ELECTION CASES

I. Qualifications Under Local Government Code

a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipal, city, or province or, in the case
of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the distrct where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor or member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twentythree (23) years of age on election day.
c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, municipalities must be at least twentyone (21) years of age on election day.
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2. Disqualifications
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
d) Those with dual citizen; (please see the law on dual citizenship)
e) x x x x
Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
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Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Annotated) by Jose Agaton R. Sibal,
First Edition pp. 75-76
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Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in
the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends
to prevent the possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from
[seeking] an election office to serve that community. Such provision is
aimed at excluding outsiders from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Establishing
residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement
defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is
best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for
a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin
or by choice.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that
officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and
bounds of their constituencies but more important, with the constituents
themselves- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite
period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their
desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the
formers qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.
In other words, the actual physical presence of herein private
respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his
intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners b\very legalistic, academic and
technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple,
practical and commonsense rationale for the residence requirement.
To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote.
In the same vein, we stated in Alberto vs. Comelec that election
cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Indeed, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty

than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.2
Comelec Resolution No. 2050, adopted on 3 November 1998 covers
two (2) different aspects:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification
filed before the election must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the
purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the
COMELEC shall order the candidates disqualification. In case the
complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu
proprio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the
Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, paragraph 2 refers to a complaint for disqualification filed
after the election against a candidate who has not yet been proclaimed or
who has already been proclaimed as a winner. In both cases, the complaint
shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law
Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation. However, if
before proclamation, the Law department makes a prima facie finding of
guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case
is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation
of the evidence of guilt is strong.3
While the filing of a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing a pre-proclamation controversy, this principle admits of
several exceptions, such as when such petition is not the proper remedy.4
Where a party alleges the existence of manifest errors in the
preparation of election returns, the proper remedy is not a petition for quo
warranto but a petition for annulment of proclamation.5
In case there exist discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in
taras/tally as against the voters obtained in words/figures in the same
returns/certificates, the votes in taras/tally shall prevail.6

Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., et. al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al. G.R. No. 137329,
August 9, 2002; Panganiban, J.
3
Amado S. Bagatsing, et. al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al., G.R. No. 134047,
December 8, 1999; Kapunan, J.
4
Angelia vs. COMELEC, 332 SCRA 757.
5
Angelia vs. COMELEC, 332 SCRA 757.
6
Angelia vs. COMELEC, 332 SCRA 757.
2

As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently

adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In In re Vinzon, (19 SCRA 815) the term moral turpitude is
considered as encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals.
We however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Election
(258 SCRA 483) that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and
that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine. We further pronounced therein that.
. In International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA
760 ([1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime
as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes, which are mala in
se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes, which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis,
whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute. (Emphasis ours)
In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda (181 SCRA 692) we held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person The effects of the
issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs.
Martinez, (146 SCRA 323) through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers
can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare and society and the public
interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an
unfounded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule
of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.7
In Jamil vs. Commission on Election, we held that a decision becomes
binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge
or member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his
vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be
withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe
and Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the reason that
Pablo C. Villaber vs. Commission on Elections and Rep. Douglas R. Cagas, G.R.
No. 148326, Novmber 15, 2001; Sandoval-Gutierrez. J
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their retirement preceded the resolutions promulgation. The effect of the

withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at
all and only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly
considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy. However, unless the
withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for
or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the decision
a nullity. (Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et.al., G.R.
Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
QUO WARRANTO AND ELECTION PROTEST:
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy
or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the
COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the
protestee or the validity of his proclamation. Nevertheless, the general rule is
not absolute. It admits of a certain exceptions, as where: (a) the board of
canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper
remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo
warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
(e) the proclamation was null and void. (Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, et.al., G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
In Samad vs. COMELEC, we explained that a petition for quo warranto
under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the
respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his
place. An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning
candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and
counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the
questions of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and
therefore is entitled to hold the office. (Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, et.al., G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC or any
other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of
endeavor, are binding on this Court. In a pre-proclamation controversy, the
board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or
behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic.
Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would necessitate
the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie
regular, the proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a preproclamation controversy. (Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, et.al., G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
REGULARITY OF RETURNS:

Absent any evidence appearing on the face of the returns that they are indeed
spurious, manufactured or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by
petitioner would require the reception of evidence aliunde which cannot be
done in a pre-proclamation controversy such as the one initiated by
petitioner. Returns can not be excluded on mere allegation that the returns
are manufactured or fictitious when the returns, on their face, appear regular
and without any physical signs of tampering, alteration or other similar vice.
If there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to appear
as normal through falsification of the election returns, such grounds are
properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation
controversy. (Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et.al.,
G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)
We (SC) stress that the residence requirement is rooted