HR Case Readings 01

1) SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to
dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and
political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed
to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1),
provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights
violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not
being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 901580.

2) Soriao vs. Pineda (Not sure if Soriano or Soriao) CA-G.R. SP No. 31546 August 10, 1994
Facts:
Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation
of talking back to school authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of
high school through a verbal notice not to readmit. Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing
on the matter and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored the students
plea to reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their prerogative. Seeking further remedies to no
avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.
Ruling:
YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara Memorial High School to allow Soriao to
enroll and study after he was meted out a disciplinary action without due process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987
Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II, Sections 13 and 17
of the 1987 Constitution provide: Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality

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education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. Section 2: The State shall:
(1)
Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the
people and society; (2)
Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the
natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age; (3)
Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be
available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged; (4)
Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as self-study programs particularly those that
respond to community needs; and (5)
Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.
Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he may only deprived of such right with due
process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.

3) Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet
unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1.
2.

Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1.
Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of the government.
ISSUE:
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Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
Significance of the Case:
This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in cases relating to forest/timber licensing. However,
the approach of the Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social and cultural rights has proved somewhat inconsistent, with
some judgments resulting in the enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989); Manila
Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but at least one instance in
which the Court made a statement that economic, social and cultural rights are not real rights (see, Brigido Simon v
Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994).
Case Law Thematic Focus:
Obligation to Respect

4) DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.

A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976
Right to Information (Access to Public Records)
FACTS:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge
Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor
to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on
the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records but that the same is
always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a
court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the
motivation is not serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote
public scandal.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on
October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the motion was denied by the
Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books infringe upon the
right of individuals to information.

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RULING:
No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. However, restrictions on access to certain records may be
imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: The President whenever it becomes necessary, may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppressrebellionand in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and
unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended
that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out
the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;
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Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than
that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on
Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo s calling-out power for the
armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

There must be a war or other emergency.

The delegation must be for a limited period only.
The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

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Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation,
he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the
types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017,
i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.
Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O.
No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

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