G.R. No.

142676

June 6, 2011

EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 146718
EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES SAMUEL GO CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, and THE BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muoz (Muoz) is seeking the reversal, annulment, and setting
aside of the Decision1 dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders3 dated June 10, 1994 and August
5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 (RTC-Branch 88) of Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-94-20632. The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case instituted by
Muoz against Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. (Atty. Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC Order4
dated May 16, 1994, granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which restored possession of the subject property to Muoz.
In G.R. No. 146718, Muoz is praying for the reversal, setting aside, and nullification of the
Decision5 dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution6 dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which affirmed the Orders7 dated August 21, 1995 and
October 3, 1995 of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 (RTC-Branch 95) in Civil Case No. Q28580 denying Muozs Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of
the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 532978 against respondents Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan).
I
FACTS
The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City,
formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching),
1

Muozs sister. Muoz lived at the subject property with the spouses Ching. As consideration for
the valuable services rendered by Muoz to the spouses Chings family, Yee L. Ching agreed to
have the subject property transferred to Muoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly
executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz,9 the latter acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 186306 covering the subject property in her name on December 22, 1972.10 However,
in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muoz purportedly sold the subject
property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No.
186366 was issued in Emilia M. Chings name. Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses
Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses
Gos names.
On October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No.
258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, on October 16, 1979, Muoz filed a complaint for the
annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the
cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names, and the restoration and revival of
TCT No. 186306 in Muozs name. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-28580 and
raffled to RTC-Branch 95. On October 17, 1979, Muoz caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. In an Order dated December 17, 1979, the RTCBranch 95 granted the spouses Gos motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in possession of the subject property.
The writ was implemented by the sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving Muoz and her housemates
away from the subject property.
Muoz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, assailing the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 10148. The appellate court dismissed Muozs petition on January 4, 1980. Yee L. Ching and
his son Frederick M. Ching filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No.
10148 and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Court of Appeals issued
a TRO. However, in a Resolution dated March 18, 1980, the appellate court denied the motion to
intervene of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the TRO previously issued.
Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching challenged before this Court, in G.R. No. 53463, the
Resolution dated March 18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals. Eventually, in a Resolution dated June
3, 1981, the Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 53463, for lack of merit and failure of Yee
L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching to substantially show that the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of
Appeals gravely abused their discretion. In a subsequent Resolution dated June 21, 1982, the
Court clarified that its Resolution of June 3, 1981 was without prejudice to the continuation of
the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still pending before the trial court, "in order that proper
and final adjudication may be made of whether or not the deed of sale by Emerita L. Muoz in
favor of Emilia M. Ching is a real, genuine and authentic transaction, thereby to settle once and
for all the issue of ownership of the property herein in question."11
Trial in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-Branch 95.
In the meantime, Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 was
cancelled on October 28, 1982 on the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of the spouses
2

Go.12 The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI
Family) and to secure the same, they constituted a mortgage on the subject property on
November 23, 1982.13 When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family
foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the highest bidder at the auction sale of the subject
property. The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption within the prescribed
period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject property in its name on October
23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364.14 Apparently, the original copy of TCT No. 370364 was among
those razed in the fire at the Quezon City Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988. As a result of the
administrative reconstitution of the lost title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI
Family. On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Samuel Go Chan
and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale15 covering the subject property for
and in consideration of P3,350,000.00. Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) in the name
of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was issued in the spouses Chans names on
January 28, 1991.16 The spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI Family on October 2, 1992 for
the construction of a building on the subject property, and to secure the same, constituted a
mortgage on the subject property in favor of BPI Family.17
On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision18 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, against
Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that
Muozs signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged; that
Muoz never sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go
were not innocent purchasers for value of the subject property. The fallo of the said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et
al.s] respective counterclaims, cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim, declaring as null and void
ab initio the following documents, to wit: (a) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972,
copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds
for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. N; (c) Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d) TCT No. 258977 of
the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh.
4, and directing defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the
subject property the registrations of all the said documents and to restore and revive, free from
all liens and encumbrances, TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of
which is marked in evidence as Exh. L, as well as ordering defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go
Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees and to pay the costs of suit. The court also hereby dismisses the rest of the claims
in [Muozs] complaint, there being no satisfactory warrant therefor.19
Emilia M. Ching, et al.s, appeal of the foregoing judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 33811 before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision20 dated March 4, 1993,
the appellate court not only affirmed the appealed judgment, but also ordered the spouses Go and
their successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject
property, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs
against [Emilia M. Ching, et al.]. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on
December 17, 1979 is hereby set aside and declared dissolved. Defendants-appellants Go and
Tan, their successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf, are ordered to
vacate the disputed premises and to deliver the same to [Muoz] immediately upon receipt of
this decision.21
Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion for extension of time to file their petition
for review, which was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 109260. However, they failed to file
their intended petition within the extended period which expired on April 23, 1993. In a
Resolution22 dated July 12, 1993, the Court declared G.R. No. 109260 terminated. The
Resolution dated July 12, 1993 of the Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and executory on
July 15, 1993 and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on even date.23
More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of
execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came forward and
filed before the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution as
Against Spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida Chan,24 opposing the writ of execution issued in
Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and possession of the subject
property on the basis of a clean title registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. The spouses
Chan further contended that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 could not be executed
against them since they were not parties to the said case; they were not successors-in-interest,
assigns, or acting on behalf of the spouses Go; and they purchased the subject property from BPI
Family without any notice of defect in the latters title.
It was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the cancellation on
October 28, 1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the spouses Gos
TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent events that led to the transfer and registration of the title to
the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan.
In its Order25 dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chans urgent
motion to stop the execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the photocopy of TCT No.
370364 in the name of BPI Family, submitted by the spouses Chan with their motion, could
hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
annotated therein were also missing from the original copy of said certificate of title. Muozs
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were annotated on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos
names as P.E.-8078 and P.E.-8178, respectively. So when TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go
was cancelled and TCT No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it could be presumed that the
Register of Deeds regularly performed his official duty by carrying over Muozs adverse claim
and notice of lis pendens to TCT No. 370364. In addition, the RTC-Branch 95 pointed out that in
this jurisdiction, the entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book of the Register of Deeds
was already sufficient notice to the whole world of the dispute over the subject property, and
there was no more need to annotate the same on the owners duplicate of the certificate of title.
Finally, the RTC-Branch 95 held that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family and TCT No.
4

53297 of the spouses Chan shall be subject to the reservation under Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 2626 "[t]hat certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections
five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property
was duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which
has not been made on the reconstituted certificate of title." Thus, the spouses Chan were deemed
to have taken the disputed property subject to the final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-28580.
On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of Execution.27 On January 10,
1994, the writ was enforced, and possession of the subject property was taken from the spouses
Chan and returned to Muoz.28 In its Orders dated April 8, 1994 and June 17, 1994, the RTCBranch 95 denied the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal,
respectively.29
G.R. No. 142676
Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and
notice of appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muoz instituted before the MeTC on February 4,
1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction30 against
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, docketed as Civil Case No. 8286. Muoz alleged in her
complaint that she had been in actual and physical possession of the subject property since
January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards for the said property. On
February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of whom
were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and
intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to vacate
the subject property. Muoz additionally prayed for judgment making the mandatory injunction
permanent and directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut to pay Muoz: (1) compensation for
the unlawful occupation of the subject property in the amount of P50,000.00 per month,
beginning February 2, 1994 until the said property is fully and completely turned over to Muoz;
(2) attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per court appearance of Muozs
counsel; and (3) costs of suit.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is
the valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject property. Samuel Go Chan
and Atty. Yabut averred that the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of Possession dated
January 10, 1994 attached to Muozs complaint as proof that the subject property had been
placed in her possession is a falsified document. The Writ of Execution issued on September
20, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had already expired and the Sheriffs Return on the Writ
another document purporting to show that possession of the subject property was turned-over to
Muoz on January 10, 1994 was then being challenged in a complaint before the Office of
Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme Court. Samuel Go Chans
possession of the subject property has never been interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan, resided at
the subject property and was never removed therefrom. On February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at
the subject property only to protect the rights and interest of his client, Samuel Go Chan, and
since the latters possession of the subject property had never been interrupted, Atty. Yabut
entered the same peacefully, without intimidation, force, or stealth. The other people at the
5

subject property on February 2, 1994 were there to attend the services at the Buddhist Temple
which occupied the fourth floor of the building erected by the spouses Chan on the subject
property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, thus, asked the MeTC to dismiss Muozs complaint
for lack of merit and legal basis.31
The MeTC received evidence from the parties on whether a writ of preliminary injunction should
be issued, as prayed for by Muoz. In its Order dated May 16, 1994, the MeTC adjudged that the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was already executed against the spouses Chan and
there was, indeed, a turn-over of possession of the subject property to Muoz. Accordingly, the
MeTC granted Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
restoring possession of the subject property to Muoz.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order through a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction32
before the RTC-Branch 88, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. They asserted
that they were not bound by the execution of the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case
No. Q-28580 as they were not parties to the said case. Muoz, on the other hand, argued that the
MeTC Order of May 16, 1994 was an interlocutory order, and under Section 19 of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order issued by the court is
one of the prohibited pleadings and motions in summary proceedings.
In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994.
On August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another Order resolving Muozs motion to
dismiss the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated June 10, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and motion to resolve with additional grounds for dismissal. According to the RTCBranch 88, the MeTC failed to distinguish the issue of finality of the judgment of the RTCBranch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the assertions of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
that the spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment because they are not successors-ininterest, assigns, or privies of the spouses Go and they are purchasers of the subject property in
good faith. The issue of whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the
spouses Chan was then still being litigated in the same case before RTC-Branch 95, where the
spouses Chans motion for reconsideration of the denial of their notice of appeal was pending.
The RTC-Branch 88 further found that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing Muozs complaint for forcible entry on the ground of "lis pendens," as the issue as to
who between Muoz and the spouses Chan had the better right to possession of the subject
property was the subject of the pending proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTCBranch 95. In the end, the RTC-Branch 88 decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment
(a) Denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Muoz for lack of merit;

(b) Denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent Muoz for the recall and/or
setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction granted to petitioners;
(c) Declaring the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman
in Civil Case No. 8286 illegal and therefore null and void; and
(d) Dismissing the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on ground of lis pendens.
Without pronouncement as to costs.33
Muoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 before
the Court of Appeals. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35322. Aside from the
nullification of the two orders, Muoz additionally prayed for the dismissal from the service of
the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge and the disbarment of Atty. Yabut.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the appealed orders of RTCBranch 88. The Court of Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the forcible entry
case on the ground of "lis pendens"; that the spouses Chan were not parties in Civil Case No. Q28580, and impleading them only in the execution stage of said case vitiated their right to due
process; that the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the spouses Chan in Civil Case No. Q28580 was null and void, considering that they are strangers to the case, and they are innocent
purchasers for value of the subject property; that the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled
from the spouses Gos certificate of title at the time they mortgaged the subject property to BPI
Family; and that the title to the subject property was already free of any and all liens and
encumbrances when the spouses Chan purchased the said property from BPI Family. The Court
of Appeals, in its Resolution dated March 9, 2000, denied Muozs motion for reconsideration.
G.R. No. 146718
Meanwhile, Muoz filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a Motion to Cite
the Register of Deeds in Contempt of Court for the failure of the Register of Deeds to restore
Muozs TCT No. 186306 despite having been served with a copy of the writ of execution on
October 11, 1993. In its Judgment (on the Contempt Proceedings against the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City Samuel C. Cleofe)34 dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs
motion, convinced that the Register of Deeds had a valid excuse for his inability to implement
the served writ. The Register of Deeds could not cancel the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297, the
subsisting certificate of title over the subject property, absent any authority or directive for him to
do so. The directive in the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 and the writ of execution
for the same only pertained to the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977.
Thereafter, Muoz filed a Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan and a Second Motion
for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz also filed a Motion for an Alias
Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
53297,35 in which she prayed for the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the Register
of Deeds not only to cancel TCT No. 258977 and all documents declared null and void ab initio
in the dispositive portion of the Decision36 dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case
7

No. Q-28580, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances Muozs TCT No.
186306, but likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering the subject property, TCT
No. 53297.
In its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muozs aforementioned
motions. The RTC-Branch 95 was of the view that Samuel Go Chans title should be litigated in
another forum, not in Civil Case No. Q-28580 where the judgment had already become final and
executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also stressed that since the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580
had long become final and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended except for
clerical error or mistake. Accordingly, the RTC-Branch 95 resolved as follows:
1. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muozs] first and second motions for
contempt and hereby absolves respondents Samuel Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty.
Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr., and several John Does of the Contempt Charges against them.
2. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the
Courts Deputy Sheriff:
(a) Defendants Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their successors-in-interest and assigns
and those acting on their behalf to vacate the disputed premises and deliver the
same to [Muoz];
(b) Defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the
subject property the registration of all the following documents, to wit: (1) "Deed
of Absolute Sale" dated December 28, 1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 186366 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (3) "Deed of
Absolute Sale" dated July 16, 1979; and (4) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of
Deeds for Metro Manila II, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and
encumbrances TCT No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City; and
(c) Defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally
to pay [Muoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the
cost of suit.37
Unrelenting, Muoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory Order, pointing out that the spouses Chan
are the present occupants of the subject property. The Order dated August 21, 1995 of the RTCBranch 95 directed the deputy sheriff to deliver the subject property to Muoz, and this could not
be done unless the spouses Chan are evicted therefrom. Resultantly, Muoz prayed that "a
clarificatory order be made categorically stating that the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C.
Chan, and all persons claiming right under them, are likewise evicted from the subject premises
pursuant to the Order of 21 August 1995."38
Once more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion in its Order dated October 3, 1995. The
RTC-Branch 95 reiterated the rule that after the judgment had become final, only clerical errors,
as distinguished from substantial errors, can be amended by the court. Furthermore, when the
decision or judgment sought to be amended is promulgated by an appellate court, it is beyond the
8

power of the trial court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or modify. Ultimately, the RTC-Branch
95 pronounced that it was "restrained x x x to consider as mere clerical error the exclusion of
spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in the Decision of the Court dated July 19, 1991, a
final judgment, which judgment cannot now be made to speak a different language."39
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its Orders
dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995, Muoz filed before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus, which was remanded to the Court of Appeals in observance of the
hierarchy of courts, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision on September 29, 2000 dismissing Muozs petition. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the RTC-Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could not be covered by the alias
writ of execution considering that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The
cancellation of TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chans names could not be done apart from a
separate action exclusively for that matter. The spouses Chan are deemed buyers in good faith
and for value as the certificate of title delivered to them by BPI Family was free from any liens
or encumbrances or any mark that would have raised the spouses Chans suspicions. Every
person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the
circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The Court of Appeals
denied Muozs motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001.
Muoz comes before this Court via the present consolidated petitions.
Muoz posits that the final judgment and writ of execution of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No.
Q-28580 bind not only Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, but also their successors-in-interest,
assigns, or persons acting on their behalf, namely, BPI Family and spouses Chan. The spouses
Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers for value of the property since the cancellation of
the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977 is completely
null and void.
Muoz further argues that the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 in Civil Case No. 8286 correctly
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring possession of the
subject property to her, as she had already acquired prior possession of the said property upon the
execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Also, the spouses Chans petition for
certiorari before the RTC-Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, challenging the
Order dated May 16, 1994 of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286, is a prohibited pleading under
the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-Branch 88 and the Court of Appeals should be
faulted for giving due course to the said petition even in the absence of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in their comments to the two petitions at bar, the spouses Chan, Atty. Yabut,
and BPI Family assert that given the peculiar factual circumstances of the case, RTC-Branch 88
was justified in taking cognizance of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabuts petition for certiorari in
Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that Muoz is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTCBranch 88 after participating in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that the spouses
Chans title to the subject property is not affected by the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, and the said judgment cannot be executed against the spouses Chan
9

since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they the successors-in-interest, assigns, or
persons acting on behalf of Emilia M. Ching or the spouses Go; that BPI Family and
consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained title to the subject property as innocent purchasers for
value, there being no notice of any infirmity in said title; and that Muoz is guilty of forum
shopping for filing her petition in G.R. No. 146718 even while her petition in G.R. No. 142676 is
still pending.
II
RULING
For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition in G.R. No.
146718.
G.R. No. 146718
Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muozs complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute
sale dated December 28, 197240 and July 16, 1979,41 the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT
No. 258977, and the restoration and revival of Muozs TCT No. 186306. The final judgment of
RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muoz and against Emilia M. Ching
and the spouses Go. The problem arose when during the pendency of the said case, title and
possession of the subject property were transferred from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and
finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the spouses Chan were never impleaded as parties
and were not referred to in the dispositive portion of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q28580.
Muoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated August 21, 1995 denying her Motion
for Contempt against the spouses Chan, Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan
and Atty. Yabut, and Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the
Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the Order dated October 3, 1995 denying
her Motion for Clarificatory Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q28580, and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. In sum, Muoz was
seeking in her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical order from the RTC-Branch 95 that the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the spouses Chan; and (2) the
surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 and restoration of Muozs
TCT No. 186306.
There is no merit in Muozs petition in G.R. No. 146718.
Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,42 we described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has
been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. Although the decree is
recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not
necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary
action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is
10

always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A
notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the
institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third
person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.43 (Emphases ours.)
The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a
land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the
parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to
deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties
and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action
for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is
a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it
concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded.44
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil Case
No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The
effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply
issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the
court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the
judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.45
A similar situation existed in Dino v. Court of Appeals,46 where we resolved that:
As the registered owner of the subject property, petitioners are not bound by decision in Civil
Case No. R-18073 for they were never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. 73069 was already cancelled at the time petitioners purchased the subject
property. While it is true that petitioners are indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073,
without whom no complete relief could be accorded to the private respondents, the fact still
remains that petitioners were never actually joined as defendants in said case. Impleading
petitioners as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said case violated petitioners
right to due process as no notice of lis pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of
said property nor were petitioners given notice of the pending case, therefore petitioners remain
strangers in said case and the Order of the trial court involving them is null and void, considering
that petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for value.47
We further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, clearly provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." Herein, several Torrens titles were already issued after the cancellation of
Muozs. Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia M. Ching, spouses Go, BPI
Family, and spouses Chan. Civil Case No. Q-28580, in which a final judgment had already been
rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of title of Emilia M. Ching and

11

the spouses Go only. To have the present certificate of title of the spouses Chan cancelled,
Muoz must institute another case directly attacking the validity of the same.
The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were
already declared null and void ab initio by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is not
enough, for it does not automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI Family and the spouses
Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio.
It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a valid
title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go
beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition
of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded
and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode
public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.48
Hence, we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.49:
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner's own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no
longer part of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties
holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to
mind what we have reechoed in Pino v. Court of Appeals and the cases therein cited:
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of a
previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its
source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of
Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale
may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred from
the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.50
(Emphases ours.)
Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that the titles
of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet no similar determination
on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The question of whether or not the titles to the
subject property of BPI Family and the spouses Chan are null and void, since they are merely the
successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, ultimately
depends on the issue of whether or not BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles to
the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of Muozs adverse claim and knowledge of the
pendency of Civil Case No. Q-28580. The latter is a factual issue on which we cannot rule in the
present petition, not only because we are not a trier of facts, but more importantly, because it was
not among the issues raised and tried in Civil Case No. Q-28580.

12

In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and the spouses Go,
Muoz cites our ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,51 in relation to De la
Cruz v. De la Cruz.52
De la Cruz is an action for reconveyance of Lot 671 founded on breach of trust filed by
Augustina de la Cruz, et al., against Lucia dela Cruz (Lucia) and Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK). We
upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 671 by Lucia to INK, and thereby validated the title of INK
to the said property.
Calalang actually involved two petitions: (1) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
originally filed by Virginia Calalang (Calalang) before this Court, and (2) a petition for
injunction with damages originally filed by Augusto M. de Leon (De Leon), et al., before the
RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767. Calalang and De Leon, et al., assert titles that
were adverse to that of INK. De Leon, et al., in particular, claim that their titles to Lot 671 were
derived from Amando Clemente. Calalang and De Leon, et al., sought from the court orders
enjoining INK from building a fence to enclose Lot 671; requiring the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to conduct an
investigation of the anomaly regarding Lucias reconstituted title to Lot 671; and dismissing the
proceedings instituted by the Register of Deeds for the cancellation of their titles. We dismissed
the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., on the ground of res judicata, the legality or validity
of the title of INK over Lot 671 had been settled with finality in De la Cruz. De la Cruz was
applied to Calalang and De Leon, et al., since the facts on which such decision was predicated
continued to be the facts on which the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., were based.
Muozs reliance on Calalang is misplaced. There are substantial differences in the facts and
issues involved in Calalang and the present case.
In Calalang, there is duplication or overlapping of certificates of title issued to different persons
over the same property. We already upheld in De la Cruz the validity of the certificate of title of
INK over Lot 671, which effectively prevents us from recognizing the validity of any other
certificate of title over the same property. In addition, Lucia, the predecessor-in-interest of INK,
had her certificate of title judicially reconstituted. The judicial reconstitution of title is a
proceeding in rem, constituting constructive notice to the whole world. Hence, we rejected the
petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., to enjoin INK from building a fence enclosing Lot 671,
and the concerned public authorities from instituting appropriate proceedings to have all other
certificates of title over Lot 671 annulled and cancelled.
In the instant case, there has been no duplication or overlapping of certificates of title. The
subject property has always been covered by only one certificate of title at a time, and at present,
such certificate is in the spouses Chans names. As we have previously discussed herein, Muoz
cannot have the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for the issuance of
an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses Chan were not parties to
the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in personam, and the final judgment
rendered therein declaring null and void the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching
and the spouses Go should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore, despite the void titles of

13

Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, the derivative titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan
may still be valid provided that they had acquired the same in good faith and for value.
More in point with the instant petition is Pineda v. Santiago.53 Pineda still involved Lot 671. INK
sought from the RTC a second alias writ of execution to implement the judgment in Calalang
against Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et. al. In opposing the issuance of such writ, Pineda, et al.,
asserted that they held titles to Lot 671 adverse to those of Lucia and INK and that they were not
parties in De la Cruz or in Calalang. In its assailed order, the RTC granted the second alias writ
of execution on the basis that the issue of ownership of Lot 671 was already determined with
finality in favor of Lucia and INK. The writ ordered the deputy sheriff to eject Pineda, et al.,
from Lot 671. When the matter was brought before us, we annulled the assailed order as the writ
of execution issued was against Pineda, et al., who were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-45767,
the ejectment suit instituted by De Leon, et al. We elaborated in Pineda that:
Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of an action in personam. In
Domagas v. Jensen, we have explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated some
actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz:
"The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is
brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled
that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions
for recovery of real property are in personam."
The respondent judge's jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the injunction suit. To
stress, the petition for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein
petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio, Felicidad Vergara Vda. De
Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando M. Vitug II, Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia,
and later amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso as additional
petitioners therein, against Bishop Erao Manalo, in his capacity as titular and spiritual head of
I.N.K. Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties thereto. Any and all orders
and writs of execution, which the respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be
enforced only against those parties and not against the herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al.
In issuing the assailed Order dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias
14

Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the respondent judge clearly went out
of bounds and committed grave abuse of discretion.
The nature of the injunction suit Civil Case No. Q-45767 as an action in personam in the
RTC remains to be the same whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An
action in personam does not become an action in rem just because a pronouncement confirming
I.N.K.'s title to Lot 671 was made by this Court in the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be
made by this Court, as the Highest Court of the Land, in actions in personam but such rulings are
binding only as against the parties therein and not against the whole world. Here lies another
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he relied on the Calalang
decision in his assailed Order dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against the whole world,
saying:
"After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the decision of the
Supreme Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual head
Bishop Erao G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do
no less but to follow and give substantial meaning to its ownership which shall include all
dominical rights by way of a Writ of Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ is a denial of
justice due the I.N.K."
As a final word, this decision shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling in
Calalang. The final ruling on I.N.K.'s ownership and title is not at all affected. Private respondent
I.N.K., as the true and lawful owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply has to
file the proper action against the herein petitioners to enforce its property rights within the
bounds of the law and our rules. I.N.K.'s recourse of asking for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in
said case, granting I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of execution against the present
petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken
down.54 (Emphases ours.)
Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended by the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of
Appeals in the present case, Muozs legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate action the
validity of the certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.
G.R. No. 142676
G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry
case she instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession
is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of
the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation,
15

threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is
determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties
who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner
himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs
merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.55
Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who had prior
physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior
possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that
it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.56
We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals57 that:
Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery
of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal
possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of
physical possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the
property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold
relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession
de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both
parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved
by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property,
the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold
respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an
ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.58 (Emphases ours.)
Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At the time said
case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a
hearing on and eventually granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Muoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in prior possession of
the subject property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January 10, 1994, pursuant
to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to implement the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of who was in prior possession of the subject property
should be litigated between the parties regardless of whether or not the final judgment in Civil
16

Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter issue in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No.
8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases could proceed
independently of one another.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses Chan have never lost possession of the
subject property since acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990. This is a worthy defense to
Muozs complaint for forcible entry, which Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should
substantiate with evidence in the continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before
the MeTC.
In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, Section 19 whereof provides:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
xxxx
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the
court.
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule
prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.59
Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of
the case or put an end to the proceedings.60 An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether
mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.611avvphil
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC in its Order dated May 16,
1994, directing that Muoz be placed in possession of the subject property during the course of
Civil Case No. 8286, is an interlocutory order. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut assailed the said
order before the RTC-Branch 88 via a petition for certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9420632. The RTC-Branch 88 gave due course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC
Order dated May 16, 1994 null and void, but went further by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286.
The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its
further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.62 The petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 is clearly covered by the said prohibition, thus, it
should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch 88. While the circumstances involved in
Muozs forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly very
peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
17

circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.63
Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to
Muoz in the event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muoz the
possession of the subject property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such
possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994 by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth). Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718
that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the spouses Chan, who
were not impleaded as parties to the said case the MeTC is precluded from granting to Muoz
relief, whether preliminary or final, that will give her possession of the subject property.
Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful execution of the final judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-28580. Based on the same reason, Muoz can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the
MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in
possession of the subject property during the course of the trial. Muoz though may recover
damages if she is able to prove wrongful deprivation of possession of the subject property from
February 2, 1994 until the finality of this decision in G.R. No. 146718.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we:
(1) GRANT Emerita Muozs petition in G.R. No. 142676. We REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June 10,
1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon
City to reinstate Emerita Muozs complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286
and to resume the proceedings only to determine whether or not Emerita Muoz was
forcibly deprived of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until
finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an award for damages
for deprivation of possession during the aforementioned period of time; and
(2) DENY Emerita Munozs petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit, and AFFIRM
the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed the Orders dated
August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95 of Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

18

G.R. No. 152643

August 28, 2008

CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C.

CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19,
petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 15, 2001 and its Resolution2 dated March 12,
2002. The CA decision set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25, 20003
granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras (Concepcions) motion to take deposition,
and dated November 3, 20004 denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G.
Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated
October 27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed
as Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Hence, the criminal case.6
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation
in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastrointestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.7
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in
Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil
Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first
be resolved.8 On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.9

19

This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking
the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 60266 and remains pending before the appellate court to date.10
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition.11
He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition
and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be
taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.12 The respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural
technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion
was already of advanced age.13 After several motions for change of venue of the depositiontaking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.14
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a special civil
action for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.15
On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision16 favorable to the respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and November 3,
2000 orders of the court a quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition that may have
been taken on the authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.17
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents petition by not
impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution
witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate
court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus,
in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. 18
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA
added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is
the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court
likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was
adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.19
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
20

WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES" IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL
CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.20
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead
the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously
defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition.21
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.22
In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in the
interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the
People of the Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the
opportunity to refute the respondents arguments.
Instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer23 in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one
and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are
correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.24
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite the procedural
defect.

21

On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case,
we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face.26 It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility
of said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules
are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus
comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as
an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination
after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf
of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119
is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule
119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick
or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been
too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her
outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination
during the trial proper.

22

Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right
to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate
that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question
and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking
her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The
appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City
erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court
where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the
previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in
good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court
of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein," the
examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the
case is pending."32
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be
made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is
nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies
only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is
kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated.33
When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room
for application.34
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil
procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
23

pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to
depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More
importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when the
witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony to prove its case,
we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

24

G.R. No. 166620

April 20, 2010

ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, RADITO V. PADRIGANO, JEAN

R. DE MESA, LEAH P. DELA CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B. CORDOBA,
ALBERT BRILLANTES, GLORIA BISDA, JOVITA V. CONCEPCION, TERESITA G.
CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T. MALIWANAG, RICHARD ODERON, CECILIA
ESTERNON, BENEDICTO CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA E. LAROCO, CESAR ANDRA,
FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA, FILOMENA A. GALANG, JEAN PAUL
MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO, JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, REYNALDO O.
ANDAL, NEPHTALIE IMPERIO, RUEL BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ,
FRANCISCO P. REYES, JR., ELISEO M. BALAGOT, JR., JOSE C. MONSALVE, JR.,
ARTURO ADSUARA, F.C. LADRERO, JR., NELSON PADUA, MARCELA C. SAYAO,
ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO, JULIANA SUPLEO, MANUEL
MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA BOBIS, DANILO VARGAS, ROY-LEO C.
PABLO, ALLAN VILLANUEVA, VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA ERENO,
FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL R. BASCO, E. JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN,
DOLORES M. AVIADO, MICHAEL P. LAPLANA, GUILLERMO G. SORIANO, ALICE
E. SOJO, ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA SORIANO, FEDERICO RAMOS, JR.,
PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO L. GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR.,
ANTONIO GALO, A. SANCHEZ, SOL E. TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. COCJIN,
DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN MARIANO, M.A. MALANUM, ALFREDO S.
ESTRELLA, and JESUS MEL SAYO, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, The Director General of
the Philippine Information Agency and The National Treasurer, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on
their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino
(President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 2851 which provided, among others, the
creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing
units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National
Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing
25

units of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction
over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national,
provincial, city and municipal governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act,
Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information
Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications,
aside from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects
of the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and
promulgated in accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378,
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 378, in turn, provide:
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and
instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction
over the printing services requirements of the government over standard and accountable forms.
It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election paraphernalia
which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the
Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the Election Code of 1987.
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services outside NPO
provided that:
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and at
a lower cost than what is offered by the NPO; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting the target completion
time of the government agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated for the programs,
projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited to
its income without additional financial support from the government. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
26

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by
former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive
Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
We dismiss the petition.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a procedural
matter. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if
the petition indeed qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,2 we held that "[c]ourts must
exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of
joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is
favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who
were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of
due process."
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of
them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have
the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company,3 the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or
other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit,
the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number
of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the
members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
27

court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to
determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of
general or common interest. (Emphases ours.)
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the
assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor
General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the
NPO.4 The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom
they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of
Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,5 ostensibly reducing the
number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the
desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due
to pressure from people "close to the seat of power."6 Still, even if we were to disregard the
affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient,
representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of
the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly
subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners effectively
instituted the present case.
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc.,7 we
observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation.
In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court
must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the
other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total
membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to
speak for the rest of the class.
Previously, we held in Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church8 that where the interests of the plaintiffs
and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class
suit will not prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,9 to which the previously mentioned
Affidavit of Desistance10 was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office
Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to
the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the contention of
petitioners counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation,
the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the
members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit.
There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners interests and those of the persons whom
they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests
of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to assail the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 378:

28

First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by
the mere issuance of another executive order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain
that former President Aquinos Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the same
was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution;11
thus, only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the
eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,12 the Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or
the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
the said Code, is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject
to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments
or agencies. (Emphases ours.)
Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book
III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
29

economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA
312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau
attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.13 (Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary
(which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary
or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.14
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above
authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice
versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President
Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President
Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the President
implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and
internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions of such
executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions
to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO
remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and
publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it
must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the
exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO,
together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine.
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity
of its printing responsibility to election forms.15
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to
agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as
seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides:

30

Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise
such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws
and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under
Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be
sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to reorganize executive
offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,16 the Court likewise adverted to certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory bases
for the Presidents power to reorganize executive agencies, to wit:
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
"Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch.
The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify
their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil [service] rules and
regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President."
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices
only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of
creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides
that:
"Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed
by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be
funded from appropriations by this Act."
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational
changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well
settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and
until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid
and binding for all intents and purposes.17 (Emphases ours)
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,18 where the Court upheld as valid then President Joseph
Estradas Executive Order No. 191 "deactivating" the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) of the Department of Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning in Larin. The Court,
among others, also traced from the General Appropriations Act19 the Presidents authority to
effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure, thus:
31

We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the
President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive
structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this
law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive
Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates,
missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b)
identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section
78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in
agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. x x x.20 (Emphasis ours)
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004
(the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority
to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the Executive
Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides:
Section 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President
of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from
appropriations provided by this Act.
Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity Improvement in Agency Organization
and Operations and Implementation of Organization/Reorganization Mandated by Law. The
Government shall adopt institutional strengthening and productivity improvement measures to
improve service delivery and enhance productivity in the government, as directed by the
President of the Philippines. The heads of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other
entities of the Executive Branch shall accordingly conduct a comprehensive review of their
respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems
and procedures; identify areas where improvements are necessary; and implement corresponding
structural, functional and operational adjustments that will result in streamlined organization and
operations and improved performance and productivity: PROVIDED, That actual streamlining
and productivity improvements in agency organization and operations, as authorized by the
President of the Philippines for the purpose, including the utilization of savings generated from
such activities, shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM,
upon consultation with the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in the implementation of organizations/reorganizations, or specific changes in
agency structure, functions and operations as a result of institutional strengthening or as
mandated by law, the appropriation, including the functions, projects, purposes and activities of
agencies concerned may be realigned as may be necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any
unexpended balances or savings in appropriations may be made available for payment of
retirement gratuities and separation benefits to affected personnel, as authorized under existing
laws. (Emphases and underscoring ours.)

32

Implicitly, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law recognize the power of the
President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act,
including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the
executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be
necessary under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the
NPOs appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily
authorized by the above provisions.
In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,21 we upheld the
"streamlining" of the National Tobacco Administration through a reduction of its personnel and
deemed the same as included in the power of the President to reorganize executive offices
granted under the laws, notwithstanding that such streamlining neither involved an abolition nor
a transfer of functions of an office. To quote the relevant portion of that decision:
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the
Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of
Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. x x x
xxxx
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding numbered
paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to
the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section
31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and
(3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to
transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency and
vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency and vice-versa.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is
a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining
the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the
authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate
court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.22 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,23
which involved a structural and functional reorganization of the Department of Health under an
executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the President to reorganize agencies
under the executive department by executive or administrative order is constitutionally and
statutorily recognized. We held in that case:

33

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject
to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
xxxx
In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court explained the rationale behind the
Presidents continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the
Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it
must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the
President Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the President are
identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the Office of the
President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the
Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that
are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
xxxx
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in
general appropriations laws. x x x.
xxxx
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to
issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No.
102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive
department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other
statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.24 (Emphases supplied.)

34

Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary25 that:

The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive
action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all
existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with
existing laws and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an
executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is
primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the
power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a
law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.26
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated
legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to
reorganize the Office of the President, "in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office
through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III of the said Code provide:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders. (Emphases supplied.)
To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in Executive Order No. 378 limiting
the appropriation of the NPO to its own income. Beginning with Larin and in subsequent cases,
the Court has noted certain provisions in the general appropriations laws as likewise reflecting
the power of the President to reorganize executive offices or agencies even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Petitioners contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is an invalid exercise of
legislative power on the part of the President has no legal leg to stand on.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in
order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the
functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a self35

reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President
Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As
pointed out in the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, the objective behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the
state policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act to
encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private contracting parties who are
eligible and qualified.271avvphi1
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the
President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include
the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it
must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive
department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.
In this regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this Court in Dario v. Mison28
that:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which
is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
"abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of
ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)
Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive
branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good
faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of
security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora,29 we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.30
This brings us to the second ground raised in the petition that Executive Order No. 378, in
allowing government agencies to secure their printing requirements from the private sector and
in limiting the budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition of
the NPO and the loss of security of tenure of its present employees. In other words, petitioners
avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith.
The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the
burden of proving it.31
36

A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their claim.
They failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPOs
budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from
office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that
the changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do
with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyos issuance of
Executive Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

37

G.R. No. 148606

June 30, 2008

CHARLES LIMBAUAN, petitioner,

vs.
FAUSTINO ACOSTA, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner seeks to set aside and annul the Decision1 dated June 26, 2001 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA), Thirteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144.
The CA decision affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 125, dated March 12, 1998 which also affirmed the decision3 dated December 29,
1997 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Caloocan City, Branch 52, ordering herein
petitioner to surrender possession of the property in question and pay the unpaid monthly rentals
thereon.
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are quoted hereunder:
Sometime in 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate consisting of 808 hectares,
located in Kalookan, primarily for a leprosarium. However, the State utilized only onefifth of the property for the purpose. More, under Republic Act 4085, it was no longer
mandatory for the segregation of hansenites. Consequently, the State needed a lesser
portion of the property for the leprosarium. In the meantime, the State found it necessary
to establish new residential areas within a 20-kilometer radius from the center of the
Metropolitan Manila and/or utilizing inexpensive land in order to serve low-income
families whose housing needs can only be met by the Government. On April 26, 1971,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 843 allocating the property to the
Department of Health, the National Housing Corporation, the PHHC and Department of
Social Welfare and Development xxx.
It was also decreed that, more precise identities of the parcels of land allocated to the
government will be made only after a final survey shall have been completed. A joint
PHHC-Bureau of Lands team was tasked to undertake the necessary segregation
survey and inquiries on private rights within the Estate. In the Interim, it was decreed
that no transfer of title shall be made until the enactment of a law allowing the use of the
site for purposes other than that of a leprosarium.
In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the Tala Estate
and constructed his house thereon, bearing address No. 786, Barrio San Roque, Barangay
187, Tala, Caloocan City. In August, 1982, Faustino Acosta, who was then a Barangay
Councilman, executed a deed styled "Registration of Property", attested by the

38

Barangay Captain, over another vacant portion of the Estate, west of the Barangay Hall,
with an area of 150 square meters, bearing the following boundaries:
NORTH: WAITING SHEDSOUTH: JUAN DAMIAN WEST: NITA CRUZ,
RESTAURANT..EAST: BRGY. HALL187 (at page 7, Records)
Faustino Acosta then took possession of the property, constructed a fence around the
perimeter of the property and planted vegetables thereon. However, in 1984, Paulino
Calanday took possession of the said property without the consent of Faustino,
constructed an edifice thereon and used the same as a beerhouse. When Faustino
remonstrated, Paulino filed two (2) criminal complaints against Faustino with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, entitled and docketed "People versus Faustino Acosta,
Criminal Case Nos. 143550-51", for "Malicious Michief" and "Unjust Vexation".
However, on September 27, 1985, the Court issued an Order dismissing the cases for
failure of Paulino to comply with PD 1508.
Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita Roces. The latter and
Faustino entered into an oral contract of lease over the parcel of land for a monthly rental
of P60.00. About a year thereafter, Juanita suddenly stopped paying to Faustino her
rentals for the property. It turned out that Juanita conveyed the beerhouse to her nephew,
Charles Limbauan, who forthwith assumed the lease from his aunt and who, thenceforth,
paid the monthly rentals for the property in the amount of P60.00 to Faustino. However,
in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying rentals to Faustino claiming that, since the
property was government property, Faustino had no right to lease the same and collect the
rentals therefore. However, Faustino did not file any complaint nor unlawful detainer
against Charles.
Sometime in February, 1995, Congress approved Republic Act 7999 under which the
State converted a portion of the Estate, with a total area of 120 hectares, for use as a
housing site for residents and employees of the Department of Health, with the National
Housing Authority as the leading implementing agency:
(a) Seventy (70) hectares of the one hundred thirty (130) hectares reserved for the
leprosarium and settlement site of the hansenites and their families under
Proclamation No. 843 are hereby declared alienable and disposable for use as a
housing site for the bona fide residents, hansenites and their immediate families
and for qualified employees of the Department of Health: Provided, That if the
said beneficiary is an employee of the Deparment of Health, the said employee
must have been assigned in the Tala Leprosarium and must have been a resident
thereat for at least five (5) years: Provided, further, That the residential lot
awarded to the beneficiaries under this Act shall not be transferred, conveyed or
assigned to any other person for a period of twenty-five (25) years, except to legal
heirs by way of succession; and
(b) The fifty (50) hectares reserved for the plants, installations and pilot housing
project of the National Housing Corporation, as provided in the same
39

proclamation, are hereby declared as alienable and disposable: Provided, That

twenty-nine (29) hectares of the said fifty (50) hectares shall be converted into a
housing site exclusively for the bona fide and qualified residents of the area.
(idem, supra)
After the passage by Congress of Republic Act 7999, Faustino filed a complaint against
Charles with the Lupon for ejectment for failure of Charles to pay his rentals from
October, 1987. On April 15, 1995, the Lupon issued a "Certification to File Action" (at
page 9, Records). Republic Act 7999 became law on April 22, 1995, without the
signature of the President.
On January 2, 1996, Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of Legal Aid of the
University of the Philippines, sent a letter to Charles demanding that the latter vacate the
property within five (5) days from notice for his failure to pay the monthly rentals in the
amount of P60.00 a month since October, 1987. Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and
refused to vacate the property.
Faustino, forthwith, filed, on February 7, 1996, a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer"
against Charles with the Metropolitan Trial Court, entitled and docketed "Faustino
Acosta versus Charles Limbauan, Civil Case No. 22521", praying that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor as follows:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. To order the immediate restoration of the premises to plaintiff in accordance
with Rule 70, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff the sum of P60.00 a month plus
interest from November 1987 until they vacate the premises;
2.(sic) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 by way of moral
damages;
3. Such other remedies as may be just and equitable under the premises. (at page
4, Records)
Upon suggestion of the Court, Faustino Acosta, through the Law Interns, sent another
letter of demand to Charles Limbauan, dated March 7, 1996, demanding that the latter
vacate the property this time within fifteen (15) days from notice, otherwise, Faustino
will institute the appropriate action for his eviction from the property. Charles Limbauan
received the letter, on March 13, 1996, but refused to vacate the property. Faustino
forthwith filed a "Motion to Approve Attached Amended Complaint" with the Court
which was granted by the Court.
40

In his Answer to the Complaint, Charles alleged, inter alia that Faustino had no cause of
action against him because the property on which the beerhouse was constructed is
owned by the government since the government is the owner of the property, Faustino
had no right of possession over the property and collect rentals therefore. Besides, it was
unfair for Faustino, who was already in possession of the lot at No. 786 B. San Roque,
Barangay 187 to still claim possession over the subject property. The Defendant
interposed the defense that the Court had no jurisdiction over the action of the Plaintiff as
it was one of accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer.
On December 29, 1997, the Court promulgated a Decision in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT:
Premises considered, decision is rendered for the plaintiff, Faustino Acosta, and
against the defendant, Charles Limbauan, directing the latter and all those
claiming under him to vacate the premises specifically described as the parcel of
commercial land located at the west portion of the barangay hall, barangay 187,
Zone 16, B. Sto. Nino, Tala, Caloocan City, to surrender peaceful possession of
the same to the former, and to pay him the following amounts:
a. P60.00 monthly from November, 1987, as reasonable compensation for the use
and occupancy of the parcel of land subject matter of this case with legal interests
from today up to the actual surrender of the same.
b. P130.00 by way of reimbursement for costs of suit as shown by the receipts on
record.
Given in Chambers. (at page 79, Records)
The Court found and declared that the Plaintiff adduced evidence that the Defendant was
the lessee of the Plaintiff over the property and, hence, the latter was estopped from
assailing Plaintiffs title over the property.
The Defendant interposed an appeal from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court
which, on August 28, 1998, rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the Court a
quo.
The Petitioner forthwith filed a "Petition for Review" with this Court (Court of Appeals),
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and posed, for our resolution, the
following issues: (a) whether or not the remedy of the Respondent in the Metropolitan
Trial Court for unlawful detainer was proper; (b) the subject property was government
property and, hence, cannot be the lawful subject of a lease contract between the
Petitioner and Respondent and, hence, the latter had no right to have the Petitioner
evicted from the property and to collect rentals from him. It was inappropriate for the trial

41

court, and the Regional Trial Court, to apply and rely on Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Evidence.
On June 26, 2001, the CA dismissed the aforementioned Petition for Review and affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition for review which seeks the reversal of the said CA decision on the basis of
the issues quoted hereunder:
a) DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED
DECISION COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION?
b) WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE IS RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC ON
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH OF THE RESPONDENT.4
In relation to the aforequoted issues, the petitioner adduces the following arguments:
(1) The right application of laws under Rule 70 and Rule 10 in relation with the law on
jurisdiction over the case was ignored.
(2) The amendment under Section 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court is a futile remedy when the
Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
(3) The alleged existence of lessor-lessee relationship between the parties had not been
sufficiently established.
(4) The fact of death of respondent rendered the case moot and academic.5
The first and second arguments advanced by petitioner are interrelated. Thus, they shall be
discussed jointly. Petitioner argues that there must be a prior demand to vacate the leased
premises and pay the rent and a 15-day period from the time of demand must have lapsed before
a complaint for unlawful detainer may be commenced pursuant to Section 2, Rule 70. According
to petitioner, respondents demand letter gave the petitioner a five-day period only instead of
fifteen (15) days within which to comply with the demand to vacate. A jurisdictional requisite,
not having been complied with, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated,
such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice
on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith
after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

42

As contemplated in the aforecited rule, the demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the
action for unlawful detainer is anchored on the non-payment of rentals, as in the instant case. The
same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful detainer suit must be commenced only if the
lessee fails to comply after the lapse or expiration of fifteen (15) days in case of lands and five
(5) days in case of buildings, from the time the demand is made upon the lessee. The demand
required and contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 70 is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose
of bringing an unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay rent. It partakes of an extrajudicial remedy
that must be pursued before resorting to judicial action such that full compliance with the
demand would render unnecessary a court action.6
Hence, it is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur,
namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease and (2)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in
Section 2, particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings. The first
requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second
refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be
pursued.7
As the subject matter of the instant case is a parcel of land, the expiration of the aforesaid fifteenday period is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for unlawful detainer. As to whether
respondent observed this fifteen-day period, an affirmative answer can be gleaned from the
evidence on record. Respondents first demand letter dated January 2, 1996 gave petitioner five
(5) days from receipt within which to pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the premises. Petitioner
received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 while respondent brought the action for unlawful
detainer on February 7, 1996, which was clearly more than 15 days from the time petitioner
received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 and well within the one-year period set forth by
Section 1, Rule 70.8 Thus, the fact that respondents demand letter granted petitioner five (5)
days to pay and to vacate the subject property is of no moment because what is important and
required under Section 2 of Rule 70 is for the lessor to allow a period of fifteen (15) days to lapse
before commencing an action for unlawful detainer. Evidently, respondent actually complied
with this requirement. For this reason, we find no error in the MTC assuming jurisdiction over
respondents complaint and in not dismissing the same.
Moreover, upon the advice of the MTC, respondent sent another demand letter dated March 7,
1996 to petitioner, this time giving the latter fifteen (15) days within which to vacate the subject
property and when petitioner still refused, respondent was compelled to file a Motion to Approve
Attached Amended Complaint. The said motion was rightly granted by the MTC in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Under this provision, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced, at any time before the filing of any responsive
pleading.9 Undoubtedly, when respondent filed his Amended Complaint on May 16, 1996,10 no
43

responsive pleading had yet been filed by petitioner, thus, the MTC validly admitted the said
amended complaint.
It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the
furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without
regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action and needless expense.11
Petitioner also contends that the MTCs purpose for admitting the amended complaint was to
eliminate the jurisdictional defect of the original complaint. Petitioner cites the cases of Rosario
v. Carandang12 and Gaspar v. Dorado13 which declared that the amendment of the complaint
could not be allowed when its purpose is to confer jurisdiction upon the court, since the court
must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. Petitioners contention
is devoid of merit. As earlier discussed, respondents original complaint was free from any
jurisdictional flaw and the MTC had jurisdiction over the case to begin with. Thus, the cited
cases are not applicable in the instant case. Hence, the MTC was correct in allowing the
amendment.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.14 A complaint for unlawful detainer is deemed sufficient if it alleges that the withholding
of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.15 Here, respondent alleged that he acquired possessory rights over the
subject property by virtue of a government grant. He leased the property to petitioner for a
monthly rental of P60.00. When petitioner failed to pay the rentals, respondent eventually sent
two demand letters asking petitioner to pay and vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, thereby
depriving respondent of possession of the subject property. Clearly, the complaint alleges the
basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, which are sufficient for the purpose of vesting
jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Likewise, petitioners allegation in his petition that he received respondents second demand
letter on May 8, 1996 was belied by the records of this case, the truth being that, the said demand
letter dated March 7, 1996 was received by petitioner on March 13, 1996.16 The letter granted
petitioner fifteen (15) days within which to pay and vacate the subject property. Respondents
Amended Complaint was filed on May 16, 1996 which was obviously two (2) months from the
time petitioner had notice of the demand, and again more than 15 days as required by Section 2,
Rule 70.
In sum, respondent clearly satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand to vacate
within the period set by the rules. The MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over both the original
complaint and the amended complaint.
Petitioner next argues that no lessor-lessee relationship existed between him and respondent.
This argument clearly deals with a question of fact. In petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of fact
44

cannot be entertained.17 The issue of whether or not a lessor-lessee relationship existed between
the herein parties is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would entail a reevaluation of the evidence and a review of the factual findings thereon of the courts a quo. As a
rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on
this Court when supported by the evidence on record.18 We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the MTC and the RTC, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed.
Lastly, petitioner capitalizes on the failure of respondents counsel to inform the court of the
death of his client, Faustino Acosta, who passed away on October 22, 200019 while the case was
pending appeal with the CA. He avers that such failure rendered the case moot and academic as
no proper substitution of a party was effected in compliance with Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules
of Court.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without first
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. xxx.
It is well settled that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform
the court of the death of his client and no substitution of such party is effected, will not invalidate
the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party.
Moreover, the decision rendered shall bind his successor-in-interest.20 The instant action for
unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real property, is a real action and as such
survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have taken his place and now represent his
interests in the instant petition.21 Hence, the present case cannot be rendered moot despite the
death of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

45

G.R. No. 125078

May 30, 2011

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ,

ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M.
ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C.
ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B.
ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO F.
ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO,
DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO,
MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE,
RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO
D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M.
BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI,
HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO,
VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B.
BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS P.
BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, MARCELINO J.
CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B.
CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO,
NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO,
VICTORIANO CANETE, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA,
VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S.
CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B.
CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA, SR.,
CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR
CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX
CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE,
ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I.
DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P.
DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ,
ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE,
FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B.
DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO
DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.
ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS,
EFRAIM ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.
ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY,
RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAOLA,
EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO,
GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO
M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO C.
GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA,
BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO,
ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G.
46

GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO,

ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, CLAUDIO
HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA,
HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C.
JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T.
JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY,
AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS,
ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO G.
LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON
LOS BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C.
LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO A.
MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON, PEDRO P.
MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO A.
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, ALBERTO T.
MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P.
MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R.
MASIGLAT, DENDERIA MATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C.
MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO,
ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA,
JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO
MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO,
BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO
NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO,
BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ORACION,
ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J.
PADILLA, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRNACISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B.
PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C.
PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C. PEREZ,
DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G.
PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO,
ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO
RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES,
EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C.
ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO ROSARIO,
ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN G. SALIGONAN,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO J. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI,
JIMMY A. SAMELIN, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE
SAMELIN, ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO
SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO,
NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T.
SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON, JAIME B.
SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT,
PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T.
SUPAS, WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A.
TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE,
47

MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. TERRADO, APOLINARIO B.

TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M.
TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD,
JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.
VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAE,
DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D.
VILLARBA, JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG,
RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO G.
YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N.
ZABALA and GRACIANO ZAMORA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
General Santos City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL
CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO.,
DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE
N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL,
INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 125598
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
vs.
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ,
ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M.
ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C.
ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B.
ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO F.
ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO,
DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO,
MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE,
RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO
D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M.
BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI,
HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO,
VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B.
BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS P.
BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, MARCELINO J.
CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B.
CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO,
NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO,
VICTORIANO CANETE, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA,
VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S.
48

CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B.

CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA, SR.,
CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR
CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX
CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE,
ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I.
DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P.
DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ,
ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE,
FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B.
DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO
DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.
ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS,
EFRAIM ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.
ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY,
RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAOLA,
EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO,
GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO
M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO C.
GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA,
BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO,
ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G.
GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO,
ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, CLAUDIO
HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA,
HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C.
JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T.
JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY,
AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS,
ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO G.
LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON
LOS BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C.
LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO A.
MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON, PEDRO P.
MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO A.
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, ALBERTO T.
MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P.
MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R.
MASIGLAT, DENDERIA MATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C.
MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO,
ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA,
JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO
MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO,
BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO
NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO,
49

BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ORACION,

ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J.
PADILLA, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRANCISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B.
PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C.
PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C. PEREZ,
DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G.
PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO,
ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO
RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES,
EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C.
ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO ROSARIO,
ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN B. SALIGONAN,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO M. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI,
JIMMY A. SAMELIN, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE
SAMELIN, ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO
SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO,
NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T.
SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON, JAIME B.
SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT,
PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T.
SUPAS, WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A.
TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE,
MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. TERRADO, APOLINARIO B.
TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M.
TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD,
JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.
VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAE,
DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D.
VILLARBA, JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG,
RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO G.
YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N.
ZABALA, and GRACIANO ZAMORA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 126654
CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA,
ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,
FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO,
BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,
JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N.
BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO
NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,
50

CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA,

LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE,
RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR.,
PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO
M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M.
COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA,
JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR.,
ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE
DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA,
RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO
GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG,
LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO
IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON,
ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA,
FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO
LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO,
MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD,
DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G.
MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES,
CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B.
MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN,
JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M.
OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA,
MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P.
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L.
PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO
RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN,
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO,
MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA
SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO,
CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO
TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO,
PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE
VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.
VILLEGAS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ROMEO D. MARASIGAN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, Davao City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE
FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A.,
DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
51

G.R. No. 127856

DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A. and DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO.,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES 16 AND 13,
CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA,
ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,
FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO,
BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,
JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N.
BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO
NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,
CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA,
LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE,
RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR.,
PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO
M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M.
COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA,
JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR.,
ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE
DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA,
RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO
GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG,
LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO
IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON,
ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA,
FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO
LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO,
MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD,
DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G.
MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES,
CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B.
MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN,
JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M.
OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA,
MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P.
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L.
PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO
RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN,
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO,
MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA
SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO,
52

CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO

TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO,
PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE
VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.
VILLEGAS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 128398
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANITA ALFELOR-ALAGABAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU,
PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO
ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO,
MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO
APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL,
SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO
BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING,
ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO
BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE,
ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO,
CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A.
CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO,
DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F.
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R.
DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA
PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR.,
CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO,
ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L.
GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G.
GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M.
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC,
SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B.
JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN,
ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO
LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO,
NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE,
RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO
MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO,
SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE
NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON,
JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY,
53

DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C.

OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA,
ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO
PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D.
QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B.
REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE,
GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO
SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO
TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,
HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B.
TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,
LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose factual
background and issues are closely intertwined.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 1250781 and 1255982 both assail the Order3 dated May 20, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said
Order decreed the dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
over the subject matter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also challenges the
Orders dated June 4, 19964 and July 9, 1996,5 which held that the RTC of General Santos City no
longer had jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case No. 5617.
On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654,6 127856,7 and 1283988 seek the reversal of
the Order9 dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No.
24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions
dated February 10, 1997,10 April 28, 199711 and March 10, 1999.12
The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:
Proceedings before the Texas Courts
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by
citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign
countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that involved
54

plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,"
which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil
Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the
consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally
granted the defendants motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that:
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of
this Memorandum and Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-party defendants
have:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States xxx;
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional
defense within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order in any action
commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his
injury occurred. Any plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within 30 days
after the entry of this Memorandum and Order;
(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitationsbased defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of
Texas;
(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any
discovery conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign
proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there;
and
(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement
binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign
court.
xxxx
Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in
which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court
will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non
conveniens].13
Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598

55

In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General
Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed
a Joint Complaint14 in the RTC of General Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL);
Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc.,
Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.;
Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are
hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)
Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the
reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They
claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the
early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or
when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida, et al.,
claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the
defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of
commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be
exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known,
were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being.
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed their
Motions for Bill of Particulars.15 During the pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996,
NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint Complaint,16 excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.,
Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants.
Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of Particulars.17
On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with Counterclaim.18
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos
City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit:
THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
xxxx
The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign
companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint
included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through
sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce.

56

Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the
present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside
Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including
the present Regional Trial Court.19
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by Navida, et al., in their
complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:
THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT
FOREIGN COMPANIES IS NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW
The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is
product liability tort. When the averments in the present complaint are examined in terms of the
particular categories of tort recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear that
such averments describe and identify the category of specific tort known as product liability tort.
This is necessarily so, because it is the product manufactured by defendant foreign companies,
which is asserted to be the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff workers,
and the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised on being the manufacturer of
the pesticides.
It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and
only if the Civil Code of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product liability
tort, inclusive of and comprehending the specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff
workers.20
Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that Navida, et al., were coerced into submitting
their case to the Philippine courts, viz:
FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES - COERCED AND ANOMALOUS
The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather were
coerced to do so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995, and
in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.21
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant
companies therein, thus:
THE DEFENDANTS SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT IS
ILLUSORY
Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the
Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of
the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of
57

the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the "Defendants Amended Agreement
Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens" (Annex to the Complaint) filed
with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that "(t)he authority of each designated
representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these
actions by the Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final
and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h), 3(i),
Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the
Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional. x x
x.
The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive condition, thus
produces no legal effect and is ineffective at the moment.22
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in
the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court
expounded:
THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal
of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to
litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates
the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN
JURISDICTION
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This
court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action.
The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of
venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent
jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition
of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE OF "LITIS PENDENCIA"
Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the same parties, same rights and interests,
as in this case. There exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the same parties
and interests. The court would like to emphasize that in accordance with the rule on litis
pendencia x x x; the subsequent case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing [precept] to the

58

case-at-bar, this court concludes that since the case between the parties in the U.S. is still
pending, then this case is barred by the rule on "litis pendencia."23
In fine, the trial court held that:
It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to continue with these proceedings, would
be violative of the constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition
of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on
further proceedings with this case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming
appearance. But the same insistence would actually thwart the very ends of justice which it seeks
to achieve.
This evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due consideration to the fact
that the dismissal of this case does not necessarily deprive the parties especially the plaintiffs
of their possible remedies. The court is cognizant that the Federal Court may resume proceedings
of that earlier case between the herein parties involving the same acts or omissions as in this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this case is now considered
DISMISSED.24
On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued an Order,25 dismissing DOWs
Answer with Counterclaim.
CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration26 of the RTC
Order dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration27 of the RTC Order
dated June 4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration28 of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.
In an Order29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost
its jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of
NAVIDA, et al., which stated that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court.
CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration30 of the above order.
On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail the
RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.
The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order31 dated August 14, 1996, which merely
noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any
jurisdiction over the case.
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari,32
challenging the orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and
July 9, 1996. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 125598.
59

In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in
ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the persons of the
defendant companies.
In a Resolution33 dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with
G.R. No. 125078.
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,34 which sought the reversal of the RTC
Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 126018. In a Resolution35 dated November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid
petition for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,36 but the same was denied through a Resolution37
dated January 27, 1997.
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL
MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs
from Davao City. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the
petitioners in G.R. No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) amended their JointComplaint on May 21, 1996.38
Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in the
banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were
exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al.,
such exposure resulted in "serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not
limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities."39 ABELLA, et al.,
claimed that the defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or
made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its hazardous effects on health,
and without providing instructions on its proper use and application, which the defendant
companies knew or ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary care and prudence.
Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective motions for bill of
particulars to which ABELLA, et al., filed their opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their
respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996.
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in its Order dated October 1,
1996, which, in its entirety, reads:
Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended Complaint For: Damages filed by the
plaintiffs against the defendants Shell Oil Company, DOW Chemicals Company, Occidental
Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food
Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International,
Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations with
Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the defendants, is
60

convinced that plaintiffs "would have this Honorable Court dismiss the case to pave the way for
their getting an affirmance by the Supreme Court" (#10 of Defendants Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July 22, 1996).
Consider these:
1) In the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state that: defendants have no properties in the
Philippines; they have no agents as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing the defendants for tortuous
acts committed by these foreign corporations on their respective countries, as plaintiffs, after
having elected to sue in the place of defendants residence, are now compelled by a decision of a
Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this jurisdiction for causes of actions which
occurred abroad (par. 19); a petition was filed by same plaintiffs against same defendants in the
Courts of Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for payment of damages based on negligence, strict
liability, conspiracy and international tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants Motion to Dismiss
on Forum non [conveniens], said petition was provisionally dismissed on condition that these
cases be filed in the Philippines or before 11 August 1995 (Philippine date; Should the Philippine
Courts refuse or deny jurisdiction, the U. S. Courts will reassume jurisdiction.)
11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July 1995, the Federal District
Court issued a Memorandum and Order conditionally dismissing several of the consolidated
actions including those filed by the Filipino complainants. One of the conditions imposed was
for the plaintiffs to file actions in their home countries or the countries in which they were
injured x x x. Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder further provided that should the
highest court of any foreign country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over these
actions filed by the plaintiffs in their home countries [or] the countries where they were injured,
the said plaintiffs may return to that court and, upon proper motion, the Court will resume
jurisdiction as if the case had never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above
but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in
its Special report "Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility," to wit:
1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The
Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against
foreign companies since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under
Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to
those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will
prove and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.
2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento opined that while a class suit is
allowed in the Philippines the device has been employed strictly. Mass sterility will not
qualify as a class suit injury within the contemplation of Philippine statute.
3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that there is simply an absence of
doctrine here that permits these causes to be heard. No product liability ever filed or tried
here.

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Case ordered dismissed.40

Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12, 1996 by ABELLA,
et al., assails before this Court the above-quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.
ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the acts
complained of and to support their claims for damages.
ABELLA, et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on the opinions of legal
luminaries reported in a newspaper, by the RTC of Davao City is bereft of basis. According to
them, their cause of action is based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They
also maintain that the absence of jurisprudence regarding the award of damages in favor of those
adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting evidence to prove their
allegations that their exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or infertility.
SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Order dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. DEL MONTE also filed its motion for
reconsideration, which contained an additional motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge.
The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order41 dated December 2, 1996, voluntarily
inhibiting himself from trying the case. Thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of
Davao City.
In an Order42 dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated
October 1, 1996, and denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by defendant
companies.
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the Orders
dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was
docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the case motu
proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as over the persons
of the defendant companies which voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the
RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged legal
experts appearing in a newspaper article.
Initially, this Court in its Resolution43 dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by
CHIQUITA for submitting a defective certificate against forum shopping. CHIQUITA, however,
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by this Court in the Resolution44 dated
October 8, 1997.

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On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review on certiorari before this Court
assailing the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 127856.
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,25196, as defined under the law and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over its person
by its voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for bill of particulars and, later, an answer
to the complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its
authority when it dismissed the case motu proprio or without any motion to dismiss from any of
the parties to the case.
In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court
consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.
The Consolidated Motion to Drop DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL as Party-Respondents
filed by NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al.
On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a
Consolidated Motion (to Drop Party-Respondents).45 The plaintiff claimants alleged that they had
amicably settled their cases with DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July 1997.
This settlement agreement was evidenced by facsimiles of the "Compromise Settlement,
Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement," which were attached to the said motion. Pursuant to
said agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the settlement
entered into between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
The Memoranda of the Parties
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a
Resolution dated June 22, 1998,46 required all the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998;47 SHELL asked to be excused from the
filing of a memorandum alleging that it had already executed a compromise agreement with the
plaintiff claimants.48 DOLE filed its Memorandum on October 12, 199849 while DEL MONTE
filed on October 13, 1998.50 NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed their Consolidated
Memorandum on February 3, 1999;51 and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum
on December 23, 1999.52
The Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598
On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 125598, 53 explaining that the said petition "is already moot and academic and no
longer presents a justiciable controversy" since they have already entered into an amicable

63

settlement with NAVIDA, et al. DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied
with their obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements.
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004,54 interposing no objection to the
withdrawal of the petition, and further stating that they maintain their position that DOW and
OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant companies, should be retained as defendants
for purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is
reinstated.
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, 2004,55 stating that they agree
with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become
moot and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had already been amicably settled by the
parties in 1997.
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598,56 stating that it has no objections to the
withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
In a Resolution57 dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion to
withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.
THE ISSUES
In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the
following issues for our consideration:
IN REFUTATION
I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because it was filed in bad faith with
petitioners intending to have the same dismissed and returned to the Texas court.
b) The court dismissed the case because it was convinced that it did not have
jurisdiction.
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE.
a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine territory.
b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is broad enough to cover the acts
complained of.

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c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court over petitioner[s] claims

did not divest Philippine [c]ourts of jurisdiction over the same.
d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop
Party Respondents Dow, Occidental and Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice
remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita.58
DISCUSSION
On the issue of jurisdiction
Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96,
respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.
Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a quo are bereft of jurisdiction
to determine and resolve the above-stated cases. All parties contend that the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the action for damages,
specifically for approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of
defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure
to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by
defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable
basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil
Code, as well as Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for damages. Thus,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed and
that the said cases be remanded to the courts a quo for further proceedings.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasidelict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there
were no actionable wrongs committed under Philippine law, the courts a quo should have
dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant companies. DOLE also
argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as
actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a
decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying
the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits
that the Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies
as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred
in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they
allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City gravely erred in relying upon
newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 given that newspaper articles are
hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the
65

newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE,
however, opines that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper, given that
plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted the cases with the sole intent of securing a dismissal of the
actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S. Federal District Court to re-assume jurisdiction
over the cases.
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the cases filed before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7
million in damages for each plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP,
not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in
consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which
states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action.
CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course
of the proceedings. None of the defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction
by the courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand of Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.59 Once vested
by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a
law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).60
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

66

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause
of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.
Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended JointComplaints filed before the courts a quo, the following prayer:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment
be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral damages in the amount of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,00.00);
b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the amount of Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) each;
c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the amount of Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00); and
e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit.61
From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the
total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City
and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview
of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN
COMMERCE nematocides containing the chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly known
as DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST the parasite known as the nematode, which
plagued banana plantations, INCLUDING THOSE in the Philippines. AS IT TURNED OUT,
DBCP not only destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH
OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO IT AFFECTING the human reproductive system as well.

67

5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the 1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used
this product in the banana plantations WHERE they were employed, and/or (b) they resided
within the agricultural area WHERE IT WAS USED. As a result of such exposure, the plaintiffs
suffered serious and permanent injuries TO THEIR HEALTH, including, but not limited to,
STERILITY and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.
6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY
MANUFACTURED, produced, sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE SAME
into the stream of commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS
EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS PROPER USE AND
APPLICATION. THEY allowed Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which
THEY knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence ought to have known, were highly
harmful and injurious to the Plaintiffs health and well-being.
7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE
AVAILABLE OR PUT DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR AT
FAULT in that they, AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous characteristics of DBCP,
or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to so warn plaintiffs;
b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to what should be reasonably
safe and sufficient clothing and proper protective equipment and appliances, if
any, to protect plaintiffs from the harmful effects of exposure to DBCP, or to
cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language understandable to the worker,
on containers of DBCP-containing materials to warn of the dangers to health of
coming into contact with DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do
so;
d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise reasonable care to publish,
adopt and enforce a safety plan and a safe method of handling and applying
DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these products for sale, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so; and
f. Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on DBCP to each plaintiff,
governmental agencies and the public, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliate to
do so.
8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT or negligence of
defendants Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc.,
Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in that they failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent each plaintiffs harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products which
68

defendants knew or should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in that they, AMONG
OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in the safe and proper
application of DBCP-containing products;
b. Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of application of said
products, or to cause such to be implemented;
c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to said products or to cause
them to be so warned;
d. Failed to test said products for adverse health effects, or to cause said products
to be tested;
e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the observed effects of said
products on Plaintiffs;
f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said products;
g. Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said products to warn them of
the damages of said products; and
h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products or to cause such
substitutes to [be] used.62 (Emphasis supplied and words in brackets ours.)
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to
their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,
specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants a
quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing,
selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain

69

DBCP, "without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions
on its proper use and application." 63
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals,64 this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasidelict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which
obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly
suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana
plantations located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas
also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point
to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction
over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in
containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of
the stream of commerce,"65 and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act
complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal
civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.66
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of
the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where
they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for
damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as
doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to
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gather in the Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this
case, it is not far-fetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of
evidence to support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with
the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the
defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject
matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.67
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of all the defendant companies
It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quo lack jurisdiction over
the cases filed before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant
companies in the action below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared
and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this
connection, all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive
summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant
companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several
voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating
during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,68
held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation
of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar
said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.69
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of the
instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the
courts a quo, continues until the termination of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants
and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising
therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to
decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.70
Plaintiffs purported bad faith in filing the subject civil cases in Philippine courts
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Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to
procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this
Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by
evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as
these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.
When this Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.71
This is especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule that good
faith is always presumed and bad faith must be proved.72
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a quo have also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all
the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this Court to order the remand of Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
respectively.
On the issue of the dropping of DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL as respondents in view of
their amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL
be dropped as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617
and 24,251-96. The non-settling defendants allegedly manifested that they intended to file their
cross-claims against their co-defendants who entered into compromise agreements. NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling defendants did not aver any cross-claim in
their answers to the complaint and that they subsequently sought to amend their answers to plead
their cross-claims only after the settlement between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore,
assert that the cross-claims are already barred.
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., since the latters Amended Complaints cited several instances of tortious
conduct that were allegedly committed jointly and severally by the defendant companies. This
solidary obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant the
statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for the payment of their respective
shares. Should the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., be granted, and the
Court subsequently orders the remand of the action to the trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA
and DOLE would allegedly be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their
other co-defendants. Moreover, a third party complaint or a separate trial, according to
CHIQUITA, would only unduly delay and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA and DOLE
similarly insist that the motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW, SHELL
and OCCIDENTAL as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, be denied.

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Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, DEL
MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion73 before the Court, stating that similar settlement
agreements were allegedly executed by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and
CHIQUITA sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were copies of the Compromise
Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling
plaintiffs, as well as the Release in Full executed by the latter.74 DEL MONTE specified therein
that there were "only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del
Monte parties"75 and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which completely
satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE. In accordance with the alleged compromise
agreements with the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of
the Amended Joint-Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of the above settlement
agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no
longer wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed that it be
allowed to withdraw the same.
Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively, the Court deems that the
Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., should likewise be referred to the said trial courts for appropriate disposition.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Like
any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and
principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are
to constitute the contract.76 Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.77 A compromise
has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata78 and this holds true even if the
agreement has not been judicially approved.79 In addition, as a binding contract, a compromise
agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it.80
In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
City should first receive in evidence and examine all of the alleged compromise settlements
involved in the cases at bar to determine the propriety of dropping any party as a defendant
therefrom.
The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was filed by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in
view of the latter companies alleged compromise agreements with the plaintiff claimants.
However, in subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA supposedly reached their
own amicable settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL MONTE qualified that it entered
into a settlement agreement with only four of the plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617.
These four plaintiff claimants were allegedly the only ones who were asserting claims against
DEL MONTE. However, the said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated in their
Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be
verified with certainty based on the records elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff
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claimants in Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying their
claims against DEL MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore, not one
plaintiff claimant filed a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as
defendants in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the alleged compromise
agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights and obligations therein. For this purpose,
the courts a quo may require the presentation of additional evidence from the parties. Thereafter,
on the basis of the records of the cases at bar and the additional evidence submitted by the
parties, if any, the trial courts can then determine who among the defendants may be dropped
from the said cases.
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in which each of
the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.81
In solidary obligations, the paying debtors right of reimbursement is provided for under Article
1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to
each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is
due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debt of each.1avvphil
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of the codebtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a solidary debtor who is made to answer for an
obligation actually delivers payment to the creditor. As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,82 "[p]ayment, which means not only the delivery
of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact
which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which
corresponds to each of the [other] debtors."83
In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on the merits
must necessarily be conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant companies are
liable for the claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would necessarily give
rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.
At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims have
been interposed by any defendant against another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is
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made by a non-settling defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the
trial court to determine the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant
must remain a party to the case purely in relation to the cross claim.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,84 the
Court had the occasion to state that "where there are, along with the parties to the compromise,
other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken part in concluding the compromise
agreement but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from
invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor."85
Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales,86 the Court upheld the ruling
of the trial court that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a third-party
complaint and/or a cross-claim to enforce his right to seek contribution from his co-debtors.
Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above situation, if
proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements allegedly entered into by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., with some of the defendant companies.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.
125078, 126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated May 20, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the
Order dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, and its
subsequent Order dated December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case No. 24,25196, and REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for
further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R. No.
127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598,
both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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