Chapter 8

1. Michi

2. PUNZALAN v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for
mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. The Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Meneses as the duly elected mayor. Manalstas and Punzalan filed
separate election protests both alleging massive fraud and illegal electoral process.
RTC found that there was fraud and that ballots, election returns and tally sheets at certain districts
"disappeared under mysterious circumstances;" and that filled-up ballots with undetached lower stubs and
groups of ballots with stubs cut out with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. RTC was constrained to
examine the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon and came up with the declaration
that
Punzalan
was
the
winner
in
the
elections.
RTC granted Manalastas application for writ of execution pending appeal to which SEC issued resolution
48-96 granting Meneses petition to set aside such order.
ISSUES:
W/n COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses
which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman
W/n the finding of RTC on authenticity of handwriting prevails over that of COMELEC.
RULING:
NO. Sec 24 RA 7166 says that mere failure (signature) does not invalidate although it may constitute an
election offense to chairman. Jurisprudence adds that it is valid provided it bears other authenticating
marks . Sec 211 Bp 881 says ballots are presumed valid unless ther is clear and good reason to justify
rejection and failure to affix signature not good and clear reason.
NO. Appreciation of ballors and elections documents is a question of fact best left to COMELEC.
COMELEC need not conduct adversarial proceeding and may even consider evidence aliunde.
Testimonies of expderts not binding upon COMELEC.

Chapter 11

1. Villamor vs COMELEC G.R. NO. 169865

Facts: On May 13, 2004, petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as mayor of Carmen, Cebu, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) in the elections held on May 10, 2004 over his opponent,
respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao. On May 17, 2004, respondent filed a petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner alleging as grounds the illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings
Subsequently, or on May 24, 2004, respondent filed an election protest with
the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. Petitioner filed his Answer to the Petition with Counter
Protest on June 7, 2004. However, in its Order dated June 24, 2004, the trial court dismissed the election
protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed one-day late.
Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, an election protest should be
filed within 10 days from the date of proclamation of the results of the election. Since petitioner was
proclaimed on May 13, 2004, respondent had until May 23, 2004 to file an election protest. However,
respondent filed the same only on May 24, 2004, thus, it was dismissed by the trial court in an Order
dated June 24, 2004.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondent which was granted by the trial court
because it found that the election protest was actually filed on time. Since the last day to file the protest
fell on May 23, 2004 which was a Sunday, thus, under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the time
should not run until the next working day which was May 24, 2004. Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court gives the courts inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders to conform with law
and justice.
Petitioner appealed the Order granting respondents motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC.
The Second Division of the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. On August 5, 2005, the
COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the Second Division
of the COMELEC issued on May 9, 2005 a Resolution which is the petition to annul the proclamation of
petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Issues: (1) whether the trial court can act on a motion for reconsideration in an election protest
(2) whether the trial court prematurely admitted respondents election protest pending a preproclamation controversy.

Held:
The court granted the petition. Anent the first issue, petitioner asserts that a motion for
reconsideration of the election protest filed by respondent was a prohibited pleading thus its filing did not
toll the running of the period to appeal. Consequently, when the latter failed to appeal within five days
from the June 24, 2004 Order of the trial court, the dismissal of the election protest became final.
On the other hand, respondent alleges that a motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited
pleading and claims that even if the motion was not filed, the trial court could reinstate the petition motu
proprio before the said order became final.

The rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election cases except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Section 256 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure clearly state that no motion for
reconsideration should be entertained. Thus, there is no room to apply the rules of ordinary civil
procedure suppletorily. Nor can resort be made by the trial court to Section 5(g) of Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court to sustain its actions. The trial court did not conform to law and justice when it granted the
motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.
With respect to the 2nd issue first, as a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of
the winning candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition
for quo warranto. The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent
filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an
election protest or a petition forquo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the
case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of the
period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto. For it is not the relief prayed for which
distinguishes actions under 248 from an election protest or quo warranto proceedings, but the grounds on
which they are based.
In the case at bar, respondents petition to annul the proclamation rested mainly on the alleged
illegal composition of the municipal board of canvassers and its proceedings which is an issue that may
be properly raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. Under paragraph (b) of Section 5 of Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, if the petition involves the illegal composition of the board of
canvassers, it must be filed immediately when the board begins to act as such, or at the time of the
appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of
the board, or immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal.
In the instant case, respondents petition to annul petitioners proclamation based on the alleged
illegal composition of the board of canvassers is a pre-proclamation controversy which should have been
filed prior to petitioners proclamation. However, respondent filed the petition on May 17, 2004 only or
four days after petitioners proclamation. As such, the filing of the petition to annul the proclamation of
petitioner did not suspend the running of the reglementary period within which to file an election protest
and inevitably, it did not suspend the latters period to file an Answer with Counter Protest. Accordingly,
the subsequent filing of the election protest on May 24, 2004 by respondent amounted to the
abandonment of the pre-proclamation controversy earlier filed.

2. LAGUMBAY V. COMELEC 16 SCRA 175 ( Deins ko mahanap full text, digest lang meron
sa net)
Facts: In each precinct the number of registered voters equaled the number of ballots and the number
of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in

power,
whereas,
all
the
Nacionalista
Party
got
exactly
zero.
All the reported votes were for the candidates of the Liberal Party, all whom were credited with
exactly the same number of votes in each precinct, whereas all the candidates of the Nacionalis ta
Party
were
given
exactly
zero
in
all
said
precincts.
ISSUE: Was the election result in said precincts utterly improbable and clearly incredible?
HELD: The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative stating that said returns were obviously false
or fabricated - prima facie

3. Bongbong

4. Castromayor v. COMELEC, 250 SCRA 298

Facts: Castromayor was declared and proclaimed winner in an election contest held in1995 in Calinog,
Iloilo, taking the 8th Sangguniang Bayan seat. When the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
rechecked the totals of the Statement of Votes, there wassome disparity and it appeared that another
candidate, Demorito has more votes thanCastromayor and the reason was that votes from one (1) precinct
was overlooked. She thereafter sent a fax to the COMELEC requesting that the MBC be reconvened for
purposes of rectifying the error and annulling the proclamation of Castromayor andproclaim Demorito as
the
8th
member of the Saggunian. The COMELEC then issued aresolution based on the request. Petitioner then
assailed the resolution of the COMELEC. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process since the
issue involves a preproclamation controversy and he should be entitled to notice and hearing so that hecan
be afforded an opportunity to refute the allegations. Petitioner contests the Resolution of the COMELEC
which
was
based
on
a
fax
letter
sent
by
Garin.
Issue: WON the resolution is valid and that the proclamation of petitioner is valid.
Held : what the COMELEC resolution contemplates is a hearing before the MBC at which petitioner will
be heard on his objection and that only if warranted will the MBC be authorized to set aside the
proclamation of petitioner previously made. In its notice to the candidates, the MBC did not state that it
was going to reconvene to annul petitioner's proclamation and make a new one but only that it was going
to do so "for the correction of the errors noted in the Statement of Votes per Precinct/Municipality.The
Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation, any error in the
statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation. It begs the question, therefore, to say that
this is not a pre-proclamation controversy and the procedure for pre-proclamation controversies cannot be
applied to the correction in the computation of the totals in the Statement of Votes.What is involved here
is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes
obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in computation,
the MBC will be acting in anadministrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. Hence any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the
COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections.

5. UTUTALUM v COMELEC
FACTS: NURHUSSEIN A. UTUTALUMand ARDEN S. ANNI were among the candidates in the last 30
May 1987 Congressional elections for the 2nd District of Sulu. After the elctions, elections returns from
Siasi showed that Ututalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the
39,801 registered voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner Ututalum would have a lead of
5,301 votes. Utatalum filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they "appear to
be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess of votes" appearing in said returns. He then
prayed for the exclusion from the canvass of any election returns from Siasi. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers dismissed petitioner's objections because they had been "filed out of time or only after the
Certificate of Canvass had already been canvassed by the Board and because the grounds for the
objection were not one of those enumerated in Section 243 of the Election Code". Petitioner filed with the
Board of Canvassers his Notice of Appeal from said Resolution to the COMELEC. Meanwhile, Sulu
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Anni as the winner. He subsequently took his oath
of office and entered upon the discharge of its functions in July 1987. On 16 January 1988, the
COMELEC issued, a Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters "on the ground of massive irregularities
committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and ordering a new registration
of voters for the local elections of 15 February 1988. On 19 April 1988 COMELEC (First Division)
denied Petitioner Ututalum's two Petitions "for lack of merit, with the advise that he may file an election
contest before the proper forum, if so desired." Declared the COMELEC inter alia: Padded voter's list,
massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest. Petitioner contends that the issue he raised
before the COMELEC actually referred to "obviously manufactured returns," a proper subject matter for a
pre-proclamation controversy and, therefore, cognizable by the COMELEC, in accordance with Section
243 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: WON the issue raised is a ground for a pre-proclamation controversy.
HELD:
NO. It is true that in Lagumbay vs. COMELEC, relied upon heavily by Petitioner Ututalum, this Court
ruled that the returns are obviously manufactured where they show a great excess of votes over what
could have been legally cast. The Siasi returns however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the
old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast.
Moreover, the Lagumbay case dealt with the "manufacture" of returns by those charged with their
preparation as shown prima facie on the questioned returns themselves. Not so in this case which deals
with the preparation of the registry list of voters, a matter that is not reflected on the face of said returns.
Basically, therefore, petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which, indeed, is
not
a
listed
ground
for
a
preproclamation
controversy.
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.The following shall be proper
issues
that
may
be
raised
in
a
pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a)
Illegal
composition
or
proceedings
of
the
board
of
canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or
falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections
233,
234,
235
and
236
of
this
Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously
manufactured
or
not
authentic;
and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of
which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
As pointed out in Espaldon vs. COMELEC: Padded voters' list, massive fraud, and terrorism are clearly
not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for
an
election
protest.
And as held in the case of Bautista vs. COMELEC: The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited
to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of
the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. Moreover, the
preparation of a voter's list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation
controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election
Inspectors and such challenges should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner should
have made specific verbal objections (Sec. 245, Omnibus Election Code), but did not. That the padding of
the List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election Inspectors may have fraudulently
conspired in its preparation, would not be a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy either. For,
whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted, the proper course of action is an election protest.
Finally, this Petition has to fail if only on the basis of the equally important doctrine enunciated in Padilla
vs.COMELEC reiterated in Baldo vs. COMELEC that: Where the respondent had already been
proclaimed as the elected representative of the contested congressional district, and has long assumed
office and has been exercising the powers, functions, and duties appurtenant to said office, the remedy of
the petitioner lies with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-proclamation
controversy becomes moot and academic. And in the more recent case of Antonio vs. COMELEC: Where
the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation controversies cease. A preproclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point in time and should be dismissed. The proper
remedy thereafter is an election protest before the proper forum. Recourse to such remedy would settle
the matter in controversy conclusively and once and for all. WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED

Chapter 12
1. ANTONIO V.A. TAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (Not sure kung tama to pero ito
pinakamalapit sa 1998 na case)
FACTS:
Petitioner was designated by the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") as Vice-Chairman of the City
Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections. On
the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning
candidate for a congressional seat to represent the Second District of Davao City in the House of
Representatives.

Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the
validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers
of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private
respondent Alterado was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The criminal
complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed. Still pending is an administrative
charge, the case now before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers,
including herein petitioner, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to
the Service." Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC thereover, he being under the Executive Department of the government.
The COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in
continuing to take action on the administrative case.
HELD:
1. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and
still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election
canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to
exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or
employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government
carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority shall take appropriate action, either to
suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found
guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or
rulings of the COMELEC. The COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary
action but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs
which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract
from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government
concerned over its own personnel.

2. BENJAMIN F. ARAO vs. COMELEC ( 210 SCRA 290 )

Facts: Petitioner Arao and private respondent Pulmones were candidates for the office of City Mayor of
Pagadian City in the January 18, 1988 local elections. After canvassing the votes, petitioner garnered
12,447 votes, while Pulmones got only12,030 votes. Consequently on January 21, 1988, petitioner was
proclaimed City Mayor-elect of Pagadian City.Private respondent filed his Protest with COMELEC
particularly alleging that fraudand anomalies were rampant in practically all the voting centers in

Pagadian City on January 28, 1988. He also filed an amended protest on February 15, 1988 or after the
ten day period to file an election protest. The First Division of COMELEC denied the said amended
protest. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc granted the amended protest and declared Pulmones as the
duly elected mayor of Pagadian City and ordered petitioner to vacate his office and surrender the same to
private
respondent.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Pulmones as the duly
elected
Mayor
of
Pagadian
City.
Held: The extraordinary power of the Supreme Court to pass upon an order or decision of COMELEC
should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution, while giving it the highest regard and respect due
a constitutional body. For, not every abuse of discretion justifies the original action of certiorari, it must
be grave. Nor any denial of Due Process within its ambit, it must be patent and it must be substantial.The
test therefore is whether petitioner has demonstrated convincingly that COMELEC has committed grave
abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process
in issuing the challenged decision. Here, petitioner has utterly failed.The complaint of petitioner against
the alleged omission of COMELEC to state the reasons for its conclusion that certain ballots were with
identical hand writings, some marked and others stray, does not in any magnitude diminish the straight
forward statement of the public respondent that it painstakingly examined and appreciated individually
the contested ballots for both protestant and protestee in accordance with existing norms.Consequently
petitioner may be deemed to have waived his right to question the Resolution when he failed to act
accordingly despite the opportunity to do so. He should not be permitted, in other words to remain mute
and unaffected in the face of a perceived jurisdictional defect and, worse, profit from his acquiescence
only to grumble in the end when it turns out to be prejudicial to his interest

3. Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970

Facts: Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states that donations of billboards to the Commission by
foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code. The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which
states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign
funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other contributions by the
Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately
preceding a regular or special election.
Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint
with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of
Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner
any elections.
The
(1)

prohibited
active
intervention
of
foreigners
thereunder
may
consist
of:
aiding
any
candidate,
directly
or
indirectly,
in
any
election;

(2)
taking
part
(3) influencing in any manner any election.

in

any

election;

and

The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioners motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to
the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not
made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space
for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election, ... .He
then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as
contrary to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave
abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No
restraining order was issued as COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term any elections, foreigner, and any candidate; as well as the terms aid,
take part, and influence, as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other
meanings
Held:
The term any elections definitely comprehends or applies to election of delegates Constitutional
Convention. Foreigner, on the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or
organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the
application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only. Any candidate likewise
comprehends some candidates or all candidates. The terms aid, to take part, and influence, were
also construed in their general sense- with aid referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen
or to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" means to
use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the
nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to
have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon physically, especially in some
gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or
sway by modifications, feelings or conduct.
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different
meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general sense. There was
likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be restricted or limited.
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it is
expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, in this case, generalia verba
sunt generaliter intelligenda applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but the effect that all candidates
benefit from the contribution amounts to an assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one
candidate. Allowing such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the laws
protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the COMELEC in the subject
resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the Revised Election Code. The law penalizing corrupt
election practices should be given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections.

The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731 promulgated respectively on
August 13, 1970 and September 17, 1970 are therefore declared illegal and null and void.

4. Patrick
5. TAN vs. COMELEC
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and
not
in
complete
accord
with
the
Local
Government
Code
because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the
new
province
of
Negros
del
Norte,
were
not
included
in
the
plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq.
km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which
states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,
the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration
of
the
existing
boundaries
of
Negros
Occidental
(parent
province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the
proposed
province
of
Negros
del
Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather,
the
dissenting
view
of
Justice Abad
Santos
is
applicable,
to
wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities
if
there
be
a
merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently

argue
the
points
raised
by
the
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

petitioners.

6. Ocampo vs House of Rep Electoral Tribunal G.R. NO. 158466

Facts: In May 2001, Mario Crespo, also known as Mark Jimenez, was declared as the elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Pablo Ocampo was the rival candidate who filed an electoral
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) alleging that Crespos win was due to
election fraud and vote buying. In March 2003, Crespo was declared by the HRET as ineligible for office
due to lack of residence in the said district of Manila. Due to such declaration, Ocampo then requested the
HRET to declare him as the winner of the election done in 2001 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6646 which
provides that Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo
should then be considered as stray votes. And that being the fact that Ocampo received the second highest
number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of 768 votes), he should be declared as the winner of
the said election. The HRET denied Ocampos petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.

HELD:
No. Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the
first among the remaining qualified candidates in the event that the highest earner of votes is
disqualified. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective office.
Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final
judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray. Hence,
when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the Election Day and was voted
for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the
electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting
for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted
for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the
candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.

7. Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970

Facts: Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states that donations of billboards to the Commission by
foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code. The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which
states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign
funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other contributions by the
Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately
preceding a regular or special election.
Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint
with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of
Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner
any elections.
The
prohibited
active
intervention
of
foreigners
thereunder
may
consist
of:
(1)
aiding
any
candidate,
directly
or
indirectly,
in
any
election;
(2)
taking
part
in
any
election;
and
(3) influencing in any manner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioners motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to
the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not
made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space
for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election, ... .He
then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as
contrary to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave
abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No
restraining order was issued as COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term any elections, foreigner, and any candidate; as well as the terms aid,
take part, and influence, as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other
meanings
Held:
The term any elections definitely comprehends or applies to election of delegates Constitutional
Convention. Foreigner, on the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or
organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the
application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only. Any candidate likewise
comprehends some candidates or all candidates. The terms aid, to take part, and influence, were
also construed in their general sense- with aid referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen
or to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" means to
use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the
nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to

have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon physically, especially in some
gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or
sway by modifications, feelings or conduct.
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different
meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general sense. There was
likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be restricted or limited.
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it is
expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, in this case, generalia verba
sunt generaliter intelligenda applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but the effect that all candidates
benefit from the contribution amounts to an assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one
candidate. Allowing such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the laws
protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the COMELEC in the subject
resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the Revised Election Code. The law penalizing corrupt
election practices should be given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections.
The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731 promulgated respectively on
August 13, 1970 and September 17, 1970 are therefore declared illegal and null and void.

Chapter 13
1. Bongbong
2. Roxy G
3. JACINTO MAPPALA vs. JUDGE CRISPULO A. NUEZ
FACTS: In 1989, the Provincial prosecutor of Isabela filed: (1) an information against Alejandro
Angoluan for illegal possession of a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866; (2) an information against
Angoluan and five other co-accused for frustrated murder and (3) an information against Alejandro and
Honorato Angoluan for violation of the Omnibus election code. The complaining witness in second case
was Jacinto Mappala, the complainant against respondent in this administrative case. All the actions were
consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, presided by
respondent. On December 20, 1993, respondent rendered a consolidated decision in the aforementioned
cases. Complainant charged respondent with among others, serious misconduct for acquitting Alejandro
Angoluan of violation of the Omnibus Election Code. In his comment, respondent justified the acquittal
of Alejandro of violation of the Election Law on the ground that ". . . the firearm was not taken from his
person within the precinct but was not taken . . . more than 50 meters away from the precinct.
Furthermore, he claimed that what the law considered as a crime was the "carrying of firearms within (50)
or 100 meters away from the precinct. The firearm was not taken from the accused within the 50 or 100
meters distance from the precinct because in truth and in fact the said firearm was surrendered by the
accused two (2) days after the elections. The mistake in the distance is merely a clerical error. But be it 50

meters or 100 meters, still the accused could not be convicted under the said provision, specifically
Section 261, Subsection (p) of Article XXII of the Omnibus election Code".
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge erred in acquitting Alejandro of violation of the Election law.
HELD:
Respondent acquitted Alejandro Angoluan of violation of Section 261 (p) of the Omnibus Election Code
which
provides
that:
Deadly weapons. Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place and within a radius
of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the
polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of affray,
turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise the
election is entitled to carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving and enforcing the
law.
In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct No. 2 during the
barangay elections. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To
respondent, the surrender of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by Alejandro
in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying
a deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while he was the
precinct. To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code, it is not necessary
that the deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a
radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon "in the polling
place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof" during any of the specified days and hours. After
respondent himself had found that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to understand
why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus election Code.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. WILFREDO D. REYES.

FACTS:
Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II, Bureau of Customs,
Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued MICP Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92 dated
January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the
Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. The actual transfer of Ebio was made
on January 14, 1992.
Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio
claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and section 261 (h) of B.P.
Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120
days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections.

After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed an Information with the Regional Trial Court
charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B. P. Blg. 881.
Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not
violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It
purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner, through the COMELEC,
opposed the motion to quash.
On September 23, 1993, the trial court granted private respondent's motion to quash and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 93-120275.

ISSUE:
Whether Maniego is liable for an election offense under Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.
HELD:
It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the
transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. The transfer or detail of
government officer or employee will not be penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to
promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333 provides that the
COMELEC has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or detail.
Prescinding from this predicate, two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261
(h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the
election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior
approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, then the Customs Operation Chief, MICP to
the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant on January 14, 1992.
On this date, January 14, 1992, the election period for the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections had
already been fixed to commence January 12, 1992 until June 10, 1992. As aforestated, this election period
had been determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 2314 dated November 20, 1991 and
Resolution No. 2328 January 2, 1992. Nonetheless, it was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect
on January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its approval on the
transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the election period. Before the effectivity of these
rules, it cannot be said that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable.
Needless to state, respondent Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the
COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on
the subject were yet in existent.

5. DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a
complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of
the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized
Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of
section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist.
The following information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan.Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to
investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans
exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges
against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute,
and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.
Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free,orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred
right andd uty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate
and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair
its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.From a careful scrutiny of the
constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit
grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear
election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the
clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of
first instance under Sections 182and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
6. Michi