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People v Padan G.R. No.

L-7295 June 28, 1957


J. Montemayor
Facts:
The accused exhibited immoral scenes and acts in one of the Manila nightclubs. Moreover, the
manager and ticketcollector were also part of the accused for hiring the women to perform sexual
intercourse in the presence of many spectators.
They were charged with a violation of the RPC Article 201 in the trial court. All pleaded not guilty. One
of the accused however, changed her mind and pleaded guilty. All were convicted. The evidence of
the lewd show was confiscated.
The accused filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. 2 of the appellants, manager Fajardo and
ticket collector Yabut, failed to file their briefs within the period prescribed by law and their appeal was
dismissed by resolution of this Court of November 25, 1955, and the decision as to them became final
and executory on January 7, 1956.
The defendant who pleaded guilty, Marina Padan, in her appeal did not question her conviction; she
merely urged the reduction of the penalty by eliminating the prison sentence. The Supereme Court
did not consider this because the trial court judge reduced the fine from 600 to 200.
Issue: Were the acts obscene and thereby punishable by Art 201 of the RPC?
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, have been called upon to take cognizance of an
offense against morals and decency of this kind. We have had occasion to consider offenses like
the exhibition of still moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity
and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of
art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of
pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming
feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and
lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that
because of all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is
neither excessive nor unreasonable.
On the appeal of Fajardo, he claimed that he was an innocent bystander but that because of his
popularity in the neighborhood, he was requested by the spectators to select the man and the woman
to engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus before the spectators. After making the selection, he
did not even care to witness the act but left the scene and returned to it only when he heard a
commotion produced by the raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager and one in charge of
the show is however ample, even conclusive. In 1953, the place used for ping-pong was used for
an exhibition of human "fighting fish", the actual act ofcoitus or copulation. Tickets were sold at P3
each, and the show was supposed to begin at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
The Manila Police Department must have gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets and provided
several of its members who later attended the show, but in plain clothes, and after
the show conducted a raid and made arrests. At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually
took place inside the building. About two civilians who attended the affair gave testimony as to what
they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto Reyes.
He also collected tickets. In all, there were about ninety paying customers, while about sixteen were
allowed to enter free, presumably friends of the management. Jose Fajardo y Garcia was clearly the
manager of the show. He was at the door to see to it that the customers either were provided with
tickets or paid P3.00 entrance fee. He even asked them from whom they had bought the tickets. He
ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the floor, covered with an army blanket and
provided with a pillow. Once the spectators, about 106 in number, were crowded inside that small
building, the showstarted.
Besides, as found by the trial court and as shown by some of the tickets collected from the
spectators, submitted as exhibits, said tickets while bearing on one side superimposed with rubber
stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which defendant Fajardo admits to be his name.

Considering all the above circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the most
guilty of the four, for he was the one who conducted the show and presumably derived the most profit
or gain from the same.
Malabanan vs. RamentoG.R. No. 62270, 21 May 1984
University students were suspended for organising a protest rally.
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and
were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on
August 27, 1982. Along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine
and Animal Science department lobby instead of the basketball court which was the place indicated in
the permit. At the assembly they manifested in vehement language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M. the same day,
they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. There was, as a result,
disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created. Petitioners were asked to explain on the same day
why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they
were informed through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus
with damages against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found
petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more
specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for
one academic year. The student leaders filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
seeking the nullification of the decision of respondent Ramento affirming the action taken by
respondent Gregorio Araneta University Foundation finding them guilty of illegal assembly and
suspending them.
Held:
The Supreme Court grants the petition nullifying the decision of respondent Ramento imposing a oneyear suspension is nullified the penalty being unduly severe.
Freedom of peaceable assembly limited by showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.
As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
and which "is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing . . . of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent."
Rights to peaceable assembly and free speech in schools; limitation.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so.
They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their
thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to
borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While,
therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it
cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there is
persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to which the schools are
dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only
an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school' and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of
it, which for any reason -- whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior -- materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
Inflamed speeches of students in school do not present a clear and present danger of public disorder.
Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That
there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of

Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the
fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem. They believed
that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their
parents. If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.
Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their
fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers
to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause,
but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible.
Disruptive action may be penalized, but penalty of one year unduly severe.
It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than
that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the
University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of
respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m." 20
Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition,
even a censure -- certainly not a suspension -- could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents
could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction -- considering the places where
and the time when the demonstration took place -- there was a disruption of the classes and
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a
much more serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too
severe, While the discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized,
the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of
proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element
of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional
objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough.
Tanada v Tuvera
L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual only
in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular
right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the
reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2
unless otherwise provided.
HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective.
The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to
provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as
citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one
hundred(100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The
said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on
Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the
said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teacher's Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and
encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teacher's Camp resulting in
damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July
25,1978. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the
local elections held in January 1980. He was elected. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the
thirty-two (32)cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the
cases are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76. However, on March 16, 1982, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against
an ex post facto law.
Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 would violate the
Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post facto law.
Held: NO. The Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from
office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against
the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states
that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as
a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those
mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before
final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the
public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its
effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law
Lozano v. Martinez G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
YAP, J:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank
for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty
prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine
or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of

the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since
this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption
of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check.
To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption
shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or
drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of
the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction
in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or
written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of
"the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the
dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored
check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the
contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt.
HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very
wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition
of penal sanctions.
ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind
that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there
would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law
should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his

certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile
units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be
violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the
premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. COMELEC
contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a
tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.
HELD:
The Court held that the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. The COMELECs contention that a
candidates jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase and the like, could not
merit the courts approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition
may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidates constitutional rights.
IN RE: TULFO [A.M. NO. 90-4-1545-0; 17 APR 1990]
Facts: In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that
the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989,
where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the
Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of
harassment in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted
from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempts.
Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.
Issue: Whether or Not Tulfo is in contempt.
Held: Yes. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon,
and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA. The power to punish is inherent
as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of court is defiance of the authority, justice and
dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be
punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article constituted both.
It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only
to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained
from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse also, because
at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry
for having written the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.
SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 85279, July 28,1989]
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending
the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject
matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the

case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the
Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by
the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such
as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180
provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that
may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to
strike they are prohibited from doing so.
People v Veridiano Digest
G.R. L-62243, October 12, 1984
Effectivity of laws
At issue in this case is the applicability of BP 22 which was circulated a month after private
respondent issued the dishonored check.
Facts:
1.
On or about the 2nd week of May 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a
check amounting to P200, 000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and
despite repeated demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment. Hence, the filing
of charges against him for violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Check law.
2.
Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offence on
ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law
took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date
of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense,
hence BP 22 is applicable.
3.
The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action hence,
this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and
hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said
publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued about the
second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for
circulation at the time.
Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed
NO.
The penal statute in question was circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April
9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the contents of a
penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then
in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have
committed the alleged crime. In effect, when the alleged offense was committed there was still no law
penalizing it. If BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Official Gazette as the point of
reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity
provision. Finally, the term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning, to
make known to the people in general.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty
(without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was
presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time
must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution
that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." Incriminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does
not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to
the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the
court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether
the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.
Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was
wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be
assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the
offense found to be capital by the court.
PEOPLE VS. LUCERO [244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29 MAY 1995]
Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John
Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution:
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the
said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue,
Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one
gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet;
all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, adriver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds,
which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.
When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with
Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of
his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house.
The extrajudicialstatement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero.
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards
his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was
blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police
officers.

The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not
informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
complainant.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said
he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4)
times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the
services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual
custodial interrogation.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court,
however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with
Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.
Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force
and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta
himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant
understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession.
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant
counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from
Atty. Peralta.
Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.
PEOPLE v BALADJAY GR No. L-26915-18 (1982)
Facts:
Sergio Baladjay and others were charged with four criminal cases in the municipal court of Ozamiz for
illegal possession of instruments for committing counterfeiting or falsification, estafa committed on
June 5, 1953, estafa committed on August 14, 1953, and theft.
The cases were elevated to the Court of First Instance. Only Baladjay was available for trial and
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
The prosecution made no determined effort to finish with its evidence as shown by the fact that the
trial court in its order noting that the despite of the length of time since these cases have been filed,
the prosecution is still unprepared. In the same order, the court granted the prosecutions motion for
postponement on the condition that if when the case are called again for hearing the prosecution will
still not be prepared, the court will take drastic action. Apparently, the prosecution was still not ready
on the dates of resetting and the hearing was cancelled again. On one hearing, the accused was
ready for trial but no one appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal sent a telegraphic motion for
postponement. Judge Zosa issued four separate orders in open court dismissing the four cases
provisionally.
The prosecution moved for the reconsideration. Baladjay opposed. Judge Zosa reconsidered the four
orders of dismissal and reinstated the four cases.
Issue:
Whether the trial courts order reinstating the four criminal cases, which it had provisionally dismissed
because of the delay in prosecuting them and because the fiscal was not ready when the cases were
called for hearing, placed the accused in double jeopardy

Decision:
We hold that the four dismissal orders, although provisional in character, which were issued upon
motion of the accused (after the case had been pending for more than eleven years without the
prosecution being able to finish the presentation of its evidence) and on the basis of his right to a
speedy trial placed him in jeopardy. The dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal. The reinstatement
of the cases would place him in double jeopardy.
The rule that the dismissal of a criminal case upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent of the
defendant, has no application to a case where the dismissal is predicated on the right of a defendant
to a speedy trial. The 'provisional' dismissal of a criminal case for failure to prosecute is not truly a
dismissal but an acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time therefor
came.
A judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and cannot thus be recalled
thereafter for correction or amendment.
It is relevant to note that because Baladjay was denied a speedy trial, he would even be entitled to
relief in mandamus proceeding to compel the dismissal of the informations
ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE
January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do
not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of
the three branches of our government.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age
of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand,
refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty
to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may
or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession
as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.