Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro.
He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with
his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-9516, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph
1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven,
they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the
latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants
stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia,

Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not
proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages
not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision
states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the
point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in
the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under
Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article
8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate
the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed
with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a
lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in
the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too
much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority
of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in
applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322

October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence,
like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.
3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with
their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage andits
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to

be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up
the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2)
the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires
the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the
place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx

xxx

xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document a written official act
of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce

decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite
a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry
her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is
in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review
of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C"
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E"
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b)
Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit
"3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the
divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987
and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner;
and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage
to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as
"a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the
law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of

whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared
or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit
of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court,

which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable.
Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership
or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided
in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond
that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good
order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like
a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of
the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article
40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only
on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish
the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is
the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter
not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano
and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both
left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges
that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of
the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The

solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both
were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge
cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in
their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is
simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that
the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 175581

- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179474

Present:

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. [2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25.He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he
and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose,
he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter

being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly
so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a prearranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose
needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However,
Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about
their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was
in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a
copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She
declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part
of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-trial
brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990.On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose
and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from
service for one year without emolument.[7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both
parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose
and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her
sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss,
unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made
to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months
to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a
ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not
believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was
residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page
25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of
Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court

if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the
New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party
within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa]
through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 [14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed.Article 87 (4)
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force
or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987
then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his
marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 [16] of the Civil Code as
one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over
the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to
the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition
was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially,
he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson voidab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and
reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition
for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the
case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance
which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of
their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on
the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is
the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as
the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as
to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least
five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must
be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas
name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of
Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out
the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)

Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis
ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. [28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code
makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage
void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.[32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or
war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, [33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should
be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. [40] Where a general rule is established
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception
in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority,
and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it
is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms,
places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is
worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts [42] in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. [43] The Court of Appeals
also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February
or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in
June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by
the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them
from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will
not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76,

that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The
present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling
Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. [52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of
a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant.The
former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be
denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is a law
on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless,
the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986

to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose and Felisas marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case,
the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers
to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. [57] It covers the years immediately preceding
the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab
initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

*-***--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9005

June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,

vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo
mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband
at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of
Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal
age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to
confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the
penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union
according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old
woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her
marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or
witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she
was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting
and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and
claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed
and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which they amply
discussed in their petition and printed brief whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the
eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in
articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the
circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay
City then, had no reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the
celebration or performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not
in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified,
however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his observation, she
might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her condition that he decided in
administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest
objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is the
admitted fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the
parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."

The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:

(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as required by
section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition no signing may seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made no
finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed, since it
said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista
to send copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in
the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the only
issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract"
constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with
legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be
set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two
witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of
marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife" which in this case actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or certificate
was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has
been cited making it an essential requisite not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is.
The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually provide for the issuance
of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the
registration or recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the
officials issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or
recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a license must be
issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of
witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and
that persons violating the conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in
authority to secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do
not void common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into
without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes to discourage deception
and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of
parties who live together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage. . . . (Section 15
American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum
"Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several formal
requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate
(section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is
executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of
Manila and its environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It was the
priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious consequences to the married pair, specially where
as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was
in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity
were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones
vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit
and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically
substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this
marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have lived publicly in a state
of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs who are the
grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . .
the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals 1 Decision
promulgated December 1, 1994 2 and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995 3 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which
reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint 4 for partition and damages against Private
Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. 5 On
October 25, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party. 6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision 7 in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled: 8
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes
Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4
parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been
receiving [his] share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence
introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore
cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription
against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed: 9
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner's] complaint and the counterclaim
thereto.

Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: 10
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994,
for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the
modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition. 11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:

12

On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the
original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of
land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 ,
before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that
the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their
father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four
(4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after
the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be
partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of
his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent
portions of the trial court's decision: 13
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in
1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that
before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years.
Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from the
time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad
Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later.
Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the
time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiff's
parents['] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the
defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and
aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes,
Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left
several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all these
[parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered
and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to

Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio
died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix
and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the
picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her
as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the
wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix
Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the
plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified
the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child
which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when . . . the picture
[was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was
baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents. Witness then
identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as
Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother
respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked.
The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used
to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she
merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented
as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture
taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister,
Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified
having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels
of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the
plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano
Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer
she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during
planting and harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of
them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from
their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the
property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her
two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4
parcels of land up to the present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes
took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and
got married. That while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while
he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when
Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants,
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father.
That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones.
That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having
died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of
baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned
during World War 2 hut he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his
mother was already dead. Plaintiff's mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well
and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the
house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then
they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and children lived with the
defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to
live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his

aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family
picture according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle,
defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken
when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years after having
lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the
land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there
are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100
coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are: EastFederico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones;
located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo
groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-Ambrosio Trinidad;
North-Federico Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased
father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a
years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico
Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540
square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with
reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half
share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the
cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No.
11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No.
16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the
share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his
father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal
judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet born
at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it
was wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,]
he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother,
it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That
[petitioner's] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident
of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia
Briones and his father are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the
brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad
[died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this
fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt,
"Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad,

according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before
1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before
his death, he answered, "That I do not know", neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of
Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes
Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and
wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila
working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon,
Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed
with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered: "I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he
stated to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there.
When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before
the court, witness answered that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of
Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940,
according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That
according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When asked on
cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness
answered that he was buried in their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around
the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the
defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit
A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is
Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not
know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that
she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he
is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon
in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived
only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not
aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not]
get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she
knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does
not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife.
When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio
Trinidad had lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the
defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother,
Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when
the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further asked if
Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, "He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents,
Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad
and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining
daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad,
testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that
her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She herself testified that she does
not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when
Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will
carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese
forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in
March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time,
the witness could not answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the
alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered;
"Yes." and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her,
she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized
and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party,
she answered; "Maybe there was." When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture
carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child
to the church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the
latter's child was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court
yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother,
Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the

plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore,
when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her
brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness
answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by
counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio
Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does
not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew
Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew
the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her
cousins. She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their
lola's house whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad
had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in
Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 1/2 months after his arrival
from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that
Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941
when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was horn in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14
years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early
months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She
further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo was then
occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident
of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that . . . she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private
respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked
if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and
he lived only for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died
in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house
which is only across the street from her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true
that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom
he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was
personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila
he was in good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to
be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and
she was one of the sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato,
Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present
a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by
one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan,
attesting to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New
Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court
ruled: 14
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that
he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that
Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in
rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan,
on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the
wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the
marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.

The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of
the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the coownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in
(Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).
Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept
of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff
attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus
acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 15
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage
of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional
Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on
August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child can be attached collaterally by the private
respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the
properties in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant proof
that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. 16 His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on
whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus,
the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a
rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of
the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records
and the evidence adduced in this case. 17
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was
born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted
arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following
would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born
during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 19

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of
births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the
primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as
other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was
present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo,
who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old
barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit
Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. 22 On July 21, 1943,
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's
baptismal party held at the same house. 23 Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting
marriage. 24 It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 25 Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate
(Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved
by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. 27
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last
world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he
presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo's testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit
A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2).
These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to
Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem
motam.
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding
Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the
child before she was baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother but not petitioner, his wife
and the couple's children slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. 30
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed
under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: 31
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate
child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or
affinity, 32 her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used
to establish petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents' selfserving negations. In sum, private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941.
Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the

Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the
Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three
months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive: 33
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was
married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said "them", to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt
Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you
know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of
anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt
Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who
has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified, that when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941,
her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother,
Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to

Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married
to Inocentes. 34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The Japanese forces occupied Manila
only on January 2, 1942; 36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were
roaming around the area.37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents
a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child. 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse
party. 39Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that
petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance
of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their
personal credibility. 40 Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence
was in petitioner's favor. It declared:
. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being
their nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he
started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so
lived with the defendants . . . is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family
pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father's share. .
. . His demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus,
they disowned him as their nephew. . . . In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous
possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants
themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition . . . as he was
already having a family of his own. . . . .
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the
plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among
them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already
77 years old at the time she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had
been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in
this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew of
Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75
years old, has no husband nor children. 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present
evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this
doctrine to petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in
possession in the concept of owners of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired
ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the coownership. 43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so
long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner,
was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of
the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if
any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were
still in their father's name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation
of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held: 44

. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly
or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition
does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532
[1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs.
De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action
for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the
land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition
for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.No pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,

Present:
- versus JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

Respondent.

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 12, 2008

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.

Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was
posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].
Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well
as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to
be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED
WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE." 4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondents
petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fideresident of the province where
the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section
2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender
in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar
was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set
for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and

reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith
enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108
provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without
whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of
the rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the
Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the
child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure
to menstruateat puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals
have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical
science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex
individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated,
whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible
into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor
truly female."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,

respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred
in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals
with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change
of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis
5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and
the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful).
(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate
of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female"
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles
of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like
a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of
Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners
first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the
trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of
name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article
376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that
courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it
could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction
on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities)
of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is
not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)

by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female
is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a postoperative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention
of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First,
even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties
who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries
in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down
the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything
else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.