Britainin thenew Europe

GEORGE

ROBERTSON

writesthatthetraditional
basisofBritish
GeorgeRobertson
foreignpolicyis no
longerrelevantin a lesssecurity-oriented
worldin whichtheEast-West
is disappearing.
He arguesthatBritainshouldrethink
confrontation
itsnational
objectives
in thenew environment
and shouldseize theperiodoffluidityand
in Europeto taketheinitiativein theEC and contribute
reconstruction
to the
economic
construction
ofEasternEurope.
The new European scene opens up a freshchance for Britain on its own
continent.The newness comes in the sudden accelerationtowardsintegration
in WesternEurope and the simultaneousreturnto democracyand the mixed
economy in Central and EasternEurope. The freshchance is fora Britishrole
in helping to constructa new order.
So far,theagenda of European constructionhas been setby the Germans,the
Americansand theRussians.They hold mostof the cards,and in the shortterm
the effectwill be to diminishthe weight of Britain,France and the smaller
European countries.But the futureis much more open.
Western politics will become much more multilateral.Afterunification,
Germany'srole will inevitablybe tied into European Communityinstitutions,
both politicallyand economically.The United Statesand theSoviet Union will
be increasinglytied into a CSCE process,which may be a lighterburden on
and demanding.
AmericathanNATO but will nevertheless
be time-consuming.
The Soviet Union and the United States will continue to try to do bilateral
deals, and with Germanyunifiedtheywill botherless with a European input.
Although this will understandablyput a strain on great power-European
relations,therewill be a unifyingEuropean effectto counterit.
In this developing new order, if Britain is shrewd enough and far-sighted
enough in establishingitsown objectives,it could have a major opportunityto
influenceand mould the way Europe develops. That, however, crucially
depends on our building a new identity,a post-'special relationship' identity:
on our rejectingeasy illusions from the past and establishingwhat it is that
Britainwants and needs in thenew internationalcircumstances.Indeed Britain
has a particularimperativein doing thissincetheweaknessof our economy and
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Affairs66,

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GeorgeRobertson
the permeabilityof Britishmarketsmake us particularlyvulnerablein relation
to our betterperformingneighbours.We have alreadylost out on many of the
possibilitieswhichhave presentedthemselvessincethecontinentrevolutionized
itselfa year ago.
These are indeed handicaps, and they manifestthemselves in Britain's
reduced economic clout and in the factthat our militaryprofilewill further
declinein importanceas NATO declinesas a militaryorganization.But we are
fortunatein at leasttwo respects.First,we are,largelyby historicalaccident,still
in key positionsin world institutions;and second, we do have some homebased institutionsof internationalworth which have been insufficiently
exploited. We are on the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations; we are a
major player in NATO, in the European Community and in the Group of
at the heartof the Commonwealth.
Seven; and we are still,by our fingernails,
Taken together,thisputsus in a unique positionwhich is subjectfromtime to
time to quiet envy by the French,Germansand Italiansas well as theJapanese.
Our under-used political and diplomatic strengthslie in the vitality and
strengthof the English language, in our cultural and educational potential
promoted globally by the BritishCouncil (and in the BBC's World Service
with its unrivalledreputation),and in the factthatLondon is stilla centrefor
major global non-governmentalorganizationactivity.
The real problem, though-and it predates the recent transformation
in
Central and Eastern Europe-is that Britain has never clearly defined its
national objectives.
Nothing better illustratesBritain's chronic lack of strategy than the
government'sapproachto theunificationof Germany.FirstthePrime Minister
said it was not on theagenda; thenwhen it clearlywas, she opposed it. Then she
made clear her open distastefor unificationand voiced very publicly, for
instance when she stood beside the Polish Prime Ministerin February,her
prejudicesabout Germanybased on formerGerman generations.
Of course othernations,many with much more painfulcause, were initially
uneasy about an emergingunifiedGermany.They, however, recognizedfirst
thatit was going to happen anyway,second, thattherewas a deep qualitative
difference
between the Federal Republic and any prewar Germany,and third,
thattherewere betterways thanopen impolitenessto a major partnerto ensure
thatunificationtook place in a restrainedand balanced process.Then, fourth,
they rightlycalculated that there was a price to be exacted for backing the
Germans in their deeply felt commitmentto unification.The French got
backing for economic and monetaryunion, which could have been put in
doubt by the preoccupationwith the East. The Americansgot a place in the
bilateral bargaining between the Germans and the Russians, as well as
continuing German support for NATO. Even the Soviet Union got
something-a commitmentto reducedtroopsin thenew nation,and economic
aid as well. But Britain,exposed by indelicateand offensivediplomacy,had to
accepttheinevitableand gainedno priceat all. The sad thingwas thattherewas
no price that we wanted, and thereforeno strategy,no gameplan, no result.
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Britainin thenew Europe

Once again the Russianrouletteof diplomacy had leftus with the last,loaded,
chamber.
Britainis being marginalized,and not principallyby forceof circumstance,
but because of a misguided policy. A change in this policy could certainly
reversethe process.Britain'sforeignpolicy mustbe based on a sober, realistic
assessmentof our statusas a medium-sizednationon the geographicalfringeof
Europe. It must also crucially involve the exercise of influence through
collective institutionsand partnershipsto protect and promote Britain's
interests.
Our principaland inescapableobjectivenow has to be on the insidetrackof
Europe. In theforeseeablefuturethiswill be in theEuropean Community.That
is where Germany'sunitywill be consolidated,where itseconomic power will
be roped in, and where theEuropean identityon a multitudeof matterswill be
fashioned.It is the only real arena where Britishinfluencecan be exercised.
In the medium term,we have to recover the economic strengthwhich we
have dissipatedand which alone gives politicalmuscle.That in turnwill require
learningsome of the lessonsof those countrieswhich have overtakenus-not
least the Germans.Given theirpreoccupationswith the unificationprocessfor
perhapsthenextfiveyears,we may have a once-and-for-allchanceto catchup.
If any one area needs attentionover all othersit is education and training,
because thatis where the comparisonwith our neighboursis at its starkest.
But politicallytoo we have to be astute.It is in the next few yearsthatthe
of a new orderwill be created,and we have to be
new and durableinstitutions
on the fasttrackdeterminingtheirscope, ambitionand timescale.Any attempt
to stand on the sidelines and lecture the others will be doomed. Only by
engagingin the dialogue and in the debate will we have a lastingeffecton the
outcome.
Of course nostalgiafor the past gloriesof world power stilllingerson. The
time when Westminsterruled supremeis stilla potentmemoryeven formany
who never actually experiencedit. Sovereigntyis a concept deeply loved by
but in the wrong context.If sovereigntydoes matter,
Britishparliamentarians,
and matterit does to the Britishpeople as it does to the French,thenit has to
mean something.There is no sovereigntyin Westminsterover acid rain, or
radioactivefalloutfromChernobylor the decisionsof major companies.When
money marketscross over national boundaries at will thereis precious little
sovereigntyleftover key economic areas. For thisreasonthepooling of powers
at a European level is regardedby most of those with a practicalratherthan a
theoreticalgrasp of sovereigntyas a means of reassertingcontrol over the
unaccountable and unreachableforcesthat now control national economies.
Unless we recognize thatour participationin an integratedEurope is a means
and thatEuropean Communitypoliticsare
of returningpower to Westminster,
now domesticpoliticswith a vengeance,Britain will continueto lose out.
We have to 'muck in' at the European level; there is, crudely, simply
no alternative.That means building alliances in the EC institutions,and
especiallyin the Council of Ministersand the Parliament.These alliancesand
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GeorgeRobertson
partnerships,
builton more diligentbilateralefforts
thanwe have seen forsome
time,will be necessaryto promote and protectwhat we see as in the national
interest.For the British,all too oftencontinentalEurope is stillseen as foreign
and alien territory,
and we see visitsto Brusselsand Strasbourgas jaunts in a
way we would never look on longerjourneys to Doncaster or Aberdeen.
We have to rediscoverthe redundantBritishart of networking,accepting
thatour island naturemakes us slightlyremotebut thatpersonaland political
contacts can compensate. The Commonwealth is one such network which
Britainhas grievouslyneglectedin the disputatiousargumentsabout sanctions
on South Africa.The Americans,once the expertmanipulatorsof the Western
caucus in most forums,now look with sournessat the way in which the EC
in theGATT. The Commonwealth
caucusesin theUN and is singlyrepresented
provides Britainwith additional opportunitiesto caucus to effect.
Gettingproperlyengaged in the European Community will also get us a
voice on the size as well as the nature of the developing Community.
Enlargementhas now become almost a theological tangle,one ostensiblyput
offuntilI992. But theissueswill have to be facedlong beforethen.Applications
are already tabled from Turkey, Austria,Cyprus and Malta, and othersare
awaited. Negotiationswith EFTA have almost stalled,and the reasonis partly
a desireby some to block looser arrangementsto ensurethatfull membership
is the best and most desirableoutcome.
Then there are the Central and East European countries,whose whole
ambitionis now focusedon membershipof the Community.Rightly,theysee
theEC as themeansof providingthateconomic ballastthatwill simultaneously
protecttheireconomic fortunesand theirpolitical stability.They cannot be
casuallyrefusedon groundsthatthe club is fullup, or the alternativecould be
a collapse into the sad repressionof the past.
We are rightlymesmerizedby what is happeningin the ex-communist(and
now anti-communist)countries,but Britainseemsincapableof being optimistic
about it. It is as if we believed that 40 years of Stalinismhad injected some
AIDS-type resistanceto marketsand mixed economies. We ignorethefactthat
the economic miracle of Hong Kong was built by refugeesfleeingacross the
border fromcommunistChina, and in so doing we seem contentto wait for
theEuropean experimentto fail.Britainmustplay itspartin creatinga climate
of optimism in Central and Eastern Europe. That will also be in the longsince the 'peace dividend' we all
standingtraditionof Western self-interest,
now takeforgrantedis pivotallydependenton stabilitybeing assuredin theeast
of the continent. Stimulatinginvestment,encouraging the exploitation of
the resourcesunique to thesecountriesand facilitatingprivateventurecapital
will repay West as well as East.
But we must also see to it that the magnet of eventual Community
membershipis there for the Central and East Europeans. In that way the
to
emergingdemocracieswill have a model to aim forand a set of institutions
work towards. In the vacuum theyfindafterthe overthrowof Stalinismthat
could be a real help to political architects.
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Britainin thenew Europe

The verynewnessof the continent'spolitical makeup will lead to mistakes.
For generationsnormshave been establishedand we have grown comfortable
in a statusquo which has taken only a year to disintegrate.Old enemieshave
gone, old political, economic and militaryrelationshipshave disappeared: a
whole generation'sworth of expertisein East-West relationsis suddenlyless
relevant. New problems now appear-nationalism, ethnic quarrels,border
wrangles,minoritiesin revolt. We need new institutionsto take a firmgrasp
on the problemsbeforeour continentis back in the old chaos again. We also
have to face the brutalfactthathuman migration,forso long held in check by
an Iron Curtain, may well be the agony of the next decade. The image of
economic success beamed into every living-room by the communications
revolution is already drawing unacceptable numbers from the Maghreb to
Spain and France. Similar attractionsbring in growing floods from Central
Europe to Germanyand others.As Checkpoint Charlie is symbolicallylifted
away to be a museum, the visa barriersmay soon come back down the
Oder-Neisse line and across the Mediterraneanto keep out the new refugees.
But Europe will findthe solutions.Memories are too deep to want history
repeated.The suddennessof the deal between Chancellor Kohl and President
Gorbachev in July showed how political will can defy normal political
dillydallying.The CSCE will come, will get itshead office,itsbureaucratsand
an impossibleagenda, but thatwill keep the talkinggoing and may trapin the
processthe germsof a solutionthatmightinfectthe continent.Britain,as one
of the moving forcesbehind the successof the CSCE processand the Helsinki
Final Act, should make its presencefeltin the new, resurrectedorganization.
Our role in the major world bodies gives us a starting-point:thereafter
it is
down to skilfuldiplomacy.
Once the possessionof nuclear weapons gave Britainits edge of influence.
The end of the Cold War has eliminatedthatmargin,as it has indeed reduced
the impact our disproportionatedefencecapabilitywill have in a diminishing
militaryalliance like NATO. Our Empire is gone, and so too is the economic
muscle we once used to greateffect.It is time forthe imaginationto come to
the rescue while we rebuild the home industrialbase.
Britainhas its chance to take the lead in I992. Providence has provided for
us in that,forin theimportantand prestigiouslastsix monthsof the I992 single
marketprogrammewe will hold thePresidencyof theEuropean Community.
To be fair, this may land us with responsibilityfor unscramblingevery
unsolved problem-and some of them will be tough indeed-but thereis an
upside. As the in-coming Presidencyin early I992 and during the crucial
Presidencyitself,Britainwill be in the drivingseat. It gives us the possibilityto
influencethepost-Igg2 agenda in ways we could otherwiseonly dreamof. One
tactic,pioneered by the famous Chequers seminaron Germany,mightbe to
assessthe weaknessof characterof our major allies,doing it in a way calculated
to set them againstus in any subsequentnegotiation-or we could be sensible
and clever.
Britaincan and should take theinitiativeinsidetheEC in settingthestandard
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for the practical European integrationwe see as necessary and desirable.
Externally,we can make thebid forambitiousenlargementof the Community
which would give life to the European dream.
Britain'srole in the world will never again be as grand or as gloriousas the
nostalgists'dream. But neitherdo we have to accept a role that is reactive,
marginaland ineffectual-whichis where currentthinkingis leading us. In a
continentchangingbeyond description,and with the whole world affectedby
it, Britainneeds nerve,ambitionand a new direction.That is the only way we
will stayin the frontrank,influencingtheeventswhich will mould our future.

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