Investigation of a Public

Infrastructure Failure

Table of Contents
1.

Introduction:......................................................................................................... 3

2.

Kaloko Dam Background...................................................................................... 3

3.

Possible Failures of Kaloko Dam........................................................................... 4

4.

3.1

Overtopping Failure........................................................................................ 4

3.2

Piping and Conduit Failure.............................................................................4

3.3

Liquefaction Failure........................................................................................ 5

Potential Causes................................................................................................... 5
4.1

Unable to Conduct the Dam Safety Inspection..............................................6

4.2

Ka Loko Dam was Categorized as a Low Hazard Dam....................................6

4.3

Inadequately Funds for Dam Inspection Program..........................................6

4.4

Inspectors Noticed Nothing Amiss at KaLoko Dam.........................................6

4.5

Dam Spillway Should Not Have Been Altered................................................6

4.6

Owner Failed to Maintain the Dam.................................................................6

Extreme Environmental Conditions......................................................................6

Recommendations in Assets Management...........................................................7

1. Introduction:
The purpose of this report is to thoroughly document the public
infrastructure failure and identify the problems associated in the
management system which led to the failure and to suggest improvements
or changes to the system in order to have successfully predicted and
managed such an event. Therefore, the breach of kaloko Dam, 2006 is
selected public infrastructure to study in this report. There are typically two
objectives in dam failure investigations. The first is to understand the cause
of the failure and how to prevent similar failures from occurring in the future,
and the second is to convey this information to the broad dam safety
community so that similar deficiencies can be corrected at existing dams and
avoided at new dams. The investigations reports are also used to determine
liability in court actions.
An investigation in case of a dam failure must address the following
purposes:

To
To
To
To
To

recognize design and construction deficiencies in dam.

reduce the potential for future similar event.
improve dam safety regulation and dam engineering.
improve understanding of warning signs of dam distress.
identify safety recommendations for improvement in dam safety.

2. Kaloko Dam Background

Kaloko Dam is a reservoir created by an earthen dam on the island of Kauai,
Hawaii. It is located on the north side of the island. Waters flow from KaLoko
Reservoir down to Waiakalua Reservoir, Waiakalua Stream, and down to the
Pacific Ocean. On March 14, 2006, just before dawn, Ka loko Dam on the
island of Kauai breached. Almost 400 million gallons of water 1.6 million
tons came crashing down from the ka loko Reservior into Kilauea Bay,
Taking trees, cars, buildings, and human lives with it. Seven people died in
the flood. It was a great human catastrophe and an ecological disaster.

Ka Loko Reservoir was initially constructed in 1890, as part of a larger

system of ditches, tunnels, and flumes that constituted the water system for
Kilauea Sugar Plantation. In 1911, Ka Loko Dam was raised 12 feet by the
hydraulic fill method. This increased the reservoir capacity to over 400
million gallons. The reservoir was fed by Ka Loko and Moloaa ditches, and its
water source was Puu Ka Ele stream and there streams in the government
land of P!paa, within the Moloaa Forest Reserve.

3. Possible Failure Mechanism of Kaloko Dam

There are different ways a dam may fail. The mechanism of the breach
failure of Ka Loko Dam can only be inferred from available evidence.

3.1 Overtopping Failure

One possible failure mechanism is embankment overtopping. When a water level
rises above the dam crest, water flows over the crest and downstream slope and
starts to erode the dam face and the foundation materials at the toe, or
downstream base, of the dam. As flow over the top of the dam increases, erosion
can increase rapidly until the breach is fully formed. One important purpose of an
emergency spillway on an earthen dam is to prevent overtopping. After the breach,
the Corps examined Ka Loko and could not see a spillway. As in report indicates,
there was no spillway where it had previously been shown in photographs and
engineering sketches. The lack of a spillway at Ka Loko Dam, as well as other
circumstantial evidence, would indicate that the dam likely failed by overtopping.

3.2 Piping and Conduit Failure

There are many other potential modes of failure, however. Internal erosion of
the embankment or dam foundation materials by seepage can lead to
formation of a conduit or pipe through the embankment or foundation that
can lead to eventual collapse of the crest. There is evidence in the factual
record going back for several decades of concern with seepage. There is also
evidence in the factual record, however, to indicate that the reservoir had
regularly (and safely) filled to the height of the emergency spillway in the
past. So this failure mechanism is possible, although it does not appear to be

fully consistent with other observed characteristics of the breach. Because

the actual failure mechanism appears to have been complex, such a piping
failure mechanism cannot be dismissed with full confidence without
additional analytical modeling.

3.3 Liquefaction Failure

After March 14, the Army Corps of Engineers, in conjunction with DLNR and
Civil Defense, inspected 54 dams. The inspection teams found at least one
detrimental condition existed on every dam they inspected on Kauai, and
noted that many of the dams have lacked basic monitoring and maintenance
programs for what appears to be an extended period. Hawaii has an
extensive system of antique dams and waterways. The economic engine of
the sugarcane industry no longer provides the resources to maintain these
water systems. More than 95% of regulated dams in Hawaii are earthen
dams, which tend to be subject to a mechanism called liquefaction in
which soil loses its stability and failure during an earthquake. It seems
likely that a number of these earthen dams, including Alexander dam on
Kauai, were built using an outmoded construction technique known as the
hydraulic fill method, and these dams may be particularly susceptible to
earthquake damage.
All of the above mentioned failures were due to the asset management
which led to a catastrophic event in the end.

4. Potential Lacks of Asset Management

First, there are many general conditions that contributed to the failure of Ka
Loko Dam that are beyond the control of any individual or institution, but
which must be recognized in considering legislative response and future
safety measures. Primary among them, perhaps, is the age of the plantation
era water systems so pervasive in Hawaii, and the change in our economy
that has removed both the economic engine and the institutions that were

required to maintain these water systems. This is a reality that must be

taken into consideration in any planning for the future.
Finally, the earthquake of October 15, 2006, is a reminder that there are
other naturally occurring events that may profoundly affect the safety of
Hawaiis dams. Indeed, there are some events that will cause any dam to
fail. That reality, too, must be taken into consideration.
While there are general conditions that likely cannot be changed, but must
be taken into consideration, the investigation also revealed specific
conditions and practices that contributed to the failure of Ka Loko Dam, and
which can be changed. There were potentially contributing factors to the
failure of the dam, they are still important to identify and address them.

4.1 Unable to Conduct the Dam Safety Inspection

The State is required by its own decrees to inspect all dams at least after
every five years. KaLoko Dam was never inspected. If the Dam had been
inspected before by trained dam inspectors, the lack of a spillway would
surely have been noted. Any other flaws that might have contributed to its
breach could possibly have been identified and rectified.

4.2 Ka Loko Dam was Categorized as a Low Hazard Dam.

KaLoko Dam was initially categorized as a low-hazard dam by the Army
Corps of Engineers as part of its inspection, which led to the dam to be
neglected of detail inspection. It seems that if KaLoko Dam had been
classified, or reclassified, as a high-hazard dam it would have been inspected
and would have been required to have an Emergency Action Plan.

4.3 State Inadequately Funds for Dam Inspection Program

The statutory mandate to conduct such inspections must be adequately
staffed and funded. One issue this raises is the appropriate source for the
necessary funding.

4.4 Inspectors Noticed Nothing Amiss at KaLoko Dam

Ka Loko Dam and Reservoir was inspected on numerous occasions by other
State inspectors. No one ever noticed anything amiss.

4.5 Dam Spillway Should Not Have Been Altered

The emergency spillway is an essential safety element of every earthen dam.
It is dangerous to fill an emergency spillway on an earthen dam, or to allow it
to become obstructed or unusable

4.6 Owner Failed to Maintain the Dam

The owner of a dam has the obligation to repair and maintain the dam. Even
if owner knew nothing of the alterations to the emergency spillway, that does
not avoid his obligation to maintain the dam and therefore to discover and
correct any problems with the spillway.
4.7

Other State Inspectors Noticed Nothing Amiss At Ka

Loko Dam.

The area around Ka Loko Dam and Reservoir was inspected on numerous
occasions by other state inspectors. But they noticed nothing amiss at the
Dame site.

5 Extreme Environmental Conditions

The extreme weather condition and heavy rainfall were also responsible for
the failure of Dam but the dam must have been designed for the extreme
conditions. Heavy rainfall during the time period turns out into a flash flood
which raises the water level above the crest and erodes the face of dam.
The Ka Loko Dam breach on March 14, 2006, occurred 24 days into one of
the most unusual periods of extended wet and stormy weather ever
observed in Hawaii. The unusual weather began almost a month prior to the
Ka Loko Dam breach on March 14, 2006. Starting February 18, National
Weather Service (NWS) flash flood watches. During that 42 day period, one
hundred and eleven (111) flash flood warnings potentially dangerous

flooding already occurring or expected within the next hour were issued for
various locations. Finally the rainfall data suggest that the heavy pre-March
14, 2006 period rainfall is rare, but far from unprecedented.

6 Recommendations in Managing Assets

Many Dams lacked basic monitoring and maintenance system that lead to
the event. Therefore there is a dire need of a managing inventory system to
monitor the condition and carry out inspection as well as look after the
inspections.

The level of funding for the dam safety program should be increased to

allow for regular dam safety inspections.

All dams should be inspected by a professional engineering service
with experience in design, construction, operation, inspection, and

evaluation of dams.
There must be specific operation plans and emergency action plans.
Implement a dam safety training program.
Develop a system to Inspect the evaluation of slope stability and

spillway capacity
There should be periodic updating of the dams inventory to

accommodate changes in the hazard classification of dams.

Dam safety inspections should include comprehensive safety reviews

and visual inspections.

Visual inspections of high-hazard dams should be conducted

comparatively earlier than low-hazard dams.

The guidelines for safety inspection of dams should be reviewed with a

view to develop more streamlined dam inspection procedures.

Consideration should be given to developing guidelines for
instrumentation monitoring of high hazard, and perhaps significant

hazard dams.
All State and County inspectors should receive proper basic dam safety

training, as should all dam owners.

Provide funds necessary to administer the program, probably collected
from dam or reservoir owners to help cover costs.

There should be Dam Safety Act which should be amended to

incorporate more thorough provisions that specifically grant certain
authority to administer certain important aspects of the dam safety

program.
Education of other State and County inspectors regarding dam safety
could be helpful.

7 References

Rick Daysog, 2009, $25M Settlement Reached in Deadly Kauai Dam

Break, The Honolulu Advertiser

Malia Zimmerman,2007, Kauai Dam Breach Tragedy Still Not Resolved

7 Years After 7 People Were Killed, Hawaii Reporter

Jacques Leslie, 2007, Before the Flood, The Epic Struggle Over Dams,

Displaced People and the Environment., The Opinion Pages

Mark Baker, 2008, Dam Failure Investigation Approaches, Reclamation

Managing water in West

Association of State Dam Safety Officials, December 8, 2011, Dam
Failure Investigation Guideline, Dam Failure Investigation Committee.