PREVENTING DUST EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES IN THE DIE CASTING

INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION
This paper outlines the causes and occurrence of dust explosions and fires. This
has been found to be a significant industrial safety problem. The paper discusses
how these events occur and how dust explosions and fires may have
catastrophic consequences. Materials used in particular die casting operations
that may be involved in dust explosions and/or fires are examined. Combustible
metals are used in die casting plants. Combustible metal dust can be and is
produced. Methods to reduce dust explosion severity how they may be prevented
are explained.
This presentation is based on Combustible Dust in Industry. . . - OSHA Safety
and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB 07-31-2005) (download at
http://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/index.html ) and NFPA 484 Standard for
Combustible Metals, 2009 Ed.
(Note: NFPA documents are available online in readable format, without
charge, at:
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp
At the above web address, the following steps will allow in accessing a
NFPA standard only in readable format: 1) select the standard, 2) click
"Preview this Document", 3) agree to the disclaimer, and 4) open the
standard.)
This document has been prepared as part of the North American Die Casting
Association course on combustible dust in the die casting Industry.
COMBUSTIBLE DUST EXPLOSIONS IN INDUSTRY
A US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) study indicated that there were about 280
explosions and fires of significance between about 1980 and 2005. The
Chairman of the CSB testified before a congressional committee that CSB had
identified an additional 82 between January 2006 and August 2008, an increase
in frequency.
Dust explosions are often catastrophic events. The CSB and OSHA have
identified several horrific explosions in recent years. They include three organic
dust explosions and fires in Massachusetts, North Carolina and Kentucky that
claimed a total of 16 killed and 84 injured, a metal dust explosion and fire in
Indiana that killed one and injured one and a recent sugar dust explosion near
Savanna, Georgia that killed fourteen and injured 40. Common causal factors
include unacceptable housekeeping to control dust accumulations; design flaws
in the ventilation system; lack of hazard assessment; and, lack of explosion
prevention and mitigation.

A disastrous series of explosions and fires occurred at the Imperial Sugar

Company in Port Wentworth Georgia on February 7, 2008. A series of
photographs obtained by the CSB show the process of the explosion through the
lens of a security camera two miles away. A large brilliant fire ball is shown
bursting from the plant. Within seconds a large, radiant, mushroom cloud has
formed and has risen high above the plant. These photographs are witness to a
catastrophe.
Safety Board found a pattern of catastrophic dust explosions. They
recommended that OSHA take actions to prevent them, including new standards
and an inspection program. They also found that MSDS sheets often fail to
provide dust explosion information. In response OSHA established the
Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program. The OSHA inspectors are to go
out and inspect facilities across the US.
DUST EXPLOSIONS AND HOW THEY OCCUR
A fire is usually considered to involve fuel, the air, and heat as an ignition source.
What is different about a dust explosion is dispersion of finely divided particles
and confinement.
A dust explosion or deflagration may occur when:
When:

Dust is combustible;
Dispersed in air or another oxidant;
Present in a concentration at or above the minimum explosible
concentration (MEC);
There is an ignition source; and
Confinement produces the disaster.

The flame front of an expanding fire ball formed around the ignition point
approaches the barrier confining the event. It is pushing concentrated fuel out in
front of it, speeding up the reaction as it approaches the barrier. High pressure
bursts the barrier. A catastrophic dust explosion involves those five things: fuel;
ignition source; oxygen; dispersion; and, confinement. It is rare that all these
things will come together and produce an explosion but it is a catastrophe when it
happens.
A dust explosion occurs in a work area because there is deposited dust around.
The dust settles on bar joists, beams, ledges, equipment and other surfaces.
Some event disturbs the settled dust into a cloud. The dust cloud is ignited and
explodes, a catastrophic event.
A dust explosion occurs more frequently in equipment. When a dust collector is
substantially built to contain a pressurizing event, it can be safely vented out an
2

engineer weak point or safety vent. It is engineered and calculated for the type of
event that could occur. The event exits a weak point as a jet of flame. It is very
possible and desirable to position the safety vent and dust collector so that all
employees are safely positioned outside the zone of danger.
In an experiment, about 4.4 lbs.(2 kilograms) of combustible dust was placed on
a shelf in front of a similar vent door. The dust inside and the dust accumulated
on the shelf outside the vent produced a much larger event. The same bursting
of that flame jet outside the container occurs, but a more generalized combustion
event happens outside the containment. This illustrates why housekeeping is
important and why not having dust deposited around the facility is important. A
person in the event environment or nearby is exposed to injury or death.

An initial (primary) explosion in processing equipment or in an area where

fugitive dust has accumulated may shake loose more accumulated dust, or
damage a containment system (such as a duct, vessel, or collector). The
additional dust dispersed into the air may cause one or more secondary
explosions. These can be far more destructive than a primary explosion. Often
the primary event, called a deflagration, occurs inside process equipment. The
time involved in these events varies but is a matter of milliseconds or
thousandths of a second. The shock wave caused by the primary deflagration
spreads throughout the facility. This may involve only a few milliseconds. Shock
waves reflected by surfaces within the building cause accumulated dust to go
into suspension. Dust clouds are thrown into the air. The deflagration breaks out
of the equipment enclosure, creating a source of ignition. This ignites a
secondary, more generalized, event within the facility. This Secondary
Deflagration is propagated through the dust clouds and around the work area. It
burst from the building roof and walls an explosion. In what may only be one
third of a second or less, what remains is a collapsed building and residual fires.
A combustible dust explosion hazard may exist in a variety of industries. Some
examples are:

Food (e.g., Candy, Starch, Flour, Feed);

Plastics;
Wood;
Rubber;
Furniture;
Textiles;
Pesticides;
Pharmaceuticals;
Dyes;
Coal;
Metals (e.g., aluminum, chromium, iron, magnesium, and zinc); and,
Fossil fuel power generation.

DUST PARTICLES
3

The dust explosion hazard has been described as . . .any industrial process that
reduces a combustible material, and some normally noncombustible materials, to
a finely divided state presents a potential for a serious fire or explosion. This
description is in the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook and is well recognized by
industry safety experts.
The hazard of combustible dust increases as particle size decreases. Intuitively,
we understand that more particles of a small size in a given volume provide a
larger surface area for combustion. It is thought that fine particles may have a
larger role in dust cloud ignition and explosion propagation. The smaller the
particle, the easier it is to heat to the kindling temperature of the substance.
There are a series of ASTM tests that are recognized by OSHA and industry
professionals as appropriate. These tests are used to determine if there is a
combustible dust hazard at the plant. Screening the dust is one of them. A .42
mm or 420 micron particle is thought to be large enough to remain airborne or
dispersed for a considerable period. This size particle may pass through #40 US
standard screens. It is considered a laboratory standard. Particles 420 microns or
smaller are considered dust. We will discuss this a little more later. Generally,
particles smaller than white granulated sugar are dust size.
Dusts may occur in the process stream and cause a hazard, regardless of
starting particle size of the material. This is because larger particles may break
into small or very small particles. They may strike the sides of a vessel, duct or
other object, or perhaps hit other particles many times.
FACILITY ANALYSIS
There are several items to consider when analyzing and examining a facility to
determine if there is a combustible dust hazard. Some points to check include:

Materials that can be combustible when finely divided;

Processes which use, consume, or produce combustible dusts;
Open areas where combustible dusts may build up;
Hidden areas where combustible dusts may accumulate;
Means by which dust may be dispersed in the air; and
Potential ignition sources.

Combustibility
To determine if an explosion can occur at a facility, an assessment of the dust
must be made. The primary factor in an assessment is whether the dust is in
fact combustible. It is determined if a dust cloud will detonate, deflagrate,
present a fire hazard or will not burn or ignite at all. This is usually done
through a series of laboratory tests. There are a series of ASTM tests that are
recognized by OSHA and other industry professionals as appropriate.
4

.
A detonation is a combustion event that burns faster than the speed of sound
as it burns and consumes the fuel. A detonation has a shattering force and
creates its own confinement. These materials are not common in industry and
are not generally the problem in an industrial dust explosion. A deflagration is
a combustion even that travels slower than the speed of sound. A deflagration
has a pushing force that is the mechanism of destruction in most combustible
dust explosions.
Until the 2006 edition of an NFPA dust standard, NFPA 654, a combustible
dust was defined as follows: Any finely divided solid material that is 420
microns or smaller in diameter (material passing a U.S. No. 40 Standard
Sieve) and presents a fire or explosion hazard when dispersed and ignited in
air is a combustible dust. In the 2006 edition the definition was changed to a
combustible particulate solid that presents a fire or deflagration hazard when
suspended in air or some other oxidizing medium over a range of
concentrations, regardless of particle size or shape. The intent was to be
more inclusive and address the issue of some larger particles that would
deflagrate but could not pass through a #40 US screen at the laboratory.
These particles have a larger surface to volume ratio than a hypothetical 420
micron particle that will pass through the screen. The larger particles of this
type will remain airborne long enough to ignite and propagate a deflagration
through a cloud.
The point of this is to determine if there is a combustible dust hazard. An
important part of this is concentration in air. The question, how much dust
can cause an explosion? must be answered. A much greater concentration
than enough dust to cause a health hazard is one answer. Approximately
1000 times more dust in air than the range of concentrations that is thought
enough (and is listed as hazardous in the OSHA health regulations).
This level of dust concentration is normally found only inside ducts or
collectors or within other dust processing or control equipment. Such a
concentration may occur when accumulated dust is thrown into the air in a
dust explosion. This makes plant housekeeping critical in preventing a
catastrophic dust explosion.
A cloud of dust that obscures light (making nearby objects impossible to see)
may be at the explosive level. This is enough dust to deflagrate and is an
explosion hazard. A 25 watt light bulb probably can not be seen through six
feet of a mixture of combustible dust in air, suspended at a concentration
greater than the minimum explosible concentration. An example is a 40 g/m3
concentration of coal dust. A 25 watt bulb can not be seen through a cloud of
this type.
A thin fog of combustible dust is far less than a combustible mixture. It is still
a dust problem however. The dust particles in the air have not been trapped
or confined and are going to settle out on the floors, walls, bar joists and other
5

surfaces. This settling out and building up of a dust layer creates a potentially
catastrophic hazard.
Die casting shops routinely use magnesium and aluminum alloys that are
able to form explosive dust clouds. This may occur within equipment or within
the plant work area (if dust has been allowed to settle out and form a layer
thick enough to be a hazard). A hazardous layer is thick enough to obscure
(make it impossible to see) the color beneath the dust. The combustibility of
zinc alloys should be tested to determine if the materials are a dust hazard. If
this is not done, it must be assumed that zinc alloys are a combustible dust as
well.
It is best to rely on As used test data to determine the combustibility of dust
produced by grinding and polishing operations in the die casting industry.
There are other sources of information, e.g.: supplier test data; MSDS sheets;
and published tables. There are variables that affect the reliability of the
information including particle size, shape, changes in the material produced
by process equipment and many others. Dust used in die casting plants is
almost always combustible when dispersed in air at the correct concentration.
Electrical Classification
Another Hazard Analysis consideration involves and electrical equipment and
facilities at the die casting plant. OSHA and the National Electrical Code
require special electrical equipment and facilities for metal dust areas. They
are called Class II Group E hazardous locations.
Codes and standards that address the type of electrical equipment necessary
at die casting plants include the following:
OSHA Electrical standard (29 CFR Part 1910 Subpart S);
NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code;
NFPA 499 . . . Classification of Combustible Dusts and of Hazardous
(classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process
Area.
How much dust is present in an area is critical. If the dust is present, or
frequently present, in air in a concentration that could explode, e.g.: within a
dust collector, it is considered a Class II (indicating dusty), Division 1 location.
This designation has the most stringent requirements. (Class I locations are
those with flammable gases or vapors like Hydrogen.) A location with
combustible metal dust, like dust produced by grinding and polishing in die
casting, is identified as a Group E location by OSHA and the NEC.
Outside of enclosures, if clean-up is reasonably constant and dust layer is not
apparent, surface color is discernible; and, there is no dust around, then the
area is not considered a hazardous location. A storage area with bags,
drums, or closed hoppers might meet these criteria. Ordinary electrical
equipment is considered suitable in these areas. If ledge dust obscures the
6

color of the surface beneath it (the color can not be determined) that area of
the shop is a hazardous location, a group E metal dust hazard, and an NEC
Class II location. This is illustrated in NFPA 499 figure 5.8(e). (See
attachment A and B.) An indoor, unrestricted area with open or semi-enclosed
equipment and a significant dust layer is illustrated. The Division 1 area is (for
example) includes an area surrounding a dusty piece of equipment for a
distance of 20 feet all around. This is indicated as an area where a moderate
or dense dust cloud or layer greater that one eighth inch thick is formed. An
additional safety zone is established around the Division 1 area where the
surface color beneath the layer is not discernible. It is identified as an
additional Division 1 area. Chapter 502 of the NEC outlines the type of
electrical equipment to found within Class II Group E hazardous locations.
Some examples of the requirements are:

Switches and Motor Controllers in all Class II, Division 1 areas must be
provided with identified dust-ignition proof enclosures. Magnesium or
aluminum dust enclosures are to be identified for such locations.
Motors and Generators must be identified for Class II, Division 1, or
totally enclosed pipe-ventilated type equipment.
Lighting Fixtures must be identified for hazardous locations, marked to
indicate the maximum lamp wattage; and for magnesium or aluminum
dust, identified for the specific location.
Receptacles and Attachment Plugs must be three wire plug-in type and
identified for Class II locations.

It is important to check the label on the equipment for these descriptions. The
label must be from a nationally recognized testing laboratory (UL, FM, ETL or
similar laboratory). A label that identifies the equipment as suitable for Class II
Group E is acceptable for Division 1 locations.
NFPA 499 is blunt about Group E metal dusts. It indicates they . . . could
cause a short in the electrical equipment . . . (Electricity may find) the path of
least resistance through a dust layer, heating up the dust particles in its path
and thus providing a source of ignition. The resulting electric arc could ignite a
dust layer or dust cloud. See NFPA 499 (2008) Sec 4.4.
NFPA 70 the National Electrical Code (2005), Article 500, contains this
warning: Dusts containing magnesium or aluminum are particularly
hazardous, and the use of extreme precaution is necessary to avoid ignition
and explosion. Group E. Atmospheres (contain) combustible metal dusts,
including aluminum, magnesium, and their commercial alloys, or other
combustible dusts whose particle size, abrasiveness, and conductivity
present similar hazards. . .
OTHER HAZARD ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
A thorough analysis will consider all possible scenarios in which dust can be
disbursed, both the normal process and potential failure modes. Where dust is
7

concentrated in equipment such as dust collectors, a combustible mixture could

be present whenever the equipment is operating. Other locations to consider are
those where dust can settle, both in occupied areas and in hidden concealed
spaces. After hazards have been assessed, one or more of the following
prevention, protection and/or mitigation methods should be applied to the
situation to control the combustible dust hazard: dust control , ignition control,
damage control and training.
Dust Control
NFPA 484 contains comprehensive guidance on dust control. Some
recommendations are:
Minimize the escape of dust from process equipment or ventilation
systems.
Use dust collection systems.
Inspect for dust residues in open and hidden areas, at regular
intervals.
Clean dust residues at regular intervals.
Use cleaning methods that do not generate dust clouds.
Only use vacuum cleaners approved for dust collection.
Locate relief valves away from dust hazard areas.
Develop and implement a hazardous dust inspection, testing,
housekeeping, and control program.
This program should be prepared in writing and establish the
frequency and method to be used.
The OSHA inspection program discusses housekeeping in detail. The
inspection program provides insight on how they interpret housekeeping.
The program is listed on the web at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIR
ECTIVES&p_id=3830
The OSHA program indicates that an employer is in violation when
cleaning is not begun immediately whenever a dust layer of 1/32-inch
thickness accumulates. This is approximately the thickness of a paper clip
wire. The program describes an area larger than 5% of the room floor area
(not to exceed 1000 square feet) as a hazard when a layer thicker than
1/32 inch exists. Important areas for housekeeping are overhead beams,
joists, ducts; the tops of equipment, and other surfaces, even vertical
surfaces if they are dusty. Rough calculations may show that the surface
area of bar joists is approximately 5% of the floor area. The equivalent
surface area for steel beams can be as high as 10% of the room area.
OSHA compliance officers are instructed to look for dust layers greater
than 1/32 inch thick in the following areas:

Structural members;
Conduit and pipe racks;
Cable trays;
Floors;
Above ceilings; and,
Around equipment.

They will look for leakage of dust around dust collectors and ductwork.
Ignition Control
Appropriate electrical equipment and wiring methods must be used. Static
electric arcing and sparking must be controlled. Required bonding of
equipment to ground must be implemented and maintained. Smoking,
open flames, and sparks must be eliminated around combustible dust.
Heating systems must be separated from dusts. Hot water or low pressure
steam systems are usually preferred. Cartridge activated tools are a
special concern as they involve an ignition source, a concussion and the
potential to have a lost cartridge cause an ignition later. Maintaining
equipment and controls for proper function prevents many potential
sources of ignition from occurring in the workplace.
OSHA regulates powered industrial trucks at 29 CFR 1910.178 (c). The
regulation does not permit powered industrial trucks where combustible
metal dust is present in hazardous concentrations, e.g.: Heavy dust
concentrations, or where there is a layer of combustible metal dust. NFPA
505, Fire Safety Standard for Powered Industrial Trucks . . . discusses
this in detail and is referenced by the OSHA standard.
Damage Control
Some methods controlling and reducing hazard involve Separation of the
hazard (isolate with distance) and Segregation of the hazard (isolate with
a barrier). These can fit into carefully planned engineering solutions where
operations are extensive.
There are a variety of Segregation methods for isolating the hazard with a
barrier. Two common devices, an automatic, fast-acting isolation valve
and a flame front diverter, must be engineered and installed to address
the hazards of the particular combustible metal dust found at the facility.
Adequate strength and spacing of the devices are important issues.
The purpose of an automatic fast acting valve or similar device is to seal
off an area of the material handling system from the spread of a fire or
deflagration. It is intended to stop the flame front and isolate the section of
the equipment where the deflagration is occurring. The purpose of an
9

airflow control diverter valve is to redirect the explosion flame front

harmlessly to a safe area. It is intended to seal mechanically and close the
duct system, preventing air or material leakage.
The typical method of controlling metal dust deflagrations within
equipment at die casting plants is with a deflagration vent panel. This
method may also be used for a room or building through the use of a
blow out wall. Deflagration venting is required for rooms or buildings
containing a dust explosion hazard. The vent closures must be directed
toward a restricted area; the closure must not be a missile hazard; and the
blast pressure and fireball must not impinge on unrestricted personnel
pathways.
It may also be possible to suppress an explosion relatively as it starts
and before it does catastrophic damage. This is because a typical fire ball
expands at about 30 feet per second. The pressure wave that precedes it
during the course of the event expands at 1100 feet per second, more or
less. Using this interval, it is often possible to apply an extinguishing agent
to the fire ball and extinguish the fire. A detector senses the rise in
pressure, alarms and signals the suppression device to quickly release
extinguishing agent. The entire process may take no more than 50 milleseconds to suppress the explosion.
It may not be possible to protect metal dust by this method. Metal powders
and similar dusts burn with a flame speed that far exceeds that of a typical
dust. In addition the temperature and amount of heat may exceed the
extinguishing systems ability to remove heat from the flame front. Testing
can determine if this technology is applicable. Dust produced by grinding
or polishing (or other similar operations) at the die casting plant probably
does not fall in the undoable category. These dusts often burn in a more
typical fashion.
Engineering may indicate that more than one type of control measure is
applicable to a particular system.
In general dry dust collectors greater than 8 cubic feet in volume must be
located outside. The location must prevent employee exposure to burn or
other injury in the event of a deflagration. A dry dust collector of
appropriate design strength and safety relief to an outside safe location
may be acceptable. Also acceptable is an inside dust collector protected
by a properly installed and maintained explosion protection system. Wet
dust collectors are greatly preferred for metal dusts and may be located
inside.
OSHA has fined facilities where dry dust collectors are located inside the
building (some exceptions exist) and/or dust collectors return air back
inside the building. Another area of OSHA and safety concern is ductwork.
Ducts that are not grounded, have continuity to ground throughout or are
10

not constructed of metal are a static electricity ignition hazard and have
also been fined.
The Ontario Fire Code, a commonly available reference, section
5.10.1.10, requires velocity to exceed 1068 meters/minute or 18 meters
per second. The purpose of this is to ensure the transport of both coarse
and fine particles. It will prevent dust from settling out within the ducts and
create a hazard a hazard within the duct system.
Training
Employees need to be trained to recognize and prevent hazards
associated with combustible dust. They also need to know how to take
preventative action, and/or how to alert management to a hazard that
needs attention. They need to know the safe work practices applicable to
their job tasks and the overall plant programs for dust and ignition source
control. Training must be completed before they start work; periodically to
refresh their knowledge; when reassigned; and when hazards or
processes change.
Management must take responsibility complying with the hazard
communication standard relating to combustible dust. A qualified team
must conduct a facility analysis (or have one done by qualified outside
persons) prior to the introduction of a hazard. A prevention and protection
scheme tailored to the operation must be developed.
Supervisors and managers should be aware of and support the plant dust
and ignition control programs. Their training should include identifying how
they can encourage the reporting of unsafe practices and facilitate
abatement actions.
GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS
Lists of standards and guidelines important to the control of combustible dust
hazards are attached to this document as Attachment C. It is obvious that NFPA
standards are significant in providing guidance on this topic. As stated in the
introduction, the NFPA documents are available online without charge in
readable format.
SUMMARY
This paper discussed the causes and occurrence of dust explosions and fires, a
significant industrial safety problem. How these events have occurred and the
catastrophic consequences of these events were explained. Materials used in
particular die casting operations involved in dust explosions and/or fires were
examined. Methods to reduce dust explosion severity and explosion prevention
techniques were discussed.
11