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Islawdistinctfrommorals?Ifso,inwhatwaysisitdistinct?Ifnot,whyisitnotdistinct?

Thispaperdiscussestherelationshipoflawandmorality.Itconsidershowmoralityinforms
ourlegalsystemsandpracticeoflaw.Itexplorestheworkofanumberofjurisprudential
thinkers,includingAustin,Bentham,Hart,DworkinandRaz,onthispoint.Thispaperalso
contemplatesthepracticalimplicationsofthedivergentviewpointsontheefficacyofour
legalsystems.InconclusionthispaperarguesthatthetenorofHartsmodernpositivism,
despiteconceptualflaws,isanappealinganddynamiclensthroughwhichtoviewthelaw.In
distinguishinglawandmorality,andinprovidinglimitedscopeformoralarguments,the
modern positivist framework protects and cultivates the individuals sense of personal
morality,whilemaintaininganefficientandrationallegalsystem.

Lawplaysanimportantroleinthefunctioningofsociety.Formany,thelawmustseema
logicalandpredictablesetofstandardsgoverningsocialbehaviour.Thelawdoesitswork
quietly,inestablishingnegativeratherthanpositiveduties 1andhighlyingrainedsocialnorms
thatremainunopposedonanylargescale.Whenitisstirredfromitsmonotonousprocedures,
normallybysemanticorfactualdisputes,thelawrespondswithrigorousargument.Debates
surroundingcurrentcontentiousissues,suchaseuthanasiaandgaymarriage,demonstrate
societysreadinesstoreflectonwhatmoralityorlawdemandsinaparticularscenario.Less
often,however,dowetakethetimetoconsidertheimpactofmoralityonlaw,orconversely,
theeffectoflawonmorality.Evenlessoftendowecontemplatethepracticalimplicationsof
convolutinglawandmorality,orofdistinguishingthetwoconcepts.Andyet,thesequestions
1ThisbeingthecaseintheAustralianlegalcontextatleast.
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underpinthestructuresfromwhichsocietysounquestionablyoperatesonadailybasis.Such
istheimportanceofthetopicthispaperseekstoaddress.

Responsesconcerningtherelationshipbetweenlawandmoralitycanbedividedintothree
maintheses.Theseincludethesourcesthesis,theincorporationthesisandthecoherence
thesis.2 The source thesis requires that a laws existence and content be discernible by
reference to facts alone, without recourse to evaluative argument. Laws of this kind are
presentinmost,ifnotall,legalsystemshoweverthesourcesthesis,unliketheothertheses,
providesthatthelawisnotenrichedbynonsourcebasedlaws.Theincorporationthesis,as
advocatedbyHart,reflectsthatalllawissourcebased,butprovidesscopeforfurtherlawto
beincorporatedifthesourcebasedlawsenablethistooccur.ThereforeforHart,therelation
ofmoralityandlawiscontingentandindirect.Finally,thecoherencethesis,asDworkinuses
in responding to Hart, posits that sourcebased law is justified and mediated by moral
justifications.ThispaperturnstothecoherencethesisandthejurisprudenceofNaturalLaw
first.

The doctrine of Natural Law postulates that law and morality are two separate sets of
standards.Lawswhichareinconsistentwithmoralityimmoralcannotbelonginavalid
legal system.3 In exercising its power, the State only acts with authority when there is
consistency between the standards required by both law and morality, thus creating this
necessaryconnectionbetweenthevalidityoflawanditsmorality.Traditionalstrongnatural
2JosephRaz,Authority,LawandMoralityinEthicsinthePublicDomain:Essaysinthe
MoralityofLawandPolitics(1995),210211.
3ThisisthestandpointofstrongnaturallawtheweaknaturallawpositionofFinnishas
largelysoftenedthisrequirement.
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law,asadvocatedbyAquinas,wasapopularviewpointuntilthe17 th and18th centuries.

Weaknaturallawisstillpersuasiveincontemporaryjurisprudence,withproponentssuchas
Finnisproclaimingthatalthoughimmorallawisdefective,itisstillbinding.4

Despitethesofteningofthedoctrineofnaturallawinrecentscholarship,growingawareness
andacceptanceofadiverserangeofmoralframeworkshasledtothemarginalisationof
manynaturallawtheories.PerhapsforAquinasandthelikesofBlackstone,referringtoan
acceptedsocialmoralitywasmoreadeptatthetimeatwhichtheywrote. 5Incontemporary
secular society, naturals laws significant reliance on morality leaves the question
unansweredastowhosemoralityistobeimposedwhenassessingthevalidityofacontested
legal principle. The decline of natural law has been further aggravated by the standard
pictureviewoflawthatprovidesthatthelawconsistsofauthoritativepronouncementsof
legalrules,interpretedthroughtheirlinguisticcontent.Language,asaconventionaltool,does
notreflectanyunderlyingrealityorideals,leavinglimitedscopeformoralitytoinformthe
authoritativepronouncementsoflaw.Thestandardpictureapproachthereforeundermines
thepracticalsignificanceofnaturallawtheories.

Legalpositivists,BenthamandAustin,writingatthecloseofthe18 thcentury,insistedonthe
needtodistinguishbetweenlawasitisandlawasitoughttobe(read:morality). 6Fromthis
perspective,naturallawtheorieswerecondemnedforconflatinglawandmorality,forin

4See,eg,JohnFinnis,NaturalLawandNaturalRights(1980).
5HereIrefertoStThomasAquinasandSirWilliamBlackstone,see,eg,H.L.A.Hart,
SeparationofLawandMorals(1958)71HarvardLawReview593,596597.
6H.L.AHart,SeparationofLawandMorals(1958)71HarvardLawReview593,594.
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Austinswords,Theexistenceoflawisonething;itsmeritordemeritisanother. 7 This
distinction,itisargued,isnecessaryforclarityandpracticalefficacy.Whiletheyrefutedthe
strongnaturallawapproachespopularinthecenturiesprecedingtheirs,theyrecognisedthe
existenceandpotentialforpointsofintersectionbetweenlawandmorality.Theyaccepted
thatthedevelopmentofanylegalsystemisinfluencedbymoralopinions,totheextentthat
thecontentofsomelawsmirrormoralrulesandprinciples. 8 Theseregularcoincidencesof
lawandmoralityattributetothegeneralconfusionregardinglawandmorality,towhichHart
responds.

Hartisconsideredamodernpositivist.LikeBenthamandAustin,hepositedlawandmorality
astwodistinctsetsofstandards,inwhichlawsinconsistentwithmoralitymaystillremain
validlegalprinciples.Hearguedthatthereisnonecessaryconnectionbetweenmoralityand
law,butconsideredthedebatesurroundingwhatisandoughttobelawtohaveintellectual
value.InhisinitialconceptionsHartwascarefultonote 9 thattheconstitutionofalegal
systemisnotfoundedonmoraljustificationsbutonsocialrulesandcustomscontainingboth
internal and external aspects.10 His theory is relatively unromantic, in that law is not
consideredacourageousventureinascertainingthegoodnorisitnotcosyorcommunal
aboutthebasisonwhichlawrestsratherthelawisasocialconstructioncontainingonly
elementswhichsocietyhasplacedthere,functioningforthepurposesofsocialregulationand
control.
7JohnAustin,TheProvinceofJurisprudenceDetermined(1832),184.
8H.L.AHart,aboven6,598.
9H.L.AHart,TheConceptofLaw(1961),107.
10Socialruleshaveanexternalaspect,insofarastheyregulateexternalbehaviourand
interactions.Socialrulesalsohaveaninternalaspectconcerningtheattitudeoftheindividual
orsocietyasawholeinacceptingthestandardestablishedbytherule.
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Hart acknowledges that there is a connection between law and morality, but that this
connections indisputable existence should not be mistaken or accepted as a necessary
connection.Inordertoaddressquestionsregardinghowmenaretoliveamongoneanother,
Hartcontendsthatwemustassumethattheindividualsaimis,generallyspeaking,tolive. 11
This assumption informs rules of conduct regulating social control, which are in turn
reflected in our legal systems, particularly in the influence of morality of the law, its
interpretationandtheabilitytocriticisethelaw.Harttermsthistruismtheminimumcontent
ofnaturallawandcontinuesthatanyclaimstatingthatthelawmustconformtomorality
beyondthatwhichispresentintheminimumcontentshouldbecarefullyscrutinised.12

Through his notions of primary and secondary rules, Hart sought to establish that legal
authorityandlegalrulescomeintoexistencesimultaneously. 13Hartsconceptionsenablehis
theoryofmodernpositivismtoavoidchickenandeggdisputes,butareopentoattackwhen
itcomestohardcaseswherethelegalruleshaverunout.Howarejudgestodecidedifficult
caseswheretheapplicationofblackletterlegalstandardswouldleadtoinjustice?Itcouldbe
argued that in a case of injustice, a judge must apply the law as it stands, without
circumventingtheoccurrenceofthatinjustice,becausetheprocessofidentifyingunjustcases
requiresamoraljudgment.Thismoraljudgmentinfersamoralcriterionfordeterminingthe
contentoflawunderminingHartsfundamentaltestforlawassourcebasedandnotcontent
based.

11H.L.AHart,aboven9,185,192.
12Ibid202.
13ScottJ.Shapiro,OnHartsWayOut(1998)4LegalTheory469,474.
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Hartseemstoincorporatejusticeandfairnessinhisvaluesystembyimplication.Butas
criticshighlight,ifthelawstrivesforjusticeaswellassocialregulationandcontrol,then
there are significant moral considerations informing our legal systems. Hart makes links
betweenjusticeandconstancyinthissense,arguingthatliketreatmentisdeeplyembedded
asaprimafacierightinthemindsofmodernmen 14andthatinthisgeneralruleoflawisthe
germatleastofjustice.15 Hart,somewhathalfheartedly,plantsthisgermofjusticeasa
featureofsocialcontrolbutdoesnotnecessarilyequatewhatisjustwithwhatismoral
though this argument is underdeveloped and requires further analysis. The incorporative
thesisdoesseemtoprovidethatmoralprinciplescanbeimplementedtoreaddownunjust
lawswithoutabandoningthepositivistsrelianceonsourcebasedtestforlaw.

Initsbriefestformulation,Dworkinscoherencebasedresponsetotherelationofmorality
andlawisthatmoralargumentsdirectlyinformtheinterpretationandapplicationofsource
based law. This interpretative practice acts to determine the justifications underlying
particularsocialpractices,astheconceptoflawisitselfcontested.Inthisway,Dworkin
assumesthatthereisapurposeinforminghumanbehaviourandthatanyrulesimposedon
thisbehaviourmustaimtomakethisbehaviourthebestitcanbewhilealsoconformingto
moralprinciples.Itisinevitable,Dworkincontends,thatjudgeswillhavetocreatenewand
divergentprecedentandinthisprocesswillbringdifferingambitionsandperspectivestothis

14H.L.AHart,aboven9,162.
15Ibid206.
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process.16ForDworkin,thisprocessrequiresthejudgetobalanceboththefitandmorality
oftherule.

Whereas Hart argued that law could be legally binding and valid despite any identified
immorality, Dworkin posits legal rights as a species of moral rights and in this way,
contendsthattherecanbenolegalrightswithoutanunderpinningmoralgroundorforce. 17
Dworkinphilosophisesthatlawandmoralityarenecessarilydifferentbecauseoftheinherent
codependencyoflegalandmoralprinciples.18Thescopeformoralitytoinformandinteract
with our legal systems is therefore extensive under Dworkins interpretative thesis. The
relationshipbetweenlawandmoralityisfarmorecomplicatedthanHartandotherpositivists
maintained,asthedeterminationofthelawinhardcasesisdependentonmoralandvalue
judgmentsofwhatthelawoughttobe.Theseevaluativejudgments,ineffect,determinethe
rulesthatareappliedinpractice.Wheretwoormoremoralstandardsconflict,thelawmust
reflectthemoralitythatmorecloselyreflectsanidealortruemorality.19

Dworkinsconceptualisationoflawasintegritydenotesthatjudgesidentifylegalrightsand
duties to reflect notions of justice and fairness, as if such notions were created by the
community personified.20 This thesis provides that judges have a duty of professional

16RonaldDworkin,LawsEmpire(1986)9.
17H.L.AHart,aboven9,268.
18RonaldDworkin,aboven16,96.
19Dworkinalsohighlightsthatthefitoftheproposedinterpretationofthelawmustbe
appropriateandadaptedtothelegalhistoryofthesocietytowhichitapplies.See,eg,ScottJ.
Shapiro,OnHartsWayOut(1998)4LegalTheory469,504506.
20RonaldDworkin,aboven16,225.
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responsibility when deciding cases, upholding the law and in paving the way for law
reform.21Itfurtherprovidesthatjudicialdecisionmakingismadeaccordingtoaconsistent
set of values as this is morally desirable. In this sense, Dworkins integrity thesis is
retrospectiveasitaimstoachieveconsistencywithpastdecisions,ratherthanconformingto
decisionsthatmayprovidefutureutility.Dworkinsframeworkinthissenseisproblematic,
as notions of the separation of powers (characterised by themes of justice and fairness)
demand that there is a distinction between those bodies creating law and those bodies
applyinglaw.Inhardcaseswherejudgesarerequiredtoactivelyimplementmoralstandards
intheapplicationofthelaw,itcouldbearguedthatthecourtisinbreachofthedoctrineof
theseparationofpowers.

Positivist critics of Dworkin interpretative and integrity based philosophies contend that
Dworkinspostulationoflegalprinciples,thatis,lawinformeddirectlybymoralargument,
undermines rules and law as a means of social regulation. Notably, Raz argues that
Dworkins thesis is inconsistent with the authoritative nature of law22 because law, on
Dworkins view, fails to mediate between law and morality and provide authoritative
pronouncements relating to social behaviour. It is this authoritative nature of the law,
suggests Raz that provides us with areason to prefer the sourcesbasedthesis described
previouslyinthispaper,23 orperhaps,aviewofthelawaslyingsomewherebetweenthe
sourcesbasedthesisandHartsincorporationthesis.ThekeyassumptionunderlyingRazs
formulationoflawisthenotionoflawasanauthoritativeinstitution.

21JosephRaz,aboven2,14.
22Ibid15.
23Ibid18.
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RazsconceptionislargelysupportiveofHartspositivistthesis,inthatitrequireslawtobe
identifiable on its own terms (according to its source) and not by having to rely on
considerationswhichthelawmustsimultaneouslyresolve.Although,whetherthepositivist
accountdoesinfactprovideanaccountthatidentifiesthelawthroughitssourceandits
terms,remainstobeseen.Itcouldbearguedthatsocialpractiseandtherulesofrecognition
cannotbythemselvesprovideanobligationtoabidebythelaw.Suchpractiseandrulesmay
demonstratewhatthepractiseofthoserulesentails,butareunabletopersuasivelyidentify
whetherornotthatpractiseistobefollowed.This,itcouldbesuggested,isultimatelyan
issueofmoralityandpoliticalobligation,forwhichRazandHartprovideablurredaccount.

Inreturningtotheissueathand,itisimportanttonotethatthesecontentiouscasesrequiring
activereflectionontherelationshipoflawandmoralityandtherequirementsofjusticeare
the exception to the norm. In many circumstances, our legal systems provide us with a
thoroughandconsistentframeworkforwhichtoregulatesocialbehaviourandpromotea
harmonioussociety.Theapplicationofthelawseldomrequiresustoconsiderwhetherornot
moralityisdistinctfromthelaw,despitethesemattersgoingtotheheartofsociallife.Lawis
oftenperceivedasanobjectivediscourseasthetestsoflawareonesofstrictliabilityor
involveobjectiveevaluationsofthefactsofeachcase.Yetineachoftheseseeminglysimple
andstraightforwardapplicationsoflaw,thereisarguablyasubtletoneofmorality.Questions
suchas,whywehaveacentralpowerauthority,whyjudgesareelectedtothepositionsthey
holdandwhycertainbehavioursmustberegulatedastheyare,infertacitassumptionsofwhy
andhowwelive.Itthereforeseemsanunconvincingargumentthatthelawexistspurelyas

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socialrules,asHartcontends.However,itissimilarlyunconvincingthatthereisastrictand
necessaryconnectionbetweenlawandmoralityasDworkinwouldhaveusbelieve.

Perhapsitisthecasethatwe,strivingforrational,logicalandclearanswers,overlookand
confusequestionsrelatingtolawandmorality.IfweacceptHartsviewofthelawasasocial
construction,whichthispaperdoestoanextent,weareattemptingthedifficulttaskoftrying
toformulateasocialsciencewhichexperiencetellsusoftenleadstomorequestionsthan
thereareanswers.ItmaystillbearguedthatthereissomethingusefulinHartsdissectionof
law andmorality.Firstly,itallowsanefficientandpredictablelegalsystem,wherelaws
striveforrecognitionasascientificcodeofsorts. 24Secondly,itallowstheautonomousand
freethinkingindividualthespacetodevelopapersonalsenseofmorality,distinctfromlaw
andapartfromthemoralityofothers.This criticalselfreflectionwouldseemapositive
featurethoughthisrequiresavaluejudgementthatsuchreflectionissomethingtoaimfor
inlife.Andmoralityheresneaksupuponusyetagain.

2,886words.

24Itwouldbeinappropriatetoequatelawwithsciencehere,despitethesocialconstructivist
elementsofsciences.Clearlylawdoesnothaveasimilarempiricalcontent;howeverthisfact
doesnotunderminethevalueinlawmakersandjudgesstrivingtoformulatelawinsucha
logicalandobjectivemanner.
10