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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
v.
SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
I.
conviction did not involve a crime of violence under the federal sentencing
guidelines.
In the prior appeal, we held that a crime would be considered violent if it
involved intent, but not recklessness. United States v. Rodriguez, 528 F. Appx
921, 924 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Mr. Rodriguez does not quarrel with this
conclusion.
Instead, he argues that the assault did not necessarily constitute a crime of
violence because the crime could have been triggered by recklessness. This much
of the argument is correct, for the Texas statute provides three different mental
states for an assault. One of them is recklessness, and another is intentional
conduct. See Tex. Penal Code 22.01(a)(1). 1
The resulting question is which mental state was required in Mr.
Rodriguezs criminal case. If it was intentional conduct, the offense would have
qualified as a crime of violence; if the required mental state was recklessness, the
offense would not have qualified as a crime of violence. And if the offense
involved a crime of violence, enhancement of the sentence would have been
The third mental state was knowingly. See Tex. Penal Code 22.01(a).
This mental state does not affect any of the issues in Mr. Rodriguezs request for
a certificate of appealability.
3
appropriate; if the offense did not involve a crime of violence, enhancement would
have been inappropriate.
II.
U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(B). We will issue a certificate only when the applicant makes
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Id. at 2253(c)(2).
This showing requires a demonstration that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983), superseded by statute,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, as recognized in Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84). Under this test, Mr. Rodriguez
must show that the district courts resolution of the claim was either debatable or
wrong. Laurson v. Leyba, 507 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Slack,
529 U.S. at 484). We conclude that no reasonable jurist could regard the merits of
the 2255 motion as debatable or wrong.
IV.
relief because we mistakenly decided the direct appeal. This argument has two
shortcomings: The claim was not part of the 2255 motion, 2 and our decision in
the direct appeal is law of the case. 3 For both reasons, any reasonable jurist would
recognize that we could not reverse the district courts denial of relief under
2255 even if we disagreed with the panels decision in the direct appeal.
V.
See Payton v. United States, 436 F.2d 575, 577 (10th Cir. 1970) (declining
to consider an appellate claim that had not been presented in the claimants
2255 motion).
3
See Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 549 (10th Cir. 2013) ([U]nder
law-of-the-case doctrine, courts ordinarily would refuse to reconsider arguments
presented in a 2255 motion that were raised and adjudicated on direct appeal.);
see also United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2011)
(declining to reconsider an argument raised in a 2255 motion that was decided
on direct appeal).
5
we had already decided the issue in the direct appeal. R. at 124. For this
statement, the district court cited United States v. Fennell, 207 F. Appx 916, 919
(10th Cir. 2006). Id. Mr. Rodriguez argues that reliance on Fennell was
misguided because he had not previously alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
We believe Mr. Rodriguez misunderstood the district courts citation of
Fennell. The district court did not question whether Mr. Rodriguez can allege
ineffective assistance of counsel under 2255. The court was simply expressing
its belief that Mr. Rodriguez was trying to relitigate an issue already decided. He
was. As noted above, Mr. Rodriguez is seeking a certificate of appealability in
part so that he can argue that the panel had incorrectly decided his direct appeal.
In these circumstances, no reasonable jurist could credit Mr. Rodriguezs
argument for reversal based on the district courts citation of Fennell.
VI.
A.
Mr. Rodriguez argues in part that his prior attorney had taken the wrong
approach in challenging the courts classification of his prior offense (simple
assault) as a crime of violence. She argued that the crime was divisible, and
Mr. Rodriguez alleges that the attorney should have argued that the crime was
indivisible. Mr. Rodriguezs allegation is misguided, and no reasonable jurist
could regard the attorneys approach as deficient or prejudicial.
1.
than the particular facts of the case. United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060,
1067 (10th Cir. 2009). The modified categorical approach is used when the
statute is ambiguous or broad enough to cover crimes that are both violent and
nonviolent. Id. In these circumstances, the court can use records from the prior
case to determine which part of the statute was charged. Id.
Selection of the approach turns on whether the prior offense is considered
divisible or indivisible. See Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.
Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013) (explaining that the modified categorical approach applies
to divisible statutes). A crime is considered divisible when it sets out the
elements in the alternative. Id. at 2281. A crime is indivisible when it provides
only a single set of elements. Id.
When Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced, we had already held that the
sentencing court could consult judicial records to determine whether a prior
conviction under the same Texas statute (Texas Penal Code 22.01) had involved
intentional conduct or recklessness. United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110,
1121-22 (10th Cir. 2008); 4 see also United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 397-
98 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that Texas Penal Code 22.01(a)(1) is divisible
because it covers three possible mental states).
When the pre-sentence report classified Mr. Rodriguez as a career offender,
his attorney objected. In the objection, the attorney treated the crime as
divisible, but argued that the offense should be considered nonviolent because
the plea petition had not identified the elements and the plea reflected only a
blanket acknowledgment of guilt. R. at 154. The district court rejected that
argument, and a Tenth Circuit panel upheld the sentence because the indictment
required intentional conduct in addition to recklessness. United States v.
Rodriguez, 528 F. Appx 921, 923-27 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
2.
Deficiency
Mr. Rodriguez alleges that his attorney should have argued at sentencing
and in the appeal that
!
the court could not refer to judicial documents from the prior
proceeding to determine whether the prior offense had involved
violence.
In Mr. Rodriguezs view, these arguments would have prevailed under Descamps
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Marrero v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2732 (2013) (mem.).
Mr. Rodriguezs allegation would not sway any reasonable jurist because
Descamps and Marrero did not affect our circuits method of distinguishing
between divisible and indivisible offenses. In Descamps, the Supreme Court
simply held that judicial documents could not be consulted when the crime
involves an indivisible statute. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283; see United States v.
Trent, 12-6283, slip op. at 17 (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 2014) (pending publication)
(stating that in Descamps, the Supreme Court did not suggest in any way that it
was retreating from its application of [the modified categorical approach] in
previous cases). And in Marrero, the Court simply remanded for reconsideration
in light of Descamps. Marrero, 133 S. Ct. at 2732. After Descamps and Marrero,
the ultimate question remains: Was the Texas Penal Statute 22.01 divisible or
indivisible? We held in the direct appeal that the offense was divisible. United
States v. Rodriguez, 528 F. Appx 921, 925 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
Mr. Rodriguez argues that his attorney should have taken a different
approach in light of Descamps and Marrero. Even in hindsight, no reasonable
jurist could regard defense counsels approach as deficient because the Supreme
Courts opinions in Descamps and Marrero did not address whether the prior
crime was divisible or indivisible.
As noted above, the Supreme Court did not face the divisibility of a statute
in Descamps. The issue did arise in the Third Circuits decisions in Marrero.
There, the issue was whether a Pennsylvania conviction for simple assault
10
Following Descamps, the First Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the
modified categorical approach (permitting consultation of state judicial
documents to identify the pertinent charge) when a state statute allowed either
intentional or reckless conduct to suffice for the mens rea. See United States
v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2014) (assault based on intentional, knowing,
or reckless conduct).
11
12
Mr. Rodriguez criticizes his attorney not only for the way that she addressed
the issue at sentencing and in her brief on direct appeal, but also for failing to cite
the Supreme Courts decisions in Descamps or Marrero. But she could not have
cited the cases in her briefs because they did not exist yet. 7
She did have an opportunity to address the decisions by submitting a letter
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), alerting the Tenth Circuit panel
to new authorities. But, that was unnecessary because the government had already
submitted two 28(j) letters, alerting the panel to both Descamps and Marrero.
Mr. Rodriguez argues that his attorney could have responded to the
governments 28(j) letters. Why would she have done that?
In the first letter, the government stated only that
!
Def.s Reply Br. at 5-6, United States v. Espinoza, 2012 WL 1878696 (5th Cir. May
14, 2012) (citations omitted).
7
The deadline for a reply brief in the direct appeal was June 3, 2013, which
was 17 days before the Supreme Courts decision in Descamps and 24 days before
the Courts memorandum decision in Marrero.
14
government had said, for she was arguing that the Texas statute involved a
nonviolent crime because the plea statement had not identified the relevant
statutory language.
Mr. Rodriguez also faults his attorney for failing to alert the Tenth Circuit
panel to the Supreme Courts memorandum decision in Marrero. We again
wonder why the attorney would have done that. Six days after Marrero was
issued, the government filed a second 28(j) letter, advising the Tenth Circuit panel
of the Supreme Courts memorandum decision. Letter from Robert Don Gifford to
Elizabeth Shumaker, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 12-6285 (10th Cir. July 3,
2013). The letter said little about the decision, for there was not much to say. Id.
The Supreme Courts discussion of the sentencing issue consisted of one
sentence, stating without explanation that the Court was vacating the judgment and
remanding for reconsideration of the week-old decision in Descamps. Marrero v.
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2732 (2013) (mem.).
Even if Mr. Rodriguezs attorney could have crafted an argument to respond
to the governments letter, she would not have had time to do so because the panel
decided the appeal within three hours of the governments Rule 28(j) letter.
In these circumstances, no reasonable jurist could regard the legal
representation as deficient for failure to argue that the Texas assault statute was
indivisible or to tell the sentencing judge or the appeal panel about Descamps or
Marrero.
15
3.
Prejudice
But, for the sake of argument, we may assume that the attorney should have
done all of that. Even then, Mr. Rodriguez would have had to prove a probability
of a different result if his attorney had taken a different position based on
Descamps or Marrero. Mr. Rodriguez could not convince any reasonable jurist
that he probably would have had a better outcome.
To determine whether the attorneys strategy was prejudicial, we project
what would have happened if the attorney had argued to the sentencing judge that
he could not review the state judicial records to identify the relevant statutory
language. The sentencing judge would have been obliged to reject that position in
light of Zuniga-Soto.
What would have happened on appeal if the attorney had raised Descamps
and Marrero? The same thing that did happen, for the Tenth Circuit panel was
alerted to both opinions and still upheld the sentence.
4.
Summary
16
C.
Mr. Rodriguez also contends that his attorney should have sought Supreme
Court review in the direct appeal. No reasonable jurist would find this contention
debatable for two reasons: (1) This contention did not appear in the 2255
17
See Payton v. United States, 436 F.2d 575, 577 (10th Cir. 1970) (declining
to consider an appellate claim that had not been presented in the claimants
2255 motion).
9
See Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 8 (1994) (per curiam) (holding that
there is no constitutional right to counsel in forums offering discretionary
review); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982) (per curiam) (holding
that because a habeas petitioner had no right to counsel in appealing to the state
supreme court, an attorneys failure to timely appeal could not have resulted in
denial of effective assistance of counsel).
10
The Court cannot tell which claims Mr. Rodriguez wants to add to his
2255 motion. It appears that he may be seeking to add the claims regarding his
attorneys failure to: (1) address Descamps and Marrero in a 28(j) letter, and (2)
file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Because we are
not sure what Mr. Rodriguez wants to add and is pro se, we liberally construe his
application for a certificate of appealability to address these issues in connection
with his appeal (as well as possible amendments to the 2255 motion). See
Sigala v. Bravo, 656 F.3d 1125, 1126 (10th Cir. 2011) (liberally construing an
application for a certificate of appealability in light of the claimants pro se
18
IX.
dismissing the appeal, we deny the request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
on the ground of mootness. See Johnson v. Keith, 726 F.3d 1134, 1136 (10th Cir.
2013) (denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground of mootness upon
denial of a certificate of appealability).
status).
19