EDU v ERICTA

FACTS:
1. May 20, 1970 - Respondent Galo and other motorists led a suit for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the
police power, for being violative of the due process clause.
2. May 28, 1970 - As a remedy in case the statute be declared constitutional,
Respondent also assailed the validity of AO No. 2 implementing such
legislation be nullied as an undue exercise of legislative power.
- Same day, Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary
injunction directed against the enforcement of such AO No. 2
- Day after, SolGen led a MR representing Petitioner Edu but
was later on denied by respondent Judge.
3. June 30, 1970 - Judge Ericta led his answer why he restrained the
enforcement of AO No. 2 and he said that it's in excess of the authority
conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power.
4. Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner led a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge Ericta (CFI-Rizal,Quezon
City), to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of Administrative
Order No. 2
ISSUE: W/N AO No. 2 went beyond its authority and violates the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.
RULING: NO.
1. It is a fundamental principle owing from the doctrine of separation of
powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two
other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local
governments may over local aairs participate in its exercise.
2. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature.
3. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and deniteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of
his authority.
4. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law, to which no valid objection can be made.

5. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the

necessary resources of exibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy.
6. A standard thus denes legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and species the public agency to apply it. The standard may
be either express or implied. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
oce designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
7. If the expressed, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector
Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
8. It bears repeating that the Reector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment,
leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character.
9. There is likewise a categorical armation of the power of petitioner as
Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His
power is clear. There has been no abuse.
10. Thus from Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well established in this
jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and eectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often nds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in
carrying the law into eect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes . . ."

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v POEA
FACTS:
1. March 15, 1985 - Vitaliano Saco was Chief Ocer of the M/V Eastern Polaris
when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan.
2. His widow sued for damages under EO No. 797 and MC No. 2 of the POEA
(before it the National Seamen Board)
3. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System as Saco is a
domestic employee not an overseas worker and should have been led
against the State Insurance Fund.
Petitioner claims that it had never entered into an employment contract as
required by MC No. 2 (This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by

both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment.)

4. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benets and P12,000.00 for burial expenses pursuan to MC
No. 2 (effective Feb. 1, 984).

5. The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the SolGen to

move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

6.

Petitioner questions the validity of MC No. 2 itself as violative of the

principle of nondelegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and
even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.

ISSUE: W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 is valid and not violative

principle of non-delegation of Legislative Power.

of the

RULING: YES
1. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be.
2. There are two accepted steps to constitute valid delegation of Legislative
powers. Intented to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
the delegate The completeness test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
The sucient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.
3. This principle is applicable to the 3 Depts but esp. impt to Legislative as
there were frequent instances of delegation. The reason is the increasing
complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention.
4.1 Particularly applicable to administrative bodies. The Legislature has found
it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
In fact, The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
". . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA)."

4.2 Two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment
at the time of his death in 1985.
a. submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval
in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order
No. 797.
b. payment of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social
and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

5.

Effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary

regulations. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

6. The power of the POEA in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sucient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the
said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself
which, in creating the POEA, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas
Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
7. Under MC No. 2, Series of 1984.

(Merely a reiteration issued by the National Seamen Board

on July 12, 1976)

"Section C. Compensation Benets"

"1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneciaries the amount of: "b. P180,000.00 for other ocers, including radio operators and
master electricians
"2. It is understood and agreed that the benets mentioned above shall be separate and
distinct from and will be in addition to whatever benets which the seaman is entitled to
under the PH law.
"c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the
beneciaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses."
8. Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are
resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor
Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
9. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

GEROCHI v DOE
FACTS
1. Congress enacted the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001"
(EPIRA), June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took eect.
2. April 5, 2002 - NPC-SPUG led with ERC availment of Universal Charge of
its share of Missionary Electrication (UC-ME).
May 7, 2002 - NPC led a petition with ERC that the share of UC-ME be
approved for withdrawal from STF managed by PSALM for
for the

rehabilitation and management of watershed area.

December 20, 2002 - ERC approved the share of UC-ME of NPC and
authorized TRANSCO and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from the
end-users on a monthly basis.
April 2, 2003 - ERC authorized NPC to withraw up to 70M from PSALM for its
2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds.
June 26, 2003 - approved the withdrawal of its share of UC-ME from STF
managed by PSALM.
3. On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric
Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all
other end-users with the Universal Charge as reected in their
respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
4. Petitioner Gerochi assailed the provision of law and its IRR are
unconstitutional on the ff grounds:
a. The UC is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating
entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said
power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the
same unlimited authority. UC as determined, xed and approved by ERC gives it complete
discretionary legislative authority.
b. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should
be used.
c. The imposition of the UC on all end-users is oppressive and conscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and
represented.
5. Respondent PSALM through OGCC contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide
income for public purposes, the assailed UC is levied for a specic regulatory purpose,
which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry, the exercise of its
inherent police power.
On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to
the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the
execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.
Respondents DOE, ERC, and NPC, through the OSG share the same view as PSALM and
deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets
forth sucient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the
powers granted to it.
Respondents argue that the imposition of the UC is not oppressive and conscatory since it
is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due
process.
Respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pursuant to
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under
Sec. 46 of the EPIRA, which imposes nes and penalties for any violation of its provisions or
its IRR.

ISSUES:
W/N The Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax.
W/N There is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.
RULING: NO to both.
1. Based on the purposes of which UC is imposed from Sec. 34 of EPIRA, it can be gleaned that
the assailed UC is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power.
Public welfare is surely promoted. Also, the STF reasonably serves and assures the
attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the UC is imposed, i.e., to ensure the
viability of the country's electric power industry.
2. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation
of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delagari potest (what has
been delegated cannot be delegated).
3.

Requirements of the valid exercise of the power of "subordiante legislation"; the

completeness test and the sufficient standard test. "Regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.

4. The Court nds that the EPIRA, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that
it contains sucient standards.
5. Sec 34 of EPIRA states that UC is to be determined, xed and approved by the ERC, shall be
imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state the specic amount to
be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the law itself.
6. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion
in the determination of the UC. Sec. 51 (d) and (e) of the EPIRA clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the
attainment of its objective, have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form
the basis for ERC in the determination of the UC ;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property
contributed to it, including the proceeds from the UC.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the rst test for valid delegation of legislative power.

7. As to the second test: Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, "to ensure the total
electrication of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the
supply of electric power" and "watershed rehabilitation and management" meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC's power to
formulate the IRR. These are sucient standards.
8. Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the
delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital
public utility. " The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great
exibility, when the need arises."

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers For Reforms v. ERC
where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sucient power to respond in
real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.
9. So it is clear that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
10. WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
TATAD v SECRETARY OF DOE
FACTS
1. RA No. 8180, or the Downstream Oil Industry Regulation Act of 1996, was enacted by
Congress for the purpose of deregulating the downstream oil industry.
"Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of
crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
reneries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy."

2. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those
dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market
without any government interference.
3. Two phases of deregulation process; the transition phase(Aug. 12, 1996) and the full
deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 392)
4. The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392.
5. One of the issues is the substantive issue regarding Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No.
392.
First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide (sufficient standard test) the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry.
Petitioners contend that the law does not dene when it is practicable for the Secretary of
Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry
or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation.
Also, the law does not provide any specic standard to determine when the prices of crude
oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
ISSUE: W/N Section 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretary of Energy
RULING: NO.
1. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will
start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation
at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it
for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the nal date of full

deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997.
2. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President he is to time it
"as far as practicable" when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable.
Petitioner's contention that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should
have been dened in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable
standards deserves scant considerations as dictionary meanings of these words are well
settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence.
3. Petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream
oil industry in February 1997.
A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two
factors to be considered by the DOE and the Oce of the President, viz .: (1) the time when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2)
the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.Section
15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation.
In the cases at bar, the Executive comingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with
the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the
peso to the US dollar.
The ruling of the Court was that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392
constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
4. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and
E.O. No. 372 void.

SEMA v. COMELEC
FACTS
1.

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two

legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The rst legislative
district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.

2. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under its Organic Act, R.A.
6734, as amended by R.A. 9054. Although Cotabato City is not part of the
ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in
the plebiscite held in November 1989.
3. August 28, 2006 - the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional
Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec. 19, Article
VI of R.A. 9054, enacted MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shari
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the rst district of
Maguindanao, later added 3 municipalities. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district.

4. October 29, 2006 - voters of Maguindanao ratied Shariff Kabunsuan's

creation in a plebiscite
Feb. 6, 2007 - Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution
No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province" under MMA Act 201.
Mar. 6, 2007 - COMELEC answered that "maintaining the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao"
Mar. 29, 2007 - In preparation for May 2007 elections, states that
Maguindanao's rst legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
May 10, 2007 - COMELEC issued a Resolution no. 7902, renaming the
legislative district in question as "Shari Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City)."
5.

Sema, who was a candidate in the May 2007 elections for

Representative of "Shari Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed
for the nullication of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion
from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that oce.
Contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in
Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance.
Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
Resolution No. 7902.

Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the

COMELEC usurped Congress' power to create or reapportion
legislative districts.
ISSUES: W/N Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional.
W/N a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA
Act 201 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province.
RULING: NO to both.
1. The creation of local government units is governed by Sec. 10, Article X of
the Constitution.
2. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province,
city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions.
1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria xed in the Local
Government Code.

2. Such creation must not conict with any provision of the Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
3.

Under the Local Government Code, "only . . . an Act of Congress" can

create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
within the ARMM.
The question here is if the delegation is in conict with the Constitution.

4. No conict arises as to the delegation of the power to create municipalities and

barangays, however in the creation of provinces and cities there exist conict with
the Constitution.
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives as similary stated by Sec 3 of the
Ordinance.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province
or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
5. For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also
validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.

6. Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL

insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the ARMM the power to
create provinces and cities for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.

Thus, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan was declared VOID. Consequently, we rule that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
TOBIAS v ABALOS
FACTS
1. Involing rights as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA 7675 otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong."
2. Prior to enactment of RA 7675, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
3. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.

4. April 10, 1994 - Plebiscite was held for the approval of the people of Mandaluyong,
in which 14.41% of the total population voted and the majority voted "yes", so R.A.
No. 7675 was ratied and in effect.
5. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7675, Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specic provisions of the Constitution.
1. It contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
Constitution. Latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts. And 2nd subject is not germane to the subject matter.
2. Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution. Division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in
the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the
Constitution. Not made pursuant to any census for the minimum population requirement. Also,
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts.

ISSUES: W/N R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

RULING: NO
1. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Should
be given a practical rather than a technical construction.
2. As to the contention of the limits of no. of representatives, the Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." So the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. So, R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
As to the census, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through
the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members
of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature
must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said
laws.
As to the contention where it has the effect which preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
3. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MARIANO v COMELEC
FACTS:

1.

Two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."

2. Mariano (resident of Makati) as one of the petitioners (residents of Taguig) led a

petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for local
elective ocials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law (b) the increase in legislative district, was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the
addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000."

3. Petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen assails

Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
ISSUE: W/N R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional.
RULING: NO.
1. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, the
court is not prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional.
To require such description in the law as a condition 'sine quanon' for its validity would be
to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due.
To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description
was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code.

2. Petitioners contention, Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present
municipal elective ocials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by
them to the favor of Respondent Binay who has served 2 consecutive terms, and
would be convenient for his political ambitions.
Petioners has not complied with the requirements in assailing the constitutionality of
the law. (APED)
1. Petition is premised on contingent events (Binay running for election), which is a
hypothetical case which has yet to ripen into an actual case or controversy.
2. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties
to raise this abstract issue.
3. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.

3. Constitutionality of Section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 .

1. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v . Abalos. In said case,
court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special
law, such as in the charter of a new city.
If reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, it would be
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.

2.

The addition of another legislative district in Makati is in accord with the

Constitution. Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

3. No merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative

district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v . Abalos, reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the "one title - one subject " rule so as not to impede legislation.
That "it should be sucient compliance if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
4. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

AQUINO v COMELEC
FACTS
1. RA No. 9716 originated from HB No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on Oct. 12, 2009 and took effect on Oct.
31, 2009.
2. In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconguring the existing 1st and 2nd
legislative districts of the province.
3. Prior to RA No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have
a population of 1,693,821,distributed among four (4) legislative districts.
Municipalities of the 1st and 2nd districts were combined to form a new
2nd legislative districts
4. Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the
approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor
of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district. Contention
below:
That the reapportionment introduced by RA No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard of (Art VI, Sec 5,(1) and (3) and Sec 3 of the
Ordinance)that requires a minimum population 250,000 for the creation of
a legislative district.
That the reconguration of the 1st and 2nd districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed 1st district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. (Art VI, Sec 5,(1) and (3)
and Sec 3 of the Ordinance)

5. Respondents, through the OSG, seek the dismissal of the present petition
based on procedural and substantive grounds.
1. Petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality
via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
2. Petioners have no "locus standi" to question the Constitutionality.
ISSUE: W/N the reapportionment by RA No. 9716 is unconstitutional.
RULING: NO.
1.

Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of

constitutionality if no specic provision of the Consitution is clearly shown
to be violated.

2. In plainly reading Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000

minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but
not so for a province, as the use of a comma to separate the phrase.
3. a. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2)
districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written
allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
b. Based on the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard the nal
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the
reapportionment is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
c. Factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
1. the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
2. the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
3. the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
recongured District One; and
4. the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of
Districts One and Two.

3. Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in
the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with
both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly
given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by
this petition.
Petition dismissed. RA No. 9716 is a valid law.
ALDABA v COMELEC
FACTS

1. Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress

through 4 legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the
city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan,
Bulacan, and Paombong.
2. May 1, 2009 - creation of RA No. 9591 amending Malolos' City Charter
creating a separate legislative district.
3. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were led in Congress in 2007,
population of Malolos City was 223,069.
4. Population of Malolos is a contested fact, but the HB No. 3693 relied the
NSO certication that "the projected population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate
of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."
3. Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, led
this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet
the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N City of Malolos has complied with the population
standard requirement.
W/N RA No. 9591 is unconstitutional.
RULING: 1. No 2. Yes
1. Under EO 135, the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos
City's compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and nonauthoritative.
Miranda's Certication "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%]
between 1995 and 2000"
Fell short of EO 135's requirements:
1. For intercensal years, the certication should be based on a set of demographic
projections and estimates declared ocial by the National Statistics and Coordination
Board (NCSB)
2. Certications on intercensal population estimates w ill be as of the middle of the year.
3. Certications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator
or his designated certifying officer.

Using Miranda's own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City's population
as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of
250,000
That Miranda issued his Certication "by authority of the NSO administrator" does
not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO
Administrator's nor the designated certifying officer.
The Certication has fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections

and estimates declared official by NCSB or make the projection as of the

middle of 2010.

2. Granting that City of Malolos has attained the standard population, under
Sec. 3 of the Ordinance, a city that has attained a population of 250,000 is
entitled to a legislative district only in the "immediately following
election."
There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has
attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected,
before the 10 May 2010 elections.
3. OSG's contention that Congress' choice of means to comply with the
population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is nonjusticiable has no merit.
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is
to contend that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
4. Petition GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
And Ladlad LGBT v. COMELEC
FACTS
1. This is a Petition for Certiorari led by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Resolutions of COMELEC.
2. COMELEC refused to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization
under RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
3. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs).
4. Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad rst applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
5. August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again led a Petition for registration with the
COMELEC. Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity.
6. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.
7. When Ang Ladlad sought for reconsideration, 3 commissioners voted to
overturn the 1st assailed Resolution, the other 3 denied the MR and the
COMELEC chairman breaking the tie upheld the 1st assailed Resolution.

8. January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad led this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant the
application for accreditation.
Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the nal ballots for the May 2010
elections by January 25, 2010.
9. Due to the urgency of the petition, TRO was issued directing the
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed
Resolutions.
ISSUE: W/N Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualies for registration as party-list.
RULING: YES
1. Respondent mistakenly for the proposition that only those sectors
specically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors may be
registered under the party-list system.
"the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors
is not exclusive"
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941 which Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation.
2. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
"government neutrality in religious matters."
So, it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad.
3. Equal Protection. From the standpoint of the political process, the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
4. Freedom of Expression and Association. Under our system of laws,
every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade
society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
5. The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated -not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

6. Petition GRANTED. COMELEC Resolutions SET ASIDE.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v COMELEC
FACTS
1. COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system as members of the House of Representatives.
2. On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA led with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim
[the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution."
It alleged that the lling up of the 20% membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory.
Literal application of the 2% vote requirement and the 3-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.

3. October 15, 1998, COMELEC granted PAG-ASA's petition and ordered the
proclamation of 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting,
would thus total 52 party-list representatives.
4. Petitions for Certiorai were led assailing two (2) Comelec Resolutions
ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives "to
complete the full complement of 52 seats in the HoR
ISSUES: Is 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or mere a ceiling? In other
words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be lled up
completely and all the time?
Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
RULING:
1. NOT MANDATORY. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in
the HOR. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to dene
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In
the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least
2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a partylist seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.
NOT necessary to ll up completely and all the time the 20% allocation of
party-list.
2. YES. In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sucient number of

constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in

Congress.
This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The
2% threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise,
in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing signicant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
3. In summary, parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
1. 20% Allocation the combined number of a ll party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
2. 2% Threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualied" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
3. 3-seat limit each qualied party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
4. Proportional Representation the additional seats which a qualied party is entitled
to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

4. Computation for Additional Seats of Qualied Parties.

1. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Compliance to
2% Threshold. Parties having at least 2% are guaranteed 1 seat. Only these parties
are qualied for computation of additional seats. Highest vote is the First Party
(503,487 votes, 5.5% ).
2. Determine the No. of seats the rst party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the rst party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the
most number of votes.First Party 5.5% = 1 seat
3. Solve for the No. of additional seats that the other qualied parties are entitled
to, based on proportional representation.
No. of Votes of Concerned Party
Concerned Party
No. of Votes of First Party

x Seats allocated to First Party = Additional Seats

ABA (321,646 / 503,487 ) x 1 seat = 0.64 *0 seat

*rounding o not applied

4. In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and
coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated
two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
5. Petitions GRANTED. COMELEC resolutions nullied.
BAGONG BAYANI-OFW v COMELEC
FACTS:
1. Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including
those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
2. Petitioners sought the disqualication of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benet the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Unsatised with the pace by which
Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
W/N political parties may participate in the party list elections.
W/N the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of
other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it
justiciable.
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is
the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualied
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the
party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the partylist system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of

respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations
was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier
of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the
law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that
the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party
lists.

BANTAY RA v COMELEC
FACTS:
1. January 12, 2007, Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules
and regulations to govern the ling of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections.
2. BA-RA 7941 and Urban Poor for Legal Relations (UP-LR) ling with the
Comelec an U r g e n t P e titio n t o Dis q u alif y , thereunder seeking to
disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations on the ground
that they fail to comply with the guidelines as provided by the SC in the
case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC.
Both petitioners do not have the list of nominees for they are still asking for
a copy of the said list. Petitioner Rosales also requested before the
COMELEC's Legal Dept. a copy of the party-list nominees.
3. COMELEC issued Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 virtually declaring
the nominees' names condential and in net effect denying petitioner
Rosales' basic disclosure request.
COMELEC has based its refusal of disclosure on Sec. 7 of R.A. 7941. This
provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling
places of a certied list of party-list system participating groups,
nonetheless tells the COMELEC not to show or include the names of the
party-list nominees in said certied list.
4. Two consolidated petitions seek to compel the COMELEC to disclose the
names of the party-list nominees and to disqualify certain accredited
organizations for failing to comply with the guidelines provided.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC, by refusing to disclose the names of the party-list
nominees has violated
the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution.
W/N COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to
public the names of the said nominees.

disclose

to the

RULING: YES to both.

1. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given
rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the selfexecutory Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is

another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure
and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest
are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the
people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of
those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of
the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.
2. No national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
3. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "The names of the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certied list. " is certainly
not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure.
The prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited
in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certied list
which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on
election day.
4. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the
right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment.
Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a
bearing on their choice.
5. First Petition is party DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation
of the respondents named therein. 1st and 2nd Petitions are GRANTED
insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections.
BANAT v COMELEC
FACTS:
1. 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for
93 parties under the Party-List System.
2. June 27, 2002 - Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) led before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided
by the Constitution.
3. July 9, 2007 - the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60, proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections.
Promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
allocated to the appropriate parties using the Veterans Formula.
4. August 3, 2007 - Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-88 for being moot and academic.

5. BANAT then led a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the
COMELEC.
ISSUES: Is 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or mere a ceiling?
Is the 2% threshold and "qualier" votes prescribed by the same
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating
in the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in
the party-list elections?
RULING:
1. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the lling up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives.
2. No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the 2% threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional.
This Court nds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the
available party-list seat exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives.
Court strike down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution
of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA
7941. The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
3. Computation of Additional Seats.
Votes of each party-list/Total votes of pary-list system = Percentage of votes each party-list
Percentage of votes each party-list x Remaining available seats = Product Whole Integer
BAYAN MUNA

979,039/15,950,900 = 6.14%
6.14 % x 38 remaining seats = 2.33
2.33 = 2 seats

Assign 1 party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualied partylist candidate is entitled.

3. No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7,
the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
ATONG PAGLAUM v COMELEC
FACTS:
1. A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc.
vs. Commission on Electionsreinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani
andBarangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT).
2. In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and organizations which
were disqualied by the Commission onElection from participating in the
May 13, 2013 party list elections because they allegedly do not represent
themarginalized and underrepresented sector of society, the majority is of
the view that the party list systemincludes not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties.
Hence, contrary to the Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system is not the
exclusive domain of sectoral representatives belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors but may be participated in
by non-sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
ISSUE:
W/N Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections
RULING: NO
1. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases.
2. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
a. 3 different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)

sectoral parties or organizations.

b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not eld candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
elds candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-dened political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-dened political constituencies
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
e. As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new
guidelines provide that they must either be members of the sector or have
a track record of advocacy for their sector.
f. Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations be disqualied, the party or organization itself will
not be disqualied provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualied.
3. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since
theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona de sectoral wing.
4. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who
lack well-dened political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack well-dened political constituencies. The common denominator
however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to eld or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election
system like the party-list system of elections.
QUINTO v COMELEC
FACTS
1. Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it
enacted RA 9369, amending theprevious act.

2. Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election

laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certicates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Ocial Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections.
3. Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. led a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution
declaring appointive ocials who led their certicate of candidacy as ipso
facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers
that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE: Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
violative of the equal protection clause
RULING:
NO.
1. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classication. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is
that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The classication rests on substantial distinctions;

It is germane to the purposes of the law;
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
It applies equally to all members of the same class.

2. Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned

provisions satisfy the rst, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It,
however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive ocials vis--vis elected ocials is not germane to the purpose
of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive oce or an elective
one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justication for excluding elected
ocials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
3. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest
expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public oce by popular vote. Considering that
elected ocials are put in oce by their constituents for a denite term, it
may justiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of
the electorate that they be served by such ocials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed ocials are concerned.
4. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective ocials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to
preserve the integrity, eciency, and discipline of the public service; the

Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also

thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the
intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this
Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.