TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.

MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16
of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children?
Ruling:
Yes, Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of

succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs.

MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to

the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing,
or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare
their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is correct?
HELD:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,
the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner, vs.

AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a property
located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who
pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the
loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said
mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for
damages against the petitioner, for the latters act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the
principal loan.
Issue:
WON petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of
the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure?
Held: Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause
of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and
not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this
purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing
of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such

remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court
of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then
may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a
cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing
four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real
estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private
respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of
action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
2. Conflicts of Law
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security
interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction
that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is
what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,

Petitioners, vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm
providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign
governments, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent
Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement
provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon then
assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road
(STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with the
Philippine Government.
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering and
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.
Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1.
Petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division,
informed respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his
ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the
STAR Project, just in time for the ICA's expiry.
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a
negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted
that respondents contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to
negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent
consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by
and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They
asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard
and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and
lex contractus.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner
Issue:
Whether or Not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals
may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most
significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens?
Ruling:

No, It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought
before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the
forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some
other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is
not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in
matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC
decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case
filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are
inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPI-INTERNATIONAL

LIMITED, and ATHONA HOLDINGS, N.V., petitioners, vs.

FINANCE

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC, VENTURA O.

DUCAT, PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and WILLIAM H. CRAIG, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance
Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by
Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its
president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement, whereby
1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona
Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA
extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid
by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon
their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to
Ducat.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note
became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners
PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for
damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in
misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of
Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the
RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective
counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that
private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than
its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia,
vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners
PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the
controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under
the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat
was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis
pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of
litis pendentia.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of pendency of another action between the same parties for the
same cause (litis pendentia) relied upon by the court of appeals in affirming the trial court's
dismissal of the civil action is applicable?
Whether or not the principle of forum non conveniens also relied upon by the court of appeals in
affirming the dismissal by the trial court of the civil action is likewise applicable?
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not holding that philippine public policy required
the assumption, not the relinquishment, by the trial court of its rightful jurisdiction in the civil
action for there is every reason to protect and vindicate petitioners' rights for tortious or
wrongful acts or conduct private respondents (who are mostly non-resident aliens) inflicted
upon them here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
First. No, Petitioners' contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the effect of res
judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not
necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the

foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this
jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as
such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 9 Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50.Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a)In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b)In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Second. Nor is the trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the
principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under
Rule 16, 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a
matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after "vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances" require the court's desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings
filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that
one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura
Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the object
of the transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after
finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction
over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and
summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, on extraterritorial service provides
that service of summons on a non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by
leave of Court where, among others, "the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines." It is not disputed that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents
had been attached prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial court dated April 20,
1987.