TREACHERY

PEOPLE VS. BOHOLST-CABALLERO

Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Cabellero were married. During the

marriage, there were times when Francisco maltreated and beat Cunigunda.
They later on separated when Francisco left Cunigunda and their child. On
her way home after caroling, Cunigunda met Francisco where he held her by
the collar and exchange of harsh words ensued. Francisco held her by the
hair, slapped her face until her nose bled and pushed her to the ground. To
keep herself from falling, she held him by the waist where her right-hand
grasped the knife tucked inside the left side of his belt line. He continued to
push her down; when fell on her back, he knelt over her, held her neckband
choked her. She pulled out the knife and thrust it to him hitting the left
backside below his waistline. When she was finally released by her husband,
she ran home and on the way, she threw the knife. In the morning, she
surrendered herself to the police. She was convicted for having killed her
husband and was found guilty of Parricide by the trial court. She seeks a
reversal of the judgment and prays for acquittal on the plea of self-defense.
ISSUE: Did Cunigunda stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her
person?
HELD:
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife
was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of Cunigundas testimony, for
ashen lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural
for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the mans
belt and thrust it at the section of the body nearest to her hand at the
moment.
The witness declared that on that night when husband and wife met
on the road, Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter was near, she
immediately stabbed him. If that were true, that is, husband and wife were
standing face to face at a distance of 1/2 meter when the stabbing occurred.

It would have been more natural and probable for the weapon to have been
directed towards the front part of the body of the victim such as his abdomen
or chest, rather than at his back, left side above the left thigh.
Appellant did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression
or attack on her person by her husband. While it was understandable
forFrancisco to get angry at his for finding her on the road in the middle of
the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment
withintent to kill by choking her. All the appellant did was to provoke an
imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not
sufficientprovocation under the law of self-defense.
ACQUITTAL due to legitimate defense of her person

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SERGIO OASG.R.

No. L-17771 November 29, 1962LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
In the evening of September 4, 1958, Simeon Gallego
was assaulted with abayonet by Sergio Oas in front of the latter's
house. The deceased Simeon Gallego had a debt of P5.80 to Sergio
Oas on the said day. When the chief of police arrived at the place
in the evening, he made an investigation and was told by the wife
of Oas that Simeon Gallego was about to enter their
house; that she and her daughter blocked Simeon's way but
Simeon pushed the daughter aside and hit the left and right arm
of Oas wife; and that upon seeing his wife hurt Oas rushed with
his bayonet and in the struggle with Simeon, the latter died.
The prosecution maintained at the trial through the
testimony of Isabelo Gallego,son of the deceased Simeon Gallego,
that in the afternoon of that day, September 4,1958, at about 2
o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Sergio Oas
offering topay the sum of P2.50, which his father had sent to Oas in part
payment of his debt; thaton finding that the amount was less than the
amount of the debt of P5.80, Oas refused to accept uttering these

threatening words: "If he does not pay this afternoon something

will happen to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sergio Oas can be acquitted for acting in
self-defense in killingSimeon Gallego.

HELD:
The Court does not believe that defendant-appellant
is entitled to a complete acquittal because of the
absence of the third element of self-defense, namely, the
reasonableness of the means used to repel the unlawful
aggression. With his cane the defendant-appellant could have warded
off the blows made by the deceased; and even if
he had actually drawn his bayonet this drawing of t
h e b a y o n e t w o u l d h a v e b e e n sufficient to prevent the
deceased from continuing with the attack. In other words, if the
accused had only drawn his bayonet in defense that would
have been enough to discourage and prevent the deceased
when he attacked the accused. In stabbing the deceased with is
bayonet, the defendant-appellant went beyond what
was necessary to defend himself against the unlawful aggression made
by the deceased.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.BENJAMIN GONDAYAO,

alias "BEN", ET AL.
G.R. No. L-26240 October 31, 1969CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
After grappling with Benjamin Gondayao, near the market
place, in the Barrio of Paitan, Municipality of Sual, Province of
Pangasinan, on November 14, 1965, OrlandoPiol appeared to
have, in addition to several lacerations on the head, two stab
wound son the back in consequence of which he died that same

afternoon, due to a
massivei n t e r n a l h e m o r r h a g e . I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e o c
c u r r e n c e , B e n j a m i n a s s u m e d f u l l responsibility for said
injuries, which he claimed to have infl icted in selfdefense. On November 17, 1965, Macario Aquino, Chief of Police
of Sual, filed, with the Municipal Court thereof, a complaint
charging Benjamin Gondayao with homicide. Twelve days later,
Aquino filed an amended complaint charging murder, allegedly committed,
not
onlyb y B e n j a m i n G o n d a y a o , b u t , a l s o , b y h i s b r o t h e r ,
A n o y G o n d a y a o , a n d E d u a r d o Bersamina, Eto Agbayani
and Jovencio Yanday. Soon thereafter, the correspondinginf
ormation for murder was filed, with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, against said five defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the theory
o f s e l f d e f e n s e c a n b e a p p r e c i a t e d i n f a v o r o f Benjamin
Gondayao.
HELD:
It is clear that Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after
disarming
him.C o n s i d e r i n g , m o r e o v e r , t h a t B e n j a m i n h a d p r o v o k
e d t h e i n c i d e n t , b y h u r l i n g uncomplimentary remarks at his
political opponents, one of whom was Piol; that such remarks led to an
altercation with Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him,
hitting him on the head; that when, owing to the impact of said stone, which
couldh a v e r e n d e r e d h i m g r o g g y, a n d t h e l a c e r a t e d i n j u r i e s t
h u s s u s t a i n e d b y h i m , P i o l prepared himself to fight by drawing out
his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting from this act, by
"rushing" to his encounter and grappling with him; and that, accordingly,
Benjamin cannot be given the benefit of either complete or incomplete selfdefense. Although Piol was stabbed from behind, Benjamin did not act with
treachery, for this was merely an incident of their struggle, which had begun
with both contenders facing each other, each prepared for the fight that ensued.

Evident Premeditation
U.S. v. SWEET
1 Phil. 18 (1901)
Facts: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed
an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6
months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without
jurisdiction because hews acting in the line of duty.
Issues:
Whether or not an assault committed by a soldier or military
employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offence under the penal code.
Held:
Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in the
RPC, physical Assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.
Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a military officer in
consequence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on

the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.

SCHNECKENBURGER v. MORAN
63 Phil. 249 (1943)
Facts: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a
private document. He objected to this saying that under the US and
Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his
objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against
him. Aside from this, he contended that original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Issues:
Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, Consuls, et.all and such jurisdiction excludes
courts of the Philippines.
Held

No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic

immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of
the laws of the country where he resides. The inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth on Nov.15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go
into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
This Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court shall
include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.
Therefore, CFI has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for
a writ of prohibition must be denied

RAQUIZA v. BRADFORD
75 Phil. 50 (1948)
Facts: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the
Army MacArthur, petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained
under security commitment order No 385. The petitioners Raquiza, Tee
Han Kee, and Infant were charged with Espionage activity with the
Japanese, active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power for
Commander of the US Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not
questioned. He based proclamation on the reasons that the apprehended
have violated due allegiance to the US and it is a military necessity.
Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.
Issues:
Whether or not the war terminated within the meaning of that
part in the proclamation.
Held:

No. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at
the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority
competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and
not the judicial department, to determine if war has ended. The fact that
delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already
begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already
terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the power of military
authorities to make even before was terminates.

QUACI-RECIDEVISM
People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968
Facts:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring
gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as Sigue-Sigue and OXO were preparing to attend a
mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the
plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved
where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their
respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, OXO members, Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six
among the twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts
confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously killed Sigue-Sigue sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa
and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking
them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby
inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.
Issues
Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the
commission of the crime.
Held:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless
when the law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character
of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

Sycip vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 12059 March 17, 2000
Facts:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel
Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latters project at Bacoor, Cavite. Upon
execution of the contract to sell, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks,
each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.
Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycips
postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent stop payment orders to the bank. When FRC
continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank
advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made
a stop payment order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioners checking
account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC file a complaint against
petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable of the B.P. Blg. 22.

Held:
The trial court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
violation of Sec. 1 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced
ordered to pay the offended party, FRC, as and for actual damages with interest thereon at the
legal rate from date of commencement of these actions, until full payment thereof.

Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioners
and other units of the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, the Court of
Appeals held that the petitioner had a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. Hence, it
said that offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to
the Revised Penal Code, the Code is supplementary to such law. The petitioner, Francisco T.
Sycip, Jr., is acquitted of the charges against him under B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient
evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to
costs.

People vs Regala
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000
Facts:
On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old
victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the formers house.
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen and went to the room of
the victims and poked at 8-inch gun on them, one after the other, and hogtied both of them.
Armando raped Nerissa in bed while her grandmother was hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw
her grandmothers aparador being opened where two rings, two wrist watches, and money were
taken from the aparador. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the
money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and
was raped again by the accused.
He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant appealed his criminal case at the
Regional Trial Court in Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence in
identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr.
Conchita Ulanday, a health officer of Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining witness
either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.

Issue:
Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery is considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Held:

The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot detract from the fact, that
both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified the accused-appellant. As correctly pointed out
by the appellee, the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world
and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a
stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulandays testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant
that the victim voluntarily submitted to sexual advances of Regala.
In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be
considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is
proper. The judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Rape, where the victim is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity. P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay
one-fourth of the costs.

People vs PO3 Fallorina

G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004
Facts:
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and
the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro,
Project 8, Quezon City, asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside.
She agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon Buddha Rodriguez, Vincent played with his
kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina
saw them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After
hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent was
lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellants shouts, Vincent
stood up and looked at the latter. As soon as Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from
the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent
and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned
carinderia and the basketball court.
The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latters hapless body in a waiting tricycle
and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival
caused by a single gunshot wound in the head.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability?
Held:
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and
penalized by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his public
position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00 (paid for funeral
services); P50,000.00 for moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00
as death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the Death Penalty.