G.R. No.

122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA
PRINCE
HOTEL
petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision
is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part
of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of
Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . 5 which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting
and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case
was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and
its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares
of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the
hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the
patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had
lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share , is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very
well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet
taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments
their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of

the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become
in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and
the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on
Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood
as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not
make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which
business may be done. For example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted
by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. 17
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third

paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only
be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies,
which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on
personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the
values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27
and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family
life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these
provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The
very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government.
it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During World War II the
hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter,
in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the
hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the
Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following:
"CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL
OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should
only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to
individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.

39

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by
the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE STATE SHALL GlVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that
Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by
Commissioner Nolledo 43
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as
the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a "qualified
foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner
has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and
requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision by the government itself
is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even
some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling,
implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts,
it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the
executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is
confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses
a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only
be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without
doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,

and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest
bid
in
terms
of
price
per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing
into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well
aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were
invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right
or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and
the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on
selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched
the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked
to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been
spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a

temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and
its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that
the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind
referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure
that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and
ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not
be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed,
the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that
has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where
heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository
of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a
history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands
cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos
Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural
heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy
provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size
of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%)
of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations
to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit
of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant
a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to selfpreservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was
the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or

legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In
fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter
. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the
development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is
also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh
to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that

insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right
vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court,
says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested

right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal,
no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T.
APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P.
ARROYO,
petitioners,

vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case has already settled (1)
whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.
Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest that the
two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law.
They cite the following statement in the opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining
petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is
not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the membership of
the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice
Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two new
appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona,
232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case
and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask, "why should it be so?"
Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip where
none exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which they can impute to
some members of the Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain rather than to justify the majority's decision to overrule the
ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case
(Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous ruling to
be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred by stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it
was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some ulterior motives on the part of the new
majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of
the Court at the time they dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The eighth
Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore
does not violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the
dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead
submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the
Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of the features which made the first
contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated May 5, 1994, a
copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.

2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with the authority of
PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of
this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" but only a manifestation that the parties were not filing a motion for reconsideration. Even
if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their
contrary view on the question of standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the
parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of
stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5)
dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was erroneous and no legal doctrine
stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of change in the membership of a
court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the
election" in 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23
years of age on the date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day
he assumed office.
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated under oath in
her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she
assumed office. The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court
ruled she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the opinion
of the Court, holding that while the statement that the accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority in the
Feliciano case," the accused could not be held liable for falsification, because
the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of the election or
whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the beginning of the term of office] has not been discussed anew,
despite the presence of new members; we simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the retirement of two members (Recess
and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David,
JJ.) and the fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its ruling in the
first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief
that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she assumed office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were noted without anyone much
less would-be psychoanalysts finding in the statement of the Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a result
of change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of the
accused.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision. This was the lesson of
Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks) legal
tender for the payment of debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting debts, was
challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of
Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice
Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis
dissented. A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm
member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally
a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts invalid.
On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to fill the
vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold
was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion
by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former majority. There were allegations that the new Justices
were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and
independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal Tender
Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted
wounds." 1

We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest,
applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that
ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the
courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the
Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, 16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:
Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Id., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but
only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we
said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and
the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which
petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this
case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may
invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any
party.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the provisions
on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On the
contrary, the speech points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than to the courts, as the
appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views. 2 Indeed, the provisions on independent people's organizations may most
usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and referendum as a means whereby the people may propose or enact
laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in question is nothing more
than an opposition to the government policy on lotteries.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving
"paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in
cases
involving
constitutional
issues
and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989);
City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of their obvious
interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional
question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84
Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU
v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992);
Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16,
1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they
do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication
of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479
[1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in
Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with
discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis added)
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to question government contracts
regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a
taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case was dismissed by the trial
court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res judicata and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the
question of petitioner's standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by the
government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed,
but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank,
which was one of the defendants in the case.
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were allowed to
sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city government for the purchase of road construction equipment because
their contention was that the contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing to it
that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by law.
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that
of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center
of the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the
President of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific
injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be
invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition questioning another form of lottery
conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a "citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children,"
had no direct and personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of." In
the case at bar, petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they should be accorded standing to bring this
suit.

The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of
timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art. II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced
in the courts. That provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such categorization.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral.
This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not stopped there and dismissed their case.
For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of action and, therefore, is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a
constitutional question must turn on whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason the Court has not ducked the
substantive issues raised by petitioners.
II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:
1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated
the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical
assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in
section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency and
manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of
Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related investments,
programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in
the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health
programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable grants:
Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as
may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other
similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party because of the clause "except for the activities
mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of 1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law of this case because the
parties are the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory provision.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one. Petitioners also say that inquiry
into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule on the
"conclusiveness of judgment," however, is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two
actions involve substantially different claims. This is generally accepted in American law from which our Rules of Court was adopted.
(Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, 28; P.
BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2 [3rd Ed.,
1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that this exception is inapplicable in this jurisdiction.
Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are substantially different from those involved in
the prior case between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the
first case.
Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only 1 (B) but also 1 (A), because the exception clause ("except for the activities
mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]") "operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this
manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A)."
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in
paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under paragraph
(B), the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs, projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes races,

lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party but also "by itself."
Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts these activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the
PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit.
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted
to it by paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain
investments, programs, projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds for health programs and charity. That is why the law
provides that such investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as
may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority." Justice Davide, then an Assemblyman, made a proposal
which was accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill they were discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the
business of others. The following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject of the discussion:
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the amendment is not to leave the
determination of whether it is adequate or not to anybody. And my amendment is to add after "adequate" the words
AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a mater of fact,
it will strengthen the authority to invest in these areas, provided that the determination of whether the private sector's
activity is already adequate must be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
(2
RECORD
p. 1007)

OF

THE

BATASAN

PAMBANSA,

Sept.

6,

1979,

Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." This seems to be
the only possible interpretation of 1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. That there is today no other entity engaged
in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the validity of this interpretation.
III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture
agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, 5 of the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the
PCSO must employ "its own competent and qualified personnel." Petitioners claim, however, that the "contemporaneous interpretation"
of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite the testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the
effect that under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of
technology.
Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not by what some
officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that 5 reflects the true
intention of the parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." The intention of the parties must be ascertained
from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts." (Art. 1371; Atlantic Gulf Co. v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It cannot
simply be judged from what one of them says. On the other hand, the claim of third parties, like petitioners, that the clause on
upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a while to change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the
law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity of the contract.
IV. It is contended that 1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for furnishing of supplies, materials and
equipment to the government or to any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale.
Consequently, a lease of equipment, like the ELA, must be submitted to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on
two premises: (1) that 1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any contract whereby the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment
and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are distinct from each other so that when an exception in 1 speaks of
"supplies," it cannot be construed to mean "equipment."
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in paragraph (a), which provides that a contract
for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is construed to include
"equipment," however, the lease of heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity will have to be submitted to
public bidding before it can be entered into by the government.
In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to expropriation, paying compensation
afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment through negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by public

bidding, not to mention the fact that the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the government can very well negotiate with
private owners.
Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, 1 covers both contracts of sale and lease
agreements and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus, under paragraph (b) of 1,
public bidding is not required "whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed
without causing detriment to the public service." Following petitioners' theory, there should be a public bidding before the government
can enter into a contract for the lease of bulldozers and dredging equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by
lahar because, first, lease contracts are covered by the general rule and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b)
covers only "supplies" but not equipment.
To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies under
procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers
received in each instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications." Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a contract
for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids because, first, lease contracts are governed by the general
rule on public bidding and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of
"supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting 1 as applicable to any contract for the furnishing of supplies,
materials and equipment and of considering the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Our ruling
that 1 of E.O. No. 301 does not cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is supported by the text of 1,
which is entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the only provisions of E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, 6
and 7, concern the lease of buildings by or to the government. Thus the text of 1 reads:
1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive order or other issuances to the
contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the
government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public
bidding, except under any of the following situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss
of, or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be
delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have
subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least
two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were
exhorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated
purchase is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head
concerned; and
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of reviewing negotiated contracts of
purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as well as lease contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298,
promulgated on August 12, 1940, required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head concerned and the
approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment could be made on a
negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this by providing as follows:
2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. In line with the principles of decentralization and accountability,
negotiated contracts for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials or equipment may be entered into by the
department or agency head or the governing board of the government-owned or controlled corporation concerned,
without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to availability of funds, compliance with the standards or
guidelines prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance with
existing rules and regulations.

Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the Secretary and two other
Undersecretaries.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned buildings or spaces
for their use, or to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, shall have authority to determine
the reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof, and to enter into such lease contracts
without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines
established pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized
representative in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment, and it was merely to change the
system of administrative review of emergency purchases, as theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was issued on
July 26, 1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and therefore does not govern the lease
contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require public bidding for entering into it.
Our holding that E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to P.D. No. 526, promulgated on
August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of
supplies." By specifying "procurement of supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases" when made under certain
circumstances, P.D. No. 526, 12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to contracts of purchase and sale. This provision reads:
12. Procurement without public bidding. Procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of public
bidding in the following modes:
(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) Emergency purchases;
(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and
(5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.
Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including
everything except real estate, which may be needed in the transaction of public business, or in the
pursuit of any undertaking, project, or activity, whether of the nature of equipment, furniture,
stationery, materials for construction, or personal property of any sort, including non-personal or
contractual services such as the repair and maintenance of equipment and furniture, as well as
trucking, hauling, janitorial, security, and related or analogous services.
Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, 1 and of P.D. No. 526, 1 and 12, make it clear that only contracts for the purchase and sale of
supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule concerning public biddings.
Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts of purchase and sale because of
"multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously
these credit and tax constraints can have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of sale over lease of
equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying that the rule on public bidding applies not only
to government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the fact also is that the government leases equipment, such as copying
machines, personal computers and the like, without going through public bidding.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

SEN.
MIRIAM
DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO
and
SEN.
FRANCISCO
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

S.

TATAD,

petitioners,

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is
supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she
sovereign acts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the
Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither
a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule
66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT
thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general
submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their
Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the
controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto
(as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the
lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case,
this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto
assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to
this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular
session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen.
Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of
20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he
was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the
issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional
or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the
Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful
Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate
minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental
law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such
office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.

Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an interpretation or application of the
Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners' theory
that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various important cases involving this very
important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an
interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this
scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever
the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was
deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the
Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution
of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein
elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the
present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It
had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation
has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other than
this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to
decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered. 17
In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to 'those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the]
legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political
question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority to and should
inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas
corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castaeda 23 that
"the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his
'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court
is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not political, is
plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers characteristic of the presidential system of government the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of
laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws
and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3)

those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere but only
within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not
only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into
or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the
Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether or not the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the
crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more,
the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the
presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in
Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of
judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza v. Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra,
Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in
apportioning among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held
that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's concurrence
in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning, an act of the political
departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in
the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled
that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of
all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and
exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the
legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They
averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House, with
which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave
abuse of discretion were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that

Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist try to hew closely to
these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of
the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the
doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is
clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the
Senate President "by majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority,"
as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for
the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader
belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent
Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they
did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that
the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During
the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R
Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee
chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39 This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where
even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress
has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with
a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the
larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a
group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser would be the minority. But where
there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could
be several minority parties, one of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the

general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination
thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant
thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. 45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II
thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary,
and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should there be more than
one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by
resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such
offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect
for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the
opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly
within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary
is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may
still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said
in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of
Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one without color of title or who is not
entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 55 or any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be
brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested
office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners
present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise of the powers of
the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts
as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the
definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment"
or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the

rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other
representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal
in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark
upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate"
because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their
prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political
confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted
meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole
determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that
in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts
refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when
private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is
granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof
may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided
for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain
whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183,
196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the
Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary
may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and
Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme
Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA

Chairman Associate Justice Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member Associate Justice Supreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member Associate Justice Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member Congressman 1st District Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member Congressman 1st District Palawan LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member Congressman 2nd District Nueva Ecija LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member Congressman 1st District Davao del Sur LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member Congressman 4th District Batangas LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member Congressman 2nd District Zamboanga del Sur (formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for
decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point,
the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at
least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman
Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco,
Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and
justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the
result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went
into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A
copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura
by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already
expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
"Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts

are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to
LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP,
and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a
prerequisite. 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following
letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on
the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session on
13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House
Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.

For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of
this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda"
(HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal
impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on
a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because
some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least
4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by
Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and
Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon
E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of
the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in the
Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us
that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be
hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935

Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices
from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the
sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements
playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal,
those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991.
Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No.
45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion
of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenary session
held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case
No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of
five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development undermines
the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of
even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar intention.
(p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct
them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators,
thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but
as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every
member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their
membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that
the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to
submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.

Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original
vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,
took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives
Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice
Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura from
assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition within ten
days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M.
Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until
the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by
the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove
any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of
death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional
provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the
reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him
because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House
of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is
erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the
HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed
decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case
No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the
suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give
recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the
Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the
respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's
membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and
elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election
contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political
parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of
three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision
reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein.
The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the
tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the
exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political
body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of
the Senate and House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National
Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference.
(Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme
of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on the
subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the
Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and
the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good
distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional
body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the
present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that
ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said
that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress
has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the
determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee
on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we have an
independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House
Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent when we still have six
politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by
Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering
that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case
No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations. That is
why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown
independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent.
(pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth
and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to
the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional
prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to
a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member
would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and
"breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura
from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of
the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's
right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET
was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of
tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional
term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of
absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the
HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on
Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will,
for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he
had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman

Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could
be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the
House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the
HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party
in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of
Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He
calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the
party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the
highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful
and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the
Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018
dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A.
Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal.
Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,
petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be,
over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these
co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal
luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns
that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is
neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from,
the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the
official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is
wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is
in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.

Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In
cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of impeachment
or a citizen files a verified complaint that
is endorsed by a Member of the House
through a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such
official are deemed initiated on the day
the Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may
be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said Committee
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

Impeachment Proceedings. Within a
period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16
hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the same
official. (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen

Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays
that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a
writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent
House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of
this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition
for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for
Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the
Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as
members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are
initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution

endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this
Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment
complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they
claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and
Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are
trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate
from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that
the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition

bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as
null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.
In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into
the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or
before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban
inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and
(d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the
status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its corespondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less
prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution,
from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated
petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that
insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing
of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter
in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court
to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention
with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in
Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel
and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on
November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time;
and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments
and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows:
(1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3)
the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not
contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned

to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803
leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself
is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through
the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed
the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law
the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it
has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by
the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that
is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has
been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on
a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review
that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the
case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate
since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs
the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack
of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to
isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be
credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI,
Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor
can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in
the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House
of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between
Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible,
the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that
the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain
well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or
its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In
Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that
the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng
v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In
Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments
is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and
that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the wellentrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the
case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the
Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-ininterest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to
whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke
the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar
and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that
it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by
the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners
additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying
these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party
must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a
matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No.
160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the
House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and
based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will
undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to
it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member
of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed
to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does
not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned.
The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of ongoing attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the
Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule
with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body
which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of
judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the
three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with
which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of
God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor
general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up
the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973
on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22,
although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not
only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were
under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1,
1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention,
dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft
of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public

discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a
telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus
the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto,
suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as
the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming
majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice,
I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them
saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been
no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite.
But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed
the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial
power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which
are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In
a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell
your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to
discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and
independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court
alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical
need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it
says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all
possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it
is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in
nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases
taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in
a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability
of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American
case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are
also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current
concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should
pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts
are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall
thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of
the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively
raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether
one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication
that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is
invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry
petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the
facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must
be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the
same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement."
Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to
automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed,"
not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement,
they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice
under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,
there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and
verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to
the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this
issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding
the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the
efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by
the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and
issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power
of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of
Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because
this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae
Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious,
would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their
confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to
be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral
fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or
body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone
has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of
the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify
himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving
the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial
power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with
the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of
the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit
of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can
be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who
lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty
will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and
risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable

official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress
would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence
of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices
cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court
has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the
petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not
mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House
of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of
the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and
seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an
Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae
affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating"
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article
XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November
5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an
end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative

moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint
and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are
"deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of
the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not
at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of
the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17
to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19
after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace
the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the
Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the
direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my
amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public
Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text
of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment
case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
"cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least
one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached.
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was
met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which
means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and
that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and
not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without
a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since
the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations
stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that
this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that
intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not
taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has
the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has
absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was
the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States
v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente
Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may

not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these
limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there
is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States,
the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in
Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that
in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with
the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business.
(House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not
what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or
folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to
our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any
act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court

against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion,
the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience
as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress
this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must
do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar
once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with
timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened
other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private
rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded
that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as
earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and
collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean
the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what
they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for
or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions
for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting
instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked,
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"
"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full
of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance
with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls
under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of
judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own
powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice,
the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as
much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the
course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power
in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of
course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify
this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members
is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the
law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there
is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the
Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the
high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court.
But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our
bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the

Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159139

June 15, 2005

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H.
LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and
BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Our Decision1 in the present case voided the Contract entered into by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) for the supply of
automated counting machines (ACMs) because of "clear violation of law and jurisprudence" and "reckless disregard of [Comelecs] own
bidding rules and procedure." Moreover, "Comelec awarded this billion-dollar undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately
checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. x x x. The illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the
Commission have not only desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but have also cast serious doubts upon the poll bodys ability
and capacity to conduct automated elections." As a result, the ACMs illegally procured and improvidently paid for by Comelec were not
used during the 2004 national elections.
In its present Motion, the poll body expressly admits that the Decision "has become final and executory," and that "COMELEC and
MPC-MPEI are under obligation to make mutual restitution." Otherwise stated, this admission implies that the ACMs are to be returned
to MPC-MPEI, and that the sum of over one billion pesos illegally paid for them be refunded to the public purse. 2 In short, ownership of
the ACMs never left MPC-MPEI and the money paid for them still belongs, and must be returned, to the government.
Consequently, the ACMs, which "admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements" cannot be used during the
forthcoming elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Apart from formidable legal, jurisprudential, technical
and financial obstacles, the use of the machines would expose the ARMM elections to the same electoral pitfalls and frauds pointed out
in our Decision. If the ACMs were not good enough for the 2004 national elections, why should they be good enough now for the 2005
ARMM elections, considering that nothing has been done by Comelec to correct the legal, jurisprudential and technical flaws
underscored in our final and executory Decision?
The Motion
Before us is the Commission on Elections "Most Respectful Motion for Leave to Use the Automated Counting Machines in [the]
Custody of the Commission on Elections for use (sic) in the August 8, 2005 Elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)," dated December 9, 2004. In its January 18, 2005 Resolution, the Court required the parties to comment. After careful
deliberation on all pleadings at hand, we now resolve the Motion.
Background Information
At the outset, we stress that the Decision in the present case, promulgated on January 13, 2004, has long attained finality.3 In our
February 17, 2004 Resolution, we denied with finality Comelecs Motion for Reconsideration dated January 28, 2004, as well as private
respondents Omnibus Motion dated January 26, 2004. The Decision was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on March 30,
2004.
Recall that our Decision declared Comelec to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when, by way of its Resolution No. 6074, it
awarded the Contract for the supply of automated counting machines (ACMs) to private respondents. It did so, not only in clear
violation of law and jurisprudence, but also with inexplicable haste and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures;
particularly the mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It further manifested such grave abuse of discretion when it
accepted the subject computer hardware and software even though, at the time of the award, these had patently failed to pass eight
critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of the elections. Consequently, this Court was constrained to exercise its
constitutional duty by voiding the assailed Resolution No. 6074 awarding the Contract to Mega Pacific Consortium, as well as the
subject Contract itself executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.

Comelec was further ordered to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement it had entered into with regard to the said
project. We also declared that, as a necessary consequence of such nullity and illegality, the purchase of the ACMs and the software,
along with all payments made for them, had no basis in law. Hence, the public funds spent must be recovered from the payees and/or
the persons who made the illegal disbursements possible, without prejudice to possible criminal prosecutions against them.4
Likewise, our February 17, 2004 Resolution denying reconsideration found movants to have raised the same procedural and
substantive issues already exhaustively discussed and definitively passed upon in our Decision. In that Resolution, we emphasized
(and we reiterate here) that the Decision did not prohibit automation of the elections. Neither did the Court say that it was opposed to
such project (or the use of ACMs) as a general proposition. We repeated our explanation that the reason for voiding the assailed
Resolution and the subject Contract was the grave abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec; as well as its violations of law -specifically RA 9184, RA 8436, and RA 6955 as amended by RA 7718; prevailing jurisprudence (the latest of which was Agan v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.5); and the bidding rules and policies of the Commission itself.
Comelecs Claims
Notwithstanding our Decision and Resolution, the present Motion claims, inter alia, that the ARMM elections are slated to be held on
August 8, 2005, and are mandated by RA 9333 to be automated; that the government has no available funds to finance the automation
of those elections; that considering its present fiscal difficulties, obtaining a special appropriation for the purpose is unlikely; that, on the
other hand, there are in Comelecs custody at present 1,991 ACMs, which were previously delivered by private respondents; that these
machines would deteriorate and become obsolete if they remain idle and unused; that they are now being stored in the Comelec
Maxilite Warehouse along UN Avenue, at "storage expenses of P329,355.26 a month, or P3,979,460.24 annually."
The Motion further alleges that "information technology experts," who purportedly supervised all stages of the software development for
the creation of the final version to be used in the ACMs, have unanimously confirmed that this undertaking is in line with the
internationally accepted standards (ISO/IEC 12207) for software life cycle processes, "with its quality assurance that it would be fit for
use in the elections x x x."
Comelec also points out that the process of "enhancement" of the counting and canvassing software has to be commenced at least six
(6) months prior to the August 8, 2005 ARMM elections, in order to be ready by then. It asserts that its Motion is (a) without prejudice to
the ongoing Civil Case No. 04-346 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, entitled "Mega Pacific eSolutions,
Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Commission on Elections)," for the collection of a purported P200 million balance
due from Comelec under the voided Contract; and (b) with a continuing respectful recognition of the finality and legal effects of our
aforesaid Decision. At bottom, Comelec prays that it be granted leave to use the ACMs in its custody during the said ARMM elections.
Private Respondents Contentions
Commenting on the present Motion, private respondents take the position that, since the subject ACMs have already been delivered to,
paid for and used by Comelec, the Republic of the Philippines is now their owner, without prejudice to Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.s
claim for damages in the case pending before the RTC of Makati; and that, consequently, as far as private respondents are concerned,
the question of using the subject ACMs for the ARMM elections is dependent solely on the discretion of the owner, the Republic of the
Philippines.
Petitioners Comment
On the other hand, petitioners contend that Comelec is asking this Court to render an advisory opinion, in contravention of the
constitutional provision6 that explicitly states that the exercise of judicial power is confined to (1) settling actual controversies involving
rights that are legally demandable and enforceable; and (2) determining whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Petitioners assert that there is no longer any live case or controversy to speak of -- an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not merely conjectural or anticipatory; and that Comelecs allegations in its Motion do not amount to an actual
case or controversy that would require this Court to render a decision or resolution in the legitimate exercise of its judicial power. This
lack of actual controversy is clearly seen in the relief prayed for in the Motion: the grant of a leave to use the ACMs during the ARMM
elections. Obviously, Comelec merely seeks an advisory opinion from this Court on whether its proposal to use the ACMs during the
said elections might be in violation of this Courts Decision dated January 13, 2004, and Resolution dated February 17, 2004.
Assuming arguendo that the present Motion might somehow be justified by the governments fiscal difficulties, petitioners further argue
that permitting Comelec to use the ACMs would nevertheless allow it to do indirectly what it was not permitted by this Court to do
directly. They argue that the instant Motion is merely a subterfuge on the poll bodys part to resurrect a lost case via a request for an
advisory opinion.

The OSGs Comment

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares in its Comment that, in compliance with this Courts directive for it to "take measures
to protect the government and vindicate public interest from the ill effects of the illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of
the void [Comelec] Resolution and Contract," it filed on behalf of the Republic on July 7, 2004, an Answer with Counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 04-346. The OSG prayed for the return of all payments made by Comelec to Mega Pacific under the void Contract,
amounting to P1,048,828,407.
The OSG also manifests that it received a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit dated September 15, 2004, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman by the Bantay Katarungan Foundation and the Kilosbayan Foundation against the Comelec commissioners who had
awarded the Contract for the ACMs; and the private individuals involved, including the incorporators and officers of Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. This Complaint-Affidavit was for violation of the Anti-Plunder Law (RA 7030), the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019 as amended), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713).
The complainants alleged immense kickbacks and horrendous overpricing involved in the purchase of the 1,991 ACMs. Based on the
OSGs available records, it appears that Comelec withdrew from Land Bank P1.03 billion, but actually paid Mega Pacific only P550.81
million. Furthermore, commercial invoices and bank applications for documentary credits reveal that each ACM cost only P276,650.00,
but that Comelec agreed to pay Mega Pacific P430,394.17 per unit -- or a differential of P153,744.17 per unit or an aggregate
differential of P306.10 million. Moreover, Mega Pacific charged P83.924 million for value-added taxes (VAT) and P81.024 million more
for customs duties and brokerage fees, when in fact -- under the nullified Contract -- it was supposed to be exempt from VAT, customs
duties and brokerage fees. Lastly, Comelec agreed to peg the ACM price at the exchange rate of P58 to $1, when the exchange rate
was P55 to $1 at the time of the bidding, resulting in additional losses for the government amounting to about P30 million.
The OSG hews to the view that the automation of elections, if properly carried out, is a desirable objective, but is mindful of the need for
mutual restitution by the parties as a result of the final Decision nullifying the Contract for the ACMs. Nevertheless, in apparent
response to Comelecs clamor to use the ACMs in the ARMM elections, the OSG manifests that it has no objection to the proposal to
use the machines, provided however that (1) Comelec should show with reasonable certainty that the hardware and software of the
ACMs can be effectively used for the intended purpose; (2) Mega Pacific should be made to return to the Republic at least a substantial
portion of the overprice they charged for the purchase of the ACMs; and (3) the use of these machines, if authorized by this Court,
should be without prejudice to the prosecution of the related criminal cases pending before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).
The OMBs Manifestation
For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman manifested that as a result of the nullification of the Contract, various fact-finding
investigations had been conducted, and criminal and administrative charges filed before it against the persons who appeared to be
responsible for the anomalous Contract; and that the various cases had been consolidated, and preliminary investigation conducted in
respect of the non-impeachable Comelec officials and co-conspirators/private individuals. Furthermore, the OMB is in the process of
determining whether a verified impeachment complaint may be filed against the poll bodys impeachable officials concerned.
A Supplemental Complaint prepared and filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman reveals that the ACMs were
overpriced by about P162,000.00 per unit; that, additionally, Mega Pacific unduly benefited by including VAT and import duties
amounting to P194.60 million in its bid price for the ACMs, despite Section 8 of RA 8436 exempting such equipment from taxes and
duties; that Comelec nonetheless awarded the Contract to Mega Pacific at the same bid price of P1.249 billion, inclusive of VAT, import
duties and so on; and that the Commission allowed Mega Pacific to peg the ACM price using an exchange rate of P58 to $1 instead of
P53 to $1, which further inflated Mega Pacifics windfall.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the OMB had allegedly prepared a comment on the present Motion, stating its position on the issue of
utilizing the ACMs, but upon further reflection decided not to file that comment. It came to the conclusion that ventilating its position on
the matter might engender certain impressions that it had already resolved factual and/or legal issues closely intertwined with the
elements of the offenses charged in the criminal and administrative cases pending before it. "For one, utilizing illegally procured goods
or the intentional non-return thereof to the supplier may have a bearing on the determination of evident bad faith or manifest partiality,
an essential element in any prosecution under the anti-graft law, and may, at the same time, be constitutive of misconduct penalized
under relevant disciplinary laws."
Consequently, out of prudential considerations, the OMB prayed to be excused from commenting on the merits of the present Motion, to
avoid any perception of prejudgment, bias or partiality on its part, in connection with the criminal and administrative cases pending
before it.
The Courts Ruling
Decision Subverted by the Motion

There are several reasons why the present Motion must be denied. First, although it professes utmost respect for the finality of our
Decision of January 13, 2004 -- an inescapable and immutable fact from which spring equally ineludible consequences -- granting it
would have the effect of illegally reversing and subverting our final Decision. Plainly stated, our final Decision bars the grant
of the present Motion.
To stress, as a direct result of our January 13, 2004 Decision, the Contract for the supply of the subject ACMs was voided, and the
machines were not used in the 2004 national elections. Furthermore, the OSG was directed "to take measures to protect the
government and vindicate public interest from the ill-effects of the illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of the void
Resolution." Accordingly, in Civil Case No. 04-346, the government counsel has prayed for mutual restitution; and for the "return of all
payments, amounting to P1,048,828,407.00 made by Comelec to Mega Pacific under the void Contract."
In the meantime, Comelec has done nothing -- at least, nothing has been reported in the present Motion -- to abide by and enforce our
Decision. Apparently, it has not done anything to rectify its violations of laws, jurisprudence and its own bidding rules referred to in our
judgment. Neither has it reported any attempt to correct and observe the "mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements"
needed to computerize the elections.
Apparently, it has simply filed the present Motion asking permission to do what it has precisely been prohibited from doing under our
final and executory Decision. If law and jurisprudence bar it from using the subject ACMs during the last elections, why should it even
propose to use these machines in the forthcoming ARMM elections? True, these elections are important. But they cannot be more
important than the 2004 national elections. Note that the factual premises and the laws involved in the procurement and use of the
ACMs have not changed. Indeed, Comelec has not even alleged, much less proven, any supervening factual or legal circumstances to
justify its Motion.
Basic and primordial is the rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. In other
words, such a judgment may no longer undergo any modification, much less any reversal, even if it is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law; and even if it is attempted by the court rendering it or by this Court.7 Equally
well-entrenched is the doctrine that what is not permitted to be done directly may not be done indirectly either. In the instant case, it is
unarguable that the inexorable result of granting the present Motion will precisely be a subversion of the Decision, or at least a
modification that would render the latter totally ineffective and nugatory.
To support its present Motion, Comelec appended as Annex 1 a letter dated January 22, 2004. Addressed to its chairman, the Annex
was signed by four8 self-proclaimed "information technology experts,"9 who had gratuitously contended that this Courts Decision was
"one of the most inopportune rulings ever to come out of the hallowed halls of that High Tribunal"; blame the Decision for supposedly
forcing our people "to entrust their votes to a manual system of counting and canvassing that have been proven to be prone to massive
fraud in the past"; and mouth legal/technical arguments that have already been repeatedly debunked in the Decision and Resolution
here. The letter also included a long-winded, tortuous discussion of the software development life cycle.
A quick check of the case records confirmed our suspicion. The very same letter dated January 22, 2004 had previously been
appended as Annex 2 to private respondents "Omnibus Motion A) for reconsideration of the Decision dated 13 January 2004; b) to
admit exhibits in refutation of the findings of fact of the Court; c) to have the case set for hearing and/or reception of evidence if deemed
necessary by the Court." The only difference is that this time around, Comelec overlooked or failed to photocopy the last page (page
17) of the letter, bearing the signatures of the four other purported "information technology experts."10 In other words, to support its
present Motion, it merely recycled an earlier exhibit that had already been used in seeking reconsideration of our aforesaid Decision.
While expressing utmost reverence for the finality of the Decision, Comelec implicitly seeks, nevertheless, to have this Court take up
anew matters that have already been passed upon and disposed of with finality.
It is a hornbook doctrine that courts are presumed to have passed upon all points that were raised by the parties in their various
pleadings, and that form part of the records of the case. Our Resolution, disposing of respondents arguments on reconsideration, did
not explicitly and specifically address all of the matters raised in the said letter of January 22, 2004. It is presumed however, that all
matters within an issue raised in a case were passed upon by the Court,11 as indeed they were in the instant case. And as we have held
elsewhere,12 courts will refuse to reopen what has been decided; they will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a
question that has been considered and decided with finality.
Besides, the letter of January 22, 2004, laden as it is with technical jargon and impressive concepts, does not serve to alter by even the
minutest degree our finding of grave abuse of discretion by Comelec, on account of its clear violations of law and jurisprudence and its
unjustifiable and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures.
Furthermore, the letter would obviously not contain anything that might serve to persuade us that the situation obtaining in January
2004 has so changed in the interim as to justify the use of the ACMs in August 2005.

The Commission seems to think that it can resurrect the dead case by waving at this Court a letter replete with technical jargon, much
like a witch doctor muttering unintelligible incantations to revive a corpse.
In its main text, the Motion concedes that our Decision "has become final and executory," and that all that remains to be done is "to
make mutual restitution."13 So, what is the relevance of all these useless argumentations and pontifications in Annex 1 by the
Commissions self-proclaimed "experts"? For its own illegal acts, imprudence and grave abuse of discretion, why blame this Court? For
Comelec to know immediately which culprit should bear full responsibility for its miserable failure to automate our elections, it should
simply face the mirror.
Recovery of Government Funds Barred by the Motion
Second, the grant of the Motion will bar or jeopardize the recovery of government funds improvidently paid to private respondents,
funds that to date the OSG estimates to be over one billion pesos. At the very least, granting the Motion will be antagonistic to the
directive in our Decision for the OSG to recover the "illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of the void Resolution and
Contract."
Indeed, if the government is conned into not returning the ACMs but instead keeping and utilizing them, there would be no need for
Mega Pacific to refund the payments made by Comelec. In fact, such recovery will no longer be possible. Consequently, all those who
stood to benefit (or have already benefited) financially from the deal would no longer be liable for the refund. They can argue that there
was nothing wrong with the voided Resolution and Contract, nothing wrong with the public bidding, nothing wrong with the machines
and software, since the government has decided to keep and utilize them. This argument can be stretched to abate the criminal
prosecutions pending before the OMB and the impeachment proceedings it is considering. After all, "reasonable doubt" is all that is
needed to secure acquittal in a criminal prosecution.
In brief, the poll bodys Motion not only asks for what is legally impossible to do (to reverse and subvert a final and executory Decision
of the highest court of the land), but also prevents the Filipino people from recovering illegally disbursed public funds running into
billions of pesos. Verily, by subverting the Decision of this Court, the Motion would be unduly favoring and granting virtual immunity from
criminal prosecution to the parties responsible for the illegal disbursement of scarce public funds.
Use of the ACMs and Software Detrimental to ARMM Elections
Third, the use of the unreliable ACMs and the nonexistent software that is supposed to run them will expose the ARMM elections to the
same electoral ills pointed out in our final and executory Decision. Be it remembered that this Court expressly ruled that the proffered
hardware and software had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections,
especially the following three items:
" They failed to achieve the accuracy rating criterion of 99.9995 percent set up by the Comelec itself.
" They were not able to detect previously downloaded results at various canvassing or consolidation levels and to prevent these from
being inputted again.
" They were unable to print the statutorily required audit trails of the count/canvass at different levels without any loss of data."14
The Motion has not at all demonstrated that these technical requirements have been addressed from the time our Decision was issued
up to now. In fact, Comelec is merely asking for leave to use the machines, without mentioning any specific manner in which the
foregoing requirements have been satisfactorily met.
Equally important, we stressed in our Decision that "[n]othing was said or done about the software -- the deficiencies as to detection
and prevention of downloading and entering previously downloaded data, as well as the capability to print an audit trail. No matter how
many times the machines were tested and retested, if nothing was done about the programming defects and deficiencies, the same
danger of massive electoral fraud remains."15
Other than vaguely claiming that its four so-called "experts" have "unanimously confirmed that the software development which the
Comelec undertook, [was] in line with the internationally accepted standards (ISO/IEC 12207) [for] software life cycle processes," the
present Motion has not shown that the alleged "software development" was indeed extant and capable of addressing the "programming
defects and deficiencies" pointed out by this Court.
At bottom, the proposed use of the ACMs would subject the ARMM elections to the same dangers of massive electoral fraud that would
have been inflicted by the projected automation of the 2004 national elections.

Motion Inadequate and Vague

Fourth, assuming arguendo that the foregoing formidable legal, financial and technical obstacles could be overcome or set aside, still,
the Motion cannot be granted because it is vague; it does not contain enough details to enable this Court to act appropriately.
The sham nature of the Motion is evident from the following considerations. While Comelec asserts a pressing need for the ACMs to be
used in the ARMM elections, strangely enough, it has not bothered to determine the number of units that will be required for the
purpose, much less tried to justify such quantification. It contracted for a total of 1,991 ACMs, intended for use throughout the entire
country during the 2004 elections. Are we to believe that all 1,991 units would be utilized to count and canvass the votes cast in the
ARMM elections? Such a scenario is highly unlikely, even ridiculous.
A genuine, bona fide proposal for the utilization of the ACMs would naturally have included a well-thought-out plan of action, indicating
the number of units to be deployed, places of utilization, number of operators and other personnel required, methods/periods of
deployment and recovery or retrieval, assessments of costs and risks involved in implementing the proposal, and concomitant
justifications, among other things. Now, either "The Plan" is being kept absolutely top secret, or it is completely nonexistent.
Furthermore, once the ACMs are deployed and utilized, they will no longer be in the same condition as when they were first delivered to
Comelec. In fact, it is quite probable that by the time election day comes around, some of the machines would have been mishandled
and damaged, maybe even beyond repair. What steps has the poll body taken to make certain that such eventualities, if not altogether
preventable, can at least be minimized so as to ensure the eventual return of the ACMs and the full recovery of the payments made for
them? A scrutiny of the 4-page Motion16 ends in futility. It is all too clear that a failure or inability of Comelec to return the machines sans
damage would most assuredly be cited as a ground to refuse the refund of the moneys paid. Yet, if Comelec has given any thought at
all to this or any other contingency, such fact has certainly not been made evident to us.
ARMM Elections Not Jeopardized by Nonuse of ACMs
Fifth, there is no basis for the claim that unless the subject ACMs are used, the ARMM elections would not be held.
At the outset, if such elections are not held, the blame must be laid squarely at the doorstep of Comelec. To stress, had it not gravely
abused its discretion, the automation of the vote counting and canvassing processes would have already become a reality over a year
ago, and the ACMs that would have been used in the 2004 national elections would now be available for the ARMM elections.
In any event, the Commission in its Motion argues that the government, given its present fiscal difficulties, has no available funds to
finance the automation of the ARMM elections. Without even asking under what authority it has assumed the role of Treasury
spokesman, we emphasize that there would not now be any lack of funds for election automation had it not improvidently turned over
P1 billion of taxpayers moneys to Mega Pacifics bank accounts.
Nevertheless, had the poll body been honestly and genuinely intent on implementing automated counting and canvassing for the
ARMM elections, it ought to have informed Congress of the non-availability of the subject ACMs due to our Decisions and of the need
for special appropriations, instead of wasting this Courts time on its unmeritorious Motion. In fact, if only it had taken proper heed of our
Decision of January 13, 2004, it could have conducted an above-board public bidding for the supply of acceptable ACMs.
Certainly, this option or course of action was not foreclosed by our Decision. Moreover, there was sufficient time within which to conduct
the public bidding process. RA 9333, which set the second Monday of August 2005 (August 8, 2005) as the date of the ARMM
elections, was enacted on September 21, 2004. Undoubtedly, Comelec was made aware of the proposed date of the ARMM elections
way before the passage of RA 9333. Thus, the poll body had about ten (10) months at the very least (between the end of September
2004, when RA 9333 came into force and effect, and August 8, 2005) to lobby Congress, properly conduct a public bidding, award the
appropriate contracts, deliver and test the new machines, and make final preparations for the election.
Even assuming that a new public bidding for ACMs was not a viable option, still, Comelec has had more than sufficient lead time -about ten months counted from the end of September 2004 until August 8, 2005 -- to prepare for manual counting and canvassing in
the ARMM elections. It publicly declared, sometime in late January 2004, that notwithstanding our Decision nullifying the Mega Pacific
Contract, it would still be able to implement such manualization for the May 10, 2004 national elections. It made this declaration even
though it had a mere three months or so to set up the mechanics. In this present instance involving elections on a much smaller scale,
it will definitely be able to implement manual processes if it wants to.
There is therefore absolutely no basis for any apprehension that the ARMM elections would not push through simply because the
present Motion cannot pass muster. More to the point, it would be ridiculous to regard the grant of permission to use the subject ACMs
as the conditio sine qua non for the holding of the ARMM elections.

What is most odious is the resort to the present Motion seeking the use of the subject ACMs despite the availability of viable alternative
courses of action17 that will not tend to disturb or render this Courts final Decision ineffectual. Thus, the present Motion is wholly
unnecessary and unwarranted. Upon it, however has Comelec pinned all its hopes, instead of focusing on what the poll body can and
ought to do under the circumstances. The consequences of granting its lamentable Motion, we repeat, will indubitably subvert and
thwart the Decision of this Court in the instant case.
Equally reprehensible is the attempt of the Commission to pass the onus of its mismanagement problems on to this Court. For instance,
the Motion quotes the cost of storage of the ACMs in its Maxilite Warehouse at P329,355.26 per month or P3,979,460.24 per annum.
Assuming for the nonce that the machines have to be held in storage pending the decision in the civil case (as it would simply not do to
throw the machines out into the streets), why must it assume the cost of storage? Per our Decision, the machines are to be returned to
Mega Pacific. If it refuses to accept them back, it does not follow that Comelec must pick up the tab. Instead of further wasting the
taxpayers money, it can simply send the bill to Mega Pacific for collection.
It would be entirely improper, bordering on unmitigated contempt of court, for the Commission to try to pass on the problem to this Court
through its Motion.
No Actual Case or Controversy
Finally, the Motion presents no actual justiciable case or controversy over which this Court can exercise its judicial authority. It is wellestablished in this jurisdiction that "x x x for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy -one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. x x x [C]ourts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging."18 The controversy must be
justiciable -- definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.19 In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must
concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue.20 There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.21
A perusal of the present Motion will readily reveal the utter absence of a live case before us, involving a clash of legal rights or opposing
legal claims. At best, it is merely a request for an advisory opinion, which this Court has no jurisdiction to grant.22
EPILOGUE
We close this Resolution by repeating the last two paragraphs of our final and executory Decision:
"True, our country needs to transcend our slow, manual and archaic electoral process. But before it can do so, it must first have a
diligent and competent electoral agency that can properly and prudently implement a well-conceived automated election system.
"At bottom, before the country can hope to have a speedy and fraud-free automated election, it must first be able to procure the proper
computerized hardware and software legally, based on a transparent and valid system of public bidding. As in any democratic system,
the ultimate goal of automating elections must be achieved by a legal, valid and above-board process of acquiring the necessary tools
and skills therefor. Though the Philippines needs an automated electoral process, it cannot accept just any system shoved into its
bosom through improper and illegal methods. As the saying goes, the end never justifies the means. Penumbral contracting will not
produce enlightened results."23
Comelec must follow and not skirt our Decision. Neither may it short-circuit our laws and jurisprudence. It should return the ACMs to
MPC-MPEI and recover the improvidently disbursed funds. Instead of blaming this Court for its illegal actions and grave abuse of
discretion, the Commission should, for a change, devise a legally and technically sound plan to computerize our elections and show our
people that it is capable of managing the transition from an archaic to a modern electoral system.
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.