1 Mindanao Bus Co. v.

City Assessor
Facts:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. He
is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair
shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries which are placed therein, its TPU
trucks are made; body constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be serviceable in the TPU
land transportation business it operates. The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400
petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board
of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty.
Issue:
Won the machineries and equipments are considered immovable which is subject to a realty tax?
Held:
No. The machineries and equipments are not considered immovable.
The court held that the equipments are merely incidental and not essential and principal to the
business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service
shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
3 EVANGELISTA vs. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO.
Facts:
Petitioner, Santos Evangelista, instituted Civil Case in the CFIof Manila for a sum of money, he obtained
a writ of attachment, which levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and
leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Manila.
In due course, judgement was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public
auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to
take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, on the ground that he had leased the
property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said
property.
It appears that a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to respondent, as the
highest bidder at an auction sale held incompliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case of the
same court for the sum of money, had been rendered in favor respondent herein, as plaintiff therein.
Evangelista instituted the present action against respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of
establishing his title over said house, securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages.
After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to
deliver the house in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally until said delivery,
plus costs.
On appeal taken by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved
said respondent from the complaint, on the ground that, although the writ of attachment in favor of
Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of respondent,
Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the
house in question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is
"ostensibly a personal property.

Issue:
WON the house is personal property?
Held:
No, the said house is not a personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not
capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges, "A true
building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by
the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. This is the doctrine of our Supreme Court in Leung
Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company.
It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal
property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, * 48 Off. Gaz.,2664; Standard Oil Co. of
New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view
is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of
estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers of said contract. Much less is it
in point where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved
as in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
affirming that of the CFI of Manila, with the costs of this instance against respondent, the Alto Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc. It is so ordered.

6 Lopez vs. Orosa and Plaza Theatre, 103 SCRA 98

FACTS:
Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied lumber for the construction
of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k thus leaving a
balance of almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, with Luzon Surety Company
as their surety and the land and building were mortgaged as counter-security. Petitioner sued to collect
the unpaid amount for the materials and was able to get a judgment against the respondents making
them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. Also, he was able to obtain a material mans lien on
the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting to 42k shall be sold in public auction in case the
respondents default. Petitioner wasnt happy because he also wanted a lien on the land, urging that
the judgment lien should include it since the building and the land are inseparable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable?
HELD:
No. The contention that the lien embraces both the land and the building or structure adhering thereto
is without merit. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building
constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the
land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Article 415 of the new Civil Code)
could mean only one thing that a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, and in view
of the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property,
irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner.

Villarico vs

Facts:
Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paraaque City, Metro Manila which was
separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government. As
this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this
strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents
herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In November that same year,
a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites Carinderia, also impleaded as
respondents.
by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of
the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name in the Registry of
Deeds of Paraaque City.
petitioner filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents. He alleged inter alia that
respondents structures on the government land closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue;
and encroached on a portion of his lot.
9

Peoples Bank v. Dahican Lumber

Facts:

ATLANTIC sold and assigned all its right in the DALCO for the total sum of P500,000.00 of which only
the amount of $50,000.00 was paid. DALCO obtained various loans from the People's Bank & Trust
Company amounting, as of July 13, 1950, to P200,000.00. DALCO also obtained, through the Bank, a
loan of $250,000.00 from the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C., evidenced by five promissory
notes of $50,000.00 each, maturing on different dates, payable to the BANK or its order.

As security for the payment of the abovementioned loans, DALCO executed in favor of the BANK a
deed of mortgage covering live parcels of land situated in the province of Camarines Norte, together
with all the buildings and other improvements existing thereon and all the personal properties of the
mortgagor located in its place of business in the municipalities of Mambulao and Capalonga,
Camarines Norte. DALCO executed a second mortgage on the same properties in favor of ATLANTIC to
secure payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price of the lumber concession amounting to the
sum of $450,000.00. Both deeds contained a provision which stated that it included essential afteracquired properties such as machineries, fixtures, tools and equiptments. Both mortgages were
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte.
Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity, the BANK paid
the same to the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C. and the latter assigned to the former its credit
and the first mortgage securing it. Subsequently, the BANK gave DALCO and DAMCO up to April 1,
1953 to pay the overdue promissory note. DALCO purchased various machineries, equipment, spare
parts and supplies in addition to, or in replacement of some of those already owned and used by it on
the date aforesaid. Pursuant to the provision of the mortgage deeds quoted heretofore regarding "after
acquired properties", the BANK requested DALCO to submit complete lists of said properties but the
latter failed to do so. On December 16, 1952, the Board of Directors of DALCO in a special meeting
called for the purpose, passed a resolution agreeing to rescind the alleged sales of equipment, spare

parts and supplies by CONNELL and DAMCO to it.

On January 23, 1953, the BANK, in its own behalf and that of ATLANTIC, demanded that said
agreements be cancelled but CONNELL and DAMCO refused to do so. As a result, on February 12,
1953, ATLANTIC and the BANK, commenced foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte against DALCO and DAMCO.

Issue:

Should the deed also be registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry in so far as it covered the afteracquired machinery, fixtures, tools and equipments?

Held:
No more, since under Articles 415 the new Civil Code, the properties in question being machinery,
receptacles, instruments or replacements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and shall tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works, are classified as immovable properties, therefore not covered by
the Chattel Mortgage Law.
10 Chavez v Public Estate Authority
GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Facts:
On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the
Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the
conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the
JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality
of the JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate
Committees.
On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of
lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale
of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin
the loss of billion of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
comply with its constitutional duties. This duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the
court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental importance tot eh public. The mere
fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute
actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the
issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic and
moral well being of the people.
The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure
the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the
national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed
lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a
petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was
under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is
purely legal or constitutional question.
The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement
as required by the constitution.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab
initio.
TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner,vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are:
Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paraaque City, Metro Manila with
an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453
issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.
Petitioners lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging
to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the
adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at
several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del
Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In
November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites
Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square
meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name as

T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City.

In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Paraaque City, a complaint for accion
publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. He alleged inter alia that
respondents structures on the government land closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue;
and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations, claiming that they have
been issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to construct their buildings on the area; and that
petitioner has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the government.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.

Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession over the subject land
except the portion thereof covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 of the
Register of Deeds of Paraaque;

2.

Ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the subject premises described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 and gives its possession to plaintiff; and

3.

Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiff against the defendants, and
likewise dismissing the claim for attorneys fees of the latter against the former.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the public land
in question. On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in actual possession of the
area. According to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of his right of way as he could use the
Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial courts
Decision in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment hereby appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignments of error:
I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A CONCLUSION WITHOUT
CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE SAME WAS BASED.

II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS

WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF
THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS BETWEEN HIS PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.

III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA IS NOT THE PROPER
REMEDY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLANTS RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT CARRY POSSESSION OVER THE SAME.
V
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT
OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LAND BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DEFENDANTAPPELLEES.[5]
In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that
petitioners action for accion publiciana is not the proper remedy in asserting his right of way on a lot
owned by the government.
Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings on the lot in question,
have deprived him of his right of way and his right of possession over a considerable portion of the
same lot, which portion is covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430 he acquired by means of exchange of real
property.
It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioners alleged right of way exists belongs to the state
or property of public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code
as follows:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Public use is use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.

[6] Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as
passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated
or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription
against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by
any voluntary easement.[7]
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion,
it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its
use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot

appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it. This is clear from
Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession.

Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents have
better right of possession over the subject lot.
However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants buildings were
constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioners name. Being
its owner, he is entitled to its possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that neither
petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were
built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.