[G.R. No. 117472.

June 25, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is
indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the
attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet another
burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the
herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction
of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994,
for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y
PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint,
aggravated by the fact that the same was committed by the accused who is the
father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659; to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray
the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs."[1]
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
"C O M P L A I N T
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed
as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant his daughter, a minor,
10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel
de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his
brief:
"This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on
September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6,

5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo
Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her
family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three
brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place, she
heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the
house (pp. 10-11, ibid.). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray
approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she
could question the appellant, the latter immediately removed her panty and made her lie
on the floor (p. 13, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and
immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully
inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15,
ibid.). While appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered: 'Masarap ba, masarap ba?'
and to which Rodessa answered: 'Tama na Papa, masakit' (p. 16, ibid.). Rodessa's plea
proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct,
appellant threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared
that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she
suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high
on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this
usually took place when her mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the
fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told
Rosalie, Rodessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain
where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was
brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was
accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical
examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her
mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side. However,
when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her: 'Kawawa naman ang Tatay
mo, nakakulong' (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma.
Cristina B. Preyna,[3] the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin state,
as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN., Aug.
22,1995, pp. 8-9)."[4]
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
"x x x the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the
RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment of her mother's dirty mind. That
her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the
sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was motivated
by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA
Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her
grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to persuade the
latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it turned out that her
complaint of attempted homicide was substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance

of her mother. That when her mother came to know about the affidavit of desistance, she
placed her granddaughter under the custody of the Barangay Captain. That her mother
was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband
poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the certification
issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the
Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused and Conrado
Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the
paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over
the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that he is
the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to conceal the nauseating sex
orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real Wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a
very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested to
become the sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal
Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have committed the imputed crime because he
considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of
the alleged commission of the crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of
Barangay Vitalis, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Exh 4). The travel time between his work
place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the condition of traffic. That the
painting contract is evidenced by a document denominated 'Contract of Services' duly
accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual organ
which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be
'mawawarak.' That it is abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the
grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her(sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing
earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the
judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation
Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be
meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's
grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become the
sole owner of that piece of property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project,
situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid crossexamination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind considering that
he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his
painting job site on the date and time of the alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry
woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw
Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes
on the vacant lot she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The
masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and
last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency

of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape.
Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she
corroborated the testimony of Mrs Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa
masturbating inside the room of her house."[5]
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the
lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward
testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against
accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential
the defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not
have insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of
the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the
lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING
OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY
AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED
LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE
PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT
ACCUSED WAS IN PARAAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED
CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN
THE CASE AT BAR."[6]
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty,
requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this
Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this
nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the
prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense."[7]
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the
scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul
insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by greed over
a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San
Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that
prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa,
concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-appellant shall be
meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the
lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in

partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the National Housing Authority
(Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was
fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a
co-owner. So, the live-in partners would have the property for their own.[8]
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to
instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply
on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.[9]
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible
where she has no motive to testify against the accused.[10]
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa
which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial
court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous
acts had made her cry.[11] Once again, we rule that:
"x x x The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to
the circumstances of the rape must be given weight for testimony of young and immature
rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially
one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People
v. Guibao, supra)."[12]
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against
him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was
already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent
testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was
dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police
investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping acts, he
uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she related
that when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap,
tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn
statement that it was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape
committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera
claimed that she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so
as to tell her a secret.[13] These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details
which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where
he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was
actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever
words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a
whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's
grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin:[14]
"This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of a

witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent
and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling
the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to
remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of
clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and
that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00
and 7:00 o'clock.[15] In his testimony, the accused- appellant stated that he could not
have raped Rodessa because of the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina
had he actually done so.[16] This Court gives no probative value on the accusedappellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo,
supra,[17] that:
"The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying
degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ is
normally limited only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being
minor. The female reproductive canal being capable of allowing passage of a regular
fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size,
including the male reproductive organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still
be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the vaginal
wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate
traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to have
occurred." (At pp. 13-14, Italics supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof.[18] A mere knocking at
the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the
crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction.
[19] In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the
healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the
commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994.[20]
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant
erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in
support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there
is no law expressly requiring so.[21] In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses
have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this
case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded.[22] More
importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the
face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape
by his victim, Rodessa.[23]
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some
painting Job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paranaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days
from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of

the commission of the offense.

The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the
complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph
3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years old.[24] Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant,
succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from
any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and
fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as
asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating,
thus:
"x x x it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are
young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is
marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not
to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk
of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the
injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation
it causes her family must also be taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by
the announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution. There is all the more
reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this
offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in
civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation,
much more so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal,
self-restraint should even be more marked."[25]
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law,
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Italics supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty
imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or
grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother.[26] On
direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was filed against him, he
had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter
and education.[27] The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accusedappellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in
partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that she, the
accused-appellant and her five children, including Rodessa, had been residing in one

house only.[28] At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of
Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous
crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a
confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother,[29] he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion
of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is
reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of
Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim
has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accusedappellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to
succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under
the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of
death.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine
Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try
him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition
with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of
the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First
Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the
reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the

Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the
courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is
not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject
to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135
U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for
violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1
Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question
raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of
the United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the
question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended
ex propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the
Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental
change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the
Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. Not only the members of this court but all other officers,
legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are
bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes
its own existence to the great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the
exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court
"shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In
deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this
court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such
original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It
then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether
the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act
No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the
cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and
determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law."
Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and

habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of
the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in
this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases
is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the
United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original
jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive
jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from
conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the
Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth
conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one
hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the
trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated,
consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers,
are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV,
section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the
Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The
original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not
made exclusively by any, law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the
Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not
an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with
the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the
power of the National Assembly to amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P.
Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80,
No. 12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try
the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court over the

petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The strictly legal reason is
set forth in the preceding illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a) historical and
based on what I consider is the (b) theory upon which the grant of legislative authority
under our Constitution is predicated.
(a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the Constitution of
the United States, considerable light would be gained by an examination of the history
and interpretation thereof in the United States.
The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787) gave
the Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the plan, authority
to hear and determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier resort . . . all cases touching the
rights of ambassadors . . . ." This clause, however, was not approved. On July 18, the
Convention of 1787 voted an extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
extending "to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such other
questions as involve the national peace and harmony." This general proposition was
considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29 which, however, did not
mention anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. But the
Committee of Detail, through Rutledge, reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI,
Section 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend . . . to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; . . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, . . . this jurisdiction shall be original . . . ."On
September 12, the Committee on Style reported the provision as follows: "Article III,
Section 2. The judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." This
provision was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate and is
now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States.
(The Constitution and the Courts, Article on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M.
Meigs, New York, 1924, vol. 1, pp. 228, 229. See also Farrand, Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, Yale University Press, 1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the
Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.)
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years after the
adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act (Act of
September 24, 1789, 1 Stat., c. 20, 687) was approved by the first Congress creating the
United States District and Circuit Courts which were nisi prius courts, or courts of first
instance which dealt with different items of litigation. The district courts are now the only
federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having been abolished by the Act of
March 3, 1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested
the district courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all
suits against consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or vice-consul shall be
a party. By the passage of the Act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause
giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction was repealed and, since then state courts
have had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings
against a consul or vice-consul. At the present time, the federal courts exercise exclusive

jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other or other public

ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have consistently
with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought
by ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is a party."
(Act of March 8, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24,
1789; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934,
sec. 233.) The district courts now have original jurisdiction of all suits against consuls
and vice-consuls." (Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec.
18; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by the
Congress of the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for more than 145
years. It was prepared chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18,
April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in the Constitutional Convention, who was later
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1796-1800). It is interesting to
note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the House of the first Congress
had been among the 55 delegates who actually attended the Convention that adopted the
federal Constitution (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston,
1935], p. 99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789
vesting in the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a
consul or a vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the
meaning of the word "original" as not being exclusive was definitely made and this
interpretation has never been repudiated. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S. Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):
In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by
Congress, at the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the
significant fact that, from 1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in its
actual adjudications determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not
within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States
jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution
with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative department of the government to
say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may safely be assumed that
nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high privileges of those for whose
protection the constitutional provision was intended. At any rate, we are unwilling to
say that the power to make the grant does not exist.
Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means "exclusive" and
as observed by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S.
Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69), the question has given rise to some differences of opinion
among the earlier members of the Supreme Court of the United States. (See, for instance,
dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U. S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.)
Reliance was had on more or less general expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in
the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was
said:
"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction
where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction,

made in the constitution, is form without substance." But Chief Justice Marshall who
penned the decision in this case in 1803 had occasion later, in 1821, to explain the
meaning and extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury case. He said:
In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed.,
60), the single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this,
was, whether the legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in
which the Constitution had clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the
construction of the article could possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think
very properly, that the legislature could not give original jurisdiction in such a case.
But, in the reasoning of the court in support of this decision, some expressions are
used which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury had insisted on the unlimited
discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial power; and it is
against this argument that the reasoning of the court is directed. They say that, if such
had been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have been useless to proceed
farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be
vested." The court says, that such a construction would render the clause, dividing the
jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that "affirmative
words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those which are
affirmed; and, in this case (in the case of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or
exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all." "It cannot be
presumed," adds the court, "that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be
without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words
require it." The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon the idea that the
affirmative words of the clause giving one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a negative
of any other sort of jurisdiction, because otherwise the words would be totally
inoperative, and this reasoning is advanced in a case to which it was strictly
applicable. If in that case original jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause
under consideration would have been entirely useless. Having such cases only in its
view, the court lays down a principle which is generally correct, in terms much
broader than the decision, and not only much broader than the reasoning with which
that decision is supported, but in some instances contradictory to its principle. The
reasoning sustains the negative operation of the words in that case, because otherwise
the clause would have no meaning whatever, and because such operation was
necessary to give effect to the intention of the article. The effort now made is, to
apply the conclusion to which the court was conducted by that reasoning in the
particular case, to one in which the words have their full operation when understood
affirmatively, and in which the negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to
defeat some of the great objects of the article. To this construction the court cannot
give its assent. The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison must be
understood with the limitations which are given to them in this opinion; limitations
which in no degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of its reasoning.
(Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat., 264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)
What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that Congress
could not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, the rule of construction being that affirmative words of the Constitution
declaring in what cases the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction must be

construed negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall.,
243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1 Wheat., 305, 330; 4
Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That was all.
It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion in the case of
Davis vs. Packard (11833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the jurisdiction of
the state court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on
the ground that jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district courts of
the United States exclusively of the state courts. Such a ground, says Justice Harlan in
Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111 U. S., 252; 4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably
not have been given had it been believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court deprived Congress of the power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction
in such cases upon subordinate courts of the Union, concluding that the decision in the
case "may be regarded, as an affirmance of the constitutionality of the Act of 1789,
giving original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United States." Of
the seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated in
the decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed.,
204), also penned by Chief Justice Marshall and relied upon as authority together with
Marbury vs. Madison, supra.
The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United States.
The question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then existing had
jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States to hear and determine
any suit whatever against the consul of a foreign government. Justice Harlan said:
The Constitution declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall extend . . . to
all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls;" to controversies
between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or subjects; that "In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction;" and that in all other cases previously mentioned in the same clause
"The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." The Judiciary Act of
1789 invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of the
courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for
offenses of a certain character; this court, with "Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of
all suits . . . in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party;" and the circuit courts with
jurisdiction of civil suits in which an alien is a party. (l Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we
have an affirmance, by the first Congress many of whose members participated in the
Convention which adopted the Constitution and were, therefore, conversant with the
purposes of its framers of the principle that the original jurisdiction of this court of
cases in which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily exclusive, and that the
subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such
representatives of foreign governments. On a question of constitutional construction, this
fact is entitled to great weight.
In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by Chief Justice Taney
in the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that
case of Gittings, it was held that neither public policy nor convenience would justify the
Supreme Court in implying that Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction

in cases affecting consuls to the inferior judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief
Justice Taney said:
If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate and
original, as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude that tribunal from appellate
power in the cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the
same clause, to imply words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction
is not there limited or prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress? The
true rule in this case is, I think, the rule which is constantly applied to ordinary acts of
legislation, in which the grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one
court, does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in
question, there is nothing but mere affirmative words of grant, and none that import a
design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on
the same subject-matter. (See also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed.,
388; United States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69;
Ex parte Baiz [1890],135 U. S., 403; 10 S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying writ of
prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs. Van de
Carr [1897], 166 U.S., 391; 17 S. Ct., 595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken
[C. C. N. Y., 1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed.
Cas., No. 8517; St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf., 259;
State of Texas vs. Lewis [C. C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of Alabama vs. Wolffe
(C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836, 837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed.,
146.)
It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra, the
jurisdiction of circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no exception being
made as to those who were consuls, was maintained. (See 1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20, sec.
11, pp. 78, 79.)
From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word "original"
in reference to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the United States over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, was never intended to be exclusive as to
prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls
and vice-consuls in other federal courts.
It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 placed cases affecting the
official representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of Federal Supreme Court
to prevent the public peace from being jeopardized. Since improper treatment of foreign
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that
the federal government, which is responsible for their treatment under international law,
should itself be provided with the means to meet the demands imposed by international
duty. (Tucker, The Constitution of the United States [1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The
Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in mind in the distinction
which international law establishes between ambassadors and other public ministers, on
the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives, on the other, Congress
saw it fit to provide in one case a rule different from the other, although as far as consuls
and vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as already
observed, though original is not exclusive. But in the United States, there are two judicial

systems, independent one from the other, while in the Philippines there is but one judicial
system. So that the reason in the United States for excluding certain courts the state
courts from taking cognizance of cases against foreign representatives stationed in the
United States does not obtain in the Philippines where the court of the lowest grade is as
much a part of an integrated system as the highest court.
Let us now turn our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner. Undoubtedly
Philippine courts are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of
the United States. We have a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of
the American federal system and possessing powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to the provisions of our own Constitution and laws.
The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our Constitution
and laws which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the laws of nations.
There are no treaties between the United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either
country from the operation of local criminal laws. Under the generally accepted
principles of international law, declared by our Constitution as part of the law of the
nation (Art. II sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls and vice-consuls and other commercial
representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status and can not claim the privilege
and immunities accorded to ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law,
sec. 249; Kent, Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The
American Constitutional System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md.,
1838; Taney's Dec., 1; Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 9 R. C. L.,
161.) The only provisions touching the subject to which we may refer are those found in
the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace the history of these provisions.
The report of the committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29, 1934, did
not contain any provisions regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls. The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the Sponsorship Committee,
submitted on October 20, 1934, however, contains the following provision:
Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction as may
be possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases
affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . . ." The Special
Committee on the Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco
and Norberto Romualdez, included in its report the provisions which now appear in
sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 2 provides:
The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribed, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other ministers and consuls . . .
. And the second sentence of section 3 provides:
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court "original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" is
literally the same as that contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States
Constitution.

In the course of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was
expressed regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme
Court. An examination of the records of the proceedings of the Constitutional convention
show that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the
judicial construction placed on, the same provision of the United States Constitution. In
order to end what would have been a protracted discussion on the subject, a member of
the Special Committee on the Judiciary gave the following information to the members of
the Convention:
. . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta dispuesto a
hacer constar que la interpretacion que debe dard a la ultima parte de dicho articulo es la
misma interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante disposicion en la Constitucion
de los Estados Unidos. (January 16,1935.) Without further discussion, the provision was
then and there approved.
It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled meaning in the
United States the country of its origin. It has there received definite and hitherto
unaltered legislative and judicial interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it
when incorporated in our own Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme
Court of the United States, we are justified in interpreting the provision of the
Constitution in the light of the principles and history with which its framers were
familiar. (United States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42 Law.
ed., 890, cited with approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin
[1904]; 195 U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114.)
(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or idolatrous
adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of our Constitution it
is realized that historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. Rationally,
however, the philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far to seek if
certain principles of constitutional government are borne in mind. The constitution is both
a grant of, and a limitation upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and
unequivocal restraint of legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is
exercisable by their representatives in their legislature. The rule is that the legislature
possess plenary power for all purposes of civil government. A prohibition to exercise
legislative power is the exception. (Denio, C. J., in People vs. Draper, 15 N.Y., 532, 543.)
These prohibitions or restrictions are found either in the language used, or in the purpose
held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the adoption of the particular
provision as part of the fundamental law. (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73 S.
W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.)
Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have
committed legislative power in a most general way to the National Assembly has plenary
legislative power in all matters of legislation except as limited by the constitution. When,
therefore, the constitution vests in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, without specifying the
exclusive character of the grant, the National Assembly is not deprived of its authority to
make that jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said that popular government lives because
of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind. It is unquestionable that the mass of
powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people, and that these

representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of
the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear
intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p.139, ante.) What the
Constitution prohibits is merely the deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls and
while it must be admitted that original jurisdiction if made concurrent no longer remains
exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction does not cease to be original merely because it is
concurrent.
It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases would mean
the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls such that the Supreme Court would have
concurrent jurisdiction with the lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice of the
peace of the courts, in a petty case for the instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance
affecting the parties just mentioned. However, no serious objection to these result can be
seen other that the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this jurisdiction with a court
pertaining to the lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other hand, the
fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the land is
made to take recognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal
ordinance simply because of the character of the parties affected. After alluding to the
fact that the position of consul of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a citizen of
the United States (and this also true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in Gittings
vs. Crawford, supra, observed:
It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our constitution
to require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less than five dollars
against another citizen, who had been clothed by some foreign government with the
consular office, should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury
summoned in order to enable him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that
the time of that court, with all its high duties to perform, should be taken up with the
trial of every petty offense that might be committed by a consul by any part of the
United States; that consul, too, being often one of our own citizens.
Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that
considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in our
jurisdiction, there may be cases where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise
either original whether exclusive or concurrent or appellate jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this class of cases to the Supreme
Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a justice of the peace court or
in a Court of First Instance against a foreign consul and no question of law is involved, it
is evident that in case of conviction, the proceedings will terminate in the Court Appeals
and will not reach the Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of
all jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the
Constitution of original jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. This is a situation,
however, created not by the Constitution but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in
the hands of the National Assembly. The Constitution cannot deal with every casus
omissus, and in the nature of things, must only deal with fundamental principles, leaving
the detail of administration and execution to the other branches of the government. It

rests with the National Assembly to determine the inferior courts which shall exercise
concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and irrespective
of the amount of controversy. The National Assembly may as in the United States
(Cooley, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the
Supreme Court in all cases affecting foreign diplomatic and consular representatives.
Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was exercisable by our
courts. This is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution framed and
adopted pursuant thereto are in force. The fact that the National Assembly has not enacted
any law determining what courts of the of the Philippines shall exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment. This can not mean and should not
be interpreted to mean that the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the
Constitution is not concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.
The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner, the writ
of prohibition should be denied.

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime
in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and
53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioners bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody
of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the
DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After

the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA
that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person
is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It
should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the
alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented
at the proper time.[1] At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.[2]
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act
was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case
falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty.[3] The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in
his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.[4] It
appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not
support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5]
As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it
to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as the one at bar.[6] Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure
is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the

jurisdiction of the MeTC.[8] Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not
affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective.[9]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/22/00 9:47 AM

[G.R. No. 125865. March 26, 2001]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28,
2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFAS DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO
BE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK (ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE
DFA PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF
FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH
PREJUDGED PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations[1] for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and
January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs
that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal

Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People,
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the
Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.[2]
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we
rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that
the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts
performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover
the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also
granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the
parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic
immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the
Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made
clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely.
The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made
by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for
this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement
Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank, to wit:
Officers ands staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioners and intervenors
Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January
28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be
considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and
personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal
case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely
stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an
official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioners utterances constituted oral
defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., Pls. See concurring opinion.