1. US vs.

TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364

FACTS:
The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house
at Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the
services discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and
spliced the tubing to leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was
discovered by the gas company. The prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr.
Tambunting to court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.
RULING:
Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable
merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible
of being siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.
2. SIBAL v. VALDEZ

FACTS: The deputy sheriff of Tarlac attached and sold to Valdez the sugarcane
planted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for the redemption of the sugarcane.
Valdez said that it cannot be subject to redemption because it is a personal
property.

ISSUE: WON the sugarcane in question is a personal or real property.

HELD:Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products. The Supreme Court

of Louisiana provided that standing crops are considered as part of the land to
which they are attached but the immovability provided for is only one in abstract.
The existence of a right on the growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a
gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right
acquired therein.

-A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It

belongs to the lessee and may be sold by him.

-Act 1508 (Chattel Mortgage Law) recognize growing crops as personal property.

Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested, when produced by annual

cultivation, is not part of realty.

Paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by Sec. 450 of Code of
Civil Procedure and Act no. 1508 in the sense that for purposes of attachment and
execution and Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of
personal property.

Sibal v. Valdez

Facts:
On 11 May 1923, the deputy-sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of
execution in civil case 20203 of the CFI Manila (Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Leon
Sibal), levied an attachment on Leon Sibals 8 parcels of land for the sum of
P4,273.93. 2 months later, or on 30 July 1923, Macondray & Co., Inc., bought said
parcels of land, at the auction held by the sheriff of the Province of Tarlac. Within 1
year from the sale of said parcels of land, or on 24 September 1923, Sibal paid
P2,000 to Macondray for the account of the redemption price of said parcels of land,
without specifying which said amount was to be applied. The redemption price of
the parcels was reduced to P2,579.97 including interest.

On 29 April 1924, the deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of
execution in civil case 1301 of the Province of Pampanga (Emiliano J. Valdez vs.
Leon Sibal 1.), attached the personal property of Sibal located in Tarlac, among
which was included the sugar cane in question in the 7 parcels of land described in
the complaint. He also attached Sibals real property in Tarlac, including rights,
interest and participation therein, which consists of 11 parcels of land and a house
and camarin situated in one of said parcels. On 9-10 May 1924, the deputy sheriff
sold at public auction said personal properties to Emiliano J. Valdez, who paid
therefor the sum of P1,550, of which P600 was for the sugar cane. On 25 June 1924,
8 of the 11 parcels, including the camarin and the house were bought by Valdez at
the auction held by the sheriff for the sum of P12,200. The 3 remaining parcels were
released from attachment by virtue of claims presented by Cayugan and Tizon. On
the same date, Macondray sold and conveyed to Valdezfor P2,579.97 all of its rights

and interest in the 8 parcels of land acquired by it in connection with civil case
20203 of the CFI Manila.

On 14 December 1924, action was commenced in the CFI of the Province of Tarlac.
The plaintiff alleged that the deputy sheriff of Tarlac Province attached and sold to
Valdezthe sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on 7 parcels of land,
and that within 1 year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff ordered
to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to Valdezthe amount sufficient to cover the
price paid by the latter, with taxes and interests, and that Valdez refused to accept
the money and return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. After hearing and on 28 April
1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the defendant holding that
the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not subject to
redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal.

Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the Tribunal Supremo de
Espana as that growing crops may be considered as personal property

Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as "ungathered
products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code, which enumerates as real
property as "Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the
land or form an integral part of any immovable property." That article, however, has
received in recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa,
which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered as
personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil Jurisprudence of
Spain.) Thus, under Spanish authorities, pending fruits and ungathered products
may be sold and transferred as personal property. Also, the Supreme Court of Spain,
in a case of ejectment of a lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee was
entitled to gather the Products corresponding to the agricultural year because said
fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to the lessee. And further,
under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as amended, the mortgage of a piece of
land does not include the fruits and products existing thereon, unless the contract
expressly provides otherwise.

Manresa admits growing crops as personal property

Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section
334 of the Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
admits that growing crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal
property.

Paragraph 2, Article 344 of the Civil Code corresponds to Article 465 of the Civil
Code of Louisiana
Article 465 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, which corresponds to paragraph 2 of
article 334 of the Civil Code, provides: "Standing crops and the fruits of trees not
gathered, and trees before they are cut down, are likewise immovable, and are
considered as part of the land to which they are attached."
Louisiana jurisprudence: Growing crops mobilization by anticipation
Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut
down are considered as part of the land to which they are attached,' but the
immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on
or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to which the crop
is attached. The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by
anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad
the right acquired therein. Jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the
growing crop. (Citizens' Bank vs. Wiltz, 31 La. Ann., 244; Porche vs. Bodin, 28 La.
Ann., 761; Sandel vs. Douglass, 27 La. Ann., 629; Lewis vs. Klotz, 39 La. Ann., 267.;
as cited in Lumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector [106 La., 418], c.f. Citizens
Bankv. Wiltz [31 La. Ann., 244])

Louisiana jurisprudence: Standing crops as immovable or movable based on owned

and leased premises; seizure by creditors
Standing crops are considered as immovable and as part of the land to which they
are attached, and the fruits of an immovable gathered or produced while it is under
seizure are considered as making part thereof, and inure to the benefit of the
person making the seizure. But the evident meaning of these articles is, where the
crops belong to the owner of the plantation, they form part of the immovable, and
where it is seized, the fruits gathered or produced inure to the benefit of the seizing
creditor. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable.
It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and
it may be sold by his judgment creditors. (Porche vs. Bodin [28 La. An., 761])

Louisiana jurisprudence: Law cannot be interpreted result in absurd consequences

If crop necessarily forms part of the leased premises the result would be that it
could not be sold under execution separate and apart from the land. If a lessee
obtain supplies to make his crop, the factor's lien would not attach to the crop as a
separate thing belonging to his debtor, but the land belonging to the lessor would
be affected with the recorded privilege. The law cannot be construed so as to result
in such absurd consequences.

American jurisprudence: growing crops by yearly labor and cultivation personal

property
The settled doctrine followed in the State of California and other states in
connection with the attachment of property and execution of judgment is, that
growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal
property. All annual crops which are raised by yearly manurance and labor, and
essentially owe their annual existence to cultivation by man, may be levied on as
personal property. Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be
harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty. They are,
therefore, liable to voluntary transfer as chattels. It is equally well settled that they
may be seized and sold under execution.

Source of provisions on execution of judgment in Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190);

Growing crops are personal property
Section 450 and most of the other sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
the execution of judgments were taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of
California. Section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the property of a
judgment debtor which may be subjected to execution, and reads as "All goods,
chattels, moneys, and other property, both real and personal, shall be liable to
execution." The Supreme Court of California, under section 688 of the Code of Civil
Procedure of that state, to which the Code of Civil Procedure was pattered, has held,
without variation, that growing crops were personal property and subject to
execution.

Chattel Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal property

Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing crops are
personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All personal property shall be
subject to mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage
executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in
part provides that "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an
agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for
and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508 were enacted
on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property.

Personal property includes ungathered products; Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the

Civil Code modified by Act 190 and 1508

Paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act
No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned
in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property; or that in the
sense that, for the purposes of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of
the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal
property. In other words, the phrase "personal property" should be understood to
include "ungathered products." In the case at bar, the sugar cane in question was
personal property and was not subject to redemption.
3. Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon. Zeus Abrogar
GR No. 155076
January 13, 2009

FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking,
stealing, and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing and completing international
long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which
connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the
call is destined. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their
own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.

ISSUE
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft

HELD
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latters consent.

Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:

There be taking of Personal Property;

Said Personal Property belongs to another;
Taking be done with Intent to Gain;
Taking be done without the owners consent;
No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things
Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in Real
Property

Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in
the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property.
Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos; US v
Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same is not included in the enumeration
of Real Properties under the Civil Code.

The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject
to appropriation.

Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature which are brought under the
control of science, as Personal Property.

The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science
can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring
such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such
apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.

In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting
various equipment or apparatus to PLDTs telephone system, through which
petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using PLDTs
facilities constitute Subtraction.

Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is

capable of appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real properties.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are

personal property which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The
act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under the said article.

While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be
considered as personal property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT
since it could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities.

Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim
that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.

What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without
PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services &
businesses.

The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of
the theft were services and business of the offended party.