Pubcorp

May 30, 2016

Monday 3:30-6:30
ConCom only applies during a revolutionary form
of government (eg. The 1986 government of cory
Aquino)
Election
Disqualifications

Sangguniang Kabataan
- 24 years below for SK Run (candidates)
- 18 to 30 of age can vote
- political dynasties prevents relative 2nd degree of
consanguinity or affinity
- some are appointed secretary and treasurer

Questions:
Local Government is a political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs.
Local Government Unit is defined as a body politic
and corporate one endowed with powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and
as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of
its territory. Local government units are composed of
the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
They are also the territorial and political subdivision
of the state.
Local Government Units (enumerate)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Provinces
Cities
Municipalities
Barangay

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the

State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine

and meaningful local autonomy to enable

them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State
shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process
of decentralization shall proceed from the
national government to the local government
units.
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure
the accountability of local government units
through the institution of effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum.
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to
require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.
Importance: serves as the preamble
Decentralization is the process by which local
government units are given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources by the national
government. In this sense, it is substantially similar
to devolution. Means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels.
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by
the peoples prerogative to remove a public officer is
an incident of their sovereign power and in an
incident of their sovereign power and in the absence
of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations. Such power has been held
to be indispensable for the proper administration of
public affairs.
Initiative an alectoral process whereby designated
percentages of the electorate may initiate legislative
or constitutional changes through the filing of formal

petitions to be acted on by the legislature or the total

electorate. As defined by the LGC, initiative is the
legal process whereby the registered voters of a
local government may directly propose, enact, or
amend any ordinance.
Referendum is a process of referring to the
electorate for approval of a new state constitution or
amendment or of a law passed by legislature. As
defined in the LGC, referendum is the legal process
whereby registered voters of the local government
units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance
enacted by the sanggunian.

MMDA is a special development and administrative

region
7 basic services:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Development planning
Transport and traffic management
Solid waste disposal and management
Flood control and sewerage management
Urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services
6. Health and sanitation, urban protection and
pollution control
7. Public safety

Autonomy
1. Decentralization of administration there is
decentralization of administration when the
central government delegated administrative
powers to political subdivision in order to
broaden the base of government power and
in the process to make local government
more responsive and accountable and
ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the
same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to
ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgements with his own.
2. Decentralization of power involves an
abdication of political power in favour of
local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to selfimmolation, since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but
to its constituency.
Objectives of MMDA

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association

Facts: Petitioner Metropolitan Manila Authority
(MMDA) is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila, while
respondent Bel-Air VillageAssociation, Inc. (BAVA) is
the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road
inside a private residential subdivision, the BelAir Village. On December 30, 1995, the president of
the respondent received from the chairman of the
petitioner a notice dated December 22, 1995
requesting the respondent to open Neptune Street to
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On
that same day, the president of the respondent was
apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, the
respondent instituted an action for injunction against
the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
136, Makati City. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. However, after due hearing, the
court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street being a private subdivision road and
to cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held
that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by an ordinance.|||Hence this petition.
Issue: WoN the MMDA has the power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community?
Held: No, the Court ruled that the MMDA has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Makati
City did not pass any ordinance or resolution

ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its

proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and
the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling.
Moreover, the MMDA was created to put some order
in the metropolitan transportation system, but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening
for public use of a private street in a private
subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion
of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.
ID.; ID.; ID.; METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; NOT A POLITICAL
UNIT OF GOVERNMENT. When R.A. No.
7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a
"special development and administrative region" and
the MMDA a "special development authority" whose
functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of
the affected local government units." The character
of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative
debates enacting its charter. . . . Clearly, the MMDA
is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the
MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was
explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations
prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. . . . The
draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the
Committee to the House of Representatives. The
explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed
MMDA is a "development authority" which is a
"national agency, not a political government unit."
The explanatory note was adopted as the
sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local
Governments. No interpellations or debates were
made on the floor and no amendments introduced.
The bill was approved on second reading on the
same day it was presented. When the bill was
forwarded on the Senate, several amendments were
made. These amendments, however, did not affect
the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in
the House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EVEN A SPECIAL
METROPOLITAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISION. It is
thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not local
government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in
Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation
of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast

in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants
of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his
function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the president, whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes
the administrative character of the MMDA.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO POWER TO ENACT
ORDINANCES FOR THE WELFARE OF THE
COMMUNITY; CASE AT BAR. Clearly then, the
MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as
the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC,
the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
Abbas vs Comelec
Facts: The present controversy relates to the
plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic
Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1)
enjoin
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of
Budget and Management from releasing funds to
the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A.
No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
After a consolidated comment was filed by the
Solicitor General for the respondents, which the
Court considered as the answer, the case was
deemed submitted for decision, the issues having
been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a
"Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File
Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral
Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 raised by

petitioners may generally be categorized into either
of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts
thereof,
violates
the
Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 conflict with the
Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues
that R.A.
No.
6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region
in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions
of the Constitution onthe autonomous region which
make the creation of such region dependent upon
the outcome of the plebiscite. LexLib
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article
XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among
others
According to petitioners, said provision grants the
President the power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the
President. That the President may choose to merge
existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is
challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section
10 of the Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may
be
created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local
government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

administrative regions is not expressly provided for

in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec.
4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between
the power of the President to merge administrative
regions with the constitutional provision requiring a
plebiscite in the merger of local government units
because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are
unconstitutional because while the Constitution
states that the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the
requirement of organizing an Oversight Committee
tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect
delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the
autonomous region hinges only on the result of the
plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority
of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect. The questioned
provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide
for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the
organization of the Oversight Committee cause an
impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for
such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth
transition period for the regional government. The
constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be
sustained as there is no basis therefor.
Note: There are 17 LGUs in the metro manila
Biggest: Quezon City

Issue: WoN R.A. No. 6734 is valid?

Smallest: Pateros

Held: Yes

MMDA was created by Imelda Marcos

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A.

No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region,
which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for
administrative
purposes
[Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as
part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres.
Sec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec.
1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge

President has the power of general supervision

Cordillera Board Coalition vs Commission on Audit
Facts: In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution,
Fr.
Conrado
M.
Balweg,
S.V.D.,
broke
off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the
New People's Army (NPA).

After President Aquino was installed into office by

People Power, she advocated a policy of national
reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces
to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of
the President. After the preliminary negotiations,
President Aquino and some members of her Cabinet
flew
to
Mt.
Data
in
the
Mountain
Province on September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr.
Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA)
and
Ama
Mario
Yag-ao
(as
President
of CordilleraBodong
Administration,
the
civil
government of the CPLA) a ceasefire agreement
that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS
No. 7, E.O. 220). cdphil
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle:
the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The
negotiations shall be a continuing process until the
demands of the Cordillera people shall have been
substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as
Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of
the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the
Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr.
Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint
agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2
Work
together in drafting an
Executive Order to create
a preparatory body that
could perform policymaking and administrative
functions and undertake
consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic
act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3
Have
representatives
from
the Cordillera panel join
the study group of the
R.P. Panel in drafting the
Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O.
220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of
the Cordillera people.

On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino

signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O.
220. [Rejoinder, G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in
the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.
XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created
the CordilleraAdministrative Region (CAR), which
covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City
of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to
accelerate economic and social growth in the region
and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its
main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local
government units as well as with the executive
departments of the National Government in the
supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and
activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor
the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The
CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a
policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive
Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10].
The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board
shall exist until such time as the autonomous
regional government is established and organized
[sec. 17].

Issue: WoN the creation of CAR is constitutional (the

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated
July 15, 1987, which created
the Cordillera Administrative Region, is
assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by the Congress and
the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act
through a plebiscite.
Held: Yes
2. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
AUTONOMOUS
REGIONS; EXECUTIVE
ORDER
NO.
220
(CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION); NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION. A reading
of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the
delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas
covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely

provides for transitory measures in anticipation of

the enactment of an organic act and the creation of
an autonomous region.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE THEREOF. After
carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220,
we find that it did not create a new territorial and
political subdivision or merge existing ones into a
larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public
corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally granted to
public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be
sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the
power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas. 2.
Then, considering the control and supervision
exercised by the President over the CAR and the
offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering
further the indispensable participation of the line
departments of the National Government, the CAR
may be considered more than anything else as a
regional coordinating agency of the National
Government, similar to the regional development
councils which the President may create under the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are
"composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices,
and
representatives
from
non-governmental
organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the
units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may
be considered as a more sophisticated version of the
regional development council.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF. The CAR is
a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process
of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region
vested with political autonomy.
5. ID.; ID.; AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONCEPT
OF LOCAL AUTONOMY. The constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art.
X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government
authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004,
January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not
unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed

also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10].

And while there was no express guarantee under
the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted
the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the
Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered
the irreversible march towards further enlargement
of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand,
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to
the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision
in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly
and special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions
[Art. X, sec. 18].
Control vs General Supervision
Control means the power of an individual to alter,
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.
Supervision means the power of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Relations between State and municipal corporations
as creatures of the state, local governments are
generally subject to the control of the state. There is
a corresponding presumption that state legislation
creating a state agency pre-empts local government
control. The theory, is that, in the absence of
contrary statutory language, the state legislature
intended the state agency to be absolutely immune
from local restrictions merely because the state
agency is an arm of the state and as such it
occupies a superior position within the governmental
hierarchy.
Note: Self Rule
History
Maura Law (Spanish for 300 years)
Natural Resources in the Philippines
US occupies Guam
Agreement between US and Philippines
amendment to the 1935 constitution (constituent

assembly for purpose of amending 1935

constitution)
Decentralization is the process by which local
government units are given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources by the national
government. In this sense, it is substantially similar
to devolution. Means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels.
Administrative autonomy vs Fiscal autonomy
Fiscal Autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable shar in the
national taxes released by the national government,
as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the
preparation of their budgets, and local official in turn
have to work within the constraints thereof. They are
not formulated at the national level and imposed on
local government, whether they are relevant to local
needs and resources or not.
Administrative autonomy
1. Decentralization of administration there is
decentralization of administration when the
central government delegated administrative
powers to political subdivision in order to
broaden the base of government power and
in the process to make local government
more responsive and accountable and
ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the
same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to
ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgements with his own.
2. Decentralization of power involves an
abdication of political power in favour of
local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum

intervention from central authorities.

According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to selfimmolation, since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but
to its constituency.
Devolution the act or instance of transferring ones
rights, duties, or powers to another; the passing of
such rights, duties, or powers by transfer or
succession <the federal governments devolution of
police power to the states>
Devolution of functions
Eg. EO 192 organizes of DENR, the DENR then
devolves its powers to the Regional Offices then
the PENRO lastly to the CENRO such powers are
now brought to the LGUs
Ganzon vs CA
Facts: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo
City. 10 complaints were filed against him on
grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office.
The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on
the merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension.
Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA
affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary.
Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to
suspend and remove local officials; this is because
the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the
present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local
Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
Held: Yes
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE
DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
FROM LEGISLATIVE REGULATION. The 1987
Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that "[T]he
President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments." It modifies a
counterpart provision appearing in the1935
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he
President shall . . . exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law." It

is the considered opinion of the Court that

notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the Charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to
provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as
may be provided by law") signifies nothing more
than to underscore local governments' autonomy
from Congress and to break Congress' "control" over
local government affairs. The Constitution did not,
however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The
change in constitutional language did not exempt
local governments from legislative regulation
provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN
DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. Since local
governments remain accountable to the national
authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner
set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against
local officials. In the case at bar, the
Secretary of Local Government, the President's alter
ego, in consonance with the specific legal
provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local
Government Code, can suspend petitioner
Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245)
and petitioner member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod (G.R. No. 93746).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT
INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY. "Supervision" is not incompatible
with disciplinary authority. As this Courtheld
in Ganzon vs. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in
administration law supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL
OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE EXERCISED
OPPRESSIVELY. While the respondent
Secretary of Interior, as alter ego of the President,
under the existing Local Government Code, has the
Power to suspend the petitioner Iloilo City Mayor,
such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten
administrative cases have been successively filed
against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made
to serve a total of 120 days of suspension for the
first two cases and the respondent Secretary has
issued another order preventively suspending the
former for another 60 days, the third time in twenty

months. We are allowing the Mayor to suffer the

duration of his third suspension. Insofar as the
seven remaining charges are concerned, we are
urging the Department of Local Government, upon
finality of this decision, to undertake steps to
expedite the same, subject to the Mayor's usual
remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or
certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are
precluding the Secretary from meting out further
suspensions based on those remaining complaints,
notwithstanding findings of prima facieevidence.
Section 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. The formulation and implementation of policies and
measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the
following operative principles:
(a) There shall be an effective allocation
among the different local government units
of their respective powers, functions,
responsibilities, and resources;
(b) There shall be established in every local
government unit an accountable, efficient,
and dynamic organizational structure and
operating mechanism that will meet the
priority needs and service requirements of
its communities;
(c) Subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations, local officials and employees
paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall
be appointed or removed, according to merit
and fitness, by the appropriate appointing
authority;
(d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and
accountability in local government units shall
be accompanied with provision for
reasonably adequate resources to discharge
their powers and effectively carry out their
functions: hence, they shall have the power
to create and broaden their own sources of
revenue and the right to a just share in
national taxes and an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development
of the national wealth within their respective
areas;
(e) Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component
barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their

component units are within the scope of

their prescribed powers and functions;
(f) Local government units may group
themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources commonly
beneficial to them;
(g) The capabilities of local government
units, especially the municipalities and
barangays, shall be enhanced by providing
them with opportunities to participate
actively in the implementation of national
programs and projects;
(h) There shall be a continuing mechanism
to enhance local autonomy not only by
legislative enabling acts but also by
administrative and organizational reforms;
(i) Local government units shall share with
the national government the responsibility in
the management and maintenance of
ecological balance within their territorial
jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this
Code and national policies;
(j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the
accountability of local government units to
their respective constituents shall be
strengthened in order to upgrade continually
the quality of local leadership;
(k) The realization of local autonomy shall
be facilitated through improved coordination
of national government policies and
programs an extension of adequate
technical and material assistance to less
developed and deserving local government
units;
(l) The participation of the private sector in
local governance, particularly in the delivery
of basic services, shall be encouraged to
ensure the viability of local autonomy as an
alternative strategy for sustainable
development; and
(m) The national government shall ensure
that decentralization contributes to the
continuing improvement of the performance

of local government units and the quality of

community life.
Limbona vs Mangelin
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the
Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary
that there shall be no session in November as his
presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his
position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it
declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case,
the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly
expelling
petitioner's
membership
therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had
"filed a case before the Supreme Court against
some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because
its
resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have
jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or
regions. What is the extent of self-government given
to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Yes.
6. ID.; LOCAL AUTONOMY; DECENTRALIZATION
OF ADMINISTRATION DISTINGUISHED FROM
DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Autonomy is
either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable,"
and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.

The President exercises "general supervision" over

them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not
to the central authorities but to its constituency.
7. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS UNDER
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. Under the 1987
Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy
in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial
and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. Sec. 2. The territorial and
political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy . . .
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting
of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. An autonomous
government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST.(1987), art. X sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of
Local Government).
Note: Absent during meeting/session request to
make session null and void)

Province of Batangas vs Romulo

Facts: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO
No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution

Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the

capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions
and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were
approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee
required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves
notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas,
petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Issue: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
Held: Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000,
and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs
and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the
Constitution, the State shall ensure the local
autonomy of local governments. Consistent with
the principle of local autonomy, theConstitution
confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to
one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon
v. Limdistinguishes supervision from
control: control lays down the rules in the doing of
an act the officer has the discretion to order his
subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules
are followed but has no authority to set down the
rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution &

release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6,
Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just
share shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent
required to perform any act to receive the just
share it shall be released to them without need of
further action. To subject its distribution & release to
the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs
of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory
automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national
internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year
is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd
preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply
in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the
implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant
or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise
control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the
LGC but only through a separate lawand not through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters
that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit any provision therein which
is intended to amend another law is considered an
inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing
the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are
matters of general & substantive law. To permit the
Congress to undertake these amendments through
the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy
of the LGUs.

The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy

is measured by the degree of autonomy they
enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply
with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy
but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon
which these provisions are based.
Note: Absent during session requests to make
session null and void
Mathay Jr. vs CA
Facts: Before the Supreme Court are three
consolidated petitions filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. HTacDS
In G.R. No. 124374, and 126366, petitioner Mayor
Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. questioned the decision of the
Court of Appeals which upheld the decision of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) ordering the
reinstatement of private respondents to their former
positions at the Department of Public Order and
Safety (DPOS). The CSC held that the
reappointment of private respondents to the DPOS
was automatic, pursuant to the provision on
absorption in Quezon City Ordinance No. NC-140,
Series of 1990. Petitioner Mayor asserted that the
Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the CSC
has the authority to direct him to reinstate private
respondents in the DPOS.
In G.R. No. 126354, petitioner CSC sought the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which overturned its Resolutions Nos. 955040 and
932732, and held that it has no authority to compel
the Mayor of Quezon City to reinstate Jovito C.
Labajo to the DPOS. Jovito C. Labajo did not appeal
from the order of the Court of Appeals.
The Court ruled that the standing of petitioner CSC
to bring the appeal was questionable. The law
applicable is B.P. 337, or the old Local Government
Code, and not the Local Government Code of 1992,
which became effective only on January 1, 1992,
when the material events in this case transpired.
Section 3 of Ordinance NC-140 is invalid for being
inconsistent with B.P. 337. A review of the provisions
of B.P. 337 showed that the power to appoint rests
exclusively with the local chief executive and thus
cannot be usurped by the city council
or sanggunian through the simple expedient of
enacting ordinances that provide for the absorption
of specific persons to certain positions.
Issue: WoN the order of reinstatement of private
respondent is valid?

Held: No
1. POLITICAL LAW; B.P. 337; OLD LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE; POWER TO APPOINT
RESTS EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE LOCAL CHIEF
EXECUTIVE. The law applicable is B.P. 337 or
the old Local Government Code and not the Local
Government Code of 1992 which became effective
only on January 1, 1992, when the material events in
this case transpired. Applying the said law, we find
that the Civil Service Commission erred when it
applied the directives of Ordinance NC-140 and in
so doing ordered petitioner to "reinstate" private
respondents to positions in the DPOS. Section 3 of
the said Ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent
with B.P. 337. We note that Section 3 of the
questioned Ordinance directs the absorption of
the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new
DPOS. The Ordinance refers to personnel and not to
positions. Hence, the city council or sanggunian,
through the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who
shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions.
However, a review of the provisions of B.P.
337 shows that the power to appoint rests
exclusively with the local chief executive and thus
cannot be usurped by the city council or sanggunian
through the simple expedient of enacting ordinances
that provide for the "absorption" of specific persons
to certain positions. TCASIH
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CITY COUNCIL HAS NO
POWER TO APPOINT. The provisions of B.P.
337 are clear. The power to appoint is vested in the
local chief executive. The power of the city council
or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited
to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city
officers and positions supported by local funds. The
city council has no power to appoint. This is clear
from Section 177 of B.P. 337 which lists the powers
of the sanggunian. The power to appoint is not one
of them.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Had
Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to
both the city council and the local chief executive, it
would have said so in no uncertain terms.
Note: Reinstatement to civil service unit (CSC
cannot reinstate except for the mayor)
Basco vs PAGCOR
Facts: On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created
under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the
policy of the government, to regulate and centralize
through an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted
by law. This was subsequently proven to be

beneficial not just to the government but also to the

society in general. It is a reliable source of much
needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul
the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and public order, among others.
Issue:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of

Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the
exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of
constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;

Held: No
8. ID.; DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER
OF THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TO IMPOSE TAXES AND LOCAL FEES;
REASONS THEREFOR. Petitioners
contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver
of the right of the City of Manila to impose
taxes and legal fees; that the exemption
clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the
principle of local autonomy. They must be
referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D.
1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
franchise holder from paying any "tax of any
kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as
fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local." Their contention
stated hereinabove is without merit for the
following reasons: (a) The City of Manila,
being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City
of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v.
Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v.
Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643).
Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly
show an intent to confer that power or the
municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v.
City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to
tax" therefore must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has
the "inherent power to tax" (b) The Charter
of the City of Manila is subject to control by

Congress. It should be stressed that

"municipal corporations are mere creatures
of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No.
7909, January 18, 1957) which has the
power to "create and abolish municipal
corporations" due to its "general legislative
powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67;
Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541).
Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over Local governments (Hebron v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back
the power. (c) The City of Manila's power to
impose license fees on gambling, has long
been revoked. As early as 1975, the power
of local governments to regulate gambling
thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or
permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and
was vested exclusively on the National
Government. Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue
"licenses or permits" for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand
or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or
permits" is no longer vested in the City of
Manila. (d) Local governments have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National
Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also
exercises regulatory powers.
Note: Gambling .... immoral..... public policy
Ordillo vs COMELEC
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast
their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of
the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889

votes in only the Ifugao Province and was

overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14,
1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved
and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in
the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the
President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and
provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso
in Sec. 13(A) that only the
provinces and city voting favorably
shall be included m the CAR, the
province of Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably
then, alone, legally and validly
constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections
in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on
the first Monday of March 1991. cdll
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC
resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5,
1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to
wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board
and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created
under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with
COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of
the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC
merely noted said petition.
On
March
30,
1990,
the
President
issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
among others that the Cordillera Executive Board
and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices
created under Executive Order No. 220 were
abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic
Act. cda
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province
as
the Constitution
and Republic
Act
No.
6766 require that the said Region be composed of
more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare
null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
memorandum
of
the
Executive

Secretary, Administrative
Order
No.
160,
and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain
the respondents from implementing the same and
spending public funds for the purpose and (2)
declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in
force and effect until another organic law for the
Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by
Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters
in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of
the respondents as an answer and decide the case.
Issue: whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held: No
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be
created autonomous
regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces,
cities,
municipalities
and
geographical
areas sharing
common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the
framework of thisConstitution
and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
(Emphasis Supplied)

The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and

geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
"region" used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization
Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of
the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a region, it must
join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of
their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other
relevant
characteristics.
The
Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case. llcd
The well-established rule in statutory construction
that the language of the Constitution, as much as
possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in
constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, must then, be applied in this case.
(See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770,
[1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be
constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide
that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government
consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION
2. The
Regional
Government
shall
exercise
powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and
development of all provinces,
cities,
municipalities,
and
barangay
or ili within
the
Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that
Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we
would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the
same small area.

Note: ifugao

challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section

10 of the Constitution which provides:

Abbas vs Comelec
No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may
be
created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local
government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Facts: The present controversy relates to the

plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic
Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1)
enjoin
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of
Budget and Management from releasing funds to
the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A.
No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
After a consolidated comment was filed by the
Solicitor General for the respondents, which the
Court considered as the answer, the case was
deemed submitted for decision, the issues having
been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a
"Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File
Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral
Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 raised by
petitioners may generally be categorized into either
of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts
thereof,
violates
the
Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 conflict with the
Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues
that R.A.
No.
6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region
in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions
of the Constitution onthe autonomous region which
make the creation of such region dependent upon
the outcome of the plebiscite. LexLib
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article
XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among
others
According to petitioners, said provision grants the
President the power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the
President. That the President may choose to merge
existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is

Issue: WoN R.A. No. 6734 is valid?

Held: Yes
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A.
No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region,
which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for
administrative
purposes
[Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as
part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres.
Sec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec.
1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec.
4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between
the power of the President to merge administrative
regions with the constitutional provision requiring a
plebiscite in the merger of local government units
because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are
unconstitutional because while the Constitution
states that the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the
requirement of organizing an Oversight Committee
tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect
delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the
autonomous region hinges only on the result of the
plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority
of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect. The questioned

provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight

Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide
for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the
organization of the Oversight Committee cause an
impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for
such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth

transition period for the regional government. The

constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be
sustained as there is no basis therefor.