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Art. 11: People vs.

Apolinar (1936) Defense of Property


Facts:

Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong
was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La
Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land when he
observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief
(of palay), the defendant called his attention but he ignored him.The defendant fired in the air
and then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his
house and consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been
wounded in the back by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the
spinal column - which wounds were circular in formand a little bigger than a quarter of an inch,
according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he sustained.The
defendant surrendered to the authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn
statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.
Issue
Whether or not, the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property
Held/Ruling:
No; the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be
invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property.
Article 11. People v Delima (1922) Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of Right/Office
*Doctrine of Self-Help
Facts:
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. The policeman Felipe Delima,
who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo
in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance.
The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The
criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. These peace officer went after him and fired again his
revolver, this time hitting and killing him.
Issue: Whether or not, Felipe Delima has a criminal liability for the death of Lorenzo Napilon?
Held/Ruling: Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime,
and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender,
and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a
weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although
it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.lawphil.net

Mamangun vs. People


GR No. 149152 February 2, 2007
FACTS:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call,
with his fellow polce officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain
Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted residents to respond and
chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio
Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun,
searched the rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect.
Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man who
turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) Contreras died of the gunshot
wound.
According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policeman
to the lighted rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the
deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly
exclaimed Hindi ako, hindi ako! to which Mamangun replied, Anong hindi ako?
and shot him.
The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were only ones at the
dark rooftop when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to
run. Mamangun shouted Pulis, tigil! whereupon the person stopped and raised a
steel pipe towards Mamanguns head. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the
person. The three police claim that Contreras only said Hindi ako, hindi ako only
when they approached him. Mamangun then asked Why did you go to the rooftop?
You know there are policemen here. Mamangub reported the incident to the desk
officer who directed investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez
later on found a steel pipe on the roof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the victim was necessary consequence of the
petitioners fulfillment of his duty.
HELD:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandinganbayans
decision after finding the petitioners testimony to be nothing but concocted story
designed to evade criminal liability. Per Sandiganbayans observations, the defense
was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect to his co-policemenwitnesses because:
1

After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly Mamangun,


its contrary to human experience for a man (who is not a suspect) to attack
one of three policemen with drawn guns.

2
3

Mamanguns admission that he did not ask the victim Why did you try to hit
me, if you are not the one? clearly belies their claim.
The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that
the victim instinctively shielded himslef instead.
Additionally, petitioners pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially
reported to the desk and was only conveniently remembered when the
investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.
Acts in the fullfilment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the
petitioners firing the fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the failure of the petitioners
plea. Also, there can be only be incomplete justification ( a privileged
mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying
circumstance the injury was caused by neccessary consequence of due
performance of duty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHUA HIONG


GR No. 10413 October 20, 1954
FACTS:
Cesario Gochero, nephew of Federico Chua Hiong published an artilce in the Manila
Chronicle on Feb. 11, 1952 entitled Doubtful Citizenship questionning the latters
citizenship. Aside from that, Gochero also filed various charges against the
appellant with different government agencies. To answer this, on February 21, 1952,
Chua Hiong published an article in Manila Chroncile accusing Cesario Gochero of
persecution mania and sending appellant to threatening letter under pseudonym
Benito Solipco. Chua Hiong also alleged that Gocheco was trying to damage his
reputation to retaliate. In an earlier case, Gochero and his family losr 2/3 of the
inheritance left by his father. Chua Hiong was behind prevailing parties, helping
them with the expenses of the case.
Thus, for the article, Chua Hiong was charged with and found guilty of the crime
libel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appelllant was justified by virtue of defense of reputation when
published
article in the Manila Chronicle dated February 21, 1952 containing libelous material.
HELD:
In the physical assault, retalliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased,
because there would be no harm to repel. But that is not the case when it is aimed
at a persons good name. Once the aspersion is cast, its sting clings and the once
defamed may avail himself of all back with another libel, which, if adequate, will be
justified.

VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE
GR NO. 160188, JUNE 21, 2007
FACTS:

petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a
security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the
mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases
of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these
cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Thereafter, petitioner
left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards
the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by
Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area.
Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered.
ISSUE:
WON Valenzuela is liable for frustrated theft?
HELD:
No. Valenzuela is guilty of consummated theft. "Unlawful taking" is most
material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal
property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At
the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude
that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. The taking by the petitioner
was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of
the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to
drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a
taxicab.

ARTICLE 6-PEOPLE v. LAMAHANG [61 Phil.703 (1935)]- Stages of Execution


Facts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store of cheap goods
in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening another when a patrolling police
caughthim. Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn. Convicted of
attempt of robbery
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence
another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from
which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and
stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by
means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion
that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner.
That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical
injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a
concrete finding.

Issue: Whether or not the crime is attempted robbery?


Held: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to a particular
and concrete offense which would lead directly to consummation. Necessary to establish
unavoidable connection & logical & natural relation of cause and effect. Important to show clear
intent to commit crime. In case at bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by force,
other inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from nature of acts executed. Acts
susceptible of double interpretation cant furnish ground for themselves. Mind should not directly
infer intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts themselves obviously
disclose criminal objective.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CEILITO ORITA
GR No. 88724 April 03, 1990
FACTS:
Cristina Abayan arrived at her boarding house early in the morning last March 20,
1983. When she was about to enter, Cielito Orita suddenly held her and poked a
balisong to her neck. She was dragged to her room where Orita ordered her to
undress. Out of fear she followed his order. While the accused starts undressing as
well. There after, Orita mounted on her while she laid on the floor. The accused
ordered her to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. At said position, Orita
cannot fully penetrate her. The accused then lay down on his back and commanded
her to mount him. In this position, only small portion of his penis was inserted in her
vagina.
Abayan was able to dash out to the next room. She was able to jump out the
window and fled to the Municipal building. Then she was brought to a hospital
where she was examined. Upon examination, it was found that the hymen is still
intact and no laceration was noted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of frustrated rape was proper.
HELD:
No. The conviction on the crime frustrated rape is erroneous. In the crime of rape,
perfect penetration is not essential for consummation of the crime. Any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Thus, Orita should have been
convicted of consummated rape. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a
felony is consummated when all elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all acts
necessary for its execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator.
PEOPLE VS AGACER
GR NO. 177751, DECEMBER 14, 2011
FACTS:
While Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a
nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario
moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working.

However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings.
This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. At
this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the
latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric,
signaled Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five
meters away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a
sack and, without warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest.
ISSUE:
WON conspiracy existed among the accused- appellants in killing Cesar Agacer?
HELD:
Yes. Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in
design, intent and execution. 27 They "performed specific acts with closeness
and coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose and design" 28 to ensure the death of Cesario.
First, all of them emerged at the same time from a banana plantation beside the
ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario by immediately surrounding him. Third, all
of them were armed at the time of the incident. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck
Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot
Cesario at close range. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor did not do anything
to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all
appellants departed from the scene of the crime together.
Note:
Existence of Conspiracy "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it." 23 In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. 24 It "may be shown through
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest." 25 Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime
is not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the
same objective suffices.

ARTICLE 8- CONSPIRACY PEOPLE v NACIONAL. G.R. Nos. 111294-95


September 7, 1995
FACTS: On February 21, 1985 at Brgy. Salvacion, Municipality of Daraga, Province of
Albay. WALTER NACIONAL alias "KA DENNIS," ABSALON MILLAMINA alias "KA ALVIN,"
EFREN MUSA, RUDY LUCES, JAVIER MIRABETE alias "COMMANDER," and ZACARIAS
MILITANTE alias "CARE, " with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, with evident planning and taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and intently shoot with a firearm QUIRINO

LAGASON and JOEL LAGASON, inflicting upon them the injuries resulting to their
death.
The judgment convicting the five accused is based on the evidence presented by
the prosecution. It is derived mainly from the testimonies of two eyewitnesses
Bienvenida Lagason, Quirino's widow and Joel's mother, and Crisanto Miranda, a
neighbor of the Lagasons and accused Walter Nacional.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the four CCP-NPA namely Efren Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier
Mirabete and Zacarias Militante are guilty of conspiracy?
HELD/RULING: WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as the criminal liability of accused-appellant Javier Mirabete is concerned, and
insofar as the civil liability of all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4854-4855. The
prosecution has clearly and convincingly established the existence of a conspiracy
in the planning and execution of the crimes. Conspiracy arises at the very instant
the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly to commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it.
The conspiracy in the instant case was established at their meeting. Apparently,
nobody disagreed with the plan to shoot the victims because immediately after the
meeting, all the accused and Wilson Lita were seen walking as a group towards
Barangay Salvacion. When they saw their intended victims, they shot them and fled
towards the RCPI building. Even those left at the waiting shed likewise fled towards
the same direction. Clearly, the shooting of the Lagasons was characterized by a
unity of purpose, intention and design.
It hardly matters that accused-appellant was not actually present at the specific
place of the shooting. He was at the waiting shed but this was for the purpose of
providing security to those who carried out the shooting. The waiting shed was
located along the way to the Lagasons' house, strategically at the entrance to and
exit from it.
A conspiracy, once established, makes each of the conspirators liable for the acts of
the others. 40 All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent of
their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO
GR NO. 189833 FEBRUARY 05, 2014
FACTS:
That on or about October 12, 2001, Morilla drove the Municipal ambulance of
Panukulan while Mitra (incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon
Province) drove the starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative
plate to read Mayor. Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were passengers of the said
vehicle. Said vehicle left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The starex van which
was ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police
officers in Baranggay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon. However,
the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the
untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van.
Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden
tiles. Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the
car. The police noticed some white crystalline granules on the floor, then they
requested Morilla to open the sacks. Morilla told the police officers that he was with
Mayor Mitra and attempted to persuade them to let him pass. His request was
rejected and upon inpsection, the contents of the sacks turned out to sacks of

methaphetanine hydrochloride. This discovery prompted the police officers to chase


the starex van of Mayor Mitra. The officers were able to overtake the van. The
operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the
ambulance. Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. The
court finds Mitra and Morilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. 6425
otherwise known as Dangerous Drug Act of 1992 Section 15 (Sale, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs).
Accused Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were acquitted for failure of the prosecution
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled thath the mere
presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were
also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the court against Morilla for conspiracy in committing
felony was correct.
HELD:
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. Article 8 of Revised Penal Code
provides that a conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is proposal
when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to
some other person or persons. The very act of transporting methamphetanine
hydrochloride is malum prohibition punishable as an offense under special law.
Therefore, the transportation of sacks containing prohibited drugs need not to be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

G.R. No. L-31922 October 29, 1976


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO VELASCO Y ABENOJAR, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
It appears that at about 5:30 in the afternoon of the 2nd day of November,
1967, the offended party, Estelita Lopez, a child, five years old, accompanied by her
cousin Nenita Lopez, another child, four years old, were at the North Cemetery,
Manila. The defendant, Ricardo Velasco y Abenojar, called them, gave Nenita a fivecentavo coin and asked her to buy cigarettes for him. After she left, the accused
held Estelita by the hand and brought her to an alley. Once in a hidden place
between the tombs he kissed her on the lips, took off her panties and placed
himself on top of the girl while she was lying down on the ground face up and tried
to insert his sexual organ into that of the victim. The girl shouted in pain, 'Aray,
Aray.' Arsenio Perez, who happened to see the accused holding the hand of the girl
while walking along 24th .street in the cemetery as as when they turned into the
alley and who at first thought that the accused was a relative of the girl, upon
hearing the shouts of the girl and because of the shouts believed that something

bad was being done to the girl, ... proceeded to the place where the shouts came
and upon standing on top of one of the tombs he saw, a short distance away, (2
tombs away) the accused on top of the girl, with his pants and drawers lowered
down to his knees, and the dress of the girl raised up and the buttocks of the
accused making upward and downward movements.
A Medico Legal examination was conducted in the Medical Examiner's office
by Dr. David S. Cabreira at out 8:10 P.M. of November 2, 1967 ..., and according to
the said report the findings were, '(1) Fresh laceration of the hymen at six o'clock
positions (2) Vaginal opening is painful and sensitive to touch. Opinion: From the
above findings on the subject Estelita Lopez, the undersigned finds that she must
have had sexual intercourse recently before this examination.' " 4

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ricardo Velasco is guilty of consummated rape.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision of February 18, 1970 of the lower court finding the
accused Ricardo Velasco y Abenojar guilty of the crime of consummated rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellant.

G.R. No. 189405

November 19, 2014

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of
his deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the
afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of
Robinsons Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner was already
inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey
Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness
Antonette Managbanags sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with
his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back,
petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffreys head. At the
last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and
a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the

struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the
gun at Jeffreys face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally
discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally,
after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
ISSUE:
Whether all the requisites of the justifying circumstance or self defense , as
provided for by law settled jurisprudence , are present in this casse.
HELD:
No. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely
threatening and intimidating action.15 There is aggression, only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at bar,
other than petitioners testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that
Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioners questions or initiated the
confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair
and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an assault which may have caused
petitioner to fear for his life.

G.R. No. 135981

January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled
and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death
of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman
syndrome as constituting self defense.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. A battered woman has been defined
as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
G.R. No. L-31922 October 29, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIO RICOHERMOSO, defendant-appellant
FACTS: Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de
Leon and one Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of
land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of
palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay harvested
from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.
Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by
Ricohermosos house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered
defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever happens. Geminiano
remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed
his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked
Geminiano. At the same time and place, Ricohermosos brother-in-law Juan Padernal
suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which
point Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that
the rifle he carried beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.
The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.
ISSUE:
W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of
avoidance of a greater evil or injury
HELD: No.
Juan Padernals reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because
his act in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the
aggressors in this case, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon
without any risk to the assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil
or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.

Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the
appellants with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to
Marianito de Leon.
G.R. No. L-26298

January 20, 1927

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA, defendant-appellant.
OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS

The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the evidence is conclusive that the
defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt whether he
succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention of the mother and
the sister of the child. The physician who examined the genital organ of the child a few hours after the
commission of the crime found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an
effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying before the court he expressed doubts as to
whether the entry had been effected. The mother of the child testified that she found its genital organ
covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be considered conclusive evidence of penetration.

ISSUE: WON the crime of rape was consummated in the case at bar?

HELD:

No. There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape, but in view
of the fact that he was living in the house of the parents of the child as their guest, the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be imposed in its maximum
degree. The defendant-appellant is hereby found guilty of the crime of frustrated rape.

(Nota Bene: In the case of People vs. Orita, the Supreme Court overruled this decision and held that for
the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by
male organ is sufficient.)

G.R. No. 172707

October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,


vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL
UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y
AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two
persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chans residence at FB
Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside
a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning,
Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan
but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish
delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of
fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be
back later that evening. Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large,
returned to Chans residence that evening. Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. 10 On 13
August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After
travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on
the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as
Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao). 15 Another woman, later identified as Thian
Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. 16 At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, a man who was later identified as
Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa
pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the
room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. 18The
group then talked to Chans son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mothers release.
It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver P400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue.

On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the abductors
acceded to a P400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue
at around 2:00 am. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later
identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the
P400,000.00 ransom.

On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. CA affirmed
with modification to the award of damages.

ISSUE: WON the accused were guilty of conspiracy?

HELD:
Yes.This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. 51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals. 52 Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has
been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence,
as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission
of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accusedappellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies
proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house;
(2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation
was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol,
Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the
prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. However, seeing that the only evidence the
prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the
room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to
the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather
only as an accomplice to the crime. (Accomplice- another topic under Art. 18)
G.R. No. L-68940 May 9, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MATEO ABAGON and ABNER ONGONION, accused-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS
That on or about April 17,1981, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Pinamarubuhan, Municipality of
Mobo, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused conspiring
and helping each other, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superiority of strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife 'machete' one Celis
Lupango, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting wounds which directly
caused his instantaneous death.

The defense presented both accused to deny the charges. For his defense, accused Mateo Abagon
claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at the seashore of Pinamarubuhan about 100
meters away from the scene of the incident. On the other hand, accused Abner Ongonion, claims that at
that particular time he left his house to fetch his mother at the Tugbo River where she washed clothes. On
his way he passed by the store of Corazon Cana to buy cigarettes. At the store he was pulled inside by
Celis Lupango, where the latter was drinking with others, among whom was June Radaza. He was asked
to drink but he refused because of a headache. Celis then asked him why are you brave' and then he
pulled out his knife, but as he did so the knife bumped the edge of the table and fell to the ground. As
Celis recovered the knife from the ground, Ongonion was able to get hold of Celis' hand and they
grappled for the knife. While grappling he succeeded in thrusting the knife to the left breast of Celis and
again he thrust it to the stomach. After he was able to get possession of the knife he kept on stabbing
Celis, being by then angry. In the meantime, as they grappled, the companions of Celis Lupango jumped
out of the window, while Jun Radaza who was there watching ran away when he saw Celis was stabbed.
He then went out and proceeded to the PC Headquarters at Masbate and surrendered. Benjamin
Bergado and Teresito Lupango were not seen by him in the store. He also stated that his co-accused
Mateo Abagon was not in the store. When cross-examined he admitted that in 1981 his elder brother
(Julio) had a quarrel with Celis and his brother was stabbed on the right thigh by a cousin of Celis named
Gualberto Roga. He admitted also that he holds a grudge against Celis because about four months
before April 17, 1981, while his brother Julio was still in the hospital, he was chased by Celis in the street
near the store of Corazon Cana and only escaped being stabbed because he ran away.

ISSUE: WON the claim of self-defense by accused Ongonion is tenable?

HELD:

No. According to the testimonies of Bergado, Radaza, and Lupango, the attack by the assailants was
unprovoked. The sudden attack on the victim with knives drawn indicates that the stabbing was
intentional. No other conclusion can likewise be surmised from the gunshots fired by the assailants at
those who tried to bring Celis to the hospital. While the victim's body lay helpless on the street, the
appellants kept on stabbing the victim, thereby ensuring his death.
Having admitted the killing, Ongonion must clearly establish that he acted in self-defense. The burden of
proof is now shifted to him. He must, therefore, rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution (People v. Sadie, 149 SCRA 240; and People v. Regulacion, 121 SCRA 40)
for even if the latter's evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the appellant admitted the killing
(People v. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48; People v. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; and People v. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772).
The number and nature of the stab wounds inflicted by more than one person belie Ongonion's theory of
self-defense.

Ongonion's claim of self-defense is likewise negated by the physical evidence and other circumstances,
such as his failure to present the knife upon surrender (p. 15, TSN, Sept. 9,1983), his failure to tell the
police authorities that he killed the deceased in self-defense, and the absence of any injury on the body of
Ongonion while the deceased suffered eleven wounds when, according to the appellant, there was
supposedly a struggle that took place. For self-defense to prosper, the following elements should have
been proved by appellant: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself (People v. Balmaceda, 148 SCRA 194).<re||an1w> On the contrary, all the evidence on
record shows that not one of the elements of self-defense is present.

G.R. No. 132547

September 20, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
The evidence shows that at around two o' clock in the morning of 22 December 1995 Buenaventura
Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his room. Suddenly, Wapili
bolted out of his room naked and chased Leydan, his brother-in-law. Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of
two (2) of his neighbors attempted to tie Wapili with a rope but was unsuccessful as Wapili was much
bigger in built and stronger than anyone of them. 4 Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy,
kept on running without any particular direction.

At around four o'clock in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Ulep together with SPO1 Espadera and
SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board an Anfra police service jeep. The three (3) police officers, all
armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw the naked Wapili approaching them. The
kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police claimed that he was armed with a bolo and
a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.

SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot
him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the police officers. When
Wapili was only about two (2) to three (3) meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came
closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.The post mortem
examination of the body conducted by Dr. Roberto A. Omandac, Municipal Health Officer of Kidapawan,
showed that Wapili sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. 7 Dr. Omandac concluded that the shots were fired
at close range, perhaps within twenty-four (24) inches, judging from the powder burns found around some
of the wounds in the body of the victim, 8 and that the wound in the head, which caused the victim's
instantaneous death, was inflicted while "the victim was in a lying position." 9

ISSUE: WON SPO1 Ulep can invoke the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par.
5?

HELD:
No. Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of The Revised Penal
Code may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely,
that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the
injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.As succinctly
observed by the trial court -Once he saw the victim he fired a warning shot then shot the victim hitting him
on the different parts of the body causing him to fall to the ground and in that position the accused shot
the victim again hitting the back portion of the victim's head causing the brain to scatter on the ground x x
x x the victim, Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground. Therefore, there was no necessity for the
accused to pump another shot on the back portion of the victim's head.

Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense. The elements in order for selfdefense to be appreciated are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the
accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 12The presence of unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has

committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. 13 In the present case, the
records show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds
he sustained, and possibly unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The aggression
that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that
moment, there was no longer any danger to his life.

Pp vs Campuhan
GR No. 129433, March 30, 2000
FACTS:
On April 25, 1996, as Corazon was busy preparing her childrens drinks, she heard one of her
daughters cry, Ayoko, ayoko prompting her to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo
Campuhan inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or jogging
pants and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical
injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact and
its orifice was only 0.5 cm in diameter . On May 27, 1997, Primo Campuhan was found guilty
of statutory rape.

ISSUE:
WON Campuhan is guilty of consummated statutory rape?
HELD:
No. Campuhan is found guilty of attempted rape.
In Orita, the court held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the
offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having
performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. The court ruled
then that perfect penetration was not essential, any penetration of the female organ by the
male organ, however slight, was sufficient. Even without rupture of the hymen or laceration
of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction of consummated rape. However, the
prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus in proving that Primos penis was able to
penetrate Crysthels vagina.
Under Art 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the RPC, the rape is attempted when the offender
commences of rape directly by overt acts, and does performs all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape and only attempted rape are
present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.