1. G.R. No.

101262 September 14, 1994

SPOUSES ALBERTO GARRIDO AND COLOMA DAGURO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RUFINO AND CONRADA SUPLEMENTO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Tomas Hingco, a widower, originally owned Lot 209 of the Dingle Cadastre, Iloilo. He married Consolacion Rondael, a widow, who
had a daughter Magdalena Rondael. In 1947 he donated one half (1/2) of Lot 209 to his stepdaughter Magdalena subject to the
condition that she could not sell, transfer or cede the same. When he died, Consolacion inherited the remaining half of Lot 209 which,
in turn, was inherited by Magdalena upon the death of Consolacion. Consequently, the entire Lot 209 was registered in the name of
Magdalena Rondael, married to Lorenzo Daguro, under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-13089.
In 1973 Magdalena sold a portion of Lot 209 (Lot 209-B) to Mariano Platinos and Florida Macahilo. The remaining portion (Lot 209A) with an area of 343 square meters is the subject of this litigation.
In 1976 Lorenzo Daguro died. Magdalena then filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition to cancel the lien prohibiting
her from disposing of Lot 209-A because she needed money for her subsistence and medical expenses as she was then in her 80's.
Besides, she was sickly. 1 He deposition on oral examination in connection with her petition was taken on 24 January 1979. 2
On 17 August 1978, during the pendency of her petition, Magdalena executed a Conditional Deed of Sale of Lot 209-A in favor of
respondent spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento "subject to the lien subsisting and annotated on the face of the Certificate of
Title." 3 Magdalena agreed to bear the cost of the cancellation of the lien and respondents to be bound thereby as long as it subsisted,
with the understanding that in the event the lien was not cancelled, the amount already paid would be refunded. It was further
stipulated that "out of the Nineteen Thousand (P19,000.00) consideration . . . only Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos . . . shall be paid
pro rata monthly for ten (10) years and to convene (commence?) one (1) year from the date of this Deed." 4
On 24 January 1979 the petition for cancellation of encumbrance was denied for the reason that the ground cited for the cancellation
was not one of those allowed by Sec. 112 of Act 496 and that Magdalena failed to produce the deed of donation which contained the
alleged restriction. Nonetheless, on 19 July 1979 Magdalena executed with the conformity of her husband a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering Lot 209-A in favor of respondents, spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento. 5 The deed was notarized on the same date. On
13 April 1982, Magdalena died. On 2 December 1982 TCT No. T-108689 was issued in the name of the Suplementos. 6
Magdalena had two (2) daughters but only one is still living, Coloma Daguro, married to Alberto Garrido, the spouses being the
petitioners herein. They were based in Davao City and would visit Magdalena only on occasions. In February 1984, Alberto Garrido
visited the Suplementos in the house where Magdalena used to live. 7 He wanted to find out if the taxes on the house were being paid.
In reply, respondents showed him the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by his parents-in-law and it was only then that he came to know
that Lot 209-A no longer belonged to his in-laws.
On 28 October 1985 petitioners Coloma Daguro and Alberto Garrido filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 209-A, reconveyance and damages claiming that the deed was fictitious since
Magdalena's signature thereon "appears to have been traced" and Lorenzo Daguro's signature was likewise a forgery since he died
prior to the execution thereof, or on 9 October 1976. 8
The trial court, relying on the deposition of Magdalena on 24 January 1979, found that she wanted to sell and did in fact sell Lot 209A to the Suplementos. In addition, the court found that the genuineness of Lorenzo Daguro's signature was not germane to the validity
of the Deed of Absolute Sale as said signature was not necessary to convey title to the paraphernal property of Magdalena. To
petitioners' credit, it held that no evidence was adduced by respondents to show payment of any installment of the balance of the
purchase price to Magdalena before her death or to her heir, Coloma. Thus, judgment was rendered on 19 October 1988 declaring the
sale of 19 July 1979 valid but ordering the Suplementos to pay petitioners P16,000.00 with legal rate of interest until fully paid. 9
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Iloilo trial court in its decision of 27 February 1991 10 and denied
reconsideration on 29 July 1991. 11
Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that they have no personality to assail the Absolute Deed of Sale and the
genuineness of the signature of Magdalena Rondael.
Petitioners assert that the issue raised in the trial court was whether Magdalena Rondael could sell the property despite the prohibition
in the deed of donation. In ruling that they were incapacitated to question the non-observance of the condition, respondent court went
beyond the issue, hence, exceeded its jurisdiction.

We find for respondents. Petitioners have no personality to question the violation of the restriction because they are not heirs of the
donor. When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions imposed by the donor, it is the donor who has the right to impugn
the validity of the transaction affecting the donated property, conformably with Art. 764 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
right to revoke may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor and may be exercised against the heirs of the donee, and the action
prescribes four years after the violation of the condition.
Petitioners' lack of capacity to question the non-compliance with the condition is intimately connected with the issue regarding the
validity of the sale on account of the prohibition in the deed of donation. Thus, we have established the rule that an unassigned error
closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, may be
considered by the appellate court. 12
Petitioners also submit that the finding of the appellate court that the signature of Magdalena Rondael in the Deed of Absolute Sale is
genuine has been overtaken by events. In a letter dated 1 August 1991, the Regional Director of the NBI, Iloilo City, furnished the
Iloilo City Prosecutor with a copy of NBI Questioned Document Report No. 413-791 dated 23 July 1991, purporting to show that the
questioned signature as well as the standard/sample signatures of the deceased Magdalena Rondael were not written by one and the
same person, 13 hence, a forgery.
Admittedly, the NBI report was never adduced before the lower courts; in fact, it is presented for the first time and only before this
Court. Obviously, this is not a newly discovered evidence within the purview of Sec. 1, par. (b), Rule 37, of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners should have thought of having the signature of Magdalena Rondael on the deed of sale examined when the case was still
with the trial court. Nothing would have stopped them from doing so. Hence, it is now late, too late in fact, to present it before this
Court.
Petitioners' reliance on the NBI report as basis for new trial on the ground of "newly discovered evidence" is a mistake. In the first
place, the rule is explicit that a motion for new trial should be filed before the trial court and within the period for appeal. In the
second place, in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as "newly discovered" for the purpose of granting
new trial, the following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and, (c) the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted would probably alter the result. 14 At the pitch of these
requirements is that what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it
first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; rather, that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
producing or locating such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The NBI report does not qualify as
newly discovered evidence because the second requirement was not complied with. Petitioners did not exercise reasonable diligence in
procuring such evidence before or during trial. By their own admission, the Fiscal sought NBI assistance only after the trial of the
case. They could have done so themselves when their case was tried. Besides, when the City Prosecutor requested the NBI for a
handwriting examination in connection with petitioners' criminal complaint for falsification against respondents, the initial response of
the NBI was: "no definite opinion can be rendered on the matter due to lack of sufficient basis necessary for a scientific comparative
examination." 15 From there it can be deduced that petitioners did not submit adequate documents before the NBI at the first instance,
thus showing their want of reasonable diligence in procuring the evidence they needed for a new trial.
We accord finality to the finding of respondent court, supported as it is by substantial evidence, that the alleged discrepancy between
the signature of Magdalena Rondael appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale and her signatures on the Conditional Deed of Sale,
petition to cancel the annotation prohibiting the sale of the donated property, petitioners' reply to opposition, 16 transcript of her
deposition dated 24 January 1979, and the deed of sale of Lot 209-B, does not exist. Having alleged forgery, petitioners had the burden
of proof. Here, they utterly failed. They even attached to their complaint five receipts purportedly signed by Magdalena but, except for
one which was signed "Magdalena Rondael," said receipts were signed "Magdalena Daguro." 17 Besides, there is not showing that the
signatures presented as bases for comparison are themselves genuine. On the other hand, the Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized
document which carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 February 1991 as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. L-15939

November 29, 1965

ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ESTELA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ceferino de los Santos, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.
Salonga, Ordoez & Associates for defendants-appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal to this Court from a decision of March 23, 1959, issued by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, in its Civil Case No.
2892, declaring null and void certain deeds of donation executed by the late Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon.
The facts were stipulated in the court below, to the effect that on April 10, 1953, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of
Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews
and nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston Magbanua.
It also appears that besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTIS
CAUSA, was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her niece, Estela Magbanua, married to Mariano Peaflorida, purporting to
convey to the donee the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2338 and 18951 of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo,
subject to the following stipulations:
Que por y en consideracion al afecto, amor y cario que la Donante guarda para con la Donataria y tambien por motivo de la
lealtad y atencion y servicion fieles que la ultima ha rendido, come sigue aun rindiendo, a favor de la primera, dicha Donante,
por la presente, CEDE Y TRANSFIERE, en concepto de donacion mortis causa, a favor de la antedicha Donataria, las
parcelas de terreno arriba descritas con las mejoras existentes en ellas, bajo las siguientes condiciones:
1. Que la Donante se reserva el derecho de hipotecar y aun vender las propiedades objecto de esta escritura de donacion
mortis causa, cuando y si necesita fondos para satisfacer sus propias necesidades, sin que para ello tenga que intervenir la
Donataria, pues su consentimiento se sobre entiende aqui, aparte de que la donacion que aqui se hace es mortis causa, es
decir que la donacion surtira sus efectos a la muerte de la donante;
2. Que la donataria sufragana todos los gastos necesarios para los tratamientos medicos, gastos de hospital y/o entierro de la
donante a menos que dicha donante tenga propios fondos depositados en un banco o bancos o que haya cosecho levantada o
recogida. en cual caso dichos recursos responderan portales, gastos a disposicion y direccion de la donataria;
3. Que la cesion y transferencia aqui provista surtira efecto al fallecer la Donante; y
4. Que si la Donataria muere antes de la Donante esta donacion surtira efecto a favor de los hijos o descendientes de la
primera, pero su marido, el actual Governador de la provincia de Iloilo Hon. Mariano B. Peaflorida, asumira las
deligaciones que asume en esta escritura de donacion la Donataria Doa Estela Magbanua, especialmente la de atender a los
gastos de ultima enfermedad y entierra de la Donante.
5. Que esta escritura de donacion no se presentara al Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues de la muerte de la donante.
Que la Donataria, por la presente, acepta la donacion aqui hecha de las tres (3) parcelas de terreno arriba, descritas, con las
mejoras existentes en ellas, en las o bajo las condiciones y/o estipulaciones arriba expresadas, y al mismo tiempo de su mas
expresivo y sincero aprecio y gratitud para con la Donante y expresa su imperecedero agradecimiento por la benevolencia y
generosidad demonstrada por dicha Donante en este acto.
Que Don Mariano B. Peaflorida, marido de la Donataria, asume las obligaciones contenidas en el parrafo 4 o de las
condiciones de esta escritura de donacion.
On December 28, 1949, the deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled "ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS
CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 925, 927 and 11042 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo stipulating as follows:
Que la DONANTE, en consideracion a los servicios prestados a la tiene, por la presente cedo y traspaso a la DONATARIA,
en concepto de una DONACION MORTIS CAUSA, (1) la totalidad del Lote No. 2054 del Catastro de Pototan, arriba
descrito, y cubierto por el Certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No.926 expedido su favor por el Registrador de Titulos de la
provincia de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes en ella, (2) la totalidad de la porcion secana y alta que no sea dedicada a
la siembra y cultivo de palay de Lote No. 2053 de Catastro de Pototan, y cubierto por el certificado de Transferencia de Titulo
No. 927, expedido a su favor por el Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes en ella; (3) y la mitad de
Lote No. 58 de la Catastro de Pototan, Iloilo, y cubierto por el certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 11042, expedido a
su favor por el Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes en ellas, cuya mitad de Lote No. 58 es la que
colinda con los lotes Nos. 61, 62 y 63 del Catastro del Pototan, Iloilo, y cuyas tres lotes Nos. 2053, 2055, y 58 estan mas
detalladamente descritos en el parrafo anterioir, bajo las condiciones siguientes:
Que si en la fecha de su muerte no haya la DONANTE tras pasado VENDIDO o cedido a otras terceras personas o entidades
la mitad de dichos lotes No. 58 del Catastro del Pototan, Iloilo, la aqui DONATARIA se compromete y se obliga a pagar a
Caridad Ubalde, casada con Tomas Pedrola, y residente en el municipio de Pototan, Iloilo, la cantidad de SEIS CIENTOS
PESOS (P600.00), y el pago de esta cantidad se verificara en la fecha en que la aqui DONATARIA tome posesion de la mitad
de dicho lote No. 58;

Que antes de su muerte, la DONANTE, podra enajenar, vender, traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquier personas o entidades los
bienes aqui donados a favor de la DONATARIA en concepto de una donacion mortis causa;
Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se registrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del
fallecimiento de la DONANTE; y
Que la DONATARIA acepta la presente donacion bajo las condiciones arriba consignadas y hace constar publicamente su
agradecimiento a la DONANTE por sugenerosidad y liberalidad.
Both donations were recorded in the corresponding Registry of Deeds after the death of the donor.
The will executed by the deceased on March 26, 1951 was submitted to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No.
991; and because the Executor and Special Administrator, Mariano B. Peaflorida, would not attack the validity of the donations
above-referred to, the nephews and nieces of the late Carmen Ubalde, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, filed the
present suit against their cousins Magbanua, seeking to have the two deeds of donation set aside for lack of testamentary formalities;
and after issue joined and by decision of March 23, 1959 the Court of First Instance rendered judgment, with a dispositive portion
reading as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment
(a) Declaring the aforementioned two deeds of donation mortis causa, executed in favor of the defendant Estela Magbanua
Peaflorida without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law invalid and of no effect;
(b) Declaring that the disposition mortis causa in favor of Estela Magbanua Peaflorida of the portion of Lot No. 2053 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo, covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo, described as "la porcion
secana y alta que no esta dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay" contained in the void deed of donation mortis causa dated
December 26, 1949, was validated by paragraph ten of the will subsequently executed by Carmen Ubalde on March 26, 1951;
(c) Ordering the defendant Estela Magbanua Peaflorida to forthwith deliver to the administrator or executor of the estate of
the deceased Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon the parcels of land covered by T.C.T. Nos. 2338, 18951, 925 and 11042 of the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo for proper distribution among the lawful heirs and the parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of
the Register of Deeds of Iloilo for adjudication in accordance with the aforesaid will; and
(d) Dismissing the case with respect to the defendants Mariano B. Peaflorida, Isabel Magbanua Velasco, Neri Magbanua and
Efrain Magbanua.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties, plaintiff and defendant, appealed.
Two issues are propounded in the appeal, which are:
(1) Are the two donations, previously described, inter vivos or mortis causa? It being admitted that in the latter event the donations are
void for not being executed with testamentary formalities.
(2) Was the donation of a portion of Lot 2053 of the Pototan Cadastre, covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo,
validated by par. 10 of the last will and testament of the decedent, which reads as follows:
DECIMO. Lego a Doa Angeles Ubalde, casada con Don Francisco Puig, toda la porcion palayera del Lote No. 2053 del
catastro de Pototan, Iloilo, y cubierto por el certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 927 expedido a mi favor por el
Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo, y en relacion con este lote, hago constar que he cedido y traspasado, en concepto de una
donacion mortis causa, a Doa Estela Magbanua, casada con Don Mariano B. Peaflorida, la porcion alta y secana que no
esta dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay de este mismo Lote No. 2053, segun documento que he firmado a su favor.
With regard to the character of the donations, it is well to recall here that the jurisprudence of this Court has established the following
rules:
(1) That the donation mortis causa of the Roman Law and the Spanish pre-codal legislation has been eliminated as a juridical entity
from and after the enactment of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 (Art. 620) as well as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Art. 728),
which admit only gratuitous transfers of title or real rights to property either by way of donations inter vivos or else by way of last will
and testament, executed with the requisite legal formalities. In the first case, the act is immediately operative, even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the donor; in the second, nothing is conveyed to the grantee and nothing is acquired by

the latter, until the death of the grantor-testator, the disposition being until then ambulatory and not final (Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).
(2) That an essential characteristic of dispositions mortis causa is that the conveyance or alienation should be (expressly or by
necessary implication) revocable ad nutum, i.e., at the discretion of the grantor or so-called "donor," simply because the latter has
changed his mind (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 92 Phil. 244; Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).
(3) That, in consequence, the specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa (Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557).
(4) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect at
the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil. 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, L-4225, August 25,
1952; Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 68 Phil. 68); such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give
effect to the real intent of the transferor (Concepcion vs. Concepcion, supra; Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
(5) That a conveyance for onerous consideration is governed by the rules of contracts and not by those of donation or testament
(Carlos vs. Ramil, 20 Phil. 183; Manalo vs. de Mesa, 29 Phil. 495).
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Tested by the foregoing principles, the donation of November 24, 1948, while somewhat ambiguous, should be held inter vivos in
character. Admittedly, it is designated as "mortis causa," and specifies that it will take effect upon the death of the donor; but, as
previously stated, these expressions are not controlling, and, in the instance, before us, are contradicted by other provisions indicating
a contrary intent. Thus,
(a) The conveyance of the properties described in the deed (Annex A, amended complaint) appears made in consideration of the
undertaking of the donee, Estela Magbanua, to bear "all expenses for medical treatment, hospital expenses and/or burial of the Donor,"
without limiting the time when such expenses are to be incurred. In fact, the use of the words "y/o entierro" (and/or burial) strongly
suggests that the illness and hospitalization expenditures to be borne by the donee may or may not be connected with the donor's last
illness.
(b) Emphasizing the onerous character of the transaction is the requirement that if the donee should predecease the donor, Governor
Peaflorida shall assume the obligations of the donee, "especialmente" (but not exclusively) "los gastos de ultima enfermedad y
entierro de la donante" (par. 4), and this undertaking was assumed even if the properties donated would not go to Peaflorida but to the
donee's children and descendants (par. 3). It was evidently because of this liability, unconnected with the conveyance, that Peaflorida
had to sign the document together with the donee. It is easy to see that unless the conveyance were to be effective before the death of
donor,, the obligations assumed by the donee and Governor Peaflorida (her husband) would be without consideration (causa). In a
very similar case (Manalo vs. De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495), this court ruled:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the donors made it
conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor Placida
Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia
Manalo; therefore, in order to determine whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to
demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in
a public instrument. (Manalo vs. de Mesa, 29 Phil. 495, 500)
Such conditions (consent, subject matter, causa or consideration and observance of the formalities or solemnities required by law) are
all present in the deed of November 24, 1948.
(c) Again, while there is a clause that the donor reserved her right "to mortgage or even sell the donated property, when and if she
should need funds to meet her own needs," this last sentence of the stipulation appears incompatible with the grantor's freedom to
revoke a true conveyance mortis causa, a faculty that is essentially absolute and discretionary, whether its purpose should be to supply
her needs or to make a profit, or have no other reason than a change of volition on the part of the grantor-testator. If the late Carmen
Ubalde Vda. de Parcon wished or intended to retain the right to change the destination of her property at her sole will and discretion,
there was no reason for her to specify the causes for which she could sell or encumber the property covered by her bounty.
It is illuminating, in this respect, to compare the provisions above discussed with the corresponding paragraph of the second deed of
donation dated December 28, 1949. The latter recites as follows:
Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar, vender, traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquier personas o entidades los
bienes aqui donados a favor de la Donataria, en concepto de una donacion mortis causa. (Annex "B", Rec. App., pp. 24-25)

Here is an unlimited power to indirectly avoid the alleged donation any time the donor should choose to do so, and which leaves no
doubt as to the mortis causa nature of the conveyance; unlike the prior donation, where the power to indirectly revoke is hedged in by
the specification that the donor could dispose of the property only to satisfy her needs, thereby impliedly rejecting alienations for any
other purpose. Hence, following the rule of Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557, the donation of November 24, 1948 must beheld to
partake of the nature of a conveyance inter vivos.
(d) Finally, it is no objection to our view that the donation of November 24, 1948 should provide that it is not to be recorded until after
the donor's death (par. 5), since the absence of registration would affect only subsequent purchasers, without denying the validity and
obligatory effects of the conveyance as between the parties thereto.
We, therefore, conclude, and so hold, that the court below erred in adjudging the deed of November 24, 1948 to be null and void. The
same is valid and operative as a donation inter vivos.
Turning now to the deed of donation (also labelled mortis causa) executed by and between the same parties on December 28, 1949,
the text thereof (quoted ante, pp. 4-5) is clear that no proprietary right was intended to pass to the alleged "donee" prior to the
"donor's" death, and that the same was a true conveyance mortis causa, which by law is invalid because it was not executed with the
testamentary formalities required by the statutes in force at the time. Here, unlike in the previous donation the designation is donation
mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that no signs contradict or limit the unqualified and unrestricted right of the donor to alienate the
conveyed properties in favor of other persons of her choice at any time that she should wish to do so; it is so expressed in the deed,
and it indirectly recognizes the donor's power to nullify the conveyance to the alleged "donee" whatever the "donor" wished to do so,
for any reason or for no particular reason at all. As we have seen, this faculty is characteristic of conveyances post mortem or mortis
causa: for the right of the transfer or to alienate the "donated" property to someone else necessarily imports that the conveyance to the
"donee" will not become final and definite in favor of the latter until the death of the "donor" should exclude every possibility that the
property maybe alienated to some other person.
Defendant-appellant Estela Magbanua Peaflorida contends that this second deed of December 28, 1949 is also a donation inter vivos;
and she argues that the stipulated power of the grantor to encumber or alienate the property to persons, other than the donee, at any
time before the grantor dies, should be viewed as a mere resolutory condition that does not contradict but confirms the immediate
effectivity of the donation. This ingenious argument is not legally tenable, since it ignores the circumstance that the so-called
"resolutory condition" is one purely dependent upon the exclusive will of the grantor, and is proof that the deed as executed, is not
obligatory at all (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1115; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1182). Confirming the rule, both the old and the
new Civil Codes prescribe that the effectivity, compliance, or binding effect of contracts cannot be left to the sole will of one of the
parties (Art. 1256, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 1308, Civil Code of the Philippines).
It is also argued that the stipulation empowering the "donor" to alienate the property elsewhere would be unnecessary if the donation
were mortis causa. The flaw in this reasoning is that it loses sight of the fact that the clause in question proves that there is no donation
at all, since it shows that the alleged donor, Carmen Ubalde, did not wish to be bound, and did not want to lose her title to, nor her
control over, the property during her own lifetime. There was, therefore, no conveyance inter vivos, since none was intended; and no
donation mortis causa because, as already pointed out, acts intended to be effective after the death of the grantor must be executed in
the form of a last will and testament, or else they will not be legally valid.
The nullity of the donation of December 28, 1949 has an exception: the conveyance therein of "la porcion alta y secana que no esta
dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay" of Lot 2053 of the Pototan (Iloilo) Cadastre was correctly held by the appealed decision to
have been confirmed and validated by the late Carmen Ubalde in clause 10 of her last will and testament executed on March 26, 1951
(Stip. of Facts, Annex "A"; Rec. on Appeal, pp. 52-53), when she solemnly declared that she had conveyed said portion to defendantappellant Estela Magbanua by donation mortis causa. While made by way of reference, we are satisfied that this portion of the will's
tenth clause (previously quoted on page 7 of this decision) is valid as an independent testamentary legacy, as it is apparent and
indubitable that the decedent had intended to bequeath the described portion of Lot 2053 to the defendant-appellant. That it should be
expressed in the past tense is irrelevant: technicalities should not be allowed to enervate the manifest will of the testatrix, clearly
expressed in a valid testament, or unavoidably inferred therefrom.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo should be and is modified by declaring, as we
hereby rule, that the deed of Donation executed by the late Carmen Ubalde in favor of Estela Magbanua Peaflorida on November 24,
1948 is a valid and effective conveyance by way of donation inter vivos, duly accepted by the donee.
IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, the appealed decision is affirmed. Without costs in this instance.
Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

3. G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ
AND REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
reversed that of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City directing petitioner to reconvey to private respondents the property donated to it
by their predecessor-in-interest.
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a member of the Board of Trustees of the Central Philippine College
(now Central Philippine University [CPU]), executed a deed of donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of land identified as Lot No.
3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A
was issued in the name of the donee CPU with the following annotations copied from the deed of donation
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical college
with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in any way encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college shall be under obligation to erect
a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be known
as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of a building
thereon. 1
On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to the time the action was filed the latter had not complied with
the conditions of the donation. Private respondents also argued that petitioner had in fact negotiated with the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter.
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed; that it did not violate any of the
conditions in the deed of donation because it never used the donated property for any other purpose than that for which it was
intended; and, that it did not sell, transfer or convey it to any third party.
On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the conditions of the donation and declared it null and void.
The court a quo further directed petitioner to execute a deed of the reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of the donor,
namely, private respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June 1993 ruled that the annotations at the back of petitioner's certificate of
title were resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition mandated petitioner to utilize the donated property for the establishment of
a medical school, the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a period was fixed for the
fulfillment of the condition, petitioner could not be considered as having failed to comply with its part of the bargain. Thus, the
appellate court rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision and remanding the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the time within which petitioner should comply with the first condition annotated in the certificate of title.
Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that the quoted annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner
are onerous obligations and resolutory conditions of the donation which must be fulfilled non-compliance of which would render the
donation revocable; (b) in holding that the issue of prescription does not deserve "disquisition;" and, (c) in remanding the case to the
trial court for the fixing of the period within which petitioner would establish a medical college. 2
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by Don Ramon
Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is
considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the donation. A gift
of land to the City of Manila requiring the latter to erect schools, construct a children's playground and open streets on the land was
considered an onerous donation. 3 Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an
obligation upon the latter to establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to
another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one. 4 It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation

became effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of
the donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. 5 If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the
condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have
acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is unavailing.
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the land donated, depended upon the
exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself
to comply with the condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended upon the
exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation
provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private
respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation. 6
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the donation and recovery of the property donated
cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or
that which should not have been done is done. 7 In cases where there is no special provision for such computation, recourse must be
had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could have been instituted. It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period. In this case, the starting
point begins with the expiration of a reasonable period and opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the
donor.
The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the necessary buildings and improvements on the property cannot be
quantified in a specific number of years because of the presence of several factors and circumstances involved in the erection of an
educational institution, such as government laws and regulations pertaining to education, building requirements and property
restrictions which are beyond the control of the donee.
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the
general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the
fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such
period has arrived. 8
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a
reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even
if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need
to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no
purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. 9 Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code,
when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall decree
the same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the
period of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of rights and interests. 10 Records are clear and facts are
undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply
with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and
equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now
return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 34, of 31 May 1991 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals of 18 June 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, petitioner is directed to reconvey to
private respondents Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A within
thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. vs. Wilfredo Palma, et al., which declared null and void the donation made by respondents of a parcel
of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in
favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents
imposed the condition that the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. This donation was
accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was
constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated
parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani
Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of
Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this,
District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the
bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the
school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he
asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already
the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated property but
Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed
of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita
Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In its Decision dated 20
August 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was no breach or violation of the condition imposed in the subject Deed of
Donation by the donee. The exchange is proper since it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and for the expansion and
improvement of the school facilities within the community. The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the
donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction of exchange is a (sic) exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs (Art.
764, Civil Code). The donee, being the State had the greater reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and onerous contract of donation.
It would be illogical and selfish for the donor to technically preclude the donee from expanding its school site and improvement of its
school facilities, a paramount objective of the donee in promoting the general welfare and interests of the people of Barangay
Kauswagan. But it is a well-settled rule that if the contract is onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in question, the doubt shall be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests, which in the instant case, is the donee.
x

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgement is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony and reconciliation between the parties;
3. With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 22
October 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds that
the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated.
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN INVALID
ACCEPTANCE BY THE DONEE.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A CONDITION IN THE DONATION.
The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the acceptance was not
allegedly done in accordance with Articles 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code.

We agree.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3)
conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation
in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for
past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made
in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of
which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal
obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more
than the thing donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of
donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by
the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions
of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a
school on the donated property
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance of the donation because:
xxx
Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The acceptance may either be in the same document as the deed of
donation or in a separate public instrument. If the acceptance is in a separate instrument, "the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both instruments.
"Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been
accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly noticed thereof. (Abellera vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85; Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78
SCRA 245). If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is
sufficient if it shows the intention to accept, But in this case, it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor and the
fact that due notice has been given it must be noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that showing
acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II, Civil Code of the Philippines by
Tolentino.)."
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as exhibit "A" and "1" to determine whether there was acceptance of the
donation. This Court found none. We further examined the record if there is another document which embodies the acceptance, we
found one. Although the Court found that in the offer of exhibits of the defendants, a supposed affidavit of acceptance and/or
confirmation of the donation, marked as exhibit "8" appears to have been offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on
record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required under Art.
749 of the Civil Code. And according to Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the requirements of perfecting a
donation. In other words, without such a notation, the contract is not perfected contract. Since the donation is not perfected, the
contract is therefore not valid
xxx
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or
with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charge which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted
in both instruments.
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of acceptance
and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in evidence. However, private respondents now question this

exhibit because, according to them "there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been admitted nor
such exhibit appear on record."
Respondents' stance does not persuade. The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at
its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the validity of the
donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it take respondents more than
ten (10) years from the date of the donation to question its validity? In the very least, they are guilty of estoppel
Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid acceptance of the donation, the acceptance was not noted in the Deed of
Donation as required in Article 749 of the Civil Code, hence, the donation is void.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the
donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court the Court held:
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate public instrument and that it was duly communicated to the donors.
Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But what they do contend is that such acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," meaning
the extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the acceptance was made by
Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this donation and
does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and
Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion that the annulment of the donation for being defective in form as
urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However, we find
that under the circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the
parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such as interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the case
at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the
donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the
donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too
much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in
the separate instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later acknowledged by Juan.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the
existence of the school building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay
Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo
Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual
knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance
of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia
of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines, it is
undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, his acceptance was authorized
under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of
its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long
as the same are not prohibited by law.
Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in exchanging the donated lot with a bigger lot, violated the condition in the
donation that the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only.
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey? "School" is simply an institution or place of education.
"Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is
synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc." "Exclusive" means "excluding or having power to
exclude (as by preventing entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession, control or
use.
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with
another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose
was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose
of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school
building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 132681

December 3, 2001

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner,

vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE REYES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of
land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on
the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. 1 The second page contains
the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that
the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of
Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness. 2 The
Acknowledgment reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY
) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No. 19055265 issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me
and to me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her
own free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages, including the page on which this acknowledgment is written,
has been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand margin of
page 2 and both pages have been sealed with my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.

(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC

Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)

DOC NO. 22;

PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No.
143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he
is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving
relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an
action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of Violeta
Quilala. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently,
respondents withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo T. San Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.

The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary
public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus
rendering the donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that
Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the
adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it
appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be registered.
The trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and
Juan Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina
Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala
and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Estate of Catalina Quilala;.
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of the deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1,) and
the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings
of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.4
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate
proceedings by the interested parties so as not to render nugatory the right of the lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on February 11, 1998.5 Hence, this petition for review,
raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY INTERVIVOS IS NOT REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA
IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA.6
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code,
the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to be valid,7 specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is
generally considered irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and
the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real
property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is
legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it." 16
The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby
expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR.17
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the
Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for
Violeta's failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e.,
the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:

Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public instruments shall be registrable:
Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by person or persons executing the same in the presence of at least two
witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or persons
executing the same before a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the
instrument so acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is written, each
page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each
page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where the signatures already appear at the foot of the
instrument shall be signed on the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses,
and all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the
acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more
parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment." (italics supplied).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one
witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the
contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law
merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the
falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his
signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong
side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the abovequoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and
void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument.
The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which
contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation,
was made in a public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter of
Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement
proceedings affecting the respective estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation, which we declare herein to be
valid, will still be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771, 18 in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donor's death,19 whether the donation was made to a
compulsory heir or a stranger,20 unless there is an express prohibition if that had been the donor's intention.21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals , is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. L-6600

July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.
Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.
Inocencio Rosete for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two deeds of donation executed on the first day of
December, 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, to be void for
being donations mortis causa accomplished without the formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions.
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. 8892) on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and
other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged
that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two
notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively,
transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of
Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs
likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and
Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services
rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence,
misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.

After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on November 13, 1949, finding that the deeds of donation were executed
by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without
any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were
presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations
were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.
Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as primary error the holding of the court below that the
donations are inter vivos; appellants contending that they were mortis causa donations, and invalid because they had not been
executed with the formalities required for testamentary disposition.
A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under consideration, and on January 12, 1953, the majority rendered judgment
holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the
testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties
in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two Justices dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations
inter vivos and voted for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of First Instance. The donees then sought a review by this Court.
The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical nature of the donations in question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2) are
couched in identical terms, with the exception of the names of the donees and the number and description of the properties donated.
The principal provisions are the following.
ESCRITURA DE DONATION
Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de edad, vencino y residente del municipio de Agno, Pangasinan,
I.F., por la presente declaro lo siguiente:
Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de su
largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hagor y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del
citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.
(Description omitted)
Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe Bonsato hasta en estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y estimado
como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su pobriza sea movido mi sentimiento
para dar una recompensa de sus trabajos y aprecios a mi favor.
Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados
pero de los productos mientras vive el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo y la parte como inquilino tomara
Felipe Bonsato.
Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatorio Felipe Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su
favor.
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donancion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos los
derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y pueda
ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente.
En Testimonio de todo lo Cual, signo la presente en Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., hoy dia 1.0 de Diciembre, 1939.

Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato

Yo, Felipe Bonsato, mayor de edad, casado, Vecino de Mabini, Pangasinan, I.F., declaro por la presente que acepto la
donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi favor.

(Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato

SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:

(Sgd.) Illegible

(Sgd.) Illegible

The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals that took cognizance of this case relied primarily on the last
paragraph, stressing the passage:

Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion . . .

while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph, wherein the donor states that he makes "perfect, irrevocable, and
consummated donation" of the properties to the respective donees, petitioners herein.
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe
the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present
that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one
may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary
dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property
by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.
Commenting on this article, Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl, Vol. XI, 2 parte, pp. 573, 575 says:
No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las donaciones mortis causa como institucion independiente, con propia
autonomia y propio compo jurisdiccional? La respuesta debe ser negativa.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo como se conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un Museo. La
asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de muerte y las transmissiones por testamento es perfecta.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses the same opinion:
"La disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: 1..o, que han desaparecido las llamas antes donaciones mortis causa
por lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; 2.o, que toda disposicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue las
reglas establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria.
And Castan, in his Derecho Civil, Vol. IV (7th Ed., 1953), p. 176, reiterates:
(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las
donaciones mortis causa han perdido en el Codigo Civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hay que considerarlos hoy
como una institucion suprimida, refundida en el legado ... . Las tesis de la desaparcion de las donaciones mortis causa en
nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el pryecto de 1851 puede decirse que constituye una communis
opinion entre nuestros expositores, incluso los mas recientes.
We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly
employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter,
then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman
vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The
donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el
donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated
property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the
contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis
causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of
revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall
become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must be
construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the
donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances;
for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a
charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos derechos de
dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y puede ejercitar su
derecho que crea conveniente.
Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to conflict with the irrevocability of the donation and its consummated
character, as expressed in the first part of the deeds of donation, a conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1285; New
Civil Code, Art. 1374; Rule 123, sec. 59, Rules of Court).
Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I. F., en consideracion de su
largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hago y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado
Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.
In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for not having been executed with the formalities of
testaments, the circumstances clearly indicated the transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. Thus, in
Cario vs. Abaya, 70 Phil., 182, not only were the properties not to be given until thirty days after the death of the last of the donors,
but the deed also referred to the donees as "those who had been mentioned to inherit from us", the verb "to inherit" clearly implying
the acquisition of property only from and after the death of the alleged donors. In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil.,
244, the alleged donor expressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time before his death, and limited the
donation "to whatever property or properties left undisposed by me during my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their ownership until his
death. While in David vs. Sison, 42 Off. Gaz. (Dec, 1946) 3155, the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the property
allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the
donated properties could not be disposed of in any way", thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership,
the power to dispose of the properties. No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of donation involved in this appeal.
That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular
significance in determining whether the deeds Exhibits 1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have
identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the
absence of any reservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that the act
was inter vivos. Hence, it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the formalities of
testaments were not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of
the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As the
properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not affect the half interest
inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from the predeceased wife of the donor.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against
respondents.

7. THE SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION and DR. BENITO
TUMAMAO, Schools Division Present:
Superintendent of Isabela,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 164748

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY,

Promulgated:
SR., represented by IGNACIA
VICENTE, RUFINO DULAY,
January 27, 2006
JR., SUSANA DULAY,
ADELAIDA DULAY,
LUZVIMINDA DULAY and
CECILIA DULAY,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78314 which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-2397.

The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente were the owners of a parcel of land located in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela,
with an area of 29,002 square meters. The lot was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-6776.
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay executed a deed of donation over a 10,000-square-meter portion of their property in
favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS]). The deed provided,
among others:
That for and in consideration of the benefits that may be derived from the use of the above described
property which is intended for school purposes, the said DONORS do by by (sic) these presents TRANSFER AND
CONVEY by way of DONATION unto the DONEE, its successors and assigns, the above property to become
effective upon the signing of this document.
The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143337 covering the portion
identified as Lot 8858-A was issued in the name of the Ministry of Education and Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the
Superintendent of Schools of Isabela. However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal National High School building on a
parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The school site was about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by the spouses
Dulay.
In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to them
considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a period of more than 13 years. On August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of
Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No. 39 recognizing the right of the donors to redeem the subject parcel of land because of the
DECS failure to utilize it for the intended purpose. It further resolved that the Rizal National High School no longer needed the
donated land considering its distance from the main campus and [the] failure to utilize the property for a long period of time.
On December 22, 1994, Rufino Dulay, Sr. passed away at the age of 80. His heirs sought the help of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Santiago City via an undated letter requesting the approval of a resolution allowing them to redeem the donated
property. The Sangguniang Panlungsod denied the request inasmuch as the city government was not a party to the deed of donation.
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents, filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of donation
and cancellation of TCT No. T-143337 before the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, against the DECS Secretary and Dr.
Benito Tumamao, the Schools Division Superintendent of Isabela. Respondents alleged that there was a condition in the deed of
donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property for school purposes, that is, the construction of a building to house the
Rizal National High School. Respondents alleged that the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land remained idle up to the
present. Respondents also averred that the donation inter vivos was inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than
what he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS complied
with said condition because the land was being used by the school as its technology and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation
was not inofficious for the donors were the owners of five other parcels of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the DECS
acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase made on December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the
amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its former Barangay Captain, Jesus San Juan; and (d) the action of the respondents had
prescribed. The OSG also claimed that students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees;
the produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for the construction of a school building on the subject property.
In their Reply, respondents denied that the donated land was being used as a technology and home economics laboratory, and
averred that there were no improvements on the property. Moreover, the fact that rice was planted on the lot was contrary to the
intended purpose of the donation. The respondents likewise denied that the property had been sold to the barangay. While the other
properties of the late donor had been sold, the deeds thereon had not been registered, and the tax declarations not yet transferred in the
names of the purchasers.

Thereafter, trial ensued. On March 6, 2001, an ocular inspection of the property was conducted by the parties and their
respective counsels, including the Presiding Judge. It was confirmed that the land was barren, save for a small portion which was
planted with palay. A demolished house was also found in the periphery of the donated lot.
On December 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby DECLARES the deed of
donation, Exhibit A, executed by the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. and his wife Ignacia Vicente over a portion of the land
covered by O.C.T. No. P-6776 and now covered by T.C.T. No. T-143337 in the name of the donee Department of
Education and Culture as REVOKED. The defendant DECS is ORDERED to execute the deed of reconveyance of
the land in favor of the plaintiffs heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr.
SO ORDERED.
In revoking the deed of donation, the trial court ruled that the donation was subject to a resolutory condition, namely, that the
land donated shall be used for school purposes. It was no longer necessary to determine the intended school purpose because it was
established that the donee did not use the land. Thus, the condition was not complied with since the property was donated in July
1981. Moreover, the DECS did not intend to use the property for school purposes because a school had already been built and
established in another lot located in the same barangay, about two kilometers away from the subject land. Finally, the trial court
rejected petitioners contention that the donation was inofficious.
Aggrieved, the OSG appealed the decision to the CA
On July 30, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the decision. The court held that the DECS failed to
comply with the condition in the donation, that is, to use the property for school purposes. The CA further ruled that the donation was
onerous considering that the donee was burdened with the obligation to utilize the land for school purposes; therefore, the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 764 of the New Civil Code did not apply. Moreover, the CA declared that a deed of donation is
considered a written contract and is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides for a 10-year prescriptive period
from the time the cause of action accrues. According to the CA, the respondents cause of action for the revocation of the donation
should be reckoned from the expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the DECS to comply with what was incumbent upon it.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Petitioners seek relief from this Court via petition for review on certiorari, contending that:
I.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THROUGH THE RIZAL NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, HAD
COMPLIED WITH THE CONDITION IMPOSED IN THE DEED OF DONATION.
II.
RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO SEEK THE REVOCATION OF THE DEED OF DONATION, IF THERE BE ANY,
IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.
The Court shall resolve the issues raised by petitioners seriatim.
The donee failed to comply with
the condition imposed in the deed
of donation
The issue of whether or not petitioner DECS was able to comply with the condition imposed in the deed of donation is one of
fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query
necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence considering mostly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation. Under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, for the simple reason that
this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for the Court to calibrate the evidence on record, as this is the function of the trial court.
Although there are well-defined exceptions to the rule, nevertheless, after a review of the records, we find no justification to depart

therefrom. Moreover, the trial courts findings of facts, as affirmed by the appellate court on appeal, are binding on this Court, unless
the trial and appellate courts overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would change the outcome of the case. The case has been reviewed thoroughly, and we find no justification to reverse the CA
decision.
Petitioners, through the OSG, maintain that the condition (to use the property for school purposes) is not limited to the
construction of a school building, but includes utilizing it as a technology and home economics laboratory where students and teachers
plant palay, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees. The OSG insists that the donee did not specify in the deed that the property
should be used for the construction of a school building. According to the OSG, the proceeds of the harvest were used and are still
being used by the Rizal National High School for the construction and improvement of its present school site. Moreover, it was
verified that there was palay planted on the donated property during the ocular inspection on the property.
In their comment on the petition, respondents dispute petitioners contentions, and aver that no evidence was presented to
prove that, indeed, palay, mahogany seedlings and fruit-bearing trees were planted on the property. Respondents also emphasized that
when the trial court inspected the subject property, it was discovered to be barren and without any improvement although some
portions thereof were planted with palay. Petitioners even failed to adduce evidence to identify the person who planted the palay.
The contention of petitioners has no merit.
As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove that the donated property was used for school purposes as
indicated in the deed of donation:
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have complied with the condition of donation. It
is not amiss to state that other than the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants, there is nothing in the records that
could concretely prove that the condition of donation has been complied with by the defendant-appellants. In the
same breadth, the planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the school
purposes referred to and intended by the donors when they had donated the land in question. Also, the posture of the
defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal
National High School is far from being the truth considering that not only is the said school located two kilometers
away from the land donated but also there was not even a single classroom built on the land donated that would
reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein. These observations, together with the
unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the trial court which revealed that the land donated remains idle and
without any improvement thereon for more than a decade since the time of the donation, give Us no other alternative
but to conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply with what is incumbent upon them in
the deed of donation.
In its Order dated March 6, 2001, the RTC reiterated that during the ocular inspection of the property conducted in the
presence of the litigants and their counsel, it observed that the land was barren; there were no improvements on the donated property
though a portion thereof was planted with palay [and a demolished house built in 1979.
Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that the palay found in the property was planted by DECS
personnel or at its instance or even by students of the Rizal National High School. No evidence was adduced to prove that there were
existing plans to use the property for school purposes. Petitioners even debilitated their cause when they claimed in the trial court that
the barangay acquired the property by purchase, relying on the certification of former Barangay Captain Jesus San Juan.
The right to seek the revocation of
donation had not yet prescribed
when respondents filed their complaint
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that respondents cause of action is already barred by prescription
under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance with the condition in the deed of donation. Since
such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the
DECS utilized another property for the construction of the school building, the four-year prescriptive period did not commence on
such date. Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its
advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to utilize

the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a
contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract. We fully agree with the ruling of the appellate court:

xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-year prescriptive period for the revocation of donation
provided under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and instead apply the general rules on contracts since Article 733
of the same Code, specifically provided that onerous donations shall be governed by the rules on contracts.
Corollarily, since a deed of donation is considered a written contract, it is governed by Article 1144 of the
New Civil Code, which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from a written contract is ten (10)
years from the time the cause of action accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause of action is from
the expiration of the time within which the donee must comply with the conditions or obligations of the donation. In
the instant case, however, it must be noted that the subject donation fixed no period within which the donee can
comply with the condition of donation. As such, resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary. Said
article provides that if the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. Indeed, from the nature and
circumstances of the condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a period was contemplated by the
donors. The donors could not have intended their property to remain idle for a very long period of time when, in
fact, they specifically obliged the defendant-appellants to utilize the land donated for school purposes and thus put it
in good use.
In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, a case squarely in point, we have established that the legal possibility of
bringing the action begins with the expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the donee to fulfill what has been charged upon it
by the donor. Likewise, we held that even if Article 1197 of the New Civil Code provides that the courts may fix the duration when
the obligation does not determine the period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the
general rule cannot be applied because to do so would be a mere technicality and would serve no other purpose than to delay or lead to
an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Altogether, it has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation. Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for the
purpose specified in the deed of donation. The property remained barren and unutilized. Even after respondents sought the return of
the property before the courts, petitioner DECS still failed to draw up plans to use the property for school purposes. In fine, petitioner
DECS has no use for the property; hence, the same shall be reverted to the respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78314 dated July 30,
2004 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 77425

June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450

June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari seek to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05456 which
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as the order of
said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract
and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop

of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite
and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein.
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both
deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land
(Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less. The deed of
donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the
execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation
and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of
Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner
spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision.
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1)
herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2)
grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the cause
of action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a real
party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their
respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on (a) whether or not the action for rescission of
contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of
contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for
reconveyance of real property.
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants' complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is
hereby ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings. No Costs.
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by
respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated February 6, 1987, hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of
the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4)
years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence
a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition thereof would render ipso facto
null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the
donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it
otherwise and that the donors and the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation to have
the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be violated, then the phrase reading "would
render ipso facto null and void" would not appear in the deed of donation.
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary
where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.It called attention to
the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the
contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort

to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special
provision granting the power of cancellation.
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not apply to
the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general
provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not
have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that the
same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of
the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently
justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor
upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al. It was held therein that said
stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need
of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the
donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was an
onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar
is also subject to the same rules because of its provision on automatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from
parity of reasons said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules
on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code
authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the
propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that Article
764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed of
donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same
should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of
donation that the property donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the
deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners
and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.
Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain
conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The
condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right
of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against
alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered applicable by analogy.1wphi1 Under the
third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article
870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20)
years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property by
gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of
prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of either the donor or testator. For that
reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative policy
expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being
an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition
within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such
condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of
donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the
nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private
respondents must fail.

It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation was not specifically put in issue in the
pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving
the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the
very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion
to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue of
prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While the
issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error
since both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case: Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related to an
error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the
trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case. The
aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition
in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case
No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.