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DIGESTED CASE: In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G.

De Jesus and Bibiana Roxa de Jesus,


Simeon R. ROXAS and Pedro ROXAS de Jesus, petitioners vs. Andres R. de JESUS, Jr. G.R. No. L-38338,
January 28, 1985

FACTS: After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted by
Simeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently,
he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was
then set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate
assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed in accordance with law. However,
the lower court issued an order allowing the probate which was found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged
holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending that the law
requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be
strictly complied with. The court then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the
holographic will on the ground that the word dated has generally been held to include the month,
day, and year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibian
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

RULING: ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should
include the day, month and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB/61 appearing on the holographic will
is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
DIGEST CASE 2: ROXAS vs. DE JESUS, JR. January 28, 1985

FACTS: The will is dated "FEB./61" and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it
is not written by a lawyer. . . "

HELD: The liberal construction of the will should prevail. As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic
Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar,
there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the
Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will
should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

DIGESTED CASE: LABRADOR vs. CA April 5, 1990

FACTS:

The 1st paragraph of the 2nd page of the holographic will provides: "And this is the day in which we
agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father."

HELD:
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. The will was not
an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing
was a will.
Icasiano vs. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422

DIGESTED CASE: ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO June 30, 1964

FACTS: Oppositors introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the
duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and
further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and
with undue influence and pressure. It was contended that the Court is bound by the expert testimony
as to the authenticity of the signature of the testatrix.

HELD: NO, the Court is not bound by such expert testimony. The opinion of expert for oppositors that
the signatures of the testatrix appealing in the duplicate original were not written by the same hand,
leaves the Court unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos
for the proponents, but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him. There was
failure to show convincingly that there are radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery,
taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and
the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right after the original. These factors were not
discussed by the expert.
Federico Azaola v. Cesario Singson
G.R. No. L-14003; August 5, 1960
FACTS:
When Fortunata Vda de Yance died, Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the probate of the formers
will, whereby Maria Milgaros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased
Cesario Singson. Francisco witnessed that one month before the death of the testator, the same was
handed to him and his wife.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the
will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the proponent was bound to produce more than one witness
2. WON 811 is mandatory
HELD:
1. No. Since the authenticity of the will was not being contested. But even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code
cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a
matter beyond the control of the proponent.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is
contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments. But it cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the
case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is
holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses
must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words if the Court deem
it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of
the wills authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert
evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is
convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the
Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
2. The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not
mandatory.
Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to
construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by
giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses,
should the Court deem them necessary.
DIGESTED CASE: Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER

FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees
of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of
the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on
the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting
of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and
various documentary evidence. The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who

produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased. The second
witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to
as the same was already destroyed and no longer available. The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed
that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the
deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will
entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the
deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was
similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure. The fifth was an employee of the DENR
who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latters
application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived
with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one
appearing on the will was genuine. Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the
lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the
signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceaseds holographic will.

HELD:
1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased
and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present
petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the voters
affidavit for verification as it was no longer available. The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts
and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a
note. The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of
the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her
motive. Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a
document. The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature in the holographic will. (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was
not complied with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator.

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the
possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased. Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will,
it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the
will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required. The word shall connotes a
mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

DIGESTED CASE: Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo Aranza


G.R. No. L-58509; December 7, 1982

Facts:
Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holo will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by appellees
Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. The
grounds of their opposition are as follows:
1. Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator.
2. The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not
intended to take effect.
3. The original must be presented and not the copy thereof.
4. The deceased did not leave any will.
The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will. The appellees'
motions were denied. They filed a Motion for recon. Motion for Recon was approved. Appellant's
motion for recon was denied. Appellant appealed the case to the CA which certified the case to the SC
on hte ground that the appeal does not involve questions of fact.

Issue:
Whether or not a holo will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic
copy.

Ruling:
Yes. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the
Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof

of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if
any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before
the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will
may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined
by the probate court.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.
Regalado P. Morales for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July
28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this
petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent.
Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic
wills. 1
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, a
petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn
opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate. 2
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed
special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son
of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio
Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children,
including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father.
The holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.

Its

In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show that
the said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose
Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate where the
couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that
Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together several
times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a
sign of respect whenever they met. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were
illegitimate children, sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to Venancio Rivera
and Maria Jocson, who were legally married and lived as such for many years. He explained that he
could not present his parents' marriage certificate because the record of marriages for 1942 in
Mabalacat were destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He
also submitted his own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda Rivera, who were
each described therein as the legimitate children of Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado

P. Morales, then 71 years of age, affirmed that he knew the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera
and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during the Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced to
him Maria Jocson as his wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two persons by the same name of
Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents
were Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10as contrasted with the marriage certificate
submitted by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of Florencio
Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also denied kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained it,
the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he
could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria
Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children in all during that
time.
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy
of children, ... .
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described
therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the same Venancio Rivera described in
Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal
certificate is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it may
nonetheless be considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one
and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called by different names.
The Court is not convinced. There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or
Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the
same name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son of
Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive. By his own
account, Jose supported himself and presumably also his mother Maria Vital as a gasoline
attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town and
obviously prospering and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with another
woman and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest, taking
no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial
terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself
as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life. Such paternal
discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered assuming the claims to be true
that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's legitimate wife
if indeed she was she should have objected when her husband abandoned her and founded
another family by another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria
Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored and neglected, she

nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate
father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of another woman and
for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his wayward father's neglect. The fact is
that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a
complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged partners
in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.
Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented at the trial to
support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done
because she was already old and bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking of her
deposition in her own house. No effort was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to
the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this Court does not
agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null and void, Jose had the
burden of proving that serious allegation.
We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the Venancio
Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's
legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with
the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except for the
curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking the two families or showing
that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.
Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to
have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811
because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose
Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP
No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate.
In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and
claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have
applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the
three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as
having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Kalaw v. Relova 132 SCRA 237 | Posadas GR L-40207, Sept 28, 1984

Rosa K. Kalaw

Hon. Judge Benjamin Relova,

FACTS:
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad
Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968. The
holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. She
opposed probate alleging that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions
without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the
Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. ROSA's position was
that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the
sole heir thereunder. Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration
denied.

ISSUE:
W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial
Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with
Rosa as sole heir.

HELD:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However,
when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of
full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided
or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid.
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature, The ruling in Velasco,
supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic
Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of
the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein,
her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.
DIGESTED CASE: Roberto and Thelma AJERO vs. CA and Clemente Sand
September 15, 1994
GR 106720
09-15-1994

FACTS:
The petition for probate of the will was opposed on the ground that it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent.

1. Whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
2. Whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. Whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and
4. Whether its signing was the voluntary act of the decedent.

HELD:
Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does
not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's
signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.

DIGESTED CASE:Miciano vs Brimo


TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in the inheritance.
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos
estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further

defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his
testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as
to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitionerappellant,
vs.In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee./1954, J. Padilla.
Doctrine: There are matters to be established in order to prove a will proved outside the Philippines,
among these
are: (a) that the foreign court was, under the laws of said foreign country, a probate court with
jurisdiction over the
proceedings; (b) the law of the foreign country on procedure in the probate or allowance of
wills; (c) the legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in such foreign country. Note: In the absence of proof of
the foreign law,
it is presumed that it is the same as that in the Philippines.
Facts:
- Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino resident citizen, died in city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.
He entered
into a contract of marriage twice in his lifetime.
- He had children, including the administrator-appellee Federico, with the late Manuela T. Cruz. He also
had a son
herein petitioner-appellant Silvino with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.
- Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings
No. 4892). After
the death of Apolonio Suntay, Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
- On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for
the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in November
1929 by the late
Jose B. Suntay. But it was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and
before the hearing
thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. Appeal was taken
and SC
remanded the case to CFI Bulacan upon the finding that the evidence is sufficient to prove the loss of
the will.

- Nonetheless, the probate court denied motion for continuance of the hearing by the surviving widow
and dismissed
the petition. In the meantime Pacific War supervened.
- After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the will
executed in the Philippines in November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China, on 4
January 1931 (Exhibit N). He claimed that he had found among the files, records and documents of his
late father a
will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and
that the same
was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China.
- The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness,
Anastacio Teodoro
and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of
the hearing of
this alternative petition.
- CFI disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in November 1929 and the
alleged last will and
testament executed in Amoy, China.
Issue (TOPICAL): WON the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should be allowed and
recorded by the
CFI? [NO, because certain facts as to the due execution of the China will were not established.]
Ratio: As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the
point in Rule
78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed,
filed,
and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance
in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such
court shall
fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it,
and a

certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall
be
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same
effect as
if originally proved and allowed in such court.
1. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The
law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of a
valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on
these points.
2. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul
General of the
Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee,
are inadmissible,
because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person
who holds it an

expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse
party would be
deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to
trade matters.
3. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for
the purpose of
taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district
court of Amoy
does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy
is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in
the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the
subject . It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both
to all interested
parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The
evidence
shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the.
4. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a
deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up to the standard of
such proceedings

in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the
back of such
interested parties.
Decision: The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow
the will which
was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be
said to have
been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in
the probate
and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of
a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of
this country.

Gr- L-20234
December 23, 1964
Paul Dela Cerna v. Manuela Rebaca Potot, et.al.
Facts:
1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two
(2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe
died, the said will was probated in 1939.
2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952
but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.
3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate
becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate
entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that
even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court
but the decree has now become final.)
The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which
did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A
decision which is binding upon the whole world.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the
disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be
re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
Cruz v. Villasor Digest
Cruz v. Villasor

G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973


Ponente: Esguerra, J.:
Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However,
the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without
the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance
with law.
2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary
public was one of them.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC
HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in
front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements,
a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud.
G.R. No. L-7647

March 27, 1914

DOMINGO CALUYA, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
LUCINA DOMINGO, respondent-appellee.
Lucas Paredes for appellant.
Julio Adiarte for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte denying
the probate of a will.
The learned court below based its judgment upon three grounds. The first one was that, although the
testator had signed by mark, it nowhere appeared in the will who had written the signature or that it
had been written at his request. The second, that the witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really
have signed the attestation clause because, at the time it was executed, he was attending a session
of the municipal council of Piddig as a member thereof. Third: That as to the other witness, Segundino
Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him by the testator, and he being thereby an
interested party his testimony could not be believed.
We do not believe that any of the objections are well founded and the judgment refusing its probate
must, therefore, be reversed.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. . . .
It is nowhere required that, where the testator is unable to write, the fact that his signature was
written by some other person, at his request and express direction, should appear in the body of the
will itself. In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan (21 Phil. Rep., 461, 463) we held the following:
From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant
whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is
that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the
presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a practical matter that the
one who signs the testator's name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the validity of the
will. Whether one person or another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely
unimportant so far as the validity of her will is concerned. The plain wording of the statute shows that
the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay it down, is absolutely unnecessary under the
law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of the statute relating to the execution of wills do not
in any sense require such a provision. From the standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw
from the words of the law the inference that the person who signs the name of the testator must sign
his own name also. The law requires only three witnesses to a will, not four.
Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law. The name of a person who is unable to
write may be signed by another, by express direction, to any instrument known to the law. There is no
necessity whatever, so far as the validity of the instrument is concerned, for the person who writes
the name of the principal in the document to sign his pen name also. As a matter of policy it may be
wise that he did so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would enable a person proving the
document to demonstrate more readily the execution by the principal. But as a matter of essential
validity of the document, it is unnecessary. The main thing to be established in the execution of the
will is the signature of the testator. If that signature is proved, whether it be written by himself or by
another at his request, it is none the less valid, and the fact of such signature can be proved as
perfectly and as completely when the person signing for the principal omits to sign his own name as it
can when he actually signs. To hold a will invalid for the lack of the signature of the person signing the
name of the principal is, in the particular case, a complete abrogation of the law of wills, as it rejects
and destroys a will which the status expressly declares is valid.
The section above quoted also provides that "the attestation clause shall state the fact that the
testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of the witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the
presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it
is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided."
Not only does the attestation clause comply with the requirements of this section, but it appears
clearly proved in evidence that the name of the testator was signed by another person at his request
and under his direction and in his presence and in the presence of the witnesses to the will. Moreover,
as appears from the last clause of the section, if the attestation clause is defective, or even absent,
the will is nevertheless valid provided it is satisfactorily proved that it was in fact signed and executed
as provided by law.
As to the second objection, namely, that Antonino Pandaraoan could not have signed the will as a
witness thereto, as stated in the attestation clause, because he was attending a meeting of the
municipal council of Piddig at the time the will is alleged to have been executed, we believe this also
to be without merit. It does not appear in the evidence of the opposition that the witness Pandaraoan
was attending a meeting of the municipal council of Piddig from something like 10 o'clock till 12.30
o'clock of the day on which the will was executed ands that the will was executed sometime between
10 and 12 o'clock. To much weight, however, can not be given to the testimony relative to the precise

time of the execution of the will. The barrio of Piddig is only a short distance from the house in which
the will was executed and it would have taken but a short time to cover the distance. the witness
Pandaraoan himself testified directly and positively that, after having left the meeting of the municipal
council, he went to the house of the testator by appointment and there signed the will as stated in the
attestation clause. The other witnesses to the will support this declaration. Not only this, but the
notary public who drew up the will and who translated it to the testator and who was present at the
time of its execution, declared and testified that the witnesses whose names appear upon the will
were present at the time it was executed by the testator and that they signed the same at his request
and in his presence and in the presence of each other. All of the witnesses to the will unite in declaring
that they were there present at the time the will was executed and that they signed as witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other. The mere fact that there was a session of the
municipal council of Piddig about the same time that the will was executed is not necessarily
conclusive against the fact that Antonino Pandaraoan was present and signed as a subscribing witness
as he declares. Mistakes in time are easily made among witnesses who measure time not so much by
clocks or watches as by the sun. Antonino Pandaraoan testified that the municipal council began its
session about 10 o'clock; that in order to attend the execution of the will, as he had agreed with the
notary public he would do, he was obliged to leave the session before it terminated; that he so left the
session, mounted a horse and arrived at the house of the testator at about 12 o'clock, in time to take
part in the execution of the ill as stated in the attestation clause.
We do not believe that the clear and positive testimony of the witnesses to the will and of the notary
public is overcome by the evidence offered in opposition to the probate.
As to the third ground upon which the court based its decision; namely, that the will having mentioned
and confirmed a sale of land to Segundino Asis, one of the witnesses to the will, while not rendering
the will entirely invalid, throws great doubt upon the legality of its execution and especially the
testimony of said witness relating thereto.
Section 622 provides:
If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife or husband, or parent, or child, a
beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or personal estate, is given by such will, such
devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far only as concerns such person, or the wife or husband, or parent
or child of such person, or anyone claiming under such person or such wife or husband, or parent or
child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will, and such person so
attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not been made or
given. But a mere charge on the real or personal estate of the testator, for the payment of debts, shall
not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will.
As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will before us relative to the sale of land
to Segundino Asis creates such an interest therein as falls within the provisions thereof. Indeed, no
interest of any kind was created by the will in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or transfer of
any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already consummated, a sale already made. Even if,
however, the will had conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it would not have been for that reason
void. Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to him would have been void; the remainder
could have stood and would have stood as a valid testament.
We are confident from a thorough examination of the record that a fair preponderance of the evidence
is in favor of the proponents, and there being no legal impediment to the probate the court erred in
refusing it.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the cause remanded to the court whence it came
with instructions to legalize and probate the will in accordance with the petition.
Maloto v. CA Digest
Maloto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988


Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four
heirs believed that the deceased did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding.
However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal
parts.

2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last
will which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and
a probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the
househelp under the instruction of the deceased

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the
will was sufficiently proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and
'animus' must concur, one without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of
destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's
paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be
the will and the burning though done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute
an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since
animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and
presence.

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