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Nos. 95-6296
95-6306
95-6307
(D.C. No. CIV-94-806-T)
(W.D. Okla. )
Defendant-AppelleeCross-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ALDISERT, ** and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. ***
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. These cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
***
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I. Punitive Damages
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides that a court may enter
judgment as a matter of law on an issue when there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for th[e] party on that issue. The
district court granted defendants motion for JMOL on punitive damages after
concluding that [n]o evidence establishing the level of misconduct by the
defendant necessary to support punitive damages was introduced. R. Vol. I at
131. We review the district courts decision de novo. Sheets v. Salt Lake
County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
In deciding whether to [enter judgment as a matter of law], the trial
court must view the evidence most favorably to the party against
whom the motion is made, and give that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. The court may not weigh the evidence or pass
upon the witnesses credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of
the jury.
Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir.
1984)(citations omitted).
The jury in this case was instructed that it could award plaintiff punitive
damages if it found that the act or omission of the defendant which proximately
caused damages to the plaintiff was done with malice or with reckless
indifference to the plaintiffs federally protected rights. R. Vol. I at 26. The
jury was instructed further that [a]n act or a failure to act is maliciously done if
prompted or accompanied by ill will, or spite, or grudge, either toward the injured
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II. Reinstatement
A district court has considerable discretion in formulating remedies for
Title VII violations, Carter v. Sedgwick County, 36 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir.
1994), one of which is reinstatement of the employee, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g).
The award of equitable relief by way of reinstatement rests in the discretion of
the trial court and this determination will not be set aside unless we are satisfied
that it is clearly erroneous. Bingman v. Natkin & Co., 937 F.2d 553, 558 (10th
Cir. 1991). Although we have held that reinstatement is the preferred remedy in
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cases of employment discrimination, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir.)(ADEA case), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946
(1985), we have also recognized that special circumstances may exist that make
reinstatement inappropriate, e.g., Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d
631, 638 (10th Cir. 1988). One such circumstance is extreme hostility in the
workplace. Id. Here, the district court determined that reinstatement would not
be appropriate because of the repeated and continuing hostility and antagonism
that existed between the plaintiff and others in the work place, a significant part
of which was caused by plaintiffs argumentative and confrontational behavior.
R. Vol. I at 129. Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff reinstatement.
discharge claim from time spent on the retaliatory discharge claim, because both
claims arose out of a common core of facts and involved related legal theories,
id. at 90, and [m]uch of counsels time was devoted generally to the litigation as
a whole, id. at 94 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)).
Without further explanation of its rationale, the district court determined that a
reduction of the lodestar is necessitated by the result obtained, and that an
appropriate award is the amount of $15,000.00. R. Vol. I at 137. This amount
was approximately half that requested.
[T]he district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee
award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. It remains important, however, for the
district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee
award. Id. District courts should articulate specific reasons for fee awards to
give us an adequate basis for review. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 552 (10th
Cir. 1983). The district court need not, however, identify and justify each
disallowed hour or announce what hours are permitted for each legal task.
Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986).
We recently held that, in making adjustments to the lodestar to reflect a
partys overall success, the district court must make a qualitative assessment to
determine what less-than-perfect results are excellent, justifying full recovery,
or to what extent plaintiff[s] limited success should effect a reduction in the
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