ELECTION LAW CASES:

(1) JOSEPH
B.
ELECTIONS, Respondent

TIMBOL, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 206004

vs.

COMMISSION

ON

February 24, 2015

FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy 6 for the
position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan
City. On January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena 7 from COMELEC Election Officer
Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear before her office
on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of
Candidacy.8
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During
the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He
contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who
ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan
City. He allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. 9
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared
in the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to
Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. The clarificatory hearing panel allegedly
assured him that his name would be deleted from the list and that his Certificate of
Candidacy would be given due course.10
In the Memorandum11 dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended
that Timbols Certificate of Candidacy be given due course. 12
Despite Election Officer Valencias favorable recommendation, Timbols name was not
removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELECs website. With
the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol
filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition13 praying that his name be included in the certified
list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. 14
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for
being moot, considering that the printing of ballots had already begun. 15
On March 15, 2013,16 Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court, arguing
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance
candidate.17 According to Timbol, the COMELEC deprived him of due process of law
when he was declared a nuisance candidate even before Election Officer Valencia
conducted the clarificatory hearing. 18 He prayed for a preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering the COMELEC to include his name in the certified list of candidates
for the position of Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of
Caloocan City.19
In the Resolution20 dated April 16, 2013, this court ordered the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on behalf of the COMELEC.
In its Comment,21 the COMELEC argued that the Petition was already moot and
academic, considering that the May 13, 2013 elections had already been conducted. 22

Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic, the COMELEC
maintained that it did not gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to Timbols argument,
he was given an opportunity to be heard when Election Officer Valencia heard him
during the clarificatory hearing. He even admitted that he attended the clarificatory
hearing with his counsel.23
Moreover, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Timbols
Petition to be included in the certified list of candidates, considering that the printing
of ballots had already started.24
With these arguments, the COMELEC prayed that this court deny the Petition for lack
of merit.
ISSUE: (a) Whether this case is moot and academic
(b) Whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner
Timbols Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
RULING:
(a)

This case is moot and academic.

A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because

of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value."30 When a case is moot and academic, this court generally declines jurisdiction
over it.31
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot
and academic cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised
required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.32 (Citation
omitted)
We may no longer act on petitioners prayer that his name be included in the certified
list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on
March 15,2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4,
2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already
proclaimed.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth
"controlling and authoritative doctrines" 33 to be observed by respondent in motu
proprio denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged
nuisance candidates. This motu proprio authority is always subject to the alleged
nuisance candidates opportunity to be heard 34 an essential element of procedural
due process
(b)

Respondents power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of

candidacy is subject to the candidates opportunity to be heard.

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]" 36 To run for public office is a
mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law." 37 Among these limitations is
the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their
certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of
the electorate."38 In Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,39 this court explained why
nuisance candidates are prohibited from running for public office:
. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the
same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical
hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is
not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions
(2) ELSIE S. CAUSINGv. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN
D. BIRON, SR. G.R. No. 199139, 09 September 2014, EN BANC,
(BERSAMIN, J.)
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 are
transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as any personnel movement
from one government agency to another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without
the issuance of an appointment; while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of
1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment.
FACTS:
Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 (Office
Order No. 12), commanding for the detailing of Causing at the Office of the
Municipal Mayor.
Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron
ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the
election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it
violated of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of
transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her
functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her

coemployees and with the public transacting business in her office.

The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
findings and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election period from
her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constitute
a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of
the COMELEC?
RULING:
No. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code there
was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or
a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only physically
transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor. Causing
is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely
required to physically report to the Mayors Office and perform her functions as
Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her
work physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her
supervisory function over the staff as she continues to review their work and signs
documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her
duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however,
does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. Moreover, Causings tooliteral
understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions
involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with
an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a
basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the
accused.

(3) OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205136, 02 December 2014, EN BANC, (Perez, J.)
COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of
the COMELEC.
FACTS:
On October 2012, Kimberly filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for
Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born
on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the
elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty-three

(23) years of age on the day of the elections. As such, Kimberly was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of attending the hearing,
Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously,
Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. The COMELEC rendered a
decision ordering the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, and the denial of the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia.
COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was
never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her
age, and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she
seeks to be elected to. Olivia countered that although Kimberly may not be qualified
to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid
COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberlys COC on the ground
of lack of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not
misrepresent her birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was
no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew
her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid substitution?
RULING:
Yes, in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered
to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we
find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Firstly, subject to its
authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the COMELEC has the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the
requirements for a valid substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First, there was a
valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC after the last day for the filing of COCs;
second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which
Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election
day.

(4) ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION

NELSON B. JULIA,Respondents.

ON

ELECTIONS

AND

G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014

FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and
had served as a member of theSanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines
Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, 8 which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur.
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the
present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining
towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won
the Sanggunian,
Third
District.
He

as among
served

the members of
until
2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of
the Sanggunian,
Third
District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013
elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 78 10 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy 11 of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served
the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of
the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term
limit rules application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not
necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run
as aSanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term
limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
cancelled Navals COC on grounds stated below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the
elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary
requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation cognizable
under Section 78 of the [OEC].
ISSUE:
proper
RULING:

Whether or not the cancellation of the Navals Certificate of Candidacy

The

Court

denies

the

petition.

As

the

issues

are

interrelated,

they

shall

be

discussed

jointly.

The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties
cite Latasa, Lonzanida v. COMELEC,26 Borja, Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, 27 and Bandillo,
which all involve the application of the three-term limit rule, the factual and legal
circumstances in those cases are different and the doctrinal values therein do not
directly
address
the
issues
now
at
hand.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city.
The then municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the threeterm limit rule by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same as the
one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that there
was no interruption of the incumbent mayors continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive
elections. While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months
before the expiration of the mayors third term, he was ousted from office. He ran
again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was
thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of violation of
the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not be considered as
having served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an
involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected officials continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In
the two immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty
post. When he ran for the same position for the third time, his disqualification was
sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that when he
assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be
treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate should have
been thrice elected for and had served the same post consecutively.
In Aldovino, preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor.
The Court ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the elective officials term.
Although he was barred from exercising the functions of the position during the period
of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of
the ten towns, which used to comprise Camarines Surs old First District, to form the
new Second District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule against
the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and
Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the threeterm limit rule upon local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts.
In the process of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss the role of elections and the
nature of public office in a democratic and republican state like ours.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval.
For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent
unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that
the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise
among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or
exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Navals arguments would practically allow him to hold the same

office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to
avert.
Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real
sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded
that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws.
Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.

(5) EMILIO
RAMON
HON. COMMISSION ON
LUIS, Respondents

"E.R."
ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 212398

P.
and

EJERCITO, Petitioner,
EDGAR "EGA Y" S.

vs.
SAN

November 25, 2014

FACTS:
Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolutio 1 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which affirmed the September
26, 2013 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition for
disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis)
against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the
May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by
San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a
fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Laguna.3 Alleged in his Petition are as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
5. [Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to
the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with an
intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor. Copy
thereof is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C" and made as an integral
part hereof;
6. In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of
Laguna, [Ejercito] and his cohorts claimed that the said "Orange Card" could be
used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical
needs as declared by the statements of witnesses which are hereto attached
and marked as Annex "D" as integral part hereof;
7. The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in
convincing the voters to cast their votes for [Ejercitos] favor in clear violation
of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
materialconsideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of

Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if hehas been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis ours)
8. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of the aforesaid law, [Ejercito] should be
disqualified;
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
9. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has
a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification issued by the
Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" as
an integral part hereof;
10. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,
otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION
ACT provides and I quote:
"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. The aggregate amount that a
candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as follows:
a. For candidates Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy.
b. For other candidates without any political party and without any
support from any political party Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party-list groups Five pesos (P5.00) for every
voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it
has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis)
11. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is
only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND
FIVE
HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX
(P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
12. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of
law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the
2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already
spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our partys official monitoring on the
following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES, to:
(1) GRANTthe Petition for Disqualification filed against respondent Emilio
Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito;
(2) DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Laguna, pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(3) ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST from performing the
functions of the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(4) DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Laguna;
(5) DIRECT the duly elected Vice Governor of Laguna to assume the Office of
the Provincial Governor by virtue of succession as provided in Section 44 of the
Local Government Code; and
(6) DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with the Law Department
of this Commission for the conduct of a preliminary investigation into the
alleged violations of campaign finance laws, rules and regulations committed by
respondent Ejercito.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of COMELEC granting the petition for
Disqualification against ER Ejercito valid
RULING:
Section 68 of the OEC expressly grants COMELEC the power to take
cognizance of an action or protest seeking the disqualification of a candidate
who has committed any of the acts listed therein from continuing as one, or if
he or she has been elected, from holding office. One ground for disqualification
listed in Section 68 is spending in an election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by law. It is exactly on said ground that San Luis is seeking the
disqualification of Ejercito. The jurisdiction of COMELEC over the petition,
therefore, is clear.
The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending
before the Commission isheard and resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of
Section 68 of the OEC. It is an administrative proceeding separate and distinct
from the criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to undergo in
order to determine whether he can be held criminally liable for the same act of
over-spending. It is through this administrative proceeding that this
Commission, initially through its divisions, makes a factual determination on the
veracity of the parties respective allegations in a disqualification case. There is
no need for a preliminary investigation finding on the criminal aspect of the
offenses in Section 68 before the Commission can act on the administrative or
electoral aspect of the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a petition. As
enunciated in Lanot, "(a)n erring candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The
electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and viceversa."

The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running

or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. 54 A
petition to disqualifya candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which
states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is
a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
animmigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to election campaign or partisan
political activityoutside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or
defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election
propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda
through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats,
intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (Section
261 [e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or
expenditure of public funds (Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any
propaganda on the day of the election within the restricted areas (Section 261 [cc],
sub-par.6). All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under
the OEC, not toviolations of other penal laws. In other words, offenses that are
punished in laws other than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a Section 68 petition.
Thus, We have held:
x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the [OEC]. All other election offenses are beyond the
ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the [OEC], the power of the COMELEC is confined
to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the
purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission
may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from its filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 268. Jurisdiction. The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action orproceeding for violation of this

Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which
shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the
decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases." 55
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled
that the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election
offense but for disqualification as well.