracts inspection, plaintiffappellant Sesbreo likewise failed to show why he alone was
singled out. It is also difficult to believe that the VOC Team would
be brazen enough to want to antagonize a person such as
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo. There is no evidence that the VOC
Team harbored any evil motive or grudge against plaintiffappellant Sesbreo, who is a total stranger to them. Until he
came along, they did not have any prior criminal records to
speak of, or at least, no evidence thereof was presented. It is
equally difficult to believe that their superiors would authorize or
condone their alleged illegal acts. Especially so since there is no
indication that prior to the incident on May 11, 1989, there was
already bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreo and defendant appellees to warrant such a malevolent
response. In fact, since availing of defendant-appellee VECOs
power services, the relationship between them appears to have
been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges stemming
from the May 11, 1989 incident were fabricated when taken
together with the lower courts evaluation of the alleged theft of
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreos personal effects. It stated that on
August 8, 1989, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo wrote the barangay
captain of Punta Princesa and accused Chuchie Garcia and
Victoria Villarta alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of his
things that earlier he claimed had been stolen by members of the
VOC Team. When he was confronted with these facts, plaintiffappellant Sesbreo further claimed that the items allegedly
stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot taken by
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla. Yet not once did
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo or any of his witnesses mention that
a conspiracy existed between these people. Clearly, much like
his other allegations, it is nothing more than an afterthought by
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo.
All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees appear to
be nothing more than a put-on to save face. For the simple truth
is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo as a
likely cheat and thief.
xxxx
Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of Baledio and
Lopez.1wphi1 The lower court rightly described their
testimonies as fraught by discrepancies and inconsistencies on
material points and even called Lopez a perjured witness. On the
other hand, it is odd that plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo chose not
to present the witness whose testimony was very crucial. But
even though Chuchie Garcia never testified, her absence speaks
volumes. Whereas plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo claimed that the
VOC Team forced her to sign two documents that made her
appear to be his authorized agent or representative, the latter
claimed otherwise and that she also gave them permission to
enter and search the house. The person most qualified to refute

Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Sesbreo

appealed.
Issue

Ruling:
The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreos main contention is that the inspection of his
residence by the VOC team was an unreasonable search for
being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done
with malice or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two
distinct portions of Sesbreos residence were inspected by the
VOS team the garage where the electric meter was installed,
and the main premises where the four bedrooms, living rooms,
dining room and kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was
installed, the respondents assert that the VOC team had the
continuing authority from Sesbreo as the consumer to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the
meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling. The authority
emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract
entered into between VECO and each of its consumers, which
provided as follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized
employees or representatives of the COMPANY to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours without being liable to trespass
to dwelling for the purpose of inspecting, installing, reading,
removing, testing, replacing or otherwise disposing of its
property, and/or removing the COMPANYS property in the event
of the termination of the contract for any cause.11
Sesbreo contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give
Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the blanket authority to enter at
will because the only property VECO owned in his premises was
the meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter only the
garage. He denies that they had the right to enter the main
portion of the house and inspect the various rooms and the
appliances therein because those were not the properties of
VECO. He posits that Balicha, who was not an employee of
VECO, had no authority whatsoever to enter his house and
conduct a search. He concludes that their search was
unreasonable, and entitled him to damages in light of their
admission that they had entered and inspected his premises
without a search warrant.12
We do not accept Sesbreos conclusion.1avvphi1 Paragraph 9
clothed the entire VOC team with unquestioned authority to enter
the garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team
obviously met the conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an
authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the objective of
conducting the routine inspection of the meter.13
Secondly, the entry and inspection were confined to the garage
where the meter was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was effected
at around 4 oclock p.m., a reasonable hour.15 And, fourthly, the
persons who inspected the meter were duly authorized for the
purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO,16 his
participation was to render police assistance to ensure the
personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the
inspection, rendering him a necessary part of the team as an
authorized representative. Under the circumstances, he was
authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly
extended such authority to "properly authorized employees or
representatives" of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreo urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the
entry into the main premises of the residence. Did this
necessarily mean that any entry by the VOS team into the main
premises required a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreo insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right of every individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered
VECO and its VOS team liable to him for damages by virtue of
Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or
in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:

(b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and
good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation
on all rights that in the exercise of the rights, the standards
under Article 19 must be observed.24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise
should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is
performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability
may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the following
elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.25 There is no hard
and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the
issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
Sesbreo asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie
Garcia to let anyone enter his residence in his absence; and that
Baledio herself confirmed that the members of the VOC team
had intimidated her into letting them in.

xxxx
(9) The right to be secured in ones person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
x x x x.
Sesbreos insistence has no legal and factual basis. The
constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is
intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents
tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State
power. The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements,
including that made in People v. Marti,17 viz:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.18
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the
main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned
upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so
would enable them to determine the unbilled electricity
consumed by his household. The circumstances justified their
decision, and their inspection of the main premises was a
continuation of the authorized entry. There was no question then
that their ability to determine the unbilled electricity called for
them to see for themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not
being agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a
search warrant to do so.
Balichas presence participation in the entry did not make the
inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit of
the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the
team by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and
escort the team during its routine inspection.19 Consequently,
the entry into the main premises of the house by the VOC team
did not constitute a violation of the guaranty.
Our holding could be different had Sesbreo persuasively
demonstrated the intervention of malice or bad faith on the part
of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main
premises, or any excessiveness committed by them in the
course of the inspection. But Sesbreo did not. On the other
hand, the CA correctly observed that the inspection did not zero
in on Sesbreos residence because the other houses within the
area were similarly subjected to the routine inspection.20 This,
we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.

The assertion of Sesbreo is improper for consideration in this

appeal.1wphi1 The RTC and the CA unanimously found the
testimonies of Sesbreos witnesses implausible because of
inconsistencies on material points; and even declared that the
non-presentation of Garcia as a witness was odd if not suspect.
Considering that such findings related to the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and
undo them now because it is not a trier of facts, and is not also
tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.26 Verily, a
review that may tend to supplant the findings of the trial court
that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the Court
with prudent hesitation. Only when Sesbreo could make a clear
showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and
records by the trial and the appellate courts should the Court do
the unusual review of the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreo was denied due
process by the refusal of the trial judge to inhibit from the case.
Although the trial judge had issued an order for his voluntary
inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the end in compliance
with the instruction of the Executive Judge, whose exercise of
her administrative authority on the matter of the inhibition should
be respected.28 In this connection, we find to be apt the
following observation of the CA, to wit:
x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the
Regional Trial Court and are therefore of co-equal rank. The
latter has no authority to reverse or modify the orders of Judge
Paredes. But in ordering Judge Paredes to continue hearing the
case, Judge Agana did not violate their co-equal status or
unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is merely part of her
administrative responsibilities as Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of which Judge Paredes is
also a member.29
Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the decision
in the CA refused to inhibit from participating in the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The motion for
her inhibition was grounded on suspicion of her bias and
prejudice,30 but suspicion of bias and prejudice were not
enough grounds for inhibition.31
Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication that
even suggested that the Associate Justices of the CA who
participated in the promulgation of the decision were tainted with
bias against him.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t1on for review on
certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 10,
2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO
ORDERED.

g.) Saladaga vs Astorga

Clearly, Sesbreo did not establish his claim for damages if the
respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the
concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not
use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable
to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to
present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the stability of social
order.21 Moreover, according to a commentator,22 "the exercise
of right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when
it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others[;] [i]t cannot be
said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil Code23 sets the
standards to be observed in the exercise of ones rights and in
the performance of ones duties, namely: (a) to act with justice;

Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege

burdened with conditions,1 including continuing fidelity to the law
and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians
of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a
consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest
standards of ethical conduct.2 Failure to live by the standards of
the legal profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege
conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant the
suspension or revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents

Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo

B. Astorga entered into a "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with
rightof repurchase) to complainant a parcel of coconut land
located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under the
said deed, respondent represented that he has "the perfect right
to dispose as owner in fee simple" the subject property and that
the said property is "free from all liens and encumbrances."3 The
deed also provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two
years within which to repurchase the property, and if not
repurchased within the said period, "the parties shall renew [the]
instrument/agreement."4
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the
period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the contract was
made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand
dated May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property.
Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property
until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural
Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the
property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI, that the bank
had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that
complainant should therefore vacate the property.5
Complainant was alarmed and made aninvestigation. He learned
the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in
the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB) as early as
November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the
names of respondent and his wife on January 4, 1982 pursuant
to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between PNB and
respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on
March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on the property, and
subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991.6
Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by
RBAI.7
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against respondent with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of
Leyte approved the Resolution8 dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No.
95-144 finding that "[t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been
committed and that respondent herein is probably guilty
thereof."9 Accordingly, an Information10 dated January 8,1996
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay,
Leyte, formally charging respondent with the crime of estafa
under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal
Code,11 committed as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner
of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the Baybay
Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera,
Albuera, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at that time was
private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de
Retro Sale which accused executed in favor of private
complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first
redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate complainant
knowing of accused[s] unlawful act only on or about the last
week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him
of the property, the mortgage having been foreclosed, private
complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced by
accused[s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.
The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases
against respondent by filing before this Court an AffidavitComplaint12 dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental
Complaint13 dated February 27, 1997, which were docketed as
A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both
complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and
recommendation.14
In his Consolidated Answer15 dated August 16, 2003 filed before
the IBP, respondent denied that his agreement with complainant
was a pacto de retrosale. He claimed that it was an equitable
mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting
of his benefits from the produce of the land, the total amount
would have exceeded P15,000.00.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

and Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt
with complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was one of
equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or
fraud when he represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the property was
covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant the owners
copy of the said certificate of title, when the said TCT had
already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT No. T3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Respondent made matters even worse, when he had TCT No. T3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his
and his wifes name on January 4,1982 without informing
complainant. This was compounded by respondents subsequent
mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to the acquisition of
the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of
complainant.
Thus,
the
Investigating
Commissioner
recommended that respondent be (1) suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with warning that a similar misdeed
in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to
return the sum of P15,000.00, the amount he received as
consideration for the pacto de retrosale, with interest at the legal
rate.
Considering respondents "commission of unlawful acts,
especially crimes involving moral turpitude, actsof dishonesty,
grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of
Governors
adopted
and
approved
the
Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation with modification
as follows: respondent is(1) suspended from the practice of law
for two years, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future
shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the
sum of P15,000.00 received in consideration of the pacto de
retrosale, with legal interest.17
The Courts Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to suspend respondent from the practice of law for
two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the
P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 in favor of
complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not
one of sale with pacto de retro, but one of equitable mortgage.
Thus, respondent argues that he still had the legal right to
mortgage the subject property to other persons. Respondent
additionally asserts that complainant should render an
accounting of the produce the latter had collected from the said
property, which would already exceed the P15,000.00
consideration stated in the deed.
There is no merit in respondents defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent
and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retroor of
equitable mortgage, respondents actuations in his transaction
with complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases,
clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required
from lawyers, for which respondent should be held
administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took
an oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion."18 He gravely violated his
oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP
Board of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent caused the
ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" as he was the one who prepared or drafted the
said instrument. Respondent could have simply denominated the
instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and
complainant as "mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively,
rather than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If only
respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the
drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy
between him and complainant could havebeen avoided or, at the
very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording
of the said deed on its face betrayed lack oflegal competence on
his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to "conduct [him]self as
a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."

More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the

fundamental tenet of human relations asembodied in Article 19
of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage
it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that
his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument
that clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A
lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement
faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the contracting
parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the
contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to
legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty
caused by respondents poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal
controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor
formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal
competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,19 the law in
effect at the time the PNB acquired the subject property and
obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in
favor of a purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in
foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such purchaser
becomes entitled to the issuance of a new certificate of title in his
name and a memorandum thereof shall be "indorsed upon the
mortgagors original certificate."20 TCT No. T-662, which
respondent gave complainant when they entered into the "Deed
of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981,
does not bearsuch memorandum but only a memorandum on
the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and the subsequent
amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood,
and deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it
appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under
his name, even giving complainant the owners copy of the said
certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already
been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not evencare to correct the wrong
statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new
copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or barely a
month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent
clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against
complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility
provide:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not
only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal
processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and
obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm
of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.22

Respondents breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of

good faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his gross
disregard of this Courts directives, as well as the orders of the
IBPs Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent
of this Court pursuant to the Courts referral of these cases to the
IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused
delay in the resolution of these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on
complainants Affidavit-Complaint in A.C. No. 4697 and
Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997
and June 25, 1997, respectively.25 While he requested for
several extensions of time within which to submit his comment,
no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require
him in a Resolution dated February 4,1998 to (1) show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt
for such failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment.26
Respondent neither showed cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, nor
submitted the consolidated comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the
proceedings before the IBPs Investigating Commissioner,
respondent was again required several times to submit his
consolidated answer. He only complied on August 28, 2003, or
more than six years after this Court originally required him to do
so. The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties to
submit their respective position papers. Despite having been
given several opportunities to submit the same, respondent did
not file any position paper.27
Respondents disregard of the directives of this Court and of the
Investigating Commissioner, which caused undue delay in these
administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
xxxx
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Respondents infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has
already been imposed a disciplinary sanction before.1wphi1 In
Nuez v. Atty. Astorga,28 respondent was held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board
of Governors, is proper.

Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or

unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the
law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply
the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough
to include such element.23

The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the

IBP to order respondent to return the sum of P15,000.00 he
received from complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase." This is a civil liability best determined and awarded
in a civil case rather than the present administrative cases.

To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,

defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking inintegrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness.
On the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:

In Roa v. Moreno,29 the Court pronounced that "[i]n disciplinary

proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer
of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondents
administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on
other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against
each other."While the respondent lawyers wrongful actuations
may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and
administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the
appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in
accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the
quantum of proof required in each. Section 5,30 in relation to
Sections 131 and 2,32 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that
in administrative cases, such as the ones atbar, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence asin civil cases.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.33

[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive

misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another
who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of
the party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must
either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and
conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on
equal terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved
party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the
false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his
injury.24 The actions of respondent in connection with the
execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly
fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a
disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They also
reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondents part.
Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as

the present administrative cases, complainant instituted a

criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as

Criminal Case No. 3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.34 Unless the complainant
waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately,
or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then his
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa
committed by respondent is deemed instituted with Criminal
Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that complainant may recover
in Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes restitution; reparation of
the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for
consequential damages,35 which may already cover the
P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the subject
property.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the
following: breach of the Lawyers Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing
undue delay of these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, reckoned from
receipt of this Decision, with WARNING that a similar misconduct
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente

lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an
opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident
be set for oral argument.[3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said
Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision
dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in
toto the trial courts decision.[6] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned
Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly
support for the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to
question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the
Petition for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.
[10]

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to
circulate this Decision to all courts in the country. SO
ORDERED.

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the

Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:

ARTICLE 21 ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL

DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6%
INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT
ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

a.) Buenaventura vs CA
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on
July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein
respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with
leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and
his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed
an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between
plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the
amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million
pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of
litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership
property[,]
particularly
the
plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
[and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty
percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or
P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the
date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares
of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy
Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly,
subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh
Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of
her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil
registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND

P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT
OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR
EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST
THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL,
AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONEHALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE
ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY
OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANTAPPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS
ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO
WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following
contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENTS
MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES
SON FOR HEARING.[12]
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00
BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.
[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE
INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF
PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF
MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.
[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN
PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT
INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO
INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.[15]

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of
Appeals articulated:

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning

and significance to the marriage. . . .[18]

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact

ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties
particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two
psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21,
2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of
the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless,
said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and
hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts
as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the
same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence
appears to have been adduced in this case.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the

defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental
pressure to marry and that because of pride he married
defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage
as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority;
that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a
husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no
inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of
trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep
defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance
and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not
only in those years the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground
that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts,
damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be
awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case
by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the
performance or non-performance of marital obligations were
awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may
be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed
for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million
pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally
prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court.[16]
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on
Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219[17] of
the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages
may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the
instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the
individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a
need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom.
In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on
which the moral damages were based were done willfully and
freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg
to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the
parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due
to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that

one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it
removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely
deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the
petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that
the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes
an award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission
has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court
deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary
damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs
of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.[21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to
deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be
considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to
litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity
causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of
marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and
exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial
Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do
with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of
declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable
Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of
marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818,
Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking
through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that
the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and
therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art.
160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what
are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the

expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of
either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to
requiring an inventory of what are the parties conjugal properties
and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff
who worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President
of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement
package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00
which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave
him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on
January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown
debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code The
net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been
a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this
Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no
marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any
voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share
in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and
transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their
residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the
defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated
July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision
dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full
settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the
defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the
plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the
process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9).
Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house
was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for
past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their
only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife
by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just,
lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same
being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been
obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of
said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half
(1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband
with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies.[22]

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a

bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to
Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule
applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab
initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24]
this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage
on the property relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it
provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"
of the Code.

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of
the trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters
share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision
approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the
parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved.
Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the
separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received
from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as
Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits
accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number
of years, most of which while he was married to defendantappellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true
with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these
were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was
married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half
thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[23]

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses

through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property
are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above
extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the
law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos
[of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the
consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall
forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the

settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in
ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family
home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as
in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by
a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for
purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the
status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the
Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases,
it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses
in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the
other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules
on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and
Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.[25]
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo
were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate
property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be
sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child,
Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to
turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005[26] and has,
therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for
Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that
the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has
attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996
which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No.
127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and
costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust
Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila
Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is
sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358)
contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2,
1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support
pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is,
accordingly, DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 22 UNJUST ENRICHMENT

a.) FILINVEST vs Ngilay

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, dated November 9, 2006, of petitioner
Filinvest Land, Inc., which seeks to set aside the Decision1
dated March 30, 2006 and Resolution2 dated September 18,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) partially reversing the
Decision3 dated October 1, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Las
Pias, Branch 253 (RTC).
The factual antecedents, as found in the records follow.
Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands located
in Tambler, General Santos City through Homestead and Fee
patents sometime in 1986 and 1991 which are covered by and
specifically described in the following Original Certificates of Title
issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City:

Negotiations were made by petitioner, represented by Lina de

Guzman-Ferrer with the patriarch of the Ngilays, Hadji Gulam
Ngilay sometime in 1995. Eventually, a Deed of Conditional Sale
of the above- enumerated properties in favor of petitioner
Filinvest Land, Inc. was executed. Upon its execution,
respondents were asked to deliver to petitioner the original
owner's duplicate copy of the certificates of title of their
respective properties. Respondents received the downpayment
for the properties on October 28, 1995.
A few days after the execution of the aforestated deeds and the
delivery of the corresponding documents to petitioner,
respondents came to know that the sale of their properties was
null and void, because it was done within the period that they
were not allowed to do so and that the sale did not have the
approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) prompting them to file a case for the
declaration of nullity of the deeds of conditional and absolute
sale of the questioned properties and the grant of right of way
with the RTC, Las Pias, Branch 253.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that sometime in 1995, the
representative of Hadji Ngilay approached petitioner to propose
the sale of a portion of his properties. Thereafter, representatives
of petitioner flew to General Santos City from Manila to conduct
an ocular inspection of the subject properties. Petitioner was
willing to purchase the properties but seeing that some of the
properties were registered as land grants through homestead
patents, representatives of petitioner informed Ngilay that they
would return to General Santos City in a few months to finalize
the sale as ten (10) certificates of title were issued on November
24, 1991.
According to petitioner, Ngilay and his children prevailed upon
the representatives of petitioner to make an advance payment.
To accommodate the Ngilays, petitioner acceded to making an
advance with the understanding that petitioner could demand
anytime the return of the advance payment should Ngilay not be
able to comply with the conditions of the sale. The Ngilays
likewise undertook to secure the necessary approvals of the
DENR before the consummation of the sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Filinvest Land, Inc. and upheld the
sale of all the properties in litigation. It found that the sale of
those properties whose original certificates of title were issued by

virtue of the 1986 Patents was valid, considering that the

prohibitory period ended in 1991, or way before the transaction
took place. As to those patents awarded in 1991, the same court
opined that since those properties were the subject of a deed of
conditional sale, compliance with those conditions is necessary
for there to be a perfected contract between the parties. The
RTC also upheld the grant of right of way as it adjudged that the
right of way agreement showed that the right of way was granted
to provide access from the highway to the properties to be
purchased. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated October
1, 2003 reads:

Homestead Patents is a prohibition against the actual loss of the

homestead within the five-year prohibitory period, not against all
contracts including those that do not result in such an actual loss
of ownership or possession. It also points out that respondents
themselves admit that the transfer certificates of title covering the
ten parcels of land are all dated 1998, which confirms its
declaration that the lands covered by 1991 Homestead Patents
were not conveyed to Filinvest until after the five-year prohibitory
period.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court upholds the sale

of all the properties in litigation. It likewise upholds the grant of
right of way in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the petition
is DISMISSED.

The five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the

homestead patent is provided under Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 456, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.10 It bears
stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the
land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for
his labour in cleaning and cultivating it.11 Its basic objective, as
the Court had occasion to stress, is to promote public policy that
is to provide home and decent living for destitute, aimed at
providing a class of independent small landholders which is the
bulwark of peace and order.12 Hence, any act which would have
the effect of removing the property subject of the patent from the
hands of a grantee will be struck down for being violative of the
law.13

No pronouncement as to damages for failure to prove the same.

Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondents elevated the case to the CA in which the latter
modified the judgment of the RTC.1wphi1 While the CA upheld
the validity of the sale of the properties the patents of which were
awarded in 1986, including the corresponding grant of right of
way for the same lots, it nullified the disposition of those
properties granted through patents in 1991 and the right of way
on the same properties. As to the "1991 Patents," the CA ruled
that the contract of sale between the parties was a perfected
contract, hence, the parties entered into a prohibited conveyance
of a homestead within the prohibitive period of five years from
the issuance of the patent. The CA Decision dated March 30,
2006 disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated October 1, 2003 is
MODIFIED:
a) The Deed of Conditional Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale for
the properties covered by the "1991 Patents", as well as the
Right of Way Agreement thereto, are declared null and void. The
Register of Deeds of General Santos City is consequently
directed to cancel the certificates of title covered by the "1991
Patents" issued in favor of appellee Filinvest and to issue new
titles in favor of herein appellants.
b) The sale of the properties covered by the "1986 Patents",
including the corresponding grant of way for said lots, are
declared valid.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CA.
Hence, the present petition.
The grounds relied upon are:
1. A CONDITIONAL SALE INVOLVING THE 1991 PATENTS DID
NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIENATION OF
HOMESTEADS UNDER THE PUBLIC LAND ACT SINCE NO
ACTUAL TRANSFER OR DISPOSITION WAS PERFECTED
UNTIL ALL THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEED ARE FULFILLED.
2. REGISTRATION IS THE OPERATIVE ACT THAT CONVEYS
OR DISPOSES RIGHTS IN REAL PROPERTY. BEING
UNREGISTERED, THE DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE DID
NOT CONVEY OR DISPOSE OF THE 1991 HOMESTEADS OR
ANY RIGHTS THEREIN IN VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC LAND
ACT.
3.ASSUMING THE NULLITY OF THE SALE OF THE 1991
PATENTS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD
HAVE ORDERED RESPONDENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
RETURN TO PETITIONERS WHAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED.6
In their Comment7 dated March 5, 2007, respondents stated the
following counter-arguments:
(1) The Honorable Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the
Deed of Conditional Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale for the
properties covered by the 1991 Patents, as well as the Right of
Way Agreement thereto is null and void for the simplest reason
that the said transactions were volatile of the Public Land Act.
(2) The questions raised by the Petitioner, Filinvest Land Inc.
(FLI) are unsubstantial to require consideration.8
In its Reply9 dated July 30, 2007, petitioner insists that the
prohibition against alienation and disposition of land covered by

The petition is unmeritorious.

In the present case, the negotiations for the purchase of the

properties covered by the patents issued in 1991 were made in
1995 and, eventually, an undated Deed of Conditional Sale was
executed. On October 28, 1995, respondents received the
downpayment of P14,000.000.00 for the properties covered by
the patents issued in 1991. Applying the five-year prohibition, the
properties covered by the patent issued on November 24, 1991
could only be alienated after November 24, 1996. Therefore, the
sale, having been consummated on October 28, 1995, or within
the five-year prohibition, is as ruled by the CA, void.
Petitioner argues that the correct formulation of the issue is not
whether there was a perfected contract between the parties
during the period of prohibition, but whether by such deed of
conditional sale there was "alienation or encumbrance" within the
contemplation of the law. This is wrong. The prohibition does not
distinguish between consummated and executory sale. The
conditional sale entered into by the parties is still a conveyance
of the homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing
Ortega v. Tan:14
And, even assuming that the disputed sale was not yet perfected
or consummated, still, the transaction cannot be validated. The
prohibition of the law on the sale or encumbrance of the
homestead within five years after the grant is MANDATORY. The
purpose of the law is to promote a definite policy, i.e., "to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion
of the public land which the State has gratuitously given to him."
Thus, the law does not distinguish between executory and
consummated sales. Where the sale of a homestead was
perfected within the prohibitory period of five years, the fact that
the formal deed of sale was executed after the expiration of the
staid period DID NOT and COULD NOT legalize a contract that
was void from its inception. To hold valid such arrangement
would be to throw the door open to all possible fraudulent
subterfuges and schemes which persons interested in the land
given to a homesteader may devise in circumventing and
defeating the legal provisions prohibiting their alienation within
five years from the issuance of the patent.15
To repeat, the conveyance of a homestead before the expiration
of the five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the
homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for it
is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what
public policy by law seeks to preserve.16
Nevertheless, petitioner does not err in seeking the return of the
down payment as a consequence of the sale having been
declared void. The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of
a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the
state and condition in which they were found before the
execution thereof.17 Petitioner is correct in its argument that
allowing respondents to keep the amount received from
petitioner is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust
enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience."18 There is unjust
enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person
is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another.19 Thus, the sale which
created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed amount
having been declared void, respondents have the duty to return
the down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it.

The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates

payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who
receives the payment has no right to receive it.20 As found by
the CA and undisputed by the parties, the amount or the down
payment made is P14,000,000.00 which shall also be the
amount to be returned by respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
November 9, 2006 or petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc. is hereby
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 30, 2006 and
Resolution dated September 18, 2006 or the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
respondents return the amount of P14,000,000.00 given by
petitioner as down payment for the sale which is ruled to be void
ab initio. SO ORDERED.

1. Defendant Domingo Gonzalo to pay the Plaintiff, John

Tarnate, Jr., the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX and 13/100 PESOS
(P233,526.13) representing the rental of equipment;
2. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS by way of reasonable Attorneys Fees for
having forced/compelled the plaintiff to litigate and engage the
services of a lawyer in order to protect his interest and to enforce
his right. The claim of the plaintiff for attorneys fees in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) plus
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) clearly appears to be
unconscionable and therefore reduced to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as aforestated making the same to be reasonable;
3. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P15,000.00) by way of litigation expenses;

b.) Gonzalo vs Tarnate, Jr.

The doctrine of in pari delicto which stipulates that the guilty
parties to an illegal contract are not entitled to any relief, cannot
prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public policy against
unjust enrichment.
Antecedents
After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the improvement
of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain ProvinceBenguet Road in the total amount of 7 014 963 33 to his
company, Gonzalo Construction,1 petitioner Domingo Gonzalo
(Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr.
(Tarnate) on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor
for the project under the latter s business known as JNT
Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that
Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of
the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate s first and second
billing in the project.2
In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6,
1999 a deed of assignment whereby he, as the contractor, was
assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total
collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee
(equivalent to P233,526.13) was the rent for Tarnates equipment
that had been utilized in the project. In the deed of assignment,
Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of
Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents
relative to the collection of the 10% retention fee and in
encashing the check to be issued by the DPWH for that
purpose.3 The deed of assignment was submitted to the DPWH
on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the documents for
the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had
unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means of an
affidavit of cancellation of deed of assignment dated April 19,
1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999;4 and that the
disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been
issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to
him.5

4. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND

PESOS (P20,000.00) for moral damages and for the breach of
contract; and
5. To pay the cost of this suit.
Award of exemplary damages in the instant case is not
warranted for there is no showing that the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner
analogous to the case of Xentrex Automotive, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 291 SCRA 66.8
Gonzalo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Decision of the CA
On February 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.9
Although holding that the subcontract was an illegal agreement
due to its object being specifically prohibited by Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1594; that Gonzalo and Tarnate were
guilty of entering into the illegal contract in violation of Section 6
of Presidential Decree No. 1594; and that the deed of
assignment, being a product of and dependent on the
subcontract, was also illegal and unenforceable, the CA did not
apply the doctrine of in pari delicto, explaining that the doctrine
applied only if the fault of one party was more or less equivalent
to the fault of the other party. It found Gonzalo to be more guilty
than Tarnate, whose guilt had been limited to the execution of
the two illegal contracts while Gonzalo had gone to the extent of
violating the deed of assignment. It declared that the crediting of
the 10% retention fee equivalent to P233,256.13 to his account
had unjustly enriched Gonzalo; and ruled, accordingly, that
Gonzalo should reimburse Tarnate in that amount because the
latters equipment had been utilized in the project.
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Gonzalo has
now come to the Court to seek the review and reversal of the
decision of the CA.
Issues

Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from

Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he brought this suit against
Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Mountain Province to recover the retention fee of
P233,526.13, moral and exemplary damages for breach of
contract, and attorneys fees.6
In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of assignment and the
authority given therein to Tarnate, but averred that the project
had not been fully implemented because of its cancellation by
the DPWH, and that he had then revoked the deed of
assignment. He insisted that the assignment could not stand
independently due to its being a mere product of the subcontract
that had been based on his contract with the DPWH; and that
Tarnate, having been fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality
of the deed of assignment from the time of its execution, could
not go to court with unclean hands to invoke any right based on
the invalid deed of assignment or on the product of such deed of
assignment.7

Gonzalo contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC

because: (1) both parties were in pari delicto; (2) the deed of
assignment was void; and (3) there was no compliance with the
arbitration clause in the subcontract.
Gonzalo submits in support of his contentions that the
subcontract and the deed of assignment, being specifically
prohibited by law, had no force and effect; that upon finding both
him and Tarnate guilty of violating the law for executing the
subcontract, the RTC and the CA should have applied the rule of
in pari delicto, to the effect that the law should not aid either
party to enforce the illegal contract but should leave them where
it found them; and that it was erroneous to accord to the parties
relief from their predicament.11
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, but we delete the grant of moral
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Ruling of the RTC

On January 26, 2001, the RTC, opining that the deed of
assignment was a valid and binding contract, and that Gonzalo
must comply with his obligations under the deed of assignment,
rendered judgment in favor of Tarnate as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and as prayed for by the
plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr. in his Complaint for Sum of Money,
Breach of Contract With Damages is hereby RENDERED in his
favor and against the above-named defendant Domingo
Gonzalo, the Court now hereby orders as follows:

There is no question that every contractor is prohibited from

subcontracting with or assigning to another person any contract
or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH
Secretary has approved the subcontracting or assignment. This
is pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594, which
provides:
Section 6. Assignment and Subcontract. The contractor shall
not assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract or make any other
disposition of the contract or any part or interest therein except
with the approval of the Minister of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the

Minister of Energy, as the case may be. Approval of the

subcontract shall not relieve the main contractor from any liability
or obligation under his contract with the Government nor shall it
create any contractual relation between the subcontractor and
the Government.
Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in question,
subcontracted the implementation of the project to Tarnate in
violation of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was
illegal, therefore, because it did not bear the approval of the
DPWH Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of assignment was also
illegal, because it sprung from the subcontract. As aptly
observed by the CA:
x x x. The intention of the parties in executing the Deed of
Assignment was merely to cover up the illegality of the subcontract agreement. They knew for a fact that the DPWH will not
allow plaintiff-appellee to claim in his own name under the SubContract Agreement.
Obviously, without the Sub-Contract Agreement there will be no
Deed of Assignment to speak of. The illegality of the SubContract Agreement necessarily affects the Deed of Assignment
because the rule is that an illegal agreement cannot give birth to
a valid contract. To rule otherwise is to sanction the act of
entering into transaction the object of which is expressly
prohibited by law and thereafter execute an apparently valid
contract to subterfuge the illegality. The legal proscription in such
an instance will be easily rendered nugatory and meaningless to
the prejudice of the general public.12
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent
contract. As such, a void contract cannot produce a valid one.13
To the same effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code, which
declares that "a contract, which is the direct result of a previous
illegal contract, is also void and inexistent."
We do not concur with the CAs finding that the guilt of Tarnate
for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594 was
lesser than that of Gonzalo, for, as the CA itself observed,
Tarnate had voluntarily entered into the agreements with
Gonzalo.14 Tarnate also admitted that he did not participate in
the bidding for the project because he knew that he was not
authorized to contract with the DPWH.15 Given that Tarnate was
a businessman who had represented himself in the subcontract
as "being financially and organizationally sound and established,
with the necessary personnel and equipment for the
performance of the project,"16 he justifiably presumed to be
aware of the illegality of his agreements with Gonzalo. For these
reasons, Tarnate was not less guilty than Gonzalo.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties
to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are
not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari
delicto or in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a
universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at
law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its
specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be
sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages
for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no
affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other.17
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is
not always rigid.1wphi1 An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes well-established public policy.18 In this
jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle of
the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
public good."19
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders,
Inc.,20 "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a
recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who through an act
of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." It is
well to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code
on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as
basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order;
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run
as golden threads through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice."21

There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor

and materials for the project in compliance with his obligations
under the subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it
was Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment for his
contract with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that
should have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of
assignment.22 Considering that Gonzalo refused despite
demands to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee
that would have compensated the latter for the use of his
equipment in the project, Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at
the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from
recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in
pari delicto. The prevention of unjust enrichment called for the
exception to apply in Tarnates favor. Consequently, the RTC and
the CA properly adjudged Gonzalo liable to pay Tarnate the
equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee (i.e., P233,526.13).
Gonzalo sought to justify his refusal to turn over the P233,526.13
to Tarnate by insisting that he (Gonzalo) had a debt of
P200,000.00 to Congressman Victor Dominguez; that his
payment of the 10% retention fee to Tarnate was conditioned on
Tarnate paying that debt to Congressman Dominguez; and that
he refused to give the 10% retention fee to Tarnate because
Tarnate did not pay to Congressman Dominguez.23 His
justification was unpersuasive, however, because, firstly,
Gonzalo presented no proof of the debt to Congressman
Dominguez; secondly, he did not competently establish the
agreement on the condition that supposedly bound Tarnate to
pay to Congressman Dominguez;24 and, thirdly, burdening
Tarnate with Gonzalos personal debt to Congressman
Dominguez to be paid first by Tarnate would constitute another
case of unjust enrichment.
The Court regards the grant of moral damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses to Tarnate to be inappropriate. We have
ruled that no damages may be recovered under a void contract,
which, being nonexistent, produces no juridical tie between the
parties involved.25 It is notable, too, that the RTC and the CA did
not spell out the sufficient factual and legal justifications for such
damages to be granted.
Lastly, the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil Code
command Gonzalo to make a full reparation or compensation to
Tarnate. The illegality of their contract should not be allowed to
deprive Tarnate from being fully compensated through the
imposition of legal interest. Towards that end, interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from September 13, 1999, the time of the
judicial demand by Tarnate, is imposed on the amount of
P233,526.13. Not to afford this relief will make a travesty of the
justice to which Tarnate was entitled for having suffered too long
from Gonzalos unjust enrichment.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on
February 18, 2003, but DELETE the awards of moral damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses; IMPOSE legal interest of
6% per annum on the principal oLP233,526.13 reckoned from
September 13, 1999; and DIRECT the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit. SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 26 ACTION FOR DAMAGES
a.) Jerome Castro vs People
This petition for review on certiorari1 emanated from the
complaint for grave oral defamation2 filed by Albert P. Tan
against petitioner Jerome Castro.
The facts follow.
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS)
dismissed Tans son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for
violating the terms of his disciplinary probation.3 Upon Tans
request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed "nonappealable" conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from
participating in the graduation ceremonies.
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education
(Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private
Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code4
against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was
undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation.
After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS code violation
point system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable
sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law). The system
therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it. 5
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to
readmit Justin Albert without any condition.6 Thus, he was able
to graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement
ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a

fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan
intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of
RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner who was the
assistant headmaster.

decision of the RTC.10 It contended that the RTC acted with

grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners
offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly
misappreciated the antecedents which provoked petitioner to
utter the allegedly defamatory statement against Tan.

Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and

told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:

The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and
found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the
CA reinstated the MeTC decision.11

Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], thats
dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said
"talking to him was dangerous."
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
petitioner on August 21, 2003.
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral
defamation in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 607 under the following Information:
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate
intent of bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit, dishonor,
disrepute and contempt, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously speak and utter the following words to Ms.
Bernice C. Ching:

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.12 Hence,

this recourse.
Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking
cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG
raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the
evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double
jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
We grant the petition.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.13 This constitutional mandate is echoed in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or in information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

xxx

The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner

depicted Tan as a "dangerous person." Ching testified that
petitioner warned her that talking to Tan was dangerous. Tan, on
the other hand, testified that petitioners statement shocked him
as it portrayed him as "someone capable of committing
undesirable acts." He added that petitioner probably took offense
because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed.

Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid

indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4)
when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or
appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy.15

"OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL TALKING

TO [TAN], THATS DANGEROUS."
and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting
nature.

For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against

Tan despite the latters complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed.
Although he admitted conversing with Ching (whom he
considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone a few
days after RIS 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner
asserted that he never said or insinuated that Tan or talking to
Tan was dangerous. On cross-examination, however, he did not
categorically deny the veracity of Chings statement.
The MeTC found that Chings statements in her affidavit and in
open court were consistent and that she did not have any motive
to fabricate a false statement. Petitioner, on the other hand,
harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will against Tan
since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the
MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching talking to Tan
was dangerous and that he uttered the statement with the
intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and professional
reputation.
In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral
defamation:8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused,
Jerome Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Oral Defamation, sentencing him therefore, in accordance
to Article 358(1) of the Revised Penal Code and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as
minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual
findings of the MeTC. However, in view of the animosity between
the parties, it found petitioner guilty only of slight oral
defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on August 21,
2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the RTC ruled that
prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner
on that ground. 9
On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the

xxx

xxx

The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,16
when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail
the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the
State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case.17
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered
by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued
without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently,
there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the
nature of petitioners statement, that is, whether it constituted
grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation
of grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs "erroneous" evaluation
and assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties.1awph!1
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or
those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law).
However, a court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the
public respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings.18 Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65
petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of
jurisdiction (or those involving the commission of grave abuse of
discretion).19
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA
erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing
the factual findings of the RTC.20 We therefore reinstate the
RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under
Article 26 of the Civil Code21 :
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a

criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,

prevention and other relief:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be

a role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29,
2007 decision and December 5, 2007 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED.
Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral
defamation as defined and penalized in Article 358 of the
Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
ARTICLE 27 LIABILTY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS
a.) Ledesma vs CA and Delmo
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals which afirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the
President of the West Visayas College liable for damages under
Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to
graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by
some students of the West Visayas College. They elected the
late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo
extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the
students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of
extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus,
the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo
informing her that she was being dropped from the membership
of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award
or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the
petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the
Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April
13, 1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the
legal officers of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta
Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an
exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the
of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution
No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to
student for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in
compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club,
Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and members of
the Club upon proper application duly approved by the majority
of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving
the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the
Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter and
having been convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the
other officers and members of the Club, that Office rendered the
order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or
decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its
effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to that
Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that
as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed based
on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and effect
and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some
officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal
(sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed
guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other
hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo,
President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively,
testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws
in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to
Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the
members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which
resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to
some officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly
believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by
the superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse
Dagoon, assured the President of the Club that he will cause the

approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent;

the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on October
9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been
likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the
action taken by the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of
the Club as well as the officers and members thereof by
dropping them from membership therein. However, this Office is
convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her
capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and
members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2
authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in
need of financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes
had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with
the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of
the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality.
Aside from misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr.
Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for
approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he
would do so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the
Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his
duties as such, this Office considers as too severe and
unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating that
Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation
from this school or any organization in this school." Violeta
Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the
school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The
decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her
sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in
this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and
hereby directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that
matter all other Club members or officers involved in this case,
be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school,
if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of
the Director and all the records of the case. On the same day,
petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the
petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also
send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all
the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of
Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the
Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision.
The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing
the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not
retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner
received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to
deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by
this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of the
honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student
instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote
the Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because
he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with
honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of
the school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the
honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her
parents in flag action for damages against the petitioner. During
the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and
thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her
parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the
petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners)
bad faith. Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director
Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it
was the defendant who inducted the officers of the Student
Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was
allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh.
"L"). If the defendant he not approve of the constitution and bylaws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and
allow the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It
was through his own act that the students were misled to do as

they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of the

Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who
made the students believe that he was acting as an extension of
Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact
that, although, he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r
Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss
Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew
that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive
Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has
not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director
Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5,
1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true
that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L,"
because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the
portion which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any
award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled
thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he
know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been
one of bias and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he
was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of
Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew
of the exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he
withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently
dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director
Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the
Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about
the decision, since he said he mailed back the decision on April
28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director
Bernardino, informing the latter that he had returned the decision
(Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a night letter when the
matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case, because
graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of the
telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been
sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit
"7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the
decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her
about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the
commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is
one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is
home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his
decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was
overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To
quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve those
honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite
the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant
received hours before the commencement executory on May 34,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in
his testimony that he would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974,
P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that
of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly
disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's
embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith and
unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been
challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks

of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power.
Come to think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and
instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p.
72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta
Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages;
P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary
damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence,
this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole
question of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable
for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.

moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate

result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon,
129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate
omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty
of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty
to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering
that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though
he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read
the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover,
the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr.
Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of
the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not
without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of
a copy of the decision, he could have used his discretion and
plain common sense by informing her about it or he could have
directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed
commencement program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director
Benardino hours before the commencement exercises on May 34, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors
due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be
embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in complete
disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr.
Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to
see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme
disappointment and humiliation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with

circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo.
Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly
disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director
Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal
capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in
order. In the same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public
good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA
431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses
Delmo damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual
capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already
entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus,
the decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded
to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight
modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision
is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
b.) Campugan vs Tolentino, Jr.
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T.
Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of
respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order
that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of
the notice ofadverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the
Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate

courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta
Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by
the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral
damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440,
448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,

Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of

the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek the
annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January
2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon
and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis
pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009

(later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the complainants narrated
that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and
Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a
residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that,
accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of their
affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement
during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to
end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the
property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided
between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would
be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs)
and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable
settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in
its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants lack of
objection thereto and the defendants willingness to similarly
withdraw their counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by
the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer
locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone
calls and visits to his office; that they found out upon verification
at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations
were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the
annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse
claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N290546; and (2) the annotation of the decision dated May 16,
2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC,
Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants Motion to
Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter request dated
June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort
who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an
appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis
pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on
March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or
beforesuch scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do not
disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio,
Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional services, the
complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case.
They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse
claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order
specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the
connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as
officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala,
the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and
signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be
thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment
on the verified complaint.11 Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his
Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert
Torres had been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation process;
that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in
the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that
they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same
way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions
contained therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as
alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the
counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that
he should not be held responsible for their representation in
other proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required
a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had
received from the complainants were those for his appearance
fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not
acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr.
whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-

59598; that although he had notarized the letter request dated

June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he
had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been
disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present
complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the
complainants against him with no other motive except to harass
and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914
that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of Deeds,
who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that
resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the
cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular
course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty
of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was
performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the
Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in
the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilalas allegation in his Comment in A.C.
No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.s signature that
appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed
another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty.
Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C.
No. 8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117
because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on
similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the
allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had made
in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that
he adopted Atty. Quilalas Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of
merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe
these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes
the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The complainants allegations of the respondents acts and
omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct
against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of the
Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the
proper documentary science stamps and that the same are
properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the present or of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial

in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise
of judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores
that registration is a merely ministerial act of the Register of
Deeds, explaining:
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to
harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a
court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see
whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the
formal and legal requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or
irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty.
Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16,
2008 or the letter-request dated June 30,2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as
their duty to examine documents presented for registration was
limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If,
upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order,
they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in
conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for
them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary
delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents performance of
duty, the complainants were not bereft of any remedy because
they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the
matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section
11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in
Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within
the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues
concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by
the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
with having conspired with each other to guarantee that the
parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable
settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with
having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of
its order dated May 16, 2008. The complainants charges are
devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order
to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from
the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is
nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear
and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in this
regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to
cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the
annotations, they presented no evidence to support their
allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated
their own active participation in arriving at the amicable
settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable
settlement that they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
initiated and participated in the settlement of the case, there was
nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as
lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.1wphi1
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement
of the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-0759598 subsisted.28
Anent the complainants charge of abandonment against Atty.
Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted

to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
clients request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of
Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement
consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to
counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently
and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty.
Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned.
Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention
to any other matters subsequent to the termination of Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between
them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had
no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.s legal representation
was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the
LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the
rendition of professional services depends on the agreement
between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.s alleged
failure to respond to the complainants calls or visits, or to
provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have
access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without
the credible showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment
complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato
G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala
and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. SO ORDERED.
ART. 29-35 CIVIL LIABILTY FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSE
a.) People vs Bayotas
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas
City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision
penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General
to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as
a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists
that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil
liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed
the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the
accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of
his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the
civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability
and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It
reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the
legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870
which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1.
Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a
su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term

"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the
ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as
Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the
accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should
the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal
caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there
cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not
the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the
simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco
holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book
One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected
in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final
judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment
beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered
must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects
of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No.
100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634;
Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender
might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the
civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced
by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we

must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will
be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called
upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof
criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and
held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if
we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines
v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6
by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused
pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison
case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and
civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes'
Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and
Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him
should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In
the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil
liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring
any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of
the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused
prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by
the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with
the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the

extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the
civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death,
ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither
solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability
of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace
its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability
based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive,

the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be
inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be
heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the
lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the
appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such
decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness
of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In
doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating
thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after
final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).

delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due

to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A reexamination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert
to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant
to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to
the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes
during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and
separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that
which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance
of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely
beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105
Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment;

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided
in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed

intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does
not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One
would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty
to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due
to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money

judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability
(U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs.
Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose,
his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of
the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they
were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex

xxx

xxx

xxx

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime,

the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition
precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when
the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accusedappellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot
survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime.
Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal
liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to
the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life
from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July
8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a

separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will

take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent
one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding.
Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability
for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and
pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which
served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to
serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of
his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego
cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice
Regalado:
xxx

xxx

These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness,

judgments for money and claim arising from contracts,
expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from
delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex
delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the
deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction
of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the
same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section
1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended)
file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from
quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to
person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the
estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for
the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we
held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under
Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to
those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed,
refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which
have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also
arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court.

xxx
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both

Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted
together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond
the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to
exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the
deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the
Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and
Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary
civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter
category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the
offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving
claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable
for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in
Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are
contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil
liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or
real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate.

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases

where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to

its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on
a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
b.) Frias vs San Diego-Sison
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Bobie
Rose V. Frias represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marie Regine
F. Fujita (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision1 dated June
18, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated September 11, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839.
Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located at No. 589
Batangas East, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which
she acquired from Island Masters Realty and Development
Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated Nov. 16,
1990.3 The property is covered by TCT No. 168173 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati in the name of IMRDC.4
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY, and Dra.
Flora San Diego-Sison (respondent), as the SECOND PARTY,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 over the property
with the following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of
THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00) receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND
PARTY, the parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six (6) months from
the date of the execution of this contract within which to notify
the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase the
aforementioned parcel of land together within (sic) the
improvements thereon at the price of SIX MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P6,400,000.00). Upon notice
to the FIRST PARTY of the SECOND PARTYs intention to
purchase the same, the latter has a period of another six months
within which to pay the remaining balance of P3.4 million.
2. That prior to the six months period given to the SECOND
PARTY within which to decide whether or not to purchase the
above-mentioned property, the FIRST PARTY may still offer the
said property to other persons who may be interested to buy the
same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00 given to the
FIRST PARTY BY THE SECOND PARTY shall be paid to the
latter including interest based on prevailing compounded bank
interest plus the amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00
should the property be sold at a price more than P7 million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the
first six months from the execution of this contract, no interest
shall be charged by the SECOND PARTY on the P3 million
however, in the event that on the sixth month the SECOND
PARTY would decide not to purchase the aforementioned
property, the FIRST PARTY has a period of another six months
within which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos provided that the
said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last six
months only. Under this circumstance, the amount of P3 million
given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and
the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage
which can be enforced in accordance with law.
x x x x.
Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos in cash
and one million pesos in a post-dated check dated February 28,
1990, instead of 1991, which rendered said check stale.7
Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of
IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified
petitioner through a letter8 dated March 20, 1991, which
petitioner received only on June 11, 1991,9 reminding petitioner
of their agreement that the amount of two million pesos which
petitioner received from respondent should be considered as a
loan payable within six months. Petitioner subsequently failed to
pay respondent the amount of two million pesos.

On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Manila, a complaint10 for sum of money with
preliminary attachment against petitioner. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30.
Respondent alleged the foregoing facts and in addition thereto
averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the
loan by making a false report11 of the loss of her owners copy
of TCT No. 168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3, 1991,
executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition12 for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of said title with the
RTC of Makati, Branch 142; that the petition was granted in an
Order13 dated August 31, 1991; that said Order was
subsequently set aside in an Order dated April 10, 199214 where
the RTC Makati granted respondents petition for relief from
judgment due to the fact that respondent is in possession of the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered the
provincial public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of
petitioner for perjury and false testimony. Respondent prayed for
the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and
payment of two million pesos with interest at 36% per annum
from December 7, 1991, P100,000.00 moral, corrective and
exemplary damages and P200,000.00 for attorneys fees.
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Manila issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon the filing
of a bond in the amount of two million pesos.15
Petitioner filed an Amended Answer16 alleging that the
Memorandum of Agreement was conceived and arranged by her
lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada, who is also respondents lawyer;
that she was asked to sign the agreement without being given
the chance to read the same; that the title to the property and the
Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC were entrusted to
Atty. Lozada for safekeeping and were never turned over to
respondent as there was no consummated sale yet; that out of
the two million pesos cash paid, Atty. Lozada took the one million
pesos which has not been returned, thus petitioner had filed a
civil case against her; that she was never informed of
respondents decision not to purchase the property within the six
month period fixed in the agreement; that when she demanded
the return of TCT No. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her
and the IMRDC from Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her these
documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991 which her
secretary placed in her attache case; that the envelope together
with her other personal things were lost when her car was
forcibly opened the following day; that she sought the help of
Atty. Lozada who advised her to secure a police report, to
execute an affidavit of loss and to get the services of another
lawyer to file a petition for the issuance of an owners duplicate
copy; that the petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy was filed on her behalf without her knowledge
and neither did she sign the petition nor testify in court as falsely
claimed for she was abroad; that she was a victim of the
manipulations of Atty. Lozada and respondent as shown by the
filing of criminal charges for perjury and false testimony against
her; that no interest could be due as there was no valid
mortgage over the property as the principal obligation is vitiated
with fraud and deception. She prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, counter-claim for damages and attorneys fees.
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996, the RTC
issued a decision,17 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2 Million plus
interest thereon at the rate of thirty two (32%) per cent per
annum beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid.
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00
representing premiums paid by plaintiff on the attachment bond
with legal interest thereon counted from the date of this decision
until fully paid.
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by
way of moral, corrective and exemplary damages.
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees of
P100,000.00 plus cost of litigation.18
The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation to pay
respondent the amount of two million pesos with compounded
interest pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement; that the
fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner to deprive respondent
of her only security to her loaned money when petitioner
executed an affidavit of loss and instituted a petition for the
issuance of an owners duplicate title knowing the same was in
respondents possession, entitled respondent to moral damages;
and that petitioners bare denial cannot be accorded credence
because her testimony and that of her witness did not appear to
be credible.

The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that she received
from respondent the two million pesos in cash but the fact that
petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without
respondents knowledge thus it is not binding on respondent; that
respondent had also proven that in 1993, she initially paid the
sum of P30,000.00 as premium for the issuance of the
attachment bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, and
P20,000.00 for the renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff should be
reimbursed considering that she was compelled to go to court
and ask for a writ of preliminary attachment to protect her rights
under the agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a Decision dated June
18, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is MODIFIED in the sense that the rate of interest is
reduced from 32% to 25% per annum, effective June 7, 1991
until fully paid.19
The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty.
Lozada partly as her commission and partly as a loan;
respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated check of one
million pesos because she had decided not to buy the property
and petitioner knew of her decision as early as April 1991; the
award of moral damages was warranted since even granting
petitioner had no hand in the filing of the petition for the issuance
of an owners copy, she executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No.
168173 when she knew all along that said title was in
respondents possession; petitioners claim that she thought the
title was lost when the brown envelope given to her by Atty.
Lozada was stolen from her car was hollow; that such deceitful
conduct caused respondent serious anxiety and emotional
distress.
The CA concluded that there was no basis for petitioner to say
that the interest should be charged for six months only and no
more; that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan;
that interest should commence on June 7, 199120 with
compounded bank interest prevailing at the time the two million
was considered as a loan which was in June 1991; that the bank
interest rate for loans secured by a real estate mortgage in 1991
ranged from 25% to 32% per annum as certified to by Prudential
Bank,21 that in fairness to petitioner, the rate to be charged
should be 25% only.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated September 11, 2002.
Hence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED BANK
INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SIX (6) MONTHS AS
CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
MORAL DAMAGES.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF CORRECTIVE AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER
EVEN IF NOT MENTIONED IN THE TEXT OF THE
DECISION.22
Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at 32% per annum
awarded by the trial court or at 25% per annum as modified by
the CA which should run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is
contrary to the parties Memorandum of Agreement; that the
agreement provides that if respondent would decide not to
purchase the property, petitioner has the period of another six
months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the
last six months only; that the CAs ruling that a loan always bears
interest otherwise it is not a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the
New Civil Code which provides that no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
We are not persuaded.
While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears interest
otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed since a simple loan may be
gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest,23 we find no error
committed by the CA in awarding a 25% interest per annum on
the two-million peso loan even beyond the second six months
stipulated period.
The Memorandum of Agreement executed between the
petitioner and respondent on December 7, 1990 is the law
between the parties. In resolving an issue based upon a
contract, we must first examine the contract itself, especially the
provisions thereof which are relevant to the controversy.24 The

general rule is that if the terms of an agreement are clear and

leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.25 It is further
required that the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.26
In this case, the phrase "for the last six months only" should be
taken in the context of the entire agreement. We agree with and
adopt the CAs interpretation of the phrase in this wise:
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six months each.
The first six-month period was given to plaintiff-appellee
(respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase
defendant-appellants (petitioner's) property. The second sixmonth period was given to defendant-appellant to pay the P2
million loan in the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not to buy
the subject property in which case interest will be charged "for
the last six months only", referring to the second six-month
period. This means that no interest will be charged for the first
six-month period while appellee was making up her mind
whether to buy the property, but only for the second period of six
months after appellee had decided not to buy the property. This
is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six months only".
Certainly, there is nothing in their agreement that suggests that
interest will be charged for six months only even if it takes
defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.27
The agreement that the amount given shall bear compounded
bank interest for the last six months only, i.e., referring to the
second six-month period, does not mean that interest will no
longer be charged after the second six-month period since such
stipulation was made on the logical and reasonable expectation
that such amount would be paid within the date stipulated.
Considering that petitioner failed to pay the amount given which
under the Memorandum of Agreement shall be considered as a
loan, the monetary interest for the last six months continued to
accrue until actual payment of the loaned amount.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of
the use of money and thus, until the principal sum due is
returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue
since the debtor continues to use such principal amount.28 It
has been held that for a debtor to continue in possession of the
principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after
maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest,
would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor at
the expense of the creditor.29
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned amount
shall earn compounded bank interests, and per the certification
issued by Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans in 1991
ranged from 25% to 32% per annum. The CA reduced the
interest rate to 25% instead of the 32% awarded by the trial court
which petitioner no longer assailed.1awphi1.nt
In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,30 we upheld the validity
of a 21% per annum interest on a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v.
Court of Appeals,31 we sustained the agreement of the parties
to a 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus,
the interest rate of 25% per annum awarded by the CA to a P2
million loan is fair and reasonable.
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were awarded on the
erroneous finding that she used a fraudulent scheme to deprive
respondent of her security for the loan; that such finding is
baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury
and false testimony filed by respondent against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.32
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury
cases filed by respondent against her, those actions are entirely
distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed
by respondent against petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that
petitioners act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of
her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and
instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to moral
damages.1a\^/phi1.net Moral damages may be awarded in culpa
contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest

purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong.

It partakes of the nature of fraud.33
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the event that
respondent opts not to buy the property, the money given by
respondent to petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the
property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage. It
was testified to by respondent that after they executed the
agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner gave her the
owners copy of the title to the property, the Deed of Sale
between petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy, and
the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed the
Deed of Sale.34 However, notwithstanding that all those
documents were in respondents possession, petitioner executed
an affidavit of loss that the owners copy of the title and the Deed
of Sale were lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of the affidavit of
loss was due to the fact that she was of the belief that since she
had demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she
thought that the brown envelope with markings which Atty.
Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 already contained the title and
the Deed of Sale as those documents were in the same brown
envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction
with respondent.35 Such statement remained a bare statement.
It was not proven at all since Atty. Lozada had not taken the
stand to corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners own
witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to establish
petitioner's claim that the title was returned by Atty. Lozada in
view of Ynfante's testimony that after the brown envelope was
given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she placed it
in petitioners attach case36 and did not bother to look at the
envelope.37
It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of the affidavit of
loss became the basis of the filing of the petition with the RTC for
the issuance of new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
Petitioners actuation would have deprived respondent of the
security for her loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a
petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral
damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the
award of exemplary damages is proper.38 Exemplary damages
may be imposed upon petitioner by way of example or correction
for the public good.39 The RTC awarded the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. While the award
of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may
not be the usual way of awarding said damages,40 no error has
been committed by CA. There is no question that respondent is
entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding attorneys fees
because the trial courts decision did not explain the findings of
facts and law to justify the award of attorneys fees as the same
was mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC
decision.
We agree.
Article 220841 of the New Civil Code enumerates the instances
where such may be awarded and, in all cases, it must be
reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be granted.42
Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the
winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They are not
awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.43 The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather
than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for the trial court to
make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within
the exception and justify the grant of such award. The matter of
attorney's fees cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive
portion of the decision.44 They must be clearly explained and
justified by the trial court in the body of its decision. On appeal,
the CA is precluded from supplementing the bases for awarding
attorneys fees when the trial court failed to discuss in its
Decision the reasons for awarding the same. Consequently, the
award of attorney's fees should be deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision dated
June 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is
DELETED.

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February
1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines
versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for
suspension of their arraignment.
The present controversy arose from the following antecedents:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and
Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral
representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative
respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province
of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the
Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan
and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and
17 February 1989, respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office
of the President for review and recall of said designations. The
latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the
petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize
private respondents as sectoral representatives.
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for
recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to declare null and void
the designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled
"Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of
Local Government, et al."
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al."
charging petitioners thus:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P.
AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES,
HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
committed as follows:
That during the period from February 1989 to February 1991 and
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros
Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, Sangguniang
Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA
while in the performance of their official functions and taking
advantage of their public positions, with evident bad faith,
manifest partiality, and conspiring and confederating with each
other did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue
injury to Sectoral Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T.
Estrellanes by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of
NINETY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00) representing respectively
their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and
such undue injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and
damage of Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists
in Civil Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City. 2

ART 36 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a

decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued
by the Department of Local Government to the private
respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in
violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code. 3

a.) Tuanda vs SANDIGANBAYAN

The trial court expounded thus:

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v.

Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7 companion
cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792,
87935, 88072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990,
ruled that:

WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of

Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by the
accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the
Secretary of the Department of Local Government) may appoint
members of the local legislative bodies to represent the
Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a
determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the said
sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to
warrant representation after consultation with associations and
persons belonging to the sector concerned.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the

aforementioned resolution in view of the decision promulgated
by the trial court nullifying the appointments of private
respondents but it was, likewise, denied in an order issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the
justification that the grounds stated in the said motion were a
mere rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the case in
abeyance. 6 The dispositive portion of its order reads as follows:

The Supreme Court further ruled

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the

accused which was scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor
Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto,
Erenieta K. Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado
Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from service hereof why they should
not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in
court today for arraignment.

For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the

Local Government Code even prescribe the time and manner by
which such determination is to be conducted by the Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has
not yet determined that the Industrial and Agricultural Labor
Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient
number to warrant representation, there will absolutely be no
basis for the designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of
the sector concerned to warrant representation, the Sanggunian
is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations
and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation
with the sector concerned is made a pre-requisite. This is so
considering that those who belong to the said sector are the
ones primarily interested in being represented in the
Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court
considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not
by any other person or body) as a condition sine qua non to a
valid appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was total absence of the
required prior determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of
private defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.
This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases,
the Supreme Court invariably nullified the designations where
the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not
complied with. Just to cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of
Valenzuela that the sectors concerned are of sufficient number to
warrant representation and there was no consultation
whatsoever with the associations and persons belonging to the
Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the
appointment of private respondents Romeo F. Bularan and
Rafael Cortez are null and void (Romeo Llanado, et al. v. Hon.
Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, where
the same is currently pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of
proceedings
filed
by
petitioners.
Said
respondent
Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that the
private complainants have been rendering services on the basis
of their respective appointments as sectoral members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros
Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption
of regularity. Having rendered such services, the private
complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to their office.
Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall
later decide that the said appointments of the private
complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are
entitled to their salaries and compensation for service they have
actually rendered, for the reason that before such judicial
declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at
least de facto public officers acting as such on the basis of
apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities.
In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered
in Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld
salaries for the services they have actually rendered as sectoral
representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the
decision that may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of the innocence or
guilt of the accused.

SO ORDERED. 5

In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is

to be filed by the counsel for the defense, set this case for
arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all
dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an
order holding consideration of all incidents pending the issuance
of an extended resolution. 8
No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed
order dated 13 May 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan set the
arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The dispositive
portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the
scheduled hearing today which We deem to be excusable, reset
this case for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the
merits on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to
start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty.
Alfonso Briones. Considering that the accused come all the way
from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no postponement will be
allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where
petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following
errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the
pendency of a prejudicial issue before the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would
entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e.,
the validity of the appointments of private respondents and their
entitlement to compensation which is already pending resolution
by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively
allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative
theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto
officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process. 10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the
legality or validity of private respondents' designation as sectoral
representatives which is pending resolution in CA-G.R. No.
36769 is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed
(see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital
to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the
resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of
the issues involved in said criminal case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to

another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative

of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 12 It is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 13

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the

public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith. 18
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated
elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where
there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto
officer in a de jure office. 19
WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and
orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are hereby SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding
with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No.
16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769. SO
ORDERED.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to

avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:
b.) Beltran vs People
(a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find
that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769,
constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of
the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the
facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the
criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the
criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and
evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and
per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was
instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of
private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in
accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly
determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the
criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal,
allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private
respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal,
however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said
designations were made in violation of the Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore,
should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision
declaring null and void private respondents' designations as
sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions
of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the
charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a
leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and
partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part
to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not
have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other
benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether
or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are
nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services
rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial court and as
borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents'
designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged
by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of
the President copies of which were received by private
respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after
they took their oath of office. 17 Hence, private respondents'
claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral
representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's
thesis that even in the event that private respondents'
designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be
considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for
services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the
following:
1) There must be a de jure office;

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated
January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special
Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of
the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said
Order denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding
with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case
against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his
wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were
married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish
Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and
four children,[2] petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9730192.[3]
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine
Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal
home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.[4]
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage[5] under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code
against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997,
found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information[6]
against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176,
was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question
to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order[7] dated
August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated
December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the
concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders
dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.[8] In an Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari.
Said Court subsequently issued another Order[10] dated
February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case
for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two

conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for
annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In
the civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid
by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the
trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows
that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling
regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal
case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of
marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason
of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments
submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed;
and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the
criminal case because he was never before a married man.

competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so

declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders
of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency
of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
c.) PASI vs Lichauco

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.[11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the
said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the
import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage
an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said
Decision read:
"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a
party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of
the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null
and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in
Donato vs. Luna[14] where this Court held that:
"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the

Decision1 dated 21 February 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. No. SP 49422. The assailed Decision authorized the
dismissal of a civil complaint against respondent Josefina
Trinidad-Lichauco (Lichauco), former Undersecretary for
Communications of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), on the premise that the complaint
constituted a suit against the State.
A brief rundown of the relevant facts is in order.
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized
corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is copetitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a
consortium of private telecommunications carriers2 which in
1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite
into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was
to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite itself to
be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently
organized as PASI).3 The consortium was to grant the Philippine
government one (1) transponder free of charge for the
government's exclusive use for non-commercial purpose, as well
as the right of first refusal to another one (1) transponder in the
Philippine satellite, if available.4 The Philippine government,
through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from
the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital
slot(s) and frequency assignment(s) for the Philippine satellite.
PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The
government, together with PASI, coordinated through the
International Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots,
designated as 161 East Longitude and 153 East Longitude, for
Philippine satellites. On 28 June 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC
Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine
government confirmation on the assignment of the two
aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites,
which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites.5 Secretary
Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming
"the Philippine Government's assignment of Philippine orbital
slots 161E and 153E to [PASI] for its [Agila] satellites."6
PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the
Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the
launching, operation and management of its satellites, including
the availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with
business partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to
the French satellite manufacturer. However, respondent
Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications,
allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the name of
[Michael de Guzman] and sabotage the business of PASI."
Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in
her offering orbital slot 153 East Longitude
for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997, despite
the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot.7 It was later
claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital
slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown to PASI.8
Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De Guzman
instituted on 23 January 1998 a civil complaint against Lichauco,
by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC, and the "Unknown
Awardee" who was to be the recipient of orbital slot 153 East
Longitude. The complaint, alleging three (3) causes of action,
was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.
The first cause of action, for injunction, sought to establish that
the award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude should be enjoined
since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot to
PASI. The second cause of action, for declaration of nullity of
award, averred that the award to the unknown bidder is null and
void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority.9

The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to

Lichauco as part of her alleged "crusade" to malign the name of
plaintiff [D]e Guzman and sabotage the business of [PASI]:
12. xxx
(a) On 4 December 1996, in a meeting with the members of the
Board of Directors of plaintiff corporation, defendant Lichauco
then uttered disparaging and defamatory comments against
plaintiff de Guzman. These defamatory remarks triggered efforts
from within the plaintiff corporation aimed at ousting plaintiff de
Guzman from his position.
(b) Defendant Lichauco, then an undersecretary of DOTC, wrote
Mr. Jesli Lapuz on 5 December 1996 (barely two days after
plaintiff de Guzman wrote him) to deny that the DOTC has
assigned the two (2) Philippine orbital slots to plaintiff
corporation. Defendant Lichauco falsely asserted that only orbital
slot 161 E was assigned to plaintiff, orbital slot 153 E was not.

26. For the same reasons, plaintiff de Guzman suffered and

continue to suffer extreme mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock and besmirched reputation, for
all of which plaintiff de Guzman should be indemnified in the
amount of at least P10 million.
27. Defendant Lichauco should also be sanctioned, as a
deterrent for public good, to pay each plaintiff exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P5 million.
28. In order to protect and enforce their rights, plaintiffs were
compelled to institute this suit, engage the services of counsel
and incur litigation expenses, for all of which plaintiffs should be
indemnified in the amount of at least P500 Thousand each.11
xxxx
In sum, petitioners sought the following reliefs for the three (3)
causes of action:

In the same letter, defendant Lichauco branded as FALSE

plaintiff de Guzman's claim that "Agila" is a registered corporate
name of plaintiff corporation.

xxxx

A copy of the letter is attached as Annex E.

[a] On the first cause of action, making permanent the writ of

preliminary injunction;

(c) Not contented, defendant Lichauco, again for reasons known

only to her, and with malice aforethought, made defamatory
remarks against plaintiffs during a telecommunications forum
held in Makati City sometime in October 1997 in the presence of
public officials and business executives.
(d) Defendant Lichauco did not spare plaintiff corporation from
her unprovoked defamation. Defendant Lichauco arrogantly said
that she had asked President Fidel V. Ramos to sue plaintiff
Michael de Guzman. With the same degree of arrogance she
threatened plaintiff corporation not to use the name "Agila",
otherwise she would fight plaintiff corporation and would make
sure that the name of Agila would never be given back to plaintiff
corporation.

3. After trial of the issues, render judgment as follows:

[b] On the second cause of action, declaring the offer and award
of orbital slot 153 E to defendant Unknown Awardee null and
void.
[c] On the third cause of action, directing defendant Lichauco to
pay the following sums:
i. P10 million each to plaintiffs as actual damages;
ii. P10 million to plaintiff corporation as moral damages;
iii. P10 million to plaintiff de Guzman as moral damages;
iv. P5 million each to plaintiffs as exemplary damages;

(e) To top it all, defendant Lichauco without basis and with

evident bad faith, said that plaintiff corporation will never pay its
contractors.
(f) In December 1997, defendant Lichauco delivered the coup de'
grace. Again, acting unilaterally, without prior notice to plaintiff
corporation and in gross violation of DOTC's earlier assignment
to plaintiff corporation of orbital slot 153 E, defendant Lichauco
offered said slot to interested applicants. A copy of the notice of
offer is attached as Annex F.
13. Plaintiffs learned of defendant Lichauco's acts after orbital
slot 153 E was offered for bidding. To plaintiff coproration's
knowledge, the orbital slot was eventually awarded to defendant
Unknown Awardee.
x x x x10
The complaint alleged that since Lichauco's act of offering and
awarding orbital slot 153 East Longitude was patently illegal and
violative of DOTC's prior commitment to PASI, Lichauco should
be enjoined from performing any acts and entering into or
executing any agreement or arrangement of whatever nature in
connection with the said orbital slot. The complaint also averred
that the purported award of the orbital slot to the "Unknown
Awardee was illegal, and thus should be declared null and void.
Finally, the complaint alleged a cause of action for damages
against Lichauco, cast in the following manner:
xxxx
21. Defendant Lichauco attacked the good name and reputation
of plaintiffs.
22. She willfully caused damage to plaintiffs by orchestrating the
above-described acts which are contrary to law; morals and
basic norms of good faith.
23. She interefered with and violated plaintiff corporation's
contract with DOTC by offering and awarding orbital slot 153 E to
defendant Unknown Awardee.
24. Because of defendant Lichauco's reprehensible acts,
plaintiffs suffered actual damages of at least P10 million each,
for all of which defendant Lichauco should be held liable to pay.
25. By reason of defendant Lichauco's illegal and malicious acts,
plaintiff corporation's business name and goodwill was tarnished,
for which plaintiff corporation should be indemnified by way of
moral damages in the amount of at least P10 million.

v. P500 Thousand each to plaintiffs as attorney's fees and

litigation expenses.
x x x x12
The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, and subsequently raffled to Branch 214. On 2
February 1998, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
against Lichauco, who received the summons together with the
complaint on 28 January 1998. Lichauco failed to file an answer
within the reglementary period, but eight (8) days after the lapse
thereof, she filed a Manifestation and Motion asking for a new
five (5)-day period, or until 25 February 1998, to file a responsive
pleading to the complaint. However, she filed instead a Motion to
Admit with attached Motion to Dismiss on 27 February 1998. She
rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on
the grounds that the suit is a suit against the State which may
not be sued without its consent; that the complaint stated no
cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by failing to seek recourse with the
Office of the President.
In an order13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC denied the motion
to dismiss. It characterized the defense of state immunity as "at
very least a contentious issue which can not be resolved by
mere allegations in the pleadings but which can be best threshed
out in a litig[i]ous forum where parties are accorded enormous
(sic) opportunity to argue for the ascertainment of whether the
act complained of are indeed within the parameters and
prerogatives of the authority exercising the same."14 The RTC
also noted that the allegations in the complaint regarding the
ultimate facts sufficiently presented an ultra vires act of
Lichauco, and that she was being sued in her personal capacity.
As to the argument pertaining to the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the RTC noted that the principle is not
an inflexible rule, and may be dispensed with when its
application would cause great and irreparable damage or when it
would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.15
Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
nullified the RTC order in the Decision now assailed before us.
The Court of Appeals sustained the contention that the complaint
is a suit against the State with the following ratiocination:
The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against the
state.1avvphil.net

The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted

with bad faith was done in the exercise of and in pursuance of an
official duty. Her duties are as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. The
Undersecretary shall:
(1) Advise and assist the Secretary in the formulation and
implementation of department objectives and policies;
(2) Oversee all the operational activities of the department for
which he shall be responsible to the Secretary;
(3) Coordinate the programs and projects of the department and
be responsible for its economical, efficient and effective
administration:
xxxxxxxxx
It is apparent from the above enumeration that the petitioner is
directly under and answerable to the DOTC Secretary. We can
therefore conclude that her official acts such as the said "notice
of offer" was with the blessing and prior approval of the DOTC
Secretary himself.
Being an official act, it is also protected by the presumption that
the same was performed in good faith and in the regular
performance of official duty.
"Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. - As a rule, a
public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not
personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act
performed within the scope of his official authority, and in the line
of his official duty. In order that acts may be done within the
scope of official authority, it is not necessary that they be
prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or
requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done
by an officer in relation to matters committed by law to his control
or supervision, or that they have more or less connection with
such matters, or that they are governed by a lawful requirement
of the department under whose authority the officer is acting.
Under this principle, state building commissioners who, in
obedience to a stature, discharge one who has been employed
to construct a state building, take possession of the work, and
place it in the hands of another contractor, are not liable to the
former contractor in damages, since in so doing they are merely
acting in the line of their duty. An officer is not personally
responsible for the necessary and unavoidable destruction of
goods stored in buildings, when such buildings were destroyed
by him in the lawful performance of a public duty imposed on him
by a valid and constitutional statute."
xxxxxxxxx
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. - Where an officer is
invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his
judgment in matters brought before him he is sometimes called a
quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given
immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the
result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however, erroneous
judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are done
within the scope of the officer's authority, and without willfulness,
malice, or corruption." (43 Am. Jur., pp. 85-86).

faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents.

Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are
not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
This too is well-settled."17
Preliminarily, we discuss the procedural grounds cited by
petitioners which they assert are sufficient to have caused the
dismissal of Lichauco's petition before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners claim that contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, Lichauco failed to attach all pleadings
and documents relevant to her petition, and that those that were
attached were merely "duplicate original copies." Lichauco
counters that for the viability of her petition for certiorari, all that
she needed to attach were her motion to dismiss, the RTC
orders acting on such motion, her motion for reconsideration of
the denial of her motion to dismiss, and petitioners' opposition to
said motion for reconsideration. She claims that only these
motions and submission were relevant to the resolution of her
petition.18
In her comment, Lichaucho claims that she did not have to
attach the complaint to the copy of the petition she sent to the
petitioners herein, since the latter obviously retained the original
copy of the complaint they filed.19 However, her petition before
the appellate court does not indicate that the same complaint
was included as an attachment, and indeed, there is a curious
absence of any averment on Lichuaco's part that she indeed
attached the said complaint to her petition.20 Certainly, in a
petition for certiorari assailing the denial of a motion to dismiss a
complaint, the very complaint itself is a document relevant and
pertinent to the special civil action. It should be remembered that
unlike in an ordinary appeal that is given due course,21 the case
record is not automatically elevated to the court exercising
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari; hence there is
an even more impelling need to attach all pleadings and
documents to the special civil action, as mandated under Section
1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. After all, how
could the court a quo properly ascertain whether or not the
motion to dismiss itself should have been granted if it did not
have a copy of the complaint sought to be dismissed itself.
Nonetheless, the requirement to attach such relevant pleadings
under Section 1, Rule 65 is read in relation to Section 3, Rule 46,
which states that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any
of the documentary requirements, such as the attachment of
such relevant pleadings, "shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition." The procedural rule accords sufficient
discretion to the court hearing the special civil action whether or
not to dismiss the petition outright for failure to comply with said
requirement. If the court does dismiss the petition on that
ground, the dismissal would be justifiable under Section 3, Rule
46, and generally such action of the court cannot be assailed as
constituting either grave abuse of discretion or reversible error of
law. If the court, on the other hand, takes cognizance of the
petition despite such lapses, the phrasing of Section 3, Rule 46
sufficiently justifies such adjudicative recourse. Indeed, the
ultimate logic behind rules of procedure being the promotion of
the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding,22 the higher
interests of justice may at times sufficiently warrant the
allowance of the petition for certiorari despite such lapses,
especially if they are nonetheless correctible through subsequent
submissions.

In Sanders vs. Veridiano[16], the Supreme Court held:

"Given the official character of the above-described letters, we
have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking,
being sued as officers of the United States government. As they
have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the
trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right
to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied
not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will require that
government, viz.: the appropriation of the necessary amount to
cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot
prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately
liable has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not
only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the
doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own
government but also to foreign States sought to be subjected to
the jurisdiction of our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the
acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good

In any event, the Court is willing to overlook Lichauco's failure to

attach the complaint in her petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, an oversight sadly ignored by the appellate court.
There are weighty issues at hand relating to the doctrine of state
immunity from suit and the requisites of a motion to dismiss.
There is a connective issue between these two aspects in that if
the State is sued without its consent, the corresponding suit
must be dismissed. At times, it would be teasingly obvious, even
from the moment of the filing of the complaint, that the suit is one
against the State. A cursory examination of the caption of the
complaint can sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as when
the suit is directly initiated against the Republic of the
Philippines, any foreign government, or an unincorporated
government agency as the named respondents. In such cases,
obviously there is need for immediate caution, although if it is
somehow established that those respondents had given their
consent to be sued, the suit may nonetheless prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the
unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the complaint as
"acting Secretary of the [DOTC]."23 The hornbook rule is that a
suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against
an officer of the government by a private citizen which would
result in a charge against or financial liability to the government
must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it
has not been formally impleaded.24 However, government

immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if
the government no longer has an interest to protect in the
outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal
because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of
his/her duties.
Petitioner insists that Lichauco is being sued for her acts
committed in excess of her authority, ultra vires in nature, and
tortious in character. The Court of Appeals responded that such
acts fell within Lichauco's official duties as DOTC
Undersecretary, thus enjoying the presumption that they were
performed in good faith and in the regular performance of official
duty. This rationale is pure sophistry and must be rejected
outright.
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good
faith" or "regular performance of official duty", yet these
presumptions are disputable25 and may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence.26 Many civil actions are oriented
towards overcoming any number of these presumptions, and a
cause of action can certainly be geared towards such effect. The
very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence
overcome the disputable presumptions involved. Otherwise, if
trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the perceived
indisputability of the presumptions, the judicial exercise would be
relegated to a mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in
a given case, nothing more. Consequently, the entire Rules of
Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save perhaps for the
provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever adopted as a
jurisprudential rule, no public officer could ever be sued for acts
executed beyond their official functions or authority, or for
tortious conduct or behavior, since such acts would "enjoy the
presumption of good faith and in the regular performance of
official duty". Indeed, few civil actions of any nature would ever
reach the trial stage, if a case can be adjudicated by a mere
determination from the complaint or answer as to which legal
presumptions are applicable. For example, the presumption that
a person is innocent of a wrong is a disputable presumption on
the same level as that of the regular performance of official
duty.27 A civil complaint for damages necessarily alleges that the
defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would
serve as basis for the award of damages. With the rationale of
the Court of Appeals, such complaint can be dismissed upon a
motion to dismiss solely on the ground that the presumption is
that a person is innocent of a wrong.
So obviously, the Decision of the Court of Appeals cannot
receive the imprimatur of this Court. Still, the question of whether
Lichauco may validly invoke state immunity from suit to secure
the outright dismissal of petitioners' complaint warrants closer
examination.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three (3) causes of action
against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any
act in relation to orbital slot 153 East Longitude; one for
declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged
award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude; and one for damages
against Lichauco herself. Evidently, the first two causes of action
stem from Lichauco's act of offering orbital slot 153 East
Longitude for bidding, through the Notice of Offer which was
attached to the complaint.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Lichauco asserts that she is being sued
for issuing the aforementioned Notice of Offer, which fell within
her official functions as DOTC Undersecretary for
Communications. She claims that it was Secretary Lagdameo
who authorized her to offer orbital slot 153 East Longitude for
bidding, and she thus acted well within the scope of her authority
to advise and assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation and
implementation of department objectives and policies.
The Notice of Offer cites Department Circular 97-01, signed by
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile, as authority for it. The Court
has examined the aforementioned Department Circular, issued
on 17 October 1997, which establishes the "Guidelines on the
Procurement of Orbital Slots and Frequency Registration of
Philippine Satellites". Therein, the DOTC is mandated "to
conduct a bidding process in case there are competing
applications for any one of the assigned or applied-for-orbital
slots"28. Further, the Department Circular states that "the DOTC
shall publish in three newspapers of general circulation a notice
of offer for the government assigned, initiated and applied for
orbital slots."29
Thus, insofar as the first two causes of action are concerned,
Lichauco may have a point when she asserts that they were
based on acts which she performed in her capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. But does this necessarily mean that these two
causes of action may thus be dismissed on the basis of state
immunity of suit?

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of

official functions by an officer of the government will result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government that the
complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself.
However, the distinction must also be raised between where the
government official concerned performs an act in his/her official
and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or
respondent.
On this point, our ruling in J.M. Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration30 is material. Petitioners therein had filed a
special civil action for prohibition to nullify Republic Act No. 2616,
or law that directed the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in
Quezon City. Impleaded as respondents were the officials and
government agency tasked to undertake such expropriation. The
respondents alleged that the petition for prohibition was actually
a suit against the State without its consent. The Court, through
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
debunked the argument, ruling instead that the petition was
within the ambit of judicial review:
[T]he power of judicial review is granted, if not expressly, at least
by clear implication from the relevant provisions of the
Constitution. This power may be exercised when the party
adversely affected by either a legislative or executive act, or a
municipal ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate suit to
test its validity. The special civil action of prohibition has been
relied upon precisely to restrain the enforcement of what is
alleged to be an unconstitutional statute. As it is a fundamental
postulate that the Constitution as the supreme law is binding on
all governmental agencies, failure to observe the limitations
found therein furnishes a sufficient ground for a declaration of
nullity of the government measure challenged. The argument
then that the government is the adverse party and that,
therefore, must consent to its being sued certainly is far from
persuasive. x x x x31
The Court further noted that it was well-settled for the purpose of
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, "it is enough if the
respondents or defendants named be the government officials
who would give operation and effect to official action allegedly
tainted with unconstitutionality."32
Unlike in J.M. Tuason, the case at bar does not seek to nullify an
unconstitutional law or measure. However, the first two causes of
action do sufficiently impute grave abuse of discretion against
Lichauco in her official capacity. Since judicial review of acts
alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is
guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows in such
instances that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in the appropriate suit.
Moreover, if the suit had been directed against Lichauco alone,
and in her personal capacity, yet it sought, as it now does, the
nullification of the Notice of Offer or the awards thereon, such
remedy could not avail even if granted. Lichauco, in her personal
capacity, cannot be directed to set aside the Notice of Offer, the
award of the bid, or to issue a new award herself. It is only
because Lichauco was sued in her official capacity as the DOTC
Undersecretary that she, or her successors in office, could be
judicially compelled to act in such fashion.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the
defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said
causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against
the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action
do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the
State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of
the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought
damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have
been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner
impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government
agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance
obtains in this case.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, Lichauco herself was already the acting head of the
DOTC, owing to the sudden death of then Secretary Enrile a few
days before. At that stage, any suit seeking to nullify the Notice
of Bid and the alleged award to the "Unknown Bidder" should
have properly denominated Lichauco as the respondent, and not
the DOTC.

Nonetheless, as to the first two causes of action, there was a

viable ground to dismiss the complaint: the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Indeed, such ground was alleged by
Lichauco in her Motion to Dismiss. Yet the principle of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies admits to several
exceptions. In its Order denying the motion to dismiss the
complaint, the RTC adequately dispensed with the objection,
applying the established exceptions to the rule of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies. To wit:

Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is

shielded by the State's immunity from suit, to hypothetically
admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such
hypothetical admission has to be deemed a concession on her
part that she had performed the tortious or damaging acts
against the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable for
damages.

Turning to the matter pertaining to non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies, it is fundamental that this principle is
not an inflexible rule. It yields to many accepted exceptions.
(Rocamora vs. RTC - Cebu, G.R. No. 65307). As in this case,
this principle can be dispensed with when its application would
cause great and irreparable damage and when it does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the defense of state

immunity from suit in regard to the third cause of action with the
assertion that the acts complained of constituting said cause of
action fell within her official functions and were not tortuous in
character. Still, to establish such assertions of fact, a full-blown
trial on the merits would be necessary, as would the case be if
Lichauco raised the defense that she did not commit these acts
complained of. Certainly, these defenses cannot be accorded
merit before trial, factual as they are in character.

When the subject orbital slot 153 E was bidded out to other
applicants, the damage and injury plaintiffs stand to suffer was
clear, present, and substantiated that this Court was impelled to
provide urgent needed measure such as the issuance of writ of
injunction against the public defendant. Indeed, under the
circumstances then obtaining it was impractical for the plaintiffs
to first proceed to the administrative official concerned before
taking court action.33
A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action,
anchored as it is on alleged acts that are tortious in character or
otherwise beyond the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The
complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and
defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false
assertions against them in her letter to the Land Bank President.
The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the
trial to be determined on the basis of the evidence. However, if
proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that
is not shielded by the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The
doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals :34
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them,
the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that
the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account
in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to
the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar
in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs.
Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or
officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from
suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or
suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or
the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit
against the State within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling
is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.35
The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on the merits, it is
established that the public official concerned had committed
illegal or tortious acts against the plaintiff. How does it apply in
relation to a motion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity
from suit, necessarily lodged before trial on the merits?
Our ruling in United States of America v. Reyes36 warrants due
consideration. The Court therein, through then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled that a motion to
dismiss averring immunity from suit of a State and its
functionaries was actually grounded on the specific ground for
dismissal of the lack of cause of action, for even assuming that
the defendants had committed the injurious acts complained of,
"no action may be maintained thereon, because of the principle
of state immunity."37 Pertinently, the Court noted that "a motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint."

All told, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find no

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying
Lichauco's Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 21 February 2000 is SET ASIDE and the
Order dated 14 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is
ordered to try and decide the case on the merits with deliberate
dispatch. No costs. SO ORDERED.
d.) Yap vs Cabales
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the Decision2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged
in the real estate business through their company Primetown
Property Group.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties
from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said
purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses
Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita
Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank,
but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were
deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the
reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands were made by
Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to
make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to
pay the amounts represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for
collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.3 On
December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and
instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
6238.4
Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City.
The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to
suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial
question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from
participating in the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil
cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000,
denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial
Motion for Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos.
34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial
Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The

subsequent motions were denied in the Order10 dated October

18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction11 before the
RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2,
2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the petition.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was
denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance
of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16 dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos.
6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231
and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the
validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but
it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to
collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks
which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this
Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks
are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so
happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in
question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore,
petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil
cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow ground.
Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is
contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why
the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for
the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer
that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil
Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the
issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the
petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.17
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was
denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN
THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY
INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND
6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF
B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME
CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO
ORDER.20
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial
question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the
present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos.
6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages
were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue
as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the
petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a
logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for
the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily
follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires,
among other elements, that the check should have been issued
for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration;
otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued.
Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was
his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his
account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He
made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the
titles to the purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos.

6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the

proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the
validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but
whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising
from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in
favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to
private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the
resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue
of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.21
The present case hinges on the determination of whether there
exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of
the proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the
petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.22
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in
one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based
on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil
case does not involve a prejudicial question.23 Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.24
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty
of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the
private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the
sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from
Evelyn.lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared
not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and
damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the
checks is in itself an offense.25
In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination
was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the
checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were
likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases
for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We
ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners
is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not
affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will
ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks.
In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached;
that is, if a bouncing check has been issued."
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v.
Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an

offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a

check issued as an evidence of debt - though not intended to be
presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary
check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
xxxx
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a
deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt
- is malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the
faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum.28
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced.
The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of
sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case
was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the
defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double
sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that
there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in
the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the
determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private
respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect
the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material
question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued
bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its
issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the
determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to
the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be
raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against
him. The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation,
as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and
evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during
trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to
ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to
put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a
well designed machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defenses
available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the
criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should
ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 filed against the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the
decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated
April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos.

55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her
husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a
Complaint dated August 2006[5] for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las
Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably,
the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were
issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007[6] in Criminal Case
Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved
facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the
resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words,
private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds
Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial
Question[7] on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial
question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which
the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue
from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of
the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action;
thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007,
granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the
nullification of the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged
violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the
civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a
criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution
rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).[8]
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,[9] the MTC denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated
May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision
dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a
previously filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in
the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear
evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was
shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages
when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil
action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not
render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in
character.[10]
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

e.) Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs Janiola

The Issue

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of

the August 26, 2008 Decision[1] in SCA No. 08-0005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The
Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007[2] and
March 12, 2008[3] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED

IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS.
55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]

The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto
S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,
Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,
2004[4] for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)
against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as
I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal
information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with

The Courts Ruling: This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7,
1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in
Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential

elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases[12] that the
elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted
provision and in Beltran v. People,[13] are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
however, became effective and the above provision was
amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now
provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil
case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a
criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was
filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner
argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a
party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending
criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must be
interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal
action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the
latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil
case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a
change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law
indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had.[14] In the instant case, the
phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of
the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the
criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the
insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action.
There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except
to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the
civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved
their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not
abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the
proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160.
Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency
of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary

investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in
law as that which must precede the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in
the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.
The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160
filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a
statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself
but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.
[16] This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or
every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[17]
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize
seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is
impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to
apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that
would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously
instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and
is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted
to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be
filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the
trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of
Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations
when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the
preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6
provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency
of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in
order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant

case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent
move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the
presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question
existed involving a civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22,
as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the
case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly
indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the
resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case
three years after the institution of the criminal charges against
him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought
to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.[19]
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of
the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent
allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is
worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and

a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly

stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid
reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission
of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed
more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction
agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the
filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil
action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent
and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it
is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be
left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the
criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of
that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial
question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is
absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the
construction agreement between the parties is declared null and
void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration
of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot
be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime
punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.[20]
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or
agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the
checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up
the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line
of cases[21] that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of
BP 22. In Mejia v. People,[22] we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge
is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check
was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or
any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason
for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear
intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case,
we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the
issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for
insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution
for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or

for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon
issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable
consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either
in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to
do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the
maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several
checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for
2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from
said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the
check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner
when the subject check was given by Bautista to private
complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer
connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be
given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with
Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere
act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This
is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[24]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the
construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private
respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that
private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that
is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the
existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the
issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal
action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 080005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders
dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case
Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order
the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61 with dispatch. No costs. SO ORDERED.
f.) Pimentel vs Pimentel
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap
(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon
City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC
Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case
No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3]
holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is
not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the
issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried
even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in
question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to

Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August
2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before
the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case
for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender
commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by
overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide
is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is
still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the
Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action
for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court

such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules

on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was
filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial
question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.[11]
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person
who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.
[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In
short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6]
provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to
RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date
of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February
2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392
on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No.
04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed
after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of

Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity
of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There
was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court
declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.[19]
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 047392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in
the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.
g.) Consing, Jr. vs People

The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC
in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 71252).

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the

defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.

On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R.

SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTCs questioned orders, explaining:

The Case

We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case,
i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held liable in the
questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of
private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati
criminal cases.

On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18,

2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the writ of
certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252
entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge,
Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing,
Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on November 26,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati
City deferring the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No.
00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil
cases pending between him and the complainant in the trial
courts in Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans totaling
P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of
land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite
registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its
option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of
P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the
amounts due to

Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite

and Makati criminal cases?

The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati

criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case show
that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in
controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles
(TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of
Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are
identical; and (6) the issue of private respondents culpability for
the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig
civil case identical to or intimately related to the criminal cases in
Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in
the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in
the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view of
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party
thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial
notice of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a
better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our
legal system abhors.

Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing

in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional
amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was
purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture
partner of Unicapital.3

Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.

63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private respondents
arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the
fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the
Cavite criminal case.12

Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property,

they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No.
114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the
parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by
de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be
spurious.4

In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders

commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil
Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13

On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount

of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and
received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive
relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding
against him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the
ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of public document against Consing
and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutors Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in
Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for
estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in
Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to
Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment
in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a
prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati
civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his
motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional
ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On
November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending
the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the
RTC denied the Prosecutions motion for reconsideration.10

On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through

falsification of public document was filed against Consing and De
la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case).
Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the
Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the
RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consings motion.
Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his arraignment and
trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on
March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its decision on May 31,
2001, granting Consing petition for certiorari and setting aside
the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial
until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this
Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the May 31,
2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court
granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed
and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
(the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
(the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila
civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother
in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the

guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for

estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and
the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative
of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if
PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus
damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be
held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document.
Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI
should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not
necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case
where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as
determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal
case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for
executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor
of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee.
Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of which
consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while
the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal
case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary
before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court
denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no
prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court
and ruled that:
the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case
on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20,
1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565
was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine
the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No.
56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument,
a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains
that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal
case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based
upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could
proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the
new Civil Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud
and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of
respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant
petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for
the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA, citing the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and
Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that
justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal
case, and claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the
Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question
that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.

On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing

itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and held
thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The
transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the issue of
the respondents culpability for the questioned transactions are
all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same
parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr.
(G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No.
99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the
disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as
a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of
the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March
18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied
the motion through the second assailed resolution of December
11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No.
148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252,
which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in
Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its
amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the
Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a
prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil
action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a
certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the
resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or
innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as an
independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately
from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized
under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took cognizance of the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended
decision that the Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case,
was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of
the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal
Case No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193,
the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial question,
because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the
mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or liability toward
Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he
filed and Unicapitals Makati civil case were not intended to delay
the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such
resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered
determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant
the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of
a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling

In his opposition to the States motion for reconsideration,

Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not
binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which
was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati
criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did
not yet become final and executory, and could still be reversed at
any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied
upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for
his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a
contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as
his principal.

The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.

Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm
holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be
suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent
civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial
question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the
ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case
with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.

A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case

reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the
effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as
security and later object of sale, a property which they do not
own, and foisting to the public a spurious title."22 As such, the
action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal
Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which
states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud
and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.23
This was precisely the Courts thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper for the CA to
apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital,
for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different
complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions
Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against
him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based
on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended
pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had
filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of
Consings being a mere agent of his mother who should not be
criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved
having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled
in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
(the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
(the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila
civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother
in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.25 (Words in
parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay
the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
ART. 40-41 PERSONALITY SPRINGS FROM BIRTH
a.) Quimiging vs Icao
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos,
presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for
support and damages, and another order denying amendment of
the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued
Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that
the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as
a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied
by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's
fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of
cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child
had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge
sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that
as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a
baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint
averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed
directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it,
as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee
(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the
motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same
Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children
may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent
them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the
Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as
yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true
that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the
Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples
expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna
doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de
los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el
nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30,
no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya
existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene
efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that
for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his
lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same

Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages
under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for
failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set
aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against
appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
b.) Continental Steel vs Montano
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February
2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution[3]
dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement
leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental
and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to
grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of
death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse,
children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for

paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of
Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the
Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA.
Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to
settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to
Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement
dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties

mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,
to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in
amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit
their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and
Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union
maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3
of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should
have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered
by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of
Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to
receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan
(Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the
delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was only
24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to
Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and
only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel;
and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who
signed the CBA with their respective employees unions were the
same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the
existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which
provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for
the laborer.

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company
shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or
his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate
dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents,
brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child.

Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on
5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5]
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January
2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express

provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1)
death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles
40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with
civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died
because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from
the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus
that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at
all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus
that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was
delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be
supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was
clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the
terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof
were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure
of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of
dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other
death benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted definition
of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the

employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel,
referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent
evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the
companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the
grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the
parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted
company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano
was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said
benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of

bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is death; (2)
such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such
dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and
accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4,
paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable
elements must be present: (a) there is death; (b) such death
must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must be
legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.[18]

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008,

affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The
appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal

sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails to impress
the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the
purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death
benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive
upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to
be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing
loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead
fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term death
of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting bereavement
leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental
Steels] theory, there can be no experience of death to speak of.
The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus
simply cannot be equated with anything less than loss of human
life, especially for the expectant parents. In this light,
bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the
employee and the latters immediate family, extend to them
solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence
that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only
sadly misses this crucial point.[20]

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the

Court of Appeals reads:
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the
right to be supported by the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for
support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a
dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery.
There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated
November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan
S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]

In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals

denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.

In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby
rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay
Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death
benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the
herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a

Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting
Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with pay and other
death benefits because no death of an employees dependent
had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of
pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal
person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any
juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its
contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was
qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the
status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the
conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA
were lacking.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently

argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal
and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a
juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave
under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,
brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of
the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could
be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of
the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of
Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos
claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on
the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and
dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are
indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to
the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor
the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement
leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40
provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it
is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles
40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be

applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of

the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts
with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein

since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person
are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the
unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior
to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs
parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death
benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide
at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by
death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24]
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
[25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under
the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one
who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else. Under said
general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of
its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA
provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or
sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes
the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs
status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27]
we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid
and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate

child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there
are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like
the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and
illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them
legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the aforecited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not
disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and
that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence,
making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply
with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident
insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave
and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for
the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits
are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen
the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the
loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in
this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born
alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and
again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of
doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way,
the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of
labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor
Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of
judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both
sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor
Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a
contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight
of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a
policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183
SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed
on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter
should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the
law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v.
NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its
favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
(P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn
child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation. SO ORDERED.