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The International History Review ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage:

The International History Review

The International History Review ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage:

ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20

Preparing Europe for the Unforeseen, 1958–63. De Gaulle, Monnet, and European Integration beyond the Cold War: From Co-operation to Discord in the Matter of the Future of the EEC

Mathieu Segers

To cite this article: Mathieu Segers (2012) Preparing Europe for the Unforeseen, 1958–63. De Gaulle, Monnet, and European Integration beyond the Cold War: From Co-operation to Discord in the Matter of the Future of the EEC, The International History Review, 34:2, 347-370, DOI:

Published online: 02 Feb 2012.

Published online: 02 Feb 2012.

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The International History Review Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2012, 347–370

History Review Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2012, 347–370 Preparing Europe for the Unforeseen, 1958–63. De

Preparing Europe for the Unforeseen, 1958–63. De Gaulle, Monnet, and European Integration beyond the Cold War: From Co-operation to Discord in the Matter of the Future of the EEC

Mathieu Segers*

Since its earliest days in the early 1950s European integration has been driven by a dynamic set free by a complex interplay between clashing grand designs, contingency and a somewhat contradictory inherent urge for both ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of communitarian integration. How did this interplay work? It is the aim of this article to try to find an answer to that question regarding the period 1958–63. At the center of the article is a detailed description of the striking story of a close behind-the-scenes cooperation in European affairs between the president of France’s Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle, and the godfather of communitarian integration, Jean Monnet, the typical adversaries in the existing historiography of European integration, respectively embodying the purest images of continental intergovernmental cooperation and of trans-Atlantic embedded supranational integration. This unknown story of the cooperation between de Gaulle and Monnet sheds new light on the integration process during the years 1958–63, a crucial episode in European integration history. The analysis in this article is based on fresh multi-archival research.

Keywords: European integration history; EEC; de Gaulle; Monnet; Cold War

I. Introduction

European integration is not the result of a conscious plan. It is more likely that it has been an unforeseen product of a ‘battle of ideas,’ or, more precisely, a clash of quite general grand designs concerning what Europe might or should become in the future. 1 Recent research has underscored that these grand designs were trans- national by nature. 2 Typically, no idea or grand design has ever been strong enough to subordinate the alternatives to its institutional logic. This was nothing new. What distinguished the post-war integration from earlier experiments was that Europe’s drifts toward unification were increasingly channeled within the institutional framework of ‘communitarian integration’ and its self-reinforcing boundaries of expansion. 3 This is not to say, however, that institutional path-dependency alone determined European integration’s founding and future. 4 On the contrary, the complete failure of communitarian integration often loomed large. Alternative paths have frequently been quite realistic options. Especially during the early stages, wider but looser free-trade designs, strongly promoted from without (and later from within) the integration process by the United Kingdom (UK), more than once appeared as the more plausible future scenario for Western Europe. 5

*Email: m.l.l.segers@uu.nl

ISSN 0707-5332 print/ISSN 1949-6540 online 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.626580

http://www.tandfonline.com

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Moreover, even after the signing and ratification of the Rome Treaties in 1957 – the single most important treaty-text in the European Union (EU)’s history – the breakdown of communitarian integration seemed on the cards, as many expected the return to power of France’s arch-patriot Charles de Gaulle in May 1958 to be the beginning of the end of it. It was only after de Gaulle’s explicit acceptance of the European Economic Community (EEC) later that year that communitarian integration was regarded an institutional model of European co-operation that might be there to stay. However, after almost a decade of dramatic ups and downs, very few were certain about its future directions. Since its earliest days in the early 1950s, European integration has been driven by a dynamic set free by a complex interplay between clashing grand designs, contingency, and a somewhat contradictory inherent urge for both ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of communitarian integration. 6 How did this interplay work? It is the aim of this article to try to find an answer to that question regarding the period 1958–63. At the center of the article is a detailed description of the striking story of a close behind-the-scenes co-operation in European affairs between the President of France’s Fifth Republic, de Gaulle, and the godfather of communitarian integration, Jean Monnet, the typical adversaries in the existing historiography of European integration, respectively embodying the purest images of continental intergovern- mental co-operation and of trans-Atlantic embedded supranational integration. The story of the co-operation between de Gaulle and Monnet sheds new light on the dramatic ending of the episode 1958–63, symbolized in the two shocking press conferences of de Gaulle on 15 May 1962 and 14 January 1963. As of May 1962, de Gaulle embarked on a confrontational European policy that ushered in a series of nakedly hostile public moves. He re-launched a rigid version of his highly controversial grand design of a ‘European’ Europe and ridiculed ‘the Europe of supra-nationalism.’ 7 After the Evian agreements (on the independence of Algeria) and the constitutional referendum in France, by means of which he strengthened his hold on power, de Gaulle’s confrontational European policies culminated in ‘enormous scandal’ by effectively vetoing British accession to the EEC on 14 January 1963. 8 The net result of these actions was that the intertwined negotiations over European Political Union (EPU) and British accession to the EEC both ended in failure. As to the existing explanations of this dramatic course of events, the period 1958– 63, in spite of the vast literature, remains full of unresolved puzzles. Scholarly discussions have mainly focused on the so-called traditionalist-revisionist debate centered on the question whether the underlying causes of de Gaulle’s European policy were primarily of a geopolitical or of a commercial-economic nature. Traditional geopolitical explanations largely follow de Gaulle’s own suggestion that the US–British nuclear deal reached at Nassau (Bahamas) a few weeks earlier had been decisive for his ‘veto,’ 9 while revisionist explanations mainly point to the structural commercial-economic interests of the French (agriculture) as the ‘veto’s’ real cause. 10 What has stayed fairly uncontroversial in the scholarly debates is the image of de Gaulle’s vicious opposition to the European communities. The General’s disdain for communitarian integration is generally treated as unproblematic background information in order to analyze his foreign and European policies. De Gaulle’s European statements in May 1962 and January 1963 still count as irrefutable empirical evidence of the uncontested primacy of his passionate French nationalism

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and his ipso facto vindictive opposition to Monnet in European affairs. 11 That de Gaulle went out of his way to pursue a subtly nuanced pro-European policy until the spring of 1962 is almost completely absent from the existing historiography. Only some detailed works on the life and work of Monnet vaguely hint in this direction yet in strongly cautious terms. 12 In this respect ‘revisionism’ has remained very limited indeed. 13 In reality however, de Gaulle’s European policy during these years was underpinned by a secret diplomacy and fine-tuned with none other than Monnet. In their confidential exchanges, de Gaulle and Monnet refrained from the stylized haggling over supranational integration versus the ‘Europe of States’ that created their images. On the contrary, at the very core of their careful co-operation was the pragmatic agreement to discern between two European arenas to circumvent a doctrinaire struggle in order to optimize the circumstances for their emerging partnership. The first arena contained the world of European rhetoric. In this arena, de Gaulle and Monnet allowed each other to appease their opposed and passionate supporters, who were either plus Gaulliste que de Gaulle or plus Monnetiste que Monnet. 14 The second arena encapsulated the hidden world of diplomatic bargaining over the design of future integration. In this arena de Gaulle and Monnet were committed to a quite unorthodox search for problem-solving compromises, strongly in favor of a political deepening of the existing European co-operation, and both willing to trans-nationalize their joint effort. This ‘division of arenas’ was at the heart of a tacitly created alliance between the entourages of de Gaulle and Monnet, which gradually evolved to a secret agreement of non-aggression in public rhetoric in the fall of 1960. To be sure, the deliberate avoidance of an escalating war of doctrines was but one issue in their sophisticated co-operation in European affairs. Complex harmonizing in three interwoven foreign-policy issues also underlay their partnership: the EPU, the ‘British Question,’ and the cold war. All four issues were thus located in different domains of foreign policy. The avoidance of a war of doctrines primarily lay in the national arena of French politics, where it loomed large after de Gaulle’s return to power. The EPU concerned the European arena of ‘the Six.’ 15 The British question for the most part rested in the trans-Atlantic arena of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD) or a specific extraction of it. And the cold war involved the bipolar global arena. The outline of the article is as follows. In the next four sections I will subsequently deal with the four issues mentioned above. De Gaulle and Monnet, contrary to existing historiography, were largely in agreement concerning European integration – that is, how to handle the first three issues. This resulted in a close co- operation during the years 1959–61, which I describe in further detail in the sixth and seventh sections. Yet their visions fundamentally differed with regard to the fourth issue (the cold war). For years this was no obstacle to their co-operation in the field of European integration, because the cold war was indirectly connected to new steps of European co-operation. However, as I explain in the eighth section, everything changed when the British government decided to make a bid for full EEC- membership in the summer of 1961. This radically transformed the subtle linkage between the four issues on which the de Gaulle–Monnet co-operation was based and heralded the demise of it. Crucially, it exposed de Gaulle and Monnet’s incompatible visions of the future of the cold war and the European role in it. In the ninth and final section I sum up the main conclusions.

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II.

EEC as a stepping stone to EPU: issue one

When de Gaulle returned to power in late May 1958, France’s European partners held their breath. The General’s installation as Premier against the backdrop of the Fourth Republic’s desperate efforts to appease the military coup in Algeria aroused deep suspicion over France’s future policies, especially in European affairs. De Gaulle had built up an impressive track record as a patriotic integration basher. 16 Moreover, the re-launched Europe of the Rome treaties was still very vulnerable; the first stage of the implementation of the EEC Treaty was to enter into force only in 1959 and could be in serious jeopardy if de Gaulle were to call upon the escape clauses by referring to France’s extraordinary circumstances due to the Algerian War. Finally, it was an open secret in European diplomacy that there existed an active anti-European group within de Gaulle’s inner circle led by the arch-Gaullist Michel Debre´. This group preferred a restoration of la belle alliance with Russia to a continuation of European integration. 17 These European doomsday scenarios would soon appear quite off the mark. 18 After he had duly obeyed the urgent call upon ‘the most illustrious of Frenchmen’ by France’s president Rene´ Coty on 29 May, 19 de Gaulle realized that he had no choice but to seek a way ‘to exploit the inevitable’ in European affairs. 20 During a restricted cabinet meeting on 10 June, he adapted to this reality by unambi- guously accepting the EEC. 21 Reality dictated that the EEC had to become the base upon which he would build his future European policy. This policy, ultimately, was aimed at the reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on a more equal European–US footing, 22 although this did not mean that de Gaulle was aiming at dismantling NATO. Indeed, he was a supporter of the Treaty of Washington. 23 On 13 August 1958 the General drew up a first sketch to organize his thoughts on the matter of Europe. In this note intended for the Quai d’Orsay, he pleaded for the entering into force of the EEC. Europe had to develop into ‘a reality,’ especially ‘in the political, economic and cultural spheres,’ to engage itself in the ‘great global problems.’ This could be achieved through a new ‘mechanism of regular consultations’ among the ‘interested governments’ (an EPU). The fact that de Gaulle was essentially undecided about its exact shape and form, is underscored by his suggestion that it could take some sort of ‘organic character’ to be developed ‘progressively.’ 24 De Gaulle further substantiated his support for the EEC during his private talks with West German Chancellor Adenauer in September and November. During their

´

first meeting, in his house in Colombey-les-Deux-E glises, de Gaulle assured Adenauer that France would carry out the European treaties it had signed. Two months later, in Bad Kreuznach, he promised not to invoke any of the escape clauses of the EEC Treaty and that France would completely carry out its tariff reduction obligations on 1 January 1959. 25 During the second half of 1958, de Gaulle confirmed his decision in favor of the existing integration process. In spite of clear geopolitical, economic, and domestic- political rationales in favor of a continuation of the Fourth Republic’s moderate pro-European policy, 26 this, nevertheless, imposed no easy choice upon the General. Why? An unambiguous choice ‘for Europe’ would commit de Gaulle to the EEC. This was highly problematic, not so much because of the economic consequences, as was often argued by French adversaries of the Common Market, but because such a choice also required a pro-active and constructive policy within the communitarian

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framework in order to promote EEC’s transformation into a robust ‘political’ reality. This would come at the cost of alienating some of the most loyal Gaullists, notably Debre´. Given these caveats, de Gaulle had to be pretty sure of the success of his endeavor to support communitarian integration before he could publicly become a ‘European.’ This necessitated threefold political tactics. First, the General’s initial pro-European decisions had to be low-key to test the merits of the risky pro- European policy against the alternatives posed by the anti-European group in his entourage and keep an exit strategy open. Second, a secret operation was strongly desirable, because the exploration of a pro-European path implied a certain trans-nationalization of policy. Third, de Gaulle needed a reliable liaison through whom he could be introduced into the unknown realm of trans-national European policy-making. Who could be a better partner in this endeavor than his old advisor Jean Monnet, the ‘remarkable’ free agent who had inspired the existing integration? They had successfully worked together in the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers in 1943 and in de Gaulle’s first post-war government. 27 The General on his side could offer Monnet support for new initiatives in the direction of EPU, while the latter, in exchange, would have to prepare ‘Europe’ for a next stage of more political integration. The first moves of rapprochement between de Gaulle and Monnet had already been conducted and indicated the possibility of a European deal between the two. Through the former Minister of Defense and de Gaulle-confidant Jacques Chaban-Delmas – one of the future founders of the Gaullist political party Union pour la Nouvelle Re´publique (UNR) – Monnet had reassured de Gaulle that he, his staff, and the influential trans- national lobby behind his Action-Committee for the United States of Europe ‘under no circumstance would oppose the general’ in the future. 28 De Gaulle was ‘not surprised,’ as he told Chaban after the latter’s exchange with Monnet. 29 Both de Gaulle and Monnet realized however that there was a vibrant world of rhetoric and potential doctrinaire warfare between them. If they wanted their joint efforts to succeed, they would have to rise above this world and resist its seductions. De Gaulle and Monnet, in a special way, were kindred spirits – realists of a peculiar sort. They both believed that it was impossible to fathom reality by applying abstract rationalist categories. Instead, they understood reality as ‘constant movement’ governed by the inevitable caprices of (Bergsonian) la dure´e (wherein mechanistic causality does not exist). 30 Both men realized that the relative power and influence of their ideas (and their internationally well-connected entourages) ultimately depended on les circonstances (and their own ability and fortune to be prepared). Furthermore, both were inclined to believe that in order to be able to adapt adequately to immediate, constantly changing, circumstances, leaders had to take an empirical approach of extraordinary flexibility essentially based on ideological suppleness (instead of being deceived into believing, by the eloquence of deductions based on past experience, that rational choices are possible). Consequently, the great statesman, in the words of Monnet, is he ‘who can work for long term goals which eventually suit situations as yet unforeseen.’ 31 To identify and serve the highest interest thus required character and vigor, for, in the words of de Gaulle, it ‘may not necessarily correspond to the popular view’ of the moment. 32 In October 1958, de Gaulle and Monnet had a teˆte-a`-teˆte meeting that the latter found ‘very encouraging’ in light of the European integration. 33 Monnet’s positive

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impression was confirmed by de Gaulle’s first irrevocable pro-European step, which came on 29 October, when the French cabinet declared its readiness to ‘implement the EEC-treaty on 1 January 1959.’ 34 Monnet and de Gaulle then had a follow-up meeting in early November, after which Monnet debriefed his right hand man, the Dutch ‘European’ Max Kohnstamm, in the following terms: ‘de Gaulle holds neither political nor moral objections to the continuation of the existing integration.’ 35 A few days later, Monnet confided in John Tuthill, the Counselor for European Affairs at the American embassy in Paris, that he believed that from France’s decision to implement the EEC ‘many favorable developments’ would follow. Moreover, Monnet stressed de Gaulle’s ‘support’ for the revived ‘Franco-German relationship’ and predicted ‘it was not at all unlikely that sometime in the future de Gaulle would take dramatic action aimed at strengthening the integration of Europe.’ Tuthill reported that Monnet ‘spoke with a feeling of conviction that the general was in the

process of realizing that the future of Europe lay

in being an integrated whole.’ 36

Nonetheless, the ‘Europeans’ remained worried. It was not exactly comforting that precisely Debre´, the master of the most vicious Gaullist Euro-skepticism, was unchallenged as the designated Premier of de Gaulle’s first government of the Fifth Republic.

III. Avoiding doctrinaire warfare: issue two

On 24 December, the former Premier of the Third Republic and political maverick Paul Reynaud sent his old friend de Gaulle an urgent message. Himself a supporter of Monnet’s lobby for a ‘United States of Europe,’ Reynaud expressed anxiety that Debre´ would prove incapable of preventing the emergence of an anti-European majority in the upcoming parliamentary debates over the government’s decision to implement the EEC – this also in light of the latest European study of the UNR (which de Gaulle would plainly reject not much later) 37 . ‘Thinking of this peril’, he urged to de Gaulle ‘to settle the matter beforehand’ by speaking in ‘such explicit words, that it would suffice for the new premier to refer to these so as to avoid a future debate on this point.’ 38 On 28 December, de Gaulle duly acted upon Reynaud’s advice. Subsequently, Debre´ made quite a spectacular turnaround, which ushered in a series of pro-EEC statements beginning on 15 January – he would, however, arouse fresh suspicion in October by suggesting in Parliament that the time of doctrinaire ‘struggles over the design of European organization’ was not yet over. 39 To be sure, de Gaulle did not muzzle Debre´ on European issues. Shrewdly, a crucial part of the Premier’s role in the play was to keep open a credible (orthodox Gaullist) fallback option in case the pro-integration adventure proved unworkable. 40 But this represented an undesired Plan B in the eyes of the General. After all, it implied waging a doctrinaire war that would rob him of the opportunities to exploit European integration. Therefore, the hierarchy in the Gaullist team prescribed that Debre´ had to play second fiddle to the subtle pro-European minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville (the former Ambassador at Bonn), who carefully maintained close relations with his friend Monnet and his team. 41 In mid-January 1959, de Gaulle and Monnet met again. This set the basis of their future collaboration. As a follow up to this meeting, Kohnstamm and the UNR Secretary General, Franc¸ois Missoffe, met several times to deepen the bonds between de Gaulle’s and Monnet’s entourages. 42 By mid-April Monnet had obtained enough

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reassurances from the Gaullist inner circle to step up his game. He believed he could have ‘faith’ in the European commitment of the principal advisors of both Adenauer and de Gaulle, not only of his friend Franz Etzel (with whom he had very successfully co-operated during the Rome Treaties negotiations) 43 , but also of Debre´. 44

IV. The British question: issue three

Against the backdrop of the French decision to implement the EEC Treaty by 1 January 1959, it had already become clear that the so-called Free Trade Area (FTA) – the British alternative to the EEC that had been launched during the most difficult phase of the EEC negotiations in the fall of 1956 – would probably end in failure. Dramatic calls to prevent ‘a split’ between the EEC and the rest of the OEEC came from the arch-Atlantic Dutch and the influential German Ordoliberals under the leadership of Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard. 45 They stressed the decisive importance of stimulating Atlantic free trade. However, this crusade against the politico-continental entrenchment of ‘Little Europe’ was to no avail. The foreign- policy elite in Washington maintained its support of any form of European integration, because of what they called the political trade-off – that is, the strengthening of the western European bloc against the Soviet Union. 46 Had it been pressed on the FTA, the State Department would have sided with France. 47 Thus, a remarkable alliance of diplomats of France’s Gaullist government and the Brussels EEC Commission could easily frustrate the FTA negotiations and let them end in failure. With de Gaulle now firmly committed to the EEC, Monnet calculated that it would probably be easier to reconcile French and US interests with regard to new European projects than to design an adequate EEC phasing-in trajectory for the UK via some sort of association agreement. Yet, the latter problem was not to be ignored. 48 Otherwise, it could easily emerge as a bone for contention in Western Europe (and the Western bloc as a whole), which could jeopardize the co-operation among ‘the Six’ and the political maturation of the integration process. Therefore, once the UK’s FTA-attempt to water down the EEC had been warded off, the insulted British had to be reconciled. This could most probably be achieved via a detour of a trans-Atlantic agreement on a general tariff reduction in the Western world, which would also ensure continued US engagement in European integration. As a consequence of France’s full commitment, the EEC rapidly gained momentum. The French government had exchanged the classic foot-dragging in European liberalization obligations for something completely different. The EEC’s booming economy and the first results of the Rueff reforms in France offered Paris the means to adapt successfully to EEC’s liberalization schemes. Yet, the Fifth Republic even went a step further and called its partners’ bluff by proposing acceleration of EEC’s liberalization schemes. (The first stage toward a common tariff and the second tariff reduction, both scheduled for 1 January 1962, would be accelerated to July 1960). Paris combined its call for the lowering of intra-EEC trade tariffs with a demand for a common tariff exceeding the existing German and Benelux levels. The effect would have been to drive a wedge between the EEC and non-EEC OEEC-members. The acceptance of France’s bold package heralded the definitive failure of the FTA

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and the rupture of the British strategy to avoid being shut out of the Common Market. 49 It was an utter affront to the UK, when the French Minister of Information, Jacques Soustelle, unilaterally declared that ‘it was not possible to form a FTA as had been wished by the British,’ on 14 November 1958. 50 The British defeat eventually would result in the establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in May 1960. A by-product of all this was a boost for the EEC Commission presided over by the former German Secretary of State for European Affairs and firm believer in the self-reinforcing power of the European treaties, Walter Hallstein. Against all expectations, the EEC Commission had found itself fighting shoulder to shoulder with de Gaulle to protect European integration from the attempts of the British and their Dutch and German friends to water down communitarian integration by replacing it with a loose form of free trade. Before the summer of 1959, French EEC Commissioner Robert Marjolin, on the urging of Monnet, had anticipated the repercussions of the British FTA debacle. He had outlined a plan for a general tariff reduction in the Western world so as to overarch the European split between what were now called ‘the Six’ (EEC) and ‘the Seven’ (the later EFTA). Key to his plan was the creation of a new multilateral organization centered on an ‘Association Council’ designed to reconcile the commercial interests of the EEC with its Western partners, be they the British and Commonwealth, a future Seven-bloc, or the United States. 51 In the realm of foreign policy, Marjolin’s technical plan matched de Gaulle’s ideas for strengthening Europe. After all, the future forum of Western-wide economic co-ordination that Marjolin depicted, anticipated the role of the EEC as a unitary, and therefore politically integrated, actor. A (Gaullist) EPU was the necessary precondition for Marjolin’s solution to the slew of difficult Western trade problems. 52 During the summer of 1959, Monnet enlightened Adenauer on the new course of European integration in two letters sent on 13 and 22 August. The letters clearly built on the Marjolin approach, which meanwhile had acquired the backing of the US State Department. 53 Monnet argued that ‘rapidly creating joint Franco-German action was indispensable’ in order ‘to consolidate European unity.’ Subsequently, he sketched the road map for such action: (1) an EPU on the basis of the Franco- German relationship; (2) an economic ‘association’ of the three western sub-blocs (US, UK and Commonwealth, and the EEC as a unit) through a joint committee focused on the issues of tariff reduction and free trade; and (3) a deepened ‘Atlantic partnership’ between the US and Western Europe. This would also solve the British question, because if the UK ‘did not want to participate in the united Europe, Europe should not treat it differently from the US’ (which meant as much as saying that the proposed road map would thwart any cynical British calculation to have the best of both worlds). 54 Adenauer was on board. ‘One should not sacrifice the EEC for the sake of the British,’ the Chancellor explained to the Christlich Demokratische Union leadership in September. 55 All in all, the circumstances were very favorable for the launch of an EPU plan by September 1959. A broad trans-national coalition strongly supportive of the EPU had emerged, consisting of the French and German governments, the EEC Commission, Monnet’s Action-Committee, and the State Department, as well as an increasingly committed Italian government. Obviously, this coalition was broad enough to force the EPU-wary Dutch in line when need be. 56 There was only one big blind spot in the picture: the UK.

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V. The cold war and the machine: issue four

When stripped of the rhetorical noise, the problem of the UK’s bonds with the EEC, beginning in 1957, had developed into a struggle for trade mastery in Western Europe, in which essentially the Commonwealth faced the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the making. 57 This largely trade-technical problem had geopolitical dimensions, making it an extremely thorny issue, when the split between ‘the Six’ and ‘the Seven’ threatened to spread to the Third World and especially to Africa. This, in turn, threatened to compromise Western Europe’s anxious readjustments to the process of decolonization, and, even more important, to menace Western Europe’s position as a US ally in the cold war. 58 Monnet considered a strengthening of the Western bloc (via the detour of trade agreements, first with the United States and subsequently with UK) as the main route to cope adequately with these cold war problems. De Gaulle, however, drew radically different conclusions. After Eisenhower had turned down his proposal for a tripartite directorate in September 1958 (and again after the Kennedy administration had reiterated US disapproval) 59 , the General had concluded that there were evident contradictions between US and European cold-war interests, especially in matters of nuclear proliferation and decolonization. 60 This obliged the Europeans to strive for independence of the United States, which ultimately (beyond the temporary realities of the cold war) would imply some kind of European association with Russia, as de Gaulle had signaled clearly to Adenauer at Colombey. 61 Whereas de Gaulle saw the EEC and its political deepening as a stepping stone toward an essentially continental concert closely linked to its (former) colonial overseas territories 62 and Russia, Monnet, diametrically opposed, was convinced that the EEC and its political deepening first and foremost should strengthen the ‘Atlantic community’ in order to confront the Soviet threat. Subsequently, a successful ‘Atlantic partnership’ could serve as an indispensable model of multi- lateralism in the post-cold war era. In spite of this fundamental disagreement, de Gaulle and Monnet also recognized the enormous possibilities of transforming their respective grand designs into diplomatic action created by the definite establishment of the EEC. In other words, their approaches converged in the realm of pro-European strategy. Within the explicitly pro-European boundaries they had agreed upon, de Gaulle and Monnet were happily willing to engage in a co-operative grand designs’ trial of strength, a benign test of skill in the art of the possible for the sake of Europe and France. Yet, the natural rapprochement that followed from this convergence centered on the EPU might have made them sidestep more practical matters somewhat lightheartedly at times. Problems of implementation, such as the exact institutional mode of deepening, were treated as a matter of secondary importance, a mere technical consequence of political will so to speak – the latter representing the sufficient precondition of any plan in the eyes of both realists. Nevertheless, it was precisely the technical issue of implementation that was at the core of the divergence of their visions of Europe and the cold war. Indeed, and in stark contrast to the dominant image, de Gaulle was not fundamentally opposed to supranational integration. 63 What he did fear, however, was its essentially unstoppable dynamic that seemed inherent in the European treaties. The General paid special attention to the emergence of rather uncontrollable technocratic machinations tending toward the finalite´ of a European super-state. Moreover, in the

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eyes of de Gaulle this judicial-technical motor within the existing integration process, to which he referred to as ce machin, 64 was identifiably linked to the ongoing undesired and culturally alien Americanization of Western Europe. In sum, the things de Gaulle feared the most while embarking on his pro- European path (because they could overpower France and a future European Europe), came together in the following ghost: the United States as the ‘federator’ of Europe, the hidden driver of ‘the machine’. Precisely these two things – the United States’ active commitment to European integration and the inherent logic of expansion embodied in the treaties – built the cornerstones of Monnet’s firm hope for a future United States of Europe. 65 It was here where their respective grand designs of Europe’s future were incompatible. Still, this fundamental difference of vision would not have to be problematic for their co-operation as long as they could put the shared goal of the EPU first. The primacy of the EPU was of the utmost importance for the durability of the de Gaulle-Monnet partnership.

VI. Waiting for de Gaulle

The rapid success of their tacitly concerted European policy pushed the fundamental differences between de Gaulle and Monnet on the issue of Europe and the cold war firmly to the background. On 25 August 1959, Monnet sent de Gaulle a long, confidential letter, in which he repeated the road map as outlined to Adenauer a few days before, yet with some striking extra details. Toward de Gaulle, Monnet elaborated on the urgent task for ‘us Europeans, to create an entity of the same order’ as the United States and the Soviet Union. He also stressed the momentum for ‘rapid’ and ‘political action’ while the General and Adenauer were still in the Elyse´e and the Bundeskanzleramt. The first step towards EPU had to be a Franco-German one, after which ‘the other EEC-countries would follow the track that France and Germany had embarked upon.’ What then followed was a detailed plan of a complete Franco-German ‘unit’ in foreign affairs (with a small bi-national council of Ministers alternately chaired bi-annually by the French President and the German Chancellor, a separate Franco-German Parliament within the European Parliament and a short-term referendum in France and Germany in order for the General and the Chancellor to obtain the consent of their peoples). The other EEC partners could join later by accepting the institutions that by then would already function between France and Germany. Having unveiled this radical plan for Franco-German union, Monnet returned to the line of argument recommended by Marjolin (an ‘Asso- ciation’ of the three economic Western blocs). Furthermore, he stressed the great advantages of such a development in terms of the British question. If this were rapid enough, the British would be confronted with faits accomplis and would subseq- uently have to decide when to join according to the terms established by the EPU. 66 For the moment, de Gaulle kept the ambitious advice of Monnet at bay. Unfortunately, he decided to follow up on his testing of the EPU waters in Italy instead, during the Franco-Italian meeting in Rambouillet on 4 September 1959. 67 Although the Italians were worried about the repercussions of de Gaulle’s EPU plans in terms of the split between ‘the Six’ and ‘the Seven,’ they nevertheless judged the results of the consultations positive enough to send out a premature demarche on the EPU to the governments of ‘the Six’ (proposing regular meetings of the heads of government and a secretariat in Paris). This was rather hopeless diplomacy. The demarche aroused deep suspicion in Bonn and The Hague, where pro-FTA and

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EPU-wary forces were still dominant. To the dismay of scrupulous French diplomats, the Italians had overplayed their hand and compromised the key ally, Adenauer. 68 Eventually, also in reaction to Benelux-positions, Germany remained reluctant and the Franco-Italian plan got nowhere. Now it was up to Monnet and his team to keep the trans-national context as favorable as possible for a re-launch of the Gaullist EPU. Monnet zealously discharged his duties, especially keeping an anxious Adenauer – who domestically was pressed heavily to make progress in the British question – on track regarding the issue of sequence. This implicated that British participation had to be the last step in the process, which could only be made after the EPU and an ‘Atlantic Partnership’ had been pulled off. Monnet worked through all possible back channels to safeguard the crucial sequence of these three steps (ranging from the Chancellor’s year-long bonds with Hallstein to explicit backing by the State Department and the Action- Committee in press releases and resolutions). 69 After the Italian fiasco, de Gaulle went back to the drawing board. 70 On 31 May 1960, the General presented a foretaste of the re-launch of the EPU to come within the next months. He announced: ‘France would work to build Western Europe into a political, economic, cultural, grouping, organized for action, progress and defence.’ 71 This was the starting point of the run-up to the next Franco-German summit (which would be held at the end of July in Rambouillet). Monnet was intimately involved. After he had seen de Gaulle ‘on the subject of a Franco-German Union,’ probably as a spin-off of his extensive letter of August 1959, Monnet asked his personal advisor on French Affairs, the French technocrat Jacques van Helmont, to put on paper a scheme for a Franco-German government, which de Gaulle and Adenauer would alternately chair. 72 Obviously, the General used Monnet’s suggestions to make up his mind on the European issue. In a private note written in July 1960 and full of traces of the letter Monnet had sent him in August 1959, he stated that the time was ripe for Franco- German action. In addition, he indicated the way that France could put an end to ‘the ‘‘American’’ form of integration’ in the Atlantic alliance and the connected phenomenon of supranational integration, evidently in opposition to the Europe that he envisaged. 73 The General was on a quest to reorganize NATO on a more equal footing that better reflected the new ‘reality,’ which relegated Europe’s ‘dependence’ to a relic of the past. 74 He concluded that only a Europe based on a Franco-German ‘accord’ could effectively take the initiative to ‘base’ the Western alliance on ‘new foundations.’ In order to realize the necessary EPU, de Gaulle proposed regular summits among ‘the Six’ covering the domains of politics, economics, culture, and defense. 75 Finally, this ‘European Union’ should be open to the UK, but only if it ‘succeeded in separating itself from the Commonwealth and the US,’ 76 which was not quite de Gaulle’s priority but probably rather a matter for the mid- to long term. 77 With the Rambouillet meeting of de Gaulle and Adenauer approaching, Monnet and his men put trans-national coalition formation into high gear. (The Franco- German union plan was now placed on hold because of the expected resistance to a two-power directorate.) It was obvious that the time was ripe for the French government, backed by its ‘Europeans,’ to launch a bold plan for the EPU. Moreover, and in spite of the fact that the supporters of communitarian integration close to Adenauer were far from reassured, 78 the German government was already deeply involved in the EPU. Monnet’s team was closely co-operating with their

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friend and former high-level civil servant of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the EEC dossiers specialist Karl Carstens (who had just entered the German Government as Secretary of State), and Germany’s Ambassador to NATO and Adenauer-confidant Herbert Blankenhorn, in what was a feverish joint quest to piece together a ready-made plan for a European Confederation that could be agreed upon in the aftermath the upcoming de Gaulle-Adenauer meeting. The proposed ‘confederation’ would consist of a supreme council of heads of government observing in many cases communitarian procedures. 79 Monnet tried to parachute the confederation document into the Elyse´e through Maurice Schumann and Couve, but the latter reacted negatively. 80 De Gaulle had slightly other plans for his upcoming meeting with the Chancellor. During his private talks with Adenauer on 29 and 30 July 1960 at Rambouillet, the General read his above-mentioned private note, written earlier that month, to a puzzled Chancellor. What followed in the days and weeks after their meeting was utter confusion. 81 Furthermore, de Gaulle apparently had misinterpreted the guardedly positive reactions of his German interlocutor, as he would soon realize. 82 France’s EEC partners tended to move in the direction of the popular pro- federalist forces in their respective parliaments, suspiciously shying away from the EPU plans of de Gaulle. In a confidential memorandum of August 1960 on the ‘re- branding’ of France’s European policy, the Gaullist deputy (and subsequently Minister of Information) Alain Peyrefitte, argued that France’s EEC partners were only ‘Community-minded’ as long as it suited them. French diplomacy was seriously disconcerted by the effectiveness of the ‘illogical’ resistance against the EPU inspired by The Hague, which supported both British accession and supra-nationalism at the same time. 83 It was up to France to uncover their ‘hypocrisy.’ If France were sufficiently ‘bold’ in its new EPU initiatives, the other five EEC members would be trumped, the federalists would side with Gaullist France without losing face, and the UK might well decide it would be better to remain outside Europe. Peyrefitte emphasized that in order to cash in on these opportunities, it was crucial ‘never to appear negative.’ 84 This was cunning reasoning in line with the tacit non-aggression agreement between de Gaulle’s men and Monnet’s ‘Europeans.’ 85

VII. Secret agreement

Peyrefitte’s scenario only represented a maximal outcome, for it depended on the consent of the other five EEC partners regarding EPU, which still was uncertain. De Gaulle realized that if this outcome was unachievable, he had to be prepared ‘to take on directly’ the (American and the supranational) ‘first fruits of integration.’ 86 According to him, two things were vital when entering such a minimal scenario. First, the friendship between Bonn and Paris had to be made strong enough to survive France’s possible radical shift in its European policy. Second, before France could decide on such a shift, the CAP had to be made irreversible – as CAP was ‘owed to’ France as compensation for the ‘serious risks’ that the country had accepted ‘in industrial and commercial matters’ by signing the EEC treaty. 87 In this matter too, Adenauer was the crucial partner who had to be won over: all the more since Erhard considered playing the British card to frustrate the CAP. 88 Although the ambitious confederation schemes of July were off the table as a result of Rambouillet, Monnet remained fully on the same track as de Gaulle. In a note to Couve he pleaded to make sure that ‘the Six’ got the EPU and CAP in place

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before Europe could ‘open the port’ to the UK (via a broader Western free-trade deal with the United States). In parallel, of course, ‘the hope’ that the UK could join Europe ‘one day’ had to be publicly expressed. In many aspects, this candid note marked the high point of the co-operation between de Gaulle and Monnet. Monnet even put in writing the goal of avoiding ‘arousing doctrinal disputes, which would run the gravest dangers’ for the EEC. For if one ‘ignored the fighting over words in regard to the effective mechanisms set up in the treaties’ one could see ‘that the treaty of Rome had, in fact, prepared a coope´ration intergouvernementale organise´e.’ 89 However, toward his team Monnet expressed himself in other terms, stressing that what he was trying to do was to exploit the ‘demanding position’ wherein de Gaulle had maneuvered himself by pulling off a ‘con-federal transition period.’ 90 The term transition period was crucial. Would this possibly imply supranational integration, inherent in the body of existing treaties, as a long-term consequence? 91 One day later, de Gaulle spectacularly launched his new EPU plan, en passant openly attacking ‘the machine’ by ridiculing the ‘delusion’ of supra-nationalism. 92 Adenauer was furious and went strongly on the offensive. On the air he remarked that he was, and had always been, a ‘sincere supporter of the existing European and NATO policies.’ 93 His reference to NATO was a slap in the face of de Gaulle. Doctrinaire warmongers in the Europe of ‘the Six’ saw new chances. Clearly, this course of events neither served de Gaulle, nor Monnet. De Gaulle and Monnet had a secret meeting in mid-September 1960. The General asked Monnet directly if the Action-Committee could perhaps pave the way for progress on EPU on which he could agree. Following up on this, he apparently posed an even more direct question: could Monnet take ‘a more active role’ in the whole process? When Monnet answered evasively that he was committed to the supranational approach, de Gaulle ostensibly replied: ‘That is no obstacle.’ However, by then Monnet thought it illusory to collaborate with Debre´ in European matters. 94 Additional reassurances were needed in light of de Gaulle’s controversial press conference of 5 September. After their September meeting, Monnet and de Gaulle indirectly, through a group of five straw men each, struck the actual deal that had been on the cards for more than two years. This resulted in a secret pact that was concluded during a meeting in Palais Bourbon on 25 October between five representatives of the French government and five representatives of what was called the Mouvement Europe´en (ME). Afterwards, the oral agreements were put in black and white in a so-called protocole, which ‘with the consent of a representative mandated by the general’ had been ‘communicated to chancellor Adenauer immediately,’ who then ‘in a direct discussion with the Elyse´e had given his accord to the agreements as presented in the protocole.’ The secret agreement contained four concrete points of agreement. The first three reassured the ME’s support for de Gaulle’s proposals regarding ‘periodical reunions of the heads of government,’ ‘co-ordination’ of foreign policy among ‘the Six’ and ‘the creation of a permanent secretariat.’ The fourth point contained the Government’s pledge to ‘respect’ the treaty of Rome and the three existing communitarian institutions. 95 Although the agreement initially seemed to work, what it really did was to inject fresh cynicism in the secret co-operation between de Gaulle and Monnet. 96 Indeed, if interpreted narrowly, the secret pact had merely obliged the General to respect the existing treaties, which did not prevent him from striving to subordinate the existing communitarian integration to a future (intergovernmental) EPU.

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VIII (i). Anglo-Saxon Europeanism

On 30 September 1960, de Gaulle had secretly dispatched Debre´ on a reconciliatory mission to Bonn in order to ease the increasing tension between the EPU and NATO. 97 Strongly urged by Monnet – who meanwhile and in accordance with the secret pact had managed to rally the Action-Committee behind the EPU - 98 the Chancellor rallied to de Gaulle’s EPU-initiative and agreed to a summit of ‘the Six,’ to be held in Paris. 99 Assisted by Monnet and supported by Italy, de Gaulle carefully short-circuited the meeting with Adenauer. 100 Nonetheless, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Luns, managed to frustrate the meeting by stating that the UK’s participation in the negotiations would be a necessary precondition for his approval. The delegations could only agree to establish a committee of national representatives to study a possible EPU (the Fouchet Commission). 101 This delay was already a decisive blow to the EPU, as Monnet later would realize. 102 Although Fouchet would largely succeed in sidelining the Dutch, 103 the Bonn declaration of 18 July that then seemed to pave the way for an EPU treaty came too late, as would become clear during the following months. 104 To the surprise of many, the Fouchet Commission tabled a complete draft treaty on 19 October (Fouchet-1). The draft foresaw an irrevocable (con-federal) co- operation aiming at a common European foreign and defense policy, as well as close co-operation in the field of culture (through regular summits and council meetings on the level of ministers of Foreign Affairs and backed up by a ‘political commission’ of high-level representatives of the ministries). Notably, the draft contained a revision clause (after three years), which would enable the strengthening of the institutional features of political co-operation. Fouchet had succeeded in sidelining the Dutch once again. 105 Nonetheless, from de Gaulle’s perspective, Fouchet-1 was outdated. During the summer the Monnet-de Gaulle road map (first EPU than other things) had been thwarted by intervention from les Anglo-Saxons. Already in early spring 1961, there had been clear signs of a growing sentiment in the UK that de Gaulle’s European policy had left the British government no choice but to call the General’s bluff by applying for full EEC membership. 106 Whereas Monnet had actively opted for a daring pragmatic-opportunistic ‘both-and’ approach, 107 de Gaulle under the pressure of these circumstances tended to shift to the above-explained narrow interpretation of their secret agreement. During the Franco-German talks on 20 May, de Gaulle managed to deepen his relationship with Adenauer to the point he desired. The Chancellor declared that if the Fouchet undertaking ended in failure, France and Germany should strike a bilateral deal; ‘the others would follow,’ he had said and would reconfirm this during a conversa- tion with de Gaulle on 15 July 1962 in Paris (after the General had rebuffed the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who had been hopelessly in search of Anglo-French rapprochement during his meeting with de Gaulle at Chateau de Champs on 2–3 June) 108 . Moreover they had agreed on excluding Britain from the EPU talks. 109 Under the new administration US European policy did not change. However, also under the influence of Monnet, 110 the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, did decide to make ‘Europe’ son proble`me, as Monnet put it, and it was evident from the appointments in his foreign-policy staff. 111 The United States would become more active in European affairs to devise better trans-Atlantic arrangements in order to tackle the United States’ declining trade position (vis-a`-vis CAP). 112 The fresh Europeanism from Washington coincided with the British quest for the right

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way to approach the EEC, especially because the CAP, regarded with hostility in London, had not yet taken off completely. The final push came from Washington:

British participation in the EEC and EPU would enhance the European and Atlantic unity Kennedy and his team envisaged. 113 In April 1961 Macmillan yielded to US pressure and decided to apply for full EEC membership. 114 He made this decision public during the summer. The British bid offered the Dutch, now backed by the pro-Atlantic ‘European’ Paul-Henri Spaak, who had returned as Belgian Foreign Minister, the opportunity to block the EPU. If they managed to link the negotiations for British accession (beginning 10 October 1961) to Fouchet in a ‘positive form,’ the French would have to prove that the EPU was not an instrument to frustrate British entry, which many held it to be. 115 Nursing his close contact with Adenauer, de Gaulle increasingly felt compelled to switch to the minimal variant in European policy (consisting of CAP, rigid Franco-German union and waging a freeing doctrinaire war). 116 Evidently, however, his intervention would occur only after the CAP had been irrevocably established. Although he promoted British membership, Monnet remained supportive of de Gaulle’s immediate European goals and loyal to their secret pact. In line with his new ‘both-and’ approach, he feverishly lobbied to pull off the CAP deal before the end of the year. 117 The CAP deal was finally struck on 14 January 1962 and its machinery set in place. (The commodity regulations were established, and communitarian bodies would manage the product markets and a fund for the management of import levies, price supports, and structural reforms.) Four days later, the French presented Fouchet-2, a re-draft by de Gaulle himself. Fouchet-2 contained three highly provocative changes to Fouchet-1 that reversed earlier French concessions: (1) the omission of any reference to NATO; (2) the re- introduction of ‘economics’ as a goal of political co-operation; and (3) the deletion in the revision clause of the passage emphasizing respect for the existing Communities. These changes destroyed the consensus reached in Bonn (on the basis of which the Dutch could be isolated) and plainly suggested that de Gaulle now aimed at weakening the existing European communities. 118 In parallel, Paris toughened its opposition in the negotiations with Britain for access to the EEC. After this shocking unilateralism, France’s EEC partners turned away from EPU, and its now rather unambiguous anti-NATO connotations. Only Adenauer, in spite of the fierce opposition he faced at home, painfully managed to keep up with the brutal French shifts 119 , strongly urged to do so by Monnet. 120 To be sure, the General’s anti-Soviet hard line in the Berlin Crisis had decisively contributed to his credibility as the most reliable Western partner in the eyes of Adenauer. With the firm backing of the Chancellor and Monnet 121 , de Gaulle made a final, vain effort to re-launch the EPU during the spring of 1962. 122 When the British government on 10 April reinforced its will to EEC accession, by declaring its preparedness to accept the principle of institutionalized political co- operation in exchange for direct involvement in the EPU-talks, 123 the EPU’s fate was sealed. At the ministerial meeting on 17 April, Spaak and Luns declared that they would reject any treaty that did not include the UK. Subsequently, Couve concluded that a continuation of the negotiations had become pointless. 124 After this failure, the EPU had expired. This set the stage for de Gaulle’s first history-making press conference on European integration on 15 May 1962, during which he severely attacked ‘the machine’ and stressed the illusion and the deceitful ‘volapu¨k’ of the existing integration, linking it emphatically to a possible ‘federator, which would not

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be European.’ 125 This open attack on communitarian integration caused his Christian-Democratic ministers to resign. Moreover, he had effectively declared the secret pact with Monnet null and void. The war of doctrines was declared at last. Only now Monnet’s Action-Committee went on the offensive. 126 According to de Gaulle, the situation called for threefold action, to which he would duly proceed. First, the Monnet-inspired US proposal for an ‘Atlantic partnership’ (JFK’s famous grand design) had to be nipped in the bud, since it would allow les Anglo-Saxons to hijack the EEC (by reversing the sequence EPU-British question). Second, de Gaulle’s countermove had to be based on a firm Franco- German union (all the more urgent since the pro-free trade Erhard would almost certainly be Adenauer’s successor). Third, British EEC-entry had to be blocked in order to make room for a Franco-German re-launch of the EPU in the not-too- distant future. De Gaulle was now merely waiting for the right moment to complete his series of nakedly hostile moves necessary to accomplish this threefold goal.

VIII (ii). Endgame: ‘the divider of the West’ versus ‘the divider of Europe’

After the Evian agreements (on the independence of Algeria) and the constitutional referendum in France (by means of which he strengthened his hold on power), de Gaulle, on 14 January 1963, held his most confrontational press conference ever, culminating in an effective French ‘veto’ of British EEC-accession. The General sent out a bombastic warning to his fellow Europeans against ‘a colossal Atlantic Community.’ The United States–UK nuclear deal struck at Nassau (Bahamas) a few weeks earlier, the US unilateral handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the ambiguous positions of UK and the US during the Berlin Crisis, and Chrysler’s surprise take-over of Simca in mid-January 1963, only added to the

argument. 127 It formed the overture to the controversial Franco-German friendship treaty, which was signed eight days later. Couve ‘never saw Monnet in such rage.’ 128 During the secret talks with Adenauer in Paris in July 1962, de Gaulle had revealed what really was at stake now. Because the EEC partners had thwarted the EPU, the issue of European integration must be again relegated to its secondary status in relation to the cold war. Seen from that perspective, the one thing that was of primordial importance for Europe’s future, according to de Gaulle, was the following observation: ‘Europe is one world – les Anglo-Saxons form another.’ What followed from that was his plea for strong ‘continental’ political bloc-formation, for now in the form of Franco-German union, possibly loosely associated economically with the UK, yet primarily focused on politico-military independence from the US (although France would stay loyal to NATO). 129 In fact de Gaulle opted for ‘encouraging’ the Americans to bring their troops stationed in Western Europe home. ‘The departure of the US’ then could be compensated by the Soviet Union,

‘by accepting the entrance’ of countries like ‘Poland, etc

as far as the Carpathians’

into the EEC! The departure of the US ‘would gladden Russia,’ while the opening up of the EEC toward Central and Eastern Europe would ‘release her from her satellites.’ This would be the beginning of a ‘continental bloc.’ In this way, ‘Europe’ could develop its true ‘civilization,’ while ignoring ‘the two nuclear monsters, and the UK.’ Adenauer had ‘adhered’ to de Gaulle’s open distrust toward the Anglo-

Saxons. 130 When Monnet heard about these secret exchanges, he was stunned. De Gaulle apparently ignored ‘the Communist phenomenon’ completely. Indeed, the General had said that history ‘wanted that Russia would be Russia again, and no

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longer la citadelle du Communisme.’ 131 Furthermore, Monnet was deeply shocked by de Gaulle’s eagerness to act as ‘the divider of the West.’ 132 However, from the perspective of the General, Monnet himself during the past two years had revealed himself as ‘the divider of Europe.’ It was this antithesis, stirred by the British bid for EEC membership, which had thwarted their initially successful behind-the-scenes co-operation in European matters and led to the eventual failure of their secret partnership. This break enabled de Gaulle’s gradual shift to a brutal minimal scenario in France’s European policies (opting to save but the essentials of Franco-German reconciliation and the CAP). Essentially, the deeper cause for this decision lay mostly outside European integration, in its linkage to the cold war. In fact, Monnet’s plans for European integration were tragically close to de Gaulle’s.

IX. Conclusions

After they had actively engaged themselves in communitarian integration through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the governments of ‘the Six’ were neither able to escape the ongoing clash of grand designs over the future of European integration, nor able to control what sprang from the widely popular trans-national idea of European unification. Instead, European integration penetrated domestic politics, causing deep splits within cabinets and parliaments, crosscutting conventional political camps and stirring up national versions of heated debate between federalists, con-federalists, Euro- skeptics, and so on. 133 Although such ‘fighting over words’ only feebly reflected the deeper clash of grand designs that essentially was about the (cultural) question of Europe’s position in the world, 134 it could easily escalate into ‘war of doctrines,’ a paralyzing zero-sum fight between antithetical visions of integration in which compromise was impossible. The possible electoral impact made member states’ governments pursue policies that kept their options open (also because uncertainty only further increased as a result of issue-linkage, especially with regard to cold war matters). 135 The national uncontrollability 136 of the process encouraged unorthodox coalition formation across national frontiers, bureaucracies and trans-national lobbies and networks. 137 Influencing the process implied a certain trans-nationaliza- tion of European policies. All in all, it took ‘the Six’ years to adapt to the overwhelming yet largely unforeseen reality of ongoing European integration. It was only after de Gaulle’s explicit acceptance of the EEC in 1958, that they dared to start the feverish search for the core of the unprecedented process that had kept them spellbound already since May 1950. One of the by-products of this was that the threat of a war of doctrines increased. Non-reconcilable ‘churches’ of unification, which during the preceding years had developed strong grass-roots movements in the member-states’ national politics and bureaucracies and were promoted by effective trans-national lobbies, inevitably got entangled in fierce fights over the property rights of the highly successful European project and its even more auspicious prospects. It was against this background that Monnet and de Gaulle found each other in 1958–9 in a joint effort to gain control over the process (and exploit it in terms of strengthening of the Western European and French positions in the world). Both realists understood that this effort had to be trans-national if it were to be successful. At the very core of their careful co-operation was the pragmatic agreement to

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carefully discern between the arenas of rhetoric and diplomacy in order to circumvent the doctrinaire struggle that seriously menaced their co-operation, given their opposite public images in the matter of European integration. By explicitly allowing each other to appease their opposed and passionate supporters, de Gaulle and Monnet managed to pull off a rapprochement between their entourages, which gradually evolved to a secret agreement (of non-aggression in public rhetoric) in the fall of 1960. Meanwhile, de Gaulle and Monnet were secretly committed to a quite unorthodox search for problem-solving compromises over the design of future integration, strongly in favor of political deepening as the next big step in the integration process. De Gaulle and Monnet, contrary to existing historiography, were largely in agreement on how to handle the two main European issues in the late 1950s and early 1960s: the EPU and the British Question (as well as the closely connected negotiations on the CAP). The issue of sequence was crucial in their handling of these intertwined problems. After the UK’s FTA-attempt to water down the EEC had been warded off in November 1958, de Gaulle tacitly agreed with the Monnet- Marjolin plan to solve the British question via the detour of a trans-Atlantic agreement on a general tariff reduction designed to reconcile the commercial interests of the EEC with its Western partners, be they the British and the Commonwealth, a future Seven-bloc, or the US. In such a scenario the choice to get in the EEC (or to be treated by Europe not differently from the US) would be up to the British (and prevent British maneuvering to have the best of both worlds). In the realm of foreign policy, this rather technical plan matched de Gaulle’s ideas for the political strengthening Europe, especially because the depicted multilateral construction anticipated the role of the EEC as a unitary, and therefore politically integrated, actor. In others words, (Gaullist) EPU build a conditio sine qua non for the Monnet-Marjolin plan. Primarily based on an intensified Franco-German co-operation, Monnet and de Gaulle succeeded to forge a broad trans-national coalition strongly supportive of the EPU, which obviously was strong enough to force the Dutch and other EPU-wary forces, for instance in Germany, in line when need be. Until the summer of 1961, it was no obstacle to their co-operation that Monnet and de Gaulle’s visions fundamentally differed with regard to the cold war. After all, the cold war seemed only indirectly connected to new steps of European co- operation. Everything changed however, when the British government, also stimulated by Washington, decided to make a bid for full EEC-membership. This radically transformed the subtly harmonized linkage between the European issues whereupon the Monnet-de Gaulle partnership rested. Crucially, it launched a challenging (trans-Atlantic) grand design of Europe’s future, backed by a strong trans-Atlantic coalition that also bound Monnet’s team. By injecting a trans-Atlantic network into the de Gaulle-Monnet project, the British bid heralded the demise of their co-operation. The challenging trans-Atlantic grand design exposed de Gaulle and Monnet’s extraordinary incompatible visions of the future of European integration in and beyond the cold war. Whereas de Gaulle saw the EEC and its political deepening as a stepping stone toward an essentially continental concert closely linked to its (former) colonial overseas territories and Russia, Monnet, diametrically opposed, was convinced that the EEC and its political deepening first and foremost should strengthen the ‘Atlantic community’ in order to confront the Soviet threat and,

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subsequently, to serve as a model of multilateralism in the post-cold war era. Until the summer of 1961, their approaches to European integration had converged in the realm of pro-European strategy, but the British bid for EEC membership highlighted the antithesis in their respective analyses of Europe’s position in the cold war. The things de Gaulle feared came together in the image of the United States as the hidden driver of ‘the machine’ (the judicial-technical motor within communitarian integration). It were, however, precisely these two things – the Unites States’ active commitment to European integration and the inherent logic of expansion embodied in the treaties – that built the cornerstones of Monnet’s firm hope that a future United States of Europe could come victorious out of the cold war. Still, this fundamental difference of vision would not have to be problematic for their co-operation as long as they could put the shared goal of the EPU first. However, as from the summer of 1961 onwards this became increasingly difficult. The changing circumstances caused by the British bid for EEC membership, which manifested themselves among others in the form of delays in the Fouchet negotiations, induced de Gaulle to gradually shift to a brutal minimal scenario in France’s European policies, opting to save but the essentials of Franco-German reconciliation and the CAP (and sacrifice all the rest). To the utter disillusionment of Monnet, the General chose the orthodox Gaullist fallback option – which always had been kept open by Debre´ – over his European partnership with Monnet in order to prepare France and Europe for the ending of the cold war as yet unforeseen.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Laurien Crump, Carole Fink and two anonymous reviewers for feedback on earlier drafts. He thanks the participants at the Visiting Scholars Seminar of the Center for European Studies (CES) at Harvard University for stimulating comments and the visiting fellowships program of the CES for providing optimal circumstances for writing this article during the fall of 2010. The author is grateful to the Fulbright-Schuman Program in Brussels for financial support regarding the visiting scholarship at CES and to the Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam, and the Van den Berch van Heemstede Stichting for the financial support that was indispensable to carry out the multi-archival research.

Notes

1. C. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca and London, 2003), 8; compare A. C. Knudsen, Framers on Welfare (Ithaca, 2009), 14–15.

2. J. Vanke, Europeanism and European Union (Palo Alto, 2010); J. G. Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity (Chapel Hill, 2002); O. Bange, The EEC Crisis of 1963 (Houndmills, 2000); H. Su, Jean Monnet face a` la politique europe´enne du Ge´ne´ral de Gaulle de 1958 a` 1969 (Villeneuve d’Ascq Ce´dex, 1998).

3. Communitarian integration or the ‘Community method’ is the expression used for the institutional operating mode which proceeds from an ‘integration logic’ that strives for the strengthening of the following features: (1) European Commission(s)’s monopoly of the right of initiative; (2) general use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers; (3) an active role for the European Parliament (in co-legislating); and (4) uniformity in the interpretation of Community law ensured by the Court of Justice.

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5.

This was, for instance, the case during the critical phase of the negotiations over the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Community (Euratom) in October 1956 (M. Kohnstamm, De Europese Dagboeken van Max Kohnstamm (Amsterdam, 2008), 109ff).

6.

See for instance articles 38, 39 (for example) and 237 of the EEC Treaty (cf. Knudsen, Framers, 9–11; Birrenbach to Brentano [not sent], 13 March 1961 [Sankt Augustin] A[rchiv fu¨r] C[hristlich-]D[emokratische] P[olitik], I-433-076/1).

7.

C. de Gaulle, Discours et Messages III (Paris, 1971), 418–21.

8.

A. Peyrefitte, C’e´tait de Gaulle (Paris, 1994), i. 351.

9.

During the press conference of 14 January 1963 de Gaulle added a second ‘No’ to the

US proposal of the Multilateral Force, the linchpin of the grand design for ‘Atlantic Partnership’ of the Kennedy administration (and interwoven with the Nassau Agreement). For recent reassertions of the traditionalist ‘Nassau argument’, see Bange, Crisis and F. Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe (Boston, 2001), 93. Against the ‘Nassau argument’: W. Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans (Houndmills, 1996), 193.

10.

For an extensive exposition of the leading revisionist claim: A. Moravcsik, ‘De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur’, Journal of Cold War Studies, ii (2000), 3–43 and 4–68 and The Choice for Europe (London, 1998), 176–97. For critical reviews of Moravcsik’s explanation, see J. Vanke, ‘Reconstructing de Gaulle’, Journal of Cold War Studies, ii (2000), 87–100; Parsons, Idea, 128; R. H. Lieshout et al., ‘De Gaulle, Moravcsik and The Choice for Europe’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vi (2004), 89–139. For a critical assessment of the work of Moravcsik’s revisionist predecessor Alan Milward, see Anderson, New Old, 3–25 and compare 82–9.

11.

R. Marjolin, ‘What Type of Europe?’ in D. Brinkley and C. Hackett (eds), Jean Monnet: The Path to European Union (Houndmills, 1991), 163; compare F. Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet. The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York and London, 1994), 318; W. Loth, ‘De Gaulle und Europa. Eine Revision’, Historische Zeitschrift, ccliii (1991), 646–7; C. de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New York, 1998), especially the third volume; J. Monnet, Memoirs (New York, 1978), 438.

´

12.

Su, Jean Monnet, 511; E . Roussel, Jean Monnet 1888–1979 (Paris, 1996), 737; Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 317.

13.

Revisionists are: S. Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? (New York, 1974, 202–53) – and Loth (‘De Gaulle’). Loth has only made a limited effort to test his hypotheses in archival

research (W. Loth, ‘Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle und das Projekt der Politischen Union (1958–1963)’ in A. Wilkens (ed), Interessen Verbinden (Bonn, 1999, 253–67).

14.

Giauque, Grand Designs, 80; Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 319.

15.

Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.

16.

Loth, ‘De Gaulle’, 644–7.

17.

Beyen to Ministry, 30 Sept. 1960 and Beyen to Ministry, 16 Nov. 1960 [The Hague] D[utch] N[ational] A[rchives], 2.05.118, 1391.

18.

Compare H.-P. Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart, 1991), 444.

19.

D. Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle (London, 1966), 228.

20.

E. Jouve, Le ge´ne´ral de Gaulle et la construction de l’Europe (Paris, 1967), i. 209.

21.

Vanke, Europeanism, 288; Roussel, Jean Monnet, 720.

22.

Fre´de´ric Bozo, ‘France, ‘‘Gaullism’’, and the Cold War’ in M. P. Leffler and O. A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge, 2010), ii. 167.

23.

G.-H. Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine (Paris, 1996), 188.

24.

C. de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes et Carnets (LNC) (Paris, 1985), viii. 73.

´

25.

[Ministe`re des Affaires E trange`res,] D[ocuments] D[iplomatiques] F[ranc¸ ais], 1958 (Paris, 1993), ii. 754–6; Giauque, Grand Designs, 85–6.

26.

Bozo, ‘France’, 166–7; Parsons, Idea, 127–8; Roussel, Jean Monnet, 720; Vanke, Europeanism, 288.

27.

Monnet, Memoirs, 201–11 and 231ff.

28.

Monnet, who basically agreed with de Gaulle’s overall course in reforming the Republic and in the Algerian problem (compare Roussel, Jean Monnet, 721), decoded the General’s first European actions to be strong signs of the belief that they could work together in enhancing the integration process.

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29. Roussel, Jean Monnet, 720.

30. For de Gaulle’s intellectual debt to the philosopher Henri Bergson, see L. Pattison de Me´nil, Who Speaks for Europe? The Vision of Charles de Gaulle (London, 1977), 7 and 12.

31. Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 404.

32. Pattison de Me´nil, Who, 11.

33. Monnet to Schuman, 20 Oct. 1958, [Lausanne,] F[ondation] J[ean] M[onnet], AMKC

14/9/54.

34. Jouve, Le ge´ne´ral, 195.

35. 10 Nov. 1958, [Florence, Historical Archives of the European Union], HAEU, M[ax] K[ohnstamm papers], J[ournaux] I[ntimes].

36. [Department of State Publications,] F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates], 1958–60 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1993), vii. 72–6; compare Roussel, Jean Monnet, 721.

37. 10 Feb. 1959, HAEU, MK, JI.

38. Jouve, Le ge´ne´ral, 195.

39. Jouve, Le ge´ne´ral, 196.

40. Compare Wahl to Bundy, undated, [Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA], P[resident’s] O[ffice] F[iles], box 116.

41. Giauque, Grand Designs, 80.

42. 10 Feb. 1959, HAEU, MK, JI.

43. Kohnstamm, Europese Dagboeken, part 2.

44. 10 Feb. 1959, HAEU, MK, JI.

45. On the role and position of these Ordoliberals in the Adenauer governments, see M. Segers, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the Common Market’ in C. Fink, et al. (eds), 1956. European and Global Perspectives (Leipzig), 169–93.

46. P. Winand, ‘American ‘‘Europeanists’’, Monnet’s Action Committee and British Membership’ in G. Wilkes (ed), Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community 1961–63 (London, 1997), 166.

47. F[oreign] O[ffice] to Tokyo, 23 Oct. 1959 and Tokyo to FO, 27 Oct. 1959, [Kew, United Kingdom] N[ational] A[rchives], [Records of the] Pr[im]e M[inister’s Office], 11/4013.

48. 18 April 1959, HAEU, MK, JI.

49. Parsons, Idea, 122–30.

50. FRUS, 1958–60, vii. 77.

51. Marjolin to Monnet, 4 Aug. 1959, FJM, AMKC 33/3/290.

52. Compare Birrenbach to Brentano, 3 June 1960, ACDP, I-433-076/1.

53. Winand, ‘American ‘‘Europeanists’’’, 167.

54. Monnet to Adenauer, 13 and 22 Aug. 1959, FJM, AMKC 9/1/35.

55. U. Lappenku¨per, Die deutsch-franzo¨sische Beziehungen 1949–1963 (Munich, 2001),

1,489.

56. M. Vaı¨sse, ‘De Gaulle, l’Italie et le Projet d’Union Politique Europe´enne, 1958–63’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, xlii (1995), 658–69, here 660–1.

57. Compare Birrenbach to Herter and Kissinger, 18 and 15 Feb. 1963, ACDP, I-433-064/2; Telcon Ball-Bundy, 3 May 1961, [Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA], Ball Papers, box 2.

58. 21 November 1960, NA, PREM 11/3131, and F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 371/146544, 1 and 4 July 1960.

59. Bozo, ‘France’, 166.

60. Compare Mem[o of] con[versation] Habib Deloncle-Rostow, 28 March 1961 and Memo, 27 June 1961, [Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA], POF, box 116a; Memcon Schumann – Sorensen/Stabler, 29 May 1961, [Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA], Sorensen Papers, box 50.

61. Lappenku¨per, Die deutsch-franzo¨sische, 1,456.

62. Jouve, Le ge´ne´ral, 202–3 and 210.

63. Loth, ‘De Gaulle’, 642–3.

64. Anderson, New Old, 79.

65. Compare Monnet to de Gaulle, 1 Nov. 1970, FJM, AMKC 14/5/40 and Monnet to Adenauer, 7 April 1961, AMKC 9/1/83; Herve´ Alphand, L’e´tonnement d’eˆtre. Journal, 1939–1973 (Paris, 1977), 322.

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66. Monnet to de Gaulle, 25 Aug. 1959; FJM, AMKC 14/5/12.

67. Vaı¨sse, ‘De Gaulle’, 660.

68. J. Vanke, ‘An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan’, Cold War History, ii (2001), 97; Lappenku¨pper, Die deutsch-franzo¨sische, 1,455–7 and 1,484–5.

69. Monnet to Adenauer 13 and 27 Nov. 1959, 21 Jan. and 9 March 1960, and Adenauer to Monnet 24 Nov. 1959, FJM, AMKC 9/1/35.

70. Soutou, L’Alliance, 151–2.

71. Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 318.

72. J. van Helmont, Unpublished Diary, [Fenffe, Private Archive Max Kohnstamm], PAMK, 143.

73. Peyrefitte, C’e´tait, 1, 61.

74. Beyen to Ministry 16 Sept. and 20 Oct. 1960, DNA, 2.05.118, 1391.

75. De Gaulle, LNC, viii. 382–3.

76. Peyrefitte, C’e´tait, 1, 62

77. As the well-informed Dutch diplomacy soon suspected, see Beyen to Ministry 16 Nov. 1960 and Beyen to Ministry 18 Nov. 1960, DNA, 2.05.118, 1391 and Linthorst Homan to Van Houten, 19 Sept. 1960; DNA, 2.05.118, 30156.

78. Birrenbach to Adenauer, 20 July 1960, ACDP, I-433-076/1.

79. Commentaire, 27 July 1960, Aide- me´moire, 28 July 1960 and 16–29 July 1960, HAEU, MK17 and MK, JI.

80. Compare, Memo 27 July 1960, FJM, AMK 55/1/23.

81. H. Kusterer, Der Kanzler und der General (Stuttgart, 1995), 139 ff; G.-H. Soutou, ‘Le ge´ne´ral De Gaulle et le plan Fouchet’, Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son sie`cle (Paris, 1992), v. 129; Memo 20 Sept. 1960, HAEU, MK18; M. Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe, 1944–2007 (New York, 2007), 91–4.

82. Compare De Gaulle, LNC, viii. 396–99; 17 Aug. 1960, HAEU, MK, JI.

83. Beyen to Ministry, 16 Sept. 1960, DNA, 2.05.118, 1391.

84. Jouve, Le ge´ne´ral, 2, 489.

85. The note was accidentally leaked by Peyrefitte’s secretary to the French liberal group in the European Parliament (Peyrefitte, C’e´tait, 70).

86. De Gaulle, LNC, viii. 399.

87. Edgard Pisani, Le Ge´ne´ral Indivis (Paris, 1974), 64.

88. Beyen to Ministry, 20 Oct. 1960, DNA, 2.05.118, 1391.

89. Memo Monnet, 4 Sept. 1960, FJM, AMK 55/1/30.

90. Memo 20 Sept. 1960, HAEU, MK18.

91. Compare 10 Feb. 1959, HAEU, MK, JI.

92. Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 319.

93. Lappenku¨per, Die deutsch-franzo¨sische, 1,523

94. The dating of this meeting is based on the diary of Ducheˆne (http://wwwarc.eui.eu/ HAEU/EN/Duchene.asp, INT555 (Interview Max Kohnstamm by Franc¸ois Ducheˆne), 357) and a comparison of the author with the diaries of Kohnstamm (17 Nov. 1960, HAEU, MK, JI). Note however that Ducheˆne himself dates this meeting in September 1959 in his Monnet biography (Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 318). The part of Ducheˆne’s biography concerned here leans heavily on the meticulous comparison of diaries he undertook together with Kohnstamm. That is also true for the reference concerning the meeting under consideration here, which is repeatedly dated in 1960 during the interview. In addition, Monnet’s actions in the fall of 1960 seem to be more in line with information available than his actions in the fall of 1959 (when Monnet’s Action Committee refrained from taking a stance on EPU); all the more since Ducheˆne’s brief report on the meeting reads as follows: ‘Could the Action Committee pave the way for steps on political union on which de Gaulle could agree and Monnet take ‘‘a more active role’’?’ (Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 318). Ducheˆne is, however, absolutely right to underline that ‘Monnet remained wary’, afraid of being used by de Gaulle.

95. Record of conversation, 21 Nov. 1960 and attached Memo, NA, PREM 11/3131. The document was produced by the Dutch Secretary of State for European Affairs, Hans van Houten, during a confidential meeting with Edward Heath, clearly hinting at a continental (Catholic) conspiracy to shut the UK out of Europe. I am grateful to Oliver

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Bange for his indispensable help in retracing this document, which is quite revealing indeed.

96.

Memo 18 Oct. 1960, FJM, AMK 55/2/3.

97.

Compare Marjolin to Monnet, 27 Feb. 1961, FJM, AMK 33/3/304.

98.

Monnet to Adenauer, undated, and Monnet to Members of the Action Committee, 21 Nov. 1960, FJM, AMKC 9/1/65.

99.

Beyen to Ministry, 12 Oct. 1960, DNA, 2.05.118, 1391.

100.

Soutou, L’Alliance, 177.

´

101.

[Ministe`re des Affaires E trange`res,] D[ocuments] D[iplomatiques] F[ranc¸ ais], 1961 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), i. 168–77 and i. 192–3; Vaı¨sse, ‘De Gaulle’, 662.

102.

Monnet, Memoirs, 438.

103.

Compare MR 14, 21 and 28 April 1961 and Fock to van Houten, 10 April 1961, DNA, 652, 156 and 2.05.118, 30156.

104.

DDF, 1961 (1998), ii. 105–25.

105.

Lappenku¨per, Die deutsch-franzo¨sische, 1,568 and 1,573.

106.

E. Roll, Crowded Hours (London, 1985), 110; the team of US ‘Europeanists’ around Ball was well-informed of the ‘quickening pace’ in London and already convinced ‘the British’ were ‘ready to take the plunge’ (Telcon, Rostow-Ball, 8 April 1961, Ball Papers, box 1). For a decent discussion of the Anglo-American dynamics behind the British EEC membership bid, see N. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War (Houndmills, 2002), 131–8.

107.

Monnet to Adenauer, 7 April and 1 Aug. 1961, FJM, AMKC 9/1/83 and 89.

108.

H. Osterheld, ‘Ich gehe nicht leichten Herzens’ (Mainz, 1986), 132. On the Champs meeting, see Ashton, Kennedy, 142–4.

109.

DDF, 1961, 1, 620 and 622.

110.

Elaborated upon in P. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and The United States of Europe (New York, 1993), especially 139–61.

111.

P. Fontaine, Jean Monnet. L’inspirateur (Paris, 1988), 102.

112.

G. Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration. The United States and European Integration 1945–1997 (Oxford, 1998), 58–95.

113.

Roll, Crowded, 110.

114.

Van Helmont, Unpublished Diary, PAMK, 149.

115.

De Vos to Luns, 29 Nov. 1961, DNA, 2.05.118, 30162.

116.

De Gaulle, LNC, ix, 174; DDF, 1961, 2, 703–8.

117.

Monnet to Hallstein, 27 Dec. 1961, FJM, AMKC 33/2/166.

118.

Soutou, L’Alliance, 190–2; compare Soutou, ‘Le ge´ne´ral’, 136–7.

119.

Osterheld, ‘Ich’, 97.

120.

Memo 31 Jan. 1962, FJM, AMKC 9/1/116.

121.

Kohnstamm to Monnet, 6 and 7 March 1962, FJM, AMK 55/5/29.

122.

Via meetings with Adenauer and Fanfani on 15 February and 4 April (Soutou, ‘Le ge´ne´ral’, 139–40).

123.

M. Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955–1963 (Princeton, 1964), 525–30.

124.

DDF, 1962 (1998), i. 433–4.

125.

De Gaulle, Discours, 418–21

126.

Roussel, Jean Monnet, 741–2.

127.

On de Gaulle’s possible use of ‘Nassau’ as a pretext for the torpedoing of British EEC- membership, see Caccia to Heath and annex [‘Why did de Gaulle do it?’], 3 Apr. 1963, NA, F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 371/169122; for the linkage to the Berlin and Cuba crises see Sutton, France, 91 and 102–3; on the linkage with the Simca takeover, see R. F. Kuisel, ‘The American Economic Challenge: De Gaulle and the French’ in R. O. Paxton and N. Wahl (eds), De Gaulle and the United States (Oxford/Providence, 1994), 199.

128.

Ducheˆne, Jean Monnet, 329.

129.

Also because, according to de Gaulle, la perspective historique ‘wanted that one day the ‘‘Whites’’ must face the ‘‘Yellows’’’ (Memo Monnet, 1 Sept. 1962, FJM, AMM 5/8/36 [‘Notes roses’, classified]). I am grateful to Mme Nicod of the FJM for giving me access to the classified ‘Notes roses’.

130.

Memo Monnet, 31 Aug. 1962, FJM, AMM 5/8/34 [‘Notes roses’]; compare Memo Monnet, 1 Sept. 1962, FJM, AMM 5/8/36 [‘Notes roses’].

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131. Memo Monnet, 1 Sept. 1962, FJM, AMM 5/8/36 [‘Notes roses’].

132. Memo Monnet, 31 Aug. 1962, FJM, AMM 5/8/34 [‘Notes roses’].

133. Compare Parsons, Idea, 23–5.

134. Memo Monnet, 4 Sept. 1960, FJM, AMK 55/1/30.

135. The issue-linkage between the history of European integration and the history of the cold war is scarcely researched (N. P. Ludlow, ‘European Integration and the Cold War’ in Leffler and Westad [eds], The Cambridge History, 179), and the linkage between European integration and the process of decolonization, closely connected to the former, is another unexplored field.

136. The uncontrollability of the integration process has been largely neglected in the existing historiography (although historical institutionalism may be considered an exception in some aspects, particularly in respect to its keen eye for unintended consequences of rational choices [Pierson, ‘Path’, 136–9; Knudsen, Farmers, 14–19]). And there is a reason: the governments’ convincing claim to have controlled the integration process. However, their pointing out of the striking match between the emerging state of affairs in the Europe of integration and clear-cut economic and/or geopolitical rationales, essentially was a hindsight depiction of largely unforeseen developments. Nevertheless, these national ex post facto rationalizations, because of their material credibility, acquired a dynamic of their own and became a central factor in the durability of the integration process.

137. A. Niemann, Explaining Decisions in the EU (Cambridge, 2006), 12–52.