Final - Poli 2011.CD

San Beda College of Law
2011 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
Case Digests in Political Law

Constitutional Law
General Principles
Delegation of Powers
Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority
G.R. No. 165299, December 18, 2009
Carpio, J.
Facts:
Petitioner is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. Respondent conducted an
investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioners laundry washing
activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. Petitioner undertook
necessary measures to abate the water pollution. After separate compliance monitoring, however,
petitioner still failed to conform to the effluent standards of LLDA. A Pollution Control and Abatement
case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner then requested another wastewater
sampling which results already showed compliance with the effluent standards. Petitioner prayed that
the Notice of Violation and its corresponding penalty be set aside for having no legal and factual basis
because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment. The Public Hearing Committee
and the CA ruled in favor of LLDAs power to impose administrative fines in pollution abatement
cases.
Issue:
Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of
legislative powers?
Held:
NO. Contrary to petitioners contention that the grant to LLDA of the implied power to impose
penalties will result in unfettered discretion to the latter to determine for itself the penalties it may
impose thus amounting to undue delegation of legislative power, the LLDAs power to impose fines is
not unrestricted.
LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling. It
was only after investigation that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner. The P 1,000.00 penalty per
day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under Section 9, P.D. 984 which partially
states any person who shall violate Section 8 of this decree shall be liable to a penalty of not to
exceed one thousand pesos each day during which the violation continues, or by imprisonment of
from 2 years to 6 years, or by both fine and imprisonment, and in addition such person may be
required or enjoined from continuing such violation. Clearly, there are adequate statutory limitations
on LLDAs power to impose fines which obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise of such power.
Fundamental Powers of the State

Eminent Domain
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation
Office (ATO)
v. Bernardo Lozada, et al.
G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010
Nachura, J.
Facts:
The Republic initiated expropriation proceedings of a lot originally owned by Respondents for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. RTC rendered judgment in the expropriation
proceeding in favor of the Republic. The affected owners including respondents appealed. Pending
Political Law

the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise agreement to the effect that the expropriated lots
would be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the
Lahug Airport.
The projected improvement and expansion of the airport was not pursued. In 1989, then President
Corazon Aquino directed the transfer of general aviations operations of the Lahug Airport to the
Mactan International Airport and the closure of the Lahug Airport. In 1990, a law was passed creating
the MCIAA. Petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of
ownership. Petitioners denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey the lot and that
the judgment of condemnation was unconditional.
Issue:
Whether respondents are entitled to the possession of the subject lot and the reconveyance of
ownership?
Held:
YES. The acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the
Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having materialized because the airport
had been abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated
property.
With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which, it should file another
petition for he new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper
exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law.
Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et. al. v. Jovito M. Luis, et. al.
G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Said parcel of land was taken by the City
of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue,
Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution
No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal
Committee of the City of Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value
of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested
the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. In
response, petitioner Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996 informing respondents
that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee. Thus,
on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages against herein
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Petitioners contend that
respondents action to claim just compensation for the property taken for public use is already barred
by prescription.
Issue:
Whether respondents action to claim just compensation for the expropriated property is barred by
prescription.
Held:
NO. At the outset, petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents action for recovery of
their property, which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is already
barred by prescription. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized "that
where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe." The Court went on to remind government agencies not to exercise the
Case Digests

power of eminent domain with wanton disregard for property rights as Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Fundamental Principles and State Policies

Immunity from Suit
Jesus P. Disini v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al
G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010
Abad, J.
Facts:
In 1989, respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the PCGG, wanted
petitioner to testify for his government in its case before the United States District Court of New Jersey
and in an arbitration case that filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration.
On February 16, 1989, respondent Republic and petitioner entered into an Immunity Agreement under
which petitioner undertook to testify for his government and provide its lawyers with the information,
affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the two cases. The Republic guaranteed that,
apart from the two cases, it shall not compel petitioner to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against his second cousin.
Petitioner complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
subpoena against petitioner, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in
an action that the Republic filed against his cousin. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the subpoena,
invoking his Immunity Agreement with the Republic. The PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement between petitioner and respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the latter from
requiring petitioner to testify against his second cousin.
Issue:
Whether the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement
between respondent Republic and petitioner.
Held:
NO. The scope of immunity offered by the PCGG may vary. It has discretion to grant appropriate
levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the
prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by
the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation.
In petitioners case, respondent Republic, acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and
civil immunity but also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign
proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so he
would agree to testify. Trusting in the Governments honesty and fidelity, petitioner agreed and fulfilled
his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should
hold the Republic on to its promise.
Bill of Rights
Due Process
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010
Brion, J.
Facts:
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations
from the list of registered parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations
Political Law

affected was petitioner PGBI. The COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional,
sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its
authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009. PGBI filed its Opposition to
Resolution No. 8679 and avers that the implementation of the challenged resolution should be
suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties
in accordance with Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941 which provides: The COMELEC xxx may remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of xxx party, organization or coalition xxx.
Issue:
Whether or not the PGBI was denied due process.
Held:
NO. PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did
seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. We find
it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case,
given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process
grounds.
Pagayanan R. Hadji-Sirad v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 182267, August 28, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
Petitioner is an employee of COA in ARMM. She was charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service because she allowed another person to
take, in her place, the October 17, 1993 Career Service Professional Examination. Hearings were
repeatedly postponed upon petitioners request. The CSC found the petitioner guilty of the said
charges. Petitioner assails denial of due process because she was not given the right to present
evidence.
Issue:
Was petitioner denied due process?
Held:
NO. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings, which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance
of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.
Petitioner cannot claim denial of due process when records reveal that (1) petitioner was given
sufficient notice of the Formal Charge against her; (2) petitioner was formally charged after an initial
investigation was conducted; (3) her several requests for postponement of the hearings were granted;
(4) the prosecution only presented evidence during the hearings when petitioner and her counsel
were present; (5) petitioner herself and her two witnesses got the opportunity to testify; and (6)
petitioner sought recourse with the CSC by filing an appeal, as well as a Motion for Reconsideration of
the unfavorable judgment subsequently rendered by the CSC. All these establish that petitioner was
able to avail herself of all procedural remedies available to her.
Equal Protection of Law

4
Case Digests

Commission on Elections v. Conrado Cruz, et al.
G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009
Brion, J.
Facts:
Some of the incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City challenge the constitutionality
of Section 2 of RA No. 9164 entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides that: xxx No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. The challenge was based on the ground that the
implementation of such would be a violation of the equal protection of the law inasmuch as the
barangay elective officials were singled out that their consecutive term limit shall be counted
retroactively whereas the consecutive limit for other local and national elective officials are counted
prospectively.
Issue:
Whether the implementation of the said provision would be a violation of the equal protection of the
law.
Held:
NO. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons
who are different from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of
the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently
in law.
The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to
length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that
while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it
left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize
substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman, et al.
v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.
G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010."
At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). Barely a month
after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
Held:
YES. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning
Political Law

the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least
three portions of the questioned executive order.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In
this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar
widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order
No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth,
must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be
arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

People of the Philippines v. Raul Nues y Revilleza
G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009
Quisimbing, J.
Facts:
Police officers conducted a search in the house of the appellant based on reports of drug possession.
The search warrant authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride and drug
paraphernalia(s). The police found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners,
tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610.00 inside appellants
dresser. The police also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric
tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu.
Issue:
Whether there was an irregularity in the search conducted.
Held:
YES. The search warrant specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and paraphernalia(s) only. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers,
electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. The purpose of the
constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit
the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is
not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. In seizing the said items then, the police officers
exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellants residence they
believed were proceeds of the crime or means of committing the offense.
Spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla v. People of the Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 158467, October 16, 2009
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Case Digests

Facts:
Special Investigator Lagasca of National Bureau of Investigation filed for search warrant against the
petitioners house located in Angeles City for violation of RA 6245. It was filed in the court of Executive
Judge Guaria III of Manila. Under Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC, the applications for search
warrant shall be personally endorsed by the Director of NBI. The application for search warrant was
not personally endorsed by Director Wycoco of the Bureau. Instead, NBI Deputy Director for Special
Investigation Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for
Lagasca to apply for search warrant.
Issue:
Whether the search warrant was defective considering the application was not personally endorsed by
the Director of NBI.
Held:
NO. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF
from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant
heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head
or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or
head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of
endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted
provision of law unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols
endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself.
Freedom of Expression
GSIS and Winston F. Garcia as Pres. & Gen. Manager of GSIS v. Dinnah Villaviza,
et al
G. R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Some 20 or so employees of the GSIS, wearing red shirts marched to or appeared simultaneously at
or just outside the office of the GSIS Investigation Unit to show support to their union officer at public
hearing for just over an hour. They brought with them recording gadgets, clenched their fists, and
some even badmouthed the GSIS guards and management.
The respondents were charged for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and were found guilty. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission found respondents
guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the
penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that the actuation of appellants can be considered as an
exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally protected right. The Court of Appeals upheld
CSC when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action.
Issue:
Whether the acts of the respondents fall within the purview of the constitutional guarantee to freedom
of expression and peaceful assembly
Held:
YES. Government workers, whatever their rank, have as much right as any person in the land to voice
out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service
does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the
government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom
can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
Thus, Section 5 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1316, which regulates the political
rights of those in the government service, provides that the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to
Political Law

realize their demands of force concession. Such limitation or qualification in the above rule is
intended to temper and focus the application of the prohibition, as not all collective activity or mass
undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, government employees would be
deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Respondents acts did not amount to a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action.
Eliseo F. Soriano v. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, et al.
G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
MTRCB imposed a penalty of suspension on the television show Ang Dating Daan. This was in
connection to certain utterances petitioner made in the show which was aired on UNTV 37 on August
10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m. against Iglesia Ni Cristo which was found by the Court indecent and
offensive. Hence, petitioner questions the suspension as it constituted prior restraint against his
freedom of expression
Issue:
Whether the suspension meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint.
Held:
NO. The suspension does not constitute prior restraint but partakes of the nature of subsequent
punishment for the violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program.
Petitioners contention that his statements were in accordance with his constitutional right of speech
and religion was not well taken by the Court as petitioner failed to take into consideration the medium
he used which was a television broadcast which is accessible to children of all ages. It is the interest
of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioners invectives which must
take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The freedom of broadcast media is, in
terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which
reaches every home where there is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of
the programs shown.
The sanctions imposed upon erring individuals and institutions may constitute restriction of freedoms
but as emphasized by the Court, freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights are far from absolute and that
each has its own limits, responsibilities, and obligations which everyone is expected to bear implicit in
the exercise of these freedoms.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., v. Anti-Terrorism Council
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
There are six petitions filed by different groups and individuals challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9372 otherwise known as Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioners assail the
definition of the crime of terrorism under the law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.
Issue:
Whether the Human Security Act of 2007 may be subjected to a facial challenge in order to assail its
constitutionality
Held:
NO. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. While the overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Facial invalidation is only
Case Digests

applicable in free speeches cases. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling
effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. This rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially
harmful conduct. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. It is settled that the
application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the Court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigants. In this case, since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. In fine, petitioners have
established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible.
Right to Information
Center for People Empowerment in Governance v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010
Abad, J.
Facts:
On May 26, 2009, the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-government
organization, wrote to respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code for the
Automated Election System (AES). CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 9369, which provides: x x x x Once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available
and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machine and the Consolidation/Canvassing System, but denied that for the
Data Capturing System. However, COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source
code that it said it was approving for release. It said that the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet
exist.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC has the duty to disclose the source code for the Automated Election System
(AES) technologies it used in the 2010 national and local elections.
Held:
YES. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is
selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review
thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law.
Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when
CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security
reasons under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.
Political Law

Right to Assembly and Petition
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Honorable Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed with the
Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge
on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law
students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but
indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP
received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The
petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on
June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve
the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively,
denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the
merits in view of the pendency of the certiorari case with the CA and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled by the first assailed issuance, that the petition became
moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the
second assailed issuance. Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether the instant petition no longer presents a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether respondent Mayor erred in the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit because his
authority to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly are not
absolute.
Held:
1. NO. An exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.
In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each
time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to
the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days prior to
the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at
hand.
2. YES. Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads: x x x (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit,
he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. x x x e) If the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. x x x
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent
10
Case Digests

and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to
be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an
unfavorable action on the permit.
It is true that the licensing official, respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably
occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there.
Non-Impairment Clause
Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation v. Puerto Azul Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 178768/G.R. No. 180893, November 25, 2009
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) obtained loans from various banks to finance its operations. Because of
the rejection of the Philippine Stock Exchange of the listing of its shares in its initial public offering, the
1997 Asian financial crisis and the decline of the real estate market, PALI was unable to keep up with
the payment of its obligations, both current and those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors,
the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development
Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure proceedings on PALIs mortgaged properties. PALI filed a
petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation
plan.
EIB contested the rehabilitation plan on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results in the
impairment of the obligations of contract. PWRDC contests the stipulations in PALIs rehabilitation
plan which include, among others, fifty percent (50%) reduction of the principal obligation and
condonation of the accrued and substantial interests and penalty charges.
Issue:
Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan is in violation of the non-impairment clause enshrined in
the Bill of Rights.
Held:
NO. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of
contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the
modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors.
Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Property rights and contractual rights are not
absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State for the common good of the general public.
Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez v. PICOP Resourec, Inc.
G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43
converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). PICOP filed before the (RTC)
City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting
to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal
requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA.
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial
court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an (IFMA) with PICOP.
Political Law
11

Issue:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the
government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by
the due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring
PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would
result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.
Free Access to Courts

Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients
from paying filing, docket and other fees.
A.M. No. 08-11-7 SC, August 28, 2009
Corona, J.:
Facts:
On September 23, 2008, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested the IBPs National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other
fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.
The IBP, through the NCLA, claims that under Section 16-D of R.A. 9406, clients of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to the
institution of action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, clients of legal aid
offices in the various IBP chapters do not enjoy the same exemption.
Issue:
Whether the Court should grant the request for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and
other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.
Held:
YES. The 1987 Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to
adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service
of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them
from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With
these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to
justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Heirs of Simeon Piedad, namely, Eliseo Piedad, et al. v. Executive Judge Cesar
O. Estrena and Judge Gaudiso D. Villarin, Regional Trial Court, Branches 29 and
59, respectively, Toledo city, Cebu
A.M. RTJ-09-2170. December 16, 2009
Velasco, Jr. J.
Facts:
12
Case Digests

Simeon Piedad filed a case against Candelaria for the annulment of an Absolute Deed of Sale. A
decision in favor of Piedad was rendered ordering the defendants to vacate the house and surrender
their possession of said house. The decision became final and executory. Subsequently, an order for
the issuance of the writ of demolition was issued. Candelaria filed a Petition for Probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad with the Toledo City RTC and raffled to Branch 59, which was
presided by respondent Judge Villarin. Also, a petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order was filed by Candelaria and was granted by Branch 29.
The following motions were filed before Branch 59 of the Toledo City RTC: (1) a motion to dismiss; (2)
a motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order; and (3) a joint motion to
resolve motions. Significantly, no action was taken on these motions. Respondent Judge Villarin
justified this by stating that he did not act on the pending motions because he did not want to interfere
with the order of a co-equal court, that is, Branch 29 of the Toledo City RTC and he believed that it
was unnecessary to issue an order on the motion, which had become moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge Villarin is guilty of undue delay in rendering an order.
Held:
YES. If respondent Judge Villarin indeed believed that the motions pending before him were
defective, he could have simply acted on the said motions and indicated the supposed defects in his
resolutions instead of just leaving them unresolved. Undue delay in the disposition of cases and
motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its
stature. No less than the Constitution mandates that lower courts must dispose of their cases
promptly and decide them within three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. There should be no more doubt that undue inaction on judicial concerns is not just
undesirable but more so detestable especially now when our all-out effort is directed towards
minimizing, if not totally eradicating, the perennial problem of congestion and delay long plaguing our
courts. The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent
delay in the administration of justice for obviously, justice delayed is justice denied. An unwarranted
slow down in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
Writ of Amparo
Reverend Father Robert P. Reyes v. Raul M. Gonzales
G.R. No. 182161, December 31, 2009
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007.
Together with fifty (50) others, petitioner was brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In
the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors conducted
inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the
others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering
respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned
case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City. However, the RTC issued on
December 13 an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of
probable cause.
Political Law
13

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Petitioner further maintained that
immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued
restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties
protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to
use his faculties in all lawful ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the
right of a person to travel.
Issue:
Whether petitioners right to travel is covered by the protection of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Held:
NO. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, "xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound
discretion."
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection
of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The
Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.
However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
Citizenship
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al. v. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., et al
G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
Perez, J.
Facts:
Records reveal that petitioners siblings Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively, to a Taiwanese
father and a Filipina mother. They were all born and raised in the Philippines and have resided in this
country for almost sixty (60) years.
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration. Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry. It was only after more than thirty (30) years that
petitioners Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, there is no
showing that petitioner Valeriano complied with the registration requirement. In 2004, the Bureau of
Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat G. Catral alleging that petitioners are
undesirable and overstaying aliens.
Issue:
Whether the failure to comply with the documentary requirements renders the election of citizenship
void.
Held:
14
Case Digests

NO. The court ruled that that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for
such election. The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines;
and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. The
constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We are
guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973
Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the
1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of
registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine
citizenship.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent; it is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the
election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and thereby negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.
Roseller De Guzman v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vicemayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent
filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006,
he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Upon approval of his application, he took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
The COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying petitioner. The
COMELEC en banc denied his motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship under RA 9225.
Held:
YES. R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who
wish to seek elective public office.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship to: (1) take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and for those seeking elective public
Political Law
15

offices in the Philippines, (2) additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The petitioner did not comply
with the second requirement.
Legislative Department
Powers of the Congress
Creation of Legislative Districts
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. In substance, the said law created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.
Held:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to
be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Parliamentary Immunity
Antero Pobre v.. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009
Velasco, Jr., J.
16
Case Digests

Facts:
Petitioner asked that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago after the latter made the following speech on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To petitioner, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. The lady senator, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, as provided in Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee.
Issue:
Whether Sen. Defensor-Santiagos remarks and conduct is covered by parliamentary immunity
Held:
YES. The Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution
of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or
its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms.
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The plea of Senator Santiago for the
dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. But to the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode
the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Jurisdiction of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010
Abad, J.
Facts:
In the 2007 elections Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group. Bantay received the sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda
Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondents filed with the HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay
and its nominee, petitioner Palparan. Respondents alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the
House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Furthermore, they
accused Palparan of committing gross human rights violations against marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Political Law
17

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner Palparans qualifications. Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a
resolution dated September 10, 2009
Issue:
Whether the HRET has the authority to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list
groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
Held:
YES. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Under Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who
shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from
the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list
system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast
their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in
the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to
the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
What is inevitable is that Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected
members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.
Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann Rosales v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 191998; December 7, 2010;
Brion, J.:
Facts:
The certiorari petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition for to disqualify respondent Juan Miguel
"Mikey" Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) in the May 10, 2010
elections pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7941 (the Party- List System Act).They argued that Arroyo, as AGPP nominee, failed to prove that he
was a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties.
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petitions for
disqualification against Arroyo. It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires the nominee to be
"a bona fide member [of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the elections." The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second
Divisions ruling in its July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution. On July 23 and 29, 2010, the certiorari
18
Case Digests

petitioners elevated their case to this Court via two (2) separate petitions for certiorari, to annul the
COMELEC Second Divisions joint resolution and the COMELEC en bancs consolidated resolution.
In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required percentage of votes
sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPPs first nominee, to sit in the House of
Representatives. On July 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives
and on the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPPs Representative.
Issue:
Whether jurisdiction over Arroyos qualifications as AGPP nominee should now properly be with the
HRET since Arroyo has been proclaimed and has assumed office as Member of the House of
Representatives.
Held:
YES. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications
of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and
purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon
was their party. From the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are
"elected" into office, not their parties or organizations.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for
him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Executive Department
Powers of the President
Prohibition to Hold Other Office
Dennis A. B. Funa v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H.
Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special
Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Petitioner Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
Respondents claim that there was no violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
because respondent Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on September 1, 2008.
She was designated MARINA OIC, not appointed MARINA Administrator. With the resignation of
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., the position of MARINA Administrator was left vacant, and pending the
Political Law
19

appointment of permanent Administrator, respondent Bautista was designated OIC in a temporary
capacity for the purpose of preventing a hiatus in the discharge of official functions.
Issue:
Whether the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
Held:
YES. The 1987 Constitution, in prohibiting dual or multiple offices as well as incompatible offices,
refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words
which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To
"hold" an office means to "possess or occupy" the same, or "to be in possession and administration,"
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
Evidently, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.
Such laudable intent of the law will be defeated and rendered sterile if we are to adopt the semantics
of respondents. It would open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of
appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Creation of Truth Commission

Mendoza, J.
Facts:
At the dawn of his administration, the President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July 30, 2010, signed
after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
Held:
NO. The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations
to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority.
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
20
Case Digests

Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is
to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
Power to Appoint
Arturo M. De Castro V. Judicial and Bar Council and President Gloria MacapagalArroyo
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
and, accordingly, directing the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice; (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of
nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
Motions for Reconsideration were herein filed by the petitioners with the aversion that a plain reading
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not lead to an interpretation that exempts
judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
Issue:
Whether judicial appointments are exempted from the ban on midnight appointments stated under
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
YES. We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby
raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many
principles of statutory construction. The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves
apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. For one, the
movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on
appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba
legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
The decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
Political Law
21

before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to
suit the purposes of any quarter.
Presidential Immunity from Suit

Lourdes D. Rubrico et. al. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et.al.
G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for
short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes) and detained
at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation, Lourdes was released
but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. After Lourdes
release, the harassment, continued.
A petition for the issuance writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was then originally filed by the
petitioners before the SC. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified
written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino
Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the
Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB filed,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them.
By separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case.
Issue:
Whether President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was correctly dropped as party respondent in the petition
since she enjoys immunity from suit during her term in office.
Held:
YES. Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her
term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed
by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken.
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued
during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. MacapagalArroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the
President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
22
Case Digests

hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential
act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights.
Judicial Department
Powers of the Judiciary
Contempt Powers
Venancio Inonog v. Judge Francisco B. Ibay
AM No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner is the security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Division of Makati City. At around
1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005, he parked the vehicle of his superior in a vacant parking space at the
basement of the Makati City Hall. At the time, the parking slots at the basement of the Makati City Hall
were indicated only by numbers and not by names of officials to whom they were assigned.
Thereafter, petitioner notified his superior that he will not be reporting for work for the rest of that day
because he was not feeling well. Thus, he left the vehicle in the said basement parking area and went
home to Tanay, Rizal.
Later that morning, petitioner received a call informing him that he should appear before the sala of
respondent judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of
court for parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge. The latter blamed the
usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision for several
criminal cases scheduled that morning.
When petitioner arrived at around 1:00 p.m., he found out that he had already been adjudged guilty of
contempt of court by respondent judge for delaying in the administration of justice. He was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt for an improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
Held:
NO. The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice" is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that
could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot
allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing that
he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of
the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We cannot
also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the
incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
Judicial Review
Legal Standing

Mendoza, J.
Political Law
23

Facts:
At the dawn of his administration, the President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July 30, 2010, signed
after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners, in these two consolidated cases, asked
the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1.
Held:
YES. The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure
to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury that can be questioned by a member of Congress. Indeed, legislators have a legal
standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, he has not shown that he sustained, or is
in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive
Order No. 1. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." The Court finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the
issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) on the ground that
it is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The petitioner
chafes the creation of the separate tribunal which was complemented by a budget allocation, a seal,
a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.
Held:
24
Case Digests

NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the instant petition as he was
unmistakably estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004 therefore making the petitioners
standing still imperilled by the white elephant in the petition. Judicial inquiry requires that the
constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Such appearance as counsel
before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about
the Supreme Courts independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded, but
it remained absolute.
Legality of Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) on the ground that
it is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which states that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
The petitioner chafes the creation of the separate tribunal which was complemented by a budget
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
The petitioner also highlights the decision in Buac v. COMELEC, which declared that "contests
involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET,
x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." He reiterates that this contravenes Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution. In a Resolution dated April 6, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
comment thereon pointing the petition filed by the petitioner to be unspecified and without statutory
basis.
Issue:
1. Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of PET unconstitutional.
Held:
(1) NO. The creation of the PET is specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the
Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" of the President and Vice-President. The Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme
Court. It faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight
the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court.
(2) NO. As regards petitioners claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention
of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC
involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of
a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. The power wielded by
PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the
PET and the Supreme Court. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
Independence of the Judiciary

Political Law
25

Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from payment of legal fees
AM No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010
Corona, J.
Facts:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Section 22,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. It anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 which
partially states that x x x GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid,
shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds. These exemptions
shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of
the approval of this Act is hereby considered paid. x x x
GSIS avers that the courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by
the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption in the above-quoted provision.
The OSG contends that there is nothing in Sec. 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees
imposed by the court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of GSIS under said
provision is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule
141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress.
Issue:
May Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees?
Held:
NO. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts independence fiscal
autonomy. Legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF
and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence
of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.
Constitutional Commissions
Civil Service Commission
Civil Service Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional Director

of CSC-NCR v. Larry M. Alfonso
G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Petitioner filed before the Civil Service Commission a complaint against respondent for violation of RA
No. 6713 with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation
of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Respondent is the Director of the Human Resources
Management Department of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter. Respondent averred that the CSC did not have
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the complaint.
Issue:
26
Case Digests

Whether CSC have jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint for misconduct filed against a PUP
Director
Held:
YES. CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all government
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as
teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil
servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a
citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and
decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the
investigation.
Equally significant is the fact that respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit and his motion for reconsideration and requested for a change
of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR. At
the very least, respondents active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before
the CSC already bars him from impugning the Commissions authority under the principle of estoppel
by laches.
Ombudsman
Policy of Non-Interference
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. v. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, et. al.
G.R. No. 154117, October 2, 2009
Facts:
This case involves the purchase by the government of a parcel of land located in Paranaque City
from AMVEL Land Development Corporation of which Mariano Mike Velarde is the Chairman. The
subject land was affected by the construction of the Tollway Project C-5 Link Expressway.
Among others, petitioner puts in issue the price paid by the government to AMVEL which was
allegedly bloated. In the determination of the purchase price, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)
followed E.O. No. 132 issued on December 27, 1937 but petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that
Administrative Order No. 50 issued by then President Estrada is applicable. The Ombudsman,
however, ruled that E.O. No. 132 is applicable because it was the governing law when the contract of
sale was perfected between the parties while A.O. No. 50 took effect before the consummation of the
contract but after its perfection. Further, the Ombudsman did not find any irregularity in the
determination of the purchase price because the evidence revealed that respondent government
officials complied with the prescribed procedure in determining a fair valuation of the properties. As a
matter of fact, the amount paid is far below the original recommendation of the Paranaque City
Appraisal Committee because the TRB sought the appraisal of another three independent appraisers
for the purpose of determining further the fair market value that would be most advantageous to the
government and at the same time fair to the property owners.
Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in dismissing his
Complaint-Affidavit for plunder and violation of RA No. 3019 against respondents.
Issue:
Whether public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed serious errors of law in dismissing
the case for lack of evidence.
Held:
NO. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the governing law is EO No. 132. A.O. No. 50 finds no
application to the already perfected contract between TRB and AMVEL. A perusal of the guidelines as
Political Law
27

well as the documentary evidence on the transaction reveals that respondents complied with the
prescribed procedure in determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the properties.
This Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. This rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by immeasurable petitions assailing the dismissal
of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in as much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
Power of the Ombudsman

Louis Barok Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
At the dawn of his administration, the President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC).
As can be gleaned from the provisions of E. O. No. 1, the PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under
the Office of the President. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not
however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare
it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions, putting forth as one the issues
that the PTC usurps the powers of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
Held:
NO. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against
them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase "when in the course of its
investigation" under Section 2(g) highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation
from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies. Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it
28
Case Digests

be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its
predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its
findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices,
therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the
PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
National Economy and Patrimony

Rep. Gerardo S. Espina, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al
G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010
Abad, J.
Facts:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762, also known as the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign
nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four
categories (Categories A to D). R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their
citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same
rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000, petitioners who are all members of the House of Representatives, filed the
present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the ground, among others, that the law
runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the
national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote
industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and
trade policies. Respondents countered that the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the
prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But
the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It
does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries
not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 8762 also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 is constitutional.
Held:
YES. The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services.
While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between
protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it
depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to
open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
Sequestration Order
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Imelda R. Marcos
G.R. No. 155832, December 7, 2010
Abad, J.
Political Law
29

Facts:
On February 28, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order 1, creating the Philippine
Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), which was empowered to recover all ill-gotten wealth
allegedly amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and close associates during
his 20-year regime.
On March 18, 1986, acting on the authority given them by PCGG Commissioner, Atty. Ramirez and
Atty. Abella issued a sequestration order against the Marcoses resthouse in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On August 10, 2001 Mrs. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash the March 18, 1986 sequestration
order against the Olot Resthouse, claiming that such order, issued only by Atty. Ramirez and Atty.
Abella, was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations which required the
signatures of at least two PCGG Commissioners. Mrs. Marcos also filed a Supplement claiming no
prima facie evidence that the Olot Resthouse constituted ill-gotten wealth. She pointed out that the
property is the ancestral home of her family.
Issue:
Whether the March 18, 1986 sequestration order against the Olot Resthouse was validly issued.
Held:
NO. A prima facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are "ill-gotten wealth" is required.
The power to determine the existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG as an
incident to its investigatory powers. The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a
collegial determination of such fact.
Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of a prima facie
case that would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The Republic presented no
evidence before the Sandiganbayan that shows differently. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the
two PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence
that would warrant such a prima facie finding.
Parenthetically, the Republics supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the
sequestered property, what makes it "ill-gotten wealth," and how former President Marcos intervened
in its acquisition. The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the
sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of the properties
void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed non-existent, as though it had never been issued.
Administrative Law
Doctrine of Finality
Ramon Yap v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner is the Department Manager of the National Development Company (NDC). He was
appointed by the Board of Directors of Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as VicePresident for Finance while remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The additional employment
entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various
allowances attached to the office. The Corporate Auditor of MGC issued notices of disallowances
against petitioner on the ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to his regular
position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances
and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2)
and Section 8, Article IX-b of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner appealed the Auditors disallowances
primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.
Issue:
Were the disallowances affirmed by COA valid?
30
Case Digests

Held:
YES. Respondent COA is in the best position to determine which allowances and benefits may be
properly allowed under the circumstances, as it is the sole constitutional body mandated to examine,
audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations such as the MGC and the NDC in the case at bar. Even if the truth of
petitioners assertion is assumed that the said allowances are "normally given," this fact alone does
not operate to preclude respondent COA from performing its constitutional mandate. It is the general
policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one that was
constitutionally created by COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also
of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule
that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
Quasi-Judicial Power
Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio aka Henry Tan
G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office,
which dismissed it by Resolution. On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by
Resolution, motu proprio dismissed the petition.
Respondents motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008, set aside the DOJ Secretarys
Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing
respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the
dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner, in this present petition for review on certiorari, asserts that the requirement in Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of "courts of justice"; that, citing Solid Homes,
Inc. v. Laserna, the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive
departments such as the DOJ.
Issue:
Whether the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies to resolutions issued by
the DOJ.
Held:
NO. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."
x x x [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it
is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor].
A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose
of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.
Political Law
31

Balangauan v. Court of Appeals in fact reiterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in
reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a
quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body." Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
Administrative Proceedings
Dr. Castor C. De Jesus v. Rafael Guerrero III, Cesario Pagdilao and Fortuna
Aquino
G.R. No. 171491, September 4, 2009
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
The Records Officer III of Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development
(PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund,
a foreign-assisted project being implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being caught, Bareza stole a
check from the PCAMRD trust fund from the desk of PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check,
forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it appear that the check was endorsed to
the cashier and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check. Then, the record officer deposited
part of the money to the Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference. The cashier
discovered the record officers wrongdoings but the latter begged not to be reported to the
management.
Petitioner formed an investigation committee to conduct formal investigations on the charges filed
against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque. Not convinced, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the
complete records of the proceedings and was of the opinion that the investigation conducted by the
fact-finding committee and investigation committee was perfunctorily and superficially done, and
made only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues because the report exonerated other persons
involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts.
Issue:
Should the complaint against the respondents be dismissed?
Held:
YES. A perusal of petitioners allegations clearly shows that they are mere general statements or
conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary support and substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to
simply aver that respondents had been derelict in their duties; he must show the specific acts or
omissions committed by them which amount to incompetence and gross negligence.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations
in his complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. The basis of
administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is
mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.
Law on Public Officers

Public Officer
Probationary Employees
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rowena O. Paden
G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009
Brion, J.
Facts:
32
Case Digests

Petitioner dropped Respondent from the service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct, that is, for
having a child borne out of wedlock. Records clearly reveal that respondent was informed only after
the expiration of her probationary period.
Petitioner fell short of affording due process to the respondent when it removed her from the service.
Petitioner failed to give notice to the respondent of the reasons for her removal from the service,
except for a faxed message which informed the respondent that she was being removed effective
March 1, 1998. The ground relied upon by the petitioner for the respondents termination of service is
misplaced.
Issue:
Must the unsatisfactory conduct necessarily relate to the conduct exhibited during the probationary
period?
Held:
YES. The unsatisfactory conduct must necessarily relate to conduct exhibited during the probationary
period and should not refer to conduct prior to entering the civil service. The reason for this is simple
given the nature and consequences of probationary employment.
A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to
determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment
affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of a probationer.
Since probationary employees are evaluated for their fitness to assume permanent employment only
for a specific term or period, it necessarily follows that the parameters for which the appointing
authority must gauge whether probationary employees committed an unsatisfactory conduct should
refer only to conduct while performing their duties and responsibilities during the probationary period.
Double Compensation
Efren Herrera v. National Power Corporation
G.R. No. 166570, December 18, 2009
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
RA No. 9136 Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted to provide a
framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of NPCs
assets and liabilities. Necessary consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of
employees from the Department of Energy, the Energy Regulatory Board, the National Electrification
Administration and the NPC. To soften the blow from the severance of employment, Congress
included a separation pay package for the affected employees.
Issue:
Whether NPC employees who were separated because of the reorganization and received their
separation pay under RA 9136 still entitled to receive retirement benefits under CA 186, as amended?
Held:
NO. There must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both separation
pay and retirement benefits to an employee. The absent of an express provision of law, the grant of
both separation and retirement benefits would amount to double compensation from a single act of
separation from employment. A careful reading of Section 63 of the EPIRA affirms that said law did
not authorize the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits. Indeed, the option granted was
either to a separation pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations
or to a separation plan which shall be one and one-half months salary for every year of service in the
government. The options were alternative, not cumulative. Having chosen the separation plan, they
cannot now claim additional retirement benefits under CA No. 186.
Political Law
33

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Judge Adoracion G. Angeles v. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite, et al.
G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for violation of the Child
Abuse Act and PD 1829. The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the child abuse charge and
dismissed the charge of violation of PD 1829. However, the Provincial Prosecutor denied the
recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor regarding the child abuse charge but approved the
dismissal of the other charge.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the DOJ; the Secretary of Justice denied the petition as well
as the Motion for Reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition before the Office of the
President, which was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration denied anchored on Memorandum
Circular 58 which bars appeal of decisions of the Justice Secretary except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. On her appeal to the CA, petitioner contended that the
said memorandum is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of the President
and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. The Court
of Appeals applied the doctrine of qualified political agency and decided against petitioner.
Issue:
Did Memorandum Circular No. 58 diminish the power of control of the President and bestow
unfettered power upon a subordinate officer?
Held:
NO. The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this
doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."
Liability of Public Officer

Eduardo Varela v. Ma. Daisy Revalez
G.R. No. 171705, July 29, 2010
Carpio, J.
Facts:
Petitioner was the mayor of Cadiz City. He created a reorganization committee. Petitioner gave
notices of termination to the city government employees, informing them that their employment would
end at the close of business hours on December 31, 1998. The employees opposed and questioned
the legality of the resolution but petitioner ignored them. On January 4, 1999, the employees tried to
report for work but were barred from entering their offices.
Issue:
Whether petitioner be held personally liable for the payment of damages?
Held:
YES. Petitioner was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the complaint, the
employees stated that, due to the illegal acts of the petitioner, private respondents suffered mental
34
Case Digests

torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation. The State can never be the author of illegal acts.
The complaint merely identified petitioner as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not categorically state that
petitioner was being sued in his official capacity. The identification and mention of petitioner as the
mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically transform the action into one against petitioner in his official
capacity. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the cause of action.
Moreover, a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Grounds for Disciplinary Action

Abuse of Authority
Joephil Bien v. Pedro Bo
G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Respondent applied with the DENR-CENRO, Legazpi City for the lease of a foreshore lot. Pending his
application, he introduced improvements in the area. The DENR conducted an appraisal report on the
status of the foreshore lot. At the time of the ocular inspection, the actual improvements found do not
include cottages owned by respondent. But it included petitioner as one of the owners of the cottages
built and was in fact demolished respondents cottages prior to the inspection.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for abuse of authority
Held:
YES. Petitioners participation in the destruction of the improvements on the subject property
introduced by the respondent, as well as petitioners ownership of one of the cottages subsequently
erected therein, were supported by substantial evidence. In administrative cases, the requisite proof is
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. In the case at bar, substantial evidence consisted in the findings of
the DENR-PENRO identifying petitioner as one of the owners of the twenty-two (22) cottages illegally
erected on the subject property covered by a lease application of respondent.
Dishonesty
Re: Complaint of Civil Service Commission, CAR v. Rita S. Chulyao
A.M No. P-07-2292, September 28, 2010
Per Curiam
Facts:
The Civil Service Commision (CSC) Examination Division received an Anonymous Complaint, which
alleged an examination irregularity involving respondent, a clerk of court. The complaint averred that
petitioner, a clerk of court employed her sister, to take for and in her behalf the July 31, 1988 Career
Service Professional Examination (CSPE) conducted in Baguio City. For purposes of comparison, the
employment records of respondents sister were requested from the CSC-CAR, Mountain Province
Field Office, From respondents sister personal data sheets, it was found that respondents sister was
the one who actually took the exam instead of respondent.
Respondent and her sister were directed to appear before CSC-CAR for preliminary investigation but
both failed to appear. Subsequently, the CSC-CAR issued a formal charge against respondents sister
for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Political Law
35

Service. The complaint against respondent was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the latter is a
court employee.
Respondent denied the allegations and claimed that it was an honest mistake that she gave the
wrong picture to the examination proctor. CSC dismissed respondents sister.
Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty?
Held:
YES. There was a significant difference in the signature of the examinee and that of the true person
represented by the examinee. No amount of good faith can be attributed to respondent. Good faith
necessitates honesty of intention, free from any knowledge of circumstances that ought to have
prompted him to undertake an inquiry. Respondent admitted that she discovered after a week or two,
from the day of examination, that she had given the picture of her sister to the proctor on July 31,
1988 and yet she did not immediately report and correct said error. A truly innocent person would
normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. Thus,
respondent's protestation of good faith and inadvertence are too incredible to be given weight.
Immorality
Thelma Babante-Caples v. Philbert Caples
A.M. No. HOJ-10-03, November 15, 2010
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Petitioner charged (her husband) respondent, a public officer with immorality and contends that she is
the legal wife. Petitioner further alleged that the affair of her husband with another woman has
become public knowledge in their community and this has caused pain to her and their children.
Respondent vehemently denied all the allegations.
Issue:
Whether respondent guilty of immoral conduct?
Held:
YES. Immoral conduct is conduct which is "willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. In several
cases, we have ruled that abandonment of ones wife and children, and cohabitation with a woman
not his wife, constitutes immoral conduct that is subject to disciplinary action. Respondents act of
maintaining an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife comes within the purview of disgraceful
and immoral conduct, defined and punished in Section 46(b)(5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of administrative liability to which he
or she shall still be answerable. Petitioner filed the case before respondent resigned from office.
Cessation from office because of resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service.
Law on Public Corporations

Local Government Units
Territorial Jurisdiction
Barangaray Sangalang v. Barangay Maguihan

G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009
Peralta, J.
36
Case Digests

Facts:
The controversy has its roots in a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner Barangay
Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan, both situated in Lemery, Batangas. Specifically, the
properties involved in the controversy are those covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 038-00315, 03800316, and 038-00317. Resolution No. 75-96 was subsequently passed recognizing that the areas
which are the subject of the barangay dispute covered are within the territorial jurisdiction of Barangay
Sangalang.
The documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas the
documents presented by respondent were sourced from the Land Management Bureau.
Issue:
Which documents presented by the parties carry greater weight in proving their respective claim?
Held:
To this Courts mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was approved by the Director of
Lands, should be given more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors
office. Said map was approved on March 17, 1986, which was approximately 10 years before the
controversy in hand developed. Hence, the same should be controlling in the absence of proof that
such document is invalid or inaccurate.
This Court shares the view of the RTC. It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the
principal government agency tasked with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given
to the documents relating to its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of
business. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the conclusion is inevitable that it is the
formers certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of
abuse of discretion.
Municipal Resolution
Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.
G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
Respondent PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA)
No. 43 converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA.)
PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned. However, only one of the
many provinces affected approved the issuance of an IFMA. PICOP nevertheless submitted to the
DENR the purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs
application for IFMA conversion.
PICOP filed a petition for mandamus against DENR Sec Alvarez for refusing to sign and execute the
IFMA contract.
Issue:
Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Sanggunian
concerned by submitting the purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the
approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion.
Held:
NO. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision. Surigao del Sur is not
the only province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. The approval of the
Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local government has control over such
project, but because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in
the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26 states that it applies to projects that "may cause
Political Law
37

pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species." The local government should thus represent
the communities in such area, the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even
climatic change if the project is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake in the resources
in the area, and deserve to be adequately compensated when these resources are exploited.
Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the local government
before the requirement of the national government seeking approval from the local government can
be applied.
Creation of LGUs
Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, etc. et. al.
G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010
Peralta, J.
Facts:
When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed as a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official
population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National
Statistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000
square kilometers. R.A. No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands, specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of
802.12 square kilometers.
Respondents asserted that the Dinagat Islands, which is composed of more than one island, is
exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which
states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands."
However, Republic Act No. 9355 was held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,"
was declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether Dinagat Islands is exempted from the land area requirement and may thus be legally
declared a province
Held:
NO. There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the land
area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace. The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least
2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area. The exemption above
pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of
territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands,
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed
of two or more islands, or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities,
such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or
the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code.
League of Cities of the Phil. Rep by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas v.
COMELEC, et. al.
G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010
38
Case Digests

Bersamin, J.
Facts:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
On November 18, 2008 the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16
Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection
clause. On March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the
respondents' first motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by
a split vote, denied the respondents' second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the November
18, 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
However, after the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and
compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the same by upholding the
constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of December 21, 2009. Hence, these
consolidated petitions.
Issue:
Whether the assailed 16 Cityhood Laws should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Ruling:
YES. In enacting R.A. No. 9009, which increased the income requirement for the conversion of
municipalities into component cities from P20 million to P 100 million, Congress did not grant any
exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress at
the time R. A. No. 9009 was passed.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of R. A. No. 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009. However, such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill
in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The classification criterion is not rationally related to the purpose
of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption
contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress
exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being
violative of the Constitution.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176951, February 15, 2011
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
This is a motion for consideration for the assailed decision in the case of League of Cities of the
Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056 dated August 24, 2010.
Political Law
39

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
Issue:
Whether the assailed 16 Cityhood Laws should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic
viability for the creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress
deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only
from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its
higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside
development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and
capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. Substantial distinction lies in the
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective
provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood
Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.
The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and
application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation,
exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they
should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable
doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the
constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.
For this reason, the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution are reversed
on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are
not found in the LGC. The Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
Powers of LGUs
Power to enter into contracts
Municipality of Tiwi, Represented By Hon. Mayor Jiame C. Villanueva and
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi v. Antonio B. Betito
G.R. No. 171872, July 9, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is liable for unpaid real estate taxes on its properties located
in the Province of Albay. The said properties were sold at an auction sale conducted by Albay to
satisfy NPCs tax liabilities. As the sole bidder at the auction, Albay acquired ownership of said
properties. NPC and Albay then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where the former
agreed to settle its tax liabilities. Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi formally requested Governor Salalima
to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi and its barangays where the NPCs properties were located
relative to the payments already made by NPC to Albay. Governor Salalima replied that the request
cannot be granted as the initial payment amounting to P 17,763,000.00 was only an earnest money
and that the total amount to be collected from the NPC was still being validated.
40
Case Digests

Mayor Corral, representing Tiwi, and respondent and Atty. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal
Services for the latter to represent the former as counsel in the recovery of Tiwis share in the
taxes. The subject contract provided, among others, that respondent and Atty. Lawenko would
receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi
through their efforts.
Issue:
Is Mayor Corral authorized to enter into the contract of Legal Services?
Held:
YES. Pursuant to Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior
authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality.
In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92
authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the
execution of this Courts Decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay. The abovequoted authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi
the Contract of Legal Services. On its face, and there is no allegation to the contrary, this prior
authorization appears to have been given by the council in good faith to the end of expeditiously
safeguarding the rights of Tiwi. Under the particular circumstances of this case, there is, thus, nothing
objectionable to this manner of prior authorization.
Prescinding therefrom, petitioners next contention that the subject contract should first be ratified in
order to become enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily fail. As correctly held by the CA, the
law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief
executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit.
Suability of Municipality
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan v. Hon. Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Respondent, doing business as KD Surplus entered into an agreement with petitioner Municipality of
Hagonoy through its then Chief Executive Felix Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which
supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality.
However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents claim for
payment, prompting the respondent to file a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages
against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the action was unenforceable
under the statute of frauds. Petitioners also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment Already Issued, invoking among others, immunity of the state from suit.
Issue:
Whether as a municipal corporation, the Municipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit, and that its
properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment
Held:
The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its
political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but
only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract,
as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or
special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers one of them is the power
to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde,
where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is
at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon
such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to
Political Law
41

satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus,
where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to
the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. The writ of
attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises, since
the property of the municipality may not, in the event that respondents claim is validated, be
subjected to writs of execution and garnishment unless, of course, there has been a corresponding
appropriation provided by law.
Doctrine of Condonation
Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
Petitioners Salumbides and Glenda Araa, who were both appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal
Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively of Tagkawayan, Quezon, and Mayor
Vicente Salumbides III and Councilor Coleta Sandro were administratively charged with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. This is in relation
to the construction of a fenced two-classroom building for the Tagkawayan Municipal High
School (TMHS) which was done without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding.
By Order dated February 1, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dropped Mayor Salumbides and
Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having
mooted the case. Petitioners were later found guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty by the Ombudsman.
On appeal, petitioners urged the Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover
coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected
official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.
Issue:
Whether the Doctrine of Condonation should be expanded to cover coterminous appointive officials
who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with
infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.
Held:
NO. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefore. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle
of vox populi est suprema lex, the reelection of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case.
The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. Substantial distinctions clearly
exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
Election Laws
Automated Election System
42
Case Digests

Harry Roque v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009
Velasco, Jr. J.
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the adoption of an
automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. On
January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369 was passed authorizing anew the COMELEC to use an
AES.
In August 2008, COMELEC managed to automate the regional polls in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Following the successful automated ARMM 2008 elections, the
COMELEC began preparations for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local polls,
initiated by the technology selection for the 2010 automated elections.
Accordingly, in early March 2009, the COMELEC released the Request for Proposal (RFP), also
known as Terms of Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the voting, counting,
transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and
Local Elections.
Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic which was
declared as the best complying bidder. The Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC) then
directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification screening, and its Precinct-Count Optic
Scan (PCOS) prototype machines to undergo end-to-end testing to determine compliance with the
pre-set criteria.
In its Memorandum of June 01, 2009, the SBAC Technical Working Group (TWG) stated that it was
undertaking a test evaluation of TIM and Smartmatics proposed PCOS project machines. The demo
systems presented PASSED all tests as required in the 26-item criteria specified in the [RFP] with
100% accuracy rating. The TWG also validated the eligibility, and technical and financial qualifications
of the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture.
On July 10, 2009, COMELEC and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract 34 for
the lease of goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of PhP 7,191,484,739.48.
Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents and
purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 COMELEC-Smartmatic-TIM
Corporation automation contract adverted to.
Issue:
1.Whether the full automation of the 2010 regular elections can validly proceed without a pilot run.
2.Whether the PCOS machines do not satisfy the minimum system capabilities prescribed by RA
8436, as amended.
3.Whether the automation contract constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll bodys constitutional
mandate for election law enforcement.
4.Whether the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
Held:
1.YES. The pilot testing is not necessary. The plain wordings of RA 9369 (that amended RA 8436)
commands that the 2010 elections shall be fully automated, and such full automation is not
conditioned on "pilot testing" in the May 2007 elections. Congress merely gave COMELEC the
flexibility to partially use the AES in some parts of the country for the May 2007 elections.
Further, the highly charged issue of whether or not the 2008 ARMM electionscovering, as NCC
observed, three conflict-ridden island provincesmay be treated as substantial compliance with
the pilot test requirement must be answered in the affirmative. No less than Senator Richard J.
Gordon himself, the author of the law, said that the system has been tried and tested in the ARMM
elections last year, so we have to proceed with the total implementation of the law.
Political Law
43

2.NO. The PCOS meets the minimum capabilities standards as prescribed by RA 8436. The Court is
fairly satisfied that the COMELEC has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism, a set of 26item/check list criteria, to ensure compliance with the minimum systems capabilities. Absent
empirical evidence to the contrary, the Court, presuming regularity in the performance of regular
duties, takes the demo-testing thus conducted by SBAC-TWG as a reflection of the capability of the
PCOS machines, although the tests, as COMELEC admits, were done literally in the Palacio del
Governador building, where a room therein simulated a town, the adjoining room a city, etc.
Perusing the RFP, however, the real worth of the PCOS system and the machines will of course
come after they shall have been subjected to the gamut of acceptance tests expressly specified in
the RFP, namely, the lab test, field test, mock election test, transmission test and, lastly, the final test
and sealing procedure of all PCOS and CCS units using the actual Election Day machine
configuration. Apropos the counting-accuracy feature of the PCOS machines, specifically dealing
with its SAES 1800, the advertised accuracy rating is over 99.99999%.
3.NO. There is no abdication of COMELECs mandate and responsibility. The proviso designating
Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of the technical aspect of the counting and
canvassing wares does not translate, without more, to ceding control of the electoral process to
Smartmatic. The designation of Smartmatic was not plucked from thin air, as it was in fact an
eligibility requirement imposed, should the bidder be a joint venture.
The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for the
automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission
devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining
to their operation. As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its
operators would provide assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the COMELEC
which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it
deputizes.
4.NO. The PCOS would not infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. Surely, the COMELEC
can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy.
The voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve
the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least
regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.
Additionally, with the AES, the possibility of system hacking is very slim. The PCOS machines are
only online when they transmit the results, which would only take around one to two minutes. In
order to hack the system during this tiny span of vulnerability, a super computer would be required.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the memory card to be used during the elections is encrypted and
read-onlymeaning no illicit program can be executed or introduced into the memory card.
Therefore, even though the AES has its flaws, COMELEC and Smartmatic have seen to it that the
system is well-protected with sufficient security measures in order to ensure honest elections.
Powers of the COMELEC

Harry Roque v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 188456, February 10, 2010
Velasco, Jr. J.
Facts:
By decision, the Court denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of
Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation
(Smartmatic). The Court also denied the petition-in-intervention of Pete Q. Quadra, praying that the
respondents be directed to implement the minimum requirements provided under pars. (f) and (g),
Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, or the Election Modernization Act, as amended by RA 9369.
The underlying petition for certiorari, etc. on its face assailed the award by COMELEC of the poll
automation project to the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture, the challenge basically predicated on the noncompliance of the contract award with the pilot-testing requirements of RA 9369 and the minimum
44
Case Digests

system capabilities of the chosen automated election system (AES), referring to the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) system. The non-submission of documents to show the existence and scope of
a valid joint venture agreement between TIM and Smartmatic was also raised as a nullifying ground,
albeit later abandoned or at least not earnestly pursued.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic.
Held:
NO. Under the automation contract, Smartmatic is given a specific and limited technical task to assist
the COMELEC in implementing the AES. But at the end of the day, the Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is
merely a service provider and lessor of goods and services to the COMELEC, which shall have
exclusive supervision and control of the electoral process. Art. 6.7 of the automation contract could
not have been clearer.
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission
En Banc, the entire process of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and
canvassing of votes shall [still] be conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials and
their performance, completion and final results according to specifications and within
specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER.
Lintang Bedol v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009.
Facts:
Petitioner was the chair of the PBOC for the province of Maguindanao during the 2007 elections. The
canvassing of the certificates before the Senate was held in abeyance due to the alleged fraud which
attended the election in Maguindanao. Petitioner failed to attend the rescheduled canvassing and also
failed to transmit to the Senate the canvassed election returns for all the municipalities in the province
of Maguindanao. Task Force Maguindanao was then created to investigate on the alleged
irregularities in the conduct of elections in the Maguindanao province. In the process, petitioner
explained that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen. During
the fact-finding proceedings of the Task Force, however, petitioner failed to participate in further
inquiry and investigation. He incurred a lot of unexplained absences. Further, petitioner had himself
interviewed before the media and challenged those who allege that there was fraud that transpired in
the Maguindanao elections to file a case against him. Consequently, COMELEC issued a contempt
charge and show cause order against petitioner for his defiance of the COMELEC rules of procedure.
Petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of COMELEC to hear and pass upon his case. Respondent body
found him guilty for contempt.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC had jurisdiction to hear and pass upon the contempt charges against petitioner
considering that it was the one which initiated the contempt proceedings.
Held:
YES. An administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner
an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence,
and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature. In the present case, COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its
quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections
in Maguindanao. The effectiveness of the quasi-judicial power vested by law on a government
institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the
hearings or proceedings. In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish
individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and
Political Law
45

order to attend would render nugatory the COMELEC's investigative power, which is an essential
incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task
Force hearings. Moreover, it was held that the language of the Omnibus Election Code and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt
proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. In fine then, COMELEC had the absolute authority to
hear and pass upon the contempt proceedings against petitioner.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010
Abad, J.
Facts:
On July 5, 2005 private respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), president of the Liberal Party (LP),
announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. Petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and
party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling
body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately
filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. On October 13,
2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the
March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision.
Subsequently, the LP held a National Executive Council (NECO) meeting to elect new party leaders
before respondent Drilons term expired. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A.
Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction before the
COMELEC against respondents to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming
that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. Petitioners Atienza, et al. also
complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and
that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the meeting.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez,
and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued a resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It
noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the
amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or won these positions
in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et
al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that
related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party
matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Petitioners lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the
composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party.
Issue:
1. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of respondent Roxas election as LP
president.
2. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the petitioners expulsion from
the party.
Held:
1. YES. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled
by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections: tthe COMELECs powers and
46
Case Digests

functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The COMELECs
power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must
act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is
also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for
candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official
standard bearer of the party.
2. NO. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts
on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was
indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity
or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be settled
within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
Political Parties
Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections
G.R.No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Brion, J.
Facts:
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant
minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition
(NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that it be recognized and
accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections.
LP filed its Opposition to the NP-NPCs petition based on the following grounds: 1.) NP-NPC was not
a duly registered coalition of political parties at the time it filed its petition for accreditation, and 2) the
petition for registration was filed beyond the August 17, 2009 deadline.
On April 12, 2010, COMELEC en banc granted the NP-NPCs petition for registration.
Issue:
Whether the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred.
Held:
Yes. The NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition is time-barred. The Court ruled that the en
banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of
the NP-NPC as a coalition. The matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that
should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic
system. The COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the
standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Political Law
47

Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women, who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), filed a petition for registration under the partylist system but was denied accreditation by the COMELEC (2 nd Division). When it sought
reconsideration, the first assailed Resolution was upheld. The COMELEC stated that (1) it cannot be
said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole, thus
violative of the spirit of RA No. 7941; (2) there is no substantial differentiation; (3) it violates public
morals; and (4) it violates Art. 201 of RPC (immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions,
and indecent shows) and Art. 694 of NCC (nuisance).
Ang Ladlad filed this Petition for Certiorari against the Resolutions of the COMELEC. It argued that
the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
1. Whether the Ang Ladlad should be denied accreditation on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration.
2. Is COMELECs resort to religion as basis for refusal to accept Ang Ladlads petition for
registration unconstitutional?
3. Is COMELECs resort to public morals, and provisions of Art. 201 of RPC and Art. 694 of NCC as
ground for refusal to accept Ang Ladlads petition for registration proper?
4. Whether COMELECs denial of accreditation to Ang Ladlad violates the equal protection clause
and the freedom of expression and association.
Held:
1. No. As the Court explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed,
aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani.
2. YES. The Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. What the non-establishment
clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. It was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad.
3. NO. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Albeit the States authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and
sexual relations, the Court cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through
the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. Mere moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the partylist system.
48
Case Digests

COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws is flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code gives definition of nuisance, the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the RPC or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to
be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
4. YES. From the standpoint of the political process, the LGBT have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Recent jurisprudence has
affirmed the rational basis test, by virtue of which, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, the Court will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.
Moreover, under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt
to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. LGBTs are
also entitled to hold and express their views. Only if a political party incites violence or puts
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee. The moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, the Court finds that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners
fundamental rights.
Party List System

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009
Carpio, J.
Facts:
This is a Resolution issued by the Court following the motion for clarification in intervention filed by
Speaker Prospero C. Nograles Representing The House Of Representatives in G.R. No. 179271
(Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC, April 21, 2009)
and G. R. No. 179295 (Bayan Muna v. COMELEC, April 21, 2009.)
According to the motion for intervention, the Court declared in these cases as unconstitutional the 2%
threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain the
minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether
the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary
thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote
requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), likewise filed a motion for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention,
alleging that the Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived
without due process and in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant
constituencies, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.
Issue:
Political Law
49

1) Whether the term "additional seats", in relation to the declaration of unconstitutionality the 2%
threshold, refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats.
2) Whether absolute proportionality is required in the allocation of party-list seats.
Held:
1) Additional seats shall pertain to the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one
seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987
Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise
of legislative power.
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a
party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation
of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the
proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent
party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the
second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the
circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number of available
party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat
allocation.
2) NO. Roa-Borjes position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the
allocation of party-list seats. However, the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality
in the allocation of party-list seats.
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that
legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this
principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list
system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section
5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the
allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through
a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof x x x." However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b) 8 of
the same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list
organization from dominating the party-list system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional
representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These
statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which does not require
absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the
maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one
party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
50
Case Digests

2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list
organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to
parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the
total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically
prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the
parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent
any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the
1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled
rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the
Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision
that party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of
Representatives. At the same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List
Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with
the 1987 Constitution.
Candidates
Certificate of Candidacy
Abraham Kahlil Mitra v. Commission of Elections
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010
Brion, J.
Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, petitioner Mitra was
the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. Before the end of Mitras second
term as (representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a highly urbanized city and thus
ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new
status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective
provincial officials.
With the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters
Registration Record from Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed
a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. They essentially argued that Mitra remains a
resident of Puerto Princesa City and has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not
qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully
abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in
Aborlan since 2008.
Issue:
Whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented that his residence is in Aborlan to deceive and mislead the
people of the Province of Palawan.
Held:
NO. From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto Princesa City to
Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office.
Political Law
51

Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. Mitra has established business
interests in Aborlan, a fact which the respondents have never disputed. It is not disputed, too, that
Mitra has started the construction of a house on a lot he bought from Rexter Temple; the site is very
near the Maligaya Feedmill that he leased from its owner, Carme Caspe.
We also consider that even before his transfer of residence, he already had intimate knowledge of
the Province of Palawan, particularly of the whole 2 nd legislative district that he represented for three
terms. For that matter, even the respondents themselves impliedly acknowledged that the Mitras, as
a family, have been identified with elective public service and politics in the Province of Palawan. We
can reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not oblivious to the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potential for growth and development, and all matters vital to the common welfare of the constituency
he intends to serve.
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no
reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will. We cannot deny, however, that
the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely
raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.
Three Term Limit Rule

Simon Aldovino v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009
Brion, J.
Facts:
The respondent was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. In September 2005
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended respondent for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he
then faced.
In the 2007 election, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
sought to deny due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated
the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA
7160.
Issue:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule.
Held:
NO. To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to
close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the
temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary
some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an
elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension
does. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time
within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective
interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted
in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term
limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancel Certificate of Candidacy

Jamela Salic Maruhom v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
52
Case Digests

Facts:
Petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom (Maruhom) and private respondent Mohammadali "Mericano" A.
Abinal (Abinal) were mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, for the 14
May 2007 national and local elections. On 1 April 2007, Abinal filed before the COMELEC a Petition
for Disqualification and to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy under Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881.
Abinal alleged that Maruhom was a double registrant, being a registered voter in Precinct No. 0208A,
Barangay Panggao Saduc, Marawi City and Precinct No. 0040A, Barangay Kialdan Proper, Marantao.
Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on 26 July 2003. Only three days thereafter, on 29 July
2003, Maruhom registered again as a voter in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration.
There being double registration, Maruhoms subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void ab
initio. And, not being a registered voter in Marantao, Maruhom was disqualified from running for
municipal mayor of said municipality.
The COMELEC First Division, on May 8, 2007, found that Maruhom had two subsisting registrations,
one in Marawi, and another in Marantao. Maruhoms Marantao registration was void ab initio. Since
Maruhom was not a registered voter in Marantao, she was disqualified from being a mayoralty
candidate therein. On August 21, 2007, the COMELEC en banc denied Maruhoms motion for
reconsideration.
Maruhom, asserts that Section 2, Article IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from
assuming jurisdiction or deciding issues involving the right to vote. Maruhom argues that the validity of
her registration in Marantao can only be directly challenged in a petition for exclusion filed with the
MTC of Marantao, and cannot be collaterally attacked in the Petition for Disqualification and to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Abinal before the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on Maruhoms voter registration.
Held:
YES. It must be underscored that in addition to the express jurisdiction of COMELEC over petitions for
cancellation of COCs, on the ground of false material representations, under Section 78 of the OEC,
the Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The determination, therefore,
made by the COMELEC that Maruhoms Marawi registration is valid, while her Marantao registration
is void, is only in accord with its explicit jurisdiction, or at the very least, its residual powers.
Furthermore, the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 21 August 2007
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office, but
it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration in Marantao is void, her
registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the
former, but she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the
latter.
Nuisance Candidate
Celestino Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for
Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. Edilito C. Martinez filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position. Petitioner Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C.
Martinez a nuisance candidate. The Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution
declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate almost 1 month after the elections. Salimbangon
was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections. Petitioner Martinez filed an election protest.
The election protest is based on 300 ballots more or less with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) did not count for
Political Law
53

petitioner Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate who had the same
surname. HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon.
Issue:
(1) What then is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after
the elections?
(2) Should ballots containing only the similar surname of 2 candidates be considered as stray votes
or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
Held:
(1) Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved prior to election day. Its pendency on election
day exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the inclusion of a then potential, later shown in
reality to be nuisance candidate. The decision or resolution on nuisance candidate, particularly where
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory after the lapse of 5 days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which
case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide
candidate.
(2) Ballots indicating only the similar surname of 2 candidates for the same position may be counted
in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared
a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Celestino A. Martinez III is hereby declared
the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu.
Election Campaign
Premature Campaign
Rosalinda A. Penera v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009
Carpio, J.
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision issued by the Court on 11 September
2009 which disqualified petitioner Rosalinda Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte on the ground of premature campaigning
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits that she was not yet a candidate at the
time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
Issue:
Whether Penera violated the prohibition on premature campaigning which merited her disqualification
to run for public office.
Held:
NO. The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. Section 79(a) of the
Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph,
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files
his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately
succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two
provisions determine the resolution of this case.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these
provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
54
Case Digests

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera
filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009
only for purposes of printing the ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date
when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political
activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within
the realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the
campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the
campaign period.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight any election offense that may
be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only
upon the start of the campaign period.
Political Advertisement
Alvin Garcia v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010,
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Private respondent, then mayoralty candidate, filed an election offense case against his rival petitioner
for the publication of political advertisements that allegedly violated the thrice-a-week publication
requirement and failed to indicate the name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit
the advertisements were published. He averred that the publication of the political advertisements
was in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 9006 and Sections 11 and 13 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6520.
Petitioner denied private respondents allegations. He contended that the political advertisements had
been made not for a single candidate, but for the entire slate of his party, Kusug-KNP Party, consisting
of 20 local candidates, plus presidential and vice-presidential candidates Fernando Poe, Jr. and Loren
Legarda, respectively. Hence, he contended that the political advertisements substantially complied
with the requirement provided by the Fair Elections Act that the advertisement shall contain the true
and correct name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the election propaganda
was printed. Appropriate information was filed against petitioner after determination of probable cause
by the COMELEC
Issue:
Whether there exists a probable cause to subject the petitioner to a criminal prosecution as the
political advertisement in question did not exceed the allowed frequency of publication and despite the
evidence that the petitioner did not cause the publication of the political advertisement in question.
Held:
YES. Paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution empowers the COMELEC to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. This prosecutorial power of the COMELEC is
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code. It is well settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests
in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The records show that the COMELEC has filed an Information
charging petitioner with violation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 and its IRR with the RTC, which has
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent dispositions of the said
case must be subject to the approval of the court.
Partisan Political Activity

Eleazar Quinto and Gerino Tolentino v. Commission on Elections
Political Law
55

G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010
Puno, C.J.
Facts:
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and
Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public
appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office
notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
Issue:
Whether he questioned provisions of law violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective
positions.
Held:
NO. The Court ruled that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and
accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code do not violate the equal protection clause.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law
creates a classification that is palpably arbitrary or capricious. In the case at bar, the petitioners
failed and in fact did not even attempt to discharge this heavy burden.
Declaring Failure of Elections

Abdul Gafar Dibartun v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No.170365, February 2, 2010
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition before the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No.
6A/7A, Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and to annul the proclamation of petitioner
Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid.
Respondent alleged that a certain Alipecry Acop Gaffar, who is the son of respondent Punong
Barangay candidate DIBARATUN got inside the polling place and was caught in possession of 3 filled
up ballots where candidate Abdulgaffar Dibartun were voted which he wanted to place or insert inside
the ballot box for official.
Respondents contended that as 10 voters had actually voted, there was no failure of elections in the
aforementioned precinct. The COMELEC en banc granted the petition. Dibaratun filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC in declaring a failure of elections and in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner as the elected Punong Barangay was acting within its jurisdiction.
56
Case Digests

Held:
YES. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions
affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A were suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting due to violence. Only 10 voters were able to cast
their votes out of 151 registered voters; hence, the votes not cast would have affected the result of the
elections. The concurrence of these two conditions caused the COMELEC en banc to declare a
failure of elections. When there is failure of elections, the COMELEC is empowered to annul the
elections and to call for special elections.
Election Contest
Bai Sandra S.A. Sema v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Didagen P. Dilangalen
G.R.No. 190734, March 26, 2010
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Petitioner, a congressional candidate filed an election protest against private respondent over 195
precincts. When the PBOC proclaimed private respondent, the protest filed did not attach the certified
true copy of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidate for
Member of the House of Representatives
Revision of ballots in all the contested precincts was conducted. The HRET found that majority of the
ballots were rejected as fake or spurious ballots since they did not contain security features, however
HRET concluded that the ballots must have been tampered with after the elections and the counting
and canvassing of votes. The HRET relied on the election return and other election documents to
arrive at the number of votes cast for the position and declare private respondent as winner.
Issue:
Whether the act of the HRET was lawful when it solely relied on election returns and other election
documents (instead of the ballots themselves) in determining the winning candidate.
Held:
Yes. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to
untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence. where a ballot
box is found in such a condition as would raise a reasonable suspicion that unauthorized persons
could have gained unlawful access to its contents, no evidentiary value can be given to the ballots in it
and the official count reflected in the election return must be upheld as the better and more reliable
account of how and for whom the electorate voted.
Nothing on record shows that the election returns, tally sheets and other election documents that the
HRET had on hand had been tampered or altered. Since it is undisputed that there are hardly any
valid or authentic ballots upon which the HRET could base its determination of the number of votes
cast for each of the parties.
Ernesto Batalla v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 184268, September 15, 2009
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent, then incumbent Punong Barangay, were candidates for the position
of Punong Barangay in Barangay Mapulang Daga, Bacacay, Albay during the October 29,
2007 barangay elections. Consequently, petitioner was proclaimed the Punong Barangay winner.
On November 7, 2007, respondent filed an election protest claiming misappreciation of seven ballots.
On February 12, 2008 the MCTC found both Batalla and Bataller garnering an equal number of 113
Political Law
57

votes each. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the election protest before the COMELEC, which was
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether five contested votes be declared void and the herein petitioner be declared as the winner in
the barangay election last October 29, 2007.
Held:
NO. But only three ballots are to be credited to respondent. The first ballot clearly shows the first
name Teodoro, while the surname written is a bit confusing; still, it certainly cannot be read as
Batalla since the way it is written clearly indicates eight characters. The intent rule is well settled in
this jurisdiction that in the appreciation of the ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into
effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty. Hence, the
intention of the voter to vote for Bataller is unequivocal from the face of the first ballot.
The fifth and seventh ballot were properly credited in Batallers name under the neighborhood rule.
The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a candidate is not written in the
proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the
vote should be counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually applied in consonance with
the intent rule which stems from the principle that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be
to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable
certainty.
The second and third ballots were stray ballots and cannot be credited to Bataller. Neither the
neighborhood rule nor the doctrine of idem sonans apply to this instance. First, the neighborhood rule
applies when the name for Punong Barangay is left vacant, while the name of a candidate for Punong
Barangay is clearly legible or discernable. Second, the word tododer written on the first line
for kagawad does not necessarily refer to Teodoro Bataller. The word tododer does not sound like
Teodoro under the idem sonans (having the same sound) rule. Said rule of law states that the
occurrence in a document of a spelling of a material word that is wrong but has the sound of the word
intended does not vitiate the instrument. Third, while it is paramount to give full expression to the
voters will under the intent rule as indicated in the ballotsthus, the liberality in ballot appreciation
it is necessary that the voters intention be at least discernable with certainty. Thus, Batalla won.
Election Protest
Joselito Mendoza v. Commission on Elections
G.R.No. 191084, March 25, 2010,
Perez, J.
Facts:
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner of the gubernatorial election. Respondent filed the Election
Protest. COMELEC annulled and set aside petitioners proclamation as governor and proclaimed
respondent duly elected to said position.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The Commission En Banc
denies the Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the elevation of the said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the
Commission En Banc be considered an appeal.
Held:
NO. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the rehearing should have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Promulgated on 15
February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter.
58
Case Digests

Election Protest Pending Appeal

Mayor Jose Marquez Lisboa Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 184286, February 26, 2010,
Abad, J.
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent ran against each other for Mayor of Busuanga, Palawan. Private
respondent was declared winner. Petitioner filed an election protest and was declared winner by the
RTC.
Respondent appealed. Pending resolution, petitioner filed a motion for execution. RTC issued an
order, reversing itself and allowing execution pending appeal because its previous order had brought
more confusion and chaos in the municipality and petitioner had the support of the provincial
government and the congressional district.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC erred when it enjoined the implementation of the RTCs order of execution
pending appeal.
Held:
NO. Petitioner points out that since the COMELEC did not issue a preliminary injunction order after its
60-day TRO lapsed; nothing prevented the RTC from implementing its earlier order installing
petitioner.
The first part of the above grants the main relief that respondent sought: it SETS ASIDE the RTCs
orders of April 17 and 28, 2008 that allowed execution of its decision pending appeal. On the other
hand, the second part grants the preliminary injunction he sought. It took the place of the TRO.
Although the Second Division did not here use the words preliminary injunction, it directed or
enjoined all parties to observe the status quo that existed prior to the issuance of the RTCs order of
April 17, 2008. It was the same status quo that the expiring TRO enforced.
Besides, if instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court opts to decide the
case on its merits with the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it stands to
reason that the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction should be
deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of petitioner Panliliothat execution
pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a decision of the higher court enjoining such
executiondoes not make sense.
Election Offense
Robert Guzman v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No. 0482004 to authorize City Mayor to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery of the City.
Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor purchased the two parcels of land. Based on the transaction,
the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province
against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section 261,
paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for having undertaken to construct a public
cemetery and for having released, disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the
May 9, 2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to the election ban
period having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004. City Mayor Ting denied the
accusations in his counter-affidavit but City Treasurer Garcia opted not to answer.
Political Law
59

Issue:
Whether the acquisition of lots during the period of the election ban was covered by the term public
works as to be in violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:
NO. Acquisition of Lots 5860 And 5881 during the period of the election ban is not considered as
Public Works in Violation of Sec. 261 (v), Omnibus Election Code. The prohibition of the release,
disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works depends on the
following elements: (a) a public official or employee releases, disburses or spends public funds; (b)
the release, disbursement and expenditure is made within 45 days before a regular election or 30
days before a special election; and (c) the public funds are intended for any and all kinds of public
works except the four situations enumerated in paragraph (v) of Section 261.
Accordingly, the term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is
properly construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to structures built by the
Government for public use and paid for by public funds. Thus, it becomes inevitable to conclude,
therefore, that the petitioner's insistence that the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a
public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation of
Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code was unfounded and unwarranted.
Atty. Reynante Orceo v. Commission on Elections
G.R.No. 190779, March 26, 2010
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Resolution No. 8714 contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sec. 32 (Who May Bear
Firearms) and Section 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of R.A. No. 7166, entitled An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the definition of firearm in
Resolution No. 8714, since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations. Further, petitioner alleges that there is no law that covers airsoft guns.
Issue:
Whether airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are included in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of
R.A. No. 8714.
Held:
YES. The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for
purposes of the gun ban during the election period is a reasonable restriction, the objective of which is
to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, it was held: where a rule or regulation has a
provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed
to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Section 35
of R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who
may bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms,
among others. These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC.
Public International Law

60
Case Digests

General Principles of International Law

Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. v. Mary Jean B. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
Brion, J.
Facts:
Engineer Tagitis, was last seen in Jolo when his companion Arsimin Kunnong realized that the former
is nowhere to be found. As Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former reported the matter to
the respondent Mary Tagitis, wife of Engr.Tagitis, and to the local police agency.
According to reliable information received by the respondent, Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, being held against his will in an attempt to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis
with the different terrorist groups. The respondent has exhausted all avenues and remedies but to no
avail, and under the circumstances, the respondent has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the petitioners except
the issuance of a writ of amparo. It was ruled that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Philippines is bound by International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance when it has neither signed nor ratified the Convention.
Held:
YES. The absence of a specific penal law is not a stumbling block for action from this Court. As a
matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the
ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence
to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or
customary international law that are binding on all states. Generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.
Diplomatic Protection
Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, established for the purpose of providing aid to the
victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women
and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped and abused by Japanese
soldiers. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines.
However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Political Law
61

Issue:
Whether the Executive Department erred in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan.
Held:
NO. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims. The
Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our
countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. In settling agreements claims deriving from private debts with
others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims
might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political considerations unrelated to
debts. Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally
wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. All they
can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress.
However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that
are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the
right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision
whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than
the legal merits of the particular claim.
Deportation
Carlos T. Go, Sr. v. Luis T. Ramos / Jimmy T. Go v. Luis T. Ramos / Hon. Alipio F.
Fernandez, etc., et al. v. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano
G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Luis T. Ramos initiated a deportation case against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten
while all the other entries were typewritten. In a Resolution, the complaint was dismissed affirming
the findings that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the
1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted
to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well. The Board of Commissioners reversed said dismissal,
holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Carlos and Jimmy filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the
Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a
petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has the power to release a detainee of the BI who was detained pursuant to an
order of deportation.
Held:
NO. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed
after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this
context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation
of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
62
Case Digests

Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board,
the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Doctrine of Incorporation
Lourdes D. Rubrico et. al. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et.al.
G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for
short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes) and detained
at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation, Lourdes was released
but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. After Lourdes
release, the harassment, continued.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed by the petitioners before
the SC, which later referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action.
The respondents included Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief, and Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office. who
were impleaded theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly
committed by their subordinates against petitioners
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review,
dismissing the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen.
Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether respondents may be held liable on the basis of the principle of command responsibility, as a
concept defined, developed, and applied under international law.
Held:
NO. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws
of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this
sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates
should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is
"an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to
crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on
military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not
yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has
yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.
Political Law
63

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a
principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation
clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents
criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo.
In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address,
the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
Furthermore, petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to
government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes.
Executive Agreement
Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo
G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement
between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N
BFO-028-03), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with
the US government.
In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals. As of
May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other
countries.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the nonsurrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and
that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as
without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter that the
Agreement, being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for
its efficacy.
Issue:
(1) Whether exchange of notes is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international
written contract among nations.
(2) Whether the concurrence of the Senate is required for the validity of the Agreement.
(3) Whether the Agreement is in violation of the Rome Statute.
(4) Whether the Agreement resulted in an abdication by the Philippines of its sovereignty.
64
Case Digests

Held:
(1) YES. Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture
being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines,
practices, and jargonsis untenable. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference
Guide) defines the term as follows: An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement, that
has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the
other. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.
The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,
or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes
binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President "sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols."
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the NonSurrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be
boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among
nations.
(2) NO, Senate concurrence is not required. Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of
dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by
the Senate. Pressing its point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under
any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations,
most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and settlement of claims.
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in
Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since
the Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea Trading. Since then, the conduct of foreign affairs has
become more complex and the domain of international law wider, as to include such subjects as
human rights, the environment, and the sea. Surely, the enumeration in Eastern Sea Trading cannot
circumscribe the option of each state on the matter of which the international agreement format would
be convenient to serve its best interest.
x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we
have entered executive agreements. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
(3) NO, the agreement is not in contravention of the Rome Statute
Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ
from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter
of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. As aptly pointed out by
respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to "be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]."
Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a
signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; whereas a StateParty, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith.
Political Law
65

In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and
not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the
Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
(4) NO. The Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines national
criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the
responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may
decide to try "persons" of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national
criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or
over US "persons" committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal
jurisdiction of the ICC over them. As to "persons" of the US whom the Philippines refuses to
prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to exercise either its national
criminal jurisdiction over the "person" concerned or to give its consent to the referral of the matter to
the ICC for trial. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with
respect to "persons" of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise
encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to
surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may
be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to
grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
66
Case Digests

Final - Poli 2011.CD

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Final - Poli 2011.CD

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

San Beda College of Law

2011 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Case Digests in Political Law

Fundamental Powers of the State

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Fundamental Principles and State Policies

San Beda College of Law

Equal Protection of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Free Access to Courts

Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Jurisdiction of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Creation of Truth Commission

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Presidential Immunity from Suit

San Beda College of Law

Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep.

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Legality of Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Independence of the Judiciary

San Beda College of Law

Civil Service Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional Director

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Power of the Ombudsman

San Beda College of Law

National Economy and Patrimony

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Law on Public Officers

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Liability of Public Officer

San Beda College of Law

Grounds for Disciplinary Action

San Beda College of Law

Law on Public Corporations

Barangaray Sangalang v. Barangay Maguihan

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

San Beda College of Law

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC