Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 95

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p.

1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

SUMRIO
A TRANSIO POLTICA DE MIANMAR: DISPUTAS INTERNAS E INTERESSES

05

EXTERNOS

Erik Herejk Ribeiro, Maria Gabriela Vieira

A QUESTO NUCLEAR NA PENNSULA COREANA: AS REFORMAS INTERNAS NA


COREIA DO NORTE E OS DESAFIOS REGIONAIS

15

Pedro Vinicius Pereira Brites

A REINSERO GLOBAL DA ECONOMIA DO IR APS O ACORDO NUCLEAR

25

Joo Paulo Alves, Marina Felisberti

AS CONVERSAES DE PAZ SOBRE O CONFLITO SRIO

36

PRINCIPAIS AVANOS E DIFERENAS ENTRE AS REUNIES DE VIENA (2015) E GENEBRA


III (2016)
Douglas de Quadros Rocha, Isabela Souza Julio, Patrcia Graeff Machry

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

SUMMARY
THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MYANMAR: INTERNAL DISPUTES AND FOREIGN

51

INTERESTS

Erik Herejk Ribeiro, Maria Gabriela Vieira

THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:


NORTH KOREA AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES

INTERNAL REFORMS IN

61

Pedro Vinicius Pereira Brites

GLOBAL REINTEGRATION OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY AFTER THE NUCLEAR


DEAL

72

Joo Paulo Alves, Marina Felisberti

THE PEACE TALKS ON THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

82

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIENNA (2015) AND GENEVA
III (2016) MEETINGS
Douglas de Quadros Rocha, Isabela Souza Julio, Patrcia Graeff Machry

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

A TRANSIO POLTICA DE MIANMAR: DISPUTAS INTERNAS E


INTERESSES EXTERNOS
Erik Herejk Ribeiro1 e Maria Gabriela Vieira2

As eleies de 2015 em Mianmar trouxeram elites civis ao governo


central aps cinco dcadas de regimes controlados por elites militares.

O processo de abertura democrtica gradual buscou normalizar as


relaes exteriores, acelerar a modernizao econmica e preservar os
interesses das elites militares.

A ascenso das elites civis pode resultar em instabilidade e


retrocessos no processo de abertura devido s disputas entre elites e aos
interesses externos de China e EUA.
Apresentao
Em novembro de 2015, as
eleies em Mianmar (antiga Birmnia)
chamaram a ateno global sob
manchetes de renovao da esperana e
da democracia no pas. Nas eleies
anteriores, em 2010, o Partido da Unio,
Solidariedade
e
Desenvolvimento
3
(USDP ), que representa as elites
militares, conquistou ampla maioria no
Parlamento. Em contraste, as eleies de
2015 deram vitria Liga Nacional pela

Democracia (NLD4), que conquistou 60%


de participao parlamentar.
At o momento, observa-se o
respeito aos resultados das urnas pelas
antigas elites. Por
outro lado,
permanecem tenses histricas entre as
tradicionais elites militares, as novas
elites civis e os grupos insurgentes locais.
Embora as perspectivas de reconciliao
nacional sejam positivas, o caminho para
a democratizao complexo e envolve

Doutorando e Mestre em Estudos Estratgicos Internacionais pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande
do Sul (UFRGS). Contato: erik_ribeiro@yahoo.com.br
2

Graduanda em Relaes Internacionais pela UFRGS. Contato: maria.g.vieira95@gmail.com

Do ingls, USDP - Union Solidarity and Development Party.

Do ingls, NLD - National League for Democracy.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

diversos grupos de interesse no pas e no


exterior.

Suu Kyi. A lder da NLD filha de Aung


San, o principal articulador do movimento
anticolonial e ainda maior expoente da
nao, mesmo tendo falecido em 1947.
Suu Kyi, que visitava o pas durante os
protestos de 1988, morava na Inglaterra
e decidiu envolver-se na poltica nacional
aps o incentivo dos manifestantes, que
enxergavam nela o legado de seu pai
(Charney, 2009).

Breve histrico
Mianmar
localiza-se
numa
verdadeira encruzilhada da sia, rodeada
pelo subcontinente indiano, pela China e
pelo Sudeste Asitico. Pas de histria e
cultura ricas, foi colonizado pelo Imprio
Britnico no Sculo XIX, conquistando
sua independncia em 1948. A antiga
Birmnia sofreu com ameaas externas5,
presses separatistas e cises entre as
elites governantes. Aps a primeira
dcada de um regime democrtico, o
pas teve um governo militar transitrio
(1958-1960) e a instabilidade culminou
num golpe de Estado organizado pelas
elites militares em 1962. O novo regime
buscava uma sntese entre as tradies
nacionais e o socialismo reformista,
rejeitando qualquer via revolucionria
(Taylor, 2009).

O caminho para a
democratizao
A situao internacional em 1990
passava por intensas transformaes
sistmicas, decorrentes da normalizao
das relaes EUA-URSS e da queda
progressiva dos socialismos no Leste
Europeu. A Terceira Onda de
democratizaes tambm j atingia boa
parte do Terceiro Mundo e desmantelava
os antigos arranjos polticos locais
(Huntington, 1991). Gene Sharp (1993),
professor de Dartmouth, prontamente
elaborou um manual de derrubada no
violenta de regimes ditatoriais tendo a
Birmnia como modelo e inspirao.
Posteriormente, esta mesma obra
influenciaria as Revolues Coloridas no
antigo espao sovitico e as revoltas
rabes de 2011.

Aps
diversas
dificuldades
econmicas e polticas, o regime
socialista ruiu em 1988. Analogamente
aos eventos da Praa de Tiananmen (na
China), protestos de estudantes foram
reprimidos e resultaram em intensa
presso internacional. O governo militar
provisrio aceitou realizar eleies em
1990, onde acabou previsivelmente
derrotado pela NLD.

O governo provisrio militar,


embora pressionado por elementos
internos
e
externos,
decidiu
progressivamente boicotar os resultados
da eleio e instituir um regime de

A Liga surgiu de movimentos


estudantis e de entidades civis, liderada
pela surpreendente figura de Aung San
5

Podemos citar, especialmente, a postura revolucionria da China nas dcadas de 1950 e 1960 e o apoio
da CIA estadunidense ao Exrcito do Kuomintang, estacionado na Birmnia desde a derrota na Guerra Civil
Chinesa. Posteriormente, os lderes destas foras nacionalistas chinesas passaram a gerir um lucrativo
negcio de trfico de herona no norte do pas.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

6
25

exceo sob seu comando. Em sua viso,


Mianmar estava sendo alvo de um
movimento internacional organizado, que
tinha Suu Kyi e a NLD como parceiros
para forar simultaneamente uma
abertura econmica radical e a
instaurao de uma democracia liberal.
Os
sucessivos
governos
socialistas e militares sempre tiveram a
autonomia nacional e o no alinhamento
como prioridades (Egreteau e Jagan,
2013). No plano econmico, ao contrrio
da maioria das experincias terceiromundistas nos anos 1990, os militares
em Mianmar realizaram um processo de
transio ao capitalismo onde as
privatizaes foram abertas apenas s
elites locais, impedindo maior insero
do capital internacional.

aliados chave. Mianmar se colocava,


portanto, como um empecilho ao triunfo
do liberalismo global, impassvel a
influncias externas. Em situao
diplomtica e econmica ameaada, os
generais mianmarenses recorreram
proteo chinesa e da Associao das
Naes do Sudeste Asitico (ASEAN), que
desejava avanar uma comunidade
poltica, econmica e cultural regional
(Charney, 2009).
Embora relativamente isolado no
Sistema Internacional, Mianmar passou
por um processo de modernizao desde
1988. Devido s ameaas internas e
externas a sua segurana, a parceria com
a China foi importante para importao
de sistemas militares modernos,
incluindo a absoro de tecnologia para
produo de blindados e fragatas stealth,
por exemplo.

Ao longo das dcadas de 1990 e


2000, Mianmar sofreu intensas presses
internacionais pela abertura poltica e
econmica. Suu Kyi foi colocada sob
priso domiciliar, sendo solta e
novamente presa algumas vezes no
perodo. O pas continuava fechado a
influncias externas, ao passo em que
seus vizinhos, notadamente a Indonsia
e a Tailndia, passavam por processos
acelerados de liberalizao econmica
com resultados instveis, a exemplo da
queda de Suharto na Indonsia e da crise
financeira asitica de 1997. Mesmo
assim, os pases do Sudeste Asitico
alcanaram altos nveis de crescimento
econmico, enquanto Mianmar sofria
embargo
econmico
dos
pases
ocidentais.

Alm disso, a construo da nova


capital Naypyidaw, no centro geogrfico e
civilizacional do pas buscou acelerar a
integrao econmica entre as regies e
retornar s origens culturais locais. A
antiga capital Yangon remetia ao perodo
da colonizao inglesa e ainda
representa o grande centro econmico e
demogrfico nacional. Sua localizao
litornea facilitaria um eventual cenrio
de interveno militar estrangeira,
apoiada por protestos das camadas
sociais urbanas.
Em 2003, o regime militar iniciou
um processo controlado de sete passos
para a transio democrtica, chamado
Mapa para a Democracia. No entanto,
os protestos da Revoluo do Aafro
(2007) foram uma nova tentativa de
impor a abertura poltica acelerada de

A nova ordem unipolar dos EUA


no sustentava ou tolerava mais regimes
militares, com raras excees de antigos

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

Mianmar, baseados nas experincias das


Revolues Coloridas do antigo espao
sovitico. Desta vez, a dura represso
das foras policiais teve cobertura dos
meios de comunicao internacionais e
de mdias alternativas. As decorrentes
propostas de sanes no Conselho de
Segurana das Naes Unidas foram
barradas pelo voto conjunto de China e
Rssia.
Conforme
aponta
Steinberg
(2010), os EUA basearam largamente
sua poltica externa para Mianmar na
figura de Suu Kyi nas ltimas dcadas. O
episdio da Revoluo do Aafro
evidenciou o interesse, principalmente
de setores polticos dos Estados Unidos,
em cooptar as elites civis locais para o
projeto liberal americano. Por outro lado,
a China apostou numa transio
controlada e limitada, para impedir a
ascenso imediata de novas elites e
evitando o colapso do Estado e da ordem
social.

artigos na Constituio que lhes


favoreciam. Podemos citar dois pontos
importantes: Reserva de 25% dos
assentos nas cmaras alta e baixa;
nomeao de um dos vice-presidentes e
dos ministros do Interior, da Defesa e dos
Assuntos de Fronteira. Em suma, os
assuntos de segurana nacional,
incluindo aqueles tratados pelo gabinete
da presidncia, continuaro dominados
pelas Foras Armadas.
A NLD, sem a liderana de Suu Kyi
(que havia retornado priso domiciliar),
decidiu no participar inicialmente do
processo de democratizao. O partido
ainda demandava o reconhecimento dos
resultados obtidos nas eleies de 1990.
Somente em 2012 a Liga decidiu
retornar ao cenrio nacional em eleies
parciais de meio de mandato.

Transio poltica e os interesses


em jogo

Sendo assim, a transio poltica


foi acelerada sob a tcita aprovao da
China e com apoio da ASEAN. O governo
Barack Obama, percebendo que o regime
se sustentava mesmo sem apoio
ocidental, iniciou a aproximao com as
autoridades de Mianmar ainda em 2009
(Haacke,
2012).
A
progressiva
normalizao das relaes com os
Estados Unidos possibilitou o dilogo
posterior das elites militares com Suu
Kyi, que no tinha mais apoio
incondicional do Ocidente.
A nova constituio de Mianmar
foi redigida em 2008 e as eleies foram
realizadas em 2010. Devido ao papel
central das Foras Armadas (Tatmadaw)
na poltica nacional, foram previstos

Inicialmente,

importante
afastar-se de anlises maniquestas,
geralmente jornalsticas, acerca dos
interesses em jogo na transio poltica
de Mianmar. No se trata simplesmente
de uma elite militar repressora versus
novas elites civis democratas. No plano
interno, h correntes conservadoras
(linha dura) e pragmticas entre os
militares. Da mesma forma, as elites civis
se dividem entre aquelas reformistas e
outras liberais radicais associadas a
interesses externos. Ainda, existem
dezenas
de
partidos
polticos
representantes de grupos tnicos
minoritrios de Mianmar, que somam um
tero da populao. Em alguns casos,

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

estes partidos so a face poltica de


grupos
guerrilheiros
fortemente
armados.

Assim, os interesses econmicos


e polticos da China estariam em risco,
pois o pas possui investimentos crticos
de
infraestrutura
que
podero
transformar seu vizinho na Califrnia
Chinesa (Thant Myint-U, 2011). Em
outras palavras, Mianmar a sada
geoeconmica da China para o Oceano
ndico e uma rota complementar
segurana energtica chinesa, que hoje
depende essencialmente do chokepoint
do Estreito de Malaca. Do ponto de vista
militar e estratgico, o pas pode ser uma
via de escape para a China em caso de
conflito no Pacfico Ocidental (a exemplo
do que ocorreu na Segunda Guerra
Mundial). Por outro lado, a utilizao de
seu territrio contra a China colocaria em
cheque a segurana de todo o seu
interior (Ribeiro, 2015).

O novo governo, eleito em 2010,


ainda continha fortes traos do antigo
regime militar, agora nominalmente uma
Democracia Disciplinada. Mesmo
assim, j era possvel identificar a
transio poltica de um poder unitrio,
centralizado e autoritrio para a difuso
de poder entre as elites militares e o
governo eleito quase civil (Callahan e
Steinberg, 2012). O governo do
presidente Thein Sein deu passos
importantes em direo abertura
gradual da economia e reconciliao
dos grupos polticos nacionais.
Inclusive, a ltima grande
iniciativa de Thein Sein foi buscar um
cessar-fogo nacional entre o governo e
todos os grupos armados do pas. O
acordo foi barrado pelo grupo da etnia
Wa, residente na fronteira com a China e
principal fora insurgente de Mianmar.
Os Was so os principais controladores
do trfico de drogas do Tringulo
Dourado (Laos, Mianmar, Tailndia),
considerada a maior regio produtora de
herona do mundo.

Os Estados Unidos, por sua vez,


adotaram uma postura pragmtica para
satisfazer seus interesses geopolticos
maiores, deixando em segundo plano a
exportao de democracias e do
liberalismo. Imersos em suas guerras no
Afeganisto e Iraque, os EUA agiram
tardiamente na sia, observando quase
passivamente a ascenso econmica,
poltica e militar da China. A nova poltica
para Mianmar se insere numa nova
ofensiva
estratgica
dos
EUA
denominada Piv para a sia. Para
retomar suas relaes com os pases do
Sudeste Asitico, era necessrio tambm
ter uma postura de engajamento, no de
confrontao, com Mianmar (Haacke,
2012). Alm disso, num contexto de
rpidas
mudanas
geopolticas,
Washington evita descartar qualquer pas
como potencial aliado, especialmente

Por trs de sua intransigncia h


um apoio tcito da China, que no deseja
perder um elemento importante de
barganha com o governo mianmarense.
Ao mesmo tempo em que os chineses
desejam e apoiam explicitamente a
abertura poltica e a reconciliao
nacional, h o temor de que um novo
governo autnomo e consolidado possa
se sentir seguro o suficiente para
aproximar-se do Ocidente.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

9
25

aps o estremecimento de suas relaes


com a Tailndia devido ao golpe militar
em 2014. Cabe mencionar que, ainda em
2013, os EUA retomaram parcialmente
seu programa de treinamento de oficiais
militares para Mianmar, suspenso desde
1988.

modo tambm a legitimar sua influncia


poltica e econmica nacional. Com a
chegada das revoltas rabes em 2011,
as lideranas mianmarenses temiam que
um novo governo civil pudesse confiscar
seus bens e condena-las priso por
crimes cometidos durante o regime
militar. Neste sentido, a transio
controlada serviu como instrumento para
legalizar o novo papel dos militares da
ativa e aposentados, que controlam boa
parte da economia nacional e tm poder
de veto constitucional6.

Numa posio mais conciliadora,


a ndia e os pases da ASEAN podem ter
papel
estabilizador
no
plano
internacional. O Nordeste Indiano uma
regio afastada de Nova Delhi e tem
sofrido por dcadas com insurgncias
armadas, que mantm conexes e fluxos
de armas com os grupos em Mianmar
(Lintner, 2012). Isto torna a ndia no
principal interessado em alcanar a
reconciliao nacional do pas vizinho. A
ASEAN, por sua vez, um projeto de
integrao regional que preza a no
interferncia em assuntos internos e
mecanismos informais de diplomacia,
conhecidos como ASEAN Way (Beukel,
2008). Para que o Sudeste Asitico
continue prosperando e avanando na
integrao, essencial que todos os
pases atinjam nveis de crescimento e
desenvolvimento
econmico
compatveis, embora em estgios
naturalmente distintos. O Japo observa
de perto os acontecimentos em Mianmar
e tambm tem fornecido ajuda
econmica e investimentos no setor
manufatureiro.

No ponto de vista econmico, as


antigas elites tiveram conscincia de que
no era possvel manter indefinidamente
um regime boicotado internacionalmente
e fechado a investimentos externos. A
China tem papel fundamental em termos
de infraestrutura, com projetos de
rodovias, ferrovias e dutos ao longo da
via Kyaukpyu-Kunming. Por outro lado, os
principais investimentos produtivos no
pas ocorrem apenas em negcios
extrativistas
(minerao,
extrao
vegetal, gs e petrleo) (Steinberg e Fan,
2012). A normalizao das relaes
exteriores pode cumprir a estratgia
nacional de barganha pela modernizao
econmica
e
pela
atrao
de
investimentos que gerem valor agregado
e renda.
Analisar as elites civis uma
tarefa bem mais complexa. Embora Suu
Kyi tenha grande controle sobre as
atividades da NLD, existe uma srie de
grupos de interesse apoiadores da Liga

Ao realizar a transio poltica, os


militares em Mianmar buscaram
rebalancear suas relaes exteriores, de
6

Quaisquer reformas profundas na Constituio de 2008 s podem ser feitas com a aprovao de 75% do
Parlamento. Como os militares possuem 25% dos assentos, bastaria apenas mais um voto entre os
parlamentares eleitos para barrar mudanas no desejadas.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

10

cujos projetos so menos publicizados.


Mesmo assim, pode-se esperar uma
postura reformista moderada do novo
governo eleito, que tomou posse em 30
de maro de 2016. Devido a restries
legais, Aung San Suu Kyi no pode ser
presidente do pas, pois seus filhos
possuem nacionalidade britnica. O novo
presidente, Htin Kyaw, foi apontado
pessoalmente por ela e funcionar num
papel majoritariamente decorativo. Suu
Kyi ficou incumbida oficialmente do
Ministrio das Relaes Exteriores.

hidreltricas existentes. importante


ressaltar que o governo Thein Sein j
havia paralisado as obras em 2011 por
apelo
de
organizaes
no
governamentais e de outros setores da
sociedade.
O encontro com o ex-general Than
Shwe marca, por parte de Suu Kyi, o
respeito s Foras Armadas e, mais do
que isso, a aceitao do status quo
vigente. Ao menos num primeiro
momento, ela parece cautelosa em
atender demandas de sua base aliada
por reformas que possam ameaar o
status nacional dos militares. Um dos
assuntos mais sensveis, que parece
estar fora de questo no momento atual,
qualquer espcie de controle civil sobre
as organizaes militares ou sobre
assuntos de segurana nacional.

Em primeiro lugar, Suu Kyi


encontrou-se nos ltimos anos com
praticamente todos os grandes atores
interessados na transio poltica de
Mianmar.
Estes
incluem
tanto
autoridades estadunidenses e chinesas,
como lideranas conservadoras e
pragmticas entre os militares. Os
episdios mais emblemticos foram sua
visita ao primeiro ministro Xi Jinping, na
China (junho de 2015) e seu encontro
com o ex-comandante da junta militar
Than Shwe (dezembro de 2015).

O manifesto eleitoral da NLD


tambm nos fornece pistas sobre
possveis
mudanas.
No
plano
econmico internacional, defende-se
relaes fortes e prximas com o Banco
Mundial e com o Fundo Monetrio
Internacional, sinalizando maior abertura
a influncias externas. Em termos de
poltica econmica e tributria, parece
haver
uma
tendncia
de
descentralizao de recursos.

A China procurou o dilogo para


tentar retomar alguns de seus projetos
de infraestrutura em Mianmar e na
regio como um todo, alm de
estabelecer pontes diplomticas com a
possvel nova liderana nacional.
Contudo, o manifesto eleitoral da NLD
aponta que a construo de grandes
hidreltricas causa grande impacto
ambiental, referindo-se indiretamente ao
projeto chins de Myitsone, que se
encontra paralisado. Por isso, o
manifesto prossegue, necessrio
procurar outras fontes de energia e
apenas
manter
as
estruturas

Uma das questes mais sensveis


da economia poltica da transio em
Mianmar o papel do empresariado
militar, que atualmente domina os
setores industrial e extrativista. At o
momento, a abertura econmica tem
sido gradual e negociada. A comisso
para investimento estrangeiro, baseada
na Constituio de 2008, tem priorizado
concesses a joint ventures com grande

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

11

participao do capital nacional. A


abertura gradual e a proteo das
empresas
nacionais
visa
evitar
doutrinas de choque adotadas como
soluo por diversos pases nos anos
1990. Na maioria dos casos, o resultado
era a dependncia exacerbada de capital
estrangeiro e a destruio da base
produtiva local.

segurana nacional e possuem uma


abordagem muitas vezes antagnica
NLD. Ainda, o assunto pode servir como
elemento de barganha para os militares,
que perderam grande parte da
representao parlamentar e no
desejam perder ainda mais influncia na
poltica nacional.
O ltimo evento relevante para o
momento de transio poltica de
Mianmar foi a votao do projeto de lei
para a criao do posto de Conselheiro
do Estado, o qual seria assumido por
Suu Kyi. Apesar de ter sofrido forte
oposio dos militares no parlamento, o
projeto necessita apenas da aprovao
do Presidente Htin Kyaw para ser
colocado em prtica. Por meio dessa lei,
Suu Kyi estaria formalmente no centro da
administrao do novo governo em
Mianmar,
com
poderes
quase
equivalentes a de um Primeiro Ministro.

Apesar de seu papel importante


para a economia nacional, as empresas
militares tambm se envolvem em
negcios de explorao margem da lei,
a exemplo da minerao de jade no norte
do pas (estado Kachin), feita em
conjunto com empresas chinesas. Caso
haja sinais de maior interferncia do
governo civil no sentido de abertura
acelerada ou de maior fiscalizao,
provavelmente haver reao por parte
de elites militares e risco de crise poltica
e socioeconmica.
Outro resultado importante das
eleies de 2015 foi a perda de
influncia dos grupos representantes das
minorias tnicas. Na maioria destas
regies, o NLD tambm conquistou
maioria, mostrando fora poltica
tambm entre as minorias. Do ponto de
vista da reconciliao nacional, a vitria
massiva do NLD em todas as regies
indica legitimidade para conduzir o
processo de cessar-fogo frente a boa
parte dos grupos tradicionais, que
perderam
representatividade
no
parlamento nacional.

Consideraes finais
A poltica em Mianmar passa por
um histrico processo de transio, que
dever produzir novos vencedores e
perdedores. Precisamente por sua
singularidade, se torna difcil prever
resultados com alto grau de certeza. Por
um lado, parece claro que as elites
militares facilitaram a abertura poltica,
seja por razes de ordem interna ou
externa. No entanto, ao iniciar uma
transio deste tipo, abriram espao para
processos que no esto mais sob seu
controle.

Por outro lado, as relaes do


governo central com os grupos
paramilitares
so
essencialmente
conduzidas pelas Foras Armadas, que
comandam os ministrios chave da

O governo Suu Kyi passar pelos


mais variados testes ao longo do tempo.
Primeiramente, a NLD nunca governou

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

12
25

qualquer unidade administrativa do pas


e carece de experincia na formulao e
implementao de polticas pblicas.
Este desafio j seria de ordem maior e,
embora o Parlamento tenha sofrido
mudanas radicais, as bases da
burocracia permanecem as mesmas.

cumprida com o auxlio e a chancela do


Tatmadaw (Foras Armadas), que iniciou
esforos significativos pela conciliao
nos ltimos anos.
Em contrapartida, h diversos
interesses polticos e econmicos
permeando a transio. Embora as elites
militares tenham grande interesse em
manter o processo atual, muitos de seus
integrantes podem reagir a reformas que
considerem potencialmente danosas
soberania nacional ou ao papel das
atuais elites econmicas. At o momento,
Suu Kyi teve uma postura pendular,
alternando entre conciliao com os
militares e o desafio ordem poltica
vigente. Cabe nova liderana civil
balancear antagonismos e buscar uma
postura mais prxima ao consenso,
evitando retrocessos e o retorno da
interferncia de potncias externas.

Em termos de poltica externa,


Mianmar pode retornar a seu histrico de
neutralidade internacional. Este princpio
basilar da Birmnia independente tem
sido suprimido pela necessidade em
subordinar-se China nas ltimas duas
dcadas. Com o engajamento positivo do
Ocidente e do Japo, Mianmar tende a
barganhar entre antigos e novos
parceiros, semelhana da prpria
postura dos pases da ASEAN em relao
s potncias atuantes na sia (Ciorciari,
2009). Mianmar um pas com baixo
nvel de desenvolvimento que necessita
de maiores reformas e de investimento
estrangeiro. Contudo, um cenrio
negativo de crise poltica e interveno
militar suscitaria o retorno das polticas
de poder externas, numa competio
acirrada entre China, ndia e EUA
(Ribeiro, 2015).
O maior dos objetivos ser a
reconciliao nacional, tarefa no
cumprida por qualquer governo nacional,
seja
ele
democrtico,
socialista
autrquico, ou militar. O pas sempre teve
dificuldade em controlar seu prprio
territrio e impedir a proliferao de
insurgncias armadas em regies mais
remotas. Ainda, esta misso dever ser

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

13

Referncias
Beukel, Erik. ASEAN and ARF in East Asias Security Architecture: The role of Norms and Powers.
Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies Report, 2008.
Callahan, Mary and David Steinberg. Drivers of Political Change in Post-Junta, Constitutional Burma.
Washington: USAID, 2012.
Charney, Michael W. A History of Modern Burma. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Ciorciari, John David. The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia. International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Oxford, v. 9, n. 1, p. 157-196, Oxford University, 2009.
Egreteau, Renaud and Larry Jagan. Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: understanding the foreign relations of
the Burmese praetorian state. Singapore: IRASEC-NUS Press, 2013.
Haacke, Jrgen. Myanmar: now a site for SinoUS geopolitical competition? IDEAS reports, ed. SR015.
London, London School of Economics, 2012.
Huntington, S. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Lintner, Bertil. Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier. Harper Collins
India, 2012.
Ribeiro, Erik H. A rivalidade e a cooperao nas relaes China-ndia: o
contexto asitico e o caso de Mianmar. Dissertao. PPGEEI/UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 2015.
Sharp, Gene. From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. Boston: Albert
Einstein Institution, 1993.
Steinberg, David and Hongwei Fan. Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence.
Copenhagen: NIAS, 2012.
Steinberg, David. Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy toward Burma/Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast
Asian Affairs, v. 29, n. 3, p. 35-59, 2010.
Taylor, Robert H. The State in Myanmar. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009.
Thant Myint-U. Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2011.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

14

A QUESTO NUCLEAR NA PENNSULA COREANA: AS REFORMAS


INTERNAS NA COREIA DO NORTE E OS DESAFIOS REGIONAIS7
Pedro Vincius Pereira Brites8

A chegada de Kim Jong Un, ainda em 2011, ao poder representou o


incio de uma inflexo no plano poltico interno da Coreia do Norte.

A poltica estabelecida pelo novo lder, o byungjin, que busca vincular


desenvolvimento e capacidade de dissuaso tem sido o centro das aes do
pas desde 2011.

O recrudescimento das aes externas do pas a partir de 2015, se


relacionam com o avano das reformas econmicas internas e com a
inteno de aproveitar o atual contexto internacional para estabelecer um
novo processo de negociaes com os EUA principalmente.

Apresentao

Em janeiro de 2016, a Pennsula


Coreana voltou a ser centro das atenes
globais em virtude do anncio da
realizao do quarto teste nuclear pela
Coreia do Norte. O pas, que j havia
testado armamentos nucleares em
2006, 2009 e 2013, alegou ter realizado
de forma exitosa teste com bomba de
hidrognio (bomba-H). Embora no haja
confirmao quanto alegao, esse

evento representaria um avano sem


precedentes no programa nuclear do
pas, pois colocaria a Coreia do Norte no
seleto rol de pases
capazes de
miniaturizar uma ogiva. Nesse sentido, a
capacidade missilstica do pas seria
incrementada
significativamente
e
ampliaria, por conseguinte, o poder
dissuasrio do regime comunista.

Agradecimento colaborao de Pedro Henrique Prates Cattelan na elaborao desse artigo.

Professor de Relaes Internacionais do Centro Universitrio Ritter dos Reis. Doutorando e Mestre em
Estudos Estratgicos Internacionais pela UFRGS. Email: pvbrittes@gmail.com.
8

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

15
25

No obstante, o anncio da
realizao do teste foi apenas o incio de
uma srie de eventos que ampliaram as
tenses no Leste Asitico e desafiam o
equilbrio regional. Em fevereiro, a Coreia
do Norte anunciou o lanamento de um
satlite (Kwangmyongsong-4), com o
dobro do tamanho do que havia sido
lanado em 2012. Mais recentemente,
em abril, o pas comunista testou msseis
balsticos a partir de submarinos. Esse
ltimo teste evidencia a procura em
desenvolver a capacidade de lanar
msseis balsticos intercontinentais a
partir de distintas plataformas. Como
resposta a esses eventos, o Conselho de
Segurana das Naes Unidas aprovou
uma nova rodada de sanes contra a
Coreia do Norte, endossada tambm pela
China. Na Coreia do Sul, avanaram as
negociaes acerca da instalao de um
escudo antimsseis mvel - THAAD
(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense)9 em parceria com os EUA. Cabe destacar
que a instalao do THAAD ameaa os
interesses chineses e russos na regio,
tanto que ambos pases firmaram
posio contrria instalao por temer
o THAAD limite a capacidade missilstica
dos dois pases. Por fim, em maro
iniciaram os exerccios militares na
Pennsula Coreana entre EUA e Coreia do
Sul. Os exerccios Foal Eagle e Key
Resolve de 2016 foram os maiores
realizados at ento. Cerca de 300 mil
soldados sul-coreanos e 17 mil
estadunidenses participaram desses
exerccios que tm como objetivo simular
ataques anfbios e em terra na pennsula.

Coreia do Norte, a realizao desses


exerccios representa uma afronta ao
armistcio de 1953 e um treinamento
para uma eventual invaso do pas.
Conquanto se possa analisar
esses eventos de modo isolado, na
realidade, parecem representar sintomas
de processos mais amplos de
transformaes da ordem regional. Por
um lado, em relao Coreia do Norte,
no se deve observar essa srie de
demonstraes de fora sem que se
analise o contexto domstico e os
condicionantes
da
sua
insero
internacional. Mais do que isso,
importante que se avalie a importncia
da capacidade nuclear como elemento
de dissuaso no plano internacional.
Principalmente neste ano, pois um ano
eleitoral nos Estados Unidos e o governo
de Kim Jong-Un observa essa conjuntura
com ateno com vistas a atrair as
atenes para a questo norte-coreana.
No plano regional, observa-se o
acirramento das disputas entre EUA e
China e o redimensionamento da posio
estratgica da Coreia do Sul e do Japo
nesse contexto. Assim, o perodo de
tensionamento derivaria de um lado, do
processo de modernizao por que vem
passando a Coreia do Norte e a sua
busca por normalizar suas relaes com
os EUA; e, de outro, pelo avano das
disputas geopolticas entre EUA, China,
Japo e, em um contexto mais reduzido,
Rssia.

As origens da questo nuclear na


Pennsula Coreana

No dia 8 de julho de 2016, Estados Unidos e Coreia do Sul anunciaram a instalao do Sistema THAAD
na pennsula. Segundo o anncio, a instalao do sistema atende necessidade responder aos avanos
do programa balstico norte-coreano.
9

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

16

A anlise da atual conjuntura na


pennsula
coreana
demanda
a
compreenso de fatores estruturais e

representam uma ruptura histrica.


Afinal, a Coreia era um reino unificado h
sculos. O surgimento da Repblica
Democrtica Popular da Coreia (Coreia
do Norte) e da Repblica da Coreia
(Coreia do Sul) representa assim a
sobreposio da cultura da Guerra Fria
sobre a cultura coreana (Bleiker 2005).
A Guerra da Coreia (1950-1953)
trouxe um aprofundamento da ciso
entre os dois Estados. Em termos
econmicos, entretanto, j havia uma
distino entre o norte e o sul. A
ocupao japonesa estabeleceu um
aparato de infraestrutura industrial no
norte, enquanto no sul predominam as
atividades agrcolas (Malkasian 2001;
Vizentini & Pereira 2014) . Com a ecloso
da conflagrao, uma das mais
sangrentas da Guerra Fria , as Coreias
tornaram-se o epicentro geopoltico do
Leste Asitico. A invaso estadunidense,
a reao chinesa e o apoio sovitico
deixaram marcas profundas para as
relaes intercoreanas e, em grande
medida, condicionam a insero de
ambos pases at hoje.

histricos e da situao na pennsula


coreana desde a ascenso de Kim JongUn ao poder em 2011. Em termos
estruturais, pode-se identificar trs
fatores centrais para a avaliao da
conjuntura atual na pennsula: i) os
efeitos da Guerra da Coreia; ii) o
significado da doutrina juche; iii) o
desenvolvimento do programa nuclear na
Coreia do Norte. A esses fatores
estruturais somam-se os fatores tpicos
da situao atual: a) processo de
modernizao na Coreia do Norte; b) a
doutrina de pacincia estratgica
implementada pelo governo Obama; e, c)
os efeitos do processo de modernizao
da China para as relaes no Leste
Asitico. luz desses fatores, pretendese, portanto, avaliar os ltimos eventos
que vm recolocando a questo nuclear
norte-coreana no topo da agenda
securitria do continente asitico.
A
Pennsula
Coreana,
historicamente, foi um corredor de
conexo entre China e Japo. Assim,
desde a antiguidade esteve sempre no
cerne das disputas entre os dois
imprios. Atualmente, a pennsula a
nica regio envolta apenas por grandes
potncias: China, Rssia e Japo, alm
da presena significativa dos EUA
(Visentini 2011). Esse quadro gera uma
situao peculiar do ponto de vista
geopoltico.

O avano dos EUA sobre as tropas


de Kim Il-Sung, lder comunista, em
direo ao norte, extrapolando o
mandato da ONU , acabou por promover
a entrada da China na guerra. A entrada
da China forou a retirada americana em
direo a Seul. A participao chinesa na
conflagrao, nesse contexto, ocorre com
vistas a afastar os EUA de sua fronteira.
Entretanto, pode ser entendida como um
antecedente do Tratado de Amizade,
Assistncia e Cooperao Mtua
assinado por China e Coreia do Norte em
1961 . A retirada das tropas americanas
ficou marcada por uma macia

A colonizao japonesa e a
subsequente diviso da pennsula em
virtude da ocupao das foras
soviticas
e
estadunidenses

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

17

campanha de destruio (Cumings


2010). O General MacArthur, lder das
tropas da ONU, ordenou a completa
destruio de qualquer indstria, vila ou
construo que pudesse auxiliar na
reorganizao das foras norte-coreanas.
Ordenou-se inclusive o bombardeio
sistemtico de usinas hidreltricas do
pas, o que causou graves danos
infraestrutura, inundaes e afetou
profundamente a populao civil. Cabe
destacar que nessa retirada foram
usados mais explosivos do que contra o
Japo durante toda a Segunda Guerra
Mundial (Cumings 2010). Alm disso, a
Coreia do Norte foi gravemente
ameaada com armas nucleares. Todo
esse processo revelou uma sensao de
vulnerabilidade securitria por parte dos
norte-coreanos diante dessa guerra de
extermnio (Malkasian 2001; Cumings
2010; Vizentini & Pereira 2014). Esse
um elemento crucial para a compreenso
dos
desdobramentos
polticos
e
securitrios contemporneos na Coreia
do Norte, bem como para o entendimento
sobre a opo de desenvolvimento de
armas nucleares.

estabelecido no armistcio. Por isso, a


busca por capacidade de dissuaso est
vinculada ao objetivo de estabelecer
negociaes diretas com os EUA.
No perodo ps-guerra, a Coreia
do Norte adotou a doutrina juche . O
iderio um elemento central para a
coeso social do pas e est baseado na
perspectiva da autoconfiana, da
autossuficincia
(Cumings
2004;
Scobell 2005). Assim, estabelece que o
povo coreano o senhor de seu prprio
destino. Pode-se dizer, grosso modo, que
estabelece as bases para o nacionalismo
norte-coreano e a perspectiva de no
submisso aos interesses externos. Em
termos prticos, diz respeito
autossuficincia
econmica
e

capacidade de garantir sua segurana


externa de modo autnomo.
nesse contexto, no final da
dcada de 1950, que a Coreia do Norte
inicia seu programa nuclear. Em termos
imediatos, foi uma resposta instalao
de artefatos nucleares na Coreia do Sul.
Todavia, o estabelecimento do programa
nuclear atendia a objetivos estratgicossecuritrios e demanda energtica,
bem como possibilitava o uso de grandes
minas de urnio de alta qualidade que
possua o pas. Apenas em 1965
instalado o primeiro reator na cidade de
Yongbyon em cooperao com a Unio
Sovitica. nessa dcada tambm que
inicia o programa missilstico do pas
(msseis Scud, de curto alcance),
igualmente em parceria com os
soviticos.

Alm disso, a Guerra da Coreia


terminou sem desfecho, afinal em 1953,
apenas foi estabelecido um armistcio, e
no um tratado de paz. A falta de um
tratado de paz um dos elementos
condicionantes da insero nortecoreana at hoje. Afinal, a busca pela
normalizao das relaes do pas com a
comunidade internacional passa pelo fim
dos embargos promovidos pelos EUA.
Para tanto, necessrio que o pas
comunista no esteja mais formalmente
em guerra com os EUA, como ainda est

A dcada de 1980 e o declnio da


URSS trouxeram efeitos significativos
para a Coreia do Norte. A perda de seu

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

18

principal parceiro representou o corte no


fornecimento de gros e combustveis
subsidiados. Diante desse quadro de
dificuldade, a Coreia do Norte buscou se
aproximar da Coreia do Sul e normalizar
suas relaes com os EUA. Como
decorrncia, em 1991, as duas Coreias
assinam o Acordo para reconciliao,
No-agresso, Cooperao e Intercmbio
entre Norte e Sul e, em 1992, lanam a
Declarao
Conjunta
para
Desnuclearizao da Pennsula (Cha
2012).

Songun. Ao contrrio do governo de seu


pai, cujo governo estava assentado em
termos
institucionais
no
papel
preponderante
do
Partido
dos
Trabalhadores Coreanos (KWP), Jong-Il
cria a poltica dos militares em primeiro
lugar. Assim, aprofunda a perspectiva de
um Garrison State, ou seja de um estado
militarizado.
Nos anos 2000, a questo nuclear
passou a ser discutida no mbito
regional, com a criao da Six-Party Talks
em 2003. Cabe destacar que o
estabelecimento da Doutrina Bush,
segundo a qual a Coreia do Norte fazia
parte do denominado eixo do mal,
trouxe muita instabilidade para a
pennsula e ampliou a percepo de
ameaa por parte dos norte-coreanos.
Dentro das Six-Party Talks houve certo
distanciamento na posio dos atores. A
Coreia do Norte ofereceu a proposta do
reward for freeze (recompensa pelo
congelamento do programa), enquanto
os EUA insistiam que s passariam a
negociar efetivamente depois do
desmantelamento do programa nuclear.
Nesse contexto, China, Rssia e Coreia
do Sul apoiavam a proposta do reward for
freeze, enquanto o Japo, naquele
momento liderado por Junichiro Koizumi,
dava suporte proposta americana
(Cordesman & Hess 2013).

Nesse contexto, a questo do


programa nuclear norte-coreano parecia
se encaminhar para uma resoluo
pacfica. Cabe destacar que esse era o
quadro de desintegrao da ordem
bipolar. Desse modo, o controle da
proliferao nuclear passou a ser
prioridade na agenda internacional. Os
EUA passam ento a exercer presso
sobre as potncias regionais e sobre os
pases do bloco comunista para que
esses abdiquem de suas armas
estratgicas.
Esses esforos levaram
assinatura do Acordo de Genebra em
1994. O acordo de 1994 representava a
resoluo
da
questo
nuclear,
entretanto, a morte de Kim Il-Sung em
julho do mesmo ano e o atraso na
entrega de combustveis prometida pelo
governo
Clinton
levaram
ao
arrefecimento das negociaes. A
ascenso de Kim Jong-Il ao poder
representou uma transformao na
poltica norte-coreana. Diante desse
quadro de incertezas e crises por que
passa o pas na dcada de 1990 (Marcha
Penosa ), Kim Jong-Il implementa o

Diante da falta de avanos das


negociaes, a Coreia do Norte adota
uma atitude mais ofensiva. A partir de
2005, o pas passa a utilizar seu
programa nuclear efetivamente como
elemento de dissuaso e anuncia o
desenvolvimento de armas nucleares.
nesse contexto, que no mesmo ano as

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

19

negociaes avanam e lanada a


Declarao Conjunta das Seis Partes
que previa o fim das ameaas entre as
duas Coreias e os EUA. Porm, em 2006,
aps testes missilsticos da Coreia do
Norte, os Estados Unidos e a ONU
adotam novas sanes. Em resposta, a
Coreia do Norte realiza seu primeiro teste
nuclear.

culminaram na realizao do terceiro


teste nuclear em fevereiro de 2013.
Apesar da manuteno do discurso
agressivo no plano regional, no plano
domstico, ascenso do novo lder
representou uma inflexo. Em primeiro
lugar, relativizou o Songun, dando mais
espao ao KWP. Nesse sentido, buscou
se aproximar do perfil de liderana de seu
av, Kim Il-Sung. Alm disso, passou a
priorizar projetos para modernizao
econmica. Em um primeiro momento,
utilizou as foras armadas em obras
pblicas
(autopistas,
plantas
energticas).
Ademais,
procurou
estabelecer uma srie de medidas com
vistas a ampliar a capacidade produtiva,
comercial e financeira do pas. Principal
sintoma desse processo a adoo da

Cabe
ressaltar
que
o
desenvolvimento de armas nucleares
para a Coreia do Norte apresenta uma
dupla funo. De um lado, pode vir a
prover capacidade de dissuaso contra
os inimigos externos; embora, essa
capacidade ainda seja passvel de
discusso frente capacidade de defesa
anti-msseis de Coreia de Sul e Japo. De
outro, representam a face moderna do
pas e, portanto, ampliam a legitimidade
interna do regime (Ahn 2011). Em parte,
pode-se dizer, que se constitui como
elemento que contribui para a resilincia
do pas frente s dificuldades
enfrentadas nas ltimas dcadas.

Linha Byungjin (), que tem como


princpio a busca simultnea por
desenvolvimento econmico e defesa
nuclear (Vizentini & Pereira 2014; Panda
2015).
Em termos econmicos, ainda em
2012, Jong-Un adotou as chamadas
Medidas de Junho que previam uma
espcie
de
reprivatizao
da
agricultura. A partir de 2013, a terra
permaneceu sob jurisdio estatal,
porm o produto agrcola passou a ser
dividido entre o Estado e as famlias que
trabalhassem na terra (proporo de
70:30, respectivamente. Aps 2014,
essa proporo ficou
em 40:60,
respectivamente) (Lankov 2014). Essa
mudana vem contribuindo para um
incremento na produo agrcola. Em
termos industriais, foram adotadas
medidas que do mais autonomia aos
administradores no processo de

A ascenso de Kim Jong-Un e o


processo de modernizao
A chegada de Kim Jong-Un ao
poder
trouxe
uma
srie
de
questionamentos acerca da capacidade
de resilincia do regime frente ao
processo de transio poltica. Em
termos gerais, a perspectiva ocidental
tem se centrado, desde o final da Guerra
Fria, na crena do colapso iminente.
Entretanto, o novo lder assumiu o pas
reafirmando o discurso de autonomia e
buscou dar demonstraes de fora.
Nesse contexto, o pas iniciou uma nova
rodada de ameas e provocaes que

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

20
25

contratao e investimentos. No plano


financeiro, em 2015, o pas criou um
Comit de combate lavagem de
dinheiro e ao financiamento de prticas
terroristas. Cabe destacar que a Coreia
do Norte tornou-se membro observador
do Comit Asitico Anti-lavagem de
Dinheiro (APG) ainda em 2014 - o que
representou uma conquista diplomtica
para o pas. Por fim, cabe destacar a
realizao da Conferncia da Indstria
Financeira em dezembro de 2015. Essa
conferncia, que no ocorria desde
1990, teve como objetivo discutir a
criao de mecanismos para dar suporte
ao aumento da circulao de moeda no
pas derivado do fortalecimento dos
mercados no-oficiais (Jangmadang).

Investimento em Infraestrutura (AIIB); e


se aproximar da Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) liderada
pela China. A incluso nesses projetos
passa por uma normalizao das
relaes com os EUA.
Entretanto, o governo Obama tem
adotado a chamada poltica da Pacincia
Estratgica, igualmente assentada na
percepo de que o regime nortecoreano tende a colapsar mais cedo ou
mais tarde (Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart &
Nikitin 2016). Nesse sentido, cr no uso
de medidas no-militares para promover
uma mudana de regime. Ou seja, nesse
caso, no haveria razes para
estabelecer negociaes. Assim, as
definies estratgicas dos EUA para a
pennsula se mantm voltadas para o
controle de danos em caso de colapso do
regime. E do ponto de vista poltico, o
governo Obama adota a postura de
afirmar que s aceitaria negociaes em
caso de demonstraes mais evidentes
por parte da Coreia do Norte de que
pretende abandonar seu programa
nuclear.

Todo esse panorama reflete um


projeto de modernizao mais amplo.
Porm, no um projeto desvinculado do
desenvolvimento nuclear. Por essa razo,
no paradoxal a manuteno do
desenvolvimento do programa nuclear e
busca por modernizar a economia: so
projetos complementares. Afinal, no
plano externo, ainda persistem as
limitaes que condicionam a insero
internacional do pas.

No entanto, as experincias
recentes ocorridas de derrubada ou
ameaa de deposio de regimes
considerados prias, tanto no Iraque
(2003), na Lbia (2011) quanto na Sria
(2011) acabaram por reforar o
entendimento norte-coreano de que
renunciar ao programa nuclear tornaria o
pas vulnervel. Assim, no de se
esperar um recuo do governo nortecoreano quanto ao avano do programa
nuclear e balstico.

No que diz respeito s relaes


com os EUA, Kim Jong-Un ainda no teve
a
possibilidade
de
estabelecer
negociaes diretas. Partindo do
pressuposto que o novo lder procura
normalizar as relaes com a
comunidade internacional, torna-se
imprescindvel lograr se aproximar dos
EUA. Dentre seus interesses mais
amplos, inclui-se o objetivo de participar
da
APEC
(Asia-Pacific
Economic
Cooperation), do Banco Asitico de

Cabe salientar que os recentes


acordos estabelecidos pelo governo

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

21

Obama com Ir e Cuba tambm servem


de modelo para os norte-coreanos. O
objetivo seria obter um espao para
negociaes com os EUA, semelhante ao
que os dois estados obtiveram.

Pennsula Coreana sob quaisquer


circunstncias; segundo, ao militar
para resoluo da questo no uma
opo; e, por ltimo, a segurana
nacional da China no deve ser
prejudicada. No se pode ignorar que a
poltica de balanceamento dos EUA tem
ampliado as disputas geopolticas na
regio da sia-Pacfico; e a pennsula
coreana no est alheia a esse processo,

O ano de 2016 o ltimo de


mandato do presidente Obama. Tendo
em vista que os candidatos que hoje
lideram as prvias para concorrer
presidncia dos EUA - Hillary Clinton pelo
Partido Democrata e Donald Trump pelo
Partido Republicano - adotam um
discurso mais agressivo em termos de
poltica externa em relao a Obama,
essa uma janela de oportunidade para
estabelecer um entendimento com os
EUA. Destarte, de se esperar que a
Coreia do Norte mantenha a sequencia
de testes militares, como forma de
chamar a ateno para a necessidade de
um processo de negociao na regio e
manter a questo nuclear na pennsula
no topo da agenda securitria das
grandes potncias.

A Coreia do Norte, por sua vez, j


demonstrou que seus interesses no
esto subordinados aos interesses de
seu principal aliado. Por sua vez, o
governo de Xi Jinping vem adotando uma
postura mais dura quanto Coreia do
Norte, que ficou evidenciada na
aprovao das recentes sanes votadas
no Conselho de Segurana. Porm, no
quadro atual a China teria muito perder
com um colapso do regime norte-coreano
e uma eventual transformao da
pennsula em regio de influncia dos
EUA. Seria uma grave ameaa
segurana do pas. Por isso, trata-se de
um balano complexo para o governo
chins. Por isso, a aposta na
modernizao da Coreia do Norte a
mais promissora para os interesses
chineses. Especialmente, em um quadro
onde a China tem buscado ampliar seus
laos econmicos com a Coreia do Sul e
estabilizar suas relaes com o Japo.
Japo que, no governo Abe, vem
procurando adotar uma postura mais
nacionalista, com vistas redimensionar o
papel geopoltico do pas na sia.

Para a China, o quadro de


instabilidade na pennsula configura-se
em obstculo para os objetivos
geopolticos do pas. Afinal, a questo
norte-coreana serve como alegao para
a manuteno da presena americana no
Leste Asitico. Situao agravada pela
recente proposta de instalao do THAAD
na Coreia do Sul - projeto que para o
governo
chins
limitaria
suas
capacidades defensivas. Recentemente,
o Ministro das Relaes Exteriores, Wang
Yi, da China reafirmou a preocupao do
pas com a situao na pennsula. Essa
preocupao est assentada em trs
princpios: em primeiro lugar, as armas
nucleares devem ser banidas da

A Coreia do Sul, nesse contexto,


enfrenta um dilema. Por um lado, no
pode se afastar da aliana com os EUA e
do processo de instalao do THAAD. A

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

22

manuteno e ampliao da parceria


securitria refora o sentido de
dependncia militar do pas em relao
aos EUA, em que pese o processo de
modernizao das foras armadas
estabelecido desde o final dos anos
1990.
Porm,
por
outro
lado,
especialmente no governo da presidenta
Park Geun-Hye, a Coreia do Sul tem
ampliado sua aproximao econmica e
poltica com a China. Nesse sentido, no
tem interesse em minar o progresso nas
relaes com o vizinho. Principalmente,
porque a parceria econmica com a
China tem grande relevncia para a
economia do pas. Cabe ressaltar que a
Coreia do Sul vive um momento de
desacelerao econmica, aumento do
desemprego e queda das exportaes.

Norte e que o pas vem procurando


estabelecer canais de dilogo com os
EUA principalmente, de se esperar que
se mantenham as demonstraes de
fora por parte do regime comunista.
Nesse sentido, possvel que haja
convergncia entre os interesses
chineses e norte-coreanos. Afinal, a
abertura de dilogo - a retomada das Six
Party Talks, por exemplo - seria de grande
interesse para ambos os pases tendo em
vista seus interesses atuais. Entretanto,
uma escalada nas tenses na pennsula
est longe de ser uma hiptese
descartvel. Afinal, no se sabe se o
governo Obama ainda tem flego - e
mesmo interesse - para iniciar uma nova
abordagem na regio.
Cabe destacar que durante o 7
Congresso do KWP - o primeiro em trinta
seis anos a Coreia do Norte deu
importante indicativos do processo de
modernizao e de busca por
normalizao
de
suas
relaes
internacionais. Nesse sentido, asseverou
o Byongjin, defendeu a aproximao com
o Sul e, mais relevante talvez, assegurou
o no first use policy; ou seja, o pas
declarou seu compromisso de no usar
armas nucleares de forma preventiva.
Entretanto, apesar desses indicativos,
esse

um
processo
cujos
desdobramentos ainda so imprevisveis.
Assim, a evoluo da recomposio
poltica interna e o avano da
modernizao econmica na Coreia do
Norte
so
indicadores
bastante
relevantes para que se trace um cenrio
mais preciso da regio.

Tendo em vista esse panorama,


as tenses na pennsula coreana
parecem evidenciar transformaes mais
profundas na ordem regional asitica.
Embora, as relaes na pennsula se
caracterizem por um padro de
tensionamento-aproximao entre as
Coreias, h um contexto mais profundo
que justifica, portanto, as tenses atuais.

Consideraes Finais
A anlise da situao na
pennsula coreana no parece indicar
que possa ocorrer uma grande inflexo
no curto prazo. Entretanto, tendo em
vista que h um processo de
modernizao em curso na Coreia do

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

23

Referncias
Ahn, Mun Suk. 2011. "What Is The Root Cause Of The North Korean Nuclear Program?". Asian Affairs: An
American Review 38 (4): 175-187. doi:10.1080/00927678.2011.604287.
Bleiker, Roland. 2005. Divided Korea. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Cha, Victor D. 2012. The Impossible State. New York: Ecco.
Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. 2016. North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear
Diplomacy, And Internal Situation. Washington: Congressional Research Service.
Cordesman, Anthony H and Ashley Hess. 2013. The Evolving Military Balance In The Korean Peninsula And
Northeast Asia. Washington: Center for Strategic and International studies.
Cumings, Bruce. 2010. The Korean War. New York: Modern Library.
Cumings, Bruce. 2004. North Korea: Another Country. New York: The New Press.
Cumings, Bruce. 2015. "The North Korea That Can Say No". Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists.
http://thebulletin.org/north-korea-can-say-no9048.
Curtis, Gerald. 2014. Abes Game Plan On North Korea. Washington: Center for Strategic & International
Studies.
Lankov,
Andrei.
2014.
"Reforming
North
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/reforming-north-korea20141117121917871925.html.

Korea". Al

Jazeera.

Lee,
Youkyung.
2016.
"South
Korea's
Central
Bank
Cuts
Growth
Forecast". AP.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/88132d26e5c5479ba02ca3244bcb1cdf/south-koreas-central-bank-cutsgrowth-forecast.
Malkasian, Carter. 2001. The Korean War, 1950-1953. Oxford: Osprey Pub.
Martins, Jos Miguel Q. 2008. "Digitalizao E Guerra Local: Como Fatores De Equilbrio No Sistema
Internacional". Doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
Panda, Ankit. 2015. "Is North Korea's 'Byungjin Line' On The US-China Strategic Agenda?". The Diplomat.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/is-north-koreas-byungjin-line-on-the-us-china-strategic-agenda/.
Scobell, Andrew. 2005. North Korea's Strategic Intentions. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College.
Visentini, Paulo G. Fagundes. 2011. As Relacoes Diplomaticas Da Asia. Belo Horizonte: Fino Trao Editora.
Vizentini, Paulo Fagundes and Analcia Danilevicz Pereira. 2014. "A Discreta Transio Da Coreia Do Norte:
Diplomacia De Risco E Modernizao Sem Reforma". Revista Brasileira De Poltica Internacional 57 (2): 176195. doi:10.1590/0034-7329201400310.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

24
25

A REINSERO GLOBAL DA ECONOMIA DO IR APS O ACORDO


NUCLEAR
Joo Paulo Alves10
Marina Felisberti11

O Acordo de Lausane de 2015 suspendeu grande parte das saes


internacionais impostas economia do Ir decorrentes de seu programa
nuclear

As negociaes que levaram ao acordo so resultados de uma


conjuntura de dificuldades socioeconmicas no Ir somadas ao
desengajamento dos Estados Unidos do Oriente Mdio

As relaes internacionais do Ir so condicionadas pela estrutura do


sistema internacional, no qual insere-se como um Estado anti-imperialista e
pr-revolucionrio.

Apresentao
Em 14 de Julho de 2015, aps
uma srie de negociaes em Lausanne,
na Sua, foi acordado o chamado Plano
de Ao Compreensivo Conjunto (Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action) referente
ao programa nuclear iraniano. Assinado
entre os P5+1 (Estados Unidos, Rssia,
China, Inglaterra, Frana e Alemanha) e o
Ir, o acordo prev o levantamento das
sanes uni e multilaterais estabelecidas
sobre a economia iraniana ao longo dos

anos 2000, como retaliao por seu


projeto nuclear. O fim desse bloqueio
abre espao para a reinsero global da
economia do pas, permitindo a sua volta
ao mercado de petrleo, o recebimento
de capitais estrangeiros e a participao
no mercado financeiro internacional.

10

Graduando do 5 semestre de Relaes Internacionais na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.


Contato: joaop.ma22@gmail.com
Graduanda do 7 semestre de Relaes Internacionais na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
Contato: marinafelisberti@gmail.com
11

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

25

Geopoltica e Histria do Ir

Essa fora geopoltica e esse


potencial
energtico
e
consequentemente econmico - so, no
entanto, constrangidos pela sua imagem
histrica, primeiro enquanto exemplo de
Estado Islmico revolucionrio e,
posteriormente,
enquanto
Estado
buscando tecnologias nucleares. Nesse
sentido, a Revoluo de 1979 foi a
responsvel pela derrubada do regime do
X Reza Pahlevi, tradicional aliado do
Ocidente, mas que era incapaz de
administrar a economia do pas, a qual
gradualmente
se
deteriorava
e
aprofundava desigualdades sociais. Em
seu lugar, ascendeu o clrigo xiita
Ruhollah Khomeini posio de Aiatol e
lder supremo, sob a promessa de
reformar a economia e de retomar os
valores
tradicionais
da
religio
muulmana (Lampreia 2014).

Na busca pelo entendimento da


atual conjuntura poltica e econmica da
Repblica Islmica do Ir, necessrio
que se faa uma breve apresentao dos
aspectos fundamentais que garantem a
esse Estado a sua estatura nas relaes
internacionais: os seus atributos naturais
e geopolticos e a sua histria de luta
contra a submisso poltica externa dos
Estados Unidos. Com quase 80 milhes
de habitantes, o Ir est localizado no
corao do Oriente Mdio, com acesso ao
Mar Cspio, ao Norte, e com uma
margem no Golfo Prsico, ao Sul, sendo
um
gigante
em
uma
posio
extremamente estratgica para o
continente Eurasiano.
Para alm de seus atributos
demogrficos e geogrficos, no entanto,
o Ir tem como maior arma geopoltica o
seu potencial energtico, traduzido por
suas imensas reservas de petrleo e gs.
Segundo Lampreia (2014), o Ir possui a
4 maior reserva provada de petrleo do
mundo - aproximadamente 154 bilhes
de barris, equivalendo a quase 10% do
total mundial. Essas reservas dividem-se
em campos onshore, muito explorados
atualmente, e offshore no Mar Cspio,
onde 100 milhes de barris tem
explorao prevista para o mdio e longo
prazo (Lampreia 2014). Ademais, o Ir
tem a 2 maior reserva e a 3 maior
produo de gs natural do planeta, com
uma mdia de 170 milhes de m
extrados anualmente, atrs apenas dos
Estados Unidos e da Federao Russa
(CIA 2016).

A Revoluo Iraniana trouxe, em


suma, duas novas diretrizes para as
relaes exteriores do pas, a) uma
orientao
anti-imperialista,
caracterizada
principalmente
pelo
rompimento das relaes com os
Estados Unidos, e b) uma postura prrevolucionria,
com
implicaes
significativas sobre o equilbrio de poder
regional. Com relao aos Estados
Unidos, destaca-se a revogao de
acordos feitos antes de 1979, cessando
o apoio iraniano s suas agendas
geopoltico-estratgicas
na
regio,
consubstanciadas na lgica da Doutrina
dos Pilares Gmeos da Administrao
Nixon. A Doutrina buscava, atravs do
estabelecimento de um aliado ocidental
na
regio
do
Golfo,
o
contrabalanceamento das projees de

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

26

poder soviticas no Oriente Mdio e a


conteno de levantes que ameaassem
os interesses norte-americanos na
regio, sem que os Estados Unidos
precisassem agir diretamente no
territrio (Lima 2016).

apoiar Israel mesmo este sendo detentor


de armamentos nucleares. De qualquer
maneira, a tecnologia nuclear compele
os Estados Unidos a negociarem com o
Ir de forma prudente, levando em conta
a sua fora na regio (Leverett e Leverett
2013).

No mbito regional, a Repblica


Islmica do Ir passou a apoiar
abertamente a nao Palestina e,
tambm, movimentos rebeldes contra os
governos do Afeganisto e do Iraque,
alm de apoiar foras de oposio na
Arbia Saudita - pas simbolicamente
alinhado ao interesse ocidental na
regio. Apesar de haver um apoio
majoritariamente retrico, esta postura
degradava progressivamente a imagem
iraniana frente a governos vizinhos e ao
Sistema Internacional, que passou a
considerar a nova postura iraniana como
intransigente. Combinava-se este clima
de desconfiana s capacidades navais e
areas iranianas, que poderiam causar
problemas s rotas de petrleo na regio
caso uma ofensiva fosse efetivamente
iniciada (Halliday 1980).

O programa nuclear do Ir teve


incio ainda na dcada de 1960, durante
o regime de Pahlevi e com amplo apoio
do Ocidente. Os Estados Unidos
contriburam com a doao de reatores
nucleares para fins de pesquisa
Universidade de Teer, e a Alemanha
auxiliou na construo da Planta Nuclear
de Bushehr. Aps a Revoluo, o
programa nuclear temporariamente
cancelado devido oposio do Aiatol
ao projeto, at o seu posterior
falecimento em 1989. A ascenso do
atual lder supremo, Ali Khamenei,
possibilitou uma nova investida. Durante
a presidncia de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
(2005-2013), o destino do programa
nuclear iraniano passa a ser questionado
pelo Ocidente, embora oficialmente o
projeto fosse orientado para fins
pacficos (Bandeira 2013).

Um segundo fator identificado


como determinante para a consolidao
das tenses entre o Ir e os pases
ocidentais, central pela relao direta
com a existncias das recentes sanes
econmicas, a formao de seu
programa nuclear. O desenvolvimento
dessa tecnologia teve motivaes
extremamente estratgicas para o Ir.
Por um lado, somente o potencial de
criao de armamentos nucleares j lhe
confere significativo poder dissuasrio
frente a ameaas internacionais. Por
outro, serve para evidenciar a hipocrisia
com que os Estados Unidos conduzem
sua poltica externa no Oriente Mdio, ao

Em
2002,
um
jornalista
denunciou a existncia de atividades
secretas de enriquecimento de Urnio
nas bases de Natanz e Arak, provocando
desconfiana sobre a finalidade do
projeto iraniano. A Agncia Internacional
de Energia Atmica (AIEA) passou a
pressionar o governo local a providenciar
provas concretas de que as atividades
estariam sendo realizadas com fins de
pesquisa. Em 2005, a AIEA alegou que
tais evidncias ainda no haviam sido
disponibilizadas. No mesmo ano, a

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

27

agncia
lanou
uma
resoluo
condenando o programa nuclear iraniano
e solicitando a ao do Conselho de
Segurana das Naes Unidas (CSNU) e,
em definitivo, abriu caminho para o
endurecimento do debate entre o Ir e a
comunidade internacional (Lampreia
2014 p.59).

entanto, somente quando as sanes e


seus impactos convergiram com um
reajuste conjuntural no Oriente Mdio, o
Ir e os Estados Unidos inclinaram-se a
formao do Acordo Nuclear, em 2015.

Foi com essas bases que se


estabeleceram as diversas sanes
sobre a economia iraniana. Essas
medidas sobre a economia do pas foram
tentativas de transferir as presses
diplomticas internacionais para a sua
populao, a fim de que se forassem
mudanas na sua poltica externa. No

Entre os anos 2006 e 2010, por


meio de resolues do CSNU e de aes
unilaterais dos Estados Unidos e da
Unio Europeia, foram adotadas diversas
medidas para isolar o Ir da economia
internacional, conforme mostra Lampreia
(2014):

Das Sanes ao Acordo Nuclear

1 Rodada
Res. 1731 CSNU
2006

2 Rodada
Res. 1747 CSNU
2007

3 Rodada
Res. 1803 CSNU
2008

4 Rodada
Res. 1929 CSNU
2010

-Proibio de comrcio
de
bens
que
pudessem contribuir
com
o
programa
nuclear.
- Congelamento de
ativos de pessoas e
entidades ligadas ao
programa nuclear
- Prazo de 60 dias para
abandono
do
programa nuclear.

- Ampliao da lista de
congelamento
de
ativos, incluindo o
banco estatal Sepah e
companhias
administradas
pela
guarda revolucionria.
Proibio
de
exportao de armas
de qualquer tipo.

- Restrio importao
de todos os itens e
tecnologias com uso
dual (civil e mlitar).
- Ampliao da relao de
pessoas e entidades com
ativos congelados.
- Expanso das restries
financeiras de pessoas
ligadas ao programa
nuclear.

- Proibio de vrias
categorias de armamentos
pesado
ao
Ir
(helicpteros de ataque,
navios de guerra, etc.)
- Ampliao da relao de
pessoas e entidades com
ativos congelados.
- Aumento da rigidez nas
inspees nos aeroportos
dos itens a caminho do Ir.

Fonte: Lampreia, 2014, p. 67-68. Tabela confeccionada pelos autores.

Em 2011, os Estados Unidos


estabeleceram uma srie de sanes
contra empresas ligadas ao setor
petrolfero iraniano, e em 2012 a Unio
Europeia organizou um embargo s
exportaes iranianas da commodity.
Como resultado disso, teve-se uma
limitao da capacidade do pas em

vender seu produto internacionalmente,


uma vez que a Unio Europeia era o
maior mercado consumidor do petrleo
iraniano. Consequentemente, houve uma
queda da produo interna - de 3.7
milhes de barris por dia, em janeiro de
2011, para 2.7 milhes de barris por dia,
em janeiro de 2013 (EIA 2016). Assim,

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

28

considerando o papel do petrleo como


responsvel por aproximadamente 80%
das receitas do governo, estima-se que
US$ 32 bilhes em receita tenham sido
perdidos em apenas um ano (SFGATE
2016).
Os efeitos dessa queda nas
exportaes iranianas tm significativa
importncia para o seu mercado
monetrio e financeiro. Os bloqueios
comerciais dificultaram a entrada de
dlares na economia do Ir, diminuindo a
sua quantidade de reservas lquidas, mas
foi o bloqueio bancrio e financeiro dos
Estados
Unidos
que
derrubou
significativamente o valor da moeda
nacional. O Dlar passou a representar,
portanto, um investimento estvel frente
s constantes desvalorizaes da moeda
nacional, e os consumidores cada vez
mais operavam atravs da compra e
venda da moeda a fim de gerar lucros.
Como o governo iraniano tentou fixar o
valor do Rial em uma taxa de cmbio
artificial baixa com relao ao dlar,
formou-se um mercado clandestino no
qual as operaes desenvolveram-se
com ainda mais fora. Sem demora o
governo iraniano teve que flexibilizar a
sua poltica cambial e aceitar a realizao
das trocas aos nveis do mercado extraoficial (Gladstone 2012; Peterson 2012)

inflao, portanto, est associada


instabilidade de preos internos, aos
cortes de verbas governamentais, aos
altos ndices de desemprego e
concentrao de renda no pas. Como
resultado, temos a formao de um ciclo
econmico nocivo associado falta de
controle estatal efetivo da situao.
Entretanto, os resultados destas sanes
tm sido evidenciados muito mais nas
questes econmicas do pas do que no
questionamento de suas instituies
polticas, colocando em dvida a
eficincia do mecanismo de sanes
como potencializador do desgaste do
regime iraniano (Peterson 2012).
Somado
aos
impactos
econmicos,
h
uma
alterao
conjuntural que culmina com a retomada
do canal de negociaes entre Estados
Unidos e Ir. Por um lado, a invaso do
Afeganisto e do Iraque e o consequente
enfraquecimento dos Estados Unidos
resultaram em uma mudana de
estratgia norte-americana para o
Oriente
Mdio,
concretizada
na
Administrao Obama pela sua proposta
de desengajamento. Somado a isso, os
Estados Unidos passam a ver o Ir como
um fator estabilizador para a regio, dada
a sua influncia sobre pontos sensveis
na regio como a Guerra Civil Sria, a
estabilidade do governo xiita no Iraque, e
as aes dos grupos no estatais Hamas
e Hezbollah (Roberto 2015; Visentini e
Roberto 2015).

Alguns dos resultados mais


evidentes
destas
sanes
so
encontrados nos ndices inflacionrios do
pas, sentidos tanto pela populao, que
perde poder seu poder de compra,
quanto pelas empresas, que encontram
na desvalorizao da moeda uma
barreira para a importao de insumos
bsicos aos seus processos produtivos. A

Por outro lado, tem-se uma


deteriorao da posio regional do Ir
com o incio da Guerra Civil na Sria e o
apoio saudita aos opositores do regime
de Bashar al-Assad, iniciando uma guerra

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

29

proxy e ameaando a derrubada de um


importante aliado de Teer12. Alm disso,
o estrangulamento econmico do Ir e os
impactos negativos das sanes sobre a
sua populao levaram eleio do
moderado Hassan Rouhani. Desde 2013,
o presidente buscou revigorar a
economia do pas atravs da retomada
das relaes econmicas com o
Ocidente, iniciando o processo de
negociaes e levando inclinao do
pas em aceitar as determinaes do
acordo (Roberto 2015; Visentini e
Roberto 2015).
As aes internacionais contra a
economia iraniana duraram at o ano de
2015, quando iniciaram as negociaes
que levaram ao chamado Acordo Nuclear
entre o pas e o grupo P5+1. O Acordo
prev, entre outras coisas, a reduo da
capacidade iraniana de enriquecimento e
armazenamento de Urnio, alm de
inspees peridicas s instalaes
iranianas de enriquecimento nuclear,
centrfugas de produo e minas de
urnio feitas pela Agncia Internacional
de Energia Atmica (AIEA). Em troca,
prev a gradual suspenso das sanes
impostas Repblica Islmica (TIMES
2016).

Nuclear, o governo iraniano organiza a


reabertura de sua economia. Assim,
houve o descongelamento de seus ativos
- no valor de US$ 100 bilhes - e o fim do
embargo europeu sobre suas vendas de
petrleo. Considerando o levantamento
das sanes sobre o Ir e a sua posterior
reinsero na economia mundial, tem-se
como
efeito,
primeiramente,
a
emergncia de um debate interno acerca
do modelo econmico a servir de base
para esse processo.

A Reabertura da Economia
Iraniana

Por um lado, h a posio linhadura do regime, encabeada pelos


membros da Guarda Revolucionria
Iraniana, beneficirios da economia
fechada pelos contratos previamente
estabelecidos no setor energtico e pela
possesso de grandes conglomerados e
holdings no pas. Sendo os mais
prejudicados pela reinsero global,
pregam pela chamada Economia de
Resistncia, com crescimento do
comrcio focado no mercado interno e
regional, e manuteno de poucos
vnculos financeiros internacionais.
Dessa forma, o pas no s tornar-se-ia
menos vulnervel a novas ameaas
econmicas do Ocidente, com uma
economia mais robusta e estvel, mas
principalmente conseguiria preservar os
aspectos ideolgicos bsicos do regime
(Takeyh 2016).

Desde
o
chamado
implementation
day,
aceito
o
comprometimento do Ir com as
diretrizes estabelecidas pelo Acordo

Por outro lado, h a posio


pragmtica, liderada pelo Presidente
Hassan Rouhani, que prega pelo
chamado Engajamento Construtivo e que

12

Segundo Visentini e Roberto (2015), a estreita relao entre Teer e Damasco pode ser corroborada atravs
da formao do Eixo de Resistncia, o qual confirma o alinhamento de vises e objetivos polticos entre os dois
pases, como a resistncia s polticas hegemnicas norte-americanas e israelenses no Oriente Mdio. A crise na
Sria, e a internacionalizao deste conflito, portanto, representa uma possvel substituio do governo de Assad
por um governo sunita, podendo romper as relaes do Eixo e deteriorar a situao estratgica do Ir na regio.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

30

assume uma posio de destaque com a


assinatura do Acordo Nuclear. Segundo
essa
vertente,
a
caracterstica
fundamental da economia iraniana
enquanto exportadora de petrleo e
outros recursos naturais no permite o
seu total isolamento dos mercados
globais. Assim, advogam pela reinsero
do pas na economia mundial,
aumentando os nveis de comrcio e
recebendo cada vez mais investidores
internacionais para criar uma situao de
interdependncia
econmica,
principalmente com pases europeus e
asiticos, que pode blindar o pas contra
novas polticas de sanes no futuro e,
inclusive, fortalecer o regime (Takeyh
2016).

explorao offshore no campo South


Pars, no Golfo Prsico, acrescentando
200.000 barris p/d a produo global
desse recurso. Com o consumo dessas
commodities estvel no mercado interno,
a expanso produtiva ser absorvida por
consumidores internacionais (EIA 2016).
Externamente, portanto, o aumento da
produo de petrleo diminuir o preo
da commodity, prejudicando os pases
exportadores do produto como um todo,
mas servindo de plataforma para o
aumento
geral
das
exportaes
iranianas, em decadncia desde os
boicotes (World Bank 2015).
Alm do retorno das potncias
ocidentais ao mercado iraniano, esperase que haja uma expanso nas suas j
consolidadas relaes comerciais com a
China. Com uma relao baseada na
exportao de bens manufaturados
diversos e na construo de obras de
infraestrutura e transporte em troca de
enormes quantidades de petrleo - sendo
atualmente o maior comprador iraniano a China sair muito beneficiada com o
acordo. Com o levantamento das
sanes, os chineses tero maior
liberdade
e
legitimidade
para
expandirem seus negcios em toda a
regio, como a retomada da explorao
de gs conjunta entre a Zhunai Zhenrong
Corporation e a National Iranian Oil
Company, e a construo das ferrovias e
oleodutos e gasodutos que ligariam a
China ao Golfo Prsico (Bliler 2015).

Dada a atual prevalncia desta


segunda
linha
de
pensamento,
evidenciada pela vitria dos seus
representantes nas ltimas eleies
parlamentares, espera-se que a abertura
da economia do Ir tenha impacto direto
sobre o mercado de petrleo e gs.
Internamente,
estima-se
que
o
levantamento das sanes incentive um
crescimento na produo de petrleo13
para 3.1 milhes p/d, em 2016, e 3.7
milhes
p/d,
em
2017
aproximadamente 10% do total da
produo da OPEP - e mais um impulso
na produo de aproximadamente
200.000 barris p/d em campos recm
construdos por companhias chinesas no
pas (EIA 2016).
Em termos de gs natural, a
abertura para novos investidores deve
acelerar
o
desenvolvimento
da
13

A reinsero do Ir no mercado de
petrleo representa, tambm, uma

A ttulo de comparao, em 2015 a produo de petrleo foi de 2.8 milhes de barris p/d (EIA 2016).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

31
16

ameaa para a sua tradicional rival na


regio, a Arbia Saudita. Os sauditas vm
adotando uma poltica de reduo dos
preos do petrleo com o objetivo de
solapar os produtores de gs de xisto nos
Estados Unidos. Caso a entrada do Ir
no seja compensada por uma poltica de
controle da produo pela OPEP, os
preos devem cair ainda mais no mdio
prazo.

explorao de recursos. Nos prximos 5


anos, devem entrar entre US$230 e
US$260 bilhes nos setores extrativistas
do pas, alm de empresas de
computao - como Hewlett-Packard e
Lenovo - e construo de automveis principalmente da Europa e do Japo
que j demonstram interesse no seu
mercado (Economist 2016; Paivar 2015).
Ademais, grandes instituies
bancrias, principalmente da Inglaterra e
da Alemanha, vm realizando suas
prospeces para futuros projetos de
financiamento em larga escala. A maior
parte destes projetos esto ligados
construo de infraestrutura e aquisio
de produtos de altssimo valor agregado,
exemplo da compra de aeronaves da
companhia Airbus. Enquanto isso, vo
gradualmente se inserindo no pas
instituies bancrias de menor porte
para a reaproximao do consumidor
mdio com o sistema de finanas (Paivar
2016).

Considerando que a receita


pblica da Arbia Saudita composta em
90% pela exportao de petrleo, o
dficit na economia saudita deve
alcanar a taxa de 20% de seu PIB ainda
em 2016 e, segundo estimativas do FMI,
mantendo-se suas polticas econmicas,
as reservas estrangeiras do pas podem
se exaurir nos prximos 5 anos. Isso
afetaria
diretamente
a
posio
internacional de investimento dos
sauditas, que em uma colocao menos
segura, tem visto seus ndices de
confiabilidade despencarem (Townsend
2015). Ademais, pode colocar em xeque
o sistema social de subsdios e gastos
pblicos que garante a prpria
estabilidade poltica do reino.

Concluso
Assim,
entende-se
que
a
reinsero global da economia do Ir traz
consigo
uma
ampla
gama
de
oportunidades, tanto para o pas quanto
para investidores internacionais. A
entrada de capitais e o estmulo ao setor
privado devem recuperar o crescimento
da renda nacional a taxas significativas,
ao passo que dar liberdade para a
atuao de companhias multinacionais
europeias e estadunidenses. No campo
diplomtico, permanecem algumas
tenses e desconfianas entre o Ir e o
ocidente, principalmente em funo dos
constrangimentos derivados das

Nesse mesmo sentido, outro


impacto direto do levantamento das
sanes recair sobre o setor financeiro
da economia iraniana, principalmente
atravs do recebimento de investimentos
estrangeiros diretos e da sua reinsero
na esfera bancria. Em termos de
investimento, o pas extremamente
atrativo em funo de sua enorme
populao, com altas taxas de
escolaridade, e de seu potencial de

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

32

tradicionais alianas estadunidenses na


regio, como Turquia, Arbia Saudita e
Israel e do discurso dos Estados Unidos
contra o programa de msseis balsticos
iraniano. No entanto, esse fator no
parece ameaar o comprometimento de
ambas as partes com o acordo.
A continuidade dessa abordagem
pragmtica do Ir com relao aos
Estados Unidos, e da prpria abertura de
sua economia, ir depender das eleies
de 2017 e da dinmica poltica interna
iraniana nos prximos anos. Enquanto
Rouhani conseguir executar seu projeto
de Engajamento Construtivo e conseguir
conter as aes conservadoras da
Guarda Revolucionria, de se esperar
que o pas continue recebendo capitais
estrangeiros e expandindo, aos poucos, a
sua economia. No obstante, as questes
estruturais da poltica externa do pas e a
conjuntura da baixa nos preos do
petrleo podem dificultar o processo de
recuperao no mdio prazo.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

33
16

Referncias
Bandeira, Luiz Alberto Moniz. 2013. A Segunda Guerra Fria: Geopoltica E Dimenso Estratgica Dos
Estados Unidos.. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizao Brasileira.
Bliler, Courtney. 2015. "China And Iran's New Love Affair?". The
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-irans-new-love-affair-13434.

National

Interest.

CIA.
2016.
"The
World
Factbook". Central
Inteligence
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.

Agency.

EIA. 2016. "IranS Petroleum Production Expected To Increase As Sanctions Are Lifted - Today In Energy U.S.
Energy
Information
Administration
(EIA)". Energy
Information
Administration.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=24592.
Gladstone,
Rick.
2012.
"Iran
Eases
Its
Currency
Exchange
Policy". Nytimes.Com.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/iran-eases-its-currency-exchangepolicy.html?_r=2.
Halliday, F. 1980. "The Iranian Revolution In International Affairs: Programme And Practice".Millennium Journal Of International Studies 9 (2): 108-121. doi:10.1177/03058298800090020301.
Lampreia, Luiz Felipe. 2014. Aposta Em Teer: O Acordo Nuclear Entre Brasil, Turquia E Ir.. Rio de Janeiro:
Objetiva.
Leverett, Flynt Lawrence and Hillary Mann Leverett. 2013. Going To Tehran. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Lima, Shnia Kellen de. 2016. "Alinhamento Internacional Do Ir Durante A Guerra Fria: Um Teste De Teorias
Realistas Das Relaes Internacionais.". In II Simpsio De Ps-Graduao Em Relaes Internacionais Do
Programa San Tiago Dantas, 1-26. So Paulo.
Paivar, Amir. 2016. "Investing In Iran After The Lifting Of Sanctions - BBC News". BBC News.
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33639124.
Paivar, Amir. 2016. "What Lifting Iran Sanctions Means For World Markets - BBC News". BBC News.
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35317159.
Peterson, Sabrina M. 2016. "IranS Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis Of The Economic Impact Of Western
Sanctions | International Affairs Review". International Affairs Review. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428.
Roberto, Willian Moraes. 2015. O acordo nuclear do Ir: uma anlise das possveis razes e impactos.
NERINT, Porto Alegre. Acesso em: 28 Abril 2016.
SFGATE.
2016.
"Iran
Feels
Economic
Pinch
Of
EU
Oil
Sanctions". Sfgate.
http://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Iran-feels-economic-pinch-of-EU-oil-sanctions-3677911.php.
Takeyh, Ray. 2016. "Iran's 'Resistance Economy' Debate". Council
http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-resistance-economy-debate/p37748.

On

Foreign

Relations.

The Economist,. 2016. "IranS Nuclear Deal Becomes A Reality | The Economist". The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/graphics-iran-sanctions-and-nuclear-deal.
Times.
2016.
"A
Safer
World,
Thanks
To
The
Iran
Deal". Nytimes.Com.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/opinion/a-safer-world-thanks-to-the-irandeal.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FIran%27s%20Nuclear%20Program&_r=0.
Townsend, Mark. 2015. "The Oil Price, Iran And Saudi's Economy". Aljazeera.Com.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/oil-price-iran-saudi-economy-151221073412010.html.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

34

Visentini, Paulo Fagundes and Willian Moraes Roberto. 2015. "As Consequncias Da Crise Na Sria Para O
Ir: Impactos Para Sua Estratgia Regional E No Eixo De Resistncia". Brazilian Journal Of International
Relations 4 (1): 71-91. doi:10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n1p71-91.
World Bank. 2015. "Iran: Lifting Of Sanctions Will Lower Oil Prices And Boost Domestic Economy If Managed
Well". World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/08/10/iran-lifting-sanctionswill-lower-oil-prices-and-boost-domestic-economy-if-managed-well.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

35

AS CONVERSAES DE PAZ SOBRE O CONFLITO SRIO


PRINCIPAIS AVANOS E DIFERENAS ENTRE AS REUNIES DE VIENA (2015) E GENEBRA III (2016)
Douglas de Quadros Rocha14
Isabela Souza Julio15
Patrcia Graeff Machry16

As conversaes de paz de Viena e Genebra III foram as ltimas


iniciativas multilaterais em busca de uma resoluo para a Guerra Civil Sria,
e elas contaram com a participao de atores domsticos e regionais
importantes que no haviam participado juntos de negociaes de paz
anteriores.

O papel de Bashar al-Assad durante e aps o processo de transio


poltica na Sria pea-chave para a resoluo do conflito.

Os interesses conflitantes dos pases e dos grupos locais envolvidos


nas negociaes, bem como a no participao de grupos relevantes da
oposio, so os principais empecilhos para o avano do processo de paz na
Sria.
Apresentao
No dia 18 de abril de 2016, a
oposio ao governo srio suspendeu, por
tempo indeterminado, sua participao
formal nas conversaes de paz acerca
da situao na Sria, que vm ocorrendo

desde o comeo do ano, em Genebra,


mediadas pela Organizao das Naes
Unidas (ONU). Porta-vozes do grupo de
oposio, autodenominado Alto Comit
de Negociao (HNC, do ingls High

14

Graduando do 5 semestre do curso de Relaes Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande


do Sul Contato: douglasqrocha@gmail.com
Graduanda do 5 semestre do curso de Relaes Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande
do Sul Contato: isabelasjulio@gmail.com
15

Graduanda do 7 semestre do curso de Relaes Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande


do Sul Contato: pgmachry@gmail.com
16

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

36

Negotiation Committee), justificaram que


a sada das conversaes de paz se dava,
sobretudo, em virtude das violaes, por
parte do governo srio, ao cessar-fogo
estabelecido em 27 de fevereiro de
2016. O presidente dos Estados Unidos,
Barack Obama, bem como o presidente
da Rssia, Vladimir Putin, demonstraram
preocupao e afirmaram a importncia
do respeito ao cessar-fogo e da
permanncia das conversaes de paz
de Genebra para uma resoluo pacfica
do conflito srio (Martin 2016; Stratfor
2016).

Saudita e as petromonarquias do Golfo,


apoiadas por Israel, Turquia e Estados
Unidos da Amrica, do outro (Matthiesen
2015; Moraes Roberto 2015).
Em paralelo ao conflito, iniciaramse diversas conversaes de paz que
visaram a soluo da situao sria. O
ltimo esforo visando a resoluo do
conflito teve incio em outubro de 2015,
em Viena, e culminou nas reunies de
Genebra III. Essas ltimas permitiram
que as conversaes adentrassem em
uma nova fase, que tinha como principal
diferencial a incluso simultnea da
oposio sria e do governo de Bashar alAssad nas negociaes.

A partir de 2011, a regio do


Oriente Mdio presenciou a ocorrncia
de uma srie de manifestaes que
ficaram conhecidas como Primavera
rabe, e que marcaram uma mudana
significativa na geopoltica da regio.
Manifestaes
pr-democracia
irromperam em vrios pases clamando,
sobretudo,
por
melhorias
socioeconmicas.
Logo
tais
manifestaes chegaram Sria, onde o
regime de Bashar al-Assad respondeu
com violncia, dando incio ao conflito
srio que se estende at os dias de hoje
(Rodgers et al. 2016). As manifestaes
na Sria transformaram-se em uma
guerra civil que j vitimou mais de 250
mil pessoas, alm de ter promovido a
maior crise de refugiados - cerca de 4
milhes de pessoas - desde a Segunda
Guerra Mundial (Hudson 2016; Amnesty
International 2015). Marcado pela
interferncia de potncias regionais e
extrarregionais, o conflito tomou
propores mais amplas, opondo,
principalmente, duas potncias regionais
e seus aliados: a Repblica Islmica do
Ir de um lado, e o Reino da Arbia

Mas, afinal, no que consistem


essas negociaes de paz? Por que elas
foram consideradas to inovadoras e
promissoras por parte da maioria dos
especialistas e, portanto, por que razo a
sada da oposio pode ter um
significado importante para o desenrolar
dos eventos na Sria, um pas cuja
situao parece cada vez mais difcil de
solucionar?
Compreendendo a importncia de
tais questionamentos, a presente anlise
buscar i) identificar a importncia do
conflito srio na regio atravs da anlise
das ltimas conversaes de paz; ii)
explorar os diversos e, inclusive,
divergentes interesses existentes com
relao resoluo da Guerra Civil Sria
e como os atores envolvidos tem se
comportado para atingi-los por meio de
sua participao nas negociaes; iii)
entender por que as conversaes de paz
de 2016 foram significativamente
diferentes
dos
demais
esforos

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

37

realizados para resolver o conflito, e iv)


analisar
quais
as
possveis
consequncias que viriam dessas
conversaes e como a sada do grupo de
oposio pode afet-las.

Frana, Reino Unido e China - levou


produo de um communiqu que
detalhava uma srie de critrios
necessrios resoluo do conflito
poltico srio. Esse documento, porm,
falhava em identificar quem eram as
partes que deveriam ser includas em um
futuro governo de transio, uma vez que
no existe apenas um movimento de
oposio ao governo srio, e sim, vrios,
dotados de ideologias e motivaes
distintas entre si (Groarke 2016; United
Nations 2012).

Parte-se da premissa que as


conversaes de Genebra III, cujas bases
acredita-se terem sido lanadas com as
negociaes de Viena em 2015, vinham
sendo fundamentalmente distintas dos
esforos anteriores em razo de terem
envolvido, ao mesmo tempo, tanto pases
com interesses divergentes, como Ir,
Arbia Saudita e Turquia, ou Estados
Unidos e Rssia, quanto o governo e a
oposio sria. Alm disso, supe-se
tambm que, apesar dessa caracterstica
inovadora, a ausncia dos curdos da Sria
nas negociaes poderia fazer com que o
alcance delas fosse limitado. Por fim,
entende-se que o respeito a um cessarfogo seja fundamental por parte de todas
as partes envolvidas para que futuras
conversaes sejam concludas com
sucesso, e que a sada do grupo de
oposio em virtude da violao do
cessar-fogo pode vir a significar o fim, por
tempo indeterminado, dos esforos
empreendidos para a resoluo pacfica
da guerra sria.

As Conversaes de Paz Sobre a


Sria

Em 2014, a II Conferncia de
Genebra, novamente realizada pela ONU,
buscou levar o governo de Bashar alAssad e alguns dos principais grupos de
oposio - organizados como Coalizo
Nacional Sria - juntos mesa de
negociao, em uma clara tentativa de
buscar a paz no pas por meio de uma
diviso de poder acordada entre todas as
partes envolvidas. Essas negociaes,
entretanto, no tiveram tantos efeitos
prticos, uma vez que, internamente,
Assad ignorava esses esforos de
incorporao
da
oposio
e,
internacionalmente, pases vizinhos e
outras potncias internacionais pareciam
ter cada vez menos disposio para
negociar com o presidente srio - sendo a
Rssia e o Ir as mais significativas
excees (Groarke 2016).

O processo de negociaes de paz


sobre a Sria j vem se desenrolando
desde 2011, quando comeou a guerra
civil que, at hoje, assola o pas. Em
2012, a I Conferncia de Genebra,
liderada pelas Naes Unidas com apoio
dos membros permanentes do Conselho
de Segurana - Estados Unidos, Rssia,

Com a ascenso do Estado


Islmico em 2014, a preocupao em
combat-lo somou-se s preocupaes
relacionadas transio poltica na Sria,
e o debate sobre o conflito no pas
tornou-se ainda mais intenso. No ano de
2015, aps o incio do envolvimento
direto da Rssia na Sria, com a

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

38

interveno de setembro, os esforos em


busca da resoluo do conflito parecem
ter atingido um patamar mais elevado,
contendo diferenas significativas com
relao aos anteriores. Assim, a presente
anlise se concentrar nas negociaes
de paz de Genebra iniciadas em fevereiro
de 2016, que ficaram conhecidas como
Genebra III, e nas negociaes anteriores
a essas, ocorridas em Viena, no final de
2015, que teriam fornecido as bases
para as conversaes de Genebra III.

No dia 23 de outubro, o secretrio


de Estado dos Estados Unidos, John
Kerry, e o ministro das relaes
exteriores
russo,
Sergei
Lavrov,
encontraram-se em Viena, e definiram
que as prximas conversaes de paz
sobre a Sria envolveriam todas as partes
envolvidas - uma definio significativa
quando se leva em conta que os ltimos
esforos
de
acordos
haviam
representado os interesses dos Estados
Unidos, da Europa e de seus aliados
regionais, como Turquia e Arbia Saudita,
de ver Assad fora do poder como
precondio para atingir a paz. A
declarao de Kerry de que estaria
disposto a aceitar qualquer parceria que
servisse para derrotar o Estado Islmico
sinalizava que, muito provavelmente,
Lavrov teria conquistado um dos maiores
objetivos russos: o consentimento
ocidental para finalmente dar ao Ir, um
dos maiores aliados do regime Assad, um
lugar na mesa de negociaes
(Mohammed and Murphy 2016).

As conversaes de paz sobre a


Sria em Viena (2015)
Em 30 de setembro de 2015, a
Rssia realizou ataques areos na Sria,
alegando que todos seus alvos seriam
pertencentes ao Estado Islmico. Alguns
pases ocidentais, em especial os
Estados Unidos, questionaram essa
alegao, acusando a Rssia, tradicional
defensora do governo de Assad, de ter
tambm infligido ataques oposio do
governo srio. Independentemente das
controvrsias geradas com relao aos
alvos dos ataques russos, porm,
importa aqui frisar que essa iniciativa
russa alterou significativamente o
balano de poder no conflito srio. Tal
interveno se deu em uma conjuntura
na qual as foras de Bashar al-Assad
perdiam progressivamente o controle
sobre territrios na Sria. Com um maior
envolvimento da Rssia, uma potncia
com grandes capacidades polticas e
militares, ficava claro que no apenas
Moscou teria um protagonismo nas
possveis resolues acerca da situao
sria, como tambm entraria nessas
negociaes em defesa de Assad.

Essas suposies confirmaram-se


no dia 30 de outubro, quando ocorreu a
primeira rodada das reunies sediadas
em Viena. Os principais participantes
foram Estados Unidos, Rssia, Arbia
Saudita, Ir e Turquia, pases com vises
fundamentalmente diferentes acerca do
futuro de Assad e do tratamento
necessrio aos diferentes grupos de
oposio na Sria, em especial os curdos.
Foi a primeira vez que Ir e Arbia
Saudita participaram de uma mesma
rodada de negociaes. Apesar dessa
mudana significativa, importante
salientar que nenhum representante srio
foi convidado a participar. Alm desses
cinco pases, tambm estiveram

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

39

presentes
Frana,
Reino
Unido,
Alemanha, Itlia, China, Egito, Om,
Qatar, Jordnia, Lbano, Iraque, Emirados
rabes Unidos, e representantes da
Unio Europeia e da Organizao das
Naes Unidas. O secretrio-geral da
ONU, Ban Ki-moon, afirmou que a palavra
de ordem em Viena deveria ser
flexibilidade, uma vez que os vrios
pases participantes apoiavam, cada um,
grupos distintos dentro da Sria (Jung
2015).

internacional renovado, apesar de seu


apoio ao regime de Assad (Waterfield,
Dominiczak and Blair 2016; Chatham
House 2016). Ficava claro que, partir
daquele momento, a resoluo da guerra
civil sria no poderia mais ser decidida
unilateralmente pelos pases ocidentais
como fora feito na desastrosa
interveno da Lbia -, mas somente por
meio de um dilogo entre todas as partes
envolvidas, inclusive a Rssia e o Ir,
principais apoiadores de Bashar al-Assad
(Mohammed and Murphy 2015; Lynch
and Hudson 2015).

Ao fim das reunies realizadas no


dia 30, os pases chegaram ao acordo de
que a resoluo do conflito srio deveria
ser diplomtica, respeitando o povo e a
integridade da Sria, e que o Estado
Islmico devia ser combatido. A ONU foi
convidada a mediar conversas entre o
governo e a oposio sria como forma de
garantir o xito de um plano de transio
poltica, mas no houve definio sobre
quais grupos da oposio seriam
convidados. Assim, ficou estabelecido
que os pases participantes reunir-se-iam
novamente dentro de duas semanas
para resolver pontos conflitantes e
construir um acordo conjunto (European
Union 2015; The Economist 2015).

Essa incluso do Ir tambm


merece destaque especial, uma vez que
ps fim ao isolamento diplomtico do
pas na regio e demonstrou sua
ascenso como polo importante de poder
para as relaes no Oriente Mdio.
Apesar da oposio que normalmente
sofre esse pas por parte da Arbia
Saudita, da Turquia e das monarquias do
Golfo, a aceitao da participao
iraniana em Viena foi um resultado quase
imediato do aumento da presena militar
russa, que possibilitou a exigncia do
comparecimento
do
Teer
nas
negociaes. Contudo, necessrio
frisar que essa incluso tambm pode ter
sido fortemente influenciada pela
aproximao entre Estados Unidos e Ir
aps as negociaes nucleares de junho
de 2015, sinalizando uma disposio por
parte de Washington de arrefecer as
histricas tenses com o pas e traz-lo
aos dilogos sobre a Sria. Tal movimento
trouxe crticas e dvidas por parte da
Arbia Saudita e de Israel, os principais
aliados estadunidenses na regio. A
Arbia Saudita a tradicional rival do Ir

Deve-se chamar ateno ao fato


de que a Rssia, ao assumir a liderana
nas
negociaes
como
principal
intermedirio entre as potncias
ocidentais e o governo srio, rompeu com
seu isolamento diplomtico, imposto
pela comunidade internacional desde a
incorporao da Crimeia e a posterior
suspenso do G8. Com a interveno de
setembro na Sria e a consequente
demonstrao de suas foras militares,
Moscou
adquiriu
um
respeito

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

40

na regio, em virtude, sobretudo, das


disputas por reas de influncia sobre os
demais pases islmicos dentro da lgica
de polarizao entre xiitas e sunitas (Nasr
2016). A Turquia posicionou-se em
consonncia com a Arbia Saudita com
relao a essa aproximao com o Ir,
por temer ver seus interesses na regio
ameaados (Tastekin 2016).

quais seriam os grupos de oposio


aceitos na negociao, delegando a
tarefa de organiz-los em algum grupo
coeso ao enviado da ONU Sria, Staffan
de Mistura.
Apesar
disso,
os
pases
enfatizaram serem receptivos a um grupo
que contivesse o espectro mais amplo
possvel de grupos de oposio, que
deviam ser escolhidos pelos prprios
srios e que definiriam quem seriam seus
representantes e seus objetivos nas
futuras negociaes. Ambas as partes do
conflito, oposio e governo, deveriam
chegar em algum acordo para elaborar
uma nova constituio, uma vez que o
ISSG considerou que o elemento poltico
era fundamental resoluo da crise
sria (United Nations 2015; Norman
2015; United States Department of State
2016).

No dia 14 de novembro, a
segunda rodada das negociaes de
Viena ocorreu, contando com a
participao de dos mesmos pases e
organizaes presentes no dia 30 de
outubro, com a adio da representao
da Liga rabe. O grupo ficou conhecido
como Grupo Internacional de Apoio
Sria (ISSG, do ingls International Syria
Support Group). Nessa ocasio, os pases
dialogaram sobre a urgncia de dar fim
destruio fsica da Sria e ao sofrimento
do povo srio, e concordaram que o
estabelecimento de um cessar-fogo na
regio deveria ser a prioridade imediata no incluindo, porm, neste cessar-fogo,
os ataques contra o Estado Islmico ou
frente
al-Nusra.
Os
pases
comprometeram-se
a
apoiar
um
processo de transio poltica nos
moldes do Communiqu de Geneva de
2012, buscando uma governana
inclusiva, no-sectria e liderada pelos
prprios srios (United Nations 2015).
Decidiu-se, ainda nessa reunio,
que eleies buscando a elaborao de
uma nova constituio seriam realizadas
dentro de 18 meses na Sria, e que 01 de
janeiro de 2016 seria a data limite para
que se iniciassem conversaes de paz
entre o governo srio e os grupos de
oposio. O ISSG no definiu de antemo

As conversaes de paz de
Genebra III (2016)
No dia 01 de fevereiro de 2016,
um ms aps o previsto, tiveram incio as
negociaes de paz sediadas em
Genebra, conhecidas como Genebra III.
Organizadas pelo ISSG e mediadas pelas
Naes Unidas, tais reunies tinham
como fim primordial estabelecer um
cessar-fogo, seguido de um governo de
transio e de eleies na Sria, alm da
derrota do Estado Islmico.
A primeira reunio foi composta
pelos mesmos participantes de Viena,
mas com a marcante diferena da
incluso de representantes do governo
srio e do Alto Comit de Negociaes

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

41

(HNC), uma coalizo composta por 3417


grupos de oposio ao regime Assad - um
tero desses representando faces
armadas -, liderada pela Arbia Saudita e
chefiada por Mohammed Alloush, do
grupo salafista Jaysh al-Islam18. A
demora para a ocorrncia dessa reunio
que estava marcada para o dia 01 de
janeiro se deu, fundamentalmente,
pela indeciso sobre quem seria a
oposio sria reconhecida (Lund 2016).
Alm disso, o prprio HNC mostrava-se
ainda um pouco reticente em negociar
com o regime de Damasco caso este no
cesasse os ataques areos contra a
oposio, mas acabou cedendo
presso internacional para estar
presente.

ataques areos em suas posies.


Apesar da ausncia de um consenso
sobre isso, ambos os lados do conflito
excluram representantes dos curdos, da
milcia jihadista Jabhat al-Nusra, a qual
possui laos com a al-Qaeda, e do Estado
Islmico (Zraick 2016). Os 34 membros
do HNC selecionaram uma delegao de
17 representantes para negociar com
uma delegao do governo srio, essa
liderada pelo Representante Permanente
da Sria na ONU, Bashar al-Jaafari, nas
conversas iniciadas em 2016 (Pike
2016; Lund 2016).
A incluso de representantes do
governo de Bashar al-Assad nas
conversaes reflete as mudanas
ocorridas em territrio srio entre as
foras do governo e demais grupos:
desde os ataques areos russos em
apoio Assad, o governo tem recuperado
regies importantes do pas, como a
cidade de Alepo, maior cidade do pas
antes da guerra. Desde ento, o governo
prometeu reconquistar o controle sobre
todo o pas, o que demonstra a sua
posio relativamente fortalecida e
slida. Isso deixou claro que Assad no
seria destitudo atravs da fora e que a

A definio sobre quais grupos


so moderados ou radicais um fator de
conflito entre as partes envolvidas: de um
lado, Estados Unidos, Arbia Saudita,
Turquia e demais pases europeus
consideram os grupos do HNC
representativos da oposio ao governo
srio, enquanto a Rssia, o Ir e o governo
Assad classificam alguns destes como
radicais ou terroristas, realizando

A ONU nunca cogitou aceitar no HNC os grupos de oposio que so amplamente considerados terroristas,
como o Estado Islmico e a Frente al-Nusra. Alguns grupos considerados terroristas pela Rssia e pelo Ir,
porm, foram includos no Comit- a exemplo do Ahrah al-Sham, do Jaysh al-Islam -, apesar das demandas
russas de que apenas grupos que no recorressem violncia contra o frgil Estado srio deveriam poder
participar. Ainda, grupos importantes no combate ao Estado islmico, como os curdos, tambm no foram
includos na coalizo da oposio. Infelizmente, ainda muito difcil encontrar fontes confiveis e
detalhadas que contenham informaes sobre quais so, de fato, os 34 grupos que compe o HNC. Aqueles
que se tem confirmao sobre a participao so Jaysh al Mujahideen, Jaysh al Islam, Al Jaysh al Awl, Jabhat
al Asala wal Tanmiya - todos esses sabidamente atuando como oposio armada -, Ahrar al-Sham, Jabal
Turkman Battalion, Suqour al-Jabab Brigade, Council of Direction of Syrian Tribes, Popular Front for Change
and Liberation, Movement Kamh, Movement for a Pluralist Society, Cairo Group, Movement for a Peaceful
Policy Change, Syrian Democratic Council, e Salim Herbek e Namroud Suleiman como participantes
independentes (Pike 2016; Cafarella and Casagrande 2016) .
17

O Jaysh al-Islam um dos principais grupos de oposio jihadista salafista na Sria. Possui apoiadores
em sete provncias diferentes na poro ocidental do pas, mas detm sua maior fora na capital, Damasco
(Cafarella and Casagrande 2016).
18

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

42

participao do governo, em qualquer


negociao, se tornara indispensvel a
partir da nova conjuntura mesmo que
grande
parte
dos
negociadores
permanea se opondo veementemente
continuidade de Assad no cargo de
presidente (Irish and Strobel 2016;
Dearden 2016).

estabelecida uma Fora Tarefa para o


Cessar-Fogo presidida pelo ISSG, EUA e
Rssia (United States Department of
State 2016). Aps as primeiras 24 horas
do estabelecimento do cessar-fogo,
porm, as foras russas e srias
continuaram seus ataques contra uma
srie de grupos opositores na parte
noroeste do pas. Mesmo apesar disso,
houve queda notvel da violncia no
pas, permitindo que o representante das
Naes Unidas avanasse com seus
esforos para a resoluo de conflito
(Syrian Institute 2016).

Os representantes do HNC
focaram nas questes humanitrias e na
libertao de prisioneiros polticos,
enquanto o posicionamento declarado do
governo srio seria de defesa da
independncia e soberania territorial
sria, alm da unidade do seu povo. O
ms de fevereiro foi, contudo, um perodo
de estagnao nas negociaes,
principalmente em virtude dos avanos
militares do governo srio e das foras
russas contra rebeldes em Alepo. Assim,
apenas foi discutida a necessidade de se
estabelecer um cessar-fogo. No dia 22,
em Munique, os Ministros de Relaes
Exteriores da Rssia e dos EUA se
reuniram na 52 Conferncia Anual de
Segurana de Munique e anunciaram
juntamente com o ISSG a adoo dos
Termos para o Fim das Hostilidades19 na
Sria. O cessar de hostilidades deveria ter
incio no dia 27 de fevereiro e ser
acompanhado de conversaes polticas
entre as partes envolvidas. Para isso, foi

Uma nova etapa das negociaes


iniciou-se no dia 14 de maro, durando
at o dia 24 desse ms. Segundo o
enviado da ONU, as conversaes,
naquele momento, tinham atingido um
novo nvel de urgncia em decorrncia do
anncio da retirada das foras russas do
territrio srio20 (Arvinth 2016). Ainda
nesse contexto, Mistura redigiu uma
declarao de princpios que iam desde o
repdio
ao
terrorismo
at
o
estabelecimento de uma transio
poltica pacfica na Sria, os quais
deveriam guiar as conversaes a partir
daquele
momento.
Contudo,
a
declarao no especificava como se
daria essa transio nem qual seria o

Esses termos incluam, entre outras coisas: a implementao da Resoluo 2254 de


da Segurana
da ONU - retomada pela Resoluo 2268, de 26 de fevereiro de 2016 -, a interrupo de ataques de
quaisquer formas s foras de governo srio ou a qualquer grupo associado a elas, e ajuda humanitria
imediata (United States of America 2016).
19

Conselho

O anncio pelo presidente russo Vladimir Putin, em 14 de maro de 2016, sobre a retirada parcial das
foras militares russas da Sria, surpreendeu os pases e grupos envolvidos no conflito. Apesar dessa
retirada parcial, bombardeamentos areos continuaram, principalmente contra posies de grupos da
oposio. Assim, a Rssia atingiu seu objetivo de fortalecer as foras do governo e estabelecer sua presena
militar no pas sempre que necessrio. Analistas acreditam que o anncio de Vladimir Putin buscou
pressionar o presidente Bashar al-Assad a oferecer maiores compromissos para um acordo de paz, em
Genebra III (Salih 2016).
20

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

43

papel da Assad nesse processo (Wintour


2016).

retrocesso nas conversaes (Hudson


2016).

No dia 13 de abril, as reunies


entraram em uma terceira etapa, em que
se esperava que fossem finalmente
definidas as condies necessrias para
a transio poltica na sria (Wintour
2016). No mesmo dia, ocorreram
eleies parlamentares nas reas da
Sria que o governo Assad ainda
controlava,
e
muitas
pessoas
compareceram em apoio a ele. Tais
eleies foram consideradas ilegtimas
pela oposio, tendo em vista a
instabilidade do pas e a necessidade do
governo em forjar um apoio da populao
sria. Em contrapartida, a Rssia
declarou que elas foram absolutamente
necessrias, em virtude da necessidade
de se evitar um vcuo de poder no pas
que poderia favorecer grupos armados
(Davison and Bassam 2016).

Nas semanas mais recentes,


ambos os lados tm se acusado
mutuamente de violar o cessar-fogo
estabelecido no final de fevereiro. Para
tentar atrair novamente os dois lados
para a mesa de conversas, o enviado
especial da ONU recorreu aos EUA e a
Rssia (Hudson 2016).
Apesar de todos esses esforos no
tocante incluso do governo srio e da
oposio, importante, porm, prestar
ateno ao fato de que o Partido da Unio
Democrtica (PYD), que representa os
territrios curdos no norte da Sria, foi
excludo de qualquer participao nas
negociaes. A participao dos curdos
na Guerra Civil Sria complexa e envolve
interferncias e interesses das potncias
envolvidas. As foras curdas so,
atualmente, o principal agente em
territrio srio em combate contra as
posies do Estado Islmico, fato que
tem incentivado a ajuda militar e
financeira por parte dos Estados Unidos.
Entretanto, devido aos laos existentes
entre o Partido e as organizaes
rebeldes curdas no sudeste da Turquia
(PKK, do ingls Kurdistan Workers Party),
o governo turco se posicionou
veementemente contrrio a qualquer
participao de representantes curdos
nas conversaes, ameaando deix-las
caso isto ocorresse (Perry and
Mohammed 2016; DeYoung and Morello
2016). Dada esta relao entre os curdos
srios e turcos, o governo de Ancara
imps ofensivas nos territrios ao norte
da Sria, prximos fronteira com a
Turquia, regio controlada pelos curdos

No dia 18 de abril, o HNC


suspendeu
formalmente
sua
participao nas negociaes de
Genebra III. O grupo citou uma srie de
motivos, sendo o principal deles a recusa
de governo srio em permitir ajuda
humanitria no seu territrio. Segundo o
HNC, as negociaes no poderiam
continuar enquanto o regime Assad e
seus apoiadores, principalmente as
foras
russas,
continuassem
bombardeando civis, atacando rebeldes
e se recusando a aceitar a formao de
um novo governo em Damasco. Apesar
de reconhecerem que a sada do HNC
teve motivos legtimos, tanto a ONU
quanto os EUA posicionaram-se contra
essa deciso, pois essa representaria um

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

44

(Reuters 2016). Assim, mesmo que em


Genebra III fosse elaborado algum
acordo entre governo e oposio, a
ausncia dos curdos nesta resoluo
poderia colocar prova suas reais

chances de efetividade, uma vez que o


PYD goza de grande apoio popular e tem
conquistado mais posies no norte da
Sria.

Imagem 1 - reas controladas pelos grupos na Sria (Janeiro 2016)

Fonte: Robbins 2016

Consideraes Finais

interesses especficos - e praticamente


opostos - na maneira como se concluir a
guerra sria, e, portanto, financiam e
apoiam grupos distintos dentro da Sria,
garantindo que o equilbrio de poder na
regio se configure de maneira favorvel
aos seus interesses. A Unio Europeia, os
Estados Unidos e a Rssia tambm
atuam,
direta
ou
indiretamente,
relacionando-se com o governo ou com
grupos de oposio, e realizando
intervenes militares diretas, tanto para
combater o Estado Islmico quanto, no
caso da Rssia, para apoiar o regime de

A
anlise
das
ltimas
conversaes de paz sobre a Sria atesta
a importncia e o alcance do conflito
srio. Esse conflito tem envolvido, de
alguma maneira, todos os pases
vizinhos: exemplos so o Iraque, em
virtude da atuao do Estado Islmico; a
Jordnia e o Lbano, em razo do fluxo de
refugiados; a Turquia, em razo dos
refugiados e tambm da questo curda.
O Ir e a Arbia Saudita, por sua vez, tm

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

45

Assad. Reconhecendo-se essa diversa


gama de interesses, a existncia das
conversaes pode ser interpretada
como um momento em que, finalmente,
houve consenso sobre pelo menos um
ponto com relao Sria: todas as
partes envolvidas deveriam participar
das discusses em virtude das muitas
ambies em jogo.

parte do governo e dos grupos rebeldes


em torno das reas em disputa
atualmente. Mesmo que as negociaes
continuem sem o HNC no modelo da
mais recente reunio de Genebra,
ocorrida em 17 de maio de 2016, que
no contou com a participao da
oposio sria e nem do governo srio -,
muito difcil que o grupo venha a acatar
as decises tomadas unilateralmente
pelo ISSG, e que, portanto, se retardem
as tentativas de transio poltica.

Apesar desse ponto positivo,


possvel afirmar que a ausncia dos
curdos srios nas negociaes poderia se
mostrar muito problemtica para que se
alcanasse uma paz verdadeiramente
duradoura no pas, em virtude do apoio
local e estrangeiro que detm. Ignorar
esse fator permitiria que os braos
armados rebeldes continuassem agindo,
j que no estariam includos em acordos
de cessar-fogo e, consequentemente, de
transio poltica. A poltica adotada por
Washington, baseada em apoio indireto e
evitando um maior envolvimento em
terra, tem demonstrado incoerncia uma
vez que fornece apoio direto aos curdos
ao mesmo tempo em que concorda com
sua ausncia nas negociaes dada,
em grande medida, por oposio da
Turquia.

Algumas
lies,
entretanto,
podem figurar como heranas positivas
das conversaes de Genebra III,
especialmente no mbito regional e
internacional, e a observao dos
prximos eventos na regio poder
confirmar ou refutar isso. Primeiramente,
a liderana por parte dos Estados Unidos
e da Rssia de maneira conjunta e
equilibrada, que foi algo realmente novo
no perodo ps-Guerra Fria, at ento
marcado pela predominncia dos EUA.
Tal situao vem se alterando desde a
crise na Ucrnia, apontando para a
possibilidade de uma nova tendncia
diplomtica de maior dilogo entre as
grandes
potncias,
sem
a
preponderncia de um nico pas, e
utilizando a ONU como palco para tais
negociaes.

A sada do Alto Comit de


Negociaes das conversaes de
Genebra pode fazer com que esse
histrico esforo multilateral em busca
da resoluo do conflito srio seja
interrompido por tempo indeterminado.
Se isso de fato acontecer, as
consequncias sero muito negativas
para a regio e, especialmente, para a
populao sria, uma vez que o fim oficial
do cessar-fogo provavelmente significar
uma escalada no uso da violncia por

Em segundo lugar, e, por fim,


importante destacar tambm o papel
desempenhado
pelo
Ir
nas
conversaes a partir das reunies de
Viena. A incluso deste pas nas
negociaes pode ser interpretada como
um sucesso diplomtico e estratgico
no somente russo e iraniano, mas
tambm estadunidense, ao conseguir um

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

46

maior envolvimento do Ir no combate as


foras do Estado Islmico. Tal rearranjo se
distingue das conversaes anteriores a
Viena, as quais foram tratadas ativamente
entre os principais aliados estadunidenses
na regio, Turquia e a Arbia Saudita,
percebidos como os tradicionais rivais do
regime iraniano no Oriente Mdio. A
presena iraniana em apoio ao governo de
Assad representou o reconhecimento, por
parte dos demais participantes, de que
uma soluo pacfica para a Sria s
poderia ter lugar com um papel mais ativo
sendo desempenhado pelo Ir, que
poderia, assim, trazer o governo de Assad
mesa de negociao. O Ir, por sua vez,
logrou, ao menos por enquanto, a
manuteno de sua influncia sobre a
Sria, impossibilitando uma deciso
unilateral por parte do bloco liderado pelos
EUA. Todos esses elementos, somados ao
fim das sanes econmicas ao Ir,
podem estar abrindo as portas para uma
nova distribuio na balana de poder do
Oriente Mdio, com uma maior
responsabilidade delegada ao Ir na
manuteno da estabilidade na regio,
alm de novas relaes entre as potncias
regionais, e destas com as grandes
potncias extrarregionais, Estados Unidos
e Rssia.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

47

References
Aljazeera. 2016. "Syria: Fate Of Assad Impedes Success Of Geneva III". Aljazeera Centre For Studies.
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2016/04/syria-fate-assad-impedes-success-geneva-iii160428104128240.html.
Amnesty International. 2015. "Syria's Refugee Crisis In Numbers". Amnesty
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/.

International.

Arvinth, Karthick. 2016. "Syria Conflict: Geneva Peace Talks 'Going Slowly'".International Business Times UK.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-conflict-geneva-peace-talks-going-slowly-1550665.
BBC. 2016. "Syria Conflict: Key Opposition Group
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35435065.

To

Join

Geneva

Talks".

BBC

News.

Cafarella, Jennifer and Genevieve Casagrande. 2016. Syrian Armed Opposition Powerbrokers. Middle East
Security Report. Washington: Institute for the Study of War.
Chatham House. 2016. "RussiaS Withdrawal From Syria: Five Things You Should Know".Chatham House.
https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/russias-withdrawal-from-syria-five-things-you-should-know.
Davison, John and Laila Bassam. 2016. "Assad Holds Parliamentary Election As Syrian Peace Talks Resume".
Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0XA2C5.
Dearden, Lizzie. 2016. "Assad Still Wants To Take The Whole Of Syria Back By Force". The Independent.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bashar-al-assad-vows-to-retake-whole-of-syria-byforce-despite-ceasefire-attempts-a6870141.html.
DeYoung, Karen and Carol Morello. 2016. "TurkeyS Difficulties With Syrian Kurds Complicate Strategy
Against Islamic State". Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syriankurds-are-snag-in-us-turkey-strategy-against-isis/2016/01/23/20eba1bc-c1e2-11e5-94437074c3645405_story.html.
European Union. 2016. "Joint Statement: Final Declaration On The Results Of The Syria Talks In Vienna As
Agreed By Participants". European External Action Service. http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/2015/151030_06.htm.
Groarke, Emer. 2016. "Mission Impossible: exploring the viability of power-sharing as a conflict-resolution
tool in Syria". International Journal Of Conflict Management 27 (1): 2-24. doi:10.1108/ijcma-12-2014-0090.
Hudson, John. 2016. "Syrian Opposition Suspends Peace Talks Amid Anti-Assad Offensive".Foreign Policy.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/18/syrian-opposition-suspends-peace-talks-amid-anti-assadoffensive/?utm_content=buffera93dd&wp_login_redirect=0.
Irish, John and Warren Strobel. 2016. "Russia Keeps Bombing Despite Syria Truce; Assad Vows To Fight On".
Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-agreement-idUSKCN0VK2NX.
Jung, Elaine. 2015. "Syria Conflict: Vienna Talks To Be Held". BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-34674003.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

48

Lund, Aron. 2016. "The Road To Geneva: The Who, When, And How Of SyriaS Peace Talks".Carnegie
Endowment For International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62631.
Lynch, Colum and John Hudson. 2015. "The Pivot To Tehran". Foreign Policy.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/29/iran-obama-kerry-vienna-talks-syria-russia-the-pivot-to-tehran/.
Martin, Nik. 2016. "Syrian Opposition Suspends Participation In Geneva Peace Talks". Deutsche Welle.
http://www.dw.com/en/syrian-opposition-suspends-participation-in-geneva-peace-talks/a-19197274.
Matthiesen, Toby. 2015. "Sectarianism After The Saudi Mosque Bombings".Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/29/sectarianism-after-the-saudimosque-bombings/?postshare=4301451733249434&tid=ss_tw.
Mohammed, Arshad and Francois Murphy. 2015. "Kerry Sees New Syria Talks Next Week, Does Not Rule
Out
Iran
Role".
Reuters.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-talksidUSKCN0SH1LN20151023.
Moraes Roberto, Willian. 2015. "A Poltica Externa Do Ir E O Impacto Do Conflito Na Sria: Alteraes
Geopolticas Regionais E A Estratgia Iraniana". Graduado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
Nasr, Vali. 2016. "The War For Islam". Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/the-war-forislam-sunni-shiite-iraq-syria/.
Norman, Laurence. 2015. "World Powers Push Timetable For Syria
http://www.wsj.com/articles/diplomats-gather-in-vienna-for-syria-talks-1447490764.

Solution".

WSJ.

Perry, Tom and Arshad Mohammed. 2016. "U.S. Envoy Visits Kurdish-Held Northern Syria".Reuters.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-visit-idUSKCN0VA2TR.
Pike,
John.
2016.
"High
Negotiations
Committee
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hnc.htm.

(HNC)".

Global

Security.

Reuters. 2016. "Turkish PM Confirms Shelling Of Kurdish Forces In Syria". The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/13/turkey-shells-kurdish-forces-in-syria-in-retaliation-forattack-on-border-posts.
Robbins, James. 2016. "Syria Conflict: What Hope
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35428456.

For

Geneva

Peace

Talks?".

BBC.

Rodgers, Lucy, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare. 2016. "Syria: The Story Of The Conflict". BBC.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
Salih, Mohammed. 2016. "What Russia's Withdrawal Means For Syria Conflict". Al-Monitor. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/putin-russia-withdrawal-syria-assad-turkey.html#.
Stratfor. 2016. Peace Talks Unravel As Opposition Body Walks Out. Sitrep Syria. Stratfor.
Tastekin, Fehim. 2016. "Are Turkey, Saudi Arabia Working Together Against Iran?". Al-Monitor. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/ja/originals/2015/03/turkey-saudi-plan-anti-iran-sunni-bloc.html#.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

49

The Economist. 2015. "After Paris, Syria's Peace Process Limps On". The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21678712-part-puzzle-after-paris-syrias-peaceprocess-limps.
The Huffington Post. 2016. "Backed By Russian Jets, Syrian Army Closes In On Aleppo". The Huffington Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/backed-by-russian-jets-syrian-army-closes-in-onaleppo_us_56b37778e4b08069c7a63e09.
United
Nations.
2012.
Action
Group
For
Syria
Final
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.

Communiqu.

United Nations. 2015. "14 November 2015, Statement Of The International Syria Support Group Vienna.
United
Nations
Department
Of
Political
Affairs.
http://www.un.org/undpa/en/Speechesstatements/14112015/syria.
United States Department of State. 2016. Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation,
as Co-Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilites in Syria. U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm.
United States Department of State. 2016. Statement of
Group.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252428.htm.

the

International

Syria

Support

Waterfield, Bruno, Peter Dominiczak, and David Blair. 2014. "G8 Suspends Russia For Annexation Of
Crimea". The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-Crimea.html.
Wilkin, Sam and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin. 2015. "Iran Accepts Invitation To Syria Peace Talks In Vienna". The
Huffington
Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-syria-peace-talksvienna_us_5630c528e4b0631799102342.
Wintour, Patrick. 2016. "Syria Peace Talks: UN Envoy To Issue Statement Of Principles". The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/24/syria-peace-staffan-de-mistura-talks-un-envoystatement-principles.
Zraick, Karen. 2016. "Syria Talks Are Complicated By Competing Opposition Groups". New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/world/middleeast/syria-talks-geneva-opposition.html?_r=2.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

50

THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MYANMAR: INTERNAL DISPUTES AND


FOREIGN INTERESTS
Erik Herejk Ribeiro21 and Maria Gabriela Vieira22

The 2015 elections in Myanmar brought civilian elites to the central


government after five decades of regimes controlled by military elites.

The gradual democratic opening sought to normalize foreign relations,


to accelerate economic modernization and to preserve the interests of
military elites.

The rise of civilian elites may result in instability and setbacks in the
opening process due to disputes between elites and the foreign interests of
China and US.
Presentation
In November 2015, elections in
Myanmar (former Burma) drew global
attention under headlines of renovation
of hope and democracy in the country. In
the previous election, in 2010, the Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP),
which represents the military elites, won
large majority in Parliament (Pyithu
Hluttaw). In contrast, the 2015 elections
gave victory to the National League for
Democracy (NLD),which won 60% of
parliamentary participation. So far, we
observe respect for the results of the
polls by the old elites. On the other hand,
historical
tensions
between
the

traditional military elite, the new civilian


elites and the local insurgent groups
remain. Although national reconciliation
prospects are positive, the path to
democratization is complex and involves
different interest groups in the country
and abroad.

PhD candidate and Master in International Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do
Sul (UFRGS). Contact: erik_ribeiro@yahoo.com.br
21

22

Undergraduate student in International Relations at UFRGS. Contact: maria.g.vieira95@gmail.com

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

51

Brief history

nation's largest exponent, despite his


early death in 1947. Suu Kyi, who visited
the country during the 1988 protests,
lived in England and decided to get
involved in national politics after the
encouragement of the protesters, who
saw her father's legacy in her image
(Charney, 2009).

Myanmar is located in a true


crossroads of Asia, surrounded by the
Indian subcontinent, China and the
Southeast Asia. A country of rich history
and culture, it was colonized by the British
Empire in the nineteenth century, gaining
its independence in 1948. In the next
decades, Burma suffered from external
threats23, separatist pressures and
divisions among the ruling elites. After the
first decade of democratic rule, the
country had a transitional military
government (1958-1960) and the
instability culminated in a coup organized
by the military elite in 1962. The new
regime sought a synthesis of national
traditions and reformist socialism,
rejecting any revolutionary way (Taylor,
2009).

The road to democratization


The international situation in
1990 was undergoing intense systemic
changes resulting from the normalization
of US-USSR relations and the progressive
fall of socialism in Eastern Europe. The
"Third Wave" of democratizations had
also been striking much of the Third
World and dismantled their old local
political arrangements (Huntington,
1991). Gene Sharp (1993), professor of
Dartmouth, promptly produced a manual
of nonviolent overthrow of "dictatorial"
political systems, using Burma as a model
and inspiration. Later, this very work
influenced the Colored Revolutions in the
former Soviet space and the Arab
uprisings of 2011.

After several economic and


political difficulties, the socialist regime
collapsed in 1988. Similarly to the events
of Tiananmen Square (China), student
protests were suppressed and resulted in
intense international pressure. The
interim military government agreed to
hold elections in 1990, in which it ended
predictably defeated by the NLD.The
League grew out of student movements
and civil organizations, led by the
surprising figure of Aung San Suu Kyi. The
leader of the NLD is daughter of Aung
San, the main articulator of the
anticolonial movement and still the

The military interim government,


although pressured by internal and
external elements, gradually decided to
boycott the election results and establish
a regime of exception under its
command. In its view, Myanmar was the
target of an organized international
movement that had Suu Kyi and the NLD
as partners to force both a radical

23

We can mention the revolutionary stance of China in the 1950s and 1960s and the support of the
American CIA to the Kuomintang Army stationed in Burma since the defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Later,
the leaders of these Chinese nationalist forces began to run a lucrative heroin trafficking business in the
north.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

52

economic
liberalization
and
the
establishment of a liberal democracy.

(ASEAN), that wished to advance a


political, economic and regional cultural
community (Charney, 2009).

Successive Socialist and military


governments have always had national
autonomy and nonalignment as priorities
(Egreteau
and
Jagan,
2013).
Economically, unlike most of Third-World
experiences in the 1990s, the military in
Myanmar carried out a transition to
capitalism in which privatizations were
open only to local elites, preventing
greater integration with international
capital.

Although relatively isolated in the


international system, Myanmar went
through a process of modernization since
1988. Due to internal and external
threats to its security, the partnership
with China was important to import
modern military systems, including the
absorption of technology for production of
tanks and stealth frigates, for example.
In addition, the construction of the
new capital Naypyidaw, at the
geographical and civilizational center of
the country, sought to accelerate the
economic integration between regions
and a return to local cultural
backgrounds. The former capital Yangon
alluded to the period of British
colonization and still represents the
major
national
economic
and
demographic center. Its coastal location
facilitates a possible scenario of foreign
military intervention, supported by
eventual protests of urban social strata.

Over the 1990s and 2000s,


Myanmar suffered intense international
pressure for political and economic
opening. Suu Kyi was placed under house
arrest, being released and rearrested a
few times in the period. The country
remained closed to outside influences,
while on your neighbors, especially
Indonesia and Thailand went through
accelerated processes of economic
liberalization with unstable results, such
as the downfall of Suharto in Indonesia
and the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
Nevertheless, Southeast Asian countries
achieved high levels of economic growth,
while Myanmar suffered economic
embargo of Western countries.

In 2003, the military regime began


a controlled seven step process for a
democratic transition, called "Roadmap
to Democracy". However, Saffron
Revolution (2007) protests were a new
attempt to impose accelerated political
opening of Myanmar, based on the
experiences of the Colored Revolutions of
the former Soviet space. This time, the
harsh repression of the police had
coverage of international and alternative
media. The resulting proposals for

The new US-led unipolar order did


not support or tolerate military regimes
anymore, with rare exceptions of older
key allies. Thus, Myanmar was placed as
an obstacle to the triumph of global
liberalism, impassive
to
external
influences. Threatened diplomatically
and economically, the Burmese generals
turned to the protection of China and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

53

sanctions in the UN Security Council were


barred by a joint veto of China and Russia.

national security issues, including those


handled by the office of the Presidency,
will continue to be dominated by the
military.

As pointed out by Steinberg


(2010), the US largely based its foreign
policy on Burma in the figure of Suu Kyi in
recent decades. The episode of the
Saffron Revolution revealed the interest,
mainly from political sectors of the United
States, in co-opting local civilian elites to
the American liberal project. On the other
hand, China invested in a controlled and
limited transition, to prevent the
immediate rise of new elites and the
following collapse of the state and local
social order.

The NLD, without Suu Kyis


leadership (who had returned to house
arrest), decided not to participate initially
in the democratization process. The party
still demanded the recognition of the
results obtained in the 1990 elections.
Only in 2012 the League decided to
return to the national stage in midterm
elections.

Political transition and the


interests at stake

Thus, the political transition was


accelerated under the tacit approval of
China and with support of ASEAN. The
Obama administration, realizing that the
regime was sustained even without
Western
support,
initiated
the
rapprochement with Myanmar authorities
in 2009 (Haacke, 2012). The gradual
normalization of relations with the United
States enabled the subsequent dialogue
of military elites with Suu Kyi, who had no
unconditional support of the West to rely
on.

Initially, it is important to move


away from Manichaean analyses, usually
journalistic, concerning the interests at
stake in Myanmar's political transition. It
is not simply a repressive military elite
versus new democratic civilian elites.
Domestically, there are conservative
hardline and also pragmatic currents in
the military. Similarly, civilian elites are
divided between reformists and radical
liberals associated with foreign groups of
interest. Still, there are dozens of political
parties representing ethnic minority
groups in Myanmar, which are roughly a
third of the population. In some cases,
these parties are the political face of
heavily armed guerrilla groups.

The new Constitution of Myanmar


was drafted in 2008 and elections were
held in 2010. Due to the Armed Forces
(Tatmadaw) central role in national
politics, it was provided for articles in the
constitution that favored them. We can
mention two important features: 25%
reservation of seats in the upper and
lower houses; appointment of a vice
president and the Ministers of Interior,
Defense and Border Affairs. In short,

The new government, elected in


2010, still contained strong traces of the
former military regime, now nominally a
'Disclipined Democracy. Even though, it
was already possible to identify the
political transition from a centralized,

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

54

unitary and authoritarian power to the


diffusion of power between the military
elite and the quasi-civil elected
government (Callahan and Steinberg,
2012). The government of President
Thein Sein took important steps towards
the gradual opening of the economy and
the reconciliation of national political
groups.

on the Malacca Strait chokepoint. From a


military and strategic point of view, the
country can be an alternative route for
Chinas war effort in case of conflict in the
Western Pacific (the example of what
happened in World War II). On the other
hand, the use of its territory against China
would put in check the security of all its
interior (Ribeiro, 2015).

The last major initiative Thein Sein


was seeking a national ceasefire between
the government and all armed groups in
the country . The agreement was barred
by the Wa ethnic group, residing on the
border with China and currently
Myanmars main insurgent force. The
Was are the main drivers of drug
trafficking in the "Golden Triangle" (Laos,
Myanmar, Thailand), the worlds largest
heroin producing region.

The United States, in turn,


adopted a pragmatic approach to meet
their greater geopolitical interests,
leaving in a second plan the export of
democracy and liberalism. Immersed in
its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US
acted late in Asia, almost passively
watching the rising economic, political
and military of China. The new policy for
Myanmar is part of a new US strategic
offensive called Asia Pivot. To resume its
relations with Southeast Asian countries,
it was also necessary to have an
engagement posture, not confrontation,
with Myanmar (Haacke, 2012). Moreover,
in a context of rapid geopolitical changes,
Washington doesnt discard any country
as a potential ally, especially after the
weakening of their relations with Thailand
due to a military coup in 2014. It should
be noted that, already in 2013, the US
partially resumed their program of
military officer training to Myanmar,
suspended since 1988. In a more
conciliatory position, India and the ASEAN
countries may have a stabilizing role on
the international stage. The Indian
Northeast is a remote area from New
Delhi and has suffered for decades with
armed insurgencies, which maintain
connections and arms flows from groups
in Myanmar (Lintner, 2012). This makes

Behind its intransigence there is a


tacit support from China, which does not
want to lose an important element of
bargaining with the Myanmarese
government. While the Chinese want and
explicitly support the political openness
and national reconciliation, they fear that
a new autonomous and consolidated
government might feel safe enough to
approach the West.
Thus, the economic and political
interests of China would be at risk
because the country has critical
infrastructure investments that can turn
its neighbor into a "Chinese California"
(Thant Myint-U, 2011). In other words,
Myanmar is a geo-economic output of
China to the Indian Ocean and a
complementary route to Chinas energy
security, which now essentially depends

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

55

India the main interested in achieving


national reconciliation in the neighboring
country. ASEAN is a regional integration
project that values noninterference in
internal affairs and informal mechanisms
of diplomacy, known as ASEAN Way
(Beukel, 2008). For the continuity of
Southeast Asias integration process, it is
essential that all countries reach
compatible levels of growth and
economic development, though naturally
in distinct stages. Japan also closely
observes events in Myanmar and has
also provided economic aid and
investments in the manufacturing sector.

railway and pipeline projects along the


Kyaukpyu-Kunming track. On the other
hand, the major productive investments
in the country occur only in extractive
business (mining, vegetal extraction, gas
and oil) (Steinberg and Fan, 2012). The
normalization of foreign relations can
fulfill the intended national strategy of
bargaining for economic modernization
and the attraction of investments that
generate added value and income.
Analyzing the civilian elites is a
more complex task. While Suu Kyi has
great control over the activities of NLD,
theres a number of interest groups
supporting the League whose projects
are less publicized. Even so, its expected
a moderate reformist stance from the
elected government, which took office on
March 30, 2016. Due to legal restrictions,
Aung San Suu Kyi can not be president,
because her children have British
nationality. The new president, Htin Kyaw,
was personally appointed by her and
works on a mostly decorative role. Suu Kyi
was officially in charge of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

While organizing the political


transition, the military in Myanmar sought
to rebalance its foreign relations, also
intending to legitimize its national
political and economic influence. With the
arrival of Arab uprisings in 2011, the
Myanmarese leaders feared that a new
civilian government might confiscate
their property and condemn them to
prison for crimes committed during the
military regime. In this sense, the
controlled transition served as a tool to
legalize the new role of active and retired
military leadership, who control much of
the national economy and have
constitutional veto power24.

First of all, Suu Kyi met in recent


years almost every major actor interested
in Myanmar's political transition. These
include both US and Chinese authorities,
as conservative and pragmatic military
leaders. The most meaningful episodes
were her visit to Prime Minister Xi Jinping,
in China (June 2015) and her meeting
with the former commander of the

From an economic point of view,


the old elites were aware that it was not
possible to maintain indefinitely a regime
boycotted internationally and closed to
foreign investment. China plays a key role
in terms of infrastructure, with road,
24

Any major reforms in the 2008 Constitution can be made only with the approval of 75% of the Parliament.
As the military have 25% of the seats, it would be necessary just one vote among elected parliamentarians
to stall unwanted changes.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

56

military junta, Than Shwe (December


2015).

greater openness to external influences.


In terms of economic policy and tax, there
seems to be a trend of resource
decentralization.

China sought dialogue to resume


some of its stalled infrastructure projects
in Myanmar and the region as a whole,
and also intending to establish diplomatic
bridges with possible new national
leadership. However, the election
manifesto of the NLD indicates that the
construction of large dams causes great
environmental impact, referring indirectly
to Chinese Myitsone project, which is
paralyzed. Therefore, the manifesto
continues, it is necessary to seek other
sources of energy and just keep the
existing
hydroelectric
structures.
Importantly, the Thein Sein government
had paralyzed the works in 2011
responding
to
the
appeal
of
nongovernmental organizations and
other sectors of society.

One of the issues most sensitive in


the political economy of transition in
Myanmar is the role of military
entrepreneurs, which currently dominate
the industrial and extractive sectors. So
far, the economic opening has been
gradual and negotiated. The commission
for foreign investment, based on the
2008 Constitution, has prioritized
concessions to joint ventures with large
share of domestic capital. The gradual
opening and the protection of national
companies is to avoid a shock doctrine
adopted as a solution by many countries
in the 1990s. In most cases, the result
was the exaggerated dependence on
foreign capital and the destruction of
local productive base.

The meeting with former General


Than Shwe signs, on behalf of Suu Kyi,
the respect paid to the Armed Forces and,
more than that, the acceptance of the
status quo. At first, she seems cautious to
meet demands from her political allies
that could threaten the national status of
the military. One of the most sensitive
issues, which seems to be currently out of
question, is any kind of civilian control
over the military organizations or over
national security issues.

Although they have an important


role in the national economy, the military
companies also engage in exploration
businesses outside the law, such as jade
mining in the north (Kachin state), made
jointly with Chinese companies. If there
are greater signs of the civilian
governments
interference
towards
accelerated
opening
or
greater
fiscalization, the military elites will
probably react and the risk of political and
socio-economic crises will grow.

The NLD election manifesto also


gives us clues about other possible
changes. In the international economic
level, it defends strong and close
relations with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, signaling

Another important result of the


2015 elections was the loss of influence
of groups representing ethnic minorities.
In most of these regions, the NLD also
won majority, showing their political force

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

57

also among minorities. From the point of


view of national reconciliation, the

opening, whether for reasons of internal


or external politics. However, the political
transition made room for processes that
are no longer under their control.

massive victory of the NLD in all regions


indicates legitimacy to lead the process of
ceasefire against many of the traditional
groups, which have lost representation in
the national parliament.

The Suu Kyi government will go


through various tests overtime. First, the
NLD never ruled any administrative unit
of the country and lacks experience in the
formulation and implementation of public
policy. This is actually their highest
challenge and, although the Parliament
has undergone radical changes, the
bureaucracy basically remains the same.

However, government relations


with the paramilitary groups are mainly
conducted by the Armed Forces, which
run key ministries of national security and
have an approach often antagonistic to
the NLD. Still, the issue can serve as a
bargaining chip to the military, who lost
much of parliamentary representation
and do not want to lose even more
influence in national politics.

In terms of foreign policy,


Myanmar can return to its history of
international neutrality. This basic
principle of independent Burma has been
suppressed by the need to subordinate to
Chinas interests in the last two decades.
With the positive engagement of the West
and Japan, Myanmar tends to bargain
between old and new partners,
resembling the posture of other ASEAN
countries in their relations with Asias
Great Powers (Ciorciari, 2009). Myanmar
is a country with a low level of
development that needs further reform
and foreign investment. However, a
negative scenario of political crisis and
military intervention would provoke the
return of external power politics, and
probably characterized as a fierce
competition between China, India and US
(Ribeiro, 2015).

The last relevant event for


Myanmar's political transition was the law
project proposing the creation of the post
of "State Counselor", which would be
taken over by Suu Kyi. Despite having
suffered strong military opposition in
parliament, the project now needs only
the approval of the President Htin Kyaw
to be put into practice. Through this law,
Suu Kyi would be formally in the center of
the new government administration in
Myanmar, with nearly equivalent powers
of a Prime Minister.

Final considerations
The political landscape in
Myanmar is going through a historic
transition, which is expected to produce
new winners and losers. Precisely
because of its uniqueness, it is difficult to
predict results with high degree of
certainty. On one hand, it seems clear
that military elites facilitated the political

The greatest objective is national


reconciliation, a task not met by any
national government, be it democratic,
socialist or military. The country has
always had difficulty to control its own
territory and prevent the proliferation of

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

58

armed insurgencies in remote areas. This


mission can be accomplished only with
the help and backing of the Tatmadaw
(Armed
Forces),
which
initiated
significant efforts for reconciliation in
recent years.
However, there are several
political
and
economic
interests
permeating the transition. Although
military elites have great interest in
maintaining the current process, many of
its members may react to reforms they
deem potentially harmful to national
sovereignty or to the role of current
economic elites. So far, Suu Kyi had a
pendulous posture, alternating between
reconciliation with the military and
sometimes challenging the existing
political order. It is up to the new civilian
leadership to balance antagonisms and
get closer to a national consensus,
avoiding setbacks and the consequent
return of the interference of external
powers.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

59

References
Beukel, Erik. ASEAN and ARF in East Asias Security Architecture: The role of Norms and Powers.
Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies Report, 2008.
Callahan, Mary and David Steinberg. Drivers of Political Change in Post-Junta, Constitutional Burma.
Washington: USAID, 2012.
Charney, Michael W. A History of Modern Burma. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Ciorciari, John David. The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia. International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Oxford, v. 9, n. 1, p. 157-196, Oxford University, 2009.
Egreteau, Renaud and Larry Jagan. Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: understanding the foreign relations of
the Burmese praetorian state. Singapore: IRASEC-NUS Press, 2013.
Haacke, Jrgen. Myanmar: now a site for SinoUS geopolitical competition? IDEAS reports, ed. SR015.
London, London School of Economics, 2012.
Huntington, S. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Lintner, Bertil. Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier. Harper Collins
India, 2012.
Ribeiro, Erik H. A rivalidade e a cooperao nas relaes China-ndia: o contexto asitico e o caso de
Mianmar. Dissertao. PPGEEI/UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 2015.
Sharp, Gene. From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. Boston: Albert
Einstein Institution, 1993.
Steinberg, David and Hongwei Fan. Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence.
Copenhagen: NIAS, 2012.
Steinberg, David. Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy toward Burma/Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast
Asian Affairs, v. 29, n. 3, p. 35-59, 2010.
Taylor, Robert H. The State in Myanmar. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009.
Thant Myint-U. Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2011.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

60

THE NUCLEAR ISSUE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: INTERNAL REFORMS


IN NORTH KOREA AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES25
Pedro Vinicius Pereira Brites26

The rise of Kim Jong Un to power in 2011 was the beginning of a shift
in the internal political level of North Korea.

The policy established by the new leader, the byungjin, which seeks to
link development and deterrence, has been the center of the country actions
since 2011.

The worsening of the external actions of the country from 2015, is


related to the advancement of internal economic reforms and the intention
to take advantage of the current international context to establish a new
process of negotiations with the US.
Presentation
In January 2016, the Korean
Peninsula once again became the center
of global attention because of the fourth
nuclear test carried out by North Korea.
The country, which had already tested
nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009 and
2013, claimed to have tested
successfully a hydrogen bomb (H-bomb).
Although there is no confirmation about
the claim, this event could represent an
unprecedented advance in the countrys
nuclear program, as would place North
25

Korea in the select group of countries27


able to miniaturize a warhead. In this
sense, the missile capacity of the country
would be increased significantly and
broaden therefore the deterrent power of
the communist regime.
Nevertheless, the announcement
of the test was only the beginning of a
series of events that increased tensions
in East Asia and challenged the regional
balance. In February, North Korea

Thanks to the collaboration of Pedro Henrique Prates Cattelan in this article.

Professor of International Relations at the University Center Ritter dos Reis. PhD and Master in
International Strategic Studies / UFRGS Email:. Pvbrittes@gmail.com.
26

Only US, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan have H-bomb. There are indications
that Israel also possesses this artifact, although not officially confirmed.
27

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

61

announced the launch of a satellite


(Kwangmyongsong-4), twice the size of
the one launched in 2012. More recently,
in April, the communist country tested
ballistic missiles from submarines. This
test shows the search to develop the
ability to launch intercontinental ballistic
missiles from different platforms. In
response to these events, the United
Nations Security Council approved a new
round of sanctions against North Korea,
also endorsed by China. In South Korea,
negotiations about installing a mobile
anti-missile shield - THAAD (Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense)28 - in partnership
with the US are advanced. It should be
noted that the installation of THAAD
threatens Chinese and Russian interests
in the region, therefore both countries are
contrary to the installation, fearing that
the THAAD will limit the missile capacity
of the two countries.

exercises as an affront to the 1953


armistice and a training for a possible
invasion of the country.
Although each of these events can
be analyzed individually, in fact, they
seem to represent symptoms of broader
processes of transformations in the
regional order. On one hand, regarding
North Korea, one should not observe this
series of force demonstrations without
analyze the domestic context and the
conditions of its international insertion.
More than that, it is important to evaluate
the importance of nuclear capability as a
deterrent in the international level.
Especially this year, since it is an election
year in the United States and the
government of Kim Jong-Un observes this
situation carefully in order to attract
attention to the North Korean issue. At
the regional level, there is an
intensification of disputes between US
and China and the resizing of the
strategic position of South Korea and
Japan in this context. Thus, the
tensioning period derive in one hand,
from the modernization process that has
been going in North Korea and its search
for normalize relations with the US; and
on the other, by the advance of
geopolitical disputes between US, China,
Japan, and in a smaller context, Russia.

Finally, in March military exercises


between US and South Korea began on
the Korean Peninsula. The exercises Foal
Eagle29 and Key Resolve30 in 2016 were
the greatest achieved so far. About
300,000 South Korean troops and
17,000 US participated in these
exercises that aim to simulate
amphibious and ground attacks on the
peninsula. North Korea perceives these
28

On July 8, 2016, US and South Korea announced the installation of the THAAD system on the Korean
peninsula. According to the announcement, the system installation meets the need to respond to the
advances of North Korean ballistic program.
The Foal Eagle exercise is mainly based on amphibious operations, which simulate landings from the sea,
especially in peninsular regions.
29

The Key Resolve exercise is based on the training of ground operations, especially those related to artillery.
In this sense, it would be directed to training of containment and of retaliation of any North Korean attack,
as this is one of the main weapons of the Korean Peoples Army.
30

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

62

The origins of the nuclear issue on


the Korean Peninsula

(Visentini 2011). This situation creates a


peculiar situation from the geopolitical
perspective.

The analysis of the current


situation on the Korean Peninsula
requires the understanding of structural
and historical factors and the situation on
the Korean peninsula since the rise of
Kim Jong-Un to power in 2011. In
structural terms, it can be identified three
key factors for the assessment of the
current situation on the peninsula: i) the
effects of the Korean War; ii) the meaning
of the juche doctrine iii) the development
of North Koreas nuclear program.
Additionally to these structural factors are
the typical factors of the current situation:
a) the modernization process in North
Korea; b) the doctrine of "strategic
patience" implemented by the Obama
administration; and c) the effects of
China's modernization process for
relations in East Asia. In light of these
factors, this article aim is to assess the
latest events that have been placing the
North Korean nuclear issue at the top of
the security agenda of the Asian
continent.

The Japanese colonization and


the subsequent division of the peninsula
after the occupation of the Soviet and US
forces represent a historical break. After
all, Korea was a unified kingdom for
centuries. The emergence of the Korean
Peoples Democratic Republic (North
Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) thus represents the overlap of the
Cold War culture over Korean culture
(Bleiker 2005).
The Korean War (1950-1953)
represented a worsened division
between the two states. In economic
terms, however, there was already a
distinction between north and south. The
Japanese occupation established an
industrial infrastructure apparatus in the
north, while the south was dominated by
agricultural activities (Malkasian 2001;
Vizentini & Pereira 2014).
With the outbreak of the conflict,
one of the bloodiest of the Cold War31, the
Koreas have become the geopolitical
epicenter of East Asia. The US invasion,
the Chinese reaction and Soviet support
left deep marks for inter-Korean relations
and largely impacts the insertion of both
countries today. The northwards US
advance against the troops of Kim IlSung,
the
Communist
leader,

The Korean Peninsula has


historically been a connecting corridor
between China and Japan. Thus, it has
since ancient times always been at the
heart of disputes between the two
empires. Currently, the peninsula is the
only region surrounded only by great
powers: China, Russia and Japan,
besides
US
significant
presence

Although there are differences, according Martins (2008) between 2.5 and 3 million people died,
of which about 50% were civilians.
31

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

63

extrapolating the UN mandate32,


eventually led to China's entry into the
war. The entry of China forced the US to
withdrawal toward Seoul. Chinas
participation in the conflagration
occurred to ward off US its border.
However, it can be seen as an antecedent
of the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance" signed by China
and North Korea in 196133.The
withdrawal of American troops was
marked by a massive campaign of
destruction (Cumings 2010). General
MacArthur, head of the UN troops,
ordered the complete destruction of any
industry, town or construction that could
assist in the reorganization of North
Korean forces. He also ordered the
systematic bombing of hydroelectric
plants, which caused serious damage to
infrastructure, floods and profoundly
affected the civilian population. It should
be noted that were used more explosives
in this withdrawal than against Japan
throughout World War II34 (Cumings
2010). Moreover, North Korea was
seriously threatened with nuclear
weapons. This whole process revealed a
sense of security vulnerability of the

North Koreans faced with this war of


extermination (Malkasian 2001; Cumings
2010; Vizentini & Pereira 2014).This is
crucial
for
understanding
the
contemporary political and security
developments in North Korea, as well as
understanding of the choice to develop
nuclear weapons.
In addition, the Korean War ended
with no outcome in 1953, as it was only
established an armistice, not a peace
treaty. The lack of a peace treaty is one of
the determining elements of the North
Korean insertion today. After all, it
searches, through the lifting of
embargoes promoted by the US, the
normalization of the countrys relations
with the international community.
Therefore, it is necessary that the
communist country is not formally at war
with the US, as still is established in the
armistice. Consequently, the search for
deterrent capability is linked to the goal
of establishing direct negotiations with
the US.
In the postwar period, North Korea
adopted the juche doctrine35. This
doctrine are a central element for
countrys social cohesion and is based on

32

According Cumings (2004), the UN mandate of US-led forces was to restore the status quo ante to the
advancement of the Northern forces. Namely, the geographic division in parallel 38.
The links between the North Korean government and the Chinese Communist Party can be traced back to
the resistance to the Japanese occupation period, where Koreans and Chinese fought side by side in the
Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.
33

Moreover, Napalm was used in large quantities, which amplified the destructive power; and there are
reports of use of chemical and biological weapons by MacArthurs troops.
34

The juche doctrine emerges in a context of increasing rivalry between USSR and China in early 1960s. In
this context, North Korea claimed its independence from the allies and approached the Third World
movement. According Vizentini & Pereira (2014), to ensure its autonomy within the socialist bloc, Kim Il-Sung
tries to keep the country isolated.
35

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

64

the perspective of "self-confidence" and


"self-sufficiency" (Cumings 2004; Scobell
2005). It establishes that the Korean
people is the master of its own destiny.
Roughly, it lays the foundation for North
Korean nationalism and the prospect of
nonsubmission to foreign interests. In
practical terms, it relates to economic
self-sufficiency and the ability to ensure
its national security autonomously.

Cooperation Between the South and the


North" and in 1992 launched the "Joint
Declaration on Denuclearization of the
Peninsula" (Cha 2012).
In this context, the issue of North
Korean nuclear program appeared to
move toward a peaceful resolution. It
should be noted that this was in the
context of the disintegration of bipolar
order. Thus, the nuclear proliferation
control has become a priority on the
international agenda. The US then
started to pressure regional powers and
countries of the Communist bloc for these
abdicate its strategic weapons.

In this context, in late 1950s,


North Korea starts its nuclear program. In
immediate terms, it was a response to
the installation of nuclear weapons in
South Korea. However, the nuclear
establishment served the strategicsecurity objectives and the energy
demand, as well enabled the use of large
high-quality uranium mines that the
country possess. Only in 1965 the first
reactor was installed in the city of
Yongbyon with Soviet Union cooperation.
It was in this decade that also the
countrys missile program (Scud missiles,
of short-range) have started, also in
partnership with the Soviets.

These efforts led to the signing of


the Geneva Agreement in 1994. The
1994 agreement represented the
resolution of the nuclear issue, however,
the death of Kim Il-Sung in July of the
same year and the delay in the delivery of
fuel
promised
by
the
Clinton
administration led to the decline of
negotiations. The rise of Kim Jong-Il to
power represented a change in North
Koreas policy. Given this uncertainty and
crisis experienced by the country in the
1990s (Arduous March36), Kim Jong-Il
implemented the Songun. Unlike the
government of his father, whose
government was seated in institutional
terms in the leading role of the Korean
Workers' Party (KWP), Jong-Il creates the
policy of "military first". Thus, he deepens
the perspective of a Garrison State, or a
militarized state. In the 2000s, with the

The 1980s and the decline of the


USSR brought significant damage to
North Korea. The loss of its main partner
represented the cut in the supply of grain
and subsidized fuel. Given this difficult
context, North Korea sought to approach
South Korea and normalize relations with
the US. As result, in 1991, the two Koreas
signed the "Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonagression and Exchanges And
36

In mid-1990s, North Korea faced severe food crises resulting from deep climatological disturbances.
Among these disorders can be cited a number of serious floods and one of the longest droughts in history.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

65

creation of the Six-Party Talks37 in 2003,


the nuclear issue started to be discussed
at the regional level. It should be noted
that the establishment of the Bush
Doctrine, under which North Korea was
part of the so-called "axis of evil", brought
a lot of instability for the peninsula and
expanded the perception of threat by the
North Koreans. There were divergences
in the position of actors within the SixParty Talks. North Korea offered the
proposal of reward for freeze (rewards by
freezing the program), while the US
insisted that it only would negotiate
effectively
after
the
nuclear
dismantlement. In this context, China,
Russia and South Korea supported the
proposal of reward for freeze, while
Japan, at that time led by Junichiro
Koizumi, gave support to the US proposal
(Cordesman & Hess 2013).

adopts new sanctions. In response, North


Korea held its first nuclear test38.

Given the lack of progress in


negotiations, North Korea adopted a
more offensive attitude. Since 2005, the
country is using its nuclear program
effectively as a deterrent and announced
the development of nuclear weapons. It is
in this context that in the same year
negotiations advanced and was released
the "Joint Declaration of the Six Parties",
which concerned the end of threats
between the two Koreas and the US. But
in 2006, after missiles tests of North
Korea, the United States and the UN

The rise of Kim Jong-Un to power


brought a series of questions about the
resilience of the system facing a political
transition process. In general terms,
since the end of the Cold War the Western
perspective has focused in the belief of
imminent collapse. However, the new
leader took over the country reaffirming
the discourse of autonomy and sought to
demonstrate its force. In this context, the
country launched a new round of threats
and provocations that culminated in the
third nuclear test in February 2013.

37

It is noteworthy that the


development of nuclear weapons has a
dual function for North Korea. On one
hand, it could provide capacity for
deterrence against external enemies;
although this capacity is still open for
discussion due to South Korea and
Japans missile defense ability. On the
other hand, it represents the modern face
of the country and thus improves the
internal legitimacy of the regime (Ahn
2011). In part, it can be said that it is as
an element that contributes to the
resilience of the country facing the
difficulties faced in recent decades.

The rise of Kim Jong-Un and the


process of modernization

These rounds of talks included the two Koreas, US, China, Japan and Russia.

The second nuclear test was carried out in 2009 and represented the closure of the multilateral
negotiations of the Six-Party Talks.
38

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

66
14

Although it maintained the


aggressive speech at the regional level, at
the domestic level the rise of the new
leader represented an inflection. Firstly,
he relativized the Songun, giving more
space for KWP. In this sense, he tried to
approach his grandfathers leadership
profile, Kim Il-Sung. Moreover, projects
for economic modernization began to be
prioritized. At first, he used the military in
public works (highways, power plants).
Moreover, he sought to establish a series
of measures aimed at expanding the
countrys productive, trade and finance
capacity. The main symptom of this
process is the adoption of the Line

money laundering and the financing of


terrorist practices. It should be noted that
North Korea has became observer
member of the Asia/Pacific Group on
Money Laundering (APG)39 in 2014 which
represented
a
diplomatic
achievement for the country. Finally, it is
noteworthy the achievement of the
Conference of Workers at Financial
Institutions in December 2015. This
conference, which had not occurred since
1990, aimed to discuss the creation of
mechanisms to support the increase in
money circulation in the country derived
from strengthening of unofficial markets
(Jangmadang).

Byungjin (), whose principle is the

All this panorama reflects a


broader modernization project. But it is
not a project unlinked to nuclear
development. For this reason, it is not
paradoxical to maintain the development
of the nuclear program and seek to
modernize the economy: they are
complementary projects. After all, in the
external sphere, there are still limitations
that affect the international insertion of
the country.

simultaneous pursuit of economic


development and nuclear defense
(Vizentini & Pereira 2014; Panda 2015).
In economic terms, in 2012, JongUn adopted the so-called "June
measures" that predicted a kind of
agriculture "reprivatization". Since 2013,
the land remained under state
jurisdiction, but the agricultural product
began to be divided between the state
and the families who worked the land
(ratio 70:30 respectively. After 2014, this
ratio stood at 40:60, respectively)
(Lankov 2014). This change has
contributed to increase the agricultural
production. In industrial terms, measures
have been taken to give more autonomy
to managers in the hiring and investment
processes. Financially, in 2015, the
country set up a committee to combat

Regarding the relations with the


US, Kim Jong-Un has not yet had the
possibility
of direct
negotiations.
Assuming that the new leader seeks to
normalize relations with the international
community, better relations with US is
essential to achieve this objective. Among
its broader interests, Jong-Un aims to
participate in the APEC (Asia-Pacific

39

The Committee has 41 members, including the United States, China, India, Japan, South Korea and
Germany. It is a committee linked to the OECD.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

67
14

Economic
Cooperation),
in
the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB); and approach the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) led by China. A normalization
of relations with the US is crucial to
be included in these projects.

with Iran and Cuba also served as a


model for the North Koreans. The goal
would be to get leverage in negotiations
with the US, similar to what the two states
obtained.
The year 2016 is the last of
President Obama's term. Given that
candidates who today lead the advance
to run for the US presidency - Hillary
Clinton for the Democratic Party and
Donald Trump for the Republican Party adopt a more aggressive speech on
foreign policy in relation to Obama, this is
an opportunity to establish an
understanding with the US. Thus, it is
expected that North Korea hold the
sequence of military tests as a way to
draw attention to the need for a
negotiation process in the region and to
maintain the nuclear issue on the
peninsula at the top of the security
agenda of the great powers.

However,
the
Obama
administration has adopted a policy
called the Strategic Patience, also based
on the perception that the North Korean
regime tends to collapse sooner or later
(Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart & Nikitin 2016).
In this sense, it believes in the use of nonmilitary measures to promote regime
change. That is, in this case, there would
be no reason to establish negotiations.
Thus, US strategic definitions for the
peninsula remain focused on damage
control in case that the regime collapses.
And from a political point of view, the
Obama administration states that only
accept negotiations if North Korea
provides more evident statements that it
intends to abandon its nuclear program.

For China, the instability in the


peninsula set up an obstacle to the
geopolitical goals of the country. After all,
the North Korean issue serves as an
excuse for US to maintain its presence in
East Asia. The situation was exacerbated
by the recent proposal of a THAAD
installation in South Korea -for the
Chinese government this project would
limit its defensive capabilities. Recently,
Chinas Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang
Yi, reiterated the countrys concern with
the situation on the peninsula. This
concern is based on three principles: first,
nuclear weapons should be banned from
the Korean Peninsula under any
circumstances; second, military action to
resolve the issue is not an option; and

However, the recent experiences


in Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and Syria
(2011), where regimes considered
pariahs were deposed or threatened to
be deposed, ended up strengthening the
North Korean understanding that a
renounce to its nuclear program would
make the country vulnerable. Thus, it is
not expected a fallback of the North
Korean government regarding the
advancement of the nuclear and ballistic
program.
It should be noted that recent
agreements by the Obama administration

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

68

finally, the national security of China


should not be undermined. It can not be
ignored that the US balancing policy has
increased geopolitical disputes in the
Asia-Pacific region; and the Korean
peninsula is not oblivious to this process.
North Korea, meanwhile, has
shown that their interests are not
subordinated to the interests of its main
ally. In turn, the government of Xi Jinping
has taken a tougher stance on North
Korea, which was evident in the recent
approval of the sanctions voted in the
Security Council. However, China would
have much to lose in the current situation
with a collapse of the North Korean
regime and eventual transformation of
the peninsula in a sphere of influence of
US. It would be a serious threat to the
countrys security. Therefore, it is a
complex balance to the Chinese
government. Therefore, investing in the
modernization of North Korea is the most
promising policy for Chinese interests.
Especially in a context where China has
sought to expand its economic ties with
South Korea and stabilizing its relations
with Japan. Japan, which under Abe
administration, has been seeking to
adopt a more nationalistic stance, aiming
to resize the countrys geopolitical role in
Asia.

1990. However, on the other hand,


especially in the government of President
Park Geun-Hye, South Korea has
deepened its economic and political
rapprochement with China. In this sense,
it has no interest in undermining the
progress in relations with the neighbor.
Mainly
because
the
economic
partnership with China has great
significance for the countrys economy. It
should be noted that South Korea is
experiencing a period of economic
slowdown, rising unemployment and
falling exports.
Given this situation, the tensions
on the Korean peninsula seem to indicate
deeper changes in Asian regional order.
While relations on the peninsula are
characterized by a pattern of tensionrapprochement between the Koreas,
there is a deeper context that therefore
justifies the current tensions.

Final Considerations
The analysis of the situation on
the Korean peninsula does not seem to
indicate that will occur a large inflection
in the short term. However, given that
there is an ongoing modernization
process in North Korea and that the
country is seeking to establish channels
of dialogue with mainly the US, it is
expected that the demonstrations of
force by the communist regime will
remain.

South Korea, in this context, faces


a dilemma. On one hand, it can not move
away from the alliance with the US and
discussions about the THAAD. The
maintenance and expansion of this
partnership reinforces the sense of
military dependence on the US, despite
the process of modernization of the
armed forces established since the late

In this sense, it is possible that


there is convergence between Chinese
and North Korean interests. After all, the
opening of dialogue - the resumption of

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

69

the Six Party Talks, for example - would be


of great interest to both countries due to
their
current
interests. However,
escalating tensions on the peninsula is
far from being a disposable hypothesis.
After all, it is unclear whether the Obama
years - North Korea has given important
indications about the process of
modernization and the search for
normalization of its international
relations. In this sense, it assured the
Byongjin, defended the approximation
with the South and, perhaps most
important ensured "the first use policy";
that is, the country declared its
commitment to not use nuclear weapons
in a preventive manner. However,
despite these indications, this is a
process whose consequences are still
unpredictable. Thus, the evolution of
domestic political recomposition and the
advancement
of
economic
modernization in North Korea are greatly
relevant indicators to trace a more
accurate picture of the region.

administration still has strength - and


even interest - to start a new approach in
the region
It is noteworthy that during the 7th
Congress of the KWP - the first in thirty six

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

70

References
Ahn, Mun Suk. 2011. "What Is The Root Cause Of The North Korean Nuclear Program?". Asian Affairs: An
American Review 38 (4): 175-187. doi:10.1080/00927678.2011.604287.
Bleiker, Roland. 2005. Divided Korea. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Cha, Victor D. 2012. The Impossible State. New York: Ecco.
Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. 2016. North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear
Diplomacy, And Internal Situation. Washington: Congressional Research Service.
Cordesman, Anthony H and Ashley Hess. 2013. The Evolving Military Balance In The Korean Peninsula And
Northeast Asia. Washington: Center for Strategic and International studies.
Cumings, Bruce. 2010. The Korean War. New York: Modern Library.
Cumings, Bruce. 2004. North Korea: Another Country. New York: The New Press.
Cumings, Bruce. 2015. "The North Korea That Can Say No". Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists.
http://thebulletin.org/north-korea-can-say-no9048.
Curtis, Gerald. 2014. Abes Game Plan On North Korea. Washington: Center for Strategic & International
Studies.
Lankov,
Andrei.
2014.
"Reforming
North
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/reforming-north-korea20141117121917871925.html.

Korea". Al

Jazeera.

Lee,
Youkyung.
2016.
"South
Korea's
Central
Bank
Cuts
Growth
Forecast". AP.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/88132d26e5c5479ba02ca3244bcb1cdf/south-koreas-central-bank-cutsgrowth-forecast.
Malkasian, Carter. 2001. The Korean War, 1950-1953. Oxford: Osprey Pub.
Martins, Jos Miguel Q. 2008. "Digitalizao E Guerra Local: Como Fatores De Equilbrio No Sistema
Internacional". Doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
Panda, Ankit. 2015. "Is North Korea's 'Byungjin Line' On The US-China Strategic Agenda?". The Diplomat.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/is-north-koreas-byungjin-line-on-the-us-china-strategic-agenda/.
Scobell, Andrew. 2005. North Korea's Strategic Intentions. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College.
Visentini, Paulo G. Fagundes. 2011. As Relacoes Diplomaticas Da Asia. Belo Horizonte: Fino Trao Editora.
Vizentini, Paulo Fagundes and Analcia Danilevicz Pereira. 2014. "A Discreta Transio Da Coreia Do Norte:
Diplomacia De Risco E Modernizao Sem Reforma". Revista Brasileira De Poltica Internacional 57 (2): 176195. doi:10.1590/0034-7329201400310.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

71
20

GLOBAL REINTEGRATION OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY AFTER THE


NUCLEAR DEAL
Joo Paulo Alves40
Marina Felisbert41

The Lausanne Agreement of 2015 suspended most of the international


sanctions imposed on Iran's economy due to its nuclear program.

The negotiations that led to the agreement resulted from a situation of


social and economic difficulties in Iran, added to the disengagement of the
United States from the Middle East.

The international relations of Iran are conditioned by the structure of


the international system, in which it operates as an anti-imperialist and prorevolutionary state.

Presentation

On 14 July 2015, after a series of


negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland,
the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan on
the Iranian nuclear program was agreed.
Signed between the P5+1 (US, Russia,
China, England, France and Germany)
and Iran, the agreement provides for the
end of unilateral and multilateral
sanctions established on the Iranian
economy over the 2000s, as a form of
retaliation for its nuclear project. The end
of this blockade opens space for the
global rehabilitation of the Irans
economy, allowing its return to the oil
40
41

market, receipt of foreign capital and


participation in international financial
markets.

Undergraduate student in International Relations at UFRGS. Contact: joaop.ma22@gmail.com.


Undergraduate student in International Relations at UFRGS. Contact: marinafelisberti@gmail.com

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

72
20

Geopolitics and History of Iran

This geopolitical strength and this


energetic and consequently economic
potential are, nonetheless, constrained
by Irans historical image, first as an
example of revolutionary Islamic State,
and later as a state seeking nuclear
technologies. In this sense, the
Revolution of 1979 was responsible for
toppling the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi,
a traditional ally of the West, but one
incapable of managing the countrys
economy, which gradually deteriorated
and deepened social inequalities.
Replacing him, the Shiite cleric Ruhollah
Khomeini ascended to the position of
Ayatollah and Supreme Leader, under the
promise of reforming the economy and
retaking the traditional values of Islam
(Lampreia 2014).

With the task of comprehending


the political and economic conjuncture of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is
necessary to briefly present the
fundamental aspects that ensure this
state its stature in international relations:
its natural and geopolitical attributes and
its historical struggle against the
submission to North American foreign
policy. With a population of nearly 80
million, Iran is located in the heart of the
Middle East, with access to the Caspian
Sea, on the North, and a shore with the
Persian Gulf, on the South, being a giant
on an extremely strategic position for the
Eurasian continent.
Beyond the demographic and
geographic attributes, however, Iran has
as its biggest geopolitical weapon its
energetic potential, translated by the
immense oil and gas reserves. According
to Lampreia (2014), Iran possesses the
worlds 4th biggest proven reserve of oil
approximately 154 billion barrels,
equivalent to 10% of global total. These
reserves are divided in onshore fields,
greatly explored nowadays, and offshore
fields in the Caspian Sea, where an
amount of 100 million barrels are
esteemed to be explored in the long term
(Lampreia 2014). Moreover, Iran has the
2nd biggest reserve and the 3rd biggest
production of natural gas on the planet,
with an average of 170 million m
extracted annually, losing only for the
United States and the Russian Federation
(CIA 2016).

The Iranian Revolution brought, in


short, two new guidelines for the
countrys foreign relations, (a) an antiimperialist orientation, characterized by
the disruption on the relations with the
United States, and (b) a pro-revolutionary
posture, with implications over the
regional scenario. Regarding the United
States, we highlight the revocation of
agreements made before 1979, ceasing
the Iranian support for North American
strategic agenda in the region, objectified
through the Twin Pillars Doctrine of the
Nixon Administration.
This Doctrine
sought, athwart regional alliances in the
Gulf region, to counterbalance Soviet
power projections in the Middle East and
contain potential uprisings that could
undermine the national interest, without
having to admit direct responsibilities
(Lima 2016).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

73
20

As for the regional scope, the


Islamic republic started to openly support
the Palestinian nation, the rebel
movements against the governments of
Afghanistan and Iraq and the opposition
forces in Saudi Arabia a country
traditionally aligned with western
interests in the region. Despite being
majorly rhetoric, this posture gradually
degraded the Iranian image towards
neighbor countries and the international
system as a whole, which started to
consider this new stance as uncompliant.
This suspicion was added to the
development of Iranian naval and aerial
capabilities, which could cause several
complications to the maritime oil routes
in the region (Halliday 1980).

The Iranian Nuclear Program


started in the 1960s, during the regime
of Phalavi and with great support from the
West. The United States contributed with
the donation of nuclear reactors for
research purposes to the University of
Tehran, while Germany assisted on the
construction of Bushehrs Nuclear Plant.
After the revolution, the Nuclear Program
was temporarily closed due to the
Ayatollahs opposition of the project until
his decease in 1989. The ascension of
the current Supreme Leader, Ali
Khamenei, made it possible for new rush
on this issue. During the presidency of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013),
the destiny of Irans nuclear project starts
to be questioned by Western nations,
even though it was officially oriented for
peaceful purposes (Bandeira 2013).

A second factor identified as


determinant for the consolidation of the
existing tensions between Iran and the
West, here stated as central for its direct
relation with recent economic sanctions,
is the formation of its nuclear program.
The development of such technologies
had extremely strategic motivations for
Iran. On one side, the sole nuclear
weapon development potential already
confers the country a deterrence power
towards international threats. On the
other, it serves to highlight the
hypocritical policies of the United States
towards the Middle East, mainly its
support for the Israeli state despite their
nuclear capabilities. Anyhow, nuclear
technologies compels Washington to
negotiate with Iran in a prudent and
respectful manner, taking into account its
regional strength (Leverett and Leverett
2013).

In 2002, a journalist denounced


the existence of secret Uranium
enrichment activities in the bases of
Natanz and Arak, provoking the rise of
mistrust over Irans pretentions with its
program. The International Agency for
Atomic Energy (IAAE) started to pressure
the local government to provide concrete
evidences that such activities were only
being conducted for scientific matters. In
2005, the IAAE alleged that those
evidences had still not being provided. In
the same year, the agency launched a
resolution condemning the Iranian
Nuclear Program and requesting an
action from the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), definitively opening the
way for the harshening of the debate
between Iran and the international
community (Lampreia 2014 p.59
Translated by the authors).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

74
25
20

From the Sanctions to the Nuclear


Deal

It was with these basis that


several sanctions were established over
the Iranian economy. These measures
were attempts to transfer the
international diplomatic pressure on Iran
to its population, with aims of forcing
changes
on
its
foreign
policy.
Nevertheless, only when the sanctions
and its impacts converged with a
conjunctural readjustment in the Middle
East were Iran and the United States
inclined to form the Nuclear Deal, in
2015.
1st Round
Res. 1731 UNSC
2006

2nd Round
Res. 1747 UNSC
2007

- Ban trade of goods


that could contribute
to its nuclear program.
- Freezing assets of
persons and entities
linked to the nuclear
program.
- Period of 60 days for
the nuclear program
abandonment.

- Expansion of the
freezing
list
of
assets, including the
state-owned
Bank
Sepah
and
companies run by the
Revolutionary Guard.
- Export ban on
weapons of any kind.

Between the years 2006 and


2010, through UNSC resolutions and
unilateral actions of the United States
and

the

European

Union,

several

measures were taken to isolate Iran from


the international economy, as Lampreia
(2014) shows:
3rd Round
Res. 1803 UNCS
2008

- Restriction on importation
of
all
items
and
technologies with a "dual"
use (civilian and military).
- Expansion of the list of
people and entities with
frozen assets.
- Expansion of the financial
constraints on people
linked to the nuclear
program.
Source: Lampreia, 2014, p. 67-68. Table made by the authors.

In 2011, the United States


established a series of sanctions against
companies connected to Iran's oil
industry, and in 2012 the European
Union organized an embargo on Iranian
exports of the commodity. As a result,
there was a limitation in the countrys
capacity to sell its product internationally,
since the European Union was the largest
consumer of Iranian oil. Consequently,
there was a fall in domestic production 3.7 million barrels per day in January
2011 to 2.7 million barrels per day in
January 2013 (EIA 2016). Therefore,

4th Round
Res. 1929 UNCS
2010

- Prohibition of various
categories
of
heavy
weapons to Iran (attack
helicopters, warships, and
so on).
- Expansion of the list of
people and entities with
frozen assets.
- Increased rigidity in the
inspections of the items on
the way to Iran at airports.

considering the role of oil as responsible


for about 80% of government revenues, it
is estimated that US $ 32 billion in
revenue were lost in just one year
(SFGATE 2016).
The effects of this decline in
Iranian
exports
have
significant
importance for Iran's monetary and
financial market. The trade blockades
hampered the inflow of dollars in Iran's
economy, reducing its amount of net
reserves, but it was the banking and
financial blockade of the United States
that significantly brought down the value

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

75
27
25

of the national currency. Therefore, the


dollar has come to represent a stable
investment in the face of the constant
devaluations of the national currency,
and consumers increasingly operated
through the purchase and sale of
currency in order to generate profits. As
the Iranian government tried to fix the
value of the Rial in a low artificial
exchange rate against the dollar, a black
market emerge in which these operations
were developed with even more force.
Soon, the Iranian government had to
relax its exchange rate policy and accept
the conduct of trade at 'unofficial' market
levels (Gladstone 2012; Peterson 2012)

culminated with the resumption of


negotiations between the US and Iran
channel. On one hand, the invasion of
Afghanistan and Iraq and the consequent
weakening of the United States resulted
in a change of US strategy towards the
Middle East, embodied in the Obama
Administration's
proposal
for
disengagement. Added to this, the United
States came to see Iran as a stabilizing
factor for the region, given its influence
on sensitive points in the region as the
Syria's Civil War, the stability of the Shiite
government in Iraq, and the actions of
non-state groups Hamas and Hezbollah
(Roberto 2015; Visentini and Roberto
2015).

Some of the most obvious results


of these sanctions are found in the
inflation rates of the country, felt both by
the population, which lost purchase
power, and the companies, which found a
barrier to the importation of basic inputs
to their production processes in the
currency devaluation. Therefore, the
inflation is associated to instability of
domestic prices, government budget
cuts, high rates of unemployment and
income concentration in the country. The
result is the formation of a harmful
economic cycle associated with the lack
of effective state control. However, the
results of these sanctions have been
more evidenced on economic issues of
the country than in the question of its
political institutions, putting in doubt the
effectiveness
of
the
sanctions
mechanism as potentiating deterioration
of the Iranian regime (Peterson 2012).

On the other hand, there is a


deterioration of Iran's regional position
with the start of the Civil War in Syria and
the Saudi support for the opponents of
Bashar al-Assad regime, starting a proxy
war and threatening the overthrow of an
important ally of Tehran. Also, the
economic strangulation of Iran and the
negative impact of sanctions on the
population led to the election of the
moderate Hassan Rouhani. Since 2013,
the president sought to reinvigorate the
economy through the resumption of
economic relations with the West,
starting the process of negotiations and
leading to the country's inclination to
accept the provisions of the Agreement
(Roberto 2015; Visentini and Roberto
2015).
The international action against
the Iranian economy lasted until 2015,
when the negotiations that led to the socalled Nuclear Agreement between the

In addition to economic impacts,


there was a conjunctural change that

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

76
27
25

country and the P5+1 group began. The


Agreement provides, among other things,
the reduction of Iran's ability to enrich
and storage uranium, as well as periodic
inspections
on
Iranian
nuclear
enrichment
facilities,
centrifuge
production and uranium mines made by
the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). In return, it provides the gradual
suspension of sanctions against the
Islamic Republic (Times 2016).

the domestic and regional markets, and


maintenance of few international
financial ties. Thus, the country would not
only be less vulnerable to new economic
threats from the West, with a more robust
and stable economy, but also preserve
the basic ideological aspects of the
regime (Takeyh 2016).
On the other hand, there is the
'pragmatic' position, led by President
Hassan Rouhani that preaches the socalled Constructive Engagement and
assumes a prominent position with the
signing of the Nuclear Agreement.
According to this aspect, the key feature
of the Iranian economy as exporter of oil
and other natural resources does not
allow its total isolation from global
markets. Thus, they advocate the
rehabilitation of Iran in the world
economy, increasing trade levels and
getting more international investors to
create a situation of economic
interdependence,
particularly
with
European and Asian countries, which can
shield the country against new sanctions
policies in the future and even strengthen
the regime (Takeyh 2016).

The Reopening of the Iranian


Economy
Since
the
so-called
implementation day, accepted the
commitment of Iran to the guidelines
established by the Nuclear Agreement,
the Iranian government organized the reopening of its economy. Thus, there was
the unfreezing of its assets - worth
US$100 billion - and the end of the
European embargo on its oil sales.
Considering the lifting of sanctions over
Iran and the subsequent reintegration of
Iran into the world economy, there is an
initial internal debate on the economic
model to serve as basis for this process.

Given the current prevalence of


this second line of thought, as evidenced
by the victory of their representatives in
the last parliamentary elections, it is
expected that the opening of Iran's
economy has a direct impact on its oil and
gas market. Internally, it is estimated that
the sanctions lifting will encourage an
increase in oil production to 3.1 million
p/d in 2016, and to 3.7 million p/d in
2017 - about 10% of total OPEC
production - and another boost in

On one hand, there is the


'hardline' position of the regime, led by
members of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards, beneficiaries of the closed
economy by contracts previously
established in the energy sector and the
possession of large conglomerates and
holding companies in the country. Being
the most affected by the reintegration,
they preach the so-called Economy of
Resistance, with trade growth focused in

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

77
27
25

production of approximately 200,000


barrels p/d in new camps built by Chinese
companies in the country (EIA 2016).

The reintegration of Iran in the oil


market is also a threat to its traditional
rival in the region, Saudi Arabia. The
Saudis have adopted a policy to reduce
oil prices in order to undermine the shale
gas producers in the United States. If
Iran's entry is not offset by a policy of
control of production by OPEC, prices
should fall further in the medium term.
Whereas the public revenue of Saudi
Arabia consists of 90% by oil exports, the
deficit in the Saudi economy should reach
the rate of 20% of its GDP still in 2016
and, according to IMF estimates,
maintaining these economic policies, the
countrys foreign reserves could be
depleted in the next 5 years. This would
directly
affect
the
international
investment position of the Saudis,
already in a less safe position, has seen a
decline on its levels of reliability
(Townsend 2015). Also, this could put in
check the social system of subsidies and
public expenditures that ensures the very
political stability of the Saudi kingdom.

In terms of natural gas, the


opening to new investors should
accelerate the development of offshore
exploration in the South Pars field in the
Persian Gulf, adding 200,000 barrels p/d
to the global production of this resource.
With a stable consumption of these
commodities in the domestic market,
production expansion will be absorbed by
international consumers (EIA 2016).
Externally, therefore, the increase in oil
production will decrease the price of the
commodity, hurting exporters of the
product as a whole, but serving as a
platform for the general increase in
Iranian exports in decline since the
boycotts (World Bank 2015).
Further to the return of the
Western powers to the Iranian market, an
expansion in its already established trade
relations with China is expected. With a
relationship based on export of various
manufactured
goods
and
the
construction of infrastructure works and
transportation in exchange for huge
amounts of oil - being currently the
largest Iranian buyer - China will really
benefit from the agreement. With the
lifting, the Chinese will have more
freedom and legitimacy to expand their
business across the region, such as the
resumption of the joint gas exploration
between Zhunai Zhenrong Corporation
and the National Iranian Oil Company,
and the construction of railways and oil
and gas pipelines that would connect
China to the Persian Gulf (Bliler 2015).

In this sense, another direct


impact of the end of sanctions will fall on
the financial sector of the Iranian
economy, especially through receiving
foreign direct investment and the Iran's
reintegration in the banking sphere. In
terms of investment, the country is
extremely attractive due to its huge
population, with high education rates,
and its resource exploitation potential. In
the next 5 years, it should enter
approximately US$230 to US$260 billion
in the extractive sectors of the country, as
well as computer companies - including
Hewlett-Packard and Lenovo - and
construction vehicles - mainly from

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

78
28
27
25

Europe and Japan - which have already


shown interest in the Iranian market
(Economist 2016; Paivar 2015).

program. However, this factor does not


seem to threaten the commitment of both
parties to the agreement.

Moreover, large banks, especially


in England and Germany, have been
carrying out their prospects for future
large-scale project financing. Most of
these projects are linked to the
construction of infrastructure and
acquisition of very high added-value
products, like the purchase of Airbus
aircraft company. Meanwhile, smaller
banks institutions in the country will
gradually be inserted to promote the
rapprochement of consumers with the
financial system (Paivar 2016).

The continuity of this Iranian


pragmatic approach regarding the United
States, and the very openness of its
economy, will depend on the 2017
elections and the dynamics of Iranian
domestic politics in the coming years.
While Rouhani demonstrates ability to
run his Constructive Engagement project
and contain the conservative actions of
the Revolutionary Guards, it is expected
that the country continues to receive
foreign capital and expanding gradually
its economy. Nevertheless, the structural
issues of the country's foreign policy and
the downward situation of oil prices could
hinder the recovery process in the
medium term.

Conclusion
Thus, it is understood that the
overall reintegration of Iran's economy
into the world markets brings with it a
wide range of opportunities, both for the
country and for international investors.
The
capital
inflows
and
the
encouragement of private sector should
recover the growth of national income at
significant rates, while it gives freedom to
the performance of European and US
multinational
companies.
In
the
diplomatic field, some tensions and
mistrust between Iran and the West
remain, mainly due to the derivative
constraints of traditional US alliances in
the region, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia
and Israel - plus the United States speech
against the Iranian ballistic missile

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

79
27
25

References
Bandeira, Luiz Alberto Moniz. 2013. A Segunda Guerra Fria: Geopoltica E Dimenso Estratgica Dos
Estados Unidos.. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizao Brasileira.
Bliler,

Courtney.

2015.

"China

And

Iran's

New

Love

Affair?". The

National

Interest.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-irans-new-love-affair-13434.
CIA.

2016.

"The

World

Factbook". Central

Inteligence

Agency.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.
EIA. 2016. "IranS Petroleum Production Expected To Increase As Sanctions Are Lifted - Today In Energy U.S.

Energy

Information

Administration

(EIA)". Energy

Information

Administration.

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=24592.
Gladstone,

Rick.

2012.

"Iran

Eases

Its

Currency

Exchange

Policy". Nytimes.Com.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/iran-eases-its-currency-exchangepolicy.html?_r=2.
Halliday, F. 1980. "The Iranian Revolution In International Affairs: Programme And Practice".Millennium Journal Of International Studies 9 (2): 108-121. doi:10.1177/03058298800090020301.
Lampreia, Luiz Felipe. 2014. Aposta Em Teer: O Acordo Nuclear Entre Brasil, Turquia E Ir.. Rio de Janeiro:
Objetiva.
Leverett, Flynt Lawrence and Hillary Mann Leverett. 2013. Going To Tehran. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Lima, Shnia Kellen de. 2016. "Alinhamento Internacional Do Ir Durante A Guerra Fria: Um Teste De Teorias
Realistas Das Relaes Internacionais.". In II Simpsio De Ps-Graduao Em Relaes Internacionais Do
Programa San Tiago Dantas, 1-26. So Paulo.
Paivar, Amir. 2016. "Investing In Iran After The Lifting Of Sanctions - BBC News". BBC News.
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33639124.
Paivar, Amir. 2016. "What Lifting Iran Sanctions Means For World Markets - BBC News". BBC News.
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35317159.
Peterson, Sabrina M. 2016. "IranS Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis Of The Economic Impact Of Western
Sanctions | International Affairs Review". International Affairs Review. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428.
Roberto, Willian Moraes. 2015. O acordo nuclear do Ir: uma anlise das possveis razes e impactos.
NERINT, Porto Alegre. Acesso em: 28 Abril 2016.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

80
27
25

SFGATE.

2016.

"Iran

Feels

Economic

Pinch

Of

EU

Oil

Sanctions". Sfgate.

http://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Iran-feels-economic-pinch-of-EU-oil-sanctions-3677911.php.
Takeyh,

Ray.

2016.

"Iran's

'Resistance

Economy'

Debate". Council

On

Foreign

Relations.

http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-resistance-economy-debate/p37748.
The Economist,. 2016. "IranS Nuclear Deal Becomes A Reality | The Economist". The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/01/graphics-iran-sanctions-and-nuclear-deal.
Times.

2016.

"A

Safer

World,

Thanks

To

The

Iran

Deal". Nytimes.Com.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/opinion/a-safer-world-thanks-to-the-irandeal.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FIran%27s%20Nuclear%20Program&_r=0.
Townsend,

Mark.

2015.

"The

Oil

Price,

Iran

And

Saudi's

Economy". Aljazeera.Com.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/oil-price-iran-saudi-economy-151221073412010.html.
Visentini, Paulo Fagundes and Willian Moraes Roberto. 2015. "As Consequncias Da Crise Na Sria Para O
Ir: Impactos Para Sua Estratgia Regional E No Eixo De Resistncia". Brazilian Journal Of International
Relations 4 (1): 71-91. doi:10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n1p71-91.
World Bank. 2015. "Iran: Lifting Of Sanctions Will Lower Oil Prices And Boost Domestic Economy If Managed
Well". World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/08/10/iran-lifting-sanctionswill-lower-oil-prices-and-boost-domestic-economy-if-managed-well

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

81
27
25

25
20

THE PEACE TALKS ON THE SYRIAN CONFLICT


MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIENNA (2015) AND GENEVA III (2016) MEETINGS

Douglas de Quadros Rocha42


Isabela Souza Julio43
Patrcia Graeff Machry44

The Vienna and Geneva III peace talks were the latest multilateral
efforts seeking a resolution for the Syrian conflict. These peace talks involved
important domestic and regional actors that, until then, had not participated
together of previous negotiations.

The role of Bashar al-Assad during and after the political transition in
Syria is one of the key elements for solving the conflict.

The main obstacles for the peace talks are the conflicting interests of
the countries and local groups involved and the fact that important opposition
groups did not take part in the negotiations.

Presentation
On April 18 2016, the Syrian
opposition against the government
suspended its formal participation on the
peace talks for the Syrian conflict for
indefinite term. The peace talks had been
taking place in Geneva since the
beginning of the year, facilitated by the
United Nations (UN). Oppositions
spokespeople
argued
that
their

withdrawal from the negotiations was due


to the violations of the cease-fire
established in February 27. United States
president, Barack Obama, as well as
Russian Federation president, Vladimir
Putin, expressed concern and stated the
importance of respecting the cease-fire
and continuing the peace talks (Martin
2016; Stratfor 2016).

42

5th semester International Relations student in Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

43

5th semester International Relations student in Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

44

7th semester International Relations student in Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

82
27
25

In 2011, the Middle East was hit


by a series of mass protests that came to
be known as the Arab Spring and set a
significant change in the geopolitics of
the
region.
Pro-democracy
manifestations claiming, mostly, for
socioeconomic development irrupted in
several countries, and eventually reached
Syria. Bashar al-Assad regime responded
with violence, causing the beginning of a
conflict that lasts up to the present
(Rodgers et al 2016).

of scholars? And how can the withdrawal


of the Syrian opposition from the peace
talks impact the upcoming of events in
Syria, where the situation seems
increasingly harder to solve?
Grasping the importance of such
questions, this paper seeks to: i)
understand the importance of the Syrian
conflict through the analysis of the latest
peace talks; ii) explore the diverse and
divergent interests related to the
resolution of the Syrian Civil War and how
the involved actors act on the peace talks
in order to achieve their interests; iii)
understand why the 2016 peace talks
were significantly different from the
former efforts to solve the conflict; and iv)
analyze the possible consequences that
could come from these peace talks and
how the opposition's withdrawal may
affect them.
This paper is based on certain
premises. Firstly, that the Geneva III
peace talks have its roots in the Vienna
peace talks of 2015, and secondly, that
they are significantly different from the
previous efforts towards resolution of the
Syrian conflict, since many parties with
divergent interests were involved at the
same time.

The protests in Syria became a


civil war that already victimized over 250
thousand people, besides provoking the
major refugee crisis since the Second
World War - roughly 4.8 million Syrians
are refugees and 6.5 million are internally
displaced (Hudson 2016; Amnesty
International 2015). The conflict
broadened
marked
by
foreign
interference, which ended up opposing
two regional powers and its respective
allies: on one side, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and on the other, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the monarchies of the
Gulf, supported by Israel, Turkey and the
United States (Matthiesen 2015; Roberto
2015).
While the conflict endured, many
peace talks took place trying to solve the
Syrian situation. The last peace talks
began in October 2015 in Vienna, and
they were followed by the Geneva III
peace talks of 2016. In Geneva III, the
negotiations entered a new phase, which
had the main difference of including
representatives of the Syrian opposition
and of Bashar al-Assads government.

Despite that, we also assume that


the effectiveness of the peace talks could
be reduced due to the exclusion of the
Syrian Kurds from the negotiations.
Finally, the respect of a ceasefire is seen
as fundamental for the success of future
talks, and the withdrawal of the
opposition group due to the violation of
the established ceasefire might lead the
peace talks to an end for indefinite time.

But in what these peace talks


really consist? Why were they considered
so innovative and promising by most part

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

83
27
25

The Syrian Peace Process

disposition to negotiate with the Syrian


president (Groarke 2016).

Since 2011, many plans and


agreements were elaborated in order to
end the Syrian conflict, and the ensemble
of these initiatives is often referred to as
the Syrian peace process.

With the rise of the Islamic State


of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the
concern to fight it was added to the other
worries related to political transition in
Syria, leading to an intensification of the
debates about the conflict. In 2015, after
the beginning of the Russian direct
involvement in Syria in September, the
efforts to resolve the conflict apparently
reached a higher level, carrying great
differences
from
the
initiatives
aforementioned. Thus, this analysis will
focus in the Vienna process, which began
in October 2015, and the consequent
Geneva Peace Conference (or Geneva III),
which began in February 2016.

In 2012, the United Nations,


supported by the Security Councils
permanent members - United States,
Russia, France, United Kingdom and
China -, headed the Geneva I Conference
on Syria. The conference ended up with
the production of a communiqu that
detailed the necessary elements to
resolve the political conflict in Syria. The
document, however, failed to identify the
parties that should be included in a
prospective transitional government,
since there are numerous opposition
movements that carry different beliefs
and motivations (Groarke 2016; United
Nations 2012).

The Syria peace talks in Vienna


(2015)
On September 30 2015, Russia
carried out attacks in Syria, alleging that
all its targets belonged to the Islamic
State.
Some
Western
Countries,
especially the United States, questioned
this allegation, accusing Russia, a
traditional Assad ally, of inflicting attacks
against the Syrian opposition. Regardless
of the controversies regarding Russian
targets, it is important to stress that this
intervention significantly changed the
balance of power in the conflict. It
happened in a moment when the
government forces were progressively
losing control of the majority of Syrian
territory. With a larger engagement from
Russia, a great power with considerable
political and military capabilities, it
became clear that not only Moscow would

In 2014, the UN held the Geneva


II Conference on Syria, where it tried to
take both the government of Bashar alAssad and some of the most prominent
opposition groups (the Syrian National
Coalition) together to the negotiating
table. It was a clear attempt to achieve
peace through an agreed division of
power. Yet, these negotiations did not
have practical effects, for both domestic
and international reasons. Domestically,
Assad ignored the recommendations to
incorporate the opposition in the
government, whereas internationally, the
neighboring countries and some other
great powers as well - except for Iran and
Russia - seemed to have less and less

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

84
27
25
20

have prominence in the upcoming


resolutions on the Syrian conflict, but also
that it would do it standing up for Assad.

representatives of the European Union


and the United Nations were also
present. UN Secretary-General, Ban Kimoon, stated that the watchword of the
meetings in Vienna should be flexibility,
since the participant countries supported
different groups in Syria (Jung 2015).

On October 23rd, US Secretary of


State, John Kerry, and the Russian
minister of foreign affairs, Sergei Lavrov,
met in Vienna and defined that the next
peace talks on Syria should gather all
parties involved in the conflict. That was
a very important definition considering
that the latter peace talks had only
represented the interests of the United
States, Europe and its Middle Eastern
allies, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia and all of them wanted Assads
resignation as a precondition to reach
peace. Kerry declared that he was willing
to accept any partnership to defeat the
Islamic State, which meant that Lavrov
had probably achieved one of Russias
main goals: the Western consent to give
Iran, one of Assads major allies, a seat in
the negotiating table (Mohammed and
Murphy 2016).

At the end of the meetings held on


the 30th, the countries had agreed that
the resolution of the Syrian conflict
should be diplomatic, respecting the
people and the integrity of Syria, and that
the Islamic State should be defeated. The
UN was invited to mediate talks between
the government and the Syrian
opposition in order to guarantee the
success of a political transition plan, but
there was no definition of which
opposition groups would be invited. Thus,
it was established that the participating
countries would meet again in two weeks
to resolve conflicting points and build a
joint agreement (European Union 2015;
The Economist 2015).

This supposition was confirmed


on October 30, when the first round of
meetings held in Vienna took place. The
key participants were U.S., Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Turkey, countries with
essentially different visions regarding the
future of Assad and the treatment of
opposition groups, especially the Kurds. It
was the first time that Iran and Saudi
Arabia met in a negotiating table. Despite
this change, it is important to stress that
no Syrian representative was invited to
participate. Besides the five countries
aforementioned,
France,
United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, China, Egypt,
Oman, Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq,
United
Arab
Emirates
and

The leadership assumed by


Russia in the peace talks as the main
broker between Western powers and the
Syrian government must be highlighted,
since it breached Russian diplomatic
isolation. This isolation was imposed by
the international community since the
annexation of Crimea and the following
suspension of G8. With the September
intervention in Syria and the subsequent
demonstration of its military forces,
Moscow
acquired
a
renewed
international respect, despite its support
for the Assad regime (Waterfield,
Dominiczak and Blair 2016; Chatham
House 2016). From that moment on, it
became clear that the resolution of the

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

85
27
25
20

Syrian civil war could not be decided


unilaterally by Western countries, like as
the disastrous intervention in Libya. On
the contrary, it would require a dialogue
among all parties involved, including
Russia and Iran, the supporters of Bashar
al-Assad (Mohammed and Murphy 2015;
Lynch and Hudson 2015).

On November 14, the second


round of negotiations took place in
Vienna, with the participation of the same
countries and organizations present on
October 30, plus the representation of
the Arab League. The group became
known as the International Support
Group for Syria (ISSG). On this occasion,
the countries talked about the urgency to
end
the
destruction
of
Syrian
infrastructure as well as to mitigate the
suffering of the Syrian people. They all
agreed that the establishment of a ceasefire in the country should be the
immediate priority, and that it would not
include, however, attacks against the
Islamic State or the al-Nusra Front. The
countries pledged to support a political
transition process in conformity with the
2012 Geneva Communiqu, seeking for
an inclusive, non-sectarian and Syrian-led
governance (United Nations 2015).

The inclusion of Iran in the


negotiating table also deserves special
attention, since it ended the diplomatic
isolation of the country in the Middle East
and demonstrated its rise as an
important power in the region. It was also
an almost immediate result of the
increased Russian military presence in
Syria, as Moscow started to demand the
Iranian presence in the peace talks
despite objection from Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and the Gulf monarchies.
However, it is necessary to stress that this
inclusion may also have been heavily
influenced by the rapprochement
between the United States and Iran after
the nuclear agreements of June 2015,
which signaled Washingtons willingness
to ease historical tensions in benefit of
the Syrian peace talks. This move raised
criticism and doubt from Saudi Arabia
and Israel, the main U.S. allies in the
region. Saudi Arabia is Irans traditional
rival in the region, particularly due to
disputes for influence in other Islamic
countries - a rivalry that fits into the wider
polarization between Shiites and Sunnis
(Nasr 2016). Turkey, in turn, had a
position in accordance with Saudi Arabia
regarding this rapprochement with
Tehran, because of the fear of seeing
Turkish interests threatened in the region
(Tastekin 2016).

Finally, it was also decided that


elections focusing on the draft of a new
constitution would be held within 18
months in Syria, and that January 1 would
be the deadline for the beginning of
peace talks between the Syrian
government and opposition groups. The
ISSG did not set beforehand which would
be the opposition groups accepted in the
negotiations, delegating the task of
organizing them into a cohesive group to
the UN envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura.
Nevertheless, the countries emphasized
being receptive to a group that contained
the broadest possible spectrum of
opposition groups. The participant groups
should be chosen by the Syrian people,
and they would have to define who would
be their representatives and what would

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

86
27
25

be their goals in future negotiations. Both


sides of the conflict, opposition and
government, should find some common
ground to draft the new constitution,
since the ISSG found that the political
element was essential to the resolution of
the Syrian crisis (United Nations 2015;
Norman,
2015;
United
States
Department of State 2016).

3445 opposition groups - one third of it


representing armed factions -, led by
Saudi Arabia and headed by Mohammed
Alloush, from the Salafist group Jaysh alIslam46. The delay in the occurrence of
this meeting - which was scheduled for
January 1 - was given mainly by indecision
on who would be the recognized Syrian
opposition (Carnegie 2016). Besides, the
HNC itself showed some reluctance in
negotiating with the Damascus regime if
it did not cease the airstrikes against the
opposition groups, but ended up yielding
to the international pressure to
participate of the talks.

The Geneva III peace talks (2016)


On February 1 2016, a month
after the expected date, the Geneva
peace talks on Syria - also referred to as
Geneva III - began. Organized by the ISSG
and mediated by the United Nations,
these meetings had the establishment of
a ceasefire as primordial goal. The
following objectives would be the
institution of a transition government in
Syria with upcoming elections and the
defeat of the Islamic State.

The question on whether some


opposition groups are radical or
moderate is a conflicting issue among all
the parties involved. On the one hand, the
U.S., Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other
European countries believe that the HNC
is satisfactorily representative of the
opposition; on the other, Russia, Iran and
Assads government classify some of the
groups of the HNC as radical or terrorists,
due to the attacks they conduct against
the governments positions. Despite the
lack of consensus regarding this issue,
both sides of the conflict agreed with the

The first meeting was formed by


the same participants of the Vienna
meetings, but with the significant
addition of representatives of the Syrian
government and of the High Negotiations
Commitee (HNC), a coalition formed by

The United Nations never considered accepting in the HNC the opposition groups that are widely perceived as
terrorists, such as the Islamic State and the al-Nusra Front. However, some groups considered terrorists by Russia
and Iran, like Ahrah al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, were included in the Committe, despite Russian demands to
accept only the groups that did not resort to violence against the fragile Syrian state. Moreover, the Kurds, who
play an important role in the combat against the Islamic State, were also not included in the coalition of opposition
groups. Unfortunately, it still is very hard to find reliable and detailed sources with information on who effectively
are the 34 groups that form the HNC. The following groups are the only ones whose participation we can confirm:
Jaysh al Mujahideen, Jaysh al Islam, Al Jaysh al Awl, Jabhat al Asala wal Tanmiya, Ahrar al-Sham, Jabal Turkman
Battalion, Suqour al-Jabab Brigade, Council of Direction of Syrian Tribes, Popular Front for Change and Liberation,
Movement Kamh, Movement for a Pluralist Society, Cairo Group, Movement for a Peaceful Policy Change, Syrian
Democratic Council, and Salim Herbek and Namroud Suleiman as independent participants (Pike 2016; Cafarella
and Casagrande 2016).
45

46Jaysh

al-Islam is one of the main jihadist salafist opposition groups in Syria. It has supporters in seven provinces
of the Western region of the country, but its major forces are settled in Damascus (Cafarella and Casagrande
2016).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

87
27
25
20

exclusion of some other groups from the


peace talks, such as the Kurds, the
jihadist militia Jabhat al-Nusra and the
Islamic State (Zraick 2016). Regardless
of the opinions of the international
community on its composition, the 34
members of the HNC selected a
delegation of 17 representatives to
negotiate with the delegation from the
Syrian government led by Bashar alJafaari, United Nations Permanent
Representative on Syria (Pike 2016; Lund
2016).
The inclusion of representatives
from Bashar al-Assads government in
the peace talks reflect the changes that
took place in the Syrian territory: since
the beginning of the Russian airstrikes in
support of Assad, the government
recovered important regions of the
country, such as Aleppo, the biggest city
in Syria. Since then, the government
promised to regain control over the entire
country, which demonstrates its relatively
strengthened position. This made it clear
that Assad would not be ousted from
power through force and that his
participation in any negotiation had
become essential - even if the majority of
participants remained strongly opposed
to his continuity as president of Syria
(Irish and Strobel 2016; Dearden 2016).

Syrias independence and territorial


sovereignty, as well as the unity of the
Syrian people. However, February was a
period of stagnation in the peace talks,
due especially to the military advances of
the Syrian government and Russian
forces against rebels in Aleppo.
Therefore, the only issue really discussed
was the need to establish a ceasefire. On
February 22 the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of Russia and the United States
met at the 52nd Annual Conference on
Security of Munich, and announced the
adoption of the Terms for End of
Hostilities in Syria47. The cessation of
hostilities would begin on February 27
and would be accompanied by political
talks between the parties involved. To
succeed with the cessation of hostilities,
a Task Force for the Ceasefire chaired by
ISSG, United States and Russia was
established (United States Department of
State 2016). Yet, after the first 24 hours
of the establishment of the ceasefire, the
Russian and Syrian forces continued their
attacks against a number of opposition
groups in the northwest portion of the
country. Even so, the ceasefire was
responsible for a remarkable decrease in
violence in the country, allowing the U.N.
representative to move forward with his
efforts to solve the conflict (Syrian
Institute 2016).

The HNC representatives focused


on humanitarian issues and on the
release of political prisoners, while the
Syrian government focused on defending

A new round of negotiations


began on March 14 and lasted until the
24th. According to the UN envoy, the talks
at that time had reached a new level of

47

These terms included among other things: the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254
- which was reiterated by Resolution 2268 of February 26th, 2016; the interruption of any form of attacks
against the Syrian government forces or any group related to them; and immediate humanitarian aid (United
States of America 2016).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

88
27
25

urgency due to the announcement of the


Russian
withdrawal
from
Syrian
48
territory (Arvinth 2016). Even in such
context, Mistura drafted a statement of
principles that should guide the
conversations from that moment on.
Those
principles
ranged
from
condemnation of terrorism to the
establishment of a peaceful political
transition in Syria. The statement,
however, did not specify how the
transition would occur nor what would be
Assads role in this process (Wintour
2016).

III peace talks. The group alleged having


a number of reasons for doing so, the
main one being the refusal of the Syrian
government to allow humanitarian aid on
its territory. According to the HNC,
negotiations could not continue unless
the Assad regime and its supporters,
particularly the Russian forces, stopped
bombing civilians and opponents, and
accepted the formation of a new
government in Damascus. Both the
United Nations and the United States
acknowledged that the withdrawal of the
HNC had legitimate reasons, but
positioned against it for considering that
it would represent a setback in the talks
(Hudson 2016).

On April 13, the peace talks got


into a third round, in which it was
expected that the necessary conditions
for political transition in Syria would
finally be defined (Wintour 2016). On the
same day, parliamentary elections took
place in the Syrian regions where Assad
still had some control, and many people
attended to support him. The opposition
groups, taking into account the countrys
instability and the governments need to
forge some support among the Syrian
people, considered these elections
illegitimate. In contrast, Russia declared
that the elections were necessary due to
the urge to avoid a power vacuum in the
country, which could benefit the actions
of armed groups (Davison and Bassam
2016).

Since then, both sides have


mutually accused each other of violating
the ceasefire established in late
February. In an attempt to bring all the
parties back to the negotiating table, the
UN special envoy has been appealing to
the United States and Russia (Hudson
2016).
Despite
all
the
efforts
aforementioned concerning the inclusion
of the Syrian government and of the
opposition groups in the peace talks, it is
important to pay special attention to the
fact that the Democratic Union Party
(PYD), which represents the Kurds in
northern Syria, was excluded from any
participation in the negotiations. The
Kurdish participation in the Syrian Civil
War is complex and of direct interest of

On April 18, the HNC formally


suspended its participation in the Geneva
48

On March 14th, Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised the other countries and groups involved in the
Syrian conflict by announcing the partial withdrawal of Russian military forces from Syria. Air strikes against
the opposition, however, continued. Thus, Russia achieved its goal to strengthen the government forces and
establish its military presence in the country whenever necessary. Analysts believe that Vladimir Putin's
announcement sought to press President Bashar al-Assad to offer greater commitments to a peace
agreement in Geneva III (Salih 2016).

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

89
27
25

the other powers involved in the conflict.


The Kurdish forces are currently the main
players in Syrian territory to combat the
Islamic State, which has encouraged the
United States to give them military and
financial support. However, the existing
ties between the PYD and the Kurdish
rebel organizations in southeastern
Turkey
(especially
the
Kurdistan
Workers Party, or PKK) led the Turkish
government to oppose vehemently to
any
participation
of
Kurdish
representatives in the Geneva peace
talks. More than that, it affirmed it
would leave the negotiations if the
PYD was included (Perry and Mohammed
2016; DeYoung and Morello 2016).

This tense relationship between


the
Turks and the Syrian Kurds
also motivated Ankara to impose
offensive attacks in the bordering
territories of Northern Syria, which are
controlled by the Kurds (Reuters 2016).
Thus, even if the Geneva III meetings
succeed in elaborating an agreement
between the Syrian government and
the opposition, the absence of the Kurds
in this resolution could undermine its
real chances of effectiveness. After all,
the PYD enjoys great popular support and
has
been constantly gaining more
positions in northern Syria over time.

Figure 1 - Areas of control by each group in Syria (January 2016)

Source: Robbins 2016.

Concluding Remarks
Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

90
27
25
20

The analysis of the latest peace


talks on Syria certifies the importance
and complexity of the Syrian conflict. This
conflict has somehow been involving all
Syrias neighboring countries: Iraq, due to
the actions of the Islamic State; Jordan
and Lebanon, due to the refugee crisis;
and Turkey, due to the influx of refugees
but also to the Kurdish issue. Iran and
Saudi Arabia, in turn, have particular and
virtually opposite interests regarding the
resolution of the war, and they finance
and support distinct groups in the country
in order to influence the regional balance
of power. The European Union, the United
States and Russia also take part in the
conflict by maintaining relations with the
government or with the opposition
groups, and by doing direct military
interventions to fight the Islamic State - or
even, to support the Assad regime, as
Russia has been doing. Acknowledging
this diversity of interests, one can
evaluate the peace talks as a moment
when there was finally a consensus about
at least one issue regarding the conflict
Syria: that all the parties of the conflict
should have a seat in the negotiating
table due to the many ambitions at stake.

strategy in Syria, currently based in


indirect support to the opposition groups
in order to avoid wider involvement on the
ground, is highly incoherent, since it ends
up strengthening the Kurds on the ground
at the same time that the U.S. agrees with
the Kurdish absence at the peace talks.
The HNC withdrawal from the
Geneva III peace talks can halt this
multilateral effort to solve the Syrian war
for indefinite term. The consequences
can be negative to the region and
particularly to the Syrian citizens,
especially if the ceasefire is broken off.
That could lead to an escalation of
violence by the government and the the
opposition groups in all the contested
regions of the country. Even if the
negotiations continue without the HNC like the May 17 negotiations in Geneva,
in which the Syrian opposition and the
government did not take part -, it is highly
unlikely that the HNC accepts any of the
deliberations drafted unilaterally by the
ISSG, thus retarding the political
transition.
Some elements, however, can still
be seen as positive legacies from Geneva
III. Primarily, the American-Russian joint
and balanced leadership is something
new in the post-Cold War era, which was
marked until now by U.S. prominence.
The international balance of power has
been changing since the Ukrainian crisis,
revealing
possibility
of
a
new
diplomatic trend marked by larger
dialogue between these two great
powers, without the preponderance of
a single country and with the United

Despite this positive perspective,


the absence of the Syrian Kurds in the
negotiations could be a genuine obstacle
to reach lasting peace in the country,
given the large local and regional support
that they enjoy. Ignoring them could
encourage their armed branches to keep
carrying out attacks, since they would not
be included in the ceasefire agreements
and consequently in the resolutions for
political
transition.
Washingtons

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

91
27
25
20

Nations as
negotiations.

the

arena

for

such

Secondly and finally, the role


played by Iran since the Vienna talks
must be highlighted. Tehrans inclusion
in the negotiations was definitely a
diplomatic victory for Russia and Iran, but
it was also for the U.S., since it
culminated
in
greater
Iranian
involvement in the fight against the
Islamic State. The arrangement of
countries in Vienna and Geneva III was
different from the previous peace talks
on Syria, which were led mainly by U.S.
key allies in the region, such as Turkey
and Saudi Arabia, Irans traditional
opponents. The Iranian presence in
support
of
Assad's
government
represented the international recognition
that a peaceful solution for Syria would
only be viable if Iran played a more
significant
role.
The
increased
importance of Tehran could then bring
Bashar al-Assad to the negotiating table.
Iran, in turn, succeeded in maintaining its
influence on Syria and hindering, at least
for now, any U.S.-led unilateral outcome
for the peace talks.
All those elements, in addition to
the ending of the economic sanctions
against Iran, may be setting the ground
for a new balance of power in the Middle
East. This new balance may delegate
greater responsibility to Iran in
maintaining the stability in the region,
and enable new dynamics among
regional powers, as well as between
them and the international great powers,
such as the United States and Russia.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

92
27
25

25
20
20

References
Aljazeera. 2016. "Syria: Fate Of Assad Impedes Success Of Geneva III". Aljazeera Centre For Studies.
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2016/04/syria-fate-assad-impedes-success-geneva-iii160428104128240.html.
Amnesty International. 2015. "Syria's Refugee Crisis In Numbers". Amnesty
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/.

International.

Arvinth, Karthick. 2016. "Syria Conflict: Geneva Peace Talks 'Going Slowly'".International Business Times UK.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-conflict-geneva-peace-talks-going-slowly-1550665.
BBC. 2016. "Syria Conflict: Key Opposition Group
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35435065.

To

Join

Geneva

Talks".

BBC

News.

Cafarella, Jennifer and Genevieve Casagrande. 2016. Syrian Armed Opposition Powerbrokers. Middle East
Security Report. Washington: Institute for the Study of War.
Chatham House. 2016. "RussiaS Withdrawal From Syria: Five Things You Should Know".Chatham House.
https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/russias-withdrawal-from-syria-five-things-you-should-know.
Davison, John and Laila Bassam. 2016. "Assad Holds Parliamentary Election As Syrian Peace Talks Resume".
Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0XA2C5.
Dearden, Lizzie. 2016. "Assad Still Wants To Take The Whole Of Syria Back By Force". The Independent.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bashar-al-assad-vows-to-retake-whole-of-syria-byforce-despite-ceasefire-attempts-a6870141.html.
DeYoung, Karen and Carol Morello. 2016. "TurkeyS Difficulties With Syrian Kurds Complicate Strategy
Against Islamic State". Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syriankurds-are-snag-in-us-turkey-strategy-against-isis/2016/01/23/20eba1bc-c1e2-11e5-94437074c3645405_story.html.
European Union. 2016. "Joint Statement: Final Declaration On The Results Of The Syria Talks In Vienna As
Agreed By Participants". European External Action Service. http://eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/2015/151030_06.htm.
Groarke, Emer. 2016. "Mission Impossible: exploring the viability of power-sharing as a conflict-resolution
tool in Syria". International Journal Of Conflict Management 27 (1): 2-24. doi:10.1108/ijcma-12-2014-0090.
Hudson, John. 2016. "Syrian Opposition Suspends Peace Talks Amid Anti-Assad Offensive".Foreign Policy.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/18/syrian-opposition-suspends-peace-talks-amid-anti-assadoffensive/?utm_content=buffera93dd&wp_login_redirect=0.
Irish, John and Warren Strobel. 2016. "Russia Keeps Bombing Despite Syria Truce; Assad Vows To Fight On".
Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-agreement-idUSKCN0VK2NX.
Jung, Elaine. 2015. "Syria Conflict: Vienna Talks To Be Held". BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-34674003.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

93
27
25

Lund, Aron. 2016. "The Road To Geneva: The Who, When, And How Of SyriaS Peace Talks".Carnegie
Endowment For International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62631.
Lynch, Colum and John Hudson. 2015. "The Pivot To Tehran". Foreign Policy.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/29/iran-obama-kerry-vienna-talks-syria-russia-the-pivot-to-tehran/.
Martin, Nik. 2016. "Syrian Opposition Suspends Participation In Geneva Peace Talks". Deutsche Welle.
http://www.dw.com/en/syrian-opposition-suspends-participation-in-geneva-peace-talks/a-19197274.
Matthiesen, Toby. 2015. "Sectarianism After The Saudi Mosque Bombings".Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/29/sectarianism-after-the-saudimosque-bombings/?postshare=4301451733249434&tid=ss_tw.
Mohammed, Arshad and Francois Murphy. 2015. "Kerry Sees New Syria Talks Next Week, Does Not Rule
Out
Iran
Role".
Reuters.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-talksidUSKCN0SH1LN20151023.
Moraes Roberto, Willian. 2015. "A Poltica Externa Do Ir E O Impacto Do Conflito Na Sria: Alteraes
Geopolticas Regionais E A Estratgia Iraniana". Graduado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
Nasr, Vali. 2016. "The War For Islam". Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/the-war-forislam-sunni-shiite-iraq-syria/.
Norman, Laurence. 2015. "World Powers Push Timetable For Syria
http://www.wsj.com/articles/diplomats-gather-in-vienna-for-syria-talks-1447490764.

Solution".

WSJ.

Perry, Tom and Arshad Mohammed. 2016. "U.S. Envoy Visits Kurdish-Held Northern Syria".Reuters.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-visit-idUSKCN0VA2TR.
Pike,
John.
2016.
"High
Negotiations
Committee
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hnc.htm.

(HNC)".

Global

Security.

Reuters. 2016. "Turkish PM Confirms Shelling Of Kurdish Forces In Syria". The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/13/turkey-shells-kurdish-forces-in-syria-in-retaliation-forattack-on-border-posts.
Robbins, James. 2016. "Syria Conflict: What Hope
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35428456.

For

Geneva

Peace

Talks?".

BBC.

Rodgers, Lucy, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare. 2016. "Syria: The Story Of The Conflict". BBC.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
Salih, Mohammed. 2016. "What Russia's Withdrawal Means For Syria Conflict". Al-Monitor. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/putin-russia-withdrawal-syria-assad-turkey.html#.
Stratfor. 2016. Peace Talks Unravel As Opposition Body Walks Out. Sitrep Syria. Stratfor.
Tastekin, Fehim. 2016. "Are Turkey, Saudi Arabia Working Together Against Iran?". Al-Monitor. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/ja/originals/2015/03/turkey-saudi-plan-anti-iran-sunni-bloc.html#.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

94
27
25
20

The Economist. 2015. "After Paris, Syria's Peace Process Limps On". The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21678712-part-puzzle-after-paris-syrias-peaceprocess-limps.
The Huffington Post. 2016. "Backed By Russian Jets, Syrian Army Closes In On Aleppo". The Huffington Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/backed-by-russian-jets-syrian-army-closes-in-onaleppo_us_56b37778e4b08069c7a63e09.
United
Nations.
2012.
Action
Group
For
Syria
Final
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.

Communiqu.

United Nations. 2015. "14 November 2015, Statement Of The International Syria Support Group Vienna.
United
Nations
Department
Of
Political
Affairs.
http://www.un.org/undpa/en/Speechesstatements/14112015/syria.
United States Department of State. 2016. Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation,
as Co-Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilites in Syria. U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm.
United States Department of State. 2016. Statement of
Group.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252428.htm.

the

International

Syria

Support

Waterfield, Bruno, Peter Dominiczak, and David Blair. 2014. "G8 Suspends Russia For Annexation Of
Crimea". The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-Crimea.html.
Wilkin, Sam and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin. 2015. "Iran Accepts Invitation To Syria Peace Talks In Vienna". The
Huffington
Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-syria-peace-talksvienna_us_5630c528e4b0631799102342.
Wintour, Patrick. 2016. "Syria Peace Talks: UN Envoy To Issue Statement Of Principles". The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/24/syria-peace-staffan-de-mistura-talks-un-envoystatement-principles.
Zraick, Karen. 2016. "Syria Talks Are Complicated By Competing Opposition Groups". New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/world/middleeast/syria-talks-geneva-opposition.html?_r=2.

Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.1 n.1 | p. 1-95 | jul/2016 | ISSN: XXXX-XXXX

95
27
25

Вам также может понравиться