Radical Islam and the West

Scott Burchill
(June 2015)

Governments contrive moral panics to consolidate domestic political support. An

alleged "existential" foreign threat is particularly useful, encouraging the population to
rally behind the leader, accept restrictions on their civil liberties, and support higher
levels of funding being directed to the military and intelligence sectors.
The veracity of the threat is almost irrelevant. What matters is that the public buys the
danger.
In Overblown, distinguished American political scientist John Mueller exposed how
politicians and the terrorism industry grossly exaggerated the threat of terrorism after
9/11.
Using detailed historical comparisons dating back to World War II, Mueller explained
how Western governments have consistently exploited and exacerbated public fears in
order to boost military spending and grant themselves draconian surveillance powers.1
Muellers conclusions were damning. The responses of the West to 9/11 and
subsequent attacks were wasteful, counterproductive and a wild, absurd
overreaction. The risks from terrorism had been hyped with the assistance of an
uncritical media, and a terrorism industry of careerist academics and opinion makers.2
Not only was the threat blown out of all proportion to the actual risk it posed, the
policies it engendered made a minor danger much worse.
Mueller's study concentrated on the United States from late 2001 until 2008, but the
responses he identified can still be seen across the Western world today.
Canberras reaction to revelations that Australian citizens were fighting for the Islamic
State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, follows precisely the same pattern of intellectual and
state fear-mongering. It's almost a perfect case study of a contemporary moral panic.
After an unprovoked intercession in a vicious sectarian conflict in Mesopotamia, former
Army Chief turned academic Peter Leahy said Australia was in for a "long war" against
"political Islam" that would last for "100 years", though he worried that the public was ill
prepared to pay the necessary price in "blood and treasure". It would be a fight
requiring pre-emptive and reactive action, both on home soil and foreign lands.
Not to be out done in hyperbole, Australia's Attorney-General George Brandis declared
ISIS to be an "existential threat to us", his Prime Minister Tony Abbott said the dangers

1

John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National
Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (Free Press, New York 2009).
2
See Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented Terrorism (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2013).

were "unprecedented", while his colleague foreign minister Julie Bishop claimed these
particular Islamists were "the most significant threat to the global rules based order to
emerge in the past 70 years - and included in my considerations is the rise of
communism and the Cold War."
This was an extraordinary suggestion, but apparently insufficient to mobilise public fear
about the scale of the threat which the nation suddenly faced. It wasn't long before she
invoked the specter of ISIS terrorists with WMD (chemical weapons) and dirty uranium
bombs, again - as in 2003 - without producing any evidence for such claims.3
In the speech where she suggested ISIS represented a greater threat to the West than
Soviet communism, Julie Bishop also explained the origins of the group. Missing
entirely from her analysis was an acknowledgement that the West's invasion of Iraq in
2003, and its subsequent occupation, had any role whatsoever in fomenting the
conditions which gave rise to ISIS.4

3

Julie Bishop, Address to 2015 Annual Dinner, Sydney Institute, 27 April 2015 http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2015/jb_sp_150427.aspx?ministerid=4;
Brendan Nicholson, 'We'll fight radical Islam for 100 years, says ex-army head Peter Leahy',
The Australian, 9 August 2014 - http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/defence/well-fight-radical-islam-for-100-years-says-exarmy-head-peter-leahy/storye6frg8yo-1227018630297;
Bernard Keane, 'Retracing our steps on the march into Iraq', Crikey, 28 August 2014 http://www.crikey.com.au/2014/08/28/retracing-our-steps-on-the-march-into-iraq;
Bernard Keane, 'Brandis goes Left Bank in his search for terror hype', Crikey, 16 September
2014 - http://www.crikey.com.au/2014/09/16/brandis-goes-left-bank-in-his-search-for-terrorhype;
Bernard Keane, 'Blaming an Arab: Julie Bishop's guide to the War on Terror', Crikey, 28 April
2015 - http://www.crikey.com.au/2015/04/28/blaming-an-arab-julie-bishops-guide-to-the-waron-terror;
Brendan Nicholson, 'Islamic state bid for chemical weapons', The Australian, 6 June 2015 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/islamic-state-bid-for-chemical-weapons/storyfnpdbcmu-1227385413494;
Brendan Nicholson, 'Islamic State's quest for dirty bomb: Bishop', The Australian, 9 June
2015 - http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/islamic-states-quest-for-dirty-bombjulie-bishop/story-fnpdbcmu-1227388878980;
See also Bernard Keane, 'Australian neocons on the march back to Iraq', Crikey, 3 June 2015
- http://www.crikey.com.au/2015/06/03/keane-australian-neocons-on-the-march-back-to-iraq;
See also Nafeez Ahmed, 'Ex-intel officials: Pentagon report proves US complicity in ISIS',
Insurge Intelligence, 2 June 2015 - https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/ex-intel-officialspentagon-report-proves-us-complicity-in-isis-fabef96e20da
4
There are many excellent analyses, one of the best on this point is Patrick Cockburn, The
Occupation: War And Resistance In Iraq (Verso, London 2007).
See also Noam Chomsky, 'America paved the way for ISIS', Salon.com. 15 February 2015 http://www.salon.com/2015/02/16/noam_chomsky_america_paved_the_way_for_isis_partner/

Also omitted from her account were the financial contributions of Saudi, Kuwaiti and
Qatari elites to their Sunni co-religionists, presumably because they are now
pretending to be allies of the West in this latest Babylonian struggle. Turkey's porous
borders, across which oil, arms and militants freely flow into ISIS-held territory, also
fails to gain a mention.
Instead, it is the democratic uprisings in North Africa and the Persian Gulf in 2010 and
2011 which produced fertile conditions for the rise of ISIS. According to the foreign
minister,
The Arab Spring for all its potential as an example of grass roots democracy
movements rising up against authoritarian regimes, in fact left behind chaos and
instability - creating a breeding ground for terrorist cells. One of the most brutal was Al
Qaeda in Iraq under the ruthless leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was
among the first to use beheadings as a tool of terror.
The mystery of who al-Zarqawi was actually fighting in Iraq is not explained by Ms
Bishop, presumably because the illegal invasion and occupation by Western military
forces remains taboo in the polite circles of the Sydney Institute. It cannot be easy
delivering a major speech on the war against ISIS without mentioning what was
happening in the country between 2003 and 2011. Or how so many former members
of Saddam Hussein's army ended up fighting for ISIS.5
However dubious her historical narrative, Bishop's invocation of the Arab Spring is
nevertheless a perspicacious lens through which to examine the relationship between
the West and radical Islam. It reveals a very different history to the one framed by
official orthodoxy, and tells us a good deal more about the main currents of
contemporary US foreign policy than the moral panic which currently prevails.
The Arab Spring, Islamists and the West
In the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, conservatives and statists expressed
concern about the rise of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in post-Mubarak Egypt - as
if the 1979 Iranian revolution was about to be reprised. To their great relief, the military
coup and counter-revolution led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, strongly backed by
Washington, soon restored the status quo ante.
Orthodox narratives in the West argued that the war on terror was another chapter in
Washingtons long-standing opposition to Islamic fundamentalism. Although the United
States always encourages the spread of democracy, regrettably it must sometimes
support dictatorships in the Middle East because they maintain regional stability,

5

John Brennan, Director of the CIA, was more honest when he conceded that "we have to
recognise that sometimes our engagement and direct involvement will stimulate and spur
additional threats to our national security interests". See Jon Schwarz, 'CIA Director John
Brennan Admits U.S. Foreign Policy Could Spur Terrorism', The Intercept, 7 June 2015 https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/06/cia-director-john-brennan-admits-killing-peoplecountries-might-make-want-kill-us.

support the Wests counter-terrorism strategy, and the alternatives - Islamists such as
those in Iran, southern Lebanon and Gaza are always much worse for Western
interests.6
According to this counter-terrorism message, the rapid overthrow of democracy in
Egypt and the restoration of military rule was necessary to thwart and reverse the rise
of Islamists to power in the most significant state within the Arab world. Unsurprisingly,
the West's most recent intervention in Iraq's sectarian conflict - the war against ISIS in
the north of the country and in Syria - is also presented as a continuation of this
struggle against religious extremists and terrorism.7
If governments are to maintain public support for their military ventures, war narratives
must be kept simple and consistent. The underlying message since 2001 must not
change: the West is always the innocent victim of terrorism, never its perpetrator.
Two questions arise from the response of leading Western states to the Arab Spring in
North Africa and the Middle East. The answers tell a very different story about the
West's attitude to Islamic fundamentalism since the 1950s.
What precisely was being stabilised in countries such as Egypt? If nothing else, the
Arab Spring demonstrated not only the limitations of realist theory with its uncritical
faith in power and stability, but also the morality of supporting dictators who repress
and immiserate their populations. Navely, the West thought that deals struck with
corrupt and brutal local elites who ignored the legitimate aspirations of their peoples,
would hold indefinitely. Despite billions spent on intelligence gathering and military
bribes, the stunning events which broke out across the region in 2010 and intensified
the following year, took them completely by surprise.
Significantly, none of the rebellions against pro-Western tyrants was inspired by the
West. In fact they were fiercely opposed by Washington and the government of what
professes to be the only democracy in the Middle East Israel. These were
endogenous revolutions.
Washingtons remaining regional clients, those in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
watched these developments in horror. They soon realised that when domestic
pressure for reform becomes politically organised, the United States will abandon them
to an ominous and uncertain fate. Unsurprisingly, they responded with a mixture of
bribery and repression, without any meaningful expressions of concern from their
Western backers.
Why must Arabs only vote for political groups that are acceptable to the West?
Engendering a panic by portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as yet another bogeymen

6

For an excellent historiography of US foreign policy, see Perry Anderson, American Foreign
Policy And Its Thinkers (Verso, London 2015).
7
See Patrick Cockburn, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising (OR Books,
New York 2014).
On Syria, see Charles Glass, Syria Burning: ISIS and the Death of the Arab Spring (OR
Books, New York 2015).

for the West, reeked of neo-colonialism a never ending attempt to shape the political
destiny of others. For conservatives its a difficult habit to shake. As in the case of
Gaza when Hamas was elected to power in 2006, it appears that democracy in North
Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Levant is only a good thing if the right people come to
power.
Those in Tahrir Square who risked their lives for a democratic future in 2011 will not
quickly forget that in the critical hours of their struggle, Washington maintained its
support for Mubarak until popular protests rendered that policy untenable. This follows
a pattern established with Marcos, Suharto, Chun, Duvalier and other former clients of
the US. Egyptians understood that despite its lofty rhetoric, Washington was more
interested in the countrys peace treaty with Israel and keeping the Suez Canal open,
than it was in supporting a democratic transition in the country.
In this particular case, America's posture completed a full circle. From dogged support
for the Mubarak dictatorship to sudden champion of the democratic tide, it soon
returned to its traditional stance - backing military rule and the reversal of democratic
gains painfully, if only temporarily won by the Egyptian people. There is no better
illustration of Washington's flexible attitude to democracy than its policy towards Egypt
between 2011 and 2013.
Washington and Islamists
A third question is more important to answer if we are to fully explain the Wests policy
response to these events, and those that preceded them. Is the anti-fundamentalist
narrative, which Washington consistently espouses as the foundation of its approach
to the Muslim world, grounded in historical truth? Has the United States always had a
problem with Islamists?
Since the 1950s, the US has paved the way for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism by
using its most extreme reactionary elements to attack secular nationalism across the
Muslim world, from Egypt to Afghanistan. This is not because Washington prefers
political theocrats, but because it dislikes independent, nationalist governments even
more.
According to Noam Chomsky, "the failure of secular nationalism, which was both
internal and external, and was strongly attacked from the outside, left a vacuum, and I
think to an extent the vacuum was filled by Islamic fundamentalism".8 So why do
outsiders, those is the West, consistently pave the way for Islamic extremists?
Islamic fundamentalists represent the greatest danger to those modernising secular
governments in the Islamic world which want to pursue an independent course of
economic development. Washington has rarely hesitated to back militants with money
and arms, regardless of local popular opinion or the extreme positions of the recipients

8

Noam Chomsky & Gilbert Achcar, Perilous Power: The Middle East And US Foreign Policy
(Hamish Hamilton, London 2007), p.27.

of US arms and money.9

Using the Saudi model to counter nationalism, communism and various secular leftwing and progressive currents in the region, Washingtons policies frequently left a
vacuum which was predictably filled by the Islamic fundamentalists it claimed to be
opposing.
Here are just eight examples where Washingtons opposition to secular nationalism
and support for militant Islamists has been decisive:
Opposition to President Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt in the 1950s
Overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953
Opposition to Prime Minister Abdul-Karim Qassem in Iraq in 1963
Support for General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan through the 1980s
Support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980s
Overthrow of President Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003
Overthrow of General Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011
Attempts to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria since 2011
In almost every country where Washington now claims to confront radical anti-Western
Islamists, it either supported groups just like them to overthrow secular nationalists or
inadvertently cleared the way for the rise of Islamists by undermining or overthrowing
secular governments. Riding the Islamist horse may have seemed the best way to
prosecute the Cold War in the Middle East and Central Asia, but to suggest the
implications of this strategy were not fully thought through fails to capture the scale of
the catastrophes that have ensued ever since.10
As Patrick Cockburn, William Dalrymple, Noam Chomsky and many others analysts
have noted, the rise of ISIS, and its predecessor organisation Al Qaeda in Iraq, was a
direct result of Washington's destruction of Iraq's sectarian balance and secular
government after the invasion in 2003, consolidated by the subsequent occupation of
the country.11

9

See Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How The United States Helped Unleash
Fundamentalist Islam (Owl Books, New York 2005).
See also, William Blum, America's Deadliest Export: Democracy (Zed Books, London 2013).
10
On Afghanistan, see Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban,
and the War through Afghan Eyes (Picador, London 2015).
On Libya, see Hassan Morajea & Erin Cunningham,, ' Libyan gains may offer ISIS a base for
new attacks', The Washington Post, 6 June, 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-libyas-civil-war-the-islamic-state-showsitself-as-the-main-threat/2015/06/06/65766592-0879-11e5-951e8e15090d64ae_story.html?hpid=z1
11
Noam Chomsky, 'The Sledehammer Worldview', Truthout, 7 July 2014 - http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/24796-noam-chomsky-the-sledgehammer-worldview
See also Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (William Collins, London
2015), ch.1.

Although Western leaders keen to bomb and escalate in Iraq again would prefer the
connection and history was forgotten, there is no escaping the fact that Washington,
London, Canberra and others played midwife at the birth of ISIS and a range of other
militant groups now traumatising Iraq and Syria. They do it again and again, most
recently, in Libya which was supposed to be a showcase of humanitarian
intervention.12
Is this irony or paradox? Stupidity, carelessness or indifference?
Given Washingtons long-standing political and financial support for fundamentalists
across the Muslim world, how seriously should we take its post 9/11 confrontation with
radical Islam? Its complex relationship with the extreme Islamists running Saudi Arabia
is a good starting point for analysis, however that bilateral relationship cannot explain
a pattern of behaviour which extends across the Arab world, Persia, Central Asia and
the sub-continent.
One explanation for these events argues that Washington has been the victim of
blowback: the unintended consequences of earlier policies, a CIA thesis popularised
by the late Chalmers Johnson. Between 1950 and 1990 anti-Communism trumped all
other considerations, so the consequences of supporting religious zealots was not
understood until it was too late. Washington is guilty of navet and short term thinking,
of having to make a number of invidious choices, but little else.13
This argument, shared by many realists who emphasise power and stability above all
other considerations, almost forms a consensus on the left. However, it is ultimately
unconvincing because it fails to account for the underlying motivation behind US
foreign policy over the last six decades.
This blowback argument absolves and conceals Washingtons responsibility for the
rise of Islamic fundamentalism. It allows the US to present itself as a victim of its own
best intentions but a victim nonetheless. In truth Washington knew exactly what the
Wahhabis, Muslim Brotherhood, Mujahideen and Taliban were like, and the
consequences of supporting them. It didnt care or, more likely, it didnt mind. They
were an effective antidote to the appeal of secular nationalists and communists, so
they were used. America also likes the fact that Islamists tend to be state capitalists,
opposing in principle class-based politics. Islam is, after all, a pro-capitalist religion and
the perfect foil to secular socialism.14
Washingtons real enemy since the 1950s has been called radical, or more

12

See Hassan Morajea & Erin Cunningham,, 'Libyan

gains may offer ISIS a base for new
'
attacks', The Washington Post, 6 June, 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-libyas-civil-war-the-islamic-state-showsitself-as-the-main-threat/2015/06/06/65766592-0879-11e5-951e8e15090d64ae_story.html?hpid=z1
13
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (Time
Warner, London 2002).
14
See Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How The United States Helped Unleash
Fundamentalist Islam (Owl Books, New York 2005), ch.7.

accurately, independent nationalism especially economic nationalism. Mostly this

was secular (eg Nasser in Egypt), though in the case of Iran after 1979, for example, it
was religious. This is the most important and consistent current running through US
foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.
The same approach fashioned US policy towards communists in Vietnam, the Allende
regime in Chile, Castro in Cuba, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Saddam in Iraq, etc,
etc,. Friends and enemies of the US during the Cold War were not determined by the
strategic threat they posed (which with the exception of the USSR was mostly
negligible), but by the extent to which they complemented Washingtons global
economic needs, including trade and resource access, opportunities for foreign
investment and the capacity to repatriate profits.15
Those states which exhibited nationalist priorities and refused to play by Washingtons
rules, such as those in the Soviet bloc, were a danger to the health of the US economy
and therefore considered enemies. They posed a threat to an open world economy,
and just as importantly, represented an example of an alternative model of economic
development which was antithetical to Washington's. Inevitably they became victims of
Washington's promiscuous interventions.
Once China opened itself up to capitalist enterprise in the 1980s it was removed from
the enemies list despite remaining politically communist. The same happened to
Vietnam after businessmen from Europe arrived, and presumably the same will now
be true for Cuba.
To complement and control
The crucial factor in explaining Western policy towards the Arab and Muslim worlds,
therefore, is not whether nationalism in these countries was secular or religious, but
that it was independent. The propaganda cover communism, "democracy" or
terrorism - simply reflected the most utilitarian discourse of the day. Whichever
approach lent itself most effectively to domestic opinion management would be used,
though fear has been a consistent theme. Washington is not primarily concerned about
ideologies or religious convictions per se. Fundamentally, it is concerned about control
and disobedience. Independence amongst the vassals has always been its biggest
worry.
A similar fear has shaped Israel's policy towards the Palestinians and the region.
When the most important nationalist force in the Palestinian territories was the secular
PLO, it supported Hamas as a countervailing political movement. Israel was not
concerned by Hamas's Islamist ideology. When Hamas emerged as a significant
political player in Gaza, Israel reverted to backing the more pliable and compromised
PLO. Again the discourse of "terrorism" and "Islamic fundamentalism" - whether it is
directed at Hamas, Iran or Hezbollah - is little more than a pretext to sell policies which

15

See for example Joyce & Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States
Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (Harper & Row, New York 1972) and Gabriel Kolko, Confronting
The Third World: United State Foreign Policy 1945-1980 (Pantheon, New York 1988).

derive from other concerns. What counts is who can and cannot be controlled.16
Washington is currently backing the world's most extreme Islamist state, Saudi Arabia,
and its equally undemocratic Gulf allies, in a vicious war against Houthis in Yemen.
Predictably this is another civilian catastrophe, though undoubtedly a blessing for Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula which is based there. In what some consider a proxy
struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Washington is unconcerned by Riyadh's
sponsorship of Sunni militancy, and that was the case previously, whether the money
was spent in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Iraq. State terrorism, whether it is delivered by
US-made drones targeted by the CIA or US-supplied fighter bombers flown by Saudi
pilots is, after all, one and the same crime.
This particular approach to global politics has always extended well beyond the Middle
East. Hypocrisy and double standards tend to prevail everywhere.
Turkey is allowed to invade and illegally occupy northern Cyprus since 1974 without
sanctions imposed by the West. It remains an important member of NATO and a close
partner of Washington in its wars against Iraq. Outside of Greece and the Greek
Cypriot community, its invasion and occupation is largely forgotten and rarely raised.
Similarly, Israel is only able to illegally colonise the West Bank and Golan Heights, and
blockade Gaza, with the explicit political and financial support of Washington. In fact
the US is so deeply implicated in Palestine's misery, it is more accurate to refer to the
joint Israel-US occupation of the territories.
However, when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea with a much more compelling
strategic rationale than Turkey could muster with Cyprus, it was immediately subject to
harsh economic sanctions and other penalties. Putin is demonised for his irredentism,
and said to be brain damaged and set on a course for war with the West. There is little,
if any mention of NATO's eastward expansion or the economic lure being set for
Ukraine by the European Union. The lesson is clear. Play by the rules and like Turkey
and Israel, you will be allowed to maintain your illegal occupation of other peoples'
land. On the other hand, you defy the West at your peril. It is always about
obedience.17

16

See Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How The United States Helped Unleash
Fundamentalist Islam (Owl Books, New York 2005), ch.8;
Most recently, see Norman G. Finkelstein, Method and Madness: The hidden story of Israel's
assaults on Gaza (OR Books, New York 2014) and Noam Chomsky & Ilan Papp, On
Palestine (Haymarket Books, Chicago 2015).
17
On Cyprus, see Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to
Kissinger (Verso, London 1997).
On Russia-Ukraine, see the work of Stephen Cohen in The Nation and interviews in
Salon.com, 17 April 2015 & 24 April 2015. See also Stephen F. Cohen, Soviet Fates And Lost
Alternatives (Columbia University Press, New York 2011), ch.7 and epilogue.
Most recently see also Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis In The Borderlands (I.B.
Tauris, London 2015).

Our responsibilities
Amongst the media commentary ascribing contemporary terrorism to some
deformation of Islam by an extremist minority, the most important question is
assiduously ignored: what responsibility does the Western world bear for creating the
conditions which have resulted in the attacks we have seen recently in Ottawa, Sydney
and Paris? After all, we are responsible for the predictable consequences of our
actions, a responsibility that extends to the policy choices of our governments to the
extent that we live in an accountable democratic state. We are not responsible for the
actions of others over whom we have limited if any influence.18
For our political leaders the answer to this question is easy: none.
Echoing John Howard after the 9/11 attacks, when Prime Minister Tony Abbott
announced last September that Australia was committing military forces against ISIS in
Iraq, he claimed that
these terrorists and would-be terrorists are not targeting us for what we have done or
for what we might do, they are targeting us for who we are, they are targeting us for
our freedom, our tolerance, for our compassion, for our decency (my emphasis).
Abbott's rationale repeats the presupposition at the basis of Western approaches: we
are always the innocent victims of terrorism, never its perpetrator. We have nothing to
explain, change or apologise for.19
This view, popularised by leaders after 9/11 and almost every subsequent terrorist
attack, is not shared by those in Western governments charged with examining this
very issue.
In 2004 Donald Rumsfeld directed the Defence Science Board Task Force to review
the impact of the Bush Administration's policies, specifically the effects that its wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq were having on terrorism and the radicalisation of Muslims.
The report's conclusions were damning. The "underlying sources of threats to
America's national security" were "negative attitudes" towards the United States in the
Muslim world and "the conditions that create them". These conditions included
"American direct intervention in the Muslim world" through its "one sided support in
favour of Israel", support for tyrannies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and, primarily, "the
American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan." These occupations were seen to "be
motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve
American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self-determination".
Strikingly, the Department of Defence report came to precisely the opposite conclusion

18

See Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the
Standards of the West (Verso, London 2000), pp.8-9.
19
See Bernard Keane, 'Abbotts (and Shortens) lies lead Australia to a sinister place', Crikey,
23 September 2014 - http://www.crikey.com.au/2014/09/23/abbotts-and-shortens-lies-leadaustralia-to-a-sinister-place; and Bernard Keane, 'The War on Terror according to the CIA:
endless, self-perpetuating', Crikey, 13 April 2015 - http://www.crikey.com.au/2015/04/13/thewar-on-terror-according-to-the-cia-endless-self-perpetuating

from John Howard, Tony Abbott and before them George W. Bush, specifically that
"Muslims do not 'hate our freedom,' but rather, they hate our policies."20
Six years later, a similar view was expressed at an inquiry into the Iraq war held in the
United Kingdom. When Baroness Manningham-Buller, Director-General of the Security
Service (MI5) from 2002 to 2007, was asked how significant the Iraq war was in
radicalising British Muslims, she replied that in her view it was "highly significant":
Our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word, a whole generation of
young people who saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in
Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam.
In evidence before the inquiry Manningham-Buller said young British Muslims "saw the
West's activities in Afghanistan and Iraq as threatening their fellow religionists and the
Muslim world [which in turn] increased the threat [to British civilians]".21
By positioning ourselves on a moral summit from which we can look down upon those
who do not reach our giddy standards, a sense of superiority may help focus our
attention on confronting violent fanatics and other miscreants. However as the
evidence from our defence and security establishment notes, just because Western
state terrorism remains a non-subject at home, does not mean it goes unnoticed
abroad.22
While responsibility for acts of politically-motivated violence rest squarely with those
who commit them, it takes a willfully ignorant and dangerously nave view of global
politics to believe that Islamists have no grievances worthy of consideration.
This does not mean that we can easily put an end to anti-Western terrorism. That is far
too ambitious given the revolt against the West dates from the period of European
colonialism.23 Or that the West is always to blame for each and every act of violence.
Our crimes and the grievances they produce should, however, be addressed to
undermine the appeal that violent jihad holds for young, alienated Muslim men across
the world. We may not be able to dissuade the deeply indoctrinated, but we would be
foolish not to target the undecided who might be swayed either way.
Simultaneously, we can restore some of our own moral and political credibility, which
has been severely tarnished in recent years.
What have we done?
What are the most pressing issues? Here are eight which challenge Mr Abbott's claims

20

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September
2004 - http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf
21
Manningham-Buller's testimony at the Iraq Inquiry
(http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx) http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/48331/20100720am-manningham-buller.pdf
22
See Alexander George (ed), Western State Terrorism (Polity Press, Cambridge 1991) and
Cihan Aksan & Jon Bailes (eds), Weapons of the Strong: Conversations on US State
Terrorism (Pluto Press, London 2013).
23
See Hedley Bull, Justice in International Relations, 1983-4 Hagey Lectures, University of
Waterloo, Ontario 1984.

about our "tolerance", "compassion" and "decency".

- Details about the torture of innocent Muslims by the CIA and their detention without
trial at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have been partially disclosed in the US
Congress. However, none of the torturers are to be prosecuted for their horrific crimes,
only the whistleblower who exposed them.
- The illegal invasion of Iraq and the destruction of Iraqi society by the US, UK,
Australia and others in 2003, followed by a decade-long occupation of the country,
created the preconditions for ISIS. There is no official acknowledgement of this, nor the
hundreds and thousands of deaths and injuries caused by the war, or the war crimes
committed in Fallujah (November 2004) and elsewhere during the occupation. Such is
the absolution afforded by righteous power.
- The longest war in US history against Afghanistan (2001-15) achieved virtually
nothing, except for the harm it caused to the population. Al Qaeda has re-spawned
and relocated, whilst the Taliban is once again a formidable political and military force
in the country and will remain so into the future. By outlasting the West, they won.
- The ongoing murder of innocent civilians in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan by US
pilotless drones. A lot of secrecy surrounds these attacks, so there is little if any
accountability for them, though popular anger helps to maintain support for groups
such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Dirty wars do not make many friends, but
they do produce more determined enemies.24
- US and Australian governments enabling (and cheerleading) Israel's regular attacks
on Gaza's population, resulting in thousands of dead, injured and homeless
Palestinians. No protests or marches by Western politicians followed these attacks,
instead doubt was cast by the Australian Government that the West Bank and
Jerusalem were even "occupied" territory. Meanwhile, Palestinians who eschew
violence and pursue membership of the UN and the ICC to try and resolve the conflict,
are punished by Israel and America for treading the diplomatic path.
- Western support for corrupt, fundamentalist tyrannies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
Bahrain. Despite what the populations of these countries must endure (beheadings,
amputations, floggings, dictatorial rule, unfree media, few rights for women, etc), these
are our favoured fundamentalists (and trading partners), and therefore beyond
criticism - even when they attack their neighbour.
- The ongoing bombing campaign by the airforces of the West against ISIS in Iraq will
only enrage those who see the military power of the West yet again deployed against
Muslims. As always, the bombings will be ineffective, indecisive and will only engender
sympathy and further support for the victims. The attacks will also produce revenge
attacks in the West which, inexplicably, will shock our governments every time. The
obvious lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq has not been learned: there are no military
solutions to the many challenges the West faces around the world. Escalation, now
being pushed by the usual ex-military and media suspects, will be a catastrophic
failure as it has been in the past.

24

Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is A Battlefield (Nation Books, New York 2013).

- The charnel house that is Syria, with hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries
since 2011, does not exercise the self-proclaimed moral conscience of the West. Like
Palestine, Syria have little to offer the West, is aligned with Russia, and therefore does
not count as a concern. There is to be no humanitarian relief for them, just illegal
bombing campaigns which mysteriously keep killing innocent civilians.
By no means a definitive list, these eight factors help to shape the view of many
Muslims towards the Western world. We can never assuage the concerns of each
fanatic in every country, however addressing legitimate grievances for which we bear
direct responsibility is an unavoidable first step towards undermining the attraction of
politically motivated, religiously inspired violence.
To get to this point we must dismiss the moral panicking which governments contrive
and their commissars in the media uncritically amplify. An honest, factual and historical
account of the relationship between radical Islam and the foreign policy of the Western
world will serve our interests better.