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    Kryscel Czarinah
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    good by fagothey

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    318 просмотров11 страниц

    Good by Fagothey

    Загружено:

    Kryscel Czarinah
    good by fagothey

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    из 11
    WEE” Hie Mpas As of SNE 77, 101@5P / how trbics soo by: Austin Fagothey Y ay zt PROBIEM the indivicual man xéliés cn his own consciousness te éetermine the gegree of his responsiilicy for his acts, and on his om conscience to Judge the good or evil, the rightuss or wronqness, of these acts as dene by him in concrete circumstances, There in no more ultimate court of appeal in this, wieideien thathestinedy af couaciencds (Nut sublactl ual agraliey (lane fe anc sufficient. fit were all we had, there would be as many judges of morality as there are porsons, and sincerity would be the sane as truth in moral matters, conscience can he erroneous as well. as currect; error can he vincible as well as invincible, When chjective truth ts attainable, conscience cannot rest satisfied with 9 subjective opinion that it knovs may be flase. Our next endeavor, therefore, rust be to find vlothar there is an objective morality with rich the judgnent o£ conscience shuld be in agreement, ad, if so, vhat that norabity is, Menceférth the vhole af our study will be devoted to this pursuit. Wa begin by aski Ds good definable? 2s gnod an end to he seught? ay obliged tc avck the good? 4 gond’a value simply in itse12? What distinguishes moral vaiues fram other values? DEFINABILTIY OF GoOD™. What is the good? How do ve define goodness? Tt seams that wo must settle: this question at the outsst, for if wa dp net know what good menns, how will we recognize it whan wo cate acoss 4¢?. On the ather hand, nc one has succedded ia giving a good definition of good. Ih fact, woule nnt a good definition of yvod requity that one alroady know good Lefore defining it? md, Af 80, why define it? ‘he questicn uf the definability! of cood was made acute ar tun of the century’by Geurge Edward Moore. His reasoning is that ‘all definstion is snalysis of concept into its components, that good is a simple concept manalyzable into anything sinpler, and that therefore the concapt of good is in- definakle. Wa can, of course, point tu-certain properties in cbjecta because of which we call these objects quod, hut that foes not tell us what is good about these properties or why it is good to have them, In a sense we ean define the yoog, the object which is good, but not the predicate quod itself. ‘that we cannot define good coos not man that we cannot inow what it is, Not all Knowledge is by definition. Na connot define yellow but-can only point to yellow objects; the wavelength of the Light tells us nething akout the lusk of tha “color We sae. Yo try to define good in terms of somthing else that is not qood ia not to define it ut to lose it, ‘The reduction of good, the simplest of ethical idaas, to something non~sthical involves what Moora calls the naturalistic fallacy, as if good wore a sort-cf natural property that some things possess and ether lack. Good is just gocd, irreducible, wianalyzable, ond indefinabie. umd the Oe might criticize this azgunent by pointing out that the dictionary cuntains a definiticn of gcoi and that rules for the use of tha vora good in Language con be formulated. Linguistic sanplysts spend much time at this task, ' cot = 2 bat Moore anticipated them by noting that the subject matter of othics is the qrneept of good itsel# and not cozroctness in speaking about it. Others solve the Duoblen cf the definaliiity of got by cctually Joining it, for example, as Dlpasure, desiraniiity, evolution, Life according to mature, ane aintlar Gdncopes; “Me shaii have to exomine these clains, but they are exemplea “oF brecisely what ‘Moure means by Naturalistic fallacy. Another objectign is that, if good camot be defined, it wild hove to be knem by sone ‘sort of direct intuition, this Hore einits, despite the unpopularity of intuitionisn. ow much intultiony if ay, must e adnitted in cthics 1a. quectio# wo will discuss Inter. 2 Whether ox pct good is inéefinable in principle, we have to bsgdn mr study of it withwat a definition, since ve could achieve one only by comsitting ourselves in advance to'a philosophy we have net yet examined. ven witlicut a dafinition mich has boon yritton about. the good. ‘the aneiants developed ue of its most fruitful aspects, the good as end, and we may as well‘hegin with this + trg@itional: approach, wu Goon as ax gine his Ethics with the statement: "rhe good is that at whol ali th "This 4s not to:be taken as a'definiticn of the goo, but only as a recvunition of the relationsitip between good and and, mm end he declares to-be"that Zor the geo of which a thing is done," and locates it among his four ate caudes. For him all change is a process whereby uowe glven unloxlying su {the notte) Aomizes a hed specification of ceternination (the foen) thresh the action of. an efficient operator {the agent) moved to act by-the abtxaction of supé govd (the end). such a view of the universe with its constant changes supposes: teleology, ox purposiveness, a directed world in which all things have alain, as opposed to the uechanistic thecry that all chanqes cone about chance. A dixécted world neads a principle of dirocticn, and the name for ‘it is nature. Bach being {a so structuren that it nets uly long certain definite lifes, ‘The nature is not soma kind of x, whether outsice or inside the being, not something @istinct from the being which acts, but its very self, It is the esqénce of ach being considered as the principiy or source of its activity. bigection supposés not ‘only a nature, a moving principle ‘to make a thing go, but also a target towerd which to move. Su nature ani ond axe correlative teras. Natural activity is teleological activity. Mon also has a nature, the source of the innor éynamism of his being, nisking it natural for man’ to seek the good as his end, that the nature of ' being structures it to’ act along definite Lines is not a bar to freedom, Some hdings havp 2 free nature, are built to cot froaly, anf 3t is-naturnl, to them to yinkee themselves to their end Ly free choice. thors lack freedom and automaticrLly run, along thé tracks their nature has laid. in either case they tend to ends. Every end is a good end every yood is an ond, +2n end would not be, sought wnleas-it ware aomehow good for’ the 'seckex, end the yond hy being seught is the end or purpose of the seaker's striving, Mo uctivity is possible excopt Zor the attainment GF some end, for the sake of some good, This is the principle of finality or teleology, which.St, Thomas expldins as follows: Good = 3 Every agent of necensity acts fur an end, For if in a mumhor of cauges, ortained to one ether the first he removed, the others nust of necessity be renoved also. Nuv the fizst of all cawses fe the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive froin save in so far in movod by an agent; for hothing remuces itself from jotontiality to ack. Tat an agent dows hot move except owt of intention for an end, Tox if the agent Were not Gaterminate 9 soe partioylar effect, 4& would not da {one thing rather then enather: consequently in order that it produce a doterminate effect, it must of necessity be determined ty sone certain one, which ‘nos, the nature of an oh In other words, beformit acts, a being with potentiality for acting is in an indeterminate condition, and can cither act or not act,’ act in this way or in that way. No acticn will ever take place unless somnthing Leaves this incetormination, stirs the heing te act, and points its action in a certain direction. Hence the principle of finality, “every agent acts for an end,” 4s inglicit in the concepts of potency ond act, and in the whole notion of causnlity. Lf uvery agent acts for an end, thehuman agent cértainly dees so. The foregoing description is based on aristotle,’who gave ta teleclogy its classical exprassion, But our interest is in man, Whatever one may think of teleolegy in the world at larye, no sane mm can deny that human heings act for ends, “Bven one who tried to prove that they do not would have this as his end in view, Failure to adapt one's omduet to zational ends is the accosted sign Of fentel derongenon (On, therefore, that thera axe such things as rational human acts is an admissidn that human beings do act for anit. The question arises: If all things, including man, inevitably end that is also the good, how ‘cit any act fail te he good, how em huten, ge wrong? ‘The good as end, as perfective, as goca for, has various meanings among which we must sort out the moral good. a an ndwet ‘The thesis uf the metahysicion, that "every being is good," refers unly to ontological or metaphysical grodness. Tt means enly that every being, by the very fact that it is a being, has scme goodness about Jt and 1s qo) for somthing, contzibuting in some way to the harmony and perfection of the wiverse.. very haing also has a certain anount of, physical goofness, which con= sists in a completeness of parts and competence of activity. though some things are physically defective, they are good insofar as they have boing, defective insofar az they lack being. “Fron the fact.that every being is good for sorgthing, hevever, it does nst follow that every being is good for everything. What"is good for one thing may not he guod for another, ond'what is goed for a thing idar these circunstances or from this dapect may not be good for the some thing wider different conditions cr from another stanfpoint. Metaphysics congiders the qood in its broadest scope and sn can find good in everything in somg way? ethics ccnsiders the goot in. the Limited Line cf voluntary anid respon ihlé himan conduct and often finds thie lina strangely warped, Tho murderer Jevels his gum ond fells his victim. rt is a goo! shot but an evil dead. as a piege of marksmanship it is acndrable, but ap an act of human conduct it 4 Garinble. Thee is sons good in all things, but it need not be the ethical or moral good. Good = @ wcauso not evanything is good Son everything, 1t is up to nants juaguent to determine what things are gvod Cor hin, Ruan juccments are 2ycn to error, and therefore he may mistake thé appexent good for the true good, talons a’ thing at, least appears to be “owd we could Rot seek it nt all, for it Souda make nd appeal tu our appetites; but we ‘oan easily confuse wnat is good for somthing ise with what ia gout for us, or what would be gooil or us in other Ciuouutances ith what is-good Zor us hero and now, TE seme lesser good makes Gnpossibia the attainment of the absolutely necessary.good, then this Lesser good jevpot the true yood for us, tho woral yrod must always be the true. good. thus there aré fegrees of yoodaess. We may seek a good not for its own! sake but as a mems t+ some further gont; it is desirable only because it Inads to senothing more desirable, ‘hue in the useful or instrumental good, and it is youd only tn a*yualified and ancloyous sense; such are all tools and distrunents, We my seek a good for the-satisfaction or enjoyment it cives without considering whether it will be heneficial to our whole being: it del! us how and may be harmless, hut it offers us no guarantee that it may not burt us‘ln the lony run and unfit us for the greater good, ‘his is the pleasant youl, and it attracts us nest vividly. lastly, we may seek a gocd because it oun~ txibates tovand the perfection of quz being 23 a whole, because it f)ts a man as sguop. his is the befitting good, the upriyht an? honorable, the noble and rigittesus, and it ig goodin the fullest sonse: Tt is not only goof for us, ae the term befitting jiplies, but good-in itaeLl¢ as an indepeniiant value epart fro itB effect on others; unfer this aspect it is called the intrinsic gnu, The moral gocd, while it muy he Naeiul smd pleasant, is always end necissarily the befitting good. ‘his analysis of the | he directed towqrd the +e ed in some senso, I goal. lo maka dt the moral good in life's purpose and our responsibility. ‘chat human ot this ds not always the mz bf gond. ah duet mst always of HE Coop AS OUGHT the good, we‘have soon, is car cinstant quest, Ya are not bom yosbescova of it fut are born seckers cf it, our existence is a passage fra Capacity to fulfilinent, from potentiality to actuality, fron pexfectihility to perfection. Cur emptiness clandrs to ba £illed, and whatowr. satisfies, cur hanger is called a gow ‘Thus the gocd appears to us. as an end, : But what obliges us to engage in this quest? As en end the good is attractive enc invites ‘us to itself. xt calls for }wing, it deservos to be, it should be realized, it ought: to be does not of itself imply that 1 am the one who gholtld make it bo, We say that a werk of art ought to be, in the sense that. it is a noble conception worthy of production and it would he m shane not to bring it to light; yet no particular artise is strictly oblige? to exoste it. We tell ann that he ought ‘to invest his nonoy in this enterprise, that it. ought to bring hin a batter xetum than ho can hope for. from any’ cthex investmentay yet. no Un@'thinks of this ought as a strict chligeticn. goot always ood excapt the moral good is ary. There is no-gatting away rem the piremnt of Living a good life and thus being @ Here we ‘dea two different sense of tho ought, which th implies, the nonmoral and the moral ought. Rvezy optional, but ie moral geod is nec denands of ncrality, fxom the geod man, This cbligatory character of the moral gooC is what impresses itsplf on those who see ethics chiefly in terns of cuty. 8 nct go much tha loveliness of the good that invites them as the stern voice of duty that calis them, : often the cholee is between a moral coud and some other kine of gond, and the other kind good: seens at the moment hy for themuze aktractiva, If wo consider the good merely as an object of desizo, as ay ond to be sought, the apparent gond cin heckon with alluring smiice while the true cood gravely po! 9 the harder path.» Yet Jone is obliged to follow the true guod and not the merely apparent good. What is the nature of this noral ought that commanils with such authority? zt is'a kind of necessity that is unique and irrerucible to any other. It is not @ logical necessity haed on the inpussilility of thinking contradicticns, rt is notia metaphysical n ‘ty steming fron the identity of being with itself: what is, is, Tt is net a physicel necessity, a met that compels us from without, destroyim our freedom, Nor is.it a biological or a psychological necossity, an intgmal impossibility of acting diffarently built into our nature, likewise dles- troying our freedom, Tt is a morel necessity, that of the ought, guiding us in cognize as the proper use of uur freetom, It is a froedom that is a necdssity and a necessity that is a freedom. ‘The requixenent is absolute, :s1 thus Lt is a necossity, hut it can also he xofused, though te our loss, she thus it is a freedom, Horal necessity affects me, the acting enbject, hut it cone object, the kind of act T the sulject om performing. ‘The act in its rend. is samething contingent that may or ney not be, tmt in ite ideal boing a: up to my veason anc will for Geliberaticn mnt choies, it assumes a practl Recessity demanding decision. Tho demand is absolute. pad use of axtistic, economic, scientific, and other p ticular ailities is penalized by failure, not cuge I had no obligation te pursue these endeavors ani honca no pbediute obligution tc. succeed fn thom. But 7 connot help being a san and psclutely have to succoed as amen, TEX ama failure at it, it is my: fault bo- Gause the failure was willfully cheeen, I do not become had in a dertain Line, but become a bad man. Everything I do expresses my personality in some way, Int the ‘us@ of my freedom is the actual exertion of my unique perscnality as omdtituting my inmost sa fault, bec Take the case of a man offered a huge fortune for one act of murdering pls bect ériond. iitintse the dangars and onhiiee the navantages as much od possible. Make the act absolutely foolproof. vet it uught not to he dene, Wy rot? 1, Eliminate the legal sanction, Suppose that the man is not «nly certiin of not heing caught but alse finds some locphole hy vhich he does not even: break any oxisting civil law and could net he pmsecuted for any crim’. Yet he sees himself a murderer and cannct approve bis act. 2, Eliminate the sociel soncticn, Sines no one will Inu, there!is 19 eno's disapproval oven if he does not receive it. flow Jifferent when ancial fonctions are not desérvad! We do not blame ourselves when wo axe innocent bat Lene society for condemning ua unjustly. 3. Eliminate the psychological sanction. he feolings of depressign, Gisqust, ond shame, tho inability to eat or sleep with the twinge of remorse and guilt, may Aisturd him, Int others cay be immme to such feelings, and veh in him they can com from other sources. The moral element remins. Tf semetiow Lhe guilty feelings could be remavad so that he no Longer felt aay psycho) Gow disturbance over his dead, still in all sincerity he would juaye his act wrong and would know that he is guilty, despite the absonco ci feelings. 4. Blininate the roligious sonction. Mere Goi not to punish it and ware we cértain that he would not, even in this abnurd hypothesis the act ‘ought not: ts be done. The dvey night fuel gat to eseape but would knew that ha did hot deserve to escape. The act is of the kin’ that God ouyht to condern,, and we would be disappointed in hin if he did not, We-would begin to question fie" jusbico, so that God hinsels wailt ac loncer medsure up to the ideal, ‘this is perhaps’ the clearest indication of the absolutoness of the moral ore 5. What remains is the moral sonction. It is intrinsic to the vory act itself, identical with the Telibernte choicé of the will, the relationship otwaen the doer and his deed, In despisiing the worel qocd XT denpise myself. According as 1 acce;t or aject ‘the worel good, I rise or fall in my ow worth as a mm. ‘the moral qrod sovides the scale by which T necessarily rate myself, unavoidably judge mysel£ Whi Jucement is not merely a subjective opinion but an ebjective estimats At ny trub werth in tha acheme of things.- this Lise or fall.is not something optional; Tay not allowed to fall, xt is not a question of whether I m intereate:! in my Zam not allowed not to bo, It is not a disjunctive necessit onsequences, it's simply: po this, © an not ride to oxyose myself ty tha consoquencad of ant doing it. In fact, whatever connoyences theze are must thonselvas be judged by this moral criterion, an] ultimate must cantein thelr on moral worth. msaqquences Sona writers prefer to express this | cught aspect’ Iy tha teras right and wrong rather than good and bad. It de true thet tho firet pair have a mora Joligatory flavor than the sectn:!, but it is impossible to get people te use auch imple terns with consistancy, especially if they are taken az Indofinables, Ue can‘use thom as synonymous and rely on the context to make them clear. 7 According as vo emphasize the good as ond of the ‘good as ought, we-have main varieties of ethics: the teleological” ana the deontological. an unortunate opposition Letween these two views has infected the whole study, a5 42 yne must opt either for an ethics of ants and consequences or for an ethics of law,and obligation, in a word, for an ethics of happiness or for an ethics, of duty. It js possible ts transcend such a dichotomy and to show that these two aspects ary not opposed but supplementary? shnial@ not the qood'he done for its own geke, purely ond simply because it is good, independently of what consequences it may Jead tu ox what authority may impose it os a duty? This may appear from a thixe and-fairly nedeyn sppsoach to the geod, the mdological, tho consideration cf the good as valve. cooD AS vntER, f Velie in’ Genexal The term value or worth se2ns to have its origin in economics, but” 13g hafore the rise of axiology es a formal study Lt wes applied analogously to

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