2.3.1.

1 Existential presupposition
The existential presuppositions is not only assumed to be present in possessive
constructions (for example, 'your car' `you have a car'), but more generally in any definite
noun phrase. By using any of the expressions in below, the speaker is assumed to be
committed to the existence of the entities named.
[15]The King of Sweden, the cat, the girl next door, the Counting Crows.
Possessive case (existential)
John's children are very noisy.
John has children.

2.3.1.2 Factive presupposition

In this presupposition, consider the following sentences:
[16]

a. Everybody knows that John is gay. (=p)

b. Everybody doesnt know that John is gay. (=NOT p)
c. John is gay. (=q)
d. p>>q & NOT p >>q
There was a different type of presupposition present in [16a] in [16b] the verb know

occurs in a structure, 'Everybody knows that q', with q as the presupposition. The
presupposed information following a verb like 'know' can be treated as a fact, and is
described as a factive presupposition. A number of other verbs, such as 'realize' in [17a.] and
'regret' in [17b.], as well as phrases involving 'be' with 'aware' [17c.], 'odd' [17d], and 'glad'
[17e.] have factive presuppositions.
[17]

a. She didn't realize he was ill.

( He was ill)

b. We regret telling him.

( We told him)

c. I was aware that she was married.

( She was married)

d. It isn't odd that he left early.

( He left early)

e. Im glad that its over.

( Its over)

Factive verbs
Martha regrets drinking John's home brew.
Presupposition: Martha did in fact drink John's home brew.
Frankenstein was aware that Dracula was there.
Presupposition: Dracula was in fact there.
John realized that he was in debt.
Presupposition: John was in fact in debt.
It was odd how proud he was.
Presupposition: He was in fact proud.
Some further factive predicates: know; be sorry that; be proud that; be indifferent that; be
glad that; be sad that, significant, odd, tragic, exciting, relevant, matter, count, make sense,
suffice, amuse, bother. regret, be aware (of), grasp, comprehend, take into consideration, take
into account, bear in mind, ignore, make clear, mind, forget (about), deplore, resent, care
(about).
Temporal clauses (factive)
Before Strawson was even born, Frege noticed presuppositions.
Strawson was born.
While Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics, the rest of social science was asleep.
Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics.
Since Churchill died, we've lacked a leader.
Churchill died.
Further temporal clause constructors: after; during; whenever; as (as in As John was getting
up, he slipped).

Cleft sentences (factive)

Cleft construction: It was Henry that kissed Rosie.
Someone kissed Rosie.
Pseudo-cleft construction: What John lost was his wallet.
John lost something.

Comparisons and contrasts (factive)

Comparisons and contrasts may be marked by stress (or by other prosodic means), by
particles like "too", or by comparatives constructions.
Marianne called Adolph a male chauvinist, and then HE insulted HER.
For Marianne to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him.
Carol is a better linguist than Barbara.
Barbara is a linguist.

2.3.1.3 Lexical presupposition

There are also a number of other forms, which may best be treated as the source of
lexical presuppositions. In lexical presupposition, the use of one form with its asserted
meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted)
meaning is understood. Each time it says that someone 'managed' to do something, the
asserted meaning is that the person succeeded in some way. When it says that someone didnt
manage, the asserted meaning is that the person did not succeed. In both cases, however,
there is a presupposition (non-asserted) that the person 'tried' to do that something. So,
'managed' is conventionally interpreted as asserting `succeeded' and presupposing `tried'.
Other examples, involving the lexical items, 'stop', 'start', and 'min'. are presented. With their
presuppositions, in [17].

[17]

a. He stopped smoking.

( He used to smoke)

b. They started complaining.

( They werent complaining before)

c. You're late again.

( You were late before)

In the case of lexical presupposition, the speaker's use of a particular expression is

taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept, whereas in the case of a factive
presupposition, the use of a particular expression is taken to presuppose the truth of the
information that is stated after it.

Implicative verbs (lexical)

John managed to open the door.
John tried to open the door.
John forgot to lock the door.
John ought to have locked, or intended to lock, the door.
Some further implicative predicates: X happened to VX didn't plan or intend to V; X
avoided VingX was expected to, or usually did, or ought to V, etc.

Change of state verbs (lexical)

John stopped teasing his wife.
John had been teasing his wife.
Joan began teasing her husband.
Joan hadn't been teasing her husband.
Some further change of state verbs: start; finish; carry on; cease; take (as in X took Y from Z
Y was at/in/with Z); leave; enter; come; go; arrive; etc.

Iteratives (lexical)
The flying saucer came again.
The flying saucer came before.
You can't get gobstoppers anymore.
You once could get gobstoppers.
Carter returned to power.
Carter held power before.
Further iteratives: another time; to come back; restore; repeat; for the nth time.

2.3.1.4 Structural presupposition

In addition to presuppositions, which are associated with the use of certain words and
phrases, there are also structural presuppositions. In this case, certain sentence structures have
been analyzed as conventionally and regularly presupposing that part of the structure is
already assumed to be true. It might say that speakers can use such structures to treat
information as presupposed (i.e. assumed to be true) and hence to be accepted as true by the
listener. For example, the wh-question construction in English, as shown in [18a.] and [18b],
is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that the information after the wh-form
(i.e. 'When' and 'Where') is already known to be the case.
[18]

a. When did he leave?

( He left)

b. Where did you buy the bike?

( You bought the bike)

The type of presupposition illustrated in [18] can lead listeners to believe that the
information presented is necessarily true, rather than just the presupposition of the person
asking the question.
Questions (structural)
Presuppose a seeking for what is sought.

2.3.1.5 Non-factive presupposition

There are, however, examples of non factive presuppositions associated with a number
of verbs in English. A non-factive presupposition is one that is assumed not to be true. Verbs
like 'dream', 'imagine', and 'pretend', as shown in [19], are used with the presupposition that
what follows is not true.
[19] a. I dreamed that I was rich.

( I was not rich)

b. We imagined we were in Hawaii.

( We were not in Hawaii)

c. He pretends to be ill.

( He is not ill)

Nonfactive predicates: likely, sure, possible, true, false, seem, appear, happen, chance, turn
out. suppose, assert, allege, assume, claim, charge, maintain, believe, conclude, conjecture,
intimate, deem, fancy, figure.

2.3.1.6 Counter factual presupposition

At the end of the discussion of deixis, a structure that is interpreted with a non-factive
presupposition (If I had a yacht, ...'). Indeed, this type of structure creates a counter-factual
presupposition, meaning that what is presupposed is not only not true, but is the opposite of
what is true, or 'contrary to facts'. A conditional structure of the type shown in [20], generally
called a counterfactual conditional, presupposes that the information in the conditional
sentence is not true at the time of utterance.
[20] If you were my friend, you would have helped me. (>> You are not my friend)

Counterfactual conditionals
If the notice had only said 'mine-field' in Welsh as well as in English, we would never have
lost poor Llewellyn.
The notice didn't say 'mine-field' in Welsh.

2.4.1 Sequentiality
In this relation, there are two types of sequentiality. First, the time of the protasis
precedes the time of the apodosis, as shown in the following example:
[24]

If it rains, the party will be cancelled.

This type is also known as predictive conditional.
The second, the time of the apodosis can precede the time of the protasis as shown in

the following example:

[25]

`If she is a blonde now, she dyed her hair'.

2.4.2 Causality
Dancygier (1998) agrees that the context or the knowledge of the hearer may play an
important role in the causal interpretation of conditional sentences in some cases, but not
always. For example, the knowledge of the hearer may motivate the causal relation between
the two clauses in an example such as [26a] which is quoted from Dancygier (1998, 9),
however, they cannot make a conditional sentence, such as the one in [26b] (which is quoted
from Dancygier (1998, 14)) causal.
[26]

a. `If you add whipped cream, the fruit salad will taste better'.
b. `If you are interested, he is my husband'.
Thus, Dancygier (1998, 84) argues that the causal relation depends on the type of

conditional, whereby `predictive conditionals, which mark a content connection between their
clauses, will be most likely to receive causal or enablement interpretation'. On the contrary,
non-predictive conditionals are open to different kinds of relations between the two clauses.
Meanwhile Sweetser (1990) argues that causal relation in conditional sentences is
understood in the content domain when the two clauses in a conditional sentence refer to the
real world. This domain in the classification of Sweetser (1990) includes all conditional
sentences that have a causal relation between their two clauses.

2.4.3 Epistemic/inferential relations

Epistemic conditional has no sequential or causal relation between the protasis and
apodosis. The following examples which are quoted from Sweetser (1990, 116) and
Dancygier (1998, 86) respectively are epistemic:
[27]

a. `If John went to the party, (then) he was trying to infuriate Miriam'.
b. `If Mary is late, she went to the dentist'.
The causal relation between the clauses in the two examples is in the reverse

direction. That is to say, the fulfillment of the apodosis causes the fulfillment of the protasis.
For example, Mary is late (the protasis) in the last example because she went to the dentist
(the apodosis) (See Dancygier (1990, 1993, 1998) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)).
Sweetser (1990), however, disagrees with the above statement and argues that there is
a causal relation between the clauses in epistemic conditional, whereby the knowledge in the
protasis causes the conclusion in the apodosis.
In addition, Dancygier (1998, 88) suggests two tests for distinguishing epistemic
conditional from other conditionals. Test (1) refers to the use of the epistemic modal must,
whereas test (2) involves using the expression it means that, as shown below respectively:
[28]

a. `If Mary is late, she must have gone to the dentist'.

b. `If Mary is late, it means that she went to the dentist'.

2.4.4 Speech act relations

Similar to epistemic conditionals, the relation between the clauses in speech act
conditionals is not sequential or causal. Sweetser (1990) calls this kind of conditionals
speech-act conditionals. She means that the condition of the performance of the speech act
which is represented in the apodosis is the fulfillment of the protasis. This means that the

protasis enables or causes the speech act in the apodosis. Sweetser (1990, 118) suggests the
following example as an example of speech act conditionals:
[29]

`If I have not already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go'.
This example can be paraphrased as If I have not already asked you to do so consider

that I ask you to sign the guest book before you go.

2.4.5 Metatextual relations

At this relation, Dancygier (1998) refers to Austins (1961, in Dancygier 1998)
conditionals famous sentence:
[30]

If you are hungry, there are biscuits on the sideboard.

In the Austin example above, then, the if-clause does not qualify the appropriateness

of asserting that there are biscuits on the sideboard, but gives a justification for offering
biscuits to the hearer.