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Shell
The affirmative should defend a topical plan.
(INSERT APPROPRIATE T VIOLATION USING TOPICALITY
FILE)
Their interpretation is bad:
Plans are good: they are falsifiable and put a clear burden on
the negative to prove the plan is worse than the status quo or a
competitive counterplan any other advocacy is not stable.
Limits: the negative should have to disprove desirability of a
policy action implemented within the bounds of the resolution
otherwise, the floodgates are opened to an infinite number of
advocacies.
Limits are key to a worthwhile debate otherwise the negative is
not prepared, clash is impossible, and the round becomes a onesided lecture only a dialogic exchange can accrue educational
benefits.
Hanghj, University of Bristol Author, 08
[Thorkild Hanghj, author affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and
Advanced Media Materials, research the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and
Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol
and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education,
2008 (PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming,
University of Southern Denmark, p. 50-51 Available Online at
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_udda
nnelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)
Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of
issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this
way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate
scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate
within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a
magic circle (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy
between gaming and teaching that tends to dominate discussions of educational
games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and
games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of
knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee,
2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these
different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K [Ruth Lessl, Assistant
Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.
182-3)
The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be
shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid
about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the
subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually
happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order
or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is
that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought
to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric
that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some
basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It
may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit
to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and
some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism.
Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the
irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties
remain. For and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For
debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the
building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an
argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain
initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two
discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense
of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being
contested, and so on. They must also agreeand they do so simply by entering into
debatethat they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are
willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply
implicit in the act of argumentation.
ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate.
They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points
of difference.
Shell
1. Interpretationthe affirmative should defend a federal
government policy that ____
A. Colon means USFG is the Agent
Army Officer School 2004 (5-12, # 12, Punctuation The Colon and Semicolon,
http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)
A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is
an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The
company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one
or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you
learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues
for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is
fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's
motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam:
A formal
resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor .
(colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.
elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions . 1. An
agent doing the acting ---The United States in The United States should adopt a policy of free
trade. Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The
verb shouldthe first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb
combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though
governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for
example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs,
discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing
has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do,
then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to
perform the future action that you propose.
2. Vote Neg
A) Limits Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual
ground which is key to sustainable controversy without
sacrificing creativity or openness
Steinberg & Freeley 2008
*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L.
Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned
Decision Making pp45-
workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak
English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by
not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal
risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low
are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state
to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border , establish a national
identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become
teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned
citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do
Groups of concerned
citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to
express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but
without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry
state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A
gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posedsuch as "What can be
done to improve public education?"then a more profitable area of discussion is
opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution
step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate
propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative
assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of
something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with."
charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school
voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a
decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined . If we merely
talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we
are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable
basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is
mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear
argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical
force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or
physical force for a specific purpose. Although
What kind of physical force is being comparedfists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what?
A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective
teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3).
However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming
means-ends schemes.
Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources
2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative
activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational
social
actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for
future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most
extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in
means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Deweys concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that
primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003;
Rnssn, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of
deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes duties and
contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights (Fesmire, 2003:
implies an irrevocable difference between acts that are tried out in imagination and acts that are overtly tried out
political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular competing possible lines of action that are relevant to
the educational
value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the right
answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domainspecific processes of problem-based scenarios.
particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective,
Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept
into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what theyre for or against, says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor
reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting
dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of choice work. In this register, Emily Robertson observes, unlike
deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by
keeping an open mind about the opponents point of view.44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of HoustonDowntowns
Center for Public Deliberation state, Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue,
people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two
they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple levels. First,
the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or
constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence communitys debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for
example, the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural technology manifest in the
bridge projects online debating applications such as Hot Grinds. An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis
pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to
democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is
especially salient to consider when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of
specific debate initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes an invitation for those
outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort. According to Doney, bridge provides an environment for
Analytic Outreacha place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and
industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the web of trust access control modelaccess to minds outside the
intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to
respond to Doneys invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an analytic force multiplier. In reflexively pondering this
technological artifacts have politics.49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and
practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: [W]hy should this
thing (bridge) be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian
branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other
than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s.50 A debate scholar need not
agree with Lords full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to
organized crime) to understand that participation in the communitys Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not
necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about whats driving the
demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their
argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that
the technological
similar rationales driving Goodwin and Daviss EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering
attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states authority to control upstream states discharges
and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to
observed that since the invited debaters didnt have a dog in the fight, they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that
even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willards concept of argumentative epistemics to flesh out his
vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what
is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In
so doing, the differing, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts,
special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined.
public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate differs both from insular contest tournament
debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student
participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics
concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many
perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of
science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication
fields performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversya
different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticisms tendency to locate its
foundations in the English fields tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this
genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Daviss response to the EPAs institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public
debate proposal, shaped by Daviss dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an
undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team
in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, Academic debate began at least 2,400 years
ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.60
[logoi] are present about every thing, opposed to each other, and further, that humans could measure the relative soundness of
knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the weaker argument stronger to activate the generative aspect
of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagorass wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal
push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of coming together deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social
bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking
senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with
interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective
action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of
attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the
frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of
Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also
brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence communitys
theoretical faith.
Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence
deliberative alliance
building. In this vein, Howard Universitys participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by
analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of
historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Daviss dual-focus vision. On
the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley Colleges tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in
the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand,
Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPAs public
debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehningers and Wayne Brockriedes vision of total debate programs that blend
switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the
tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Daviss dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that
Greene and Hicks would find disconcertingnotions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using words as weapons70there is little
doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly
from the intelligence communitys eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially
evident in light of the EPAs commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane
suggest
rhetoric in a translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while
science itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent
on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of rhetoric. As taught by
make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fools errand. But to gauge from Robert Harimans recent
literature, philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or less appreciated.79 Th is
essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical traditionthose dealing with and
can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for
cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our times most daunting
challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical
situations characterized by an endemic surplus of heterogeneous content.
deliberation
Definitions
Resolved
Resolved expresses intent to implement a plan
American Heritage Dictionary 2000, www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?
term=resolved
Colon
The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon the
USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters
Websters Guide to Grammar and Writing 2000,
http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand
by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on If the introductory phrase
preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real
business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.
USfg
Federal Government means the central government in
Washington D.C.
Encarta 2K
Should
Should requires we perform the actions of the following verb,
its a necessity
Cambridge Dictionary 13 (published by Cambridge University Press, Should
[American Version], 2013, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/americanenglish/should_1?q=should)
should
modal verb (DUTY) /d, d/
Definition
used to express that it is necessary, desirable, or important to perform the action of the
following verb
2NC Blocks
Critique Fails
Critiques get bogged down in theoretical jargon that distract
from efforts for true political change we must engage in the
rhetoric of policymaking.
McClean Rutgers Philosophy Professor 1
[David E., Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American
Philosophy, The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion
%20papers/david_mcclean.htm]
Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our
Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the
eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany
of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me
hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy
prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of
homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to
suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group,
those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a
disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step
program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies"
wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies
are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what
shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be
protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined
(heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak
our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty").
As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been
'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either
philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of
economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political
relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts
a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice
produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The
Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost
between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for
lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to
consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."
Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left,
which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good
reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure
culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the
barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything
like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge
and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this
country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And
Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural
Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain.
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they
bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge
public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our
country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X;
the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace
and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the
American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the
"beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet
diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan
ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be
part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not
seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of
social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create
from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who
has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move
past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting"
but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it
possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the
character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How
can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system
with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a
"law of peoples?"
The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade
theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international
markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics
of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our
arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social
institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but
where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often
unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making
honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the
actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us
from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are
talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they
proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures
from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called
"managerial class."
Simulation
Simulating government discourses allows students to synthesize
theory and fact creating useful real-world knowledge.
Esberg and Sagan, special assistant to the director at New York University's and
Professor at Stanford, Center 12
(Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on.
International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott
Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for
International Security and Cooperation NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION:
Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy, The Nonproliferation Review,
19:1, 95-108 accessed 5-7-13, RRR
Dialogue
Their interpretation results in a monologic dialogue where
debate becomes a one-sided lecture only a dialogic exchange
can accrue educational benefits.
Hanghj, University of Bristol Author, 08
[Thorkild Hanghj, author affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and
Advanced Media Materials, research the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and
Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol
and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education,
2008 (PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming,
University of Southern Denmark, p. 50-51 Available Online at
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_udda
nnelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)
Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of
issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this
way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate
scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate
within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a
magic circle (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy
between gaming and teaching that tends to dominate discussions of educational
games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and
games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of
knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee,
2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these
different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a
central assumption in Bakhtins dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of
communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin,
1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a
centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that
any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: Every
concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as
centripetal forces are brought to bear (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an
example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going
negotiation of truths between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: Truth is
not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between
people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction
(Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies
centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game
involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of
the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure.
Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and
create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating
and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of
enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these
centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students
game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that
combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student
presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within
the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is
too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game
facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or facts of a
game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities
and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the
duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between
monological and dialogical forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the
monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns
anything new from the students, despite Socrates ideological claims to the contrary
(Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when someone who knows and
possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error, where a
thought is either affirmed or repudiated by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a:
81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that
are able to expand upon students existing knowledge and collaborative construction of
truths (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtins term dialogic is
both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other
utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an
ideal to be worked for against the forces of monologism (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this
project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the
same time, I agree with Wegerif that one of the goals of education, perhaps the most
important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself (Wegerif, 2006: 61).
Decisionmaking
Critical frameworks destroy decision-making skills we become
intellectually invested in utopian alternatives that lack political
traction.
Strait, George Mason University, and Wallace, George Washington University
Communications Professors, 7
[L. Paul and Brett, The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making,
http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/2007/The%20Scope%20of
%20Negative%20Fiat%20and%20the%20Logic%20of%20Decision%20Making.pdf, p.
A-5)
absolute truth, but merely that a team making that argument did the better debating.
When it comes to education about content, the number of times someone will change
their personal convictions because of something that happens in a debate round is
extremely low, because everyone knows it is a game. On the other hand with cognitive
skills like the decision-making process which is taught through argument and debate,
repetition is vital .The best way to strengthen decision-makings cognitive thinking skills
is to have students practice them in social settings like debate rounds. Moreover, a lot of
the decision-making process happens in strategy sessions and during research periods
debaters hear about a particular affirmative plan and are tasked with developing the best
response. If they are conditioned to believe that alternate agent counterplans or utopian
philosophical alternatives are legitimate responses, a vital teaching opportunity will have
been lost.
Informed Citizenry
Critique disavows our responsibility to being an informed
citizenry their framework arguments are intrinsically
apolitical.
Lundberg University of North Carolina Communications Professor, 10
[Christian 0., January 2010, The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the
Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,
http://academia.edu/968401/LundbergOnDebate, p. 311, accessed 7/5/13,
ALT]
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating
debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of
debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited
to speechas indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of
public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of
modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of
increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and
technological change, outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and
ever-expanding insular special-interest and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling
solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If
democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the
challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenrys capacities can change,
which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The
Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on deducation (Dewey 1988, 63,
154). Debate provides an indispensable form of education in the modern articulation of
democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and
be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the
evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly
information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward
policies that matter the most to them.
Critical Thinking
Debate is key to critical thinking skills - arguing opposing points
of view enables a self-reflexive thought process that checks
dogmatism and ideological rigidity.
Keller, University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration Professor, et.
al, 01 [Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas
E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of
Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, 2001
(Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge
through active learning, Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001,
EBSCOhost)
The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting
competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to
social policy. Like other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "realworld" activities, issue-oriented debates actively engage students in course content.
Debates also allow students to develop and exercise skills that may translate to political
activities, such as testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, debates may help to stimulate critical thinking by shaking students free
from established opinions and helping them to appreciate the complexities involved in
policy dilemmas. Relationships between Policy Practice Skills, Critical Thinking, and
Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the
development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson,
1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues,
gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and
creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended
to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing
coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 5758), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice
activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values
inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative
merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and
positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner;
political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and positiontaking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These
policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987;
Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging
underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving
at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987).
Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values
underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a
position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share
much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in
Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from
opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own
position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each
of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey,
the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the
development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas
to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in
social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from
discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of
ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have
contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the
ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry,
1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism,
rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's
opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the
inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the
capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a
coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by
bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then
integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning
process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in
substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by
Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation
of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to
debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing
perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to
yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue
Empathy
Using a statis point to debate multiple sides of an issue
humanizes people with opposing views and creates empathy.
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 High
School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating
Possibilities for Political Learning http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1034&context=theses)
very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive
society. With humankinds next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism
backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any
other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage
rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming
and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution
will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will
invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current
course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical
solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face
the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and
tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin
to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing,
and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and
more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism?
How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power?
These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our
conception of education. Well need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth
to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first
century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic
engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself
well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a
higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban
setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity
such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at
a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear
understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other
affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often
ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on
this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice
to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic
engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community
conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been
around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of
Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically
that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete
expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic
engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, lets not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic
engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate
around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some
will say that todays youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement.
Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement.
And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and todays youth. But
one thing is for sure;
valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world . Instead of criticizing this judgment,
perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, There is a tragic flaw in our
precious Constitution, and I dont know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.
Maybe the youths rejection of American politics isnt a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response
to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster
fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twentyfirst century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our
challenge becomes
convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have
the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political
meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social
justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a
subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define
itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new
points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working
in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at
an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making
better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to
different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the
natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and
service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them.
However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart
our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.
Debate=Policy
The resolution was created for two distinct sides to determine the
desirability of policy action.
PARCHER 2001 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February,
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)
(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To
make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into
constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at
*Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution.
2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question.
American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion,
as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly
inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write
a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people
coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are
empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community
attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction . They focus on
issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for
debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution.
That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic
committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution
adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or
decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy
debate.
AT Exclusionary
C/A Limits their interpretation excludes the rest of the
tournament.
Effective subversion occurs within the limits of the game, not
from the outside.
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K [Ruth Lessl, Assistant
Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.
180)
Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything,
they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast
supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to
certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable
behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the
boundaries of behaviorif they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their
skepticism and iconoclasmthey need first to be firm believers in something. Which
is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not
support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed,
the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For
example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but
(what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the
freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But
"because the new rebel is a skeptic"because he and/or she cannot bring him
and/or herself to will something definite and limited "he and/or she cannot be a
revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way
when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical
skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge
among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To
embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to
embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment.
Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to
embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats
one's purposesto tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and closemindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists'
refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary
impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not
rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a
particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny
themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the
terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of
the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the antidemocrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a
true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support
political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To
generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or
exclude those who reject civility and democracy.
math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would reply, because some old,
dead guy said so. Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything
and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with
actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student understands the why. In that case, one immediately admits that
there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up
as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself,
which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such questioning. Even in fields that do not admit of
mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can
give no mathematically sure reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more
productive than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not
foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is
acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and
forever testable. In short, authoritative words may or may not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words
were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the
law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it
was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit.
Bakhtins embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories the regime propounded,
but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives
on it, demands it. It follows from Bakhtins argument that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily
weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided
that defenders have been willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all
objections perfectly we are often convinced with qualifications, with a just in case, with loopholes. 320 However,
they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive
power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing
quotation marks. An authoritative word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as
a voice speaking the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in
which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by
Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the
authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he
will not follow it and will do wrong. Much of the moral complexity of this book lies in Hucks self-questioning, as he does
what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how
much of our own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition
without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a
wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be
different from, and wiser than, our professed beliefs. our own authoritative words The basic power of an authoritative
voice comes from its status as the one that everyone hears. Everyone
Thinking of ourselves as oppositional, we often forget that we, too, have our own
authoritative discourse and must work to remember that, in a world of difference, authority
may not extend to those unlike us. The testable authoritative voice: we hear it always, and
though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its nonauthoritarian power is based 321 above all on its
ubiquity. In
a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still
significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one . It demands not
adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an
authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction. We have all these accounts of
Soviet dissidents say, Solzhenitsyn who tell their story as a narrative of rethinking (to use Christian Knoellers
phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise some questions that by their nature
could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If
silence does not succeed in ending private questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of
Soviet dissidents is typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied
by guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether. Vulnerability
accompanies too much power. But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual development, an
authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic community), still sounds,
still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative
voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they
are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the
authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we see some of the
reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our teachers and the
new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a great extent an
innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in
the process acquired the intonations of authority. In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some
point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it with the sign
of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue goes on. At a later
point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I
had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing
voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to
our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and
verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. It is always a difficult moment when we realize that our
own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its 322 own terms, not like
our parents voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents authoritative words
may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the
same thing we did question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them
was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not sound so rigid? We all
think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities). Dialogue, Laughter, And Surprise Bakhtin viewed the
whole process of ideological (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless
often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often
painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on The
Theme of
the Rebel and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were
the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther,
who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be
so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely
beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He
knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often
enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that
one knows the root cause of evil: isnt that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan
were rebelling
victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the
same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the
unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power . His favorite
writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of
the insulted and humiliated, have seized power unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin
surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had.
Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has
borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps
exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If ones ideological becoming is understood
as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth , one is likely to want to impose
that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much
the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast, if ones rebellion against an
authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to more of a
self-check if it does. Then one questions ones own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become what one has
opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. Laughter at oneself invites the perspective of the other. Laughter
is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at ones opponents as the unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to
them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to
say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I
must measure it, test it, against my own experience. Dialogue
AT Creativity
Not at the expense of limits the result is a pedagogically
bankrupt discussion.
We can incorporate their offense but they cant incorporate
ours.
Steinberg, University of Miami, and Freeley, John Caroll University, 8
[Austin L. and David L., 2/13/2008, Argumentation and Debate: Critical
Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 12th edition,
http://teddykw2.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/argumentation-anddebate.pdf, p. 45]
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and
placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly
defined. If we merely talk about homelessness or abortion or crime or global
warming we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable
basis for argument. For example, the statement Resolved: That the pen is mightier than
the sword is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we
take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force
for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of
writing or physical force for a specific purpose.
Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too
broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are
we concerned withpoems, novels, government documents, website development,
advertising, or what? What does effectiveness mean in this context? What kind of
physical force is being comparedfists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or
what? A more specific question might be, Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by
our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis? The
basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as Resolved: That
the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania. Negative
advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a
better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative
interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over
competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very
engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on
a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
AT K of Fairness
Conflicts are inevitable our attempt to establish procedural
fairness is necessary to the decision-making process EVEN IF
substantive fairness cannot be achieved.
Menkel-Meadow, 4 (Carrie, Georgetown University Law Center, 2004, From
Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute
Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context)
If recent world events have taught us anything, it is that conflict and conflicting notions
of the good are inevitable for human beings. So, while many of us seek ways to establish
more universal notions of the good toward which to direct our human efforts, it has,
sadly, become, in the early years of the twenty-first century, more common for us to
assume there will be basic value differences among us. We should, then, spend our time
thinking about how we can at least develop fair and considerate processes for
communicating enough with each other so that we may act with the most benefit and the
least harm. Some offer hopes that "the rule of law" can be universalized as a principled
way to resolve conflicts, domestically and internationally. Others of us see law as often
conflictual, indeterminate, and politically contested or manipulable, or so focused on the
need for regulation of the aggregate that it cannot always do 'Justice" in particular cases.
Legal justice is not always actual justice. The social philosopher Stuart Hampshire has
recently concluded, in his book Justice Is Conflict, that while we may never agree about
what the content of universal justice is "because there never will be such a harmony,
either in the soul or in the city," we might instead come closer to recognizing that
"fairness in procedures for resolving conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness, and
that it is acknowledged as a value in most cultures, places, and times: fairness in
procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature."2 Hampshire goes on to
say-in words eloquent enough to make one feel proud of what has constituted at least
half of a lifetime's work of theorizing and practice 10 conflict resolution-that [b]ecause
there will always be conflicts between conceptions of the good, moral conflicts, both in
the soul and in the city, there is everywhere a well- recognized need for procedures of
conflict resolution, which can replace brute force and domination and tyranny.3 The
existence of such an institution [for conflict resolution], and the particular form of its
rules and conventions of procedure are matters of historical contingency. There is no
rational necessity about the more specific rules and conventions determining the criteria
for success in argument in any particular institution, except the overriding necessity that
each side in the conflict should be heard putting its case ("audi alteram par/em '].4 [T]he
skillful management of conflicts [is] among the highest of human skills. 5 Hampshire
identifies several principles which are crucial to understanding the importance of
procedural justice. 1. Conflict is human and ubiquitous. Conflict is actually necessary for
defining what is important about oneself and the polity to which individuals belong, and
for instigating important social change (e.g., the elimination of slavery, the movements
toward racial and gender equality, as well as increased democratic participation in many
nations). Agreement on all human values is unlikely given human diversity, deep-seated
cultural norms, and the variation of human needs and desires. 2. Even if we cannot all
agree on substantive norms and goals, we can probably agree on some processes for
making decisions that will enable us to go forward and act. We might have some virtually
universal ideas about procedural fairness, like the ability to "make a case" and "be heard"
and to have impartiality and fairness govern any decision-making process. Some might
go further and suggest that some participation in the process by which decisions are
made is essential to the legitimacy of a process (with or without commitments to
democratic political regimes).
Early in her essay, and again at the end, Roberts-Miller shakes hands with her opponent and acknowledges that there is a
legitimate grievance against agonistic rhetoric. The basic problem with valuing agonistic rhetoric is that one seems at the
One
needs a way to distinguish between agonistic rhetoric that is merely succeed-at-all-costs and-never-give-in combat and agonistic rhetoric that uses competition and struggle to
accomplish something greater than simple conquest. She is not sure that she has a satisfying way of addressing
same time to be promoting mere wrangling. The opponents ofagonistic rhetoric have opposed it on these grounds.
this problem, but she cites a passage from John Locke in which the essence of wrangling is that the wranglers are
incapable of changing their minds, of being convinced by opposing arguments. Later in her essay, in her gloss on a passage
from Arendt, she develops this important feature of agonistic discourse: "It is not asymmetric manipula- tion ofothers ... it
must be a world into which one enters and by which one can be changed" (593). This is a familiar condition by which
argumentation theorists attempt to delineate just what argumentation is. If
It
has not been a way for them to gain a hearing, or a way to negotiate, or a way to resolve
conflict, or a way to learn, or a way to gain self-knowledge. They have succumbed to the
threat that Socrates feared for his own interlocutors-misology , the hatred of arguments-because of the
experience of being constantly defeated by them and by those who wield them with
virtuosity. This is not a problem that can be directly addressed by theorizing and argumentation, although the theory
in general, or even in court and with lawyers, and perhaps in education-is to have been outdone by argumentation.
of argumentation is quite an important part of it. It requires rather a practical kind of wisdom and virtuous action. When
Socrates breaks off the argument with young Theaetetus in Plato's dialogue of that name, it is because he understands
Theaetetus and his condition, the stage of his formation, and the threat of misology, and because he has the virtue to act
on the younger man's behalf, to keep a space open for his individual development. One of the less noted objections to
agonistic rhetoric is that it damages those who are defeated by it, that it creates an association between reason and failure,
reason and psychological pain. It would be interesting to hear Roberts-Miller address this objection. What would it take
not only to theorize a logical distinction between agonistic rhetoric and wrangling but also to make use ofthe distinction in
our practice and teaching? The central move in Roberts-Miller's deployment of Arendt's think- ing is to accept the
distinction between agonistic and collaborative rhetoric but to present arguments that reverse the value hierarchy that the
split sets up: to replace "much ofour dislike ofconflict with a dislike of consensus." Here she gives us Arendt at her most
Heideggerian. Human
Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively
fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have
their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The
affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams
have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous,
taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.
Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to
the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages,
counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows
for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively
balanced argumentative table.
When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also
undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side
excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant
(Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a
fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that
takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links
to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that
a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical
thinking not be silenced.
Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular
negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to
meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to understand what went on
and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan
furthers this line of reasoning:
Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they
enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition
is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument,
discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any
kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us
to a common causeIf we are to be equalrelationships among equals must find
expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).
Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that
maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither
state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the
topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is
oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically
suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the
affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role
to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective counter-word and
undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other
substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
AT Roleplaying
No link defending policy does not necessitate pretending to be
the USfg fiat is merely an intellectual heuristic for imagining
the enactment and consequences of a plan does not kill
agency.
Michael Eber 5, former Director of Debate at Michigan State University, Everyone
Uses Fiat, April 8th,
http://www.opensubscriber.com/message/edebate@ndtceda.com/1077700.html
AT Agency
Policy debates are empowering.
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 High
School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating
Possibilities for Political Learning http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1034&context=theses]
A debate education becomes a way for students to think of themselves as activists and
critics of society. This is a practice of empowerment. Warner and Brushke (2001)
continue to highlight how practicing public speaking itself may be vitally empowering.
Speaking in a highly engaged academic environment where the goal is analytical victory
would put many on edge. Taking academic risks in a debate round, however, yields
additional benefits. The process of debating allows students to practice listening and
conceiving and re-conceiving ideas based on in-round cooperation. This cooperation,
even between competing teams, establishes respect for the process of deliberation. This
practice may in turn empower students to use speaking and listening skills outside the
debate round and in their local communities skills making students more comfortable
talking to people who are different from them (Warner and Brushke, 2001, p. 4-7).
Moreover, there is inherent value in turning the traditional tables of learning around.
Reversing the traditional classroom demonstrates students taking control of their own
learning through the praxis of argumentation. Students learn to depend on themselves
and their colleagues for information and knowledge and must cooperate through the
debate process. Taken together, policy debate aids academic achievement, student
behavior, critical thinking, and empowers students to view themselves as qualified
agents for social change.
AT Privilege DA
Forcing confessions out of individuals fails to collectivize action
that can change broader structures of domination Instead it
bestows cultural capital to those least privileged creating a
perverse game to be the most oppressed.
Andrea Smith, Ph.D., co-founder of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, UC
Riverside Associate Professor, 2013, Geographies of Privilege, Unsettling the Privilege of
Self-Reflexivity, Kindle
In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself
participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc.
privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: I am so and so, and I have x privilege. It was
never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in
question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It
AT Discourse/Reps
Placing representations and discourse first trades off with
concrete political change
Taft-Kaufman, 95 (Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And
Dramatic Arts, at Central Michigan University, Southern Communication Journal,
Spring, proquest)
Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of
critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines
Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all
social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens
speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion,
Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual
impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst
terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly
ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's
conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of
the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from
the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of
ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that
require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive
without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material
circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete
social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of
marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences
are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example,
argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p.
571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of
education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299).
West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about
"Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170).
Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy
about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from
marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete
circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for
postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new
recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not
address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism,
sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are
living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences.
Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a
cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and
attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful
of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and
the budgets that fuel them.
AT: Ontology/Epistemology
No prior questions
Owen 2 David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton,
655-7
Commenting on the philosophical turn in IR, Wver remarks that [a] frenzy for words like epistemology and ontology often
signals this philosophical turn, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed
or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one
respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve
recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such
reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical
positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a
confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger
strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of
empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a
particular image of disciplinary debate in IRwhat might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) the Highlander
viewnamely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical
alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view
because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one
theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and
epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially
vicious circle arises.
State Good
While there are important variations in the way international relations scholars use governmen- tality theory, for the
purpose of my argument I identify two broad trajectories.2 One body of scholar- ship uses governmentality as a heuristic
tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects in the contexts where they are
deployed; the other adopts this notion as a descriptive tool to theorize the globally oppressive features of international
methodology that privileges a relational approach and focuses on practice;3 William Walters has advocated consider- ing
governmentality as a research program rather than as a depiction of discrete systems of power;4 and Michael Merlingen
has criticized the downplaying of resistance and the use of governmentality as interchangeable with liberalism.5 Many
other scholars have engaged in con- textualized analyses of governmental tactics and resistance. Oded Lowenheim has
shown how responsibilization has become an instrument for governing individual travelers through travel warnings as
well as for developing states through performance indicators;6 Wendy Larner and William Walters have questioned
accounts of globalization as an ontological dimension of the present and advocated less substantialized accounts that focus
on studying the discourses, processes and practices through which globalization is made as a space and a political
economy;7 Ronnie D. Lipschutz and James K. Rowe have looked at how localized practices of resistance may engage and
transform power relations;8 and in my own work, I have studied the deployment of disciplinary and governmental tools
for reforming governments in peacekeeping operations and how these practices 9 were hijacked and resisted and by their
targets. Scholars
political action has more to do with playing with the cards that are dealt to us to produce
practical effects in specific contexts than with building idealized new totalities where
perfect conditions might exist. The political ethics that results from non-substantialist ontological positions is
one that privi- leges modest engagements and weights political choices with regard to the consequences and dis-
tributive effects they may produce in the context where they are made rather than based upon their universal normative
aspirations.13
8. Provide a way for people to see themselves as actors and to be actors. Our
consider a range of actions that different actors (such as individuals, small groups, nonprofits, businesses, schools, and
government) can take, they are more likely to see that solutions to public problems can come in many and varied ways.
They are also more likely to see themselves as actors. When a public conversation ends with analy- sis of the
issue and does not progress to an intentional conversation about action steps, it reinforces the idea that the possibilities
for addressing the issue are entirely outside the room. The final session of a study circle gives participants a chance to
follow this natural progression, consider a range of possible actions, and decide which action steps they see as most
important. Then they present those action prior- ities at a large-group meeting (often referred to as an action forum) that
gives all the small groups a chance to pool their ideas and move forward on a range of actions. It is also important to keep
the results of the deliberative dialogue process in the public eye. This helps people see the value of their participa- tion.33
Some communities have developed benchmarks for change to help par- ticipants and the larger community measure the
progress they are making. This recognition of change encourages sustained efforts and also inspires broader
participation. We have found that the marriage of community organizing to deliberative dialogue is essential for bringing
this principle to life. While it is possible for people in small-scale engagement processes to consider possible action steps, a
diverse, large-scale process opens up many more avenues for action that can address institutional, community-wide, and
policy dimensions of issues.34 9. Connect to government, policymaking, and governance. A common prac- tice in public
talk processes is to ask participants to report the results of their deliberation to elected officials. Yet if the process does not
include a way to establish trust and mutuality between citizens and government, it will fall short of helping them work
together more effectively. Some engagement processes include ways to capture themes and convey them to public officials.
Identify- ing areas of common ground among members of the public can be especially
Deliberative Dialogue to Expand Civic Engagement 127 useful
to legislators who are looking for ways to reframe adversarial public pol- icy debates. But the more effective input
processes go one step further: they involve the policymakers as participants on an equal basis in the dialogue. Democratic
conversation between citizens and government has always been central to the ideal (if not practice) of
democracy. A current-day example is Benjamin Barbers call for horizontal conversations among citizens rather than
the more usual vertical conversation typical of communication between citizens and elites.35 This type of process
makes it more likely that the input will be meaningful to officials, and thus acted on. It creates a
context of reci- procity and relationship building that makes for a nonthreatening way for pub- lic officials to reevaluate
their own perspectives on policy issues, and
meaningful way. In Oklahoma, the League of Women Voters and several other organizations organized a statewide
study circle program on criminal justice and corrections. The study circles occurred in thirteen communities across the
state and included state legislators. The involvement of legislators in the deliberative dialogue helped break a longstanding deadlock on corrections policy and helped create a rad- ical revision of the criminal justice system.36
The practice of doing politics as a form of religiosity is a highly conservative one. As Marx argued, religion was the opium
of the people - this
personal ones - there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement . It appears that
theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of
awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the celebration of differences at
marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people
While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or
impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement
or organisation. Governments Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global
ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed
the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of
debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, healing the scar of Africa, the war on terror and the war against
climate insecurity. Tony Blair argued in the Guardian last week that foreign policy is no longer foreign policy (Timothy
Garten Ash, Like it or Loath it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for, 26 April 2007), this is certainly
true. 4 Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geo-political interests with a clear framework for policy-making,
no longer seems so important. The government is down-sizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where
people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long-term, and provides more resources to the
Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UKs
attempt to develop an Ethical Foreign Policy in the 1990s an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic
interests for values and the promotion of Britains caring and sharing identity. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on
the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on
the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-termist policy-making, as was seen in the value-based interventions
from Bosnia to Iraq (see Blairs recent Foreign Affairs article, A Battle for Global Values, 86:1 (2007), pp.7990).
Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political
agenda for - the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere the freedom
from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution
has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making based on a clear political programme to
the ambitious assertion of global causes saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending
war but solving the causes of conflict etc of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account
for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the US or
the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of
the UN, the UK, the civilised world, NATO or the EU are on the line in wars of choice from the war on terror to the war
on global warming lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of Realpolitik
than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection,
even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or cohere political
programmes. As Baudrillard suggests, without a connection to the represented masses, political leaders are as open to
ridicule and exposure as the 5 Emperor with no clothes (In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York:
Semiotext(e), 1983, for example). It
are more concerned with our reflectivity the awareness of our own ethics and
values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which
theoretical frameworks they agreed with most and they replied mostly Critical theory and Constructivism despite the fact
that they thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical
preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals than about how theory might be
used to understand and engage with the world.
AT: Exclusive
The state is not innately exclusionary invoking nationhood can
vitalize and sustain civic engagement as well as relativize
internal differences.
Brubaker 4
Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation:
Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2,
www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf
In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, nation can
work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the rhetoric of
the contemporary European far right (la France oux Francais, Deutschland den
Deutshchen). Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally inclusive way.3
It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of the nation, inclusively
defined to include all citizensand perhaps all long-term residentsof the state. To
invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to transcend or at least relativize internal
differences and distinctions. It is an attempt to get people to think of themselves to
formulate their identities and their interestsas members of that nation, rather than as
members of some other collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical
resource, though it is not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and
humanities in the United States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such
invocations of nationhood. They are often seen as depasse, parochial, naive, regressive,
or even dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, nation is a
suspect category.
Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And
often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance,
xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign
policy. Unspeakable horrorsand a wide range of lesser evilshave been perpetrated in
the name of the nation, and not just in the name of ethnic nations, but in the name of
putatively civic nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for
the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally
wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of
imagined communities as wellin the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith.
In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our timethe sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put
it, nationalism is the starkest political shame of the 20th-century there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the
widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category nation was to economic, political, and
cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category,
and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4
The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The
empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages,
images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to cage (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic,
cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning
problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted
an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous
move beyond the nation-state. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe workedand were intended
to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at
the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The short twentieth
century concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale
nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood.
Can one speak of an unprecedented porosity of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects
especially with regard to the movement of peoplesocial technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of
control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated
technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The worlds poor who seek
to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 301,
267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to
the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today on balance slightly less intensive than those of the
later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they
managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clearcontrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest
that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to
regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domainssuch as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behaviorthe regulatory grip of
the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 4912).
The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from methodological nationalism (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002;
Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)the tendency to take the nation-state as equivalent to society, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the
expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be
overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks.
But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so
much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled as it often iswith the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it
serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for
better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power.
The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state,
should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics
celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations.
One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the
nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since
membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the
cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree
with this point. No matter how open and joinable a nation isa point to which I will return belowit is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed,
as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond
the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic
resources.9
The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-statethe multiculturalist critiqueitself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a
homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact
nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11).
But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to
cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties.
In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary
American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who
has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not
only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good
reasonsat least in the American contextfor cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who
defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad
I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They
can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive
social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the
development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy.
First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is
sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens, and
therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument shares
the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies allegedly
need; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with largely
passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in functionalist
form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that does not make
it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It can help
generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity
groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is conceived as a deep
horizontal comradeship. Identification with fellow members of this imagined
community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my problems, for
which I have a special responsibility.12
Patriotic identification with ones countrythe feeling that this is my country, and my
governmentcan help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than disengagement
from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of responsibility for such
actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them; it may even generate powerful
emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie and motivate opposition to
government policies. Patriotic commitments are likely to intensify rather than attenuate
such emotions. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, you can feel shame over your
countrys behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your country.13 Patriotic
commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate and sustain civic
engagement
The state remains one of the central and most persistent problems of radical politics.
Revolutions in the past have attempted to seize state power with the view to its eventual
withering away; however, the result has often been a strengthening and expansion of
the state, and with it a repression of the very revolutionary forces that sought to
control it. This is the problem that I have termed the place of powerthe structural
imperative of the state to perpetuate itself even in moments of revolutionary upheaval
(see Newman 2001). Alain Badiou also sees this problem as being of fundamental
importance: More precisely, we must ask the question that, without a doubt, constitutes
the great enigma of the century: why does the subsumption of politics, either through
the form of the immediate bond (the masses), or the mediate bond (the party) ultimately
give rise to bureaucratic submission and the cult of the State? (2005: 70) In other
words, perhaps there is something in the political forms that revolutions have taken in
the past that led to the perpetuation of the state. We might recall that this was the same
problem that classical anarchists during the nineteenth century confronted in their
debates with Marx. Anarchists like Mikhail Bakunin warned of the dangers of a workers
revolution that sought not to dismantle the state, but to seize control of it and use it to
complete the revolution. He predicted that this would end up in the emergence of a new
bureaucratic class of technocrats who would exploit and oppress workers and peasants,
much in the same way as the old class system did (Bakunin 1973: 266). Moreover, the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the political and ideological conflict between
liberal-democracy and totalitarianism, has allowed us to confront, for the first time, the
specific problem of state power. In other words, liberal-democracy and Communism
merely served as the ideological masks of the state. These fictions have now fallen away
and the true face of sovereignty has been laid bare. This dull visage is merely one of
naked power: a power that no longer tries to justify itself legally or normatively; a power
that now operates more or less with total impunity in the name of guaranteeing our
securityor, to be more, precise, creating a permanent state of insecurity in order to
legitimize its existence. Indeed, we might say that the war on terrorismwith its
permanent state of emergency and warmerely operates as the states latest and
flimsiest ideological fiction, a desperate attempt by the state to disguise its absence of
legitimate foundation. In its new security mode, the liberal-democratic state is
becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the authoritarian police state. As Giorgio
Agamben argues, the modern state now has the provision of securityor some illusion
of securityas its sole purpose. The guarantee of security has become, in other words,
the ultimate standard of the states political legitimacy.
Topic Specific
On April 20, 2004, the 16 member Oceans Commission, appointed by President Bush,
issued a report detailing the deteriorating condition of the nation's coastal waters. The
Commission's chairman, Adm. James Watkins, commented at the release of the report:
Our oceans and coasts are in serious trouble [1, p. A-15]. The Commission's report,
along with numerous other studies including the recently released Pew Oceans
Commission report America's Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change, argue
for new approaches and actions to mitigate and correct these deteriorating conditions.
Along these lines, the Pew Oceans Commission called for a new era of ocean literacy
that links people to the marine environment [2, p. 91]. The Commission further argues
that there is a need to provide the public with understandable information about the
structure and functioning of coastal and marine ecosystems, how ecosystems affect daily
lives, and how we affect ecosystems [2, p. 11]. Similarly, the Report of the US
Commission on Ocean Policy states: To successfully address complex ocean- and
coastal-related issues, balance the use and conservation of marine resources, and realize
future benefits of the ocean, an interested, engaged public is essential [3, p. 85]. Doug
Daigle echoes this call for greater public involvement in coastal conservation, the only
hope for further progress on environmental protection and sustainable development lies
with a public that is not only informed but also engaged [4, p. 230]. Knowledge is vital
in developing an individual's perception of the oceans and the resources they provide.
Additionally, knowledge is a key component in accomplishing effective environmental
policies [5], [6] and [7]. As Janicke comments, without a doubt, environmental
knowledge and public awareness are important factors influencing environmental policy
and management [8, p. 11]. Because citizens are either directly or indirectly involved in
activities and behaviors that may place our ocean and coastal areas at risk, it is indeed
important to assess the scope and depth of policy-relevant knowledge among the public
and to learn where people tend to acquire their information about ocean and coastal
conditions.
Steel et al, 5 (Brent S. Steela, , Court Smithb, Laura Opsommerc, Sara Curiela, Ryan
Warner-Steeld a Department of Political Science, Oregon State University b Department
of Anthropology, Oregon State University, c Master of Public Policy Program, Oregon
State University, Corvallis d Department of Biology, University of Oregon, 3/3/5, Ocean
and Coastal Management, Public ocean literacy in the United States,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569105000190)
Increasingly the scientific and technical complexity of many public policy issuessuch as
environmental issues concerning coastal areas and the oceansposes serious challenges
for the effective participation of citizens in the democratic process [6], [9] and [10]. In
order for citizens to effectively monitor policy-makers in democratic societies, they need
to be informed consumers of relevant scientific research and the policy options suggested
by those findings [11] and [12]. As Beierle and Cayford have argued, Increasing public
understanding of environmental problems builds capacity for solving those problems
[5, p. 15]. However, the critical gap between the need for policy-relevant knowledge and
the generally poor level of public understanding of many public policy issues has led
some commentators to proclaim the existence of a legitimacy crisis [13]. As Mondak
points out, popular input into government will be vacuous if citizens fail to
comprehend the intricacies of policy debates [14, p. 513]. Many scholars suggest that
knowledge is central to the policy-making process and that improving the knowledge
base of citizens should be the first step in establishing a nation-wide effort to preserve
the oceans. Eagly and Kulesa have argued communications directed to the general
public are important not only because they may influence public opinion, and therefore
have an impact on public policy, but also because they are potentially effective in
inducing individuals to engage in behavior that can lessen the destructive impact of
humans on the environment [15, p. 123]. In fact, McKenzie-Mohr [16] has identified the
lack of knowledge as a major reason for public non-involvement in environmental
activities.
Ocean issues with conceptual ties to science and a global society have captured the attention, imagination, and concern
of an international audience. Global climate change, natural disasters, over fishing, marine pollution, freshwater
shortages, groundwater contamination, economic trade and commerce, marine mammal stranding, and decreased
biodiversity are just a few of the ocean issues highlighted in our media and conversations. The ocean shapes our weather,
links us to other nations, and is crucial to our national security. From the life-giving rain that nourishes crops and our
bodies, to life-saving medicines; from the fish that come from the ocean, to the goods that are transported on the seas
surface--- the ocean plays a role in our lives in some way everyday (NOAA, 1998). The American public values the ocean
and considers protecting it to be a fundamental responsibility, but its understanding of why we need the ocean is
superficial (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 1999). However, a broad disconnect exists between what scientist know and
the public understands about the ocean. The ocean, more than any other single ecosystem, has social and personal
relevance to all persons. In the 21st century we will look increasingly to the ocean to meet our everyday needs and
future sustainability. Thus, there
reveal that the public is not well equipped with knowledge about ocean
issues. This implies that the public needs access to better ocean information delivered in the most effective manner.
The component lacking for both adults and youth is a baseline of ocean knowledge--- literacy about the oceans to
balance the emotive factors exhibited through care, concern and connection with the ocean. The
interdependence between humans and the ocean is at the heart of ocean literacy. Cudaback
(2006) believes that given the declining quality of the marine environment (Pew Ocean Commission, 2003), ocean
educators have the responsibility to teach not only the science of the ocean, but also the interdependence with humans.
Ocean literacy is especially significant, as we implement a first-ever national ocean policy to halt
the steady decline of our nations ocean and coasts via the Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century (U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy, 2004). The need for ocean education and literacy that goes beyond emotive factors is critical and relevant
towards preparing our students, teachers, and citizens to regularly contribute to ocean decisions and socioscientific
issues that impact their health and well being on Earth. The biggest barriers to increasing commitment to ocean
protection are Americans lack of awareness of the condition of the oceans and of their own role in damaging the oceans,
(Belden, et al., 1999). The challenge for ocean educators is to explicitly state the connections between the ocean and
daily decisions and actions of people. People enjoy the beauty of the ocean and the bounty of its waters, but may not
understand that their everyday actions such as boating, construction, improper waste disposal, or ignoring protected
areas, can impact the ocean and its resources. More than one-half of the US population lives within 200 miles of the
ocean. Long-term planning for growth, development and use of coastal areas is key to the continued productivity of the
ocean (NOAA, 1998). Because
Of equal concern is the fact that with oceans covering 70% of our planet and play- ing such a critical role in sustaining life,
somehow we have allowed our oceans to degrade to the point where it has become a
crisis. One of the reasons may be that very few people are ocean-literate and thus have
no concern for the state of our oceansnot because they dont care but because they dont know. In a recent
national survey of the American public, results indicated a super- ficial level of knowledge about the impor- tance of our
oceans to human life and to our planets future.1 So what is the solution? The
solution is to improve
awareness of our ocean, coasts and Great Lakes by developing an ocean-literate society
accomplished by simply educating all Americans about our oceans, from school-aged children to se- nior citizens. This
way they
will under- stand its importance to our existence on this planet and the urgency for action and
become advocates for change. With over 200 recommendations put forth in the Ocean Commission (OC) report
to Con- gress, a key item states, strengthening the nations awareness of the importance of the oceans requires a
heightened focus on the marine environment through both formal and informal education efforts. Curricula for
kindergarten through 12th grade should expose students to ocean is- sues throughout their formal education with the next
generation of ocean scien- tists, managers, educators and leaders be- ing prepared through diverse higher edu- cation
opportunities... The report went on to say, the
education in ocean-related fields also needs to flourish in the United States if the nation
is to have the expert sci- entists, teachers, and policy makers, now and in the future. Closely
intertwined with this high quality graduate education is ocean re- searchalso essential if we are to make
the right decisions on how to preserve and man- age our oceans and coasts. But again, gradu- ate education in the ocean
sciences cannot be the concern of a single agency because all agencies with an ocean-related mission must have a welleducated workforce. Informal education, defined by the National Science Foundation (NSF) as a life-long learning
process where people ac- quire knowledge and values from daily ex- periences (usually voluntarily and driven by personal
interest), is also necessary to educate our society. We must provide the opportunities that will draw interest from our
society to learn about the oceans, the prerequisite for an ocean literate society. The OC report states it clearly by explaining while most people do not recognize the number of benefits the ocean provides, or its potential for further discovery,
many do feel a positive connection with it, sens- ing perhaps that the vitality of the sea is directly related to human
survival. This connection can be a powerful tool for in- creasing awareness of, interest in, and re- sponsible action toward
the marine envi- ronment, and is critical to building an ocean stewardship ethic, strengthening the nations science
literacy and creating a new generation of ocean leaders. There