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PA RT Y P O L I T I C S
V O L 1 0 . N o . 6 pp. 701722
London
Thousand Oaks
New Delhi
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increase of power concentration within the party, for example (see Nassmacher, 1989; Panebianco, 1988). Moreover, the increasing availability of
state subventions has strengthened the orientation of parties towards the
state while at the same time contributing to their shifting away from society
(Katz and Mair, 1995). In addition to a reinforcement of the linkages
between parties and the state, public funding has also served to encourage
a particular conception of democracy and political parties, by which parties
are increasingly seen as an essential public good for democracy and less
exclusively as the private voluntary associations which are the instruments
of civil society (see Katz, 1996).
It is especially in the more recently established democracies in Europe that
public funding has acquired an exceptional relevance and is of particularly
crucial importance for the way in which parties in these new democracies
organize (see van Biezen, 2003). In this article it will be shown that the state
plays an even more critical role in the financing of parties in new democratic polities than in the established democracies in Western Europe. In
addition, and perhaps more importantly, the significance of the state as a
financial contributor to party activity transcends its immediate empirical
importance and also has a bearing on the normative connotations associated with political parties and democracy. The contention of this article is
that the increasingly prominent role of the state in party financing should
be interpreted in the context of an ideational transformation concerning the
place of political parties in modern democracy. More specifically, it is as a
result of changing conceptions of parties and democracy that political
parties have come to be perceived increasingly as necessary and desirable
institutions for modern democracy. This has paved the way for the legitimation of direct state involvement in their internal affairs and their external
activities.
Moreover, public funding and the extensive nature of public control on
party finance have contributed to a transformation of parties from the
traditionally voluntary private associations which perform public roles and
occupy government positions, towards parties as public utilities. Recent
cases of democratization, where parties were attributed a markedly privileged position in legal and constitutional terms, where the state plays a
decisive role in party financing and where state regulation exercises a degree
of control on party activity unprecedented in the context of a liberal democracy, provide the most unequivocal testimony of such a new conception. In
this article, the newer European democracies are taken as a point of departure for analysis. However, the explicit comparative reference point is with
the experiences in the older democracies, thereby underlining not only what
is typical for the nature of political parties in the broader realm of new
democracies but also what has been distinctive about their place in the
established liberal democracies in Western Europe.
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provided by the state. These ideas are particularly closely related to the cartel
party model of organization as advanced by Katz and Mair (1995), in which
colluding parties become entrenched within the state and employ resources
of the state in order to guarantee their own survival. From a conception of
parties as public utilities, the fact that parties have developed into agents of
the state actually becomes a positive quality. Hence, the cartel party model
of organization may not only be attractive from the perspective of party elites
wishing to protect their own interests, but also corresponds to the prevailing
normative conceptions on the place and role of parties in a democracy.
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electoral system. As a result, the two bigger parties (PSOE and PP) collected
between 82 and 89 percent of the total of electoral subsidies between 1986
and 1996, while oscillating between 65 and 76 percent of the vote (see van
Biezen, 2000). Party finance regimes as in Spain thus penalize smaller parties
and may in fact make it more difficult for newcomers to enter the system
or for smaller parties to challenge the status quo, and may even contribute
to a cartelization of the party system (Gillespie, 1998: 8184).
Given that state subventions were introduced when most parties were still
in an initial stage of party formation and therefore usually lacked alternative organizational resources, public funding was always likely to play a
critical role in the financing of these parties. Indeed, the state appears to be
the predominant player in party financing in many of the post-communist
countries in Europe as well as in their Southern European counterparts. For
many parties the financial dependence on public subventions is such that
the state is often (at least formally) the single most important financial
contributor to party activity, while some parties are virtually entirely dependent on public money. To the major Portuguese and Spanish parties, for
example, the state contributes on average some 75 to 85 percent of their
total income (van Biezen, 2000). In most of the post-communist democracies in Eastern Europe the role of the state in party financing tends to be of
equal significance (Lewis, 1998; Szczerbiak, 2001; van Biezen, 2003).
Table 1 gives an impression of the relative importance of the state for the
financing of parties and election campaigns in some of the newer democracies in Southern and East-Central Europe. The figures here present the
averages for a variety of parties over a number of years, and distinguish
between three broader categories of monetary income: the state (including
subsidies for election campaigns and routine organizational activities),
private or voluntary fundraising (including membership fees, individual and
corporate donations) and other sources (which may include bank loans, the
revenues from real estate or unspecified income). The evidence here is
presented in a rather crude and aggregated form.6 Nonetheless, it clearly
demonstrates the unequivocal importance of state support, which amounts
to some 28 percent in the case of Portugal, about half of the annual party
Table 1. Financing parties and elections
Public
subsidies
Private
fundraising
Other
47.6
55.8
28.1
76.4
26.2
7.0
38.2
14.6
26.0
37.2
33.7
9.0
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Britain have recently attributed a greater role to the state in the control of
party financing by adopting new legislation on the issue (see Koole, 2001).
Countries such as Switzerland are now among the few where, at least in
financial terms, the separation between state and parties continues to
persist: on the federal level no public subsidies are available for party
organizations or election campaigns and there are no public regulations on
their financial activities (Nassmacher, 2001b: 103, 105).
In many respects, the legal codification of political finance in the newer
democracies provides a marked example of the modern conception of party
as public utility. In sharp contrast with the late 19th- and early 20th-century
democratization processes, recent transitions to democracy took place in a
context in which parties had already come to be perceived as key institutions
performing a special service to democracy. From the birth of the new democratic polity they were therefore attributed a privileged status and they were
often furnished with direct state support from the very beginning. In
addition, public control on party finance would also be enacted virtually
from the outset (Lewis, 1998). Moreover, party finance legislation in the
newer democracies was not only enacted more swiftly than in the older
democracies, the financing regimes also tend to entail a much larger degree
of public control. The notion that parties are a distinctive type of public
utility has encouraged a practice of party financing which is subject to strict
legal regulations, such as on the amount and type of permissible contributions or on the amounts of party or campaign expenditures. Indeed, and
as will be discussed at greater length below, the relatively restrictive legal
frameworks on the organization, activities and financing of political parties
in the newer democracies stand out in sharp contrast with the relatively
liberal finance regimes in their older counterparts, underlining that it is the
new democracies in particular which provide the most marked indication
of a conception of the party as a public utility.
Table 2 shows that in virtually all areas of party finance the newer democracies have adopted stricter regulations than the long-established ones.8
More so than in the older democracies, for example, parties in the new
democracies are obliged to report their annual accounts and to disclose the
amount and source of contributions and/or the details of expenditures. New
democracies also tend to be less permissive with regard to private and
corporate donations, as well as party and campaign expenditures. While
corporate donations are permitted virtually everywhere (the only exceptions
are Belgium and France), in a few countries, all of which are new democracies, the amount per donor or the total amount of corporate contributions
is limited by law. A similar pattern emerges from the regulations on the
amount of private (individual) donations. Only a small minority of countries have capped the amount of private donations or have put a ceiling on
the total amount of donations parties and candidates may receive per year
or per election cycle. With the exceptions of Belgium and France, it is only
in new democracies that these donations are subject to legal regulations. In
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Country
Finance
law
Disclosure
and/or
reporting
Limits on
private
donations
Limits/bans
on corporate
donations
Limits/bans
on foreign
donations
Albania
Austria
Belgium
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes (ban)
Yes (limit)
No
No
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
n/a
No
Yes (ban)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
n/a
Yes
n/a
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes (ban)
n/a
Yes (limit)
No
Yes (limit)
Georgia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (limit)
Yes (limit)
Germany
Greece
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes (limit)
Yes (limit)
No
Hungary
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes (limit)
Ireland
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Italy
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Latvia
Lithuania
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes (limit)
Yes (limit)
Yes (ban)
Yes (limit)
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes (limit)
No
No
No
No
Yes (limit)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Romania
Russia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (limit)
No
Yes (limit)
Yes (ban)
Slovakia
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes (ban)
Slovenia
Spain
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (limit)
Yes (limit)
Yes (ban)
Yes (limit)
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United
Kingdom
No
No
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
n/a
No
No
No
Yes (ban)
Yes (ban)
(ban)
(ban)
(ban)
(limit)
Limits on
expenditures
No
No
Yes (party &
campaign)
No
No
n/a
No
n/a
Yes
(campaign)
Yes (party &
campaign)
No
Yes
(campaign)
Yes
(campaign)
Yes
(campaign)
Yes
(campaign)
No
Yes
(campaign)
n/a
Yes*
No
No
n/a
No
Yes (party &
campaign)
No
Yes (party &
campaign)
Yes
(campaign)
n/a
Yes
(campaign)
No
No
Yes*
Yes
(campaign)
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fact, almost half of the newly established democracies have introduced legal
limits on private and corporate donations, while the large majority of the
long-established democracies have left the issue on the whole unregulated.
Table 2 furthermore shows that, in terms of the amounts that may be spent
on party activity or election campaigns, the newer democracies have also
adopted a more restrictive regime than the older ones:9 virtually all of the
new democracies (with the exception of Poland and Romania) have
restricted party and/or campaign expenses by public legislation against only
half of the older democracies.
Many countries have also adopted legal provisions which restrict foreign
donations. At one extreme, some countries have imposed a complete ban
on donations from foreign individuals and organizations. With the exception of the United Kingdom, which banned foreign donations in 2000, all
of these are newer democracies. At the other extreme, the countries which
do not prohibit foreign donations in any form are virtually all older democracies (Greece being the only exception). In between are the (mostly new)
democracies which do allow certain types of foreign donations while
prohibiting others. Estonia, for example, excludes donations from foreign
public institutions, Hungary prohibits donations from foreign states but
permits donations from foreign individuals or organizations, while Portugal
allows donations from foreign individuals but not from foreign organizations. Perhaps paradoxically, also in this regard the new democracies are
more restrictive than their older counterparts, while it is at the same time
an almost conventional wisdom that many of these parties received financial support from abroad, especially in the early years of the transition.
Communist parties in post-authoritarian Southern Europe were known to
be financed by the Soviet Union, for example, while other parties received
financial (and technological) support from West European and particularly
West German parties and their associated research institutes (e.g. del
Castillo, 1989). Foreign financial aid to parties in Southern Europe significantly diminished after the demise of the communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and particularly the unification of Germany, after which German
financial aid was mostly directed to the East. In addition to the financial
support from Western Europe, many democratizing countries in Eastern
Europe have relied heavily on the financial assistance of the US (see Glenn,
1999).
While this brief account does not aim to provide a systematic analysis of
the substance of finance legislation in Europe, it nevertheless serves to illustrate a fundamental difference between old and new democracies. The
overall picture that emerges here is of party finance legislation being much
more rigorous, less permissive and less liberal in the newer democracies than
in the long-established ones. This can be seen as indicative of a particular
notion of the party. It suggests a conception in which, as Katz puts it, party
structures have become legitimate objects of state regulation to a degree far
exceeding what would normally be acceptable for private associations in a
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Conclusion
The widespread access of parties to public funds has unquestionably developed a strong financial linkage between parties and the state. While the
introduction of state subventions may have contributed to a shifting orientation from society to the state in Western Europe, the early availability of
public subsidies in the newer European democracies coupled with the relatively weakly developed linkages with society results in no such shift ever
occurring, leaving parties largely dependent on, and oriented towards, the
state from the very beginning. Moreover, the close financial linkage with the
state has discouraged parties from looking for additional sources of income
(except for corrupt sources perhaps) and has thus removed a key incentive
to establish a more structural relationship with civil society.
Moreover, the excessive dependence on public funds has facilitated the
access to, and thereby encouraged the unauthorized use of, state resources.
As the strong dependence on the state may further strengthen the pervasive
patterns of patronage and corruption, illicit financing may serve to reinforce
the entrenchment of parties within the state (van Biezen and Kopecky, 2001:
424). In this sense, the potential of public subsidies to curtail improper
private financing appears to be limited and may even be counterproductive
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to its intentions. More generally, the practice of party financing may be less
malleable through direct state intervention than anticipated. Not only
public funding but also public law has an only limited capacity to regulate
and monitor patterns of political finance. At the very least, in many of the
new democracies, the institutional framework of public funding has
advanced a particular logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1984)
which encourages a standard of behaviour that allows political actors to
operate within a relatively robust although rather inconsequential system of
statutory control on party finances.
The rapid development and expansion of party finance legislation which
is to hold parties publicly accountable for their internal affairs and external
activities underlines the particular conception of political parties as a special
kind of public good for democracy. At the same time, state regulation
contradicts and progressively undermines their organizational autonomy
and their status as private associations, turning parties into a unique type
of public utility. As Bartolini and Mair (2001: 340) contend, the more the
activities of parties are regulated by public law, the more this will lead to
their being defined as public service agencies. They go on to argue that this
may progressively weaken their internal hierarchical order and may ultimately undermine the capacity of political parties for institutional integration. This contention has a special relevance for the newer democracies.
Here, to a larger degree than in the established democracies, political parties
can be seen as encapsulated by the state and as primarily public institutions
which are part of the state apparatus rather than private institutions which
act as the agents of civil society, in a context in which their political integration capacity is already much more weakly developed.
Notes
In addition to the two anonymous referees, I would like to thank Todd Eisenstadt,
Justin Fisher, Jonathan Hopkin, Jeremy Jennings and Peter Mair for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 See, for example, its legislative resolution A50167/2001 on the proposal for a
Council regulation on the statute and financing of European political parties
(COM [2000] 898 C5 0081/20012001/0011 [CNS]).
2 See, for example, the report adopted by its Commission for Democracy through
Law (the Venice Commission; report CDC-INF[2001]008) or Recommendation
Rec (2003[4]) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, both
containing guidelines on the financing of political parties.
3 See www.idea.int/publications/funding_parties/fpp_book.htm.
4 Amongst others, Transparency International compiles subjective corruption scores
by country, published in the annual Index of Corruption Perception. See
www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi.
5 Financial Times, 12 February 2003.
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6 For a breakdown and more detailed analysis, see van Biezen, 2003: Ch. 8.
7 For Portugal it should be noted that the figures only cover election campaigns.
The dependence of parties on public money for the financing of their party
organizations is, with the exception of the Communist Party, on a similar level to
that of their Spanish counterparts. Furthermore, even for the financing of elections
the role of the state appears to be growing. A comparison of the 1995 and 2002
elections clearly shows an increase in importance of state subventions (from 10 to
46.1 percent) while contributions from private or voluntary fundraising declined
from 50.1 to 26.4 percent.
8 Unless indicated otherwise, the comparative figures in this section are drawn from
the findings of the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption (GMC)/Working
Group on the Funding of Political Parties (GMCF) of the Council of Europe,
Report GMC (99) 23 Rev2, 9 June 2000. This includes an analysis of the legal
frameworks of political finance in 35 of its member states and 2 observer
countries, with information drawn from responses to a questionnaire. The focus
of the analysis presented here is on 30 European countries, of which 13 are old
democracies (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) and the
remaining 17 are newer political regimes, including a number of so-called illiberal
democracies (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Spain).
9 Table 2 only addresses the existence of limits on the amount of money that can
legally be spent on party and campaign activities and excludes legal provisions
regulating expenditures on certain types of activities. In the Netherlands, for
example, parties are not allowed to use state funding for election campaigns but
there are no limits on the amounts of party or campaign expenditure (Gidlund
and Koole, 2001: 128).
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