G.R. No.

169059

September 5, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LAMBERTO RAFON, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This treats of the appeal from the Decision1 dated
5 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00115 affirming the
Decision2 dated 8 July 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61 in
Criminal Case Nos. 6204-G and 6694-G where
appellant Lamberto Rafon was found guilty of
raping his minor daughter and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death.
In two (2) separate Informations3 filed on 5 March
1999, appellant was charged, the accusatory
portions of which read, thus:
Criminal Case No. 6204-G
That sometime in the year 1994, at
Barangay x x x,4 Municipality of x x
x,5 Province of Quezon, Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with one [AAA],6 his own
daughter, a minor, 11 years of age,
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 6694-G
That sometime in the year 1998, at
Barangay x x x, Municipality of x x x,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one [AAA], his own
daughter, a minor, 15 years of age,
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
Forthwith, trial ensued which culminated in the

guilty verdict. The dispositive portion of the

judgment reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing
premises, accused LAMBERTO RAFON is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of rape defined
and penalized under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code[,] as amended by R.A.
[No.] 7659[,] and is hereby imposed the
penalty of DEATH for each crime of rape.
He is further ordered to indemnify [AAA]
the amount of P75,000.00 for each act
or P150,000.00. In addition, accused shall
pay her likewise P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape or the
total amount of P60,000.00. Costs against
the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
The case was thereafter elevated to this Court on
automatic review and the parties were directed to
file their respective Briefs.10 The parties complied.
However, the Court issued a Resolution11 on 21
September 2004, transferring the case to the CA
for intermediate review conformably with the
ruling in People v. Mateo.12
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court with the following modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated 8 July 2002
isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant is ordered to pay
[AAA] P50,000.00 as moral damages
andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of rape.13
The case is again before us for our final
disposition.
The evidence for the prosecution consists mainly
of the testimonies of private complainant, AAA,
and Dr. Cheres Daquilanea, a resident physician
of the Doa Marta District Hospital, Atimonan,
Quezon.
AAA testified that she was born on 3 November
1983 as evidenced by her birth certificate.14 She
is one of five children born to appellant and
BBB.15 She recounted that appellant first raped
her in their house sometime in 1994 when she
was in grade five and while her mother was
working overseas. Her two younger brothers were

at a neighbor's house watching television while

her two sisters were studying in the poblacion.
Appellant who was drunk allegedly forced her to
lie down on the papag and remove her clothes.
He then warned her not to make any noise or he
would kill her and her siblings. Appellant started
kissing her then she felt pain when he inserted
his penis inside her vagina and proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with her. She tried to
cross her legs but was overpowered by her father
and she could not do anything but cry silently.
She did not report the harrowing experience to
anyone for fear that appellant would make good
his threats.16
Appellant allegedly raped her several more times
thereafter until she was in second year high
school, the last incident being sometime in 1998.
AAA recalled that the last incident was similar to
the first, with the appellant forcing her to lie down
and to remove her clothes, and successfully
having his way with her. Afraid of what appellant
might do to her and her family, AAA did not dare
tell her mother BBB of her sufferings in the hands
of her father. It was at the instance of her
boyfriend to whom she first revealed the truth
about her father that she eventually had the
courage to tell BBB. When BBB arrived home in
January 1999, AAA relayed the rape incidents to
her and they both went to the police to report the
matter.17
Dr. Daquilanea testified that AAA went to see her
on 4 January 1999 at the Doa Marta District
Hospital to have herself examined because she
was raped.18 Dr. Daquilanea found healed
hymenal lacerations in AAA at the 3 o'clock, 6
o'clock, and 9 o'clock positions that according to
her could have been caused by sexual
intercourse.19
As the lone witness for his defense, appellant
denied the charges against him. He testified that
AAA is his daughter and he is legally married to
BBB. From 1994 to 1998, he worked as a laborer
so that he sometimes went to Lopez, Quezon to
haul coco lumber.20 Averring that BBB never left
their house during the said period, appellant
wondered why AAA would file a criminal case
against him as he had very cordial relations with
her. On cross-examination, however, he testified
that BBB had been working as a beautician in
Saudi Arabia since 1995 and came home for a
vacation every two years.21 His parents allegedly
stayed with them in their house while BBB was
away. He claimed that it was his brother-in-law,
CCC,22 who had a grudge against him because the
latter wanted a share in the money sent to him by
his wife. CCC allegedly initiated the instant case
because he owed appellant P10,000.00 and was
angry at him.23

In finding the appellant guilty, the RTC made the

following findings, thus:
Certainly, the innocent but natural and
straightforward testimony of [AAA] alone
on [sic] the detailed narration of a pretty
girl on [sic] her teens on how she was
repeatedly violated by her own father from
1994 to 1998 is sufficient to sustain the
conviction of her father. No one indeed
would want to go through the troubles and
humiliation of a trial for a much debasing
offense unless she was really raped and
her motive was solely to seek justice.
(People v. Gaban, 262 SCRA 598; People v.
Campesino, 131 SCRA 56). In fact, it is
entitled to greater weight since her
accusing words are directed against a
close relative, her own father (People v.
Lao, 249 SCRA 137). It is indeed extremely
difficult to believe that the complainant
Arlene, young as she was, could have
guile and craft to accuse her father of such
heinous crime.
xxxx
Verily, [AAA] is a credible witness. Her
testimony deserves the highest credence.
She would not have admitted in public
that she was deflowered by her own father
unless she was telling the truth for in
doing so, she was compromising her
family. (People v. Esquila, 254 SCRA 140).
The age of [AAA] has been established
beyond cavil by her birth certificate (Exh.
"B") indicating that she was born on
March24 [sic] 3, 1983 and that her name
[AAA] as Exh. "B-1" and the name of
Lamberto Rafon as her father was marked
as Exh. "B-3." Computing her age based
on November 3, 1983, her age in 1994
was 11 years old and in 1998 is 15 years
old.
The relation that exists between the
complainant and the accused as daughter
and father is established beyond cavil not
only as shown in the birth certificate (Exh.
"B") but by the testimony of both
complainant and the accused. x x x x25
Like the lower court, the appellate court gave full
faith and credence to AAA's positive and
straightforward testimony as against appellant's
bare denial. It stressed that although there were
inconsistencies in her testimony as to who
removed her clothes and as regards the
whereabouts of her siblings at the time of the

rape incidents, these are trivial and do not impair

her credibility as "a rape victim is not expected to
mechanically keep memory details of the rape
incident and then when called to testify
automatically give an accurate account of the
traumatic experience she suffered."26 It further
held that AAA's testimony is corroborated by
physical evidence, she having sustained hymenal
lacerations. According great respect to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, the CA affirmed the RTC's
decision, modifying it only to increase the award
of moral damages from P20,000.00 toP50,000.00
for each count, and similarly increasing the award
of exemplary damages from P10,000.00
toP20,000.00 for each count in accordance with
jurisprudence.

inconsistencies in her testimony, the OSG notes

that the same are minor and inconsequential and
seem more apparent than real. As regards AAA's
failure to recall the exact time and date of the
commission of the offenses, it observes that the
time of commission is not a material ingredient of
rape. The OSG adds that appellant did not object
to the sufficiency of the Informations before he
entered his plea and it is now too late for him to
complain.

In his brief,27 appellant avers that the court a

quo erred: (1) in giving credence to the testimony
of AAA, which according to him was unreliable
and unbelievable; and (2) in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt despite the uncertainty
of the commission of the crime charged.

Appellant argues that the statement only of the

year of commission of the offense is too vague so
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to
be informed of the accusation against him and to
fully prepare for his defense. We disagree.

Appellant insists that he cannot be convicted

based on AAA's incredible testimony. The absence
of a struggle or an outcry during the rape plus the
long delay in reporting the incidents defy a
woman's natural instinct for self-preservation, he
argues. He claims that there was no imminent
danger to AAA's life and she had every
opportunity to report the incident and to prevent
a recurrence but she failed to do so. Questioning
the truthfulness of AAA's testimony, he asserted
that it reeked of inconsistencies. He maintains
that all these cast doubt on the prosecution's
evidence which, as a consequence, cannot result
in a judgment of guilt.
Appellant also challenges the two Informations
filed against him for being ambiguous as they did
not specify the date or at the very least the
month as to when the rape incidents allegedly
took place. This, so he stresses, is a denial of due
process as no less than the Constitution
guarantees that the accused must be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. The allegations that he committed two
counts of rape, one in 1994 and another in 1998,
deprived him of the chance to interpose the
defense of alibi, he concludes.
In its brief,28 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) maintains that appellant's guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the positive
and credible testimony of AAA. The OSG points
out that AAA resisted her father's bestial acts but
to no avail and that his moral ascendancy also
cowed her to submission. Addressing the

A careful examination of the records as well as

the transcripts of stenographic notes of the
instant case lead us to affirm appellant's guilt.
We shall first address the issue of the
insufficiency of the Informations.

It is unnecessary to state in the information the

precise date that the offense was committed,
except when it is an essential element of the
offense.29 The date of commission is not an
element of the offense of rape.30 The gravamen of
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the circumstances provided by law.
In People v. Bugayong,31 we held that "when the
time given in the complaint is not of the essence
of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged
and x x x the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at
any time within the period of the statute of
limitations and before the commencement of the
action."32In said case, accused therein was
charged with raping his stepdaughter several
times before and until 15 October 1994 but was
convicted of his dastardly acts committed in
1993. The Court therein held that the victim's
Sworn Statement which categorically stated that
she had been raped by the accused in 1993 when
she was in grade three substantially cured the
vagueness in the information and considered
accused to have been sufficiently informed
thereby. Thus, a statement of the year of the
commission of the offense, as in the instant case,
would suffice.
Furthermore, it is too late in the day for appellant
to raise this issue. He should have made his
objection before he was arraigned. Section 9,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, to wit:

The failure of the accused to assert any

ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
As was held in Bugayong, appellant herein cannot
be said to have been deprived of his right to be
informed. He did not timely object to the alleged
defects in the Informations and he actively
participated in the trial, defending himself and
confronting the witnesses against him. Hence,
there was no denial of due process.
We now go into the crux of the controversy.
We note that appellant was charged with two
counts of rape. The first which was committed in
1994 is governed by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) before the enactment of R.A. No.
8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.33As regards
the rape incident in 1998, the applicable
provisions are Arts. 266-A and 266-B of the
RPC,34 as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.
As to the 1994 rape incident, it was alleged that
AAA was only 11 years old at that time. The
applicable law then already considered carnal
knowledge with a woman under 12 years of age
as rape. The offense being statutory rape, what
essentially had to be established was simply the
fact of having sexual intercourse with AAA. Proof
of the use of force in committing the sexual act
was unnecessary and superfluous.
As regards the rape that occurred in 1998, AAA
was already 15 years old at that time. Thus, the
offense falls under paragraph 1 (a) of Art. 266-A
of the RPC, as amended. This time, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the carnal knowledge occurred through the
use of force, threat, or intimidation.
In both cases, the offense of rape is qualified
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Under the new rape law the imposable penalty in
that instance is death.
As to the 1994 rape incident, AAA categorically
testified that appellant had sexual intercourse
with her, thus:

Q: When was the first time that you were

raped by your father [sic], what year?
A: 1994, Ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now, you said it was nighttime when
you were first raped in 1994 by your
father. How did you[r] father rape you?
A: He laid me down in our papag and there
he raped me, Ma'am.
Q: After he laid you in the papag, what
else did he do if he did any?
A: He removed his clothes, Ma'am.
Q: And after he removed his clothes, what
else did he do?
A: He told me not to make noise, Ma'am.
Q: Were you wearing clothes at that time
or no clothes at all?
A: I still have clothes, Ma'am.
Q: And after he warned you not to make
noise, what else did he do?
A: Then he told me to remove my clothes,
Ma'am.
Q: What did you do when he ordered you
to remove your clothes?
A: I was forced to remove my clothes,
Ma'am.
Q: Why were you fo[r]ced to remove your
clothes?
A: Because he told me that if I would not
do that, he will kill all of us, Ma'am.
Q: And where were your brothers at that
time?
A: Watching TV in the house of our
neighbor, Ma'am.
Q: And after he [sic] removed your clothes
as ordered by your father, what did he do
next?
A: He raped me, Ma'am.
Q: You said you were hinalay. How did he
do that? Can you explain to us? You were
both naked. What else did he do?
A: He placed himself on top of me. Ma'am.
Q; When he was on top of you, what did he
do? By the way, when your father laid on
top of you, where were you?
A: In [sic] the papag, Ma'am.
Q: And while on top of you, what did your
father do? (No answer)You said that you
were raped, what did you feel when you
were raped as you said?
A: I got afraid and I felt that my vagina
was painful, Ma'am.
Q: Why was your vagina painful[,]
Miss Witness?
A: Because the penis of my father
was inserted, Ma'am.
Q: Where was it inserted?
A: To [sic] my vagina, Ma'am.
Q: And when he inserted his penis to
[sic] your vagina, what did you feel, if
any?

A: It was painful, Ma'am.

Q: What [sic] that your first
experience?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q; And after his penis was inserted on
[sic] your vagina, was he moving or
not?
A: He was moving, Ma'am.
Q: He was moving. How long did he
stay on top of you?
A: I do not know how long he was on
top of me but he stayed long, Ma'am.
Q: And after he left you, what did you
do, if any?
A: I cried, Ma'am.35 [Emphasis
supplied]
As regards the rape episode in 1998, AAA
testified in a clear-cut manner on the coercion or
intimidation exerted by appellant that forced her
into sexual intercourse with him. Thus:
Q: And how did your father rape you in
1998 last raped you in 1998?
A: The same thing was done to me,
Ma'am.
Q: What is that same thing? What did he
do?
A: He laid me down and I was told to lay
[sic] down and I was ordered to remove
my clothes, Ma'am.
Q: When you were ordered to lay [sic]
down, was he wearing clothes or none?
A: No more, Ma'am.
Q: And after you removed your clothes,
what did he do next?
A: He laid on top of me, Ma'am.
Q: Then?
A: He was touching my breast, Ma'am.
Q: Aside from touching your breast,
what else did he do?
A: He again inserted his penis to [sic]
my vagina, Ma'am.
Q: And what did you feel while your
father was doing that to you?
A: I was angry and afraid, Ma'am.
Q: Why galit at takot?
A: I was angry at myself because I
could not defend myself, Ma'am.
Q: And why were you afraid?
A: Because he might do what he was
telling me that he will kill us, Ma'am.
xxxx
Q: When your mother left for abroad, did
your father engage in drinking liquor?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell this Court in what place
does your father used to drink?
A: In our house, sir.

xxxx
Q: Now, on what time of the day do they
have drinking session[s] in your house?
A: Sometimes in the afternoon, sir.
Q: Do they drink in the evening?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Was he under the influence of
liquor during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: And when your father placed
himself on your top, what did you do?
A: I was just crying, sir.
xxxx
Q: You did not box him?
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not push him away?
A: I pinched him, sir.
Q: You did not bite him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you not cross your two legs?
A: I was trying to do that, sir.
Q: What did your father do when you
were trying to close your two legs?
A: He was trying to separate my legs,
sir.
xxxx
Q: But you did not shout?
A: No, sir, I was just crying.36 [Emphasis
supplied]
At the core of almost all rape cases is the issue of
credibility of witnesses,37 and the trial court is in
the best position to resolve the question, having
heard the witnesses and observed their
demeanor during trial.38 In assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court has laid down
the following parameters, thus:
First, the appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower court
unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the
result of the case;
Second, the findings of the trial court
pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great weight and respect
since it had the opportunity to examine
their demeanor as they testified on the
witness stand; and
Third, a witness who testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous
and frank manner and remained

consistent on cross-examination is a
credible witness. 39
The lower court and the appellate court found
appellant guilty of rape on both counts. The
courts below similarly gave full faith and
credence to AAA's testimony. We find no cogent
reason to disturb their findings.
Appellant's attempt to damage the credibility of
AAA is futile. He challenged the truthfulness of
her testimony given the following inconsistencies:
(1) on direct examination, she stated that she
removed her clothes but on cross-examination,
she testified that it was her father who undressed
her; (2) she narrated that her brothers were
watching television at their neighbor's house
when her father first raped her but when asked
again later, she answered that they were
sleeping; and (3) she claimed that her mother
was abroad when the rape incidents transpired
but her mother never left their house in the years
1994 to 1998 according to appellant.
The appellate court correctly held that the
adverted inconsistencies are minor and
inconsequential. They are plainly insufficient to
render complainant's testimony doubtful, more
they do not negate the commission of rape.
Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not
in truncated portions or isolated passages.40 If at
all, it is appellant who was inconsistent when he
first testified that his wife never left the house
from 1994 to 1998 and then later stated on crossexamination that he received money from her
while she worked as a beautician in Saudi Arabia
during those years. Thus, AAA's clear and
categorical narration of the sexual assaults
against her, free from material inconsistency,
deserves full faith and credence especially when
set against appellant's bare denial. That she
would falsely accuse her own father of
committing so grave a crime as rape only to fuel
a grudge harbored by her uncle is hardly
believable. There is no other conclusion than that
her declarations bear the ring of truth.
That appellant had sexual intercourse with his
daughter in 1994 was sufficiently proven. That he
forced her into sexual congress in 1998 was
likewise proven. The courts below correctly found
that appellant had indeed employed threats and
intimidation in order to subject AAA to his evil
desires. Threats to kill her and her siblings who
lived with a drunkard of a father under one roof
coupled with his moral ascendancy and influence
over her are sufficient factors to build a climate of
psychological terror. It was observed in People v.
Melivo,41 that in incestuous rapes, "[t]he rapist

perverts whatever moral ascendancy and

influence he has over his victim in order to
intimidate and force the latter to submit to
repeated acts of rape over a period of time. In
many instances, he succeeds and the crime is
forever kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim
suddenly finds the will to summon unknown
sources of courage to cry out for help and bring
her depraved malefactor to justice."42 That
ascendancy or influence flows from the father's
parental authority over his children and from the
latter's correlative duty of reverence and respect
towards the former.43 Although we have
subsequently held that the moral ascendancy of
the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not
lead to the conclusion that sufficient intimidation
was present,44 it may be considered a
contributing factor when coupled with other
threatening circumstances such as those in this
case.
Considering the foregoing, we thus find appellant
guilty of rape on both counts. The age of AAA at
the time of the rape incidents as well as her
relationship with appellant were sufficiently
established by the prosecution and admitted by
appellant. Thus, the lower court correctly meted
out to appellant the penalty of death on both
counts. However, R.A. No. 9346, entitled an "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines," signed into law on 24 June 2006,
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Appellant thus shall suffer only the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua.
We sustain the awards of P75,000.00
and P25,000.00 as civil indemnity and exemplary
damages, respectively, for each count of rape but
increase the award of moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Lamberto Rafon is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count. For each
count of rape, he is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

proceedings in cases OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB1-01-1083-K.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

On 7 November 2001, private respondent

Nora

L. Magnaye (Magnaye),

Professor

IV

of

the Batangas State University (BSU), filed with

the

public

respondent

an

administrative

complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression,

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the
Service,

Falsification

of

Official

Documents,

Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation

of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise
known as CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, PORFIRIO
C. LIGAYA, ROLANDO L. LONTOK, SR.,
ROLANDO M. LONTOK, JR. and
GLORIA G. MENDOZA,
Petitioners,
- versus OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and
NORA L. MAGNAYE,
Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before

Us

is

Petition

STANDARDS

FOR

PUBLIC

OFFICIALS

AND

EMPLOYEES against petitioners Ernesto M. de

Chavez

(de

Chavez),

BSU

President; Porfirio C. Ligaya (Ligaya),

BSU

President

Operations;

for

Extension

Campus

Vice-

Rolando L. Lontok, Sr. (Lontok, Sr.), BSU VicePresident

for

Academic

Affairs;

Rolando

M. Lontok, Jr. (Lontok, Jr.), BSU Associate Dean of

for

Review

on Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure which seeks the nullification of the
Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005[2] and the
Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005[3] in
cases OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K,
both issued by the public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman. It also prays for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order commanding the
public respondent to cease and desist from
implementing the said Supplemental Resolution
dated 12 July 2005 or from conducting further

the College of Computer Science and Information

Technology; Gloria G. Mendoza (Mendoza), BSU
Dean of the College of Liberal Arts; and other BSU
officials namely, Virginia Baes, BSU Executive
Vice-President;
BSU

Amador

University

A. Zaraspe (Zaraspe),
Finance

and

M. Lualhati (Lualhati),
Secretary;

BSU

Victoria

Vice-President

Administration;

and

for

Jessie

A. Montalbo (Montalbo), BSU Vice-President and

Dean of the College of Computer Science and
Information Technology.[4] The case was docketed
as OMB-1-01-1036-K. The generative facts which
gave rise to the filing of the complaint are

8.
De
Chavez
prevented the elected President of
the Federation of Supreme Student
Assembly to sit as a member of the
Board of Regents.

summarized in the Comment dated 8 September

2005[5] of the public respondent, to wit:
1.
De
Chavez, Lontok, Sr. and Mendoza
caused to be collected, and
received
the
proceeds
of,
graduation
fees
from
the
graduating class of SY 2000-2001
without issuing an official receipt
and without remitting the same to
BSU.

9.
De
Chavez
issued a Memorandum increasing
the rates of fees for records and
other documents issued by BSU
without any approval of the
governing Board of the BSU.
10.
De
Chavez, Baes and Zaraspe designat
ed and appointed faculty members
to key positions in BSU without any
authority under the law, rule or
regulation.

2.
De
Chavez
and Lontok, Sr., did not conduct
any public bidding for the rental of
caps and gowns which were used
during the graduation for the SY
2000-2001 and gave the contract
to rent caps and gowns to their
relatives.

11.
De
Chavez
and Lontok, Sr. failed to respond to
the letter of officials of the PTABSU Lipa Campus in violation of
R.A. 6713.

3.
De
Chavez
and Lontok,
Sr.
required
and
received from the graduating class
of SY 2000-2001 the amount of
P200.00 from each student as
payment
for
said
students
comprehensive examination. Said
collection was not authorized by
the BSU Board of Regents.
4.
Lontok,
Jr.
and Montalbo collected from BSU
students internet fees without
issuing an official receipt and
despite the absence of internet
facilities in BSU Lipa City Campus.
5.
Ligaya collecte
d from BSU students the amount
P200.00 each as payment for
Related Learning Experience Fee
(RLEF) without issuing any official
receipt.
6.
De
Chavez
and Baes conspired in designating
close relatives of De Chavez to key
administrative positions in BSU.
7.
De
Chavez
made appointments of faculty
members and transmitted said
appointments to the CSC [Civil
Service Commission] without the
approval of the BSU Board of
Regents.

12.
De
collected notarial fees
contractual
employees
issuing official receipts.

Chavez
from
without

13.
De
Chavez
and Lontok, Sr. did not renew the
contract of two faculty members.[6]

Subsequently, on 13 November 2001,

based on the above imputed acts plus an
additional one,[7] private respondent also filed
with the public respondent another Complaint
imputing criminal liability to the BSU officials
above-named for Violation of Section 3(a) and (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
ANTI-GRAFT

AND

CORRUPT

PRACTICES

ACT,

Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713,

Falsification of Official Documents and Estafa.
[8]

The criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-

1-01-1083-K.

Petitioners

denied

the

allegations

of

private respondent. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit

December
2001,
the
collection of this fee was
already turned over to the
Cashiers Office of the BSU.

dated 30 January 2002,[9] which was summarized

in the Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005 of
the public respondent, petitioners countered the
following:
1.

2.

3.

4.

The BSU management

did not collect graduation
fees for the commencement
exercises of SY 2000-2001
like in the previous years. It
was
claimed
that
the
members of the graduating
class, with the guidance of
their advisers, were the
ones who fixed, collected
and
disbursed
the
contributions/fees for the
commencement exercises.
No public bidding was
conducted for the rental of
the
caps
and
gowns
because the BSU did not
enter into contract with any
supplier. The graduating
students have the complete
freedom to hire their caps
and gowns from anyone.
The
receipts
signed
by Lontok, Sr. was merely in
acknowledgment
of
the
receipts of certain amounts
fromMagnaye which
the
latter requested to be given
to
Mr. Fralundio Sulit from
whom the graduating class
rented
their
caps
and
gowns.
Whenever a collection
of the internet fee is made,
a receipt was issued by the
BSU using Accountable Form
No. 51. Further no collection
of internet fees was made at
BSU Lipa City Campus.
The collection of the
Related Learning Experience
Fee was done by the
Cashiers
Office
of
the
College. What was being
collected in the past by the
Office
of
Dr. Porfirio Ligaya was
the
Dual Training Fee for nondegree courses. However,
effective the second week of

5.

De Chavez relied on
the
authority
of
the
Resolution issued by the
Office of the President
declaring
that
the
designation of the relatives
of De Chavez to certain
positions in the BSU is
not violative of
the
rule
against
nepotism.
The
subject designations were
all duly confirmed by the
Board of Regents.

6.

The Board of Regents

recognized the practice of
De Chavez of submitting
first the appointments he
made to the CSC for
attestation
before
submitting the same for
confirmation of the Board.
The
appointments
of
professors/instructors
which Magnaye claim
is violative of existing law
and rules has already been
confirmed by the Board of
Regents.

7.

No one has been

elected as President of the
Federation
of
Student
Assembly. Said position is
still non-existent in view of
the failure of the student to
draft
and
ratify
their
constitution and by-laws.

8.

The
increase
in
miscellaneous fees was duly
approved by the Board of
Trustees of PBMIT through
Board Resolution No. 6
series of 1997.

9.

The failure to respond

to some letters query was
brought about by the preoccupation of petitioners to
other pressing and more
important matters.

10.

The
collects

BSU
neither
nor
shares
in

the notarial fees charged by

the notary public.
11.

In
[11]

private

Under
Section
4(d)
of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, the
higher Education Modernization Act
of 1997, state universities and
colleges are authorized to deposit
in any authorized government
depository bank and treat as
Special Trust Fund, income from
tuition fees and other necessary
school
charges
such
as
matriculation fees, graduation fees,
and laboratory fees.

The management can

opt to renew or not to renew
the
contract
for
employment of some faculty
members. They are not
governed by the security of
tenure
as
commonly
enjoyed by the regular
employees
of
the
government.[10]

her

Reply

dated

respondent

attached

March

2002,

therewith

photocopy of the alleged Audit Report dated 7

February 2001 of State Auditor IV Milagros
D. Masangkay,

Office

of

the

Auditor,

Pablo BorbonMemorial Institute of Technology,

[12]

containing a finding and recommendation on

the graduation fees collected by BSU, thus:

4. FINDING
Graduation fees were not
yet issued official receipts and
were not taken up in the books
of the College despite prior
years audit recommendations
and
in
violation
of
the
provisions of Sections 63 and
68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1445, and Section 4(d) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292
resulting
to
an
aggregate
understatement of Cash and
Trust Liability accounts by
about P3,342,550.00.
Section 63 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445 requires all
moneys and property officially
received by a public officer in any
capacity or upon any occasion to
be accounted for as government
funds and government property,
while Section 68 of the same
presidential decree provides that
no payment of any nature shall be
received by a collecting officer
without immediately issuing an
official receipt in acknowledgment
thereof.

The existing practice of not

issuing official receipts and not
taking up in the books of accounts
graduation fees paid by graduating
students has been an audit finding
since 1997.
Based on the Annual Audit
Report for calendar year 1999, the
graduation fees from 1997-1999
totaled P2,057,600
with
an
expenses of P921,529.00.
The
graduation
fees
collected and the expenses paid
out of these fees during the
calendar year 2000 could not be
determined due to failure of the
employee concerned to furnish this
Office with certified statement of
collections of graduation fees and
the related disbursements together
with the supporting papers despite
our
request
to
the
College
President in a letter dated January
17, 2001.
Likewise, in response to our
Memorandum dated October 11,
2000 requesting information as to
the status of the implementation of
the 1999 audit recommendations,
the College President informed this
Office and I quote the holding of
graduation rites is a tradition of the
PBMIT
[Pablo Borbon Memorial
Institute of Technology] academic
community
but
it
is
never
compulsory. Graduating students
may not join the ceremonies but if
majority of them decided to hold
one, it is their prerogative to plan,
execute
and
evaluate
their
ceremony. In the process, and
through the senior council and/or
its advisers, they may agree among
themselves to contribute certain

amount voluntarily to finance the

program. After the rites and if there
are cash balances, the graduating
class usually donate something to
their
Alma
Mater
as
their
remembrance or legacy. This office,
with all due respect to the COA,
may not be able to follow the
recommendation. This office is not
yet ready to break this hallowed
tradition.
The continuous refusal of
management to implement prior
years audit recommendations and
the letter of the Honorable
Chairman of the Commission on
Audit relative to the handling of
graduation
fees
was
already
communicated to the Commission
on Audit thrice, the latest was last
November 8, 2000 when the
General Counsel of the Commission
on Audit asked for status report.
Since graduation fee is one
of the items to be recorded under
Special Trust Fund per R.A. No.
8292, failure to record the same in
the books of accounts of the
Institute understated the cash and
trust liability accounts.
Since there were no records
submitted to this Office pertaining
to graduation fees collected from
graduating
students,
understatement of Cash and Trust
Liability
Accounts
amounting
to P1,284,950.00 (Annex G) was
based on the number graduating
students and the graduation fee
per student last school year 19992000. The 1999 Annual Audit
Report of the previous COA Auditor
reported a total collections from
1997 to 1999 of P2,057,600.00.
These amounts when added will
yield an aggregate understatement
of Cash and Trust Liability accounts
by about P3,342,550.00.
RECOMMENDATION
Require the accountable
officer to issue official receipts
(Accountable
Form
51)
for
graduation fees collected and
deposit the collections in an
authorized government depository
bank. Enjoin the Accountant to

record in the books of accounts of

the College all collections and
disbursements conformably with
generally
accepted
accounting
principles and in accordance with
pertinent laws and regulations.

Private respondent Magnaye also accused

the

petitioners

of

grave

oppression

and

harassment for giving her two unsatisfactory

performance ratings corresponding to the periods
of June to 15 July 2001 and 16 July 2001 to 20
October 2001. She claimed that these ratings
were given as a way to get back at her and lay
the basis for dropping her from the rolls of BSU.
[13]

Of

course,

petitioners

refuted

the

said

imputations.

After

the

conduct

of

a clarificatory hearing[14] and upon submission of

both parties of their respective position papers,
the public respondent, through Graft Investigation
and

Prosecution

Officer

II

Joy

N. Casihan-

Dumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and

Deputy

Ombudsman

for

Luzon

Victor

C.

Fernandez concurring, issued its Joint Resolution

dated 14 February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and
OMB-1-01-1083-K recommending the indictment
of

petitioners

De

Chavez, Lontok,

Sr.,

and

Mendoza for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic

Act No. 3019. It, however, proposed the dismissal
of

the

complaints

petitioners Ligaya and Lontok,

officials

of

BSU

and Montalbo for

[15]

Jr.,

against
and

other

namely, Lualhati, Zaraspe,

lack

of

probable

The fallo states:

WHEREFORE,
considered,
it
is
recommended that

premises
respectfully
respondents

cause.

ERNESTO
M.
DE
CHAVEZ,
ROLANDO L. LONTOK, SR., and
GLORIA G. MENDOZA, be indicted
for violation of Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019.

unlawfully collecting graduation

fees. In addition, they are also
liable for Estafa under Art. 315 (2)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code;
b)
Respondents D
e Chavez and respondent Lontok,
Sr. are hereby found liable for
violation of Section 3 (e) RA 3019,
as amended, in relation to Section
3 (h) thereof, relative to their
engaging in the business of rental
of caps and gowns;

With regard to the rest of

respondents,
namely:
VIRGINIA
BAES, AMADOR M. LUALHATI,
PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA, VICTORIA A.
ZARASPE, ROLANDO M. LONTOK,
JR., and JESSIE A. MONTALBO, it is
recommended
that
instant
complaints
against
them
be
dismissed for lack of probable
cause.

Upon review by Ombudsman Simeon V.

Marcelo, he issued a Supplemental Resolution
dated 12

July

modifications

2005partially
the

Joint

approving

Resolution

with

dated 14

February 2005. Among other findings, he found

petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and
Mendoza liable for violation of Section 3(e) and
(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for violation of
Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. He
also

found

petitioners

de

Chavez,Lontok,

Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty

and Grave Misconduct, and, thus, imposed on
them the penalty of Dismissal from the Service
with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service.
[16]

The decretal portion

of

the

Supplemental

Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
the 14
February 2005 Joint Resolution of
the
Office
of
the
Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon is partially
approved subject to the following
modifications:
a)
Respondents D
e
Chavez, Lontok,
Sr.,
and Mendoza are hereby found
liable for violation of Section 3 (e)
RA
3019,
as
amended,
for

c)
Respondent D
e Chavez and respondent Lontok,
Jr., are found liable for violation of
Section 3 (e) RA 3019, as amended,
for illegally collecting internet fees
from students. In addition, they are
also liable for Estafa under Art. 315
(2) (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
d)
The
Field
Investigation Office (FIO) is directed
to conduct further fact-finding on
respondent Ligaya for
probable Malversation under
Art.
217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
collecting P200.00 each from BSU
students as payment for Related
Learning Experience Fee (RLEF)
without issuing official receipts and
misappropriating the same, and to
establish with certainty the total
amount collected;
e)
The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
is hereby directed to refer to the
Civil Service Commission the
administrative
aspect
of
the
charges relating to nepotism,
appointment,
assignment/designation, transfer of
personnel,
and
performance
evaluation ratings;
f)
The Office of
the
Deputy
Ombudsman
for Luzon is
also
ordered
to
immediately conduct a fact-finding
investigation with respect to the
holding
of
comprehensive
examination and the collection of
fees therefore;
g)
The
Field
Investigation Office (FIO) is directed
to
immediately
conduct
an
investigation to gather evidence

relative to the students who rented

caps and gowns for the school year
2000-2001 and prior to said school
year; and

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
DID NOT DISMISS THE TWO
SEPARATE
BUT
IDENTICAL
CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.[19]

h)
Respondents D
e
Chavez, Lontok,
Sr., Ligaya and Lontok Jr.,
are
hereby found guilty of Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct and are,
thus, meted the penalty of
Dismissal
from
the
Service,
pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV,
Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, with the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from employment
in government service pursuant to
Section 58, Rule IV of the same
Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.

Apropos the first issue, the petitioners

alleged that the public respondents Supplemental
Resolution dated 12 July 2005 categorically stated
that petitioners are liable for the criminal acts
complained of; that the public respondent did not
even discuss the matter of probable cause but
instead immediately ruled on their guilt; that the
said resolution did not state or instruct the filing

Corollary thereto, the Civil

Service Commission is hereby
requested to implement this Order
in accordance with law and to
advice this Office of compliance
thereon. Let a copy of this decision
be
furnished
the
Honorable
Chairman,
Civil
Service
Commission,
Constitution
Hills, Diliman, Quezon City.

of the appropriate criminal informations against

them before the courts of justice.Hence, the
public

respondents

instantaneous

finding

of

criminal liability on their part renders any trial

against

them

an

exercise

in

futility

which

inevitably clashes with Section 14(2) of the 1987

Constitution

which

grants

to

the

this

accused,inter alia, the right to have a speedy,

petition. Petitioner Mendoza filed a Petition in

impartial and public trial. Therefore, the public

Intervention dated 12 December 2005 after her

respondent had exceeded its jurisdiction under

lawyer found out that she was not included in the

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the

instant petition.[17] Her intervention was allowed

Ombudsman Act of 1989, since there is nothing in

in the Courts First Division Resolution of 28

the said statute which grants to it the power to

Aggrieved,

the

2006.[18] Both

August

petitioners

petitions

filed

raised

following issues for our consideration:

I.

the

determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

[20]

Further,

they

argued

that

the

public

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FINDING
PETITIONERS ALREADY LIABLE FOR
CRIMINAL OFFENSES.

respondents directive to the Field Investigation

II.

Revised Penal Code, is questionable as it had

Office (FIO) to conduct further fact-finding on

x x x [petitioner] Ligaya for
probable Malversation under

already

arbitrarily

Art.

decreed

217

the

of

guilt

the

of

for

believe that the respondent is guilty thereof.[25] In the

collectingP200.00 each from BSU Students as

conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor

payment

petitioner Ligaya when

for

without

it

Related

issuing

pilloried

Experience
official

him

Fee

(RLEF)

does not decide whether there is evidence beyond

receipts

and

reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A

misappropriating the same x x x.[21]

prosecutor
probable

merely
cause,

determines

and

to

file

the
the

existence

corresponding

information if he finds it to be so.[26]

We reject the foregoing asseverations.

Petitioners make mountain on the use of

At the threshold, we must accentuate

the words liable for violation x x x employed by

that in the exercise of the powers and in the

the Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers

discharge of his functions and responsibilities, the

of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, the

Ombudsman, as in that of the other officials,

laws and jurisprudential pronouncements is in

enjoys the presumption of regularity in the

order. Both

performance

the

1987

Constitution

and

the

of

official

functions.

Rule

131,

Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770)

Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules of Evidence

empower the public respondent to investigate

provides:

and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any

person, any act or omission of any public official
or employee, office or agency when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.[22] By virtue of this power,[23] it may

SEC.
3. Disputable
presumptions.
The
following
presumptions
are
satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxxx

conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere

purpose of determining whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded

(m) That official duty has

been regularly performed; x x x.

belief that a crime has been committed and the

respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should

This presumption of regularity includes

the public officers official actuations in all the

be held for trial.[24]

phases of his work.[27]

A

preliminary

investigation

is

merely

inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of

With

particular

reference

of

to

the

discovering the persons who may be reasonably

Ombudsman, it is well to state that his office is,

charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to

indeed, one of the more powerful agencies of the

prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial

government and wields vast powers, though

of the case on the merits and has no objective except

limited to a certain extent. Concomitant to this

that of determining whether a crime has been

stature, our laws have required more stringent

committed and whether there is probable cause to

qualifications, most especially to the intellectual

quality and capacity, for the person who will run

the Ombudsman had found probable cause to

for the office.

hold petitioners liable for the crimes imputed and,

thus, should be held liable for trial in the courts of

In

light

of

this

observation,

the

law. It is not a declaration of guilt.

presumption that the Ombudsman knows whereof

he

speaks

forcefully

then

Probable cause, as used in preliminary

presume that he is well aware of the extent and

investigations, has been defined as the existence

limitations

when

of such facts and circumstances as would excite

Ombudsman Marcelo used the words liable for in

the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the

his Supplemental Resolution of 12 July 2005, he is

facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that

presumed to have used these within the sense of

the person charged was guilty of the crime for

the limited power vested in him by our laws and

which he was prosecuted.[31] We reiterate this in

jurisprudence the finding of probable cause.

the case of Pimentel Jr. v. COMELEC,[32] thus:

of

applies. We

his

must

powers. Thus,

[a] finding of probable cause needs

only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was by
the suspects. Probable cause need
not
be
based
on
evidence
establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar vs.
United States, while probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion,
it requires less than evidence which
would justify x x x conviction. A
finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspects to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement
of guilt. (Emphasis ours.)

Further, the word liable is described as

to mean subject or exposed to some usually
adverse contingency or action.[28] The word is now
rather

wide

in

its

use

and

is

considered

synonymous to the words susceptible, prone, and

exposed, all indicating temporary or fluctuating
situations.[29]

We, likewise, call special attention to the

fact that nowhere in the challenged resolution is
it stated that petitioners are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, in stark

The public respondents finding of probable

contrast to the disposition of the administrative

cause to indict petitioners for the crime charged

case[30] wherein

(sic)

is based on and supported by the complaints

Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., are

under oath of the private respondent, sworn

hereby found guilty of x x x and were meted the

statements

corresponding penalty.

witnesses, and official and public documents

petitioners

De

submitted
We, then, conclude that the words liable

[33]

and

by

notarized

the

affidavits

private

A clarificatory hearing[34]attended

of

her

respondent.
by

private

the

respondent and almost all of the petitioners was

to

conducted by the public respondent on 13 May

the probability of guilt. They simply imply that

2004. During the hearing, the public respondent

for

employed

challenged

by

the

resolution

Ombudsman

really

alluded

in
only

asked

the

private

respondent

establish with certainty the total

amount collected;

some clarificatory questions with regard to the

latters complaints.

As it is, the public respondent merely

The 24-paged Supplemental Resolution
dated 12 July 2005, as well as the 24-paged Joint
Resolution dated 14 February 2005, of the public
respondent

contains

lengthy

and

substantial

discussions on the bases of its finding of probable

cause to indict the petitioners for the criminal
offenses. The Resolutions took pains to determine
the

appropriate

crimes

to

be

imputed

to

petitioners and to analyze each charge vis-a-

directed the FIO to conduct further investigation

and gather more evidence on the liability of
petitioner Ligaya for probable malversation. It did
not in any way conclude that petitionerLigaya is
guilty

beyond

reasonable

doubt

of malversation. In fact, it saw the need to first

gather more information and evidence before
deciding on whether petitioner Ligaya may be
indicted for malversation.

vis the elements of the crime. The evidences

submitted by the private respondent for each
charge were subjected to careful scrutiny.

Coming

now

to

the

second

issue,

petitioners argued that the public respondent

should have dismissed the two separate but

As to petitioner Ligaya, it is asserted that

the public respondents directive to the Field

identical complaints filed by private respondent

on the ground of forum shopping.

Investigation Office (FIO) to conduct further factfinding

on

x x x [petitioner] Ligaya for

probable Malversation under

Art.

217

of

the

Revised Penal Code, is questionable as it had

already

arbitrarily

petitioner Ligaya when

decreed
it

the

pilloried

guilt

of

him

for

collecting P200.00 each from BSU Students as

payment
without

for

Related

issuing

Experience
official

Fee

(RLEF)

receipts

and

misappropriating the same x x x. The subject

directive reads:
d) The Field Investigation Office
(FIO) is directed to conduct further
fact-finding
on
respondent Ligaya for
probableMalversation under
Art.
217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
collecting P200.00 each from BSU
students as payment for related
Learning Experience Fee (RLEF)
without issuing official receipts and
misappropriating the same, and to

The test in determining the presence of

forum shopping is whether in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties, (2)
rights or causes of action, and (3) relief(s) sought.
[35]

In the instant case, although the parties, facts

and circumstances are essentially the same, the

rights or causes of action, as well as the relief(s)
sought are different. The complaint filed on 7
November 2001 is for an administrative case. The
causes

of

action

oppression,

conduct

are

grave

prejudicial

misconduct,
to

the

best

interest of the service, dishonesty, gross neglect

of duty and violation of Section 5(a) of Republic
Act

No.

6713. The

relief

sought

against

petitioners is dismissal from the service with

forfeiture

of

retirement

benefits

and

leave

credits. On the other hand, the complaint filed

on 13 November 2001is for a criminal case. The

We

causes of action are violations of Section 3(a) and

interfering

(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of

investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the

official documents and estafa. The relief(s) sought

public respondent absent any compelling reason.

against petitioners are, among other prayers, for

[38]

In

imprisonment,

[39]

citing The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding

perpetual

disqualification

from

the

have
with

consistently
the

case

of Quiambao v. Desierto,

Committee

of the government of any prohibited interest and

v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto,[40]we ruled:

to their salary and other lawful income. Thus,

petitioners

allegation

of

forum

shopping

is

vacuous.

Relative

to

petitioners rantings in

the

probative value of the affidavits presented during

the

preliminary

conclusions

of

investigation
fact

reached

and
by

on

the

the

public

respondent, suffice it to say that the technical

rules of evidence should not be applied in the
conduct of preliminary investigation by the public
respondent

strictly. This

is

clear

in

AND MODIFYING CERTAIN RULES OF PROCEDURE

OF THE OMBUDSMAN[36] The validity and the
merits of a partys defense or accusations as well
as the admissibility of testimonies and evidences
are better ventilated during the trial stage than in
the preliminary stage.
The factual and evidentiary issues can
best be passed upon and threshed out during a
full-blown court trial since it is the courts task to
determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt based
on the evidence presented by the parties at a
trial on the merits.[37]

Behest

The prosecution of offenses

committed by public officers is
vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office
from outside pressure and improper
influence, the Constitution as well
as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with
wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory powers
virtually
free from legislative, executive, or
judicial intervention. This Court
consistently
refrains
from
interfering with the exercise of its
powers, and respect the initiative
and independence inherit in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the
integrity of the public service.

the

Administrative Order No. 08 entitled CLARIFYING

from

constitutionally-mandated

public office and confiscation or forfeiture in favor

unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion

on

refrained

In Maturan v. People,[41] we held:

A policy of non-interference
by the courts in the exercise of the
Ombudsmans
constitutionally
mandated powers is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality
as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the Court will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing
the
dismissal
of
investigatory
proceedings
conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman
with
regard
to
complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if
they were compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of
the
fiscals,
or
prosecuting
attorneys, each time they decide to

Loans

file an information in court or

dismiss a complaint by private
complainant.

petitioners.

In

the

v. Desierto,[43] we
decisions

of

leading

ruled
the

that

public

case

of Fabian

appeals

from

respondent

in

One final and significant observation. This

administrative liability cases should be taken to

Court noted that the present petition seeks the

the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997

annulment of public respondents Supplemental

Rules

Resolution dated 12 July 2005 on the criminal

administrative aspect of the present petition

(OMB-1-01-1083-K) and administrative (OMB-1-

should be referred to the Court of Appeals for

01-1036-K)

proper disposition.

complaints

respondent. Procedurally,

of

the

remedy

private
of

respondent

where

the

latter

Civil

Procedure.

Consequently,

the

an

aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the

public

of

found

WHEREFORE,
regards

criminal

the

case

instant

petition

as

OMB-1-01-1083-K

is

probable cause is to file with this Court a petition

hereby DISMISSED. Petitioners appeal of the

forcertiorari under Rule 65.[42] Thus, we gave due

public

course and resolved the issue of finding of

dated 12 July 2005 with regard to administrative

probable cause in the criminal aspect of the

case OMB-1-01-1036-K is hereby REFERRED to

instant petition.

the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. Costs

respondents

against petitioners.
This Court, however, cannot and will not
pass judgment on the administrative liability of

SO ORDERED.

Supplemental

Resolution