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Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, et al.

G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004

Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining succeeded in discovering marble deposits in Mount Mabio. The petitioner applied
with the Mines Bureau,wherein they were given License No. 33 was issued to the petitioners. Respondent Maceda
cancelled the petitioner's license stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of
PD 463. The latter reason was confirmed by Proclamation No. 84 which states that public interest would be served by
reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the
Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a
declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional
proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto
law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded
from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents' license, is clearly not penal in character.
Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising
legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which
promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened
under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.


Private respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner alleging that the latter defaulted in payment of rentals
and refused to vacate the subject property owned by private respondent despite repeated demands. MTC and RTC
decided against petioner.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court committed reversible error when it declared him to have lost his preferential
right to buy the subject property and gave private respondent 30 days from finality of judgment to redeem the "3/9
portion" of the disputed property acquired by petitioner from private respondent's co-owner.
whether the appellate court committed reversible error when it declared petitioner to have lost his preferential right to
buy the subject property ?
The terms of the original lease contract which are revived in the implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil
Code are only those terms germane to the lessee's right of continued possession and enjoyment of the property
leased. Therefore, in this case, the implied new lease did not ipso facto carry with it the revival of petitioner's option to
buy the leased premises because said option was alien to the lease. Stated differently, petitioner's right to exercise
the option to purchase expired with the termination of the original contract of lease.

Regarding private respondent's right of redemption, Article 1088 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that, should
any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one month from the time they were notified in writing by the vendor. The requirement of a written notice is
mandatory . Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still has the right to redeem said onethird portion of the subject property. On account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs, the 30day period never commenced.
Therefore, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the appellate court in rendering the assailed decision.


Facts: National Power Corporation is a government corporation tasked under its franchise, to generate and transmit
electric power and, for this purpose, to obtain easement of right of way to string transmission lines across private
property. Petitioner obtained such easement from respondent Feiino B. Lucero in 1993 and strung 138 kilovolts
transmission lines across 7,572 square meters of respondent's 64,477 square-meter land in Badian, Cebu. For
petitioner's alleged failure to pay damages for the creation of the easement, respondent, in December 1999, sued
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Barili, Cebu, for payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should only be limited to 10% of the value of the area traversed by its
transmission lines?

Ruling: No: This Court has consistently rejected as untenable petitioner's reliance on Section 3(A) of RA 6395, as
amended, to lower its liability to 10% of the value of the property subjected to its easement of right of way in light of
the perpetual and hazardous burden the stringing of high-voltage transmission wires imposes on private property.
Legally, this type of easement is akin to taking within the contemplation of eminent domain proceedings, thus
compensation, as the CA correctly ruled, covers the full amount of the property burdened by the easement.

Facts: On October 29, 1997, MERALCO received a letter from the City Treasurer of Lucena, stating that the company
was being assessed real property tax delinquency on its machineries beginning 1990, in the total amount of P17,
MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of
Lucena City on December 23, 1997 and posted a surety bond dated December 10, 1997 to guarantee payment of its
real property tax delinquency. MERALCO asked the LBAA to cancel and nullify the Notice of Assessment and declare
the properties covered exempt from real property tax.

ISSUE: WON the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO may
qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code?

Ruling: Yes. under Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code, machinery, to be deemed real property subject to
real property tax, need no longer be annexed to the land or building as these "may or may not be attached,
permanently or temporarily to the real property," and in fact, such machinery may even be "mobile." The same
provision though requires that to be machinery subject to real property tax, the physical facilities for production,
installations, and appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or not
permanently attached to the real property (a) must be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the
particular industry, business, or activity; and (2) by their very nature and purpose, are designed for, or necessary for
manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes.


GR No. 158385
Respondent Juliet filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner Modesto, alleging that he occupied and
encroached on the northern portion of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes.
Respondent prayed to be declared the rightful owner of the northern portion, the cancellation of petitioners tax
declaration, and the removal of petitioner and his improvements from the property.
On the other hand, petitioner maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-interest have openly and
continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. During this entire time, no one disturbed his
ownership and possession thereof.
ISSUE: Who between the parties has the better right to the subject property?
Modesto Palali has the better right. Petitioner was able to prove his and his predecessors actual, open, continuous
and physical possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war era (aside from petitioners tax

declaration over the subject property). Also, petitioners witnesses were long time residents of Sitio Camambaey, they
knew of the introduction of improvements made by petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.
Respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as the subject property
is concerned. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the
absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership.[37] Respondents tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in
possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.

RP vs TAN Properties G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008

Facts: In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration of a land,
located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of 56.4007 hectares. To support its application, it submitted
two certificates, issued by CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable
and disposable.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ground
that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.
Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and disposable.
No.It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is alienable and disposable and
for such the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the needed proof. For the documents provided by the
company, the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No. 20 (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20
proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable;
and DAO No. 38 provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a maximum
area of 50 hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has no
jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the aforementioned DAO's that the documents submitted by T.A.N. Properties
did not prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Baluyo vs Cruz (Oct 14, 2015)

Gregory G. Baluyo filed a complaint for forcible entry against Joaquin and Rebecca De La Cruz. The complaint
alleged that he was the caretaker of a residential house and lot in Calabanga, Camarines Sur, owned by his brother
Emmanuel, who bought the property from the spouses Dimaano on November 30, 1999; that the house was leased to
Lourdes Perico since March 2008;and, that on April 23, 2008, the respondents, through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, demolished the house on the property, forcibly ejecting the lessee Perico and depriving the
petitioner of his possession thereof.

Whether or not the petitioner has establish his prior physical possession of the subject property?

Yes. Proof of prior physical possession is an indispensable element in a forcible entry case. Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires that, in actions for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege that he has been deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. This requirement implies that
the defendant's possession of the property is unlawful from the beginning, as he acquires possession by unlawful
means. The plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was
deprived thereof by the defendant.

The presence of the subject deed of absolute sale well supports the claim that the petitioner has had physical
possession of the subject property since the date of its execution for beginning November 30, 1999. The petitioner's
claim is further strengthened by affidavits of witnesses attesting to the fact that Emmanuel Baluyo and his caretaker
Gregory Baluyo had previously possessed and occupied the subject residential house which was leased to a certain
Kagawad Edzel Severo and subsequently, to Lourdes Perico. The petitioner, therefore, enjoys priority in time of
possession compared to the respondents who have never been in actual possession, and based on their claim, would
have inherited the subject property only upon Bonifacio's death in July 2007.

City of Davao vs. Intestate Estate of Dalisay

Facts: The properties of the Estate of Amado S. Dalisay were forfeited for nonpayment of estate taxes. 5 properties
were acquired by the City Government of Davao pursuant to Sec. 263 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) on July
19 2004.
On Sept. 11 2006 Respondent inquired for the balance needed to pay for the redemption and tendered such payment
on Sept. 13 2006 in the RTC after refusal of the City to accept stating the 1 year period had already expired.
The City Treasurer issued the subject five Declarations of Forfeiture only on September 13, 2006.

Issue: WON the redemption period starts upon the date of the sale or upon the date of the issuance of the declaration
of forfeiture?

Held: The phrases date of such forfeiture is construed to mean upon the date of the sale. The term such was
phrased to avoid repetition and to mean the entire legal process of auction. The redemption period was deemed
expired and Respondents claim is dismissed.
Although these laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the redeemer there is also a statutory prescription of
rights. The evidence that respondents only pursued to ask of the balance only almost a year after the annotation or a
year after the auction sale proves they were negligent and sleeping on their rights.

Benguet Corporation vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Facts: On 1985 the Provincial Assessor of Zambales declared the Benguet Corporations tailings dam as
improvements with the land thereunder included. Petitioner did not declare such property as taxable and filed for
appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals who agreed with the initial assessment that the tailings dam was
improvements on the property subject to realty tax.
Petitioner went to the courts stating the dam was to be considered part of the mine as real property.
Respondent contends that the tailings dam was considered an improvement on the property and also deemed
immovable real property itself subject to taxation.

Issue: WON the tailings dam was correctly declared an improvement on the real property.

Held: Yes, improvements are interpreted to mean artificial alterations of the physical condition of the ground that are
reasonably permanent in character.
Permanent in a sense that it is not actually to exist perpetually but permanently immovable to last up until it is
utilized for its purpose.
It was also admitted and proven the mine can exist and operate even in the absence of the tailings dam and the
addition of the said dam increased effectively the operation of the mine thereby pushing the courts to agree that the
dam was indeed correctly classified as real property under the Civil Code and improvements under the Real
Property Tax Code.