Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the
groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is
to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be
made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be
provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the
contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is
to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of
a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an
Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each
station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of
the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, secondprize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to
make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in
order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive
cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and
third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first;
P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines
through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be
delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
1

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of
any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the
Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent"
plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class
mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such
person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.
The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of
any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or
telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of
any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in
money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which
the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting
Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined
to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration
of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the
contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion
rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953),
the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is
nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10,
1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if
the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails
to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective
memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex
B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
public distribution of said rules by the mails.
2

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition
states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis
for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are
affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and
for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification,
this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua
non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of
Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50
O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of
the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief,
our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant points
stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly
has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise
and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with
the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out
plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the
dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request
the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises
and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the
proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to
be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their
respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was
matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by
the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will
have to be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion
of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial
by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial
thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as
real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views
on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the
suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and
enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue
a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent
and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo
y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation
of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are
thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of action.
Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was
translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of
3

Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because
the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the
rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact
that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal
provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the
appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry
into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction
or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount
to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief
action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the
construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting
clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of
speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity
distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language
in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869,
to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to
choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to
whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with
these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but
is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may
attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a selfappointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is
constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality
with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised
Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to, rights and duties under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our
jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case
if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to
subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this
jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8,
Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which
must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to
enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will
terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without
precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the
characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject
to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action
against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see
4

also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc.
vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in
sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal
service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or
of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the
resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio,
44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the
abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with
the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147
U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson
[1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39
Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of
inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our
task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive
yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the
party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the
invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy
anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your
favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service
be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has
but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and
submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern
injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious
tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In
our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by
5

chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply
to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps
this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a prerequisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything
or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally
benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex
products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of
consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid
down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a
valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of
value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant
is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the
matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some
benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the
element of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844"
(54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the
appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real
or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while
the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case
cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both
curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases,
upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not
a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential,
the determination of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found it to
be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there
appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied
to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p.
817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce
of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell
vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the
scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not
they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the
broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose
will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift
enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to
constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan
& Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P.
6

2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare
that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements
of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs.
Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver
vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing:
Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The
apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not
identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance
has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel.
Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the
pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word
"lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the
element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no
other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery
is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which
on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar
schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit
and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is
inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that
where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said
to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby.
City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p.
695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that,
under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the
use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and
that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not
transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez,
7

JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar

November 6, 2010
18 SCRA 247 Statutory Construction Construction; defined Noscitur A Sociis
In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. The mechanics of the
contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However, then acting
Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a violation of
the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be
deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property
of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot be mailed by
Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for declaratory relief.
Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery consists of the
8

following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is missing. Said
element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything theres no consideration on the
part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was merely
applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a
construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said contest, assuming
arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited by the
Postal Law to be mailed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
HELD:
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Blacks Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or
process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No.
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no
consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing
jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit
definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term gift enterprise was used
in association with the term lottery. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory
construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the
term gift enterprise be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is
neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.

Synopsis/Syllabi
THIRD DIVISION

[G. R. No. 112090. October 26, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. APOLINAR LAZARO y SERVANIA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated 1 March 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 24,
finding accused-appellant Apolinar Lazaro y Servania guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the costs.
The information[2] dated 6 May 1991, docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-3483, filed against accused-appellant
alleged:
That on or about May 5, 1991, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) handgun, Cal. 38 Revolver TM-Squires Bingham, SN-1029315 with 6 empty shells on (sic) the chamber,
said accused not having any license and/or permit to possess and carry the same from the authorities charged with the
issuance thereof. That the aforesaid firearm has been used in shooting two persons one of whom died and the other has
(sic) serious condition at the Mother Seton Hospital.
It appears that a separate case for homicide, docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-3487, was filed against the
accused[3] but was tried separately before the same judge.
Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. 91-3483 (the illegal possession case), accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Pfc. Edilberto Puncia, Sgt. Alejandro Bonnet,
Cpl. Jose Manzanero, and Major Jose A. Tuazon.
The facts as shown by the evidence of the prosecution reveal that on 05 May 1990, at around 3:30 p.m., Police
Sergeant Alejandro Bonnet was on board a Mobile Patrol conducting an inspection of traffic policemen. While cruising
10

along Panganiban Drive in Naga City, his attention was called by bystanders who were shouting that there was a bloodied
man beside the driver of a Toyota type jeep that was traveling south. This prompted P/Sgt. Bonnet to go after the said
vehicle.[4]
When the Toyota jeep stopped along Gen. Luna Street, Bonnet was able to see a man with blood all over him
beside the driver.
P/Sgt. Bonnet then instructed the driver to follow the mobile patrol to the Bicol Regional Hospital. [5] When they
arrived at the Bicol Regional Hospital, he saw that his station commander, Police Major Jose A. Tuazon, was waiting for
them.
It appears that earlier Police Major Tuazon received a telephone call at around 4:00 a.m. informing him that a
shooting incident had occurred at Queborac, Naga City [6] Major Tuazon then immediately dispatched Capt. Guisic and
Pat. Barbosa to the crime scene in order to investigate the report.
Moments later, Major Tuazon received another telephone call, this time from the Naga City Hospital informing him
that a wounded man, on board a yellow colored Toyota Tamaraw jeep driven by a person armed with a handgun, was
brought for treatment at the hospital [7] Thereafter, Major Tuazon, together with Pfc. Edilberto Puncia proceeded to the
Naga City Hospital. Upon their arrival, they were informed that the Toyota jeep had already left with the injured person
and was on its way to the Bicol Regional Hospital. The police officers immediately proceeded to the said hospital. They
took a shorter route and were able to arrive ahead of the Toyota jeep. After a short wait, they saw the Naga City Police
Mobile Patrol arrive at the hospital escorting a Toyota Tamaraw jeep [8]
The injured person was brought inside for treatment. As he was previously informed that the driver of the jeep was
armed with a handgun, Major Tuazon ordered the said driver to step out of his jeep. He then saw the driver with a
handgun tucked in his waist, pull out the handgun[9] from its holster[10] and drop it at the back of the drivers seat [11]. Upon
seeing the gun, Major Tuazon pulled the driver out of the vehicle, got hold of the gun which turned out to be a .38 caliber
revolver bearing Serial Number 1029315[12] The gun contained six empty shells.[13]
Major Tuazon then confronted the driver and asked him why he was carrying a gun and whether he had a license to
possess said firearm. The driver did not respond to his question[14]
Maj. Tuazon brought the driver to the police headquarters and turned over the firearm to the duty investigator, Cpl.
Jose Manzanero.[15] At the police station, he learned that the name of the driver was Apolinar Lazaro, herein accusedappellant.
A certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra, Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office
(FEO) at Camp Crame was presented in court by the public prosecutor. The certification stated that accused-appellant is
not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind or caliber.[16]
For his part, accused-appellant recounted the circumstances which led to his capture at the Bicol Regional
Hospital. He Testified that on 5 May 1991, at around 9:00 a.m., he, together with his nephew Manolo Lazaro and Ricardo
Ronquillo went to Marupit, Camaligan, Camarines Sur for a drinking spree. [17] While drinking, accused-appellant and
Ricardo Ronquillo allegedly had a little discussion about a fishing net. They left the place at around 3:00 p.m. onboard a
Toyota Tamaraw jeepney being driven by his nephew, Manolo Lazaro. [18] On the way back, Manolo Lazaro stopped the
jeep in order to urinate and while he was alighting therefrom, accused-appellant saw Ronquillo draw a gun and point it at
him (accused-appellant). Allegedly in self-defense, accused-appellant grappled for the possession of the gun and as a
result, he and Ronquillo fell to the ground. [19] As they continued grappling for the gun, accused-appellant heard several
shots go off. Immediately after the shots were fired and while still grappling for possession of the gun, he heard somebody
shout that he was hit. He realized that it was his nephew, Manolo Lazaro, who was shot and who was telling accusedappellant to bring him to the hospital. As he was still grappling with Ronquillo, he could not immediately do anything
about his nephews cries for help. After a while, accused-appellant felt Ronquillo weakening and stop moving. He then
drove Manolo Lazaro to the hospital as he was shouting for help. Accused-appellant claimed that he did not know what
had happened to Ronquillo after he left him at the scene of the incident. He also could not recall where he had placed the
gun.[20]
Accused-appellant declared that he drove the Tamaraw jeepney to the Naga City Hospital but they were not
accepted as the hospital had no facilities for emergencies. [21] While driving to another hospital, he noticed a police car
trailing them. He then gave a signal to the police car to escort them to a hospital. One of the policemen then alighted from
11

the car and inspected the jeepney. The policeman did not take anything from the jeepney. The policeman then signaled
accused-appellant to follow the patrol car to the Bicol Regional Hospital. [22] When they reached the hospital, accusedappellant went down from the Tamaraw jeepney and assisted in bringing down his nephew, Manolo Lazaro. Accusedappellant was then told by the policemen to ride in the police mobile car.As they were about to leave the hospital, he saw
several persons searching the jeepney. The policemen then brought him to the City Jail where he remembered being asked
why he was carrying a gun.[23] When the gun was shown to him, accused-appellant stated that he was not sure whether it
was the same gun he was grappling with Ronquillo for, as the incident happened quite fast. He also cannot remember
Major Tuazons account that accused-appellant pulled the gun and holster from his waist. What he remembers is that after
alighting from the jeepney, he went around the jeepney and assisted Manolo because the latter was then leaning on the
side of the jeepney.[24]
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Joel Jurado who testified that he conducted the autopsy on Ricardo
Ronquillo. He found that the cause of death was due to loss of blood from his gunshot wounds. [25] The victim died
instantaneously. In his opinion, the injuries were not inflicted accidentally as more than one shot was inflicted on the
victim.[26]
In sur-rebuttal, accused-appellant testified anew and stated that both he and Ronquillo fell from the jeepney while
grappling for the gun. He testified that during the struggle, there were times when the gun was in his possession and there
were also times when it was in the possession of Ronquillo. [27] He cannot recall who was holding the gun when it was
fired.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated 1 March 1993 [28] finding accused-appellant guilty as charged,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Apolinar Poly Lazaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs. The handgun (Exh. A) and the
spent shells (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-5) are confiscated and ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by
homicide.[29]
In cases involving illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866 [30], as amended, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. [31]
In the case at bench, the first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearm and six empty shells were recovered
from the accused-appellant while he was alighting from the Tamaraw jeepney. Thus, Major Tuazon testified:
Q: What did you actually do when the car stopped?
A: Being aware that the driver was then armed, I was ready to get hold of him, and when I saw the gun tacked on his
waist, he pulled it and dropped it at his back.
Q: You said he pulled a handgun from his waist, will you please indicate on what particular place was it placed?
A: It was near, it was more in front of his waist. (The witness is pointing to the rightside middle portion of his
waistline).
Q: And, in relation to the driver, where were you then when you saw him pulled (sic) that gun?
A: I was very near because I wanted to get hold of him.
Q: And, where did he dropped (sic) the said handgun, as you said?
A: Right at his back, at the back of the drivers seat.
Q: So, he just dropped it on the seat behind the drivers seat?
A: Yes, sir.
12

Q: And, that gun has a holster?

A: Yes, Sir. Inside a holster bag tacked on his waist.
Q: When he pulled that gun---did he pull that gun alone?
A: He pulled it together with the holster.
Q: And he placed the gun inside the holster right behind the drivers seat?
A: He pulled the gun together with the holster and dropped the same at his back.
Q: By the way, what kind of gun was that? A revolver?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And, what did you do upon seeing that the gun together with the holster was dropped by the accused at his back?
A: I pulled the driver out, and I immediately got hold of the gun. [32]
The subject firearm, its holster and the six empty shells were identified and offered in evidence during the trial.
As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the absence of a license to
carry a firearm as the prosecution merely marked in evidence a certification from the Firearms and Explosive Section in
Camp Crame without presenting the person who issued the certification himself, a certain Antonio Sierra. Over the
objection of accused-appellants counsel, the lower court admitted the exhibit on the ground that the same is an official
public record and because the fiscal stated that he himself saw the signatory sign the document.
The records of the case show that the prosecution merely presented in court the certification from the Firearms and
Explosive Office before formally offering its documentary evidence. Thus:
PROS. ESTELA:
I am, Your Honor, please, formally submitting the certification issued at Camp Crame on August 20, 1991 of the
firearms and explosives office, issued by the firearms and explosive office, issued by A.T. Sierra, Service Sup.
MNSA, PNB Chief firearms and explosive office to the effect which reads --- this is to certify that Apolinar
Lazaro is not a licensed or registered firearms holder of any kind or caliber (the fiscal is reading)
I would like to request that it be marked as Exhibit D, for the purpose of this is to show to the Honorable Court that
this accused is not a registered licensed holder of the subject firearm, and your Honor, may I please be allowed to
rest my case.
With the formal offer of evidence for the prosecution, with the testimonies of Pfc. Ed. Puncia, Sgt. Alejandro Bonnet,
Cpl. Jose Manzanero, and Maj. Jose Tuazon, and the following (documentary) exhibits--XXX
Exhibit D is the certification of the firearms explosive office to the effect that herein accused is not a licensed or
registered holder of any firearm. This is dated August 20, 1991.
Exhibit D-1 which I request to be marked as such --- the signature of Antonio A. Sierra, the issuing officer of the
firearms and explosives office. The signature was affixed in my presence when I personally procured this
certification from the Camp Crame.
With all of these evidence, testimonial, physical and documentary evidence, we close the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
XXX
We have no objection to its submarkings. We are, however, objecting to Exhibits D and D-1 being self-serving as the
author of said certification was not presented for cross-examination.
XXX
13

PROS. ESTELA:
XXX
And, as to Exhibit D and Exhibit D-1, this is an official document which is an exception to the hearsay rule. This is an
official public document.
COURT:
No other objections?
XXX
Exhibit D is a public document, which was procured in line of duty, and considering that according to the Fiscal he
himself was a witness to the signatory of the same.
All the exhibits are admitted.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon the said certification considering
that the person who made the document was not presented in court to testify. Thus, accused-appellant argues, the
certification should have been excluded for being hearsay.
There is no merit in the above argument.
On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. [33] Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence admits of
several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which states as follows:
Rule 130, Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of the said document. Thus:
Rule 132, Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. - A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contains no
such record or entry.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP-Firearm and Explosives Office,
which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove
that accused-appellant is not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a
custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it
ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to this effect would
be.[34]
Accused-appellant finally argues that assuming that he is guilty, he should only be convicted of the crime of simple
illegal possession not qualified by homicide. He offers two propositions in support of this argument.
First, accused-appellant argues that the information filed against him in Criminal Case No. 91-3483 did not clearly
allege the crime of homicide. Instead, he argues, it was the separate information for homicide filed in Criminal Case No.
91-3487 which alleged all the elements of homicide. He states further that the case for homicide, for which he was
likewise convicted, is now the subject of an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Second, accused-appellant argues that assuming that the information in Criminal Case No. 91-3483 sufficiently
alleged the said qualifying circumstance, he still could not be convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition qualified by homicide as the prosecution failed to prove the fact of homicide during the trial of Criminal Case
14

No. 91-3483. The prosecution, he contends, did not produce any eyewitness to the homicide. Instead, the alleged
eyewitness to the homicide, Manolo Lazaro, was only presented in Criminal Case No. 91-3487, the homicide case, which
was being tried separately.
We do not find it necessary to consider accused-appellants arguments. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8294,
which amended the provisions of P.D. 1866, has rendered said arguments moot and academic.
Accused-appellant was convicted of illegal possession of firearms under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 which was the
governing law at the time the crime was committed in 1991. Section 1 of P.D. 1866 provides:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used
or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
(Underscoring supplied)
Under the ruling in People vs. Quijada, [35] violation of P.D. 1866 is an offense distinct from murder or homicide and
the accused is culpable for two separate offenses.
Republic Act No. 8294 has since amended P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the penalties for simple and aggravated forms
of illegal possession and considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide. The law now provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm such as rimfire handgun, .380
or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger than .38 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .45 and also lesser caliber firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. (underscoring supplied)
In view of these amendments introduced by R.A. 8294, this Court has recently in the case of People vs. Molina,
and reiterated in People vs. Feloteo, [37] that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under P.D. 1866.Thus in People vs. Molina, it was held:
[36]

Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the use of an unlicensed
firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as separate offense. The intent of Congress
to treat as a singleoffense the illegal possession of firearm and the commission of murder or homicide with the use of such
unlicensed firearm is clear from the following deliberations of the Senate during the process of amending Senate Bill No.
1148:
Senator Drilon. On line 18, we propose to retain the original provision of law which says, If homicide or murder is
committed with the use of unlicensed firearm. And in order that we can shorten the paragraph, we would suggest and
15

move that the use of the unlicensed firearm be considered as an aggravating circumstance rather than imposing another
period which may not be in consonance with the Revised Penal Code.
So that if I may read the paragraph in order that it can be understood, may I propose an amendment to lines 18 to 22 to
read as follows: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of the unlicensed firearm, SUCH USE OF AN
UNLICENSED FIREARM SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President.
The president. With the permission of the two gentlemen, Senator Santiago is recognized.
Senator Santiago. Will the principal author allow me as co-author to take the [f]loor to explain, for the information of
our colleagues, the stand taken by the Supreme Court on the question of whether aggravated illegal possession is a
complex or a compound offense.May I have the [f]loor?
Senator Revilla. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Thank you.
In 1995, the Supreme Court held that when the crime of killing another person is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the ruling in the case of People vs. Barros was that the crime should only be illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form. But in the later case, in May 1996, in the case of People vs. Evangelista, the
court apparently took another position and ruled that when a person is killed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, it is possible to file two separate information(s)-one for murder and one for illegal possession of firearms.
In other words, in two successive years, the Supreme Court issued two different ways of treating the problem. The first
is to treat it as one crime alone in the aggravated form, and the second is to treat it as two separate crimes.
So at this point, the Senate has a choice on whether we shall follow the 1995 or the 1996 ruling. The proposal of the
gentleman, as a proposed amendment is to use the 1995 ruling and to consider the offense as only one offense but
an aggravated form. That could be acceptable also to this co-author.
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Flavier]. So, do I take it that the amendment is accepted?
Senator Revilla. Yes, it is accepted, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Flavier.] Thank you. Is there any objection to the amendment? [Silence] There being none,
the amendment is approved.
Although the explanation of the legal implication of the Drilon amendment may not have been very precise, such
modification, as approved and carried in the final version enacted as RA 8294, is unequivocal in language and
meaning. The use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing is now merely an aggravating circumstance in the crime of
murder or homicide. This is clear from the very wordings of the third paragraph of Section 1 of RA 8294, which
reads:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Furthermore, the preceding paragraphs, also in Section 1, state that the penalties for illegal possession of firearms shall
be imposed provided that no other crime is committed. In other words, where murder or homicide was committed,
the separate penalty for illegal possession shall no longer be meted out since it becomes merely a special
aggravating circumstance.[38]
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that accused-appellant was charged, tried and convicted for two separate crimes of
illegal possession and homicide. Accused-appellant, in his brief, refers to the homicide case in arguing that his conviction
in the illegal possession case was not proper.[39] Similarly, the Solicitor-General, in his Brief, mentioned the homicide case
in justifying the sentence handed down by the trial court. [40] Finally, the records themselves show that trial in the two cases
proceeded separately.[41]The two separate cases, Criminal Case No. 91-3487 (for homicide) and Criminal Case No. 9116

3483 (for illegal possession of firearm) were not tried jointly, although filed in the same trial court. Criminal Case No. 913487 was appealed to the Court of Appeals.[42]
In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act 8294 to Presidential Decree 1866, separate prosecutions for
homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was committed on May 5, 1991. As a
general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application except where the new law will be advantageous to the
accused. In this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession
of firearm. Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive application.
In People vs. Valdez,[43] this Court stated:
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes
involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective application. In cases, however, where the new law will be
advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it
will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of
Firearm) subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of firearm should not be
misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In
general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detatunder Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in
Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly
raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this
particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the
crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
Accordingly, and in line with the above ruling, the accused-appellant should be spared from a separate conviction for
the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of the present review.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision finding accused-appellant guilty for violation
of P.D. 1866. Accused-appellant is hereby acquitted of the said crime. Criminal Case No. 91-3483 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

17

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his
capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila,
CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO
LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO
MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO,
JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the
Municipal Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge
R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of
18

Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065,
"An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the
Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It
was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the
Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of
the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No.
9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter
signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed.
The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16,
1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines,
who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act
No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor
drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on
the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a
letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly
approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A
subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President
of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and
therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House
19

Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable
and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with
this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of
Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually
passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court
issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising
any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called
Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders
from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila.
Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae,
and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal
and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal
entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited
differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While
the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question
has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to
the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been
passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives"
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo
F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the
province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill"
theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court
had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the
resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as
amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears
20

indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case
of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has
been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill
being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The
function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed
both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to
whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The
affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself
is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a
bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is
submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and
this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of
its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not
conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the
presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The
authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall
be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed
by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
21

billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is
absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of
decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the
presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require
the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to
its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized
in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation
it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already
present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested
by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the
Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but
would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in
the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
22

Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of
the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled
"AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY
OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary
restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO G.R. No. 187883

and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.
LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,
- versus SPEAKER PROSPERO C.
23

NOGRALES, Representative,
Majority, House of Representatives,
Respondent.
x----------------------x
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 187910
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. CARPIO,
NOGRALES, Speaker of the CORONA,
House of Representatives, CARPIO MORALES*,
Congress of the Philippines, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondent. VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 16, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
24

PUNO, C.J.:
This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirk its
bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."[1] Be that as it may, no amount of exigency can make this
Court exercise a power where it is not proper.
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned
citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A
Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering
Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant
a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge
petitioners supplications. While some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving
the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of
justiciability set by this Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional
disputes.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. [2] The determination of
the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the
judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional
boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its solemn and
sacred obligation under the Constitution. [3] This Courts power of review may be awesome, but it
is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.[4] The case-or-controversy
requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent
questions,[5] lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative
or executive action.[6] In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission[7]:
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.

25

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In

the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.
[8]
Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court
consideration.[9] In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual
injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. [10] An alternative road to review
similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in. [11]
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review
is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse
injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109
only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired
and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been
made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at
all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.
Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners filed a
petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Langley resolution, which dealt with the range of
authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The court resolved the issue thus:
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no
room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to
submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and
until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is
controlling. It is implicit in the rule of law. [12]
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or standing to
sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. [13] In the cases at bar, petitioners have not
shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus
standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It
assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of
the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.[14] The lack of petitioners personal
26

stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any
legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are
instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit
requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation.[15] It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or
disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.To be sure, standing as a citizen has
been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance or when paramount public interest is involved. [16] While the Court recognizes
the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of
House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus
standi under the transcendental importance doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived
from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to
settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] viz.:
x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor
are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The
rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is
intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps
more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a
coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very
essence of representative democracies.
xxxx
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to
litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our
resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is
severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and
suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves
ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our
judiciary today.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving
from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such
liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove
nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a
partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury. [18] When warranted by the presence of
27

indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that
may confront it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

28