[G.R. No. 160701.

February 9, 2004]
BAYLON vs. AMADOR
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 9 2004.
G.R. No. 160701 (Fulton Baylon vs. Terencio Amador.)
Petitioner assails the July 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54363 which modified the January 22, 1996 consolidated decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Civil Cases 91-5653 (specific
performance) and 92-5747 (certiorari).
On August 26, 1987, private respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner
at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacon, Sorsogon, alleging that the latter defaulted
in payment of rentals and refused to vacate the subject property owned by private
respondent despite repeated demands.
On December 28, 1990, after the parties submitted their respective position papers,
the MTC decided in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioner to vacate the
subject premises.
In retaliation, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 91-5663 before the Sorsogon RTC for
specific performance alleging that their contract of lease also contained an option to
buy through which private respondent gave petitioner the preferential right to purchase
the subject property in the event the same was put on sale.
In the meantime, private respondent's ex parte motion for execution of judgment in
the ejectment case was granted and on April 19, 1992, the MTC issued an alias writ of
execution.
To prevent imminent ejectment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) at the
Sorsogon RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-5747.
Meanwhile, without notice to private respondent, petitioner acquired a "3/9 portion"
of the subject property from one of the co-owners.
Trial of both Civil Case Nos. 91-5653 and 92-5747 ensued. Thereafter the
Sorsogon RTC, Branch 52 rendered the January 22, 1996 decision. The dispositive
portion stated:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff (Civil Case No. 5633), the petitioner in Civil Case No. 5747 and against the defendant
in (Civil Case No. 5633) and the respondent in (Civil Case No. 5747).
1. Finding that the plaintiff has .the preferential right to acquire the property in question in the
event defendant sells/alienate the remaining portion of the property in question.
2. To permanently enjoin the lower court from enforcing the alias writ of execution in Civil
Case 183.
3. Declaring plaintiff to be co-owner of the house and lot in question for having acquired by
purchase at least 3/9 portion of the questioned property.
4. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum
of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
5. The counterclaim of defendant is hereby dismissed.
6. Defendant shall pay the cost of the suit.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On July 30, 2001, the appellate court modified the decision of the Sorsogon RTC:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated January 22, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 52) in Sorsogon, Sorsogon in Civil Cases Nos. 91-5653 and 925747, is hereby MODIFIED in that:
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(1) The plaintiff-appellee has lost his preferential right to buy the property in question; and
(2) The defendant-appellant be given a period of thirty (30) days from finality of this judgment
within which to redeem that portion which had been acquired by the plaintiff-appellee;

but AFFIRMED in all other respects. No costs. Let the records be remanded to the court a quo
for appropriate action.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 6, 2003.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court committed reversible error when it
declared him to have lost his preferential right to buy the subject property and gave
private respondent 30 days from finality of judgment to redeem the "3/9 portion" of the
disputed property acquired by petitioner from private respondent's co-owner.
The petition is without merit.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, even if the parties originally had a contract
of lease with option to buy, when the lease contract expired, the tacit renewal of the
contract was limited only to those terms of the contract which were germane to the
petitioner's right of continued lease over the property and did not extend to alien
matters like the option to buy the leased premises.
The Court has ruled that, in case of implicit renewal of a contract of lease on a
monthly basis, the terms of the original lease contract which are revived in the implied
new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are only those terms germane to
the lessee's right of continued possession and enjoyment of the property leased.
Therefore, in this case, the implied new lease did not ipso facto carry with it the revival
of petitioner's option to buy the leased premises because said option was alien to the
lease. Stated differently, petitioner's right to exercise the option to purchase expired
with the termination of the original contract of lease.
Regarding private respondent's right of redemption, Article 1088 of the New Civil
Code explicitly states that, should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing by the vendor.
The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. This Court has long established
the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled
to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about
the sale, its terms and conditions as well as its efficacy and status.
Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still has the right
to redeem said one-third portion of the subject property. On account of the lack of
written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs, the 30-day period never commenced.
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the appellate court in
rendering the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied due course.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
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Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios
and Edgardo P. Cruz of the Fourth Division.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[3]
Rollo, p. 39.
[4]
Vda. De Chua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 SCRA 99 [1993].
[5]
Dizon vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 288, [1999].
[6]
Verdad vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 593, [1996].
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